1

Th N t

f A l i d Ethi

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Th t
" l i d thi"
d it
" t i l
thi"
it
i h
1970
h
h i l h
d th
d i
b
t
dd
i
l
bl
i
it
di
f i l
thi ( i l l
d i l thi
d b i
thi) P i t
l th
d
bti
t h i
th
t
ti
fh
d i l
bjt i
h
i
i
f f t i
ti
acceptable risk in the workplace the legal enforcement of morality civil disobedi
ence unjust war and the privacy of information

H i t i l

D i t th
t ii
f th t
" l i d thi"
i
t i
tht f
t
bjt
tt
b t d t
i t ti
F
l libti
t
blih
controversial opinions engage in civil disobedience commit suicide and choose
one's religious viewpoint are matters of perennial interest as are questions of unjust
wars and the moral status of animals Although moral philosophers have long
d i d th
bl
it i
bl th
tht
j
h i l h
t h h
t th h i t
f
l h i l h h d l d
thd f
lid
thi
M l
h i l h
h
tditill f l t d t h i
f th i h t h
d
d th i t
tht
t t i th
t
lt
A
til
i
i
id f thi t h t i l
lit it i
ll h
hth
d if
h
th
i t b
lid t
t
bli
li
ttl
l
bl
d d
t
i
t i l
It is not obvious that applied ethics is the offspring of or even dependent upon
general moral philosophy Its early successes in the 1970s owed more to arguments
directed at pressing and emerging moral problems in society than to traditional theor
i
f thi M
idiidl i l
h i l h i l
d t h l i l thi
litil
th
d th
f i
ildi
dii
b i
i i
d itifi
h d d d th
i
Th
idiidl
f d l
fftd b
i th
id
it
di i d i i d l l i b t i
il
lit
d
i
f
f b
dijti
d i t d t l b l
Th i
i d b iil
iht
' iht
i l i h t th
t th
i t l
1

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

t
d th i h t
f i
d th
t l l ill ft i l d d
thil
issues that stimulated the imagination of philosophers and nonphilosophers alike
(A volume that nicely illustrates the state of one area of interdisciplinary ethical
inquiry around 1970 is the massive compendium on research involving human
bjt
titld Experimentation with Human Beings [ K t 1972])
I th l t 1960
d
l 1970 h i l h
i i l
it
t t
ith
l f
th d i i l i
h
i t t d i
l
bl
ldi
th
f th h l t h
f i
l
b i
i i
d th
il
d b
h i l
i
P h
th
t i f l t i l f l d i th d l t
f
hl
l litt
i
l i d thi
l
d
l h i l h
M
bl
f
applied ethics have since been framed in the vocabularies of these two disciplines
This is not surprising since moral philosophy and law have common concerns over
matters of basic social importance and share various principles requirements and
iti
f id
L
i i
t th
bli'
f
t l t i
lit i t
liit
il
idli
d
ti
df tilti
i h t
f
ff
C
l
i
til
h
idd
d t
db i
t i l tht
i f l t i l i ll
f
l i d thi
D i
th 1970
d
l 1980
b
f h i l h
b
t fhi
their careers around interests in applied ethics an almost unprecedented develop
ment in a profession generally skeptical that "applied ethics" was either a scholarly
enterprise or had a future in the university The late 1970s and early 1980s saw
th
bliti
f
l b k d t d t h i l h i l t t t
f
bjt
l i d thi
Vitll
b k
blihd i
l i d thi
i t th l t
1970 h d b
id t i l l
th th
i t
f
l
i i l
h i l h i l t h i
Thi
itti
h d
idl i th l t 1970
d
1980

Problems of Definition
M

h i l h
h
i d
l i d thi
th t t t t i l t
ith
l
l
lt h i
ith th
l f
li
til
bl
Th
th
t
d
l i
t l tht
b
d t
i
th
l
bl
H
it i t d
ll
td tht
t i h t f d
tt
til j d t
i
ibl b
l ith t
l t h i
t
l
l i i l
( h
"O
ht
t t
t t
l
t th
d f t h " "O
ht t k
i " "O
ought not to inflict harm or risk of harm;" "One ought to treat people fairly and
with equal respect;" and "One ought to respect the autonomy of others") This s
the socalled gap between theory and practice Theory and principles must it
b
l t d i
b
di
f iht
ti
i i l
dt
i t i l
i
d th lik B t i
il
hih
()? Thi
ti h l
h " l i d thi" i
difflt
ti t
d t d
d df
A d i l
it
d b t f l tht
l i d thi i b t d f d
th
li
ti
f
l thil t h i
t
til
l
bl
( h l
th d f i t i
l

