2000 Rules On Criminal Procedure

THE 2000 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
By Justice Ricardo P. Galvez

Associate Justice, Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Former Solicitor General
I. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
1. The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, shall have jurisdiction over all
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is imprisonment not exceeding
prision correccional or six years, regardless of the amount of the fine, the civil
liability, or the accessory penalties (R.A. 7691).
2. The Regional Trial Courts shall have jurisdiction over all criminal cases where
the penalty imposed exceeds prision correccional or six years imprisonment
regardless of the amount of the fine, the civil liability, or the attendant accessory
penalties. (Ibid.)
(a) In cases where the only penalty provided by law is a fine, the
jurisdiction is determined by B.P. 129 (Sec.32 (2) which
provides that where the amount of the fine does not exceed
P4,0000, the same shall fall under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court, In excess of such amount, the Regional
Trial Court.
(b) However, in cases involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, the case shall fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts regardless of
the amount of the fine.
(c) Regional Trial Courts, designated by the Supreme Court to act
as Family Courts, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide (1) Criminal Cases where one or more of the accused is
below eighteen (18) years of age but no less than nine (9) years
of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense; Cases of domestic
violence against women and children. If an act committed
against women and children likewise constitutes a criminal
offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the corresponding penalties. However, if any
question involving any of the above matters should arise as an
incident in any case pending in the regular courts , said incident

By Justice Ricardo P. Galvez (C.A., Ret.)
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shall be determined by that court (R.A. 8369, otherwise known

as the Family Courts Act of 1997)
(d) Notwithstandng the ruling in Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA,
494 (1998), the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
extends only to decisions of the Supreme Court in
administrative cases petitions for certiorari arising from
criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court (Kuizon
vs. Desierto, 354 SCRA 158 [2001])
3. The Sandiganbayan. upon the other hand, shall have jurisdiction over all
criminal cases filed against public officials belonging to Salary Grade 27,
charged with offenses in relation to their offices, and these facts are alleged in the
information. (R.A. 8249;Republic vs. Asuncion,231 SCRA 211) An offense is
considered as committed in relation to the office if the offense cannot exist
without the office or that the office must be a constituent element of the crime
as defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal
Code, and that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the
offender perpetuated while he was in the performance , though improper or
irregular, of his official functions. Moreover, the fact that the offense was
committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information,
because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the information. (Republic vs.Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211;
Aguinaldo vs.Dumagas, G.R. No. 98452, en banc resolution, Sept. 26, 1991).
However, in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 [1999], en banc, it
was held that the mere allegation in an information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient.
The phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the accuseds official duties. What is controlling is the specific factual allegation
in the amended information that would indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to
public office. This ruling was reiterated in Escobal vs. Garchitorena, G.R.No.
124644, February 5, 2004.
The enumeration in R.A. 8249 as to who are the officials considered to
belong to Grade 27 is not exclusive. The determination of such grade depends
upon (a) the nature of the position, (b) level of difficulty, and responsibilities
etc., attendant to the office.. (Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 120680-83, Oct.1,
1999; Organo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 133525, Sept. 29, 1999; Llorente
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122297-98, Jan. 19,2000)

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4. Under R.A. 9282 reorganizing the Court Tax Appeals approved on March 30,
2004 and which took effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in newspapers of
general circulation, the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the following criminal cases:
a. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from
violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other
laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
principal amount of taxes or fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed
shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any
provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and
penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the
same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed necessarily
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
b. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses: (a) Over appeals from
judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally
decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction; (b) Over petitions for review
of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
jurisdiction.
5. Under R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004, approved on March 8, 2004, regional trial courts designated as Family
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and
their children under said law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
6. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of

the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of
the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with
other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city, and state prosecutors. However,
the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases. (Honasan vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004)

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7. Jurisdiction of courts over the subject-matter is conferred exclusively by the

Constitution and by law. It is determined by the allegations in the complaint and cannot be
made to depend on the defenses of the private respondent. (Republic vs. Tan, et al., G.R. No.
145255, March 30, 2004)
B. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
1. Where the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court or was duly
arrested, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. (Santiago
vs.Ombudsman, 217 SCRA 633)
2. Any irregularity attendant to an arrest is cured when the accused fails to raise
such issue before arraignment and when he voluntarily participates in the trial
(People vs.Majid Samson, G.R. No. 100911, May 16, 1995; People vs.
Matugas, G.R. No. 139698-726, Feb. 20, 2002)
3. When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, it must be for the sole
and distinct purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction (Palma vs. Court of
Appeals, 232 SCRA 714 [1994])
4. Basic is the rule that before a court can act upon the case of an accused it must
first acquire jurisdiction over his person (People vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 447
SCRA 291 [2004])
II. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (Rule 110)

A. How Criminal Actions are instituted:
1. For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required (Sec 1,par. 2,Rule 112)
by filing the complaint with the (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their
assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) Other officers as may be
authorized by law.
2. For offenses where a preliminary investigation is not required, by filing the
complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. However, in Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their
charters.
3. For offenses committed by juveniles (below eighteen years of age but not less
than nine years of age), by filing a complaint with the prosecutor or the municipal

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trial court in cases where a preliminary investigation is required. In Manila and

other chartered cities, if their charters so provide, the complaint shall be filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor. It may also be filed directly with the Family
Court if no preliminary investigation is required under Section 1 of Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. All criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor assigned to the Family Court. (The Rules on Juveniles in
Conflict With the Law which took effect on April 15, 2002)
4. . The filing of a criminal complaint with the Provincial or City Prosecutor shall
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period of the offense charged unless
otherwise provided in special laws (Reodica vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA
87(1997).
NOTE: The last paragraph of Section 1. Rule 110 does away with the rulings in
People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA and Zaldivia vs. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277.
Complaint or Information is required to be (1) in writing; (2) in the name of the
People of the Philippines, and (3) against all persons who appear to be responsible for
the offense involved.
(1) The mandatory duty of the prosecuting officer does not mean that
he has no discretion at all in determining whether the evidence
presented before him is sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that
a person has committed an offense (Guiao vs. Figueroa, 94 Phil.
1018;People vs. Solana, 6 SCRA 60)
(2) Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules now require that both
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically
alleged in the information to be appreciated as such. Under the old
Rules, only the qualifying circumstances were required to be
alleged in the information, and aggravating circumstances, even if
not alleged, could still be appreciated, except in cases where an
aggravating circumstance would result in the imposition of the
death penalty. (People vs. Lab-eo, G.R. No. 133438, Jan. 16,2002)
(3) There is no need to include anymore in the information an accused
whose discharge as a state witness is to be sought later on, if said
accused was admitted as a state witness under R.A. 6981,
otherwise known as the Witness Protection Program Law (Webb
vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234,121245, and 121297, August
23,1995)

