Rosales v.

Mijares
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
55904 affirming Resolution No. 991208[2] of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) granting the appeal of the respondent
herein from the Order dated September 24, 1998 dismissing
the respondent as Municipal Engineer of Catarman, Northern
Samar; and Resolution No. 992130 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
As culled by the appellate court from the records, the
antecedents are as follows:
Being the duly-elected mayor of Catarman, Northern
Samar, during the 1998 local elections, Francisco C. Rosales, Jr.
(or petitioner) assumed office on July 1, 1999. Shortly
thereafter, petitioner summoned the department heads for a
conference, among whom was the municipal engineer, Miguel
H. Mijares (or respondent).

During the meeting, petitioner told

respondent to resign under pain of abolition of
his position. Not wishing to antagonize the
mayor, respondent informed him a week later
that he was open to the possibility of being
transferred or detailed at the Provincial
Engineering Office. Then and there, petitioner
instructed respondent to prepare his papers.

On August 3, 1998, petitioner indorsed

respondent to the provincial governor of
Northern Samar for consideration for the
position of Assistant Provincial Engineer.
On August 12, 1998, petitioner wrote to
respondent stating:
Your request to transfer
to the Provincial Engineering
Office, Catarman, Northern
Samar, is granted for a period of
thirty (30) days from receipt
hereof, subject to the condition
imposed by Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations.
Meanwhile, respondent continued
reporting for work at the Municipal Engineers
Office. However, the provincial governor did
not act on petitioners endorsement.
On September 24, 1998, petitioner again
wrote to respondent, this time informing him
of his separation, viz:
The 30-day period given
to you to transfer to the
Provincial Engineering Office has
now elapsed and, in as much as

you did not seek an extension of

your permit to transfer, you are
considered resigned from this
government
unit
as
of
September 13, 1996, pursuant to
MC No. 38, S. 1993 of the Civil
Service Commission.
In a letter dated October
2, 1998, respondent requested
petitioner to withdraw the
above-quoted
separation
letter. He pointed out that since
the request for transfer to the
Provincial Engineers Office was
not acted upon, the same never
became effective and, therefore,
he did not cease to be an
employee of the municipal
government.
In his reply letter dated October 15,
1998, petitioner explained that respondent was
not terminated and that his separation from
the service was by operation of law, i.e., Civil
Service Commission (or CSC) Memorandum
Circular (or MC) No. 38, S. 1993. In the same
communication, petitioner offered to reinstate
respondent.
On November 12, 1998, respondent filed
a complaint for illegal termination against

petitioner before the CSC. Treating the

complaint as an appeal, the Director of CSC
Regional Office No. 8 instructed Victoria E.
Valeriano (or Ms. Valeriano), Head Civil
Service Field Officer in Catarman, to conduct a
fact-finding investigation on respondents
case. Pursuant to the directive, Ms. Valeriano
asked petitioner to submit the original of
respondents request for transfer. In a letter
dated January 11, 1998, petitioner informed
Ms. Valeriano that respondents request was
merely verbal.
In an order dated April 16, 1999, the CSC
Office of Legal Affairs required petitioner to
comment on the appeal. Complying with the
directive,
petitioner
explained
that
respondents separation was valid and legal
under CSC MC No. 38, S. 1993, since the latters
permit to transfer to the Provincial Engineers
Office expired without his transfer being
effected. In support of his defense, petitioner
appended his documentary evidence to his
comment, including the legal opinions of the
CSC Regional Office and the Provincial
Prosecutor upholding the validity of his action.
On June 17, 1999, the CSC issued a
resolution, the decretal portion of which
resolution (sic) reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal

of Miguel H. Mijares is hereby
granted. Accordingly, Mayor
Francisco C. Rosales, Jr. is
directed
to
immediately
reinstate Mijares to his former
position of Municipal Engineer
and to cause the payment of all
his salaries and other benefits
from the date of his unlawful
separation from the service up
to his actual reinstatement. [3]
The CSC held that the respondent did not freely and
voluntarily seek permission from the petitioner to transfer to
another office and that based on the record, the supposed
transfer of the respondent to the Office of the Provincial
Engineer was a shrewd machination or clever ploy resorted to
by the petitioner to oust the respondent from his position as
Municipal Engineer; hence, such transfer was illegal. The CSC
cited the rulings of this Court in Sta. Maria v. Lopez[4] and
Divinagracia, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas.[5] The CSC also ruled that a
request for transfer, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 9838, must be in writing; and that even assuming that a verbal
request for transfer may be made, the petitioner failed to
adduce any proof that the respondent made such verbal
request, as well as the date of the effectivity of the
transfer. The CSC cited its ruling in CSC Resolution No. 991616 dated July 20, 1999. The CSC declared that the letter of
the petitioner to the respondent dated August 12, 1998 was

but a detail of the respondent to the Office of the Provincial

Engineer.
The petitioners motion for a reconsideration of the
resolution was denied by the CSC per its Resolution No.
992130.
The petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for review with
the CA assailing the resolutions of the CSC. On December 20,
2001, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition and
affirming the resolutions of the CSC. The appellate court
affirmed in toto not only the finding of the CSC, but also its
rulings on the issues raised by the petitioner. The CA also held
that:
Well-settled is the rule that in reviewing
administrative decisions, the findings of fact
made therein must be respected as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence (Lo vs.
Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 190). We see no
cogent reason to depart from said principle.
It is also noteworthy that the ground
relied upon to justify respondents removal,
i.e., expiration of his permit to transfer, is
purely technical and, therefore, too flimsy to
override the constitutional mandate upholding
an employees right to security of tenure (Art.
IX-B, Sec. 2, par. 3, 1987 Constitution). As held
in Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Sto. Tomas (244 SCRA
595), the guarantee of security of tenure is an
important object of the civil service system
because it affords a faithful employee

permanence of employment, at least for the

period prescribed by law, and frees the
employee from the fear of political and
personal prejudicial reprisal.[6]
The petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied by the appellate court.
The petitioner filed his petition for review on certiorari
with this Court, contending that the CA erred as follows:
I.

IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF THE CIVIL

SERVICE
COMMISSION
WHICH
IMPROPERLY
INTERPRETED
THE
PROVISIONS OF PART II, ITEM 5(a)[4] OF
CSC MC NO. 93-38 AND RULING THAT
PETITIONER
ILLEGALLY
TERMINATED
RESPONDENT.

II.

IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS

AFFORDED DUE PROCESS.

III.

IN DECIDING THE CASE IN FAVOR OF

RESPONDENT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO THE
CONTRARY.

IV. IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE

COSTS.[7]
The petition has no merit.

The petitioner faults the CSC and the appellate court for
ruling in favor of the respondent, contending that, as gleaned
from the respondents October 2, 1998 Letter, the latter
requested for a transfer and was not coerced nor forced to do
so. The petitioner asserts that no less than the respondent
declared therein, as well as on the other documents on
record, that he requested to be transferred to the Office of
the Provincial Engineer, and that he secured photo copies of
his service records and other documents from the municipality
in support of his written request for transfer, and himself
submitted such request to the Office of the Governor. The
petitioner asserts that the October 28, 1998 Opinion of CSC
Regional Office No. 8 and of the Provincial Prosecutor dated
November 12, 1998 frontally belie the findings of the CSC and
the appellate court. According to the petitioner, he should
not be faulted by the CSC for applying the letter and spirit of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38.
The petitioner further alleges that the respondent did
not even heave a whimper of protest despite the receipt of
the Letter dated September 24, 1998 informing him of his
separation. The respondent is thus estopped, the petitioner
insists, from assailing the termination of his service as
Municipal Engineer of Catarman. The petitioner concedes
that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies, such as the CSC,
are conclusive if based on substantial evidence. He, however,
contends that, in this case, the CSC ignored and
misunderstood the evidence on record, thereby committing a
grave injustice.
We do not agree with the petitioner. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 93-38 reads:

Transfer is a movement from one

position without break in service involving the
issuance of an appointment.
The transfer may be from one agency to
another or from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency.
An employee who seeks transfer to
another office shall first secure permission from
the head of the department or agency where
he is employed stating the effective date of the
transfer. If the request to transfer of an
employee is not granted by the head of the
agency where he is employed, it shall be
deemed approved after the lapse of 30 days
from the date of notice to the agency head.
If, for whatever reason, the employee
fails to transfer on the specified date, he shall
be considered resigned and his reemployment
in his former office shall be at the discretion of
his head.[8]
The CSC interpreted its Memorandum as requiring a
written and not merely a verbal request for an employee to
transfer to another office. Moreover, such request must be
express and unequivocal, and cannot be merely implied or
ambiguous. The request by an employee to transfer to
another office must be such that he intended to surrender his
permanent office. Also, a transfer connotes an absolute

relinquishment of an office in exchange for another

office. Such request must be voluntary on the part of the
officer concerned and not vitiated by force, coercion, or
intimidation or even deceit. Indeed, in Sta. Maria v. Lopez,[9]
we held that:
A transfer that results in promotion or
demotion, advancement or reduction or a
transfer that aims to lure the employee away
from his permanent position, cannot be done
without the employees consent. For that
would constitute removal from office. Indeed,
no permanent transfer can take place unless
the officer or employee is first removed from
the position held, and then appointed to
another position.[10]
The Court also held that unconsented transfer is
anathema to security of tenure.[11] A transfer that aims by
indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation
constitutes removal.[12] An employee cannot be transferred
unless for causes provided for by law and after due
process.[13] Any attempt to breach the protective wall built
around the employees right to security of tenure should be
slain on sight. The right of employees to security of tenure
should never be sacrificed merely at the whims and pleasure
of some unscrupulous and heartless politicians. As we held in
Nemenzo v. Sabillano:[14]
There are altogether too many cases of this nature,
wherein local elective officials, upon assumption of office,
wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing

employees with their own proteges, regardless of the laws

and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls
should not be taken as authority for the commission of such
illegal acts.[15]
In this case, the petitioner, who perceived that the
respondent was a well-known supporter of the political party
opposed to his candidacy, coerced the respondent into
resigning and even threatened to have his position as
Municipal Engineer abolished. This was chronicled by the
respondent in his letter to the petitioner dated October 2,
1998:
Hon. Francisco C. Rosales, Jr.
Municipal Mayor
Catarman, Northern Samar

because you did not like me to continue serving

under your administration, and if I did not
resign, you would abolish my position. You give
(sic) me one week to think about your
proposal. As a permanent employee, I realized
that your proposal was political harassment
because I did not support you during the last
elections.[16]
The petitioner denied the allegation in his letter to the
respondent dated October 15, 1998 that the CSC correctly
disbelieved the petitioners bare denial. Before the petitioner
was elected Mayor of Catarman and assumed office, there
was no reason for the respondent to abandon his position as
Municipal Engineer and seek a transfer to another office. The
respondents ordeal commenced after the petitioner assumed
office as Municipal Mayor and coerced the respondent into
resigning or transferring to another position.

Dear Mayor Rosales:

In answer to your letter of 24 September
1998 terminating my services as Municipal
Engineer of Catarman, effective September 13,
1998, allegedly due to my failure to seek an
extension of my permit to transfer to [the]
Provincial Engineering Office, please be
reminded of the following facts and events.
A few days after you assumed office as
new Mayor of Catarman, or on July 2, 1998, you
called me to your office and told me to resign
from my position as Municipal Engineer

The respondent, in his letter to the petitioner dated

October 2, 1998, admitted that during their second meeting
on August 10, 1998, he suggested that he was open to a
transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office or, at least to be
detailed thereat, in lieu of resignation, to which the petitioner
agreed; and that upon the petitioners orders, the respondent
accomplished the requisite Form 212, secured copies of his
service records, and submitted the same to the Office of the
Provincial Governor for a possible appointment as Assistant
Provincial Engineer; and that the petitioner endorsed and
recommended the same to the Provincial Governor. However,
taking into consideration the entirety of the contents of the
letter, and the facts and circumstances which impelled the

respondent to write the same, it cannot thereby be concluded

that the respondent had voluntarily and unequivocally
decided to transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. In
light of the demands and threats of the petitioner, the
respondent had only three options: to resign, to agree to
transfer to another office, or to remain as Municipal Engineer
with the threat of the petitioner to have his position abolished
hanging over his head.
Admittedly, rather than resign as demanded by the
petitioner, the respondent opted to make himself available for
appointment by the Provincial Governor as Assistant
Provincial Engineer. However, the Form 212 submitted by the
respondent to the Provincial Governor is not the written
request envisaged in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38 for
the following reasons: (a) the respondent continued reporting
and performing his duties as Municipal Engineer of Catarman
and receiving his salary as such; and (b) the respondent did
not send any written request to the petitioner for transfer to
the Office of the Provincial Engineer.
Evidently, the respondent intended to request for
permission to transfer to the position of Assistant Provincial
Engineer only after the Governor had agreed thereto. The
respondent did not want to risk unemployment by making a
written request for transfer without first being assured of his
appointment by the Provincial Governor to the position of
Assistant Provincial Engineer; hence, he opted to wait for the
Provincial Governors approval for his appointment before
submitting a written request for transfer to the petitioner. As
it were, the Governor failed to act on the respondents
application.

In his obsession to do away with the respondent even

before the Governor could act on his papers, the petitioner
wrote the respondent on August 12, 1998, informing the latter
that his request for transfer had been granted, knowing fully
well that the respondent had not yet made such a written
request for transfer. The letter of the petitioner reads:

August 12, 1998

Miguel H. Mijares
Municipal Engineer
Catarman, Northern Samar
Sir:
Your request to transfer to the Provincial
Engineering Office, Catarman, Northern Samar,
is granted for a period of thirty (30) days from
receipt hereof, subject to the condition
imposed by Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations.
Very truly
yours,
S
gd.
FRANCISCO
C. ROSALES, JR.

Municipal
Mayor[17]
We agree with the ruling of the CSC that the letter of
the petitioner to the respondent is merely a detail of the latter
for a period of thirty days to the Office of the Provincial
Engineer:
As already stated in the Resolution now
being sought to be reconsidered, the purported
permit to transfer dated August 12, 1998
issued by movant unmistakably refers to a
personnel action other than a transfer. The
said permit to transfer states that (y)our
request to transfer to the Provincial
Engineering Office, Catarman, Northern Samar
is granted for a period of thirty (30) days from
receipt hereof This statement does not
contemplate a transfer as defined under the
Civil Service Law and Rules. Rather, such a
personnel action is in reality a detail because
Mijares is to be temporarily moved for a period
of 30 days from his employer, the Municipal
Government of Catarman, to the Provincial
Engineering Office.[18]
The deplorable machination resorted to by the
petitioner to remove the respondent from his position
became more evident when, on September 24, 1998, he
wrote the respondent, thus:
September 24, 1998

Engr. Miguel H. Mijares

Municipal Engineer
Catarman, Northern Samar
Engr. Mijares:
The 30-day period given to you to
transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office has
now elapsed and in as much as you did not seek
an extension of your permit to transfer, you are
considered resigned from this government unit
as of September 13, 1998, pursuant to MC No.
38 S 1993 of the Civil Service Commission.
FRANCISC
O C. ROSALES, JR.
Mun
icipal Mayor[19]
By his September 24, 1998 letter to the respondent, the
petitioner made it appear that he had granted the respondent
permission to transfer within thirty days, and that the
respondent failed to effect his transfer. This was done by the
petitioner despite the absence of any letter from the
respondent requesting for such transfer. By his August 12,
1998 letter, the petitioner merely detailed the respondent to
the Office of the Provincial Engineer. It must be stressed that
the only legal effect of a detail of an employee, upon the lapse
of the period of such detail, is for that employee to return to
his permanent station. Thus, the respondent retained his

position as Municipal Engineer despite his detail to the Office

of the Provincial Engineer.

employees right to security of

tenure.

The petitioner capped his chicanery by considering the

respondent resigned as of September 13, 1998, or after the
lapse of the period for detail of the respondent to the Office
of the Provincial Engineer.