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

ffd
b G t 1982 5 1 2 ) Thi d f i i t i
i
tht
ill
t
recognize it as reflecting either the appropriate method or content of applied ethics
A weaker and more defensible view is that "applied ethics" refers to any use
of philosophical methods to treat moral problems practices and policies in the
f i
t h l
t
d th lik Thi b d
k
i t t t th l
f
l t h i
i i l
d d
t i i t
b l l i
th
l It
b th
t
d t d i
f th t
ithi th
f i
f h i l h
b t it
ld b i d
tid
h i l h
flti
i i f i t diili
bi
A d i f f t bi i f d i th id t h t " l i d t h i " i
ith
"professional ethics" Problems such as the allocation of scarce medical resources
unjust wars abortion conflicts of interest in surrogate decisionmaking hate
crimes pornography war and terrorism whistleblowing the entrapment of public
ffiil
i t t i l
jti
h
i l
d th
fidtilit
f
t i f t i
t d b d
f i l
d t
t ll
t i
i th
d i
f
l i d thi
Th
t l
ti
b t th
t
f" l i d
thi"
l d t
idti
f b t h th
t t
d th
thd f
l i d thi

Problems of Moral Content

Th

i f l t i l t
f
h
d i th l i t t
th
it
f
t t i
l i d thi
i t l
t
t l
t
d
i d i t l t l
t Th
t i
fit
f h i d f th
l i
f
f i l
thi
b t th
b
l i d t th
h
i t i t t i l
d
thi
f ll t
Th fit d f d
thi d i d f
f i l
i t i t t i l
ti
t d d
Th
d
iti
tht
t i
tti
f
l i d thi
l
d
i jtifiti
b
external standards such as those of public opinion law the common morality
religious ethics and philosophical ethics The third claims that distinct forms of
t i l thi internal t
f i
d ititti
t h l
d l
i f l d b b d
( t l )
l t l
f
k
Internalism
S

h i l h
h
i t i d tht tblihd
ti
id th
i
f
t i l thi I f l t i l i thi l i t t
i Aldi M l t '
f
"practice" to designate a cooperative arrangement in pursuit of goods that are
internal to a structured communal life He holds that "goods internal to a practice"
such as those found in the professions are achievable only by engaging n the
ti
d
f i
t it t d d
f
ll
S t d d i t l t th
f i
t h f
d t i
h t it
t b
d
titi
E h
f i
h
hit
d
ifi h t
tht
ti
tditi
ii
f i l
t
l t i t it i t
(Mlt
1984 17 175 187 1 9 0 2 0 3 )
H d
B d
d F k Mill
ff
f
f i t l i
t
l i th
f d t i
f
d i l thi

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Physicians by virtue of becoming socialized into the medical profession accept alle
i
t
t f
l l
h i h dfi th
t
f dil
ti Th
l
i ri t t l t
f th
l dti i b t
hii
i thi
f i l
l
d i d i t th i t
t hii
Th professional integrity of physicians is constituted by allegiance to this internal morality (Brody and
Mill 1998 386)
These writers and others like them maintain that moral frameworks in the profes
sions derive from rolespecific duties and professional virtues
N
bl d i t t h t
f i l
l i
t
l bliti
didl H
i t l
lit
t i l
tb
d t l
h i
h t
ll
t b l Trditi
d
f i l
t d d
t
f
l d
d
f t t l
f i l
d i
dii
b i
j l i
i i
d th fild ft
ilif
l
i t
k th
idfibl
iid
li
lt
d th
ity than they are entitled to claim
Brody and Miller address this problem by distinguishing between the core moral
norms appropriate to a profession and the dogmatic and unsystematic provisions
f d i
d
f
f i l
thi A th
it
i t l
lit
d hld
l i th f
f
il h
"Even the core f
dil
lit
t b thhtfll
l t d
d
t t d
t i t l
d th
t t i
ill b
id
t b th
h li i
d
it
h
i i t b l
i f l d b
itl
l
th i t t th h i t " ( B d
d Mill
1998
3 9 3 4 397
h i
ddd)
T h h
t thi i
i ftl t i t l i
It h
tht i t l
t d d
may be shallow and expendable whereas some external standards are deep and
essential Even current practice standards might be weak and insupportable We
also know from recent history that a meaningful reconstruction of traditional pro
f i l
di t i t t i l
liti t
dt
l t l h
i
likl t
b
l t th i t l
t d d
f
f i l
lit
C i d
thi h i t i l
l I th l t 1960 th b k A Time to Speak: On
Human Values and Social Research b
il
h l i t H b t Kl
b
lihd j t
b
f
t i l
f d
f b
fh
bjt
b
i l i t i t (Kl
1968) K l '
b k
d th
f t i d
k
ll l t i
i l i t i t t th f t t h t th h d
i
d f i i i
in standards of research ethics Careful attention was subsequently paid to the
moral judgments that psychologists should make in carrying out their research and
to the many defects of standards in the then prevailing practices Problems were
f d i
ti
h
th
i t l d t i
f b j t th
llti
f
dt
i
i d i i d l l idtifibl f
d th
f
fiil
i
ti
t
bti
bjt
It b
l
t h t th
ili
ti
t d d
d t
t dd
th
ti
Externalism
A th
t i l