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(4) With respect to the averment of the date the offense was committed
in the complaint or information: (a) where time is not a material
ingredient of the offense, it is sufficient that the information alleges
that the act constitutive of the offense was committed at a time as
near to the actual date when the same was carried out, but (2)
where time is a material ingredient of the offense, it must be
correctly alleged in the information. (People vs. Dinglasan, G.R.
No. 133645, September 17, 2002)
B. Who must prosecute criminal actions (Sec. 5, Rule 110)
1. All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy
work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors,
the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution
Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval
of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the
absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn. (Supreme Court Resolution En Banc A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC dated April
10, 2002, to take effect on May 1, 2002) However, in Municipal Trial Courts or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the
case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This
authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of
the case to the Regional Trial Court.(See OCA Circular No. 39-2002 clarifying
amendment to Sec.5,Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
superceding OCA Circular No. 14-2002dated June 1, 2002)
2. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon
complaint filed by the offended spouse. However the signing of the complaint by the
offended spouse
is no longer jurisdictional (People vs. Tanada,166 SCRA 360;
People vs. Bugtong, 169 SCRA 797)

3. Rape is no longer a private crime (R.A. 8353)
4. The principle of parens patriae found in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 110,
applies only to seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness, and not to adultery
and concubinage (Pilapil vs. Somera, 174 SCRA 651 (1989)
5. The offenses of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness, filed under special
laws, such as the Child Abuse Act, shall be governed by the provisions of the special
law under which the accused is prosecuted.

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C. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 now require that not only the qualifying but also all other
aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information, otherwise if not alleged,
even if proved, they cannot be taken into account in the imposition of the penalty. (People
vs. Nunez, 310 SCRA 168 (1999); People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 (1999); People vs.
Mauricio, G.R. No. 133695,Feb. 8,2001; People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366 [2004])
D. Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure, before plea, the
prosecution may amend the information with respect to form and substance WITHOUT
LEAVE OF COURT. Under the 2000 Rules however, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court, in resolving such motion, shall
state its reasons in granting or denying the same, furnishing all parties, especially the
offended party, with copies of its order. This amendment came about because of the case
of Dimatulac vs. Judge Villon, 297 SCRA 67
E. Amendment of information after plea requires LEAVE OF COURT but the same is
limited as to formal amendments only, provided it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of
an information is when a defense under the original information would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused would be
inapplicable to the amended information (Gabionza vs.Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140311, March 30,2001; Poblete vs. Sandoval, 426 SCRA 346 [2004])
F. In criminal cases, venue is synonymous with jurisdiction, hence it cannot be waived.
(People vs. Amadora, G.R. No.140669-75, April 20, 2001; U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 243;
People vs. Enriquez, CA-G.R. No. 12778, March 1, 1976. In Yoingco, et al., vs. Gonzaga,
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-03-1489, March 31, 2004, the Supreme Court called to task a
municipal trial judge for ruling that venue can be waived in criminal cases. The Supreme
Court said that respondent judges irresponsible convolution of the concept of venue in a
civil case and in a criminal case exhibits ignorance of the law.
III. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111)

A. What is presently deemed instituted with the criminal case is only the recovery of civil
indemnity arising from the offense charged. When a criminal action is instituted
against a juvenile in conflict with the law, the action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from offense charged shall be governed by Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Sec. 12, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict With The Law)
B. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party who desires to recover
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code must have to file a

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separate civil action for that purpose. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action does not anymore constitute a waiver to file such separate and independent civil
actions. (Casupanan, et al.,vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002; Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., vs. People, 427 SCRA 456 [2004])
C. Recovery of civil indemnity against an employer is limited solely to subsidiary liability.
D. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not only his
criminal liability but his civil liability arising from delict as well (People vs. Bayotas,236
SCRA 239 (1994)
E. The concept of a prejudicial question has likewise been changed in that the elements of a
prejudicial question are (a) the civil action must have been instituted earlier than the
criminal action; (b) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
IV. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (Rule 112)

A. At present, even offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
require a preliminary investigation if the penalty is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, without regard to the fine. The right of an accused to a
preliminary investigation is a personal right and can be waived expressly or by
implication (People vs. Lazo, 198 SCRA 274). If not waived, the absence of a
preliminary investigation may amount to a denial of due process. However, lack of a
preliminary investigation, does not impair the validity of an information or render it
defective (Villaflor vs. Gozon, G.R. No. 134744,Jan. 16,2001; Yusop vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60,Feb. 22,2001) Where the right to a preliminary
investigation is timely invoked, a court should hold in abeyance or suspend the
proceedings and remand the case to the office of the prosecutor for him to conduct a
preliminary investigation (Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92).Such right to
a preliminary investigation must however be raised before plea, otherwise the accused is
deemed to have waived the same (Rule 114, Sec. 26; Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 230
SCRA 33)
B. Preliminary investigations can be conducted ex parte if respondent cannot be
subpoenaed or does not appear after due notice. The Revised Rules on Crimoinal
Procedure does not require as a condition sine qua non for the validity of the
proceedings the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made,
and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The
obvious purpose of this rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart
their prosecution by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics. (Mercado vs.

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Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109036, July 5, 1995; An actual hearing is not always an
indispensable aspect of due process as long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interest in the cause. (Lumifuel vs. Exchevea, 282 SCRA 125)
C. An investigating prosecutor does not necessarily have to give notice to the respondent
upon the filing of a complaint with him and which requires a preliminary investigation.
Should he find the complaint utterly devoid of merit, then he may recommend its
outright dismissal. It is within his discretion whether or not a preliminary investigation
should be conducted. (Knetch vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 121916, June 28. 1998)
D. As far as consistent with the 2002 Rule on Juveniles In Conflict With the Law, the
preliminary investigation of a juvenile shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If clarificatory questions become necessary, the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness shall apply. If a preliminary investigation is
required before the filing of a complaint or information, the same shall be conducted by
the judge of the Municipal Trial Court or the public prosecutor in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the
investigating prosecutor finds probable cause to hold the juvenile for trial, he shall
prepare the corresponding resolution and information for approval b y the provincial or
city prosecutor, as the case may be. The juvenile, his parents/nearest relative/guardian
and his counsel shall be furnished forthwith a copy of the approved resolution. (Sec.
13,Rule on Juveniles In Conflict With the Law)
E. The records of the preliminary investigation do not form part of the records in the trial
court Hence, the prosecution is not mandated to offer in evidence said record of
preliminary investigation since it is separate from the records of the case and may or
may not be considered by the court. It is not a part of the judicial proceedings for the
determination of the guilt of the accused. The two are independent of each other. Once
the information against the accused is filed in court, the investigating officer loses
control over the case and the adjudication thereof is shifted to the trial judge. (People vs.
Jakosalem, G.R. No. 130506, Feb. 28, 2002)
F. While under Section 3 of Rule 112, the complainant is required to submit, not only his
affidavit and those of his witnesses, but also the necessary supporting documents to
establish probable cause, if the evidence is voluminous, the complainant shall simply be
required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, which
should be made available for examination or copying by the respondent, but at the
expense of the latter.
G. . The filing by the respondent of a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a counter-affidavit, is
now prohibited.

