TRIAL

TECHNIQUE
LIBEL CASES

SPS. FREDDIE & ELIZABETH WEBB vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (G.R. No. 139120. July 31,
2003)
FACTS: On October 13, 1995, spouses Freddie and Elizabeth Webb and their children (petitioners) filed a
Joint Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-3485,
against the members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) for publishing seven
alleged "false and defamatory news articles implicating petitioners in the Vizconde rape slay
case and the purported 'cover-up' thereof."
After preliminary investigation, the Makati City Prosecutors Office, by Memorandum of February 5, 1996,
dismissed the complaint against the respondent-members of the PDI Board of Directors as Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code is specific in stating that only the person who shall publish or cause the
publication or exhibition; the author or editor of a book or pamphlet; the editor or business manager of a
daily newspaper . . . shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein.
The City Prosecutors Office, however, found probable cause for two counts of libel against respondents
Yambot, Jimenez-Magsanoc, Nolasco, Engracia, Paurom, Bandayrel, Lardizabal and Herrera, and one count
of libel against respondent Jumilla, arising from the publication in the PDI of news reports entitled "Alabang
Boys: A Passion for Basketball and Ecstasy and "NBI Probers: Webb Papers Falsified."
Informations for libel were accordingly filed against the non-members of the PDI Board before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
On petition for review by petitioners, the Secretary of Justice, by January 22, 1998 letter-resolution
addressed to the Makati City Prosecutor, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against the respondentPDI members of the Board, and reversed the finding of probable cause against all the other respondents.
He accordingly directed the withdrawal of the informations filed against the non-members of the PDI
Board.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Secretary of Justices January 22, 1998 letter-resolution
having been denied by letter-resolution of August 26, 1998 addressed to petitioners counsel, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. By Resolution of February 8, 1999, the appellate
court dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari for failure to timely file it, following Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended
HELD: At the time petitioners petition for certiorari was filed before the appellate court and even up to
the rendition of its assailed Resolution on February 8, 1999, the rule in force was above-quoted Rule 65,
Sec. 4. The petition at bar would then fail. The rule, however, was amended during the pendency of the
present case before this Court by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Further Amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure) which took effect on September 1, 2000. The 60-day period to file a petition for
certiorari is now reckoned from date of receipt of the notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration or
new trial if one was filed.
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors,
hence, has power of review over their resolutions. He may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
rulings.
The power of review of the Secretary of Justice is also recognized under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, as in the present case, any disposition of
the case be it dismissal of the case, or conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound
discretion of the court. For although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court
which is the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case.
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Our duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case
may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may
not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions to this rule,
none of which are obtaining in the case now before us x x x x Since the Information has already been filed,
the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case is the Regional Trial Court as earlier discussed .
(Underscoring supplied)
In the present case, there is no showing that the public prosecutor has filed a motion to withdraw the
informations before the trial court. The trial judge has thus not been afforded the chance to pass upon any
such motion to determine whether probable cause indeed does or does not lie against the accused-nonmembers of the PDI Board.

With respect to the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice of the exclusion of the respondent-members of
the PDI Board of Directors in the information for libel: The records on hand do not show that petitioners
have come up with prima facie evidence that respondent-members of the Board actually caused or
participated in the publication, or were in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing or
publishing of the alleged libelous articles. It is on this score that this Court finds that the affirmance by
the Secretary of Justice of the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent-members of the PDI Board
was not attended with grave abuse of discretion.

JUDGE MARTIN A. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SUN-STAR PUBLISHING, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 133575 December 15, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. He filed a
Complaint for Libel on account of two articles which appeared in the August 28, 1997 and August 30, 1997
issues of Sun-Star Daily, a provincial newspaper published and circulated by respondent in Cebu.
The August 28, 1997 article, which appeared on pages two (2) and twenty two (22) of the aforesaid
newspaper, reads in part as follows
"Judge Ocampo facing graft raps at Ombud
"BRANCH 7 Judge Martin Ocampo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) faces graft charges before
the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Lawyer Elias Tan who also accused Ocampo of conduct unbecoming a judge asked the
Supreme Court to bar Ocampos retirement pending an investigation and deny the
retirement benefits due him should he be convicted by final judgment.
Tan said Ocampo violated the provisions of judicial canons when he granted petition for relief
from judgment on a dismissed case against the Millenium Industrial Commercial Corp.
(MICC).
ISSUE: (W)hether or not petitioner is entitled to a judgment for civil libel as a matter of law
HELD: We find no merit in the instant Petition.
While the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are exceptions to this general
rule, set forth in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit
"ART. 354. Requirement of publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions."
We agree with the lower court that the subject articles fall under the second exception for the following
reasons:
First, the articles complained of are fair and true reports of a judicial/administrative proceeding, which is
not confidential in nature. They quote directly from the affidavit-complaint filed before the Ombudsman.
Indeed, a perusal of the first article would readily show that it merely reported the filing of graft charges
against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. In so reporting, the article quoted
from the affidavit-complaint filed by the complainant lawyer, Elias Tan, and narrated the antecedent facts
leading to the filing of the graft charges. On the other hand, the second article presented petitioners own
reactions against the graft charges filed against him; with explanatory statements from Office of the
Ombudsman Director Virginia Santiago refuting petitioners claims that the said office had no jurisdiction
over graft charges against judges for alleged violations of judicial canons.
Second, there were no comments or remarks made by the reporter of private respondent in both
instances. The articles were pure reports of the graft charges filed against petitioner.
Third, they were both fair reports. The fairness and balance exercised by private respondent is evident in
the fact that petitioner was given a chance to air his side on the graft charges filed against him. In fact,