t l
b
t t
lit? A
t l

t i t l
lit i

t d d
tht i

f i l
t

d itit
d l

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

tht
ti
l t
t th
f
i t l
lit P b l i
ii
law religious institutions and philosophical ethics have all served (whether justifi
ably or not) as sources of external morality
One influential answer in philosophy to the question of which external source is
t
i t i t h t t h i l th
id th
it b i f
lid
thi A
l i f d i th
k fB d G t
dD
Cl
Th
i t i tht t
k
dj d t
i
l i d thi th
t b "
i l
i f d t h i l t h " Th
l f t h i th
i t
id "
f
k
h i h ll f th d i t i
ti
"
d t
i
"id
i t
tht
tititil
ll l " Th b l i
t h t t h i th
will alert attentive persons to issues of applied ethics identify the morally relevant
features of circumstances determine the difference between morally acceptable and
unacceptable solutions to problems and show which conditions are necessary and
f f i t t j t i f th
ilti
f
l
l (Cl
d G t 1990
2 3 1 2 f G t t l 1997
3 6 1519)
Gt
d Cl
d
t h l d t h t th
i
l
li
it
t l
t d d f
f i l
thi O l t h i th
d
ll th
t h i
ftll f l d
di b l
f
d di
P
t
f th t h i
ll
assume a similar partisan stance Independent of this confusion over whether one
particular theory is morally authoritative it is often unclear whether and if so
how a philosophical theory is to be used to criticize internal standards or address a
diffilt
l
bl
If
ld b
fidt tht
t h i l th
lid h
b t b i
ld
k
t t i l
til
d li
ti
b
i l
ki th
i t h t th
ifi H
t
t
h
h th
d
l
it tht
th
f thi
d i
ti
i likl t
B t h ithi
d i t h t h i l h th t h i
tht i
f
t t d th th
i t t
f th
il
lit
f
h i h th
i
E
if
idiidl i
i d tht
til
theory is correct (authoritative) he or she needs to deal responsibly with the fact
that other morally serious and informed individuals reject this conviction
Skepticism about the practical relevance of theory is not surprising in light of the
f t tht h i l h
h
tditill tid t
li
d jtif
lit t
lif
l
t t
i h
lj d t
d
t
d
d t
b i
i i l
f
l
t t
ti t h i
t
l
til
l
bl
d l i t
d
f
f i l
thi
G l
t h i
ill i t d
ll
itd f
til
kb
th
dd
h i l h i l
bl
tht
i t h l
d i d f
ti
Althh b t
l
ity philosophical theories are primarily attempts to understand or unify morality
not attempts to specify its practical commitments
Mixed interncdism and externalism

A thid t
f
bth i t l i
d
t
i l t d
f th
f i
d

h t th
t t f
lid thi i
t l i
It t t
ith th
iti
i difft
i di
lt
th t t d i t i t t i
b d b

t
tht
d

t
l

f
it

M b
l t d d
ht
5

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

fid t
l b thi
b h i ( i t l
l i t ) b t l b th
moral standards of the broader culture or community (an external morality) The
authority to practice is itself granted by society on the condition that its professions
and institutions will in a responsible manner be educated in and adhere to the high
l t d d
td b tht
i t If
f i
d ititti
td t
f
thi
ti
t h t th
ili
l l
f th l
it
ill b h d
i
ti Th
il t d d
di t th
t
ti
ill
f
it t
it I t l
liti i th
f i
ill
dil b
th
i i i f i t
d d t
th
t l
liti
A theory of this description has been advanced by H Tristram Engelhardt He
holds that profound disagreement exists about the nature and requirements of
professional practice across larger communities such as Orthodox Judaism Roman
Cthlii
Hidi
d
l
h i
There is no way to discover either a canonical contentfull secular morality or the
t
ll
ttfll
lti
t t
h th
t b d b th
lit f h d
l ii t h t bid
lf i d M l t
d
t
see the world in the same way Moral strangers [cannot] resolve contentfull moral
t i
b
d t i l
t M l fid
th th h d
di
idl
h d h
h
i i
(Elhdt
d Wild 1994 136
l 13547)
A d i
t E l h d t
ttfll
lit
difft
iti
Th
t l k f Othd
Jdi
f
l d t i
ht i
t
bl
tbl
l f tht
ti
f th J i h
ti
hih
t it
dititi
F
thi
ti
l t d d
f ht i blit
d
permissible for professionals in medicine politics law and business derive from the
more general moral commitments of a larger community beyond the narrower
community of professionals
Th d
lthi t
k i thi
t i k t i l th
btti
f d t i
f
l
l i d thi
d lki
h f d t i
th
f d t i
f
t f
l i d thi
th th h i t i l
t i
iti N i t l
lit
it
t i th
t l
lit f
til
lt
(Elhdt
d Wild 1994 1 3 7 8 E l h d t 1 9 9 6 1 0 5 2 4 )
Thi
t h
i i h t i t th
lti
bt
t l
d i t l
liti
b t it h
k
B
h i i
d i i t
it i
t
overlook basic similarities; that is to neglect the core of near identical moral goals
interests and commitments that exist among welltrained professionals from differ
t
l t l b k d
F
l
h i i
ll
th
ld h
l
d t h i
fhli
lliti
hbilitti
i d i f t
di
ti t t i
d th lik Th
i
h d
l i i t (h
iitd)
d
h d
f
f i l
ti
th
iti
P d i l l
thi th
l
tt
th d
f h d
t ithi
"th
iti
f
l f i d " tht f
th
i
f th
t
Th th
ii
h i
i l
h d
ifit i
h
it