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H. In the present Rules, in offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, the prosecutors must forward to the Ombudsman for approval the
formers resolution within five days. (See Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,G.R.No. 105965-70,
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration dated March 20,2001)
I. Under the present Rules, when an information is filed by the prosecutor in court, the
judge to whom the case is raffled, may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. It is only in case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause may the judge order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice. The judge must thereafter resolve the issue
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
J. Under the present Rules, the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the Regional Trial Judge
upon the filing of an information is no longer necessary if (1) the information was filed
under Section 7, Rule ll2 or (2) the Municipal Trial Court which conducted the
preliminary investigation had already earlier issued a warrant, or (3) the offense is
penalized by a fine only
K. In preliminary investigations conducted by a municipal trial judge, he shall follow the
procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 112 If his findings and recommendations are
affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and
the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. HOWEVER,
WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE INVESTIGATION, the
judge may issue a warrant of arrest IF HE FINDS AFTER EXAMINATION IN
WRITING AND UNDER OATH of the complainant and his witnesses IN THE FORM
OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, (1) that a probable cause exists and
that (2) there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice.
L. In cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, if filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, the prosecutor to whom the case is
assigned shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing. IF FILED
WITH THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, if within ten (10) days after the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause (a) after personally
evaluating the evidence, or (b) after personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall
dismiss the case. He may however require the submission of additional evidence, within
ten days from notice, to determine the existence of probable cause. If, notwithstanding
the additional evidence, he still finds no probable cause, he shall dismiss the case. If he
finds probable cause, he shall either issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order.

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However, if he believes that there is no need for placing the accused under custody, he
may issue a summons instead.
M. The determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation is an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor ( Dupasquier vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112089, January 24, 2001). To warrant the filing of an
information in court after preliminary investigation, a finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor needs only to rest on evidence showing more likely than not
that a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. x x x a finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. (Webb vs. Judge De Leon, et
al., G.R. No. 121234-45, 121297, August 23, 1995; Paul Roberts vs.Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996) But while the prosecutor has full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once filed in court, it
is the latter, and no longer the prosecutor, that has full control whether the case should
be dismissed or consolidated with other cases (Domondon vs. Sandiganbayan, 328
SCRA 292 )
N. While the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether an information should
be withdrawn and a criminal case should be dismissed, and to move for the withdrawal
of such information or dismissal of a criminal case, the final disposition of such
motion and of the case is addressed to the sound discretion of the
SANDIGANBAYAN subject only to the caveat that the action of the
Sandiganbayan must not impair the substantial rights of the accused and the
People to due process of law. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the
Sandiganbayan acted in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion in granting the
motion of the accused and ordering the dismissal of the criminal case. (People vs. Velez,
G.R. No. 138093, February 19, 2003)
O. Courts should adopt a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsmans
constitutionally mandated powers. Courts would be extremely swamped with cases if
they were compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the public
prosecutors each time the latter either file or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant. (Nava vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 136470, Oct. 16, 2001) There
are, however, exceptions to this general rule, to wit: (1) When necessary to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) When necessary for
the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3)
When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (4) When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the prosecution is under an

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invalid law, ordinance, or regulation; (6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7)
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) Where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. (Filadams
Pharma, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422, March 30, 2004; Mendoza-Arce
vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), et al., G.R. No. 149148, April 5, 2002; Roxas,
et al., vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002) The principle of non-interference
does not likewise apply when there is grave abuse of discretion, as when the
Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the determination of
probable cause. Such grave abuse of discretion authorizes the aggrieved party to file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Sistoza vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 144784, September 3, 2002).
P. But once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, be it
dismissal of the case, or conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound
discretion of the court. For although the prosecution retains the direction and control of
criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court which is the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case.
(Sps. Webb et al., vs.Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R.No. 139120, July 31, 2003)
Q. In conducting a preliminary investigation, a municipal trial judge has no legal authority
to determine the character of the crime and, regardless of his belief as to the nature of
the offense committed, his only duty after conducting the preliminary investigation is to
transmit to the provincial prosecutor his resolution together with the entire records of
the case (Jamora vs.Bersales, 447 SCRA 20 [2004])
R. The Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in court.(Balindong vs. Court of Appeals, 447 SCRA
200 [2004] reiterating the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 [1987])
S. Once a case is filed in court, its subsequent dismissal must be based on the judges
personal conviction that there was no case against the accused. Technicalities will have
to yield to the paramount interest of the nation to enforce its laws against tax evasion.
Procedural rules should not be rigidly when to do so would result in manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice. (People vs. Lucio Tan & Court of Appeals, July 13, 2004)
T. When the Ombudsman dismisses a case against a co-accused, the latter has a right to
consider the complaint against him as closed and for all intents and purposes, he is no
longer a party in the criminal action. Should a re-investigation be conducted later on and
the Ombudsman finds a probable cause against the co-accused whose case was earlier

Page 13 of 39
dismissed, the Ombudsman should first notify said co-accused and afford him the
opportunity to be heard before ordering his inclusion in the criminal case. The
subsequent findings of probable cause against said co-accused which he had neither
knowledge of nor participation in, violated his right to procedural due process. At the
very least, co-accused should have been notified that the complaint again him has not
yet been finally disposed of, or that the fight was not yet over, so to speak. He should
have been apprised of his possible implication again in the criminal case to enable him
to meet any new accusation against him head-on, and to prepare for his defense. (Roxas
vs. Vasquez, et al., G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002).
U. The records of the preliminary investigation do not form part of the records in the trial
court. Hence, the prosecution is not mandated to offer in evidence the said record of
preliminary investigation since it is separate from the records of the case and may or
may not be considered by the court. A preliminary investigation is not a trial or any part
thereof and has no purpose except that of determining whether or not the defendant
should be released or held for trial before a competent court. (People vs.Jakosalem,
G.R.No. 130506, February 28, 2002)
V. The rule on disqualification under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court applies
even to preliminary investigation and not only where a judge is called upon to decide a
case. (Sales vs.Calvan, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1331, February 27, 2002)
V.ARREST (Rule ll3)