Besides, the alleged request for transfer

was not freely and voluntarily made by
respondent, not to mention that petitioners
approval of the request is ambiguous. Thus,
the CSC found:

We agree with the ruling of the appellate court, which

affirmed that of the CSC, thus:

*T+o sustain the

argument
advanced
by
[petitioner] would be setting a
dangerous precedent. This will
lead to a situation where any
head of an agency or local
government unit who, for
whatever reason, wants to
terminate a subordinate from his
employment
would
simply
inform the latter that his verbal
request to transfer was accepted
and, thereafter, exclude his
name from the payroll, as what
happened in the present case,
although the employee never
made any such request. This
was never the intention of the
framers of said rule as it would
make a mockery of the

the Commission has

noted that the purported grant
by Mayor Rosales of permission
to
Mijares
is
utterly
ambiguous. In his letter dated
August 12, 1998, Mayor Rosales
stated that (y)our request to
transfer to the Provincial
Engineering Office, Catarman,
Northern Samar, is granted for a
period of thirty (30) days from
receipt hereof, . This simply
means that the supposed
transfer of Mijares to the
Provincial Office was granted by
his stay or service thereat is
good only for a period of 30
days.
The foregoing facts and
circumstances duly supported by
the
evidence
on
record

convinces the Commission that

Mijares did not freely and
voluntarily seek from Mayor
Rosales permission to transfer to
another office. On the contrary,
it is apparent that the supposed
transfer
was
a
shrewd
machination or clever ply (sic)
resorted to oust Mijares from his
present position. This, the
Commission will never tolerate
much less countenance, as this
would infringe the right to
security of tenure of Mijares.
Well-settled is the rule that in reviewing
administrative decisions, the findings of fact
made therein must be respected as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence (Lo vs.
Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 190). We see no
cogent reason to depart from said principle.
It is also noteworthy that the ground
relied upon to justify respondents removal,
i.e., expiration of his permit to transfer, is
purely technical and, therefore, too flimsy to
override the constitutional mandate upholding
an employees right to security of tenure (Art.
IX-B, Sec. 2, par. 3, 1987 Constitution). As held
in Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Sto. Tomas (244 SCRA
595), the guarantee of security of tenure is an

important object of the civil service system

because it affords a faithful employee
permanence of employment, at least for the
period prescribed by law, and frees the
employee from the fear of political and
personal prejudicial reprisal.[20]
Likewise, barren of merit is the petitioners contention
that he was deprived of due process because the CSC failed to
consider the effect of the opinion of the Provincial Prosecutor
and the Regional Director of the CSC holding that the
petitioner had complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No.
93-38, as well as the other documents appended to his
comment. The CA correctly ruled that:

Finally, there is no merit in petitioners

insistence that he was denied due process
because the CSC did not consider the
documentary evidence attached to his
comment. The CSC, in its resolution dated
September 21, 1999, stated that the
Commission received *petitioners comment+
including all its annexes on May 18, 1999 and
(a)fter a careful evaluation of the same, the
Commission found not a shred of evidence to
show that [respondent], indeed, requested for
his transfer. (Italics supplied)
Settled is the rule that the essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be

heard or, as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. What the
law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot
feign denial of due process where he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side
(Audion Electric Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 308 SCRA
340).[21]
The petitioner cannot find solace in the October 28,
1998 Opinion of Judith Chicano, Regional Director of Region 8
of the CSC, and the November 12, 1998 letter-opinion of the
Provincial Prosecutor stating that the petitioner correctly
applied CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38. This is because:
(a) the petitioner falsely represented to the Regional Director
and Provincial Prosecutor that the respondent had requested
for a transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer when, in
truth and in fact, the respondent had not done so; (b) the
Regional Director and the Provincial Prosecutor were not even
furnished with copies of the October 2, 1998 Letter of the
respondent to the petitioner; and (c) the opinion of the CSC
Regional Director and Provincial Prosecutor were not
conclusive on the CSC, as the latter could still reverse the said
opinion on appeal.
The records negate the contention of the petitioner
that the respondent kept a stoic silence even after receiving
the September 24, 1998 letter informing him that he was
deemed resigned as of September 13, 1998. The fact of the
matter is that the respondent appealed the letter to the

Regional Director of the CSC, Region 8, which the respondent

took cognizance of and acted upon via her endorsement of
the letter to Ma. Victoria E. Valeriano, Head, Civil Service Fiscal
Officer for a fact-finding investigation.[22]
On the contention of the petitioner that the appeal of
the respondent to the CSC was made beyond the period
therefor under Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of
Procedure, the CSC correctly ruled that:
Movant claims that Mijares appeal was
filed way beyond the reglementary period for
filing appeals. He, thus, contends that the
Commission should not have given due course
to said appeal.
The Commission need not delve much on
the dates when Mijares was separated from the
service
and when
he
assailed his
separation. Suffice it to state that the
Commission found his appeal meritorious. This
being the case, procedural rules need not be
strictly observed. This principle was explained
by in the case of Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA 388,
where the Supreme Court ruled, to wit:
Assuming for the sake of
argument that the petitioners appeal
was filed out of time, it is within the
power of this Court to temper rigid
rules in favor of substantial
justice. While it is desirable that the

Rules of Court be faithfully and even

meticulously observed, courts should
not be so strict about procedural
lapses that do not really impair the
proper administration of justice. If the
rules are intended to ensure the
orderly conduct of litigation, it is
because of the higher objective they
seek which is the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. As
held by the Court in a number of cases:
Because there is no
vested right in technicalities,
in meritorious cases, a liberal,
not literal, interpretation of
the rules becomes imperative
and technicalities should not
be resorted to in derogation
of the intent and purpose of
the rules which is the proper
and just determination of
litigation. Litigations, should
as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and
not on technicality. Dismissal
of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon, and
the rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense, for they

are adopted to help secure,

not override, substantial
justice, and thereby defeat
their very aims. As has been
the constant rulings of this
Court, every party-litigant
should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of
his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities

Besides, Mijares assailed his separation

from the service and asserted his right to his
office within one (1) year from his
separation. This being so, the Commission
correctly gave due course to his appeal (Isberto
vs. Raquiza, 67 SCRA 116). And what is ironic is
that it is only now that movant raised the issue
on timeliness of filing an appeal. Never did he
assail this matter in his comment.[23]
The respondent never relented in his resistance to the
petitioners sustained effort to oust him from his
position. The records show that after receipt of the
petitioners September 24, 1998 letter, the respondent,
thereafter, requested for its withdrawal in a reply-letter dated
October 2, 1998.[24] In his letter dated October 15, 1998, the
petitioner informed the respondent that he was forwarding
the latters personnel file to the CSC for its legal opinion on

the matter.[25] The petitioner, through counsel, sought the

opinion of the CSC Regional Director on October 20,
1998.[26] On October 28, 1998, the CSC Regional Director
rendered her opinion in favor of the petitioner. The
respondent then wrote to the Regional Director on November
4, 1998, anent the September 24, 1998 letter of the
petitioner. The Regional Director treated the said letter of the
respondent as an appeal. In his comment on the appeal of
the respondent, the petitioner did not contest the timeliness
of the said appeal and opted to delve into and discuss the
merits of the case.
It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves
the security of tenure of a public officer sacrosanctly
protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a
resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the
same based on a strained and inordinate application of
Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure.[27]
On the last issue, we find that there is no factual basis
for directing the petitioner to pay the costs.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court
is AFFIRMED. However, the award for costs is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Office of the Ombudsman v. CA (G.R. No. 168670)
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the

Decisioni[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
85585 dated June 14, 2005 which set aside the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) finding respondent Heidi
M. Estandarte guilty of grave misconduct.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 17, 1998, Peoples Graftwatch, through its
Chairman, Dr. Patricio Y. Tan, referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas), for immediate investigation, a
complaint of the Faculty Club and Department Heads of the
Ramon Torres National High School (hereinafter the Faculty
Club) against Heidi Estandarte, the school principal. The
complaint consisted of 33 allegations of improprieties ranging
from illegal handling of school funds, irregular financial
transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority.ii[2] However, the
complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant, and not supported by the sworn statements of
witnesses. The complaint also lacked a statement of nonforum shopping as required under CSC Resolution No. 95-3099
dated May 9, 1995.iii[3] The Ombudsman (Visayas) treated the
matter as a request for assistance, and docketed the
complaint as RAS-VIS 98-1030.
On August 31, 1998, the Ombudsman forwarded the
complaint to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
Regional Office VI (DECS-Region VI) and the Commission on
Audit (COA) for appropriate action pursuant to Section 15(2)
of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.iv[4] On September 29, 1998, the
DECS-Region VI found that the complaint did not comply with

the formalities under Executive Order No. 292, otherwise

known as The Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, it dismissed
the complaint, without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate one.
Undaunted, the Faculty Club filed a formal complaint
sworn and subscribed to by the complainants with DECSRegion VI on February 5, 1999.v[5] However, in a lettervi[6]
dated February 12, 1999, the said office dismissed the
complaint outright for lack of verification and certification
against forum shopping.
On March 22, 1999, the DECS-Region VI received the
requisite verification and certification.vii[7] This case was
entitled Faculty and Department Heads of the Ramon Torres
National High School, Bago City v. Heidi Estandarte.
On April 19, 1999, the DECS-Region VI required
Estandarte to answer the charges in writing.viii[8] Estandarte
filed her answer to the complaint on June 7, 1999.ix[9]
Thereafter, a Special Investigating Committee was created to
hear the case; DECS-Region VI approved the composition of
the Committee in a 1st Indorsement dated July 26, 1999.x[10]
The Committee issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
the State Auditor assigned to the case, requiring him to
produce the original copies of certain documents. The State
Auditor, however, replied that he could not comply with the