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

ff i d
hih
bl
tbl
d libl
t
di th
l f th
professions and professional ethics However in communities of almost any size
there exists a pluralism of viewpoint These communities are not lacking in sub
groups with different moral points of view and hopes to revise prevailing conditions
ti
d d C h i
i t
f b i t i
d t i
i d t i
liti
th
lti
f iil i h t
d th lik
k f flid
i t
th
iti
ith
t
dt
l
iti
Ath
k
i t h t thi
i d i t l i t t l i t
t fftil
ld
l t l tht i
it j d t
Th
lidit f
l
dj d t
d d
i thi
t
thi
d
t
b
nity; no transcendent principle warrants crosscultural appraisal It follows that
there are no universal human rights that protect individuals Human rights are by
definition valid claims that are justified by reference to morally relevant features of
h
bi
tb
f
t
l t d d
It i l d i f f l t t
h
i thi th
ll
td
bli
li i t
b f h i d i
lliti
i t It i
t
h
thi th
tf
i t
lii i
i t ititti
b t it i b i l i t t
li
tif
d iti
i
bli
li
k it
t ft h
ith th
d
ld d
bl t
apply ethics to our deepest social problems

Problems of Method and Justification

S l
dl
f
thd
ti
lld
thd
dl
f
tifti
h
b
d i d i
l i d thi
Th
f th
t i f l t i l
dl
t t d i thi
ti
Th
fit
dl
h jtifiti
d
thd f
t d
ti t h t
h i
l
d t h i l th
Th
d
approaches justification and method from a bottomup perspective that emphasizes
moral tradition experience and particular circumstances The third refuses to
assign priority to either a topdown or a bottomup strategy
Top-down models
I

th

fit
dl
iti
Thi
dl
f
t th
ll it
thd i l
li
t h t fll
d th
l Th
"applying" a rule:
ti

lid t
hih i t l l
ll
l l ( i i l
idl
flli
i th d d t i
f
i

ti
l
iht
i

it
t thik
t) t
l d i

1 Every act of description A is obligatory

2 At bi fd i t i
A T h f
3 At bi blit
Thi
d

dl
libl
b i l
d
d i
i
hih t h i

th
l
d

i l

f
j d t
b h t
ditl
i i l
b t it l
t l
libl
l i i l
j
i i t i thi

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

t d i t i l
ti
i t i t t i l
l
d
j d t
Whil
h i th
moral life conforms roughly to this conception of moral priority much does not
There are several problems with this moralpriority thesis First moral judgments
in hard cases almost always require that we make the norms themselves more
ifi (
th
ti
"Pbl
f S i f t i " b l ) bf
bi
til
i t
d
i
l
i i l
I th
f
ifi
di
ki
til
j d t
ft
t tk it
t f t l
blif
b t th
ld
l t l
tti
j d t
f likl
t
d
i
d t t h l fill t d i
iht t
l
i i l
d t h i
Th
i
l
l i i t i th
S d
th f t
f
itti
also be such that no general norm (principle or rule) clearly applies and the differ
ent moral norms that can be brought to bear on a set of facts may yield inconclu
sive results For example destroying a nonviable human embryo or fetus does not
l l
ilt
l
i t killi
d
d
th
l tht
h
iht t
t t bdil i t i t
d
t l l
l t thi
li
E
if
h
ft
t i h t th h i
fft
d th h i
f l tht
d
l t
ill
t
j d t tht i i t i b l
ith
th
' hi
fft
d l Slti
th i h t t f f t
db i i
th
right set of rules to bear on these facts are not reducible either to a deductive form
of judgment or to the resources of a general ethical theory
The topdown model also creates a potentially infinite regress of ustification a
di
d d
f fil j t i f i t i
b
h l l
f
l t
i
t
i
hih
l l t j t i f it If t d d
jtifid
til b h t
d
jtifid
i
t it
ld
th
ti
f thi
h t h t th
jtifid
i i l
j d t
I th
ld h d l thi
bl
b
ti
tht i
lfjtifi
t h t it i i t i l
t t hld b t
f tht
thi t t
d
t h t th j t i f
ll th
i i l
d l i
t d d
tht
t thil
theory is well equipped to meet
Bottom-up models
S
it
i
l i d thi
t thi
ttti
l
h
til
d i i
d
th th
l i i l
d t h i
Th
bli
tht
l
i
d jtifiti
d btt
t t d
Th
it t
f iti
il
t
d
ti
i i h t d i
l
d
ti
l i
th t t i i t
f
hih
commonly make moral decisions They also depict an evolving structure of moral
beliefs based on exemplary lives and narratives experience with hard cases and
analogy from prior practice
Btt
dl
ttill i l d
lditit
t h d l i
C i t
h
b
th
t idl d i d i
l i d thi b t
i
f
f
ti
t i l i
d th
thd
l
lif P
t
f th
h
l i i l
d i t i
i th
d
fk l d
t i
T h t i th
i
f t i
d iht f
i i l di
f
i
l t l
i
til
i t
(J
dT l i
1988) F
l
h i i
8