A. Unlike a search warrant which has a lifespan of ten days only from its issuance, a
warrant of arrest, unless specifically provided in the warrant, remains enforceable until
it is executed, recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Section 4, Rule ll3, is
only a directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return to the court.
(People vs. Givera, G.R. No.132159, January 18,2001)
B. It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge before issuing a warrant of
arrest. What is required is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents
upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify
the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause (Okabe vs. Gutierrez,
429 SCRA 685 [2004])
C. Any objection to the legality of the warrant of arrest must be made before plea (Ibid.)
D. Section 5, paragraph (b)of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:

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(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
This section was amended in 2000 to read as follows
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5(b) above quoted
must be based on reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the person
making the arrest. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had,
in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]).
In People vs. Chua Ho San, G.R. No.128222, June 17, 1999, it was explained that
probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant cautious mans belief that the person
is guilty of the offense charged. Specifically, with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
In People vs. Escordial, G.R. No. 138934-35, January 16, 2002, the Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret paragraph (b ), Section 5, Rjule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In said case, the accused, at the time of his arrest, was watching a game in a
basketball court. He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested
by the police. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a
warrant.
The question is whether this case falls under paragraph (b) because the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed
a crime. The phrase personal knowledge in paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise:
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion

Page 15 of 39
therefore , must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the person
making the arrest. In this case, the crime took place on December 27, 1996, but Escordial was
arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting
officers were not present when the crime was committed, they could not have personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime so as to be justified in
the belief that Escordial was guilty of the crime. The arresting officers had no reason for not
securing a warrant. However, the records show that the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged against him during his arraignment on February 27, 1997, without questioning his
warrantless arrest. He thus waived objection to the legality of his arrest.
In People vs. Tudtud, G.R.No. 144037, September 23, 2003, probable cause was defined
as:
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arrest
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person
to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest.
n the same case, it was emphasized that the long standing rule in this jurisdiction,
applied with a great degree of consistenchy, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused performs some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
The Supreme Court said further:
We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend
its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would
infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so
deserving of full protection.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of

the fact that the search yielded contraband, the mere fact of looking from side to side
while holding ones abdomen, or of standing on a corner with ones eyes moving
very fact, looking at every person who came near, does not justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a). Neither does putting something in ones pocket, handling
a bag on board a trisikad sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to cross the
street per se.

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Under the Rules, peace officers may, without a warrant, arrest a person under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. If a
killing was committed on September 2,1996, not in the presence of the arresting officers, and the
arrest was effected only on September 11, 2002, the arrest could not be considered to cover an
offense that had just been committed. In such an arrest, the presumption of the regularity in the
performance of official functions could not be considered. (People vs. Samus, G.R. No. 13595758, September 1, 2002) An arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch
as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
Any search resulting form a lawful warrantless arrest is valid because the accused committed a
crime in flagranti delicto.(Teodosio vs. Court of Appeals, 431 SCRA 194 [2004])
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from detention or custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of the detention as
of, at the earliest, at the time of the application for habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at
its inception, illegal, it may, by reason of supervening events, be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the petition. (Epimaco Velasco vs.Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 118644, July 7,
1995)
A warrantless arrest, even if illegal, does not render void all other proceedings, including
those leading to the conviction of the accused, nor can the State be deprived of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability (People vs.Conde, G.R.
No. 113269, April 10, 2001; People vs. De La Cruz, G.R. No. 141162-63, July 11, 2002)
Any objection involving an arrest, of the procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, must be made before he enters a plea, otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. The accuseds plea of not guilty when arraigned and in
participating at the trial without timely questioning the legality of his arrest forecloses further
ventilation of the issue on appeal. (People vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 87187, June 29,1995; People vs.
Lopez, G.R. No. 104662, June 16, 1995; People vs. Pacistol, G.R. No. 11974-75, January 22,
1998; People vs. Wisehunt, G.R. No. 123819, Nov. 14, 2001; People vs. De La Cruz, et al., G.R.
No. 141162-63, July 11, 2002). . .
R.A. 7438- An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation As Well As The Duties Of The Arresting, Detaining, And Investigating
Officers And Providing Penalties For Violations Thereof.
NOTE; Sec. 4 of said law provides for penalties on any arresting public officer,
investigator, or employee: (a) who fails to inform any person ARRESTED, DETAINED or
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; (b) who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person ARRESTED, DETAINED, or UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISS ION OF AN OFFENSE if the latter cannot afford the

Page 17 of 39
services of his own counsel; (c) who obstructs, prevents, or prohibits any lawyer, any member of
the immediate family of the person ARRESTED,DETAINED, or UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from
visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family with
him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour
of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night.
VI. BAIL (Rule 114)

A. If the Regional Trial Court convicts an accused of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, said court may act on an application for bail by
the convicted accused despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the records of
the case had not yet been transmitted to the appellate court. However, if an accused was
originally charged with a non-bailable offense, but was subsequently convicted of a
bailable offense, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court. Should the trial court grant the bail, the accused may be provisionally
released during the pendency of his appeal under the same bail which he had put up
during the trial subject to the consent of the bondsman.(Sec. 5, Rule 114)
B. (1) Insofar as juveniles are concerned, those charged with offenses falling under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be released on recognizance to the custody of
their parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for the juveniles
appearance in court whenever required; (2) All juveniles shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right before final conviction of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; (3) In the event the juvenile cannot post bail for lack of
financial resources, the Family Court shall commit the juvenile to the care of the DSWD,
a youth detention center, or a local rehabilitation c enter recognized by the government in
the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the said court. The center or
agency concerned shall be responsible for the juveniles appearance in court whenever
required. In the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from
the venue of the trial, the juvenile shall be detained in the provincial, city, or municipal
jail which shall provide adequate quarters for the juvenile separate from adult detainees
and detainees of the opposite sex. (Secs. 15 & 16, Rule on Juveniles)
C. The following are the duties of judges in case an application for bail is filed: (1) In all
cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; (2) Where bail is
a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing on the application for bail regardless of whether
or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (3) Decide