subpoena because the documents are being used by the

Ombudsman (Visayas) in the criminal and administrative cases
pending before it which concerned the same parties. xi[11]
On September 17, 1999, the Committee held a prehearing conference.xii[12] It issued a 1st Indorsement on
December 6, 1999, recommending the dismissal of the case on
the ground of forum shopping.
Meanwhile, the COA referred the complaint against
Estandarte to the Provincial Auditor for the Province of Negros
Occidental, Crispin A. Pinaga, Jr. Pursuant thereto, Pinaga
conducted an investigation and submitted his report to the
Ombudsman (Visayas). He found that Estandartes actions in
connection with 24 of the 33 allegations in the complaint were
within the bounds of propriety.xiii[13] The Provincial Auditor
made the following findings:
Complaint No. 2 - The collections of
miscellaneous fee of Ten Pesos (P10.00) (Annex
II) per student upon enrolment which was not
authorized by DECS.
As explained by the principal in her
letter dated June 8, 1998, this practice had
been going on when she assumed thereat and
the same has the implied permission of the PTA
(Annex III).

Finding:
The imposition of this miscellaneous fee
of Ten Pesos (P10.00) is in violation of DECS
Order No. 27 s. 1995 dated May 24, 1995
(Annex IV).
Complaint 19 & 24
The principal, Miss Heidi M. Estandarte
bought the .38 Caliber Handgun and Shotgun
which she registered under her name, which
should not be done so because the money she
used to purchase said firearm came from the
student government fund.
Finding:
The firearms as alleged by the principal
were intended for the use of the security guard
of the school. However, the arm dealer had
secured the licenses of the firearms in the
name of the principal. These firearms had been
turned-over to the School Supply Officer
(Annex V). Representations had been made for
the transfer of the license to the school, Ramon
Torres National High School (Annex VI-A).
Complaint 21 & 31

She sold, kept and disbursed the income

of the old newspaper with no accounting by the
COA since 1994.
Complaint 23 & 25
The principal Ms. Estandarte accepted
cash and in kind donations without being
properly channeled and accounted first by the
property custodian and the cash without first
[being] deposited in the Trust Fund.
Finding:
Cash donations as acknowledged by Ms.
Heidi Estandarte are as follows:
Source
Amount

Mrs. Ma. Belen J. Elizalde

(not Phil-Am Life) (Annex VI)
10,000.00
Coca Cola Bottlers (Annex VIII)
100,000.00

Mr. Kojima (Annex IX)

53,400.00
Sales Old Newspaper (Annex X)
3,949.00
Total
P167,349.00

=========
The donations and the proceeds from the sale
of old newspaper were personally received and
disbursed by Ms. Estandarte. However, these
amounts were not acknowledged through the
issuance of official receipts.
Hence the
donations were not taken up in the book of
accounts of the school. Further these amounts
were disbursed personally by the principal Ms.
Heidi Estandarte who acted as the procurement
and disbursing officer at the same time and in
violation of the applicable law which provides
to wit:

property officially received by a public office in any capacity or

upon any occasion must be accounted for as government
funds and government property. Government property
should be taken up in the books of the agency concerned at
acquisition cost or an appraised value.
Section 68 PD 1445
Issuance of Official Receipt (1) No
payment of any nature shall be received by a
collecting officer without immediately issuing
an official receipt in acknowledgment thereof.
The receipt may be in the form of postage,
internal revenue or documentary stamps and
the like, or officially numbered receipts, subject
to proper custody, accountability and audit.
Section 112 PD 1445
Recording of financial transactions
Each government agency shall record its
financial
transactions
and
operation
conformably
with
generally
accepted
accounting principles and in accordance with
pertinent laws and regulations.

Section 63, PD 1445

Accounting for Moneys and Property received by
public officials Except as may otherwise be specifically
provided by law or competent authority all moneys and

In view of the foregoing findings of the Auditor, the

Ombudsman (Visayas) issued the Memorandum dated
October 8, 1999, with the following recommendation:

1.) This RAS be upgraded to criminal and

administrative cases against Ms.
Estandarte;
2.) Provincial Auditor Crispin Pinaga, Jr. be
required to submit (his) Affidavit/s or sworn
statement/s in order to substantiate his
findings. The same is true with respect to
the complaints;
3.) Upon receipt of the Affidavits of Provincial
Auditor Pinaga, Jr. and the complainants, a
preventive suspension order be issued
against respondent Estandarte for a period
as may be warranted under the
circumstance, to be determined and
recommended by the investigator to whom
the administrative case may be assigned;
and
4.) RAS-VIS-98-1030 be considered closed and
terminated.xiv[14]
The Ombudsman (Visayas) decided to refer the
administrative aspect of the case (OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941,
entitled COA Region 6, Office of the Provincial Auditor v.
Heidi Estandarte) to the DECS-Region VI for administrative
adjudication pursuant to Section 23(2) of Rep. Act No. 6770.
The complete records of the case were forwarded to the
DECS-Region VI in a letter dated November 29, 1999.xv[15]

It appeared, however, that the DECS-Region VI did not

receive this referral because on December 7, 1999, it inquired
on the status of RAS-VIS-98-1030 from the Ombudsman
(Visayas).xvi[16] On March 9, 2000, the Ombudsman (Visayas)
inquired about the progress of the case from the DECS-Region
VI,xvii[17] and when it did not receive an answer, it sent another
letter-inquiry on September 21, 2000.xviii[18] Finally, on
November 22, 2000, the Ombudsman (Visayas) received a
letter from the DECS-Region VI informing it that the latter did
not receive any referral concerning the case.xix[19] Hence, the
Ombudsman (Visayas) again forwarded the records of the case
to the DECS-Region VI, which received them on December 26,
2000.xx[20]
The DECS-Region VI directed the consolidation of
this case (COA Region 6, Office of the Provincial Auditor v.
Heidi Estandarte) with the case pending before it (Faculty and
Department Heads of the Ramon Torres National High School,
Bago City v. Heidi Estandarte).xxi[21] Thereafter, the hearing of
the case by the Special Investigating Committee resumed.
In view of the referral to DECS-Region VI, the
Ombudsman (Visayas) considered OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941
closed and terminated in its Memorandum of November 27,
2001.xxii[22]
In a letterxxiii[23] dated April 29, 2002, the Faculty Club
requested the Ombudsman (Visayas) to take over the case
for speedier disposition. Ms. Lucia Jane Grecia, a member of
the Faculty Club, also wrote a letter to the Ombudsman
(Visayas) complaining that she was being oppressed by
Estandarte. She likewise requested the Ombudsman (Visayas)

to take over the case. Consequently, on July 5, 2002, the

Ombudsman (Visayas) informed the DECS-Region VI that it
would not object if the case is returned to it.xxiv[24]

Ombudsman (Visayas), therefore, issued an Order stating that

in view of Estandartes failure to attend the scheduled
hearing, she is deemed to have waived her right to a formal

On August 16, 2002, DECS-Region VI turned over the

records of the case to the Ombudsman (Visayas) for
adjudication, stating that *i+t is the impression of this Office
that the complainants intend that their case be heard by the
Office of the Ombudsman and that Office had also manifested
its willingness to reassume jurisdiction of the same.xxv[25] The
case was docketed as OMB-V-A-02-0572-J.

investigation unless she is able to justify her absence. In an

Urgent Motion for Postponement,xxx[30] Estandartes counsel
explained that he was due to attend a hearing in another
court on the scheduled day of the hearing. He manifested that
they intended to challenge the Ombudsmans order denying

On November 6, 2002, the Ombudsman (Visayas) set

the motion to remand the case to the DECS-Region VI through

the case for preliminary conference.xxvi[26] In the meantime,

a petition for certiorari. In its Orderxxxi[31] dated July 24, 2003,

Estandarte filed an Urgent Motion to Remandxxvii[27] the case

the Ombudsman reset the preliminary conference to July 30,

to the DECS-Region VI on the ground that jurisdiction is

2003.

now exclusively vested on the latter. On December 17, 2002,

the Ombudsman (Visayas) denied the motion ratiocinating
that it was not barred from assuming jurisdiction over the
complaint after the DECS-Region VI had relinquished its
jurisdiction over the same.xxviii[28] Estandarte filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Order, which was later denied by the
Ombudsman (Visayas).xxix[29]
The preliminary conference was set on May 21, 2003.
On the said date, only the counsel of COA was present. The