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

dd i t h d i
i
l i f i
t h l i
f
tit
t fi
missible killing But progressively after dealing with many agonizing cases they and
society came to frame many of these acts as forms of permissible allowing to die or
even as morally required acts of acknowledging refusals of treatment All practical
l l
b t killi
d ltti
di
i
d
f d
ti
th
b
th
i i l l
it i
l t l
ti
f idli
A
it'
l i
fid thi
tt h h
bddd
l tditi
d
t f
d
tht
it d
ft
iiht
d j d t
A
l
t th
thit
ti i
l i
ti
id t b t th h t
f thi
thd
h th d i i
f
jit
fj d
b
thitti
i
case the judgments in their decision are positioned to become authoritative for other
courts hearing cases with similar facts Defenders of bottomup reasoning see moral
authority as analogous: social ethics develops from a social consensus formed
d
hih
th b
t d d t
itht l
f th
ltd
l id
A
hit
f iil
d iil
d t
t
it b
i i l
f d t i it
l
l i
d
k l d
liti
( l
i i l ) i it
li
tditi
f
thil
flti
Case analysis which is central to casuistry has long been used in law schools
and business schools Training in the case method is widely believed to sharpen
skills of legal and business reasoning as well as moral reasoning One can tear a
t
d th
t t
btt
ft t i
iil
itti
I th
t h t d
l
tti
t h
d t d t
lik
h
l i
b t iht
d b t
t
i
Th b j t i
i t
d l
it t
bl
d t fd
l lti
tht
k i th
t t
k i
h
t
d ti
i d th
k i
tht
thi i th
th b i
f f d t i l
l
fl i
t
Th
thd i l
h
t b
d t d
ble facts and judge the weight of evidence enabling the transfer of that weight to new
cases This task is accomplished by generalizing and mastering the principles that
control the transfer usually principles at work in the reasoning of judges Use of the
thd i b i
h l
i
f
idl f d t i
tht
t th
t d t i th d i i k i
l ft
iitil i i
i t th f t
f
l
itti
H
th
f th
thd i t
t
itti
lt
ith th f t
ii
d
jdi
tht
iht
t
dt fd
f ki
it d i i
i
h
i
t
A
ith t d
t h i
i
bl
li i
it f
d f d
f btt
up theories First defenders sometimes write as if paradigm cases or particular
circumstances speak for themselves or inform moral judgment by their facts alone
Clearly they do not To move constructively from case to case or to attend to the
l t f t
f
til
itti
id
l f
l l
t
t th
itti
Th
l i
t
t f th
itti
bt
th
f i t t i
d liki
itti
All
l i l
i
i
ti
t i d i t tht
bjt
t i ik
lik
th i
l t
t Th
ti
di
f th
i
t l i k i
t b
h i d b
l
itlf Btt
t