Page 18 of 39
whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; and (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied. (Te vs. Perez, A.M. MTJ00-1286, January 21, 2002)
D. Bail in capital offenses cannot be granted without a petition for bail and without a hearing
(Directo vs. Bautista, MTJ-99-1205, Nov. 29,2000; Jamora vs. Bersales, 447 SCRA 20
[2004]); The burden of proof during such hearing is on the prosecution (Sec. 8, Rule 114)
The hearing contemplated is the presentation of proof that the evidence of guilt is strong.
(Narciso vs. Sta. Romana Cruz, G.R. No.13450, March 12, 2000;Bantuas
vs.Pangandapuan,RTJ-98-1707,July 20,1998)
E. In applications for bail involving capital offenses or those punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a judge should not grant bail simply on the failure of the
prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong. A judge should
endeavor to determine the existence of such evidence. Under the present rules, a hearing
is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. A motion to reduce
the amount of bail likewise requires a hearing before it is granted in order to afford the
prosecution the chance to oppose it. In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right
or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or
fiscal, or at least he must be asked for his recommendation. If the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose and objection, it is still mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions. In fact, even in cases
where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held. (Te vs. Perez, supra)
F. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion that remains with the judge (Jamora vs. Bersales, 447 SCRA 20 [2004]);
However, the standard of strong evidence of guilt, which is sufficient to deny bail to an
accused in a criminal case, is markedly higher than the standard of probable cause to
initiate criminal cases against the accused (Cabrera vs. Marcelo, 446 SCRA 207 [2004])
G. A bail application in capital offenses does not only involve the right of the accused to
temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of
the community from dangerous elements. Accordingly, the prosecution must be given
ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, because, by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial is
exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion.
Though not absolute nor beyond control, the discretion of the trial court must be sound
and exercised within reasonable bounds. (People vs. Antona, et al., G.R. No. 137681,
January 31, 2002)

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H. Even if an accused is charged with a capital offense, he is entitled to bail, but no longer as
a matter or right. Instead, it is discretionary and calls for a judicial determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong in order to grant bail. (Andres vs. Judge Beltran, AM No.
00-9597, August 20, 2001)
I. In cases where bail is authorized, it may be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. (Lavides vs.Court of Appeals,
324 SCRA 321 [2000])
J. The accused applying for baiI should be in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan; Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, 247 SCRA 85(1995);
Guillen vs. Nicolas, 299 SCRA 623(1998); A person is considered to be in the custody of
the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.
(People vs. Judge Gako, 348 SCRA 334 [2000]) (See Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 115407,Aug. 28,1995 on principle of Constructive Custody)
K. The grant or denial of bail in capital offense hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings
wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to
present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show
strong evidence of guilt. (Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs.Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No.
148965, February 26, 2002)
L. It is error for a judge to depend solely, in granting bail in a capital offense, on a medical
report made nine (9) months earlier the defense should present a more recent one that
would convincingly raise strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the
accused would endanger his life. (People vs. Judge Gako, supra) .
M. A hearing is required even if the prosecution has no objection to the grant of bail in
capital offenses. (Manalo vs. Narisma,MTJ-96-1072,Jan. 31,1996)
N. The court hearing the application for bail must make in his order denying or granting bail
a summary of the evidence adduced during the hearing (Carpio vs. Maglalang,196 SCRA
41;Basco vs. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220 (1997); People vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, of
Muntinglupa City, 431 SCRA 319 [2004]; Jamora vs. Judge Bersales, 447 SCRA 20
[2004]; Zuo vs.Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382 [2004]
O. A municipal trial court conducting a preliminary investigation of a criminal case
involving a capital offense may entertain and act upon a petition for bail filed by the
accused (Borinaga vs. Tamin,226 SCRA 206)

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P. A municipal trial judge conducting a preliminary investigation has the authority to grant
bail and to order the release of the accused even if the records of the case had been
transmitted for review to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Such action cannot be
validly attacked on jurisdictional grounds. (Cabatingan, Sr., vs. Arcueno, A.M. No. MTJ00-1323, August 22, 2002)
Q. The putting up of bail by an accused shall not bar him from later on questioning the
legality of his arrest or the absence of a preliminary investigation provided he raises such
issues before entering his plea (Sec. 26, Rule 114;usop vs. Sandiganbayan ,G.R. No.
138859-60,February 22,2001;People vs. Gomez,325 SCRA 61(Feb.8,2000)
R. An accused who appealed after conviction by the trial court, who is found to have filed
fake bail bonds, is deemed to have escape from confinement during the pendency of his
appeal, and in the normal course of things, his appeal should be dismissed. By filing fake
bail bonds, an accused mocked and trumped the judicial process, and he must be
considered to have waived or forfeited his right to further review of the decisions of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. (People vs. Del Rosario, 348 SCRA 603 [Dec.
19,2000])
S. While it may be true that the accused in this case have the right to apply for bail since the
charge of violation of the Election Code is a bailable offense, however, before a judge
may grant applications for bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, the
prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of hearing or he must be asked to submit his
recommendation even if the accused had not yet been charged in court. The purpose for
bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by
the court. Thus, the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when required but not higher than is reasonably necessary to fulfill this purpose. A bail
application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty. But
likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerous elements. (Caneda vs. Alaan, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-01-1376, January 23, 2002)
T. Even in applications for bail on recognizance, a hearing is required, and notice is to be
given to the prosecutor whose recommendation must be asked. Before a youthful
offender is released to the custody of his parents, the recommendation of the DSWD or
other agency or agencies authorized by the Court must likewise be obtained and the
procedure laid down in Section 191 of P.D. 603 must be observed. The judge must not
merely rely on the birth certificates of the accused in granting an application for bail on
recognizance. (Cabrera vs. Zerna, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1715, September 3, 2002)
U. In fixing the amount of bail, judges shall primarily consider the factors enumerated in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The amount of bail should be
reasonable at all times. Excessive bail shall not be required. In implementing the

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mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoners pecuniary circumstances. That which is
reasonable to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like
offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
(Magsucang vs, Balgos, A.M. MTJ-02-1427, Feb. 27, 2003)
V. Under the first paragraph of Section 22, Rule 114, upon application of the bondsmen,
with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused
or proof of his death. This does not apply to cash bonds which, under Section 14 of the
same Rule, shall be applied to the payment and costs, and the excess, of any, shall be
returned to the accused or to any person who made the deposit. (Esteban vs. Alhambra,
G.R. No. 135012, September 7, 2004)
VII. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Rule 115)
A. The right to speedy trial is a relative one, subject to reasonable delays and
postponements arising from illness, medical attention, and body operations, as in the
present case where it was duly proven that complainant had to undergo a carotid
operation. Speedy trial means one that can be had soon after the indictment is filed as the
prosecution can, with reasonable diligence, prepare for that. The accused sometimes
forget that those who are aggrieved also have rights. For this reason, in determining
the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of scheduled hearings of the case. What
offends the right to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an
unreasonable length of time. While a judge may have a laudable purpose in insuring the
prompt disposition of cases, i.e., one that is free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, he must not lose sight of the fact that his primordial concern must be
justice and fairness.(De Zuzuarregui, Jr. vs. Rosete, AM No. MTJ-o2-1426, May 9,
2002)
B. The concept of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. While the Speedy Trial Act pf 1998
provides for a trial period for criminal cases in general shall be 180 days, in determining
the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The
right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are
asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motives a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. (People vs. Tee, G.R.
No. 14546-47, January 20, 2003)