On July 21, 2003, Estandarte filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings on the ground that she filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the CA assailing the order denying her
motion to remand the case to the DECS-Region VI. The
Ombudsman denied the motion.xxxii[32]
On July 29, 2003 Estandarte filed an Urgent Motion for
Postponementxxxiii[33] of the hearing scheduled the following
day, and a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for

Voluntary Inhibition, assailing the denial of her motion to

suspend the proceedings. However, due to her failure to
furnish the complainants with a copy of the motion to
postpone, the Ombudsman (Visayas) proceeded with the
preliminary conference with only the complainants present.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution.xxxiv[34]

Estandarte filed a petition for review with prayer for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction with the CA. She alleged that the Ombudsman
(Visayas) violated her right to due process when her request
for a formal investigation was denied; that the DECS-Region

In a Decision dated March 9, 2004, the Ombudsman

(Visayas) found Estandarte guilty of grave misconduct, thus:

VI has jurisdiction over the case; and that the Ombudsman

(Visayas) failed to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.xxxvii[37]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Heidi

Estandarte, Principal, Ramon Torres National High School,
Bago City, Negros Occidental, is hereby found guilty of Grave
Misconduct, and is meted the penalty of Dismissal from
Service, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office
and forfeiture of all benefits and cancellation of Civil Service
eligibilities.xxxv[35]
The Ombudsman (Visayas) held that Estandartes
failure to issue receipts for the donations received in violation
of Sections 63, 68, and 112 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1445, as well as the appropriation for personal use of the
proceeds from the sale of the old newspapers and the
counterpart contribution of the students for diploma case,
constitute grave misconduct. The act of submitting receipts
which do not prove that disputed items were purchased
suggests that Estandarte is predisposed to commit
misrepresentation.xxxvi[36]

On September 10, 2004, the CA ordered the issuance

of a TRO.xxxviii[38] It later granted Estandartes application for a
writ of preliminary injunction in a Resolutionxxxix[39] dated
November 10, 2004.
On June 14, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Decision granting
the petition and remanding the case to the Special
Investigating Committee of the DECS-Region VI. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in
the case at bench, SETTING ASIDE the decision

rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman

(Visayas) on March 9, 2004 in OMB-V-A-020572-J and the order issued by it in the same
case on June 3, 2004 and ORDERING the Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to remand the
record of OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941 to the
Special Investigating Committee of DECSRegion VI created on July 26, 1999 for the said
committee to conduct further proceedings
therein with utmost dispatch and eventually to
submit its findings and recommendations to the
Director of Public Schools for the proper
disposition thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.xl[40]

and jurisdiction over such cases is originally and exclusively

lodged with the Investigating Committee created pursuant to
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670. xliii[43]
The appellate court further held that, assuming the
Ombudsman (Visayas) has jurisdiction, the assailed decision
and order would have to be set aside because Estandarte was
denied her right to substantive and procedural due process. It
pointed out that she was denied the right to a formal
investigation and the opportunity to be heard. Following the
Courts ruling in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,xliv[44]
the CA held that the Ombudsman (Visayas) has no authority to
directly impose the penalty of dismissal on those who are the
subject of its investigation because its power is merely
recommendatory.xlv[45]
The Ombudsman, now petitioner, submits the following
issues:
I.

The CA held that the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or

in excess of jurisdiction when it took over the case after it
issued a memorandum considering the case closed and
terminated and after jurisdiction had already been vested in
the Special Investigating Committee. Such act violates the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction is acquired
by or attached to a proper investigative body or agency, such
jurisdiction continues until the termination of the case. Citing
Fabella v. Court of Appealsxli[41] and Emin v. de Leon,xlii[42] the
CA held that Rep. Act No. 4670 specifically covers and governs
administrative proceedings involving public school teachers,

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS FULL

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION
OVER PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, INCLUDING THE LESSER
POWER TO ENFORCE THE SANCTIONS MPOSED
ON ERRING FUNCTIONARIES, PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS INCLUDED.
II.
THE RELIANCE BY THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ON THE OBITER DICTUM IN

TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

379 SCRA 322 (2002) DISPOSSESING THE
OMBUDSMAN OF ITS DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY, CONSTITUTES A GRAVE ERROR
CONSIDERING THAT: THE POWER OF THE
OMBUDSMAN TO IMPLEMENT ITS JUDGMENTS
HAS ALREADY BEEN SETTLED BY NO LESS THAN
THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF
LEDESMA [VS.] COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 465
SCRA 437 (2005), AND FURTHER AFFIRMED IN
THE CASE OF OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 160675,
PROMULGATED ON 16 JUNE 2006.

AND PROCEDURAL DUE [PROCESS], AND

NEITHER WAS THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING AGAINST HER TAINTED WITH ANY
IRREGULARITY, AS IN FACT THE OMBUDSMAN
AFFORDED HER DUE PROCESS.
V.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF GUILT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ESTANDARTE WHICH WARRANTS
THE IMPOSITION ON HER OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE.xlvi[46]

III.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN DID NOT
COMMIT ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
TOOK OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION OF THE DISCIPLINARY CASE
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT ESTANDARTE.
AS IN POINT OF LAW IT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE SAID CASE WHEN THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REFERRED THE
SAME TO THE OMBUDSMAN.
IV.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
APPELLATE COURT, PRIVATE RESPONDENT
ESTANDARTE WAS NOT DENIED SUBSTANTIVE

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that it is

bereft of the authority to directly impose on the respondent
the sanction of dismissal from service. It stresses that it has
full and complete administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over
public school teachers. It points out that Ledesma v. Court of
Appealsxlvii[47] already declared that the ruling in the Tapiador
case, that the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss
an employee from government service, is merely an obiter
dictum. Therefore, it has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of a public official or employee, and
direct and compel the head of office and agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed.xlviii[48]
Petitioner submits that it has concurrent disciplinary
jurisdiction with the DECS over the administrative case against
the respondent. Jurisdiction over the said case is not exclusive
to the DECS, as the respondent is a public official and the

offense charged pertains to the performance of her official

functions. Consequently, there is no bar for it to take
cognizance of the case after the DECS referred it for
administrative adjudication.xlix[49]
Petitioner further avers that the Fabella case is not applicable
to the present case because it does not involve an issue of
illegal constitution of any investigating committee. Rep. Act
No. 4670 provides for the administrative disciplinary
procedure in cases involving public school teachers where the
case is filed with the DECS.l[50]
Petitioner contends that the respondent was given ample
opportunities to rebut the charges and defend herself from
the administrative case filed against her. By her failure to
comply with the order to submit a position paper, submitting
instead frivolous motions that delayed the proceedings,
respondent was deemed to have waived her right to a formal
investigation. Petitioner points out that respondent opted for
a formal investigation only when the case was submitted for
resolution.li[51]
Finally, petitioner maintains that its finding is based on more
than substantial evidence. Factual findings of administrative
and quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded not only
respect but at all times finality.lii[52]
Respondent, for her part, argues that petitioner cannot divest
the DECS of its jurisdiction over the administrative case
because once jurisdiction attaches, it continues until the
termination of the case. She posits that when the DECS

assumed jurisdiction over the case, the petitioner was

effectively precluded from assuming the same jurisdiction.liii[53]
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not the DECS
has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
The petition has no merit.
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases
against government employees, which includes public school
teachers, is vested by no less than Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution which states
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof.liv[54]
In a case of recent vintage, the Court held that the
Ombudsman has full administrative disciplinary authority over
public officials and employees of the government, thus:
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770
taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority. These provisions cover the entire

gamut of administrative adjudication which

entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold
hearings in accordance with its rules of
procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under
preventive suspension public officers and
employees pending an investigation, determine
the appropriate penalty imposable on erring
public officers or employees as warranted by
the evidence, and necessarily, impose the said
penalty.lv[55]
However, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670, otherwise known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, provides that:
Section 9. Administrative Charges.
Administrative charges against a teacher shall
be heard initially by a committee composed of
the corresponding School Superintendent of
the Division or a duly authorized representative
who would at least have the rank of a division
supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers organization and a supervisor of the
Division, the last two to be designated by the
Director of Public Schools. The committee shall
submit its findings, and recommendations to
the Director of Public Schools within thirty days
from the termination of the hearings: Provided,
however, That, where the school