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

t h f
t
i i l
l
i
til
l l
ents in the case or set of facts at hand
"Paradigm cases" and "morally relevant features of circumstances" seem to com
bine facts that can be generalized to other situations (for example "The employee
bl
th
hitl
th
l " )
d ttld
l
(f
l
" K l d b l
l
h
iht t d i l
th
di
f th
l " ) Th
ttld
l
ltill ditit f
th f t
f
til
Th
l th
t l
l
ti
th l
th
t th t t
f
l i i l
l
Btt
t l
t
bl
h
th
it
fliti
l
gies judgments and case interpretations Defenders stress that cases and particular
circumstances point beyond themselves and evolve into generalizations but they
also may evolve in the wrong way if they were improperly grounded from the
t t Btt
t h
l
t h d l i l
t
t
b i d d l t
f
l t f l t ft
f
Th
bl
l d t
ti
b t th j t i f i t
f th
t
H
d
jtifti
? I it
l b
il
ti
d
l ? Miht
t difft
l i
d
l
t
ti
"iht"
? With
out some stable framework of norms there seems to be a lack of control over
judgment and no way to prevent prejudiced or poorly formulated social conven
tions This criticism is a variant of the muchdiscussed problem that bottomup
t l k
i t i l dit
f
l t l blid
h
l
d
l
ii
Idtifti
f th
ll
l t f t
f
d d
th
h
k j d t
b t
d th
idiidl
ld
t f
tilit
d i i
bi
jdiil
f
l
tht i
h k d b
tbl
t
fi t i l
i i l
dh
iht
Th h t
f th
bl
b t h t th
t
t
thd
itht
t t tht i
t l ft h h t tht dil
th f d t l i t
f
comparison and analogy in moral thinking but that lacks initial moral premises It
is certain that we reason morally by analogy almost daily and we are often confi
dent in our conclusions However such analogies also often fail and analogies
t
li
ftth
tit
Thi
t h d th
l
ith th
bl
tht
tt h
ti t
i t
iitill h
if
f
th f t i t
t
t
th
t i th
d i
t
i l d
d
fl
t t t
Coherentism
"The top" (principles theories) and "the bottom" (cases particular udgments) are
both now widely regarded as insufficient resources for applied ethics Neither gen
l i i l
til
i t
h
ffiit
t
t
l i
ith th
dd
libilit P i i l
d t b
d
if f
d
l i
d i l l i t i
f
l i i l
I t d
f
t d
btt
dl
t
i
f
th
dl
i l
f d t
"flti
ilibi"
d" h
t h "

10

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

Jh R l '
l b t d
t f "flti
ilibi" h b
th
t
influential model of this sort In developing and maintaining a system of ethics he
argues it is appropriate to start with the broadest possible set of considered moral
judgments about a subject and to erect a provisional set of principles that reflects
th
Rflti
ilibi
i
i t i t i
i thi ( d th
t t i )
flti
tti
f
l i i l
t h t i l
tlt
d th
l t
l blif t
k th
h t
ibl
" C i d d j d t " i
t h i l t
f i
t j d t
i
hih
l blif
d
iti
t likl t b
td
itht
ditti
bi
E l
j d t
b t th
f
il d i i i t i
li
gious intolerance terrorism torture and political conflicts of interest These con
sidered judgments occur at all levels of generality "from those about particular
situations and institutions through broad standards and first principles to formal
d b t t
diti
l
t i "
E
th
i d d j d t
tht
t" i i l l
fid
it"
R l
"libl t
i i " Th
l f flti
ilibi
i t
th
d djt
i d d j d t
i
d t
d th
h t
ith th
i
f
t
l
l
i t t
W t t
ith
d
d t
of moral lightness and wrongness and then construct a more general and more
specific account that is consistent with these paradigm judgments rendering them
as coherent as possible We then test the resultant actionguides to see if they yield
i h t
lt If
d j t th
id
i th
d
th
W
ltl
tbl
ilibi
th
i
d
djti
b
td t
t i l l ( R l 1971 20ff 4 6 5 0 5 7 9 8 0
[1999
d 17ff 4 0 5 5 0 8 9 ] 1996 8 381 384 399)
T tk
l i th thi
f
t l t t i
i i
tht
t t t d t
h ft
lii
(1) d i t i b t
b
td
b
f
f
i l (i
d t
i i
th b f i i l
t
f th
d )
d (2)
distribute organs by time on the waiting list (in order to give every candidate an
equal opportunity) As they stand these two distributive principles are not coherent
because using either will undercut or even eliminate the other We can retain both
(1)
d (2) i
th
f fi ditibti
bt t d
ill h
t i t d
liit
bth i i l
t t h
ith
t fh
t
if
i t t
d bl
th
i t t
i t th
i t t
Th
liit
d
t ill i t
h
t b
d
h t
ith th
i i l
d l
h
di d i i i t i
i t th l d l
d th
l f bilit t
i
j t
h
f th l l t i
f
i
dil
d
We have no reason in applied ethics to anticipate that the process of achieving
moral coherence will either come to an end or be perfected A moral framework
adequate for applied ethics is more a process than a finished product; and moral
bl
h
d l i
th
t itbl
t
f
t
d
ditibti
hld b
i d d
j t i
d f
t i l
d j t t b
flti
ilibi
W hld
i
l i d thi t h t
f
di
h f i h
df
l itti
tht hll
t
lf
k
( R l 1971 1 9 5 2 0 1 [1999
d 1716])

