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probative value is the weight given to a particular piece of evidence.

10. Probative value. A torrens title, once issued, is an evidence of indefeasible title which the owner has,
and a person dealing with the land covered by such title need not go behind the corresponding certifi cate
and inquire into transactions the existence of which is not there intimated. Under Section 47, Act No. 496,
the certifi cate of title is conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far as otherwise provided
in this Act. This certifi cate refers to that issued pursuant to the decree of registration or patent, as the
case may be; it does not include such memoranda or annotations as may be effected by the Register of
Deeds in the process of subsequent registration. (LRC Consulta No. 45. Vicente, et al. v. Register of Deeds
of Pampanga, May 25, 1955; LRC Consulta No. 85, Register of Deeds of Mindoro Oriental v. Yu Hiong Bon,
April 14, 1956; and LRC Consulta No. 139, Register of Deeds of Mountain Province, pet., Feb. 21, 1957).

23. Probative value of Torrens title. As provided in Section 47 of Act No. 496, the original certifi cate in the
registration book, any copy thereof duly certifi ed under the signature of the Register of Deeds and also
the owners duplicate certifi cate, shall be received as evidence in all the court of the Philippines, and shall
be conclusive as to all matters contained therein principally, the identity of the owner of the land covered
thereby except so far as provided in the Land Registration Act.79 This rule is not true, however, with
respect to the contents of the annotations or memoranda on a certifi cate of title. Thus, it was held that
the memorandum of a power of attorney made on the back of an original certifi cate of title is not
admissible as evidence of the contents of said power of attorney, but only of the fact of its execution, of its
presentation for notation, and of its notation for the purposes of constructive notice to the public in
connection with the creation of preferential rights to the registered land covered by the title.80

Defective or void title may be the root of a valid title if it passes to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value. A void title is a useless piece of paper. It produces no right. In Republic vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 99331,
Apr. 21, 1999, the Supreme Court, however, said that even assuming arguendo that the procurement of
the title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, a defective title may be the source of a completely
legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. In Gloria Cruz vs. CA, 281 SCRA 492, it
was said: Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certifi cate of title thus issued,
acquired rights over the property the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of
the certifi cate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confi dence in the
certifi cate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certifi cate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certifi cate to
determine the condition of the property

PROBATIVE VALUE OF A TORRENS TITLE

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Ching vs.
Court of Appeals, 1990, 181 SCRA 9, 18; Sec. 49, Act 496). It is settled that mere possession cannot defeat

the title of a holder of a registered Torrens title to real property (J.M. Tuazon & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
1979, 93SCRA 146 cited in Abad vs Court of Appeals, 1989, 179 SCRA 817, 826-827).
A Torrens certificate accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee simple title which as owner possesses. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title
which the ownerhas (Legarda, et al., vs. Saleedy, 31 Phil. 590 [915].
A Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse, open, and notorious possession. A
registered title under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once registered, is
noticed to the whole world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration
(Egao vs. Court of Appeals, 1989, 174 SCRA 484, 492 citing Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595; See
also Sec. 46 of Act 496, Land Registration Act).
4. In the case of a transfer certificate of title, the same is enforceable in the hands of a holder in good faith
and for valuable consideration or an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is
deemed, under the Torrens system, to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for
value (Ibid citing Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). Section 51, Paragraph 2 of the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
5. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1073 dated January 25, 1977 further provides: Section 3 the
judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected Spanish Grants such as
application for the purchase, prior to the transfer or sovereignty from Spanish to the United State shall no
longer be allowed. However, P.D. 1529 should be read in conjunction with the provisions of this section
shall not be construed as prohibiting any person claiming the same land under Section 48 (
and

Section 48 (C) if he meets the conditions prescribed for Judicial confirmation of Torrens System.
6. On July 7, 1989, Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela
Cruz, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint on the subject land claim in the history
of the Philippines in the subject controversy in these consolidated cases base on the following ground that;
(a) private respondent are already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens title
which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title. (b) To enjoy the presumption of validity as a last
hurrah to champion their claim to the vast state covered by the Spanish title.