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C. The right to counsel and the right to remain silent do not cease even after a criminal
complaint or information had been filed against the accused, as long as he is still in
custody. To claim otherwise would give police authorities and other law enforcement
agencies a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from the accused before they
are arraigned on the submission that, at such stage, the accused are not supposedly
entitled to the enjoyment of the right to remain silent and to counsel (Pdeople vs.
Maqueda alias Putol, G.R. No. 112983, March 22, 1995). Likewise, in custodial
interrogation, the law does not distinguish between preliminary questions during
custodial investigation, since any question asked of a person while under detention is
considered as a question asked while he is under detention. (People vs. Isla, G.R. No.
96176, August 21, 1997)
D. The phrase preferably of his own choice found in the Constitution regarding the right
of an accused to counsel, does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by the
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense. (People vs. Mojello, 425 SCRA 11
[2004])
E. A simple forewarning to the accused that the next time that he would not be ready with
his defense, he would be deemed to have waived his right to present it does not satisfy
the accuseds constitutional right to due process the trial court should first apprise the
accused or explain to him in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
(People vs. Macarang, 424 SCRA 18 [2004])
F. A barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution a suspects uncounseled
statement before the barangay chairman is admissible. (Peoplevs. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374
[2004])
VIII.. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA (Rule 116)
A. When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be
deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him (Sec. 1(d) (New)
B. When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled within three
days from the filing of the complaint or information. He shall be arraigned within ten
days from the date of the raffle, and the pre-trial of his case shall be held within ten days
from arraignment.
C. The presence of the offended party is now required during the arraignment for purposes
of plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his
presence. If he does not appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged with the
conformity of the trial fiscal alone.

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D. Added as a further ground for the suspension of the arraignment is the pendency of a
petition for review either with the Department of Justice or the Office of the President,
but such suspension shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the filing of such petition
for review.
E. Arraignment in absentia is null and void. (Nolasco vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 502
[1985]) A rejected plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be appreciated if after trial, the
court finds the accused guilty of the lesser offense to which he offered to plead guilty
(People vs. Santos, 104 Phil. 551)
F. If the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the judge is required to accomplish three
things: (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of the accuseds plea; (2) to require the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) to inquire whether or not
the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and to allow him to do so if he
desires. (People vs. Olarte, G.R. Nos. 129530-31, September 27, 2001)
G. In a plea of guilty to a capital offense, a mere warning to the accused that he faces the
supreme penalty of death is not enough (People vs. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490 [2000]).
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the
matter of a proper searching inquiry, it would be well for a trial judge, for instance, to
require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, by
making him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to
furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance in order to determine, once
and for all, his liability for the crime. (People vs.Samontanez, 346 SCRA 837 [Dec. 4,
2000])
H. Under established principles, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the
requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a) of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that
actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given,
with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socioeconomic status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of
counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the
opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. These matters are relevant since
they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt
Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the crime he was charged
with and its penalty and civil liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to defense
counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to him to meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is mandatory and absent
any showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been
undertaken. (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 14129-33, December 14, 2001) .

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I. In a more recent case, People vs. Besonia, G.R. No. 151284, February 5, 2004, reiterating
the rule in People vs. Galvez, G.R. No. 135053, March 6, 2002, it was held that the
searching inquiry to be conducted by the trial court should consist of the following: (1)
Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b ) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either b y
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. (2) Ask the
defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. (3) Elicit
information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may serv de as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. (4) Inform the accused [of] the exact
length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
will serve such sentenced. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit his guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of
the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charge against him
or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to
supply missing details of significance. x x x Where the punishment to be inflicted is
death, it is not enough that the information be read to the accused or even translated into
the dialect they speak. This is because the implementation of such penalty is irrevocable,
and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The trial
court must avoid improvident pleas of guilt, since the accused might be admitting their
guilty and thus forfeiting their lives and liberties without having fully understood the
meaning, significance or consequences of their pleas.
J. A conditional plea of guilty, or one entered subject to the condition that a certain penalty
be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would therefore require a
full-blown trial before judgment could bed rendered. (People vs. Madroga, G.R.No.
129299, Nov. 11, 2000)
K. Insofar as juveniles are concerned, where the maximum penalty for the offense with
which they are charged is imprisonment of not more than six (6) months, regardless of
fine or fine alone regardless of the amount, and the corresponding complaint is filed with
the Family Court, the case shall not be set for arraignment; instead, it shall forthwith be
referred to the Diversion Committee which shall determine whether the juvenile can be
diverted and referred to alternative measures or services offered by non-court institutions.

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Pending determination by the Committee, the court shall deliver the juvenile on
recognizance to the custody of his parents or legal guardian who shall be responsible for
the presence of the juvenile during the diversion proceedings. (Sec. 20, Rule on
Juveniles)
L. The provisions of Rule 116 and 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall
apply to the arraignment of the juvenile in conflict with the law. The arraignment shall be
scheduled within seven (7) days from the date of the filing of the complaint or
information with the Family Court, unless a shorter period is provided for by law.
Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by the judge by furnishing the
juvenile a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in a language or dialect
known to and understood by him, explaining the nature and consequences of a plea of
guilty or not guilty and asking him what his plea is. (Sec. 27, Ibid)
M. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period
of sixty (60) days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period , the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. (Samson vs. Daway, et
al., G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004)
IX. . MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

A. A trial court cannot motu propio quash an information except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction (People vs. Nitafan, 302 SCRA 424 (1999). If a motion to quash is based on
the ground that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute an offense, the court
shall first give the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or, despite the amendment, the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect, the court shall dismiss the same.
B. If an accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense, a modified order or trial
under Section 11(e), Rule 199 may be directed, but this does not mean that in such a case,
trial could be dispensed with altogether. A judge must nonetheless ascertain whether the
defense put up by the accused could withstand judicial scrutiny. In other words, while the
burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he is entitled to an extenuating circumstance, the trial court is still duty-bound to hold
a regular trial on the merits for this purpose, and should not take shelter under the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court that if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of (its) jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by (the) Rules,
any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable
to the spirit of said law or rules. The Rules do not sanction the automatic conversion of

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a hearing on a motion to quash to a hearing on the merits of a case, in the absence of any
clear waiver by the accused of his right to a regular trial. (Dayawon vs. Garfin, A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1367, September 5, 2002)
C. The new Rule contains a provision to convert a provisional dismissal into a permanent
one (Sec. 8, Rule 117) which states: Provisional dismissal A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
6 years or a fine of any amount or both shall become permanent one (1) year after the
issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. In People vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, May 28, 2002, the
Supreme Court, interpreting this provision, ruled that Even if the cases were revived
only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to
comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a time to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present
compelling reasons to justify the revival of the cases beyond the 2-year bar
On motion for reconsideration filed by the State, the Supreme Court, on April 1,
2003, ruled that the two-year time-bar should be counted from December 1, 2000, when
the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect.
The two year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
retroactive application of the of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit
the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the to the State
and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws
in particular.
On October 7, 2003, acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Panfilo
Lacson, the Supreme Court ruled:
In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court,
in the interest of justice, may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of
the situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a
rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which
the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own
distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on the
administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combi9ne must
inevitably vary with the dictate involved.
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a
statute. To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, the Court in defining the limits of adherence may make a choice for
itself between the principle of forward operation and that or relating forward