before the first article was published, private respondents reporter took pains to interview petitioner on
the matter; and his reactions were equally published in both articles.
Finally, the reports were also true accounts of a newsworthy event, the filing of graft charges against a
local judge. It cannot be denied that petitioner did face "graft raps" at the Ombudsman as the complaint
filed against him was for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.4
Neither can the narration in the articles be denied as these were merely culled from the subject affidavitcomplaint.

ERNIE G. MIAQUE, NOEL R. CABOBOS, RODOLFO H. DIVINAGRACIA and PETER G.

JIMENEA, complainants, vs. JUDGE NILO P. PAMONAG, in his capacity as Acting Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pototan-Mina, Branch 008, Iloilo Province, respondent.
FACTS: On August 27, 1998, complainants, who are connected with the Daily Informer, a widely circulated
newspaper in the Western Visayas, were charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pototan-Mina,
Iloilo, Branch 008, presided by respondent Judge Nilo P. Pamonag, with the crime of libel, entitled Fraulen
Cordero, et al., v. Bernie Miraque, et al.
Acting thereon, the respondent Judge conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued on
September 2, 1998 warrants for the arrest of the herein complainants, fixing the bail at P10,000.00
each. Consequently, on September 8, 1998, the latter filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the respondent
judge or any other officer from enforcing the assailed warrants of arrest.
On October 11, 1999, complainants filed an administrative case against the respondent Judge for gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of judicial functions and authority and issuing patently illegal
orders. Complainants contended that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 4363, the respondent Judge neither has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation nor to
issue warrants for their arrest.
In his Comment, the respondent Judge admitted his mistake and explained that the same was his first libel
case and that he issued the challenged warrants in good faith. He said that he erroneously relied on a
pamphlet of the Revises Penal Code quoting Article 360 which consisted only of four (4) paragraphs,
without any word on the conduct of a preliminary investigation. He also expressed that had his attention
been earlier called by the parties, he could have easily rectified the mistake by recalling the warrants of
arrest. He added that he had been sufficiently chastised in several issues of the Daily Informer which
publicized his blunder. Respondent likewise stressed that except for this single honest mistake, he had
never brought dishonour to his family and to the court. For his lapse, he promised to keep himself updated
on laws, as well as on jurisprudence and circulars of the Supreme Court.
In its report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that
respondent Judge be fined in an amount equivalent to one (1) month salary with stern warning that
repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
In respondents Comment, he repleaded his comment, and attached therein newspaper articles on the
ruling of the RTC in the prohibition case which declared as void the preliminary investigation he conducted
and the warrants of arrest he issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge should be ordered to pay a fine in an amount equivalent to one
(1) month salary with stern warning that repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely for being
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
RULING: Yes.
Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, which took effect on
June 19, 1965, jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases is indeed lodged with the
provincial or city prosecutor of the province or city or with the municipal court of the city or capital of the
province. Moreover, as early as April 5, 1967 the Department of Justice issued a circular relative to the
provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 4363. Pertinent portion thereof
reads:

It should be noted from these provisions that a complaint or information for libel may be filed only in the
Court of First Instance. The preliminary investigation of the criminal case may, however, be conducted by
the city court of the city or the municipal court of the capital of the province where the case is filed
In the case at bar, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pototan-Mina, Iloilo, Branch 008, over which
respondent Judge presided in an acting capacity, is not a court in the cities of Iloilo province (Iloilo City and
Passi City), nor a court in Iloilo City, the capital of the province of Iloilo. He therefore had no authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest in the said libel case.
Although judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for every
erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith, it is imperative that they should have basic
knowledge of the law. To be able to render justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system,
judges must keep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that judges must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Obviously, they cannot live up to this expectation if they act in a case without jurisdiction through
ignorance.
While we believe that the reliance of the respondent on the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 4363, was an honest mistake, we cannot, however
condone his failure to keep himself updated with the amendments and latest jurisprudence on the said
statute. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no
less.

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC vs. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. - G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003
FACTS:
An article was published by petitioner in August 1, 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi
kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito
kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa
tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa
tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag
nilang Ramadan."
Because of this the respondent filed a complaint. The complaint alleged that the libelous
statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the
pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with
intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion
in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that
on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines
but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed this earlier decision. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may held liable for liable
HELD:
NO LIBEL
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or
slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or

vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an
identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding
to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without
at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of
the press, under the Bill of Rights.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class
allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with
the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.