GENERAL RULE
A certificate of titles is not conclusive evidence of title if the same land had already been registered and an
earlier certificate for the same is in existence whether wholly or partly, the certificate that is earlier title in
date prevails. (Heir of Luis J. Gonzales vs. Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeal, 261 SCRA 327)
A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of
another in earlier land registration case. (Laburada vs. Land Registration Authority, 387 SCRA 333) a
second decree for the same land is, therefore, null and void (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System vs. Court of Appeal, 215 SCRA 783) once declared by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Torrens
System Title to the land is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceeding being in rem
(Lahora vs. Dayanghirang, Jr., 37 SCRAA 346).

Proceeding in rem. Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in
rem, and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. (P.D. 1529,
Sec. 2)
Land registration under the Torrens system is a judicial proceeding in rem (P.D. 1529. Sec. 2), intended to
confirm and register the ownership or title of a person over the land. (see Republic vs. Reyes, 71 SCRA
450, 458; Development Bank of the Phil. Vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 267, 281)
In rem proceedings such as land registration constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. (Calalang
vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208 SCRA 215) (Machine copy is hereto attached as NNEX and
made an integral part of this paragraph.)

Probative Value of a Torrens Title


A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein ( Ching vs. Court of
Appeals, 1990, 181 SCRA 9, 18; Sec. 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and
that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing prior to the
issuance thereof not annotated on the title.
The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein (Ybanez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 1991, 194 SCRA 743)
QUESTION:
What is the probative value of Torrens title?
Torrens title may be received in evidence in all courts of the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all
matters contained therein, principally as to the identity of the land owner except so far as provided in the
Land Registration Act.

A Torrens certificate is an evidence of indefeasible title of property in favour of the person in whose name
appears therein such holder is entitled to the possession of the property until his title is nullified.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990


ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, respondents.
Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.
Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of Appeals (penned by
Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP
entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City)
granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No.
6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land
Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No. 2433
correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of KayBiga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit
"7", p. 80, CA, Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio
and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633 was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly
(Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and
83, Ibid.).
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo
Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the
estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in
the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors
appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was
appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3,
1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory submitted to
the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private
respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil
Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on
possession (p. 33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the
face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint). (Order
dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or
Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing
abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served
by summons and other processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his
estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the complaint were published
in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12
and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive
pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the
presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be duly substantiated by the
evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant declaring the

former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137;
ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant
Ching Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing in which the said
T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered
to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff
Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the
fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes due the Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was
cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently
sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition on
November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980
(penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo).
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered and set aside, the decision
dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated September 2, 1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but the same was denied by the
trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed on September 30,
1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February 10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the pendency of the case with the
Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with the resolution dated April 26,
1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, 1982 (p. 159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to
the petition in the resolution of June 28, 1982 (p. 191, Ibid.)
Petitioner raised the following:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE VALIDLY SERVED
WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND CANCELLATION OF
TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY
SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE
CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
AND THE PARTIES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES IN INSTITUTING THE ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19 YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE OF
REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a way probably
not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the court a quo never
acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of service of summons by publication in
accordance with the ruling laid down in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem, for while the judgment
that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy
and to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be
allowed unto Ching Leng who on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the doctrine
enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the
whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.
Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v.
Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced
thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475
[1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical
personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate as co-defendant. it is
a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or administrator in his representative capacity
(21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay
City as shown in his death certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same
court, Branch III commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such misleading and
misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case, RTC,
Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496,
as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v.
Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world
when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner Perkins was a non-resident
defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks
with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The action being a quasi in rem summons by publication satisfied the
constitutional requirement of due process.
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the amended complaint of
private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser
for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since
1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter
one year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed
unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66742; Teoville
Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the
private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length
of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the
"mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A
strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible
against any "information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda.
de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated
September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint
in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

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