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In the refilling of a case which has been provisionally dismissed, the usual
procedure is file a new information, but in the 1979 case of Lauchengco vs.
Alejandro, 88 SCRA 175, it was held that the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case does not call for the filing of a new information if, as in this case, the parties
are clearly made aware, in such order of provisional dismissal, that it is lacking
the impress of finality and therefore could be revived and reinstated. However, in
Tupaz vs. Apurillo, et al., G.R. Nos. 151380-81, December 10, 2004, the Supreme
Court held that with the finality of the order of dismissal, a criminal case is
already removed from the docket of the court and the remedy available to the
prosecution, is to file a new information. The mere revival of a dismissed case by
motion or otherwise is not procedurally feasible considering that the dismissal,
although without prejudice, had already attained finality.
D. Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to
quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion, only facts as are alleged in
the information, and those admitted by the prosecutor , should be taken into account in
the resolution thereof. Matters or defense can not be produced during the hearing of such
motions, except where the rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy. (Valencia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141336, June
29, 2004)
E. A regional state prosecutor has no power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the
authority to file an information without the prior written authority or approval of the city
or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. (People vs. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393
[2004])
X. PRE-TRIAL (Rules 118)
A. This Rule incorporates the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act and Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98.
B. On Pre-Trial Agreements, read Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 448 and People vs.
Cristina Hernandez, G.R. No. 108028,July 30,1996. While the omission of the signature
of the accused and his counsel renders a stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence, the
prosecution is not without remedy the prosecution can submit evidence to establish the

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elements of the crime instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused
in the stipulation (People vs. Bandang, 430 SCRA 570 [2004])
C. The accused can now plead guilty to a lower offense only if the latter is necessarily
included in the offense charged.
D. On June 8, 2004, the Supreme Court En Banc issued A.M. 03-1-09-SC providing for
GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF
COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DISCOVERY
MEASURES to take effect on July 1, 2004, the second part of which deals on criminal
cases.
XI. TRIAL (Rule 119)
After a plea of not guilty, the accused is given at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for
trial, which should be commenced within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order. (Sec.
1, Rule 119)
Trial shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. In no case shall
be trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court . (Sec.2)
Exceptions to the 180-day rule:
1. Criminal cases covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure or where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of not more
than one thousand (P1,000) pesos;
2. Under R.A. 4980 where the offended party is about to depart from the Philippines with
no definite date of return, in which case the trial shall commence within three days after
the accused is arraigned and no postponement shall be granted of the initial hearing
except on illness of the part of the accused or other grounds beyond the control of the
accused.
3. Child Abuse Cases (Rules and Regulations Implementing Sec. 32 of R.A. 7610,
otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act)
4. Violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, R.A. 9165)
5. Heinous Crimes and other crimes covered by Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
104-96, which shall be terminated within sixty (60) days from commencement of trial

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and to be decided within thirty (30) days from submission of case for decision, unless a
shorter prior is provided by law or otherwise directed by the Supreme Court.
NOTES: Section 3 of Rule 119 enumerates the periods of delay which shall be excluded from
the thirty (30) day period within which to commence the trial of a criminal case, while Section 4
of the same Rule enumerates the factors for the granting of postponements or continuance of
trial.
1.Trial In absentia The Constitution as well as Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure permits trial in absentia provided that (1) the accused has been arraigned; (2) he has
been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is unjustified.
2.The accused can however be compelled to appear during the trial for purpose of
identification.
3.The non-inclusion of some of the names of eyewitnesses does not preclude the
prosecutor from presenting them during the trial. The enumeration of witnesses in the
information is not necessarily exhaustive, it is not meant to absolutely limit or lessen the
prerogative of the prosecutor (People vs. Jamiro, 279 SCRA 290 [1997])
4. A Judges asking questions may amount to undue interference. When a judge, by crossexamining the defense witnesses, and not merely limiting himself to clarificatory questions, had
taken up the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against the accused. The cold
neutrality of an impartial judge requirement of due process is denied an accused when the
judge, with his overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. (Tabuena vs.
Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332[1997])
5.The order of trial in a criminal case is provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, with the prosecution first presenting evidence, followed by the accused,
then rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence.
The order of trial as prescribed in Section 11 is intended to protect the fundamental right
of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96
SCRA 322 [1980]; A deviation from the regular course of trial which denied the accused his day
in court or the prosecution of due process renders the judgment invalid. (Alonte vs. Savellano,
Jr., 287 SCRA 245 [1998]

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However, the order of trial may be modified if the accused admits the act or omission
charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense. (Sec. 11, par. [e])
6. The trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge
against the principal. (Vino vs. People, 178 SCRA 626 [1989])
7. Examination of witness for the prosecution Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court, when it satisfactorily appears that a prosecution witness is too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend
the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination shall be
considered as a waiver.
8. Examination of witness for accused before trial Under Section 12, Rule 119, an
accused may have his witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf by filing a motion alleging
that his witness is too suck or infirm or resides more 100 kilometers from the place of trial and
has no means to attend the same. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit of the accused
and such other evidence as the court may require.
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which may be taken before any judge, or if
not practicable, before any member of the bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the
order, or, if the other be granted by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be
designated in the order, the examination of a witness for the prosecution may be made only
before the judge or the court where the case is pending.
Under Section 7, Rule 119 of the 1964 Rules, the deposition of prosecution witnesses
who are unable to testify may be taken, in the presence of the accused. Significantly, the 1985
Rules removed the taking of a deposition and is no longer included therein. Under the present
Rule, the testimony of a prosecution witness may only be taken before the judge or court where
the case is pending.
In People vs. Webb, 312 SCRA 573 [1999]. The trial judge denied a defense motion to
take the oral deposition of its witnesses. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and