superintendent is the complainant or an

interested party, all the members of the
committee shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Education.
In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,lvi[56] the Court ruled that Section
9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 reflects the legislative intent to impose
a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in
connection with administrative proceedings involving public
school teachers. And in Alcala v. Villar,lvii[57] this Court
emphasized that:
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including
members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries except over officials who
may be removed by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was
held that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, specifically covers and
governs administrative proceedings involving
public school teachers.lviii[58]
Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region VI first assumed jurisdiction
over the administrative complaint against the respondent. It
should be recalled that when Peoples Graftwatch forwarded

the complaint to the Ombudsman (Visayas), the latter treated

it as a request for assistance and referred it to the DECSRegion VI and COA for appropriate action. After it had
resolved to upgrade the matter to an administrative case, the
Ombudsman decided not to take cognizance of the same and
refer it, instead, to the DECS-Region VI pursuant to Section
23(2) of R.A. 6770 which provides:
Section 23. Formal Investigation.
xxxx
(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman
may refer certain complaints to the proper
disciplinary authority for the institution of
appropriate administrative proceedings
against erring public officers or employees,
which shall be terminated within the period
prescribed in the civil service law. Any delay
without just cause in acting on any referral
made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be
a ground for administrative action against the
officers or employees to whom such referrals
are addressed and shall constitute a graft
offense punishable by a fine of not exceeding
five thousand (P5,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
We do not agree with petitioners contention that it could
assume jurisdiction over the administrative case after the
DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction
over the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction is a
matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the

instance of the parties but continues until the case is

terminated.lix[59] When the complainants filed their formal
complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on
the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the
instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of
the DECS and petitioner.
Nonetheless, even if we hold that the Ombudsman (Visayas)
had concurrent jurisdiction over the administrative case, we
would still sustain the DECS authority to decide the
administrative case. In one case, the Court pronounced that
In any event, since We are not dealing with
jurisdiction but mainly with venue, considering
both court concerned do have jurisdiction over
the cause of action of the parties herein against
each other, the better rule in the event of
conflict between two courts of concurrent
jurisdiction as in the present case, is to allow
the litigation to be tried and decided by the
court which, under the circumstances
obtaining in the controversy, would, in the
mind of this Court, be in a better position to
serve the interests of justice, considering the
nature of the controversy, the comparative
accessibility of the court to the parties, having
in view their peculiar positions and
capabilities, and other similar factors. x x x
xlx[60]

Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher

who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670, the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is
in a better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS
has already commenced proceedings over the administrative
case by constituting the Special Investigating Committee
pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
We are not unmindful of the Courts ruling in Emin v. De
Leonlxi[61] reiterated in Alcala v. Villar,lxii[62] that a party may be
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the DECS:

As held previously, participation by parties in

the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto bars them from raising
any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them. In the case
at bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time in his amended
petition for review before the CA. He did not
raise this matter in his Motion to Dismiss filed
before the CSC Regional Office. Notably, in his
Counter-Affidavit, he himself invoked the
jurisdiction of the Commission by stating that
he was open to further investigation by the
CSC to bring light to the matter and by further
praying for any remedy or judgment which
under the premises are just and equitable. It is
an undesirable practice of a party participating
in the proceedings, submitting his case for
decision, and then accepting the judgment only

if favorable, but attacking it for lack of

jurisdiction, when adverse.lxiii[63]

However, the rulings of the Court in Alcala and de Leon are

not applicable in this case. From the very start, respondent
consistently protested the referral of the case back to the
Ombudsman, and demanded that the same be remanded to
the DECS. She refused to participate in the proceedings before
the Ombudsman precisely because she believed that
jurisdiction was already vested on the DECS-Region VI. Hence,
she filedinstead a motion to remand the case to the DECSRegion VI and motions to postpone or suspend the
proceedings. On the other hand, what was striking in the Emin
and Alcala cases was that the respondent therein actively
participated in the proceedings before the other tribunal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 14, 2005 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131136

February 28, 2001

CONRADO L. DE RAMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION), ELADIO MARTINEZ, DIVINO DE JESUS,
MORELL AYALA, ARISTEO CATALLA, DAISY PORTA,

FLORDELIZA ORIASEL, GRACIELA GLORY, FELECIDAD ORINDA

Y, MA. PETRA MUFFET LUCE, ELSA MARINO, BERNARDITA
MENDOZA, JANE MACATANGA y ADELFO GLODOVIZA and
FLORENIO RAMOS, respondents.

Felicidad Orinday

Accounting Clerk II

June 27, 1995

Bernardita
Mendoza

Agricultural
Technologist

June 27, 1995

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Flordeliza Oriasel

Clerk I

June 27, 1995

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao,

Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Raffia wrote a letter dated
July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking
the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal
employees, namely:

Jane Macatangay

Day Care Worker I

June 27, 1995

Adolfo Glodoviza

Utility Worker II

June 27, 1995

Florenio Ramos

Utility Foreman

June 27, 1995

NAME

POSITION

DATE OF
APPOINTMENT

Eladio Martinez

Registration Office I

June 1, 1995

Divino de Jesus

Bookbinder III

June 1, 1995

Morell Ayala

Accounting Clerk III

June 16, 1995

Daisy Porta

Clerk IV

June 27, 1995

Aristeo Catalla

Gen. Services Officer

June 19, 1995

Elsa Marino

Mun. Agriculturist

June 19, 1995

Graciela Glory

Bookkeeper II

June 27, 1995

Ma. Petra Muffet

Lucce

Accounting Clerk III

June 27, 1995

Petitioner de Raffia justified his recall request on the

allegation that, the appointments of the said employees were
"midnight" appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S.
Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
(Underscoring supplied)
While the matter was pending before the CSC, three of the
above-named employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala,
and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for payment
of their salaries, alleging that although their appointments
were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim, Director II of the

CSC Field Office based in Quezon, petitioner de Rama withheld

the payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office
Order No. 95-01, which was issued on June 30, 1995, wherein
the appointments of the said fourteen (14) employees were
recalled.

President and cannot be made to apply to local elective

officials. Thus, the CSC opined, "the appointing authority can
validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long
as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the
position."4

Based on the documents submitted by Marino, Ayala and

Oriazel, the Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued
an Order2 finding that since the claimants-employees had
assumed their respective positions and performed their duties
pursuant to their appointments, they are therefore entitled to
receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their
positions. Citing Rule V, Section 10 of the Omnibus Rules3
which provides, in part, that "if the appointee has assumed
the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his
salary at once without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission," the CSC Legal and QuasiJudicial Division ruled that the said employees cannot be
deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral act of
the newly-assumed mayor.

The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the

ground that they had already been approved by' the Head of
the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner's failure
to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or
recall of the said appointments.

On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's request for the
recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack
of merit. The CSC also cited Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the
Omnibus Rules, and declared that the appointments of the
said employees were issued in accordance with pertinent
laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately, and cannot
be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until
disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also dismissed petitioner's
allegation that these were "midnight" appointments, pointing
out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC's

Resolution, as well as the Order of the CSC Legal and QuasiJudicial Division, averring that the CSC was without
jurisdiction: (1) to refuse to revoke the subject appointments;
and (2) to uphold the validity of said appointments, even
assuming that there was failure to present evidence that
would prove that these appointments contravened existing
laws or rules. He also posited that the CSC erred in finding the
appointments valid despite the existence of circumstances
showing that the same were fraudulently issued and
processed.
On November 21, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. The CSC reiterated its ruling that:
In the absence of any showing that these alleged
midnight appointments were defective in form and in
substance, nor is there evidence presented to show
that subject appointments were issued in

contravention of law or rules, these appointments are

deemed valid and in effect.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mayor de Rama failed to present evidence that subject

appointments should be revoked or recalled because
of any of the abovementioned grounds enumerated.
As a matter of fact said appointments were even
approved by the Head, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena
City when submitted for attestation. In the absence of
a clear showing that these appointments were issued
in violation of any of these grounds, the Commission
has no other recourse but to uphold their validity.
(Underscoring supplied).
The CSC also 'cited the Supreme Court ruling in the case of
Aquino v. Civil Service Commission5 wherein this Court held
that:
It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued
and the moment the appointee assumes a position in
the civil service under a completed appointment, he
acquires a legal not merely equitable right (to the
position), which is protected not only by statute, but
also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away
from him either by revocation of the appointment, or
by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice
and hearing. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals, arguing that the CSC arrived at the