11

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

One problem with this general model is that a bare coherence of norms never
provides a sufficient basis for justification because the body of substantive udgments and principles that cohere could themselves be morally unsatisfactory This
points to the great importance but also the great difficulty of starting with considered judgments that are themselves morally justified These considered judgments
presumably will have a history rich in moral experience that undergirds our confidence that they are credible and trustworthy; but how is one to justify such a claim
in the case of any proposed set of considered judgments? After all the persons
codes institutions or cultures from which the premises descend may not themselves be highly reliable For example the Hippocratic tradition the starting-point
in medical ethics for centuries has turned out to be a limited and generally unreliable basis for medical ethics
In addition vagueness surrounds the precise nature and scope of the method of
appeals to coherence A philosopher seeking coherence might be pursuing one or
more of several different interests: evaluating public policy constructing a moral
philosophy improving his or her personal set of moral beliefs and so on The focus
might be on judgments on policies on cases or on finding moral truth It is also
not clear how we should and should not achieve coherence or how to be sure that
we have done so
In light of the differences in the models explored in this section and the diverse
literature in applied philosophy it is questionable whether applied ethics has a distinct method or type of justification Applied philosophers appear to do what philosophers have always done: they analyze concepts examine the hidden presuppositions
of moral opinions and theories offer criticism and constructive accounts of the moral
phenomena in question and criticize strategies that are used to justify beliefs policies
and actions They seek a reasoned defense of a moral viewpoint and they use considered judgments and moral frameworks to distinguish justified moral claims from
unjustified ones They try to stimulate the moral imagination promote analytical
skills and weed out prejudice undue emotion false authority and the like
From this perspective differences between traditional ethical theory and applied
ethics can be easily exaggerated In philosophy journals that publish both applied
and theoretical work no sharp line of demarcation is apparent between the concepts and norms of ethical theory and applied ethics There is not even a discernible
continuum from theoretical to applied The applied-theoretical distinction therefore
needs to be used with caution (Beauchamp 1984: 514-31; Gert 1984: 532-48)

Problems of Specification
It is now generally agreed in literature on the problems addressed in the previous
two sections that specific policy guidelines and truly practical udgments cannot be
squeezed from abstract principles and general ethical theories alone Additional
content must be introduced from some quarter General theories and principles f
used at all must be made specific for contexts; otherwise moral guidelines will be
empty and ineffectual The implementation of these general norms must take account of feasibility efficiency cultural pluralism political procedures uncertainty
12

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

b t
rik
li
b difftd
ti
l dil
d th lik I
short theories and principles must be specified for a context
Specification should not be understood as a process of producing general norms;
it assumes they are already available It is the process of making these norms
t
t h t th
ifll
id
d t Sifiti
i
d
i
th i d t i t
f th
l
t
i th
i
d
ti
idi
it
hil
tii
th
l
i t t
i th
i i l
Filli
t th
i t t
f th
ith h i h
t t i
lihd b
i
th
f th
t
l b
lii
h t th
l
Th
i
d
H
Rihd
t it b " l l i
t
where when why how by what means to whom or by whom the action is to be
done or avoided" (Richardson 2000: 289; see also Richardson 1990: 2 7 9 3 1 0 )
For example without further specification the principle "respect the autonomy of
t t
" i t
t hdl
litd
bl
f ht t
k f i liil
dii
d
h i l i
h
bjt A
dfi
iti
f" t
f
t "
(
" l l i
t t
t
i
thi libt
riht")
iht lif
'
i
bt
ld t
th
l
d it
if S i f t i
i
d i f f t kid f
lli
t th
analysis of meaning It adds content For example one possible specification of
"respect the autonomy of competent persons" is "respect the autonomy of compe
tent persons after they become incompetent by following their advance directives"
Wh
i th
f thi
til
ifti
b t l
t
diffilti i l i
d
diti
ld
if f t h
fll
" R t th
t
f
t t
( f t th b
i t t )
b
flli
thi d
diti
if d l if th d i t i
l
d
tii
t th i t
t h d " A th
bl
th
f
ifi
ti
ill
ti
Tht i l d
ifd
l
idli
d lii
ill b
fth
ifd t h d l
l
i t
Thi
i
specification is one way to practice applied ethics and it may be the best way
In progressive specification there must remain a transparent connection to he
initial norm that gives moral authority to the string of norms that develop over
ti
Th
i l
th
ibilit f
th
ifiti
bi
bl
d it i
ibl t h t d i f f t
ti
ill ff d i f f t
ifti
Th
ti
ifti
ll b t t t i
d jtifibl
Of
t ll
j t i f i b l Th
t f
f i l
iti
(i
ifti
thi
d
lii
d
j d t ) h
ft b
t
d
i
th h
b
b i d
d l f t t i
P f i l
thrit
i thi
way protect shoddy moral reflection In the process of specification overconfidence
in one's specifications is a moral vice that can have profound consequences
Moral disagreement in the course of formulating specifications is inevitable n
t t
I
i
b l t i
d i l t i
l
ti
ifti
itll
ti t b ffd bt l t t i
ifiti
d
t b
tt
f
t
th
th
i
th
t t i
hih
flti
ff
l t t i
lti
t
til
bl
Thi
b t i
tk
t th
bjt fh
hld i
itti
i
hih
llitdd
d i i
dk l d b l
fid
t h l
i
d
i
t
13

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Problems of Conflict and Disagreement