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ruled that the taking of such deposition in criminal cases is permissible. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the court did not squarely rule on the issue of whether or not the taking of oral
deposition is available in criminal cases, but held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial judge in denying the motion since there was already more than sufficient
evidence to establish the purpose of the deposition. The Supreme Court held that the use of
discovery procedures in criminal cases is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
9. Insofar as the examination of child witness is concerned, the Supreme Court has
promulgated the Rules thereon, which took effect on December 15, 2000
10. A waiver of the accused of his right to present evidence should never be taken lightly
and should always be subjected to a careful scrutiny by the court. To be upheld as valid, it must
be established that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and possible consequences. However, the invalidity of
the waiver does not automatically vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case and cause the
remand thereof to the trial court; there must be a showing that the invalid waiver resulted in the
inadequate presentation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. (People
vs. Beriber, 431 SCRA 332 [2004]
11. Discharge of a co-accused to be utilized as a state witness (People vs.
Sandiganbayan and Paredes, G.R. No. 11543941, July 16, 1997; People vs. Reyes, G.R. No.
49112, October 22,1992; R.A. 9165, Otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
However, if a co-participant in a crime, after the conduct of the preliminary investigation, is
subsequently admitted to the Witness Protection Program under R.A.6981 before the filing of the
case in court, he shall not anymore be included in the criminal complaint or information. There
is neither any need to file a motion to discharge him as a state witness. However, if he has been
included in the information, the prosecution may seek his discharge under Section 17 of Rule
119. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because
it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of the accused
is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function.
(Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652[1995]

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12. Application of Section 19,Rule 119. When a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense. The articles presupposes that there has been a trial but the court believes that the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or of one that necessarily includes it. It is the
primary function of the court to motu propio order the dismissal of the case and direct the filing
of the appropriate information.
X. JUDGMENT (Rule 120)

A..Unlike in civil cases where judgment is deemed rendered by the delivery of the judge
of his signed decision to the Clerk of Court, who, in turn, has the ministerial duty of
furnishing the parties with copies thereof, in criminal cases, on the other hand, the
judgment must be promulgated in open court (Sec. 6, Rule 120) and that the judge must
still be in office at the time, unless he is absent or outside the province. If the judge had
ceased to be a judge at the time of the promulgation, the judgment is null and void. It
should be promulgated by the next judge in accordance with the evidence already
introduced. (People vs. So., L-8733, July 30, 1957)
B...Promulgation of Judgment Merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to
the accused is not sufficient; it is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts
and the law on which such judgment is based.(Dizon vs. Judge Lilia Lopez, 278 SCRA
483 [1997])
C..Promulgation in absentia (Sec, 6, Rule 120;Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140243,December 14,2000);People vs. Mapalao,197 SCRA 76;People vs. Agbulos,222
SCRA 196)
D.Insofar as juveniles are concerned, the court shall promulgate the sentence against
them in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
but such sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the convicted
juvenile. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days
from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the
Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem (Secs. 31, 32, Rule on
Juveniles)
E. A decision need not be a complete of the evidence presented. It is sufficient if it states
the facts as found by the court; To test the adequacy of a challenged decision, the proper
yardstick is Section14 of Article VIII of the Constitution. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, et
al., 447 SCRA 291 [2004])
F. It is the bounden duty of a judge to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a
protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself
provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances.

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Courts should not concern themselves with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of the laws.
(People vs. Hon. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 242 [1995])
XI. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL (Rules 121 and 122
A. Appeal to the Supreme Court where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise
to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed. (See People vs. Francisco, G.R. No.135201-02,March
15,2001)
B. For newly discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following requirements
must be met: (1) the evidence is discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
and (3) the evidence is material not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and of
such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment. ( People vs. Datu, et al., G.R. No. 136796, February 19, 200
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Heinous Crimes Law, reclusion perpetua remains
to be an indivisible penalty (People vs. Lucas,232 SCRA 537;People vs. Gatward, G.R.
No. 119772,Feb. 7,1997;People vs. Fuertes,294 SCRA 605;People vs. Qui Ang,292
SCRA 306;People vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 130490,June 19,2000)
D. A motion for new trial in criminal cases must be based on newly discovered evidence,
that is, the following must concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching and of such weight that, if admitted, could probably change
the judgment. (People vs.Bongalon, G.R. No. 125025, January 23,2002)
E. In People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678 promulgated July 7, 2004, the Supreme Court,
through Justice Vitug, ruled that henceforth, if only to ensure utmost circumspection,
before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court
now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. A prior determination by the
Court of Appeals, particularly on the factual issues of the case, would minimize the
possibility of error of judgment.
F. On September 8, 2004, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC amending
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure on death penalty cases, to take effect on October
15, 2004, providing that (a) the appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the regional
trial court is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed

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for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals; (b) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court
imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment
as provided for in Section 10 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall
be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty
days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of
denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed,
the court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and
forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the
same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to the Supreme Court.
In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such
penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed
with the Court of Appeals.
If it is the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, that
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, or where it imposed a
lesser penalty on offenses committed in the same occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the imposition of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
appea shall be made directly to the Supreme Court by the filing of a notice of appeal with
the Sandiganbayan and serving a copy thereof to the adverse party.
Whenever the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
imposes the death penalty, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15th) day
following the promulgation of the judgment or the notice of the denial of the Motion for
New Trial or Reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days
after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
Whenever the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, finds
that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed, it
shall render judgment accordingly. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment

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and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for
Review. (Amendment to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated Oct. 12, 2004)
XII. SEARCH AND SEIZURE (Rule 126)
A. The doctrine in Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249, is now modified by
Section 2,Rule 126
B. A search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all court (Kenneth Roy
Savage vs. Taypin, 331 SCRA 697)An application for a search warrant need not be
accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping, as this is only required in
initiatory pleadings (Ibid). However, a recent Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions
for Infringement of Intellectual Rights promulgated by the Supreme Court, which took
effect on February 15, 2002, provides that an application for a search warrant for
violations of the Intellectual Property Code can be filed only with regional trial courts
designated by the Supreme Court to try violations of intellectual property rights stationed
at the place where the violation occurred or is to occur, or the place to be searched, at the
election of the applicant. Provided, however, that where the complaint for infringement
has already been filed, the application shall be made in the court where the case is
pending. An application for a search warrant for the violation of the Intellectual Property
Code is required to contain a certification against forum shopping as prescribed by
Section 5, Rule 7 0f the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. The right to immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures also applied to
corporations (Bache &Co., vs.Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823). But the legality of the search and
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383; Uy vs. BIR, 344 SCRA 36, 67)
Consequently, corporate officers may not validly object to the use in evidence against
them from the offices and premises of the documents, papers, and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not
be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacities. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra)
D. The judge issuing the warrant is now required to ascertain within 10 days after its
issuance, if a return has been made, and if none, to summon the person to whom the
warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made.
E. A motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence should be filed and acted
upon only by the court where the criminal case was filed as a consequence of the search.
If no criminal case was filed, the motion may be filed with the court which issued the

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warrant. However, if the issuing court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
F. The rule that searches and seizure must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an
absolute one. There are at least