erroneous conclusion after it ignored his "supplement to the

consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration" wherein
he laid out evidence showing that the subject appointments
were obtained through fraud.
After reviewing the facts and issues raised by petitioner, the
Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 6 dated May 16, 1997
which held that there was no abuse of the power of
appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
The Court of Appeals further held that the fact that the
appointments of Marino, Ayala, Ramos, Mendoza and Glory
were made more than four (4) months after the publication of
the vacancies to which they were appointed is of no moment.
Setting aside petitioner's suppositions, the Court of Appeals
ruled that Republic Act No. 7041 does not provide that every
appointment to the local government service must be made
within four (4) months from publication of the vacancies. It
cited Section 80 of said Act, to wit:
Section 80. Public Notice of Vacancy: Personnel
Selection Board.
(a) Whenever a local chief executive decides to fill a
vacant career position, there shall be posted notices of
the vacancy in at least three (3) conspicuous public
places in the local government unit concerned for a
period of not less than fifteen (15) days.
(b) There shall be established in every province, city or
municipality a personnel selection board to assist the
local chief executive in the judicious and objective

selection of personnel for employment as well as for

promotion, and in the formulation of such policies as
would contribute to employee welfare.
(c) The personnel selection board shall be headed by
the local sanggunian concerned. A representative of
the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel
officer of the local government unit concerned shall be
ex officio members of the board.7
Likewise, neither did the CSC's own Circular Order No. 27,
Section 7, Series of 1991, require that vacant positions
published in a government quarterly must be filled up before
the advent of the succeeding quarter.
On the basis of all the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals
denied for lack of merit the petition for review.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the
appellate court erred in upholding the CSC's resolutions
despite the following defects:
I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted
by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating the
respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of
notice of vacancy as required by the rules and the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed
by the selection board and by the appointing authority
as required by the Civil Service rules;

IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the

appointments of respondents.8
In a Resolution dated October 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari on the
following assigned errors:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS,
GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE PETITIONERS RECALL OF THE
APPOINTMENTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE
FACE OF FRAUD AND VIOLATION OF RULES AND LAWS
ON ISSUANCE OF APPOINTMENTS.
II. THE-PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTICULAR
GROUNDS NAMELY:
I. No screening process and no criteria were
adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in
nominating the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public
places of notice of vacancy as required by the
rules and the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were not
observed by the selection board and by the

appointing authority as required by the Civil

Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the
appointments of respondents.
ARE NEW ISSUES BECAUSE THE GROUNDS FOR RECALL
OF THE APPOINTMENTS BY THE PETITIONER WERE
PRECISELY THE VIOLATION OF LAWS AND
REGULATIONS ON ISSUANCE OF APPOINTMENTS AS
RAISED BEFORE THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION.
Petitioner assails the findings of both the CSC and the Court of
Appeals for being contrary to law and not being supported by
the evidence on record.
This argument is too specious to be given credence. The
records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of
recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private
respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify
his action was that these were "midnight appointments" that
are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution.
However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said
prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth
and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on
the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments.
Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted
by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and
regulations governing appointments. His solitary reason for

recalling these appointments was that they were, to his

personal belief, "midnight appointments" which the outgoing
mayor had no authority to make.
Even in petitioner's consolidated appeal and motion for
reconsideration, he did not make any assertion that these
appointments were violative of civil service rules and
procedures. Indeed, he harped on the CSC's alleged lack of
jurisdiction to refuse to recall the subject appointments. After
first invoking the authority of the CSC to approve or affirm his
act, he then contradicted himself by arguing that the CSC had
no jurisdiction to do so, but only after the CSC had ruled that
the recall was without legal basis. He emphasized that he
alone has sole discretion to appoint and recall the
appointment of municipal employees, an authority which, he
stressed, the CSC cannot usurp. Yet, nowhere in said pleading
did he cite any other ground, much less present proof that
would warrant the recall of said appointments.
Perhaps realizing the weakness of his arguments, albeit
belatedly, petitioner filed a supplement to the appeal and
motion for reconsideration where, for the very first time, he
alleged that the appointments were fraught with irregularities
for failing to comply with CSC rules and regulations.
Nevertheless, the CSC overruled petitioner's assertions,
holding that no new evidence had been presented to warrant
a reversal of its earlier resolution.
Thus, in a petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner questioned the CSC's conclusion because it had
ignored the allegations and documents he presented in the
supplement to his earlier consolidated appeal and motion for

reconsideration. He argued that these form part of the

records of the case and that the CSC erred in failing to
consider the assertions he raised therein. The appellate court,
however, agreed with the CSC when it ruled that the
documents presented by petitioner in the supplemental
pleading did not constitute "new evidence" that would
convince the CSC to reverse its earlier ruling. In fine, the Court
of Appeals, as did the CSC, simply dismissed petitioner's
allegations and documents attached to the supplemental
pleading for they did not constitute new evidence that a court,
board or tribunal may entertain.
Herein lies the inconsistency of petitioner's arguments. He
faults the Court of Appeals and the CSC for ignoring his
supplemental pleading, while at the same time arguing that
the grounds for recall such as violations of laws and
regulations on issuance of appointments are not new issues
because he had timely raised them before the CSC.
There is no question that parties may file supplemental
pleadings to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading,
but which should not entirely substitute the latter. 9 The
propriety and substance of supplemental pleadings are
prescribed under Rule 10, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The

adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days

from notice of the order admitting the supplemental
pleading.
Supplemental pleadings must be with reasonable notice, and
it is discretionary upon the court or tribunal to allow the same
or not. Thus, the CSC was under no obligation to admit the
supplemental pleading, or even to consider the averments
therein.
Secondly, a supplemental pleading must state transactions,
occurrences or events which took place since the time the
pleading sought to be supplemented was filed. In the instant
case, petitioner alleged fraud and irregularities that
supposedly occurred contemporaneous to the execution of
the appointments. They should have been raised at the very
first opportunity. They are not new events which petitioner
could not have originally included as grounds for the recall of
the appointments.
Accordingly, the CSC, as well as the Court of Appeals, found
that the allegations in his supplemental pleading did not
constitute "new evidence" that can be the proper subject of a
supplemental pleading. These were old facts and issues which
he failed to raise earlier. Consequently, the CSC and the Court
of Appeals did not err in refusing to give credence to the
supplemental pleading.
Be that as it may, these alleged irregularities were considered
by the CSC and the Court of Appeals as new issues which were
raised for the first time on appeal. It is rather too late for
petitioner to raise these issues for the first time on appeal. It

is well-settled that issues or questions of fact cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.10 We have consistently held that
matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original
proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where
they are raised for the first time.11 To consider the alleged
facts and arguments raised belatedly in the supplemental
pleading to the appeal at this very late stage in the
proceedings would amount to trampling on the basic
principles of fair play, justice and due process. 12
The grounds for the recall of the appointments that petitioner
raised in his supplemental pleading to the consolidated appeal
and motion for reconsideration are that: (1) the rules on
screening of applicants based on adopted criteria were not
followed; (2) there was no proper posting of notice of
vacancy; and (3) the merit and fitness requirements set by the
civil service rules were not observed. These are grounds that
he could have stated in his order of recall, but which he did
not. Neither did he raise said grounds in his original appeal,
but only by way of a supplemental pleading. Failure of the
petitioner to raise said grounds and to present supporting
documents constitute a waiver thereof, and the same
arguments and evidence can no longer be entertained on
appeal before the CSC, nor in the Court of Appeals, and much
less in a petition for review before the Supreme Court. 13 In
fine, the raising of these factual issues for the first time in a
pleading which is supplemental only to an appeal is barred by
estoppel.14
Petitioner asks this Court to appreciate and consider these
factual issues. It must be recalled that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing

only errors of law, not of fact.15 That is, of course, unless the
factual findings assailed by petitioner are devoid of support by
the evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts.16
A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSC's ruling
is supported by the evidence and the law. The fourteen (14)
employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the
Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995.
There is no showing that any of the private respondents were
not qualified for the positions they were appointed to.
Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the
Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof,
they had already assumed their appointive positions even
before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as
town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect
immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by
petitioner.
It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment
and the appointee's assumption of the position in the civil
service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away
either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except
for cause and with previous notice and hearing."17 Moreover,
it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the
civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal,
not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is
protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well,
which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the
appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do
so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing. 18

Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming
the position of town mayor was to issue Office Order No. 9501 which recalled the appointments of the private
respondents. There was no previous notice, much less a
hearing accorded to the latter. Clearly, it was petitioner who
acted in undue haste to remove the private respondents
without regard for the simple requirements or due process of
law. In doing so, he overstepped the bounds of his authority.
While he argues that the appointing power has the sole
authority to revoke said appointments, there is no debate that
he does not have blanket authority to do so. Neither can he
question the CSC's jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall.
Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of
the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that "an
appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn
or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in
force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission."
Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment
initially approved, but only when such appointment and
approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions
of the civil service law and regulations.19
Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides:
Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with
pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately
upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if
the appointee has assumed the duties of the position,
he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once
without awaiting the approval of his appointment by
the Commission. The appointment shall remain

effective until disapproved by the Commission. In no

case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the
date of its issuance.
Section 20 of Rule VI also provides:
Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an
appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the
following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the
procedures/criteria provided in the agency's
Merit Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agency's
Selection/Promotion Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective
agreement between management and
employees relative to promotion; or
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law,
rules and regulations.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may
only be recalled on the above-cited grounds. And yet, the only
reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that
these were "midnight appointments." The CSC correctly ruled,
however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called
"midnight appointments," specifically those made within two
(2) months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

If ever there were other procedural or legal requirements that

were violated in implementing the appointments of the
private respondents, the same were not seasonably brought
before the Civil Service Commission. These cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition
for review is DENIED and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC Resolutions
Nos. 96-2828 and 96-7525 hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, De
Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 137473

August 2, 2001

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The present petition seeks to review and set aside the
Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated July 31,
19981 upholding the decision of the Civil Service Commission
which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Estelito V. Remolona
(Remolona) from the government service for dishonesty, and

the Resolution dated February 5, 19992 denying petitioner's

motion for reconsideration.
Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the
Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon,
while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa
Elementary School.
In a letter3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America,
District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility
of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as
per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for
Teachers.4 Mr. America likewise disclosed that he received
information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a fee of
P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher's
board examinations. -On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director Bella
Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona's
eligibility, after verification from the Register of Eligibles in the
Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that
Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing
examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10,
1989 does not include the name of Remolona. Furthermore,
Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating
belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the
examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%." 5

During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G.

Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City,
Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a
written statement of facts6 regarding the issuance of the
questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona, which is
summarized in the Memorandum7 submitted by Director
Pasion as follows:
"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September,
1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit Bus from Sta.
Cruz, Laguna on his way to San Pablo City, he met one
Atty. Hadji Salupadin (this is how it sounded) who
happened to be sitting beside him;
3.2 That a conversation broke out between them until
he was able to confide his problem to Atty. Salupadin
about his wife having difficulty in acquiring an
eligibility;
3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as
working at the Batasan, offered his help for a fee of
P3,000.00;
3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan
where he gave the amount of P2,000.00,
requirements, application form and picture of his wife;
3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around 1:00
P.M., they met again at the Batasan where he handed
to Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00 plus
P500.00 bonus who in turn handed to him the Report

of Rating of one Nery C. Remolona with a passing

grade, then they parted;
3.6 That sometime in the last week of September, he
showed the Report of Rating to the District Supervisor,
Francisco America who informed her (sic) that there
was no vacancy;
3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to Dr.
Magsino in writing . . . that Mr. America is asking for
money in exchange for the appointment of his wife but
failed to make good his promise. He attached the
corroborating affidavits of Mesdames Carmelinda
Pradillada and Rosemarie P. Romantico and Nery C.
Remolona x x x;
3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able to
get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each plus bonus of Nery
C. Remolona;
3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he
felt that Mr. America would verify the authenticity of
his wife's Report of Rating, he burned the original."
Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in
acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no
knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted
them to be together. Based on the foregoing, Director Pasion
recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative
action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona
from any liability since it has not been shown that she willfully
participated in the commission of the offense.

Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed

against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and Atty.
Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification
and dishonesty.8 A formal hearing ensued wherein the parties
presented their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC Regional
Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued a Memorandum dated
February 14, 19959 recommending that the spouses Estelito
and Nery Remolona be found guilty as charged and be meted
the corresponding penalty.
Said recommendation was adopted by the CSG which issued
Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20, 1995, finding the spouses
Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing
the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. The
case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin was held in abeyance
pending proof of his identity.10 In its Resolution No. 96551011
dated August 27, 1996, the CSC, acting on the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Remolona, absolved Nery
Remolona from liability and held that:
"Further, a review of the records and of the arguments
presented fails to persuade this Commission to
reconsider its earlier resolution insofar as Estelito
Remolona's culpability is concerned. The evidence is
substantial enough to effect his conviction. His act of
securing a fake eligibility for his wife is proved by
substantial evidence. However, in the case of Nery
Remolona, the Commission finds her innocent of the
offense charged, for there is no evidence to show that
she has used the fake eligibility to support an
appointment or promotion. In fact, Nery Remolona did
not indicate in her Personal Data Sheet that she

possesses any eligibility. It must be pointed out that it

was her husband who unilaterally worked to secure a
fake eligibility for her.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied insofar as respondent Estelito
Remolona is concerned. However, Resolution No. 952908 is modified in the sense that respondent Nery
Remolona is exonerated of the charges. Accordingly,
Nery Remolona is automatically reinstated to her
former position as Teacher with back salaries and
other benefits."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned
decision dismissing the petition for review filed by herein
petitioner Remolona. His motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
"1. in denying petitioner's motion for new trial;
2. in holding that petitioner is liable for dishonesty; and
3. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner for an
offense not work connected in relation to his official
position in the government service."
The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service
employee can be dismissed from the government service for
an offense which is not work-related or which is not
connected with the performance of his official duty. Remolona

likewise imputes a violation of his right to due process during

the preliminary investigation because he was not assisted by
counsel. He claims that the extra-judicial admission allegedly
signed by him is inadmissible because he was merely made to
sign a blank form. He also avers that his motion for new trial
should be granted on the ground that the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case
before the Regional Office of the CSC was not forwarded to
the Court of Appeals. Finally, he pleads that the penalty of
dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits is too harsh considering
the nature of the offense for which he was convicted, the
length of his service in government, that this is his first
offense, and the fact that no damage was caused to the
government.
The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial
confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted by
counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12
paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
deserves scant consideration.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. It is when questions are initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the

start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule

under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation.12
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may
at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains
that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry
may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel. In an
administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the
provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260
(otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to
counsel is not always imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measure against erring public officers and employees, with
the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority
is not part of a criminal prosecution.13
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in
the investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The
investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining
the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence
sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the

CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty

thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the
admissions made by Remolona during such investigation may
be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extrajudicial admission and that he merely signed a blank form
cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high position
in government as Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon and, as such,
he is expected to be circumspect in his actions specially where
he is being administratively charged with a grave offense
which carries the penalty of dismissal from service.
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to
due process under Section 2(3), Article XI (B) of the
Constitution which provides that "no officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause." Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable
under the Civil Service law, Remolona opines that such act
must have been committed in the performance of his function
and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of
dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating
of his wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on his
office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for
cause. This proposition is untenable.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave
offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in
order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The

rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or

employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a
dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and
well, because by reason of his government position, he is
given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and
entities of the government other than the office where he is
employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty
less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil
acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be
segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects
on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office
and the discipline and morale of the service.14
The principle is that when an officer or employee is
disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such
officer or employee but the improvement of the public service
and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in
the government.15
The general rule is that where the findings of the
administrative body are amply supported by substantial
evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also
finality, and are binding on this Court.16 It is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the

sufficiency of evidence.17 Thus, when confronted with

conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the
administrative agency concerned in the exercise of discretion
to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of
the evidence received.18 The rule, therefore, is that courts of
justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the
latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or
when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner
such that their action may amount to an excess of
jurisdiction.19

We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that

the penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that there
was no damage caused to the government since the certificate
of rating was never used to get an appointment for his wife,
Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary damage was incurred
by the government, there was still falsification of an official
document that constitutes gross dishonesty which cannot be
countenanced, considering that he was an accountable officer
and occupied a sensitive position.21 The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.22

We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below

and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings
of the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The written admission of
Remolona is replete with details that could have been known
only to him. No ill-motive or bad faith was ever imputed to
Director Pasion who conducted the investigation. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
remains unrebutted.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED

in toto.

The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken

during the formal hearing before the CSC is entirely a matter
of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of this Court clearly states
that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it is
within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the
original records of the proceedings under review transmitted
to it.20 Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits of the
case on the bases of the uncontroverted facts and admissions
contained in the pleadings filed by the parties.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Melo, Panganiban, Buena, JJ ., on official
leave.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., is on leave.