Moral disagreements emerge in the moral life from several different sources These
include disagreements over which specification is appropriate factual disagreements
(for example about the level of suffering that an action will cause) conceptual
disagreements scope disagreements about who should be protected by a moral
norm (for example whether fetuses or animals are protected) disagreements
resulting from a genuine moral dilemma disagreements about which norms are
relevant in the circumstances and disagreements about the weight of the relevant
norms in the circumstances
It should not be presumed in a context of disagreement that at least one party is
morally biased mistaken or otherwise deficient Conscientious and reasonable
moral agents who work with due diligence at specification and reasoning about
moral problems sometimes understandably disagree The parties may disagree
about whether religious values have any place in political affairs whether any form
of affirmative action is viable whether physician-assisted suicide is ever acceptable
and dozens of other issues in applied ethics
When evidence is incomplete or different sets of evidence are available to different
parties one party may be justified in reaching a conclusion that another party s
justified in rejecting We cannot hold persons to a higher standard than to make
judgments conscientiously and coherently in light of the relevant basic and specified
norms together with the available evidence Of course tolerance for some norms
rightly has its limits The method of specification offered in the previous section
needs enrichment by an account of moral justification that will help distinguish
justified and unjustified specifications The models of method and ustification discussed in earlier sections may be our best resources in this endeavor but if so
these resources stand in need of further development to be of real practical assistance in applied ethics

Conclusion
A robust confidence in and enthusiasm for the promise and harvest of applied ethics
is far from universal Many are unconvinced that traditional philosophical ethics or
contemporary ethical theory can play any significant role in case analysis or in
policy or professional contexts There is for reasons discussed throughout this chapter skepticism that philosophical theories even have practical implications (or applications) However these suspicions may rest on misconceptions of the nature of
applied ethics No morally serious individual doubts the importance of the issues
treated in applied ethics and virtually everyone familiar with work in the field can
cite some examples of outstanding applied work The better view is that adequate
conceptions of the method and moral content of applied ethics remain a project n
the making

14

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

References
Beauchamp T L (1984) On eliminating the distinction between applied ethics and ethical
theory The Monist, 67: 514-31
Brody H and Miller F G (1998) The internal morality of medicine: explication and application to managed care Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 23: 384-410
Clouser K D and Gert B (1990) A critique of principlism The Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy, 15: 219-36
Engelhardt H T (1996) The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd edn New York: Oxford University
Press
and Wildes K (1994) The four principles of health care ethics and post-modernity In
R Gillon (ed) Principles of Health Care Ethics, pp 13547 London: John Wiley
Gert B (1982) Licensing professions Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 1: 51-60
(1984) Moral theory and applied ethics The Monist, 67: 532^48
Culver C M and Clouser K D (1997) Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. New York:
Oxford University Press
Jonsen A and Toulmin S (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning.
Berkeley CA: University of California Press
Katz J with Capron A and Glass E S (1972) Experimentation with Human Beings. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation
Kelman H (1968) A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass
Maclntyre A (1984) After Virtue, 2nd edn Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press
Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press (rev edn 1999)
(1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press
Richardson H S (1990) Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 279-310
(2000) Specifying balancing and interpreting bioethical principles Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy, 25: 285-307

Further reading
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (1996) Final Report. New York:
Oxford University Press
Altaian A (1983) Pragmatism and applied ethics American Philosophical Quarterly, 20:
227-35
Beauchamp T L and Childress J F (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th edn New
York: Oxford University Press
Brock D W (1987) Truth or consequences: the role of philosophers in policy-making Ethics,
97: 786-91
Daniels N (1996) Wide reflective equilibrium in practice In L W Sumner and J Boyle (eds)
Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, pp 96-114 Toronto: University of Toronto Press
DeGrazia D (1992) Moving forward in bioethical theory: theories cases and specified principlism Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 17: 511-39

15

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Dworkin R (1993) Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion Euthanasia and Individual
Fd
Feinberg J (1984-7) Th Ml
Liit
f th C i i l L
4 vols New York: Oxford University Press
Freeman E and Werhane P (eds) (1997) Dictionary of Business Ethics Cambridge MA:
Mthil
hy 20: 222-34
Maclntyre A (1984) Does applied ethics rest on a mistake? The Monist 67: 498-513
Alid
Ethi i
Tbld
Wld
Dordrecht: Kluwer
Rachels J (1990) Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism New York:
Oxford University Press
Mtt
f Lif
d Dth N I t d t
E
i Ml
Philh
3rd edn New York: McGraw-Hill
Reich W (ed) (1995) Encyclopedia ofBioethics 2nd edn New York: Macmillan

AC

Alid
i

Ethi
t Ethi

(1993) P t i l Ethis 2nd edn New York: Cambridge University Press

Sugarman J and Sulmasy D P (eds) (2001) Methods in Medical Ethics Washington DC:
Sunstein C (1993) On analogical reasoning H d
Winkler E R and Coombs J R (eds) (1993) Alid
well

16

L Riw
106: 741-91
Ethi A Rdr
Cambridge MA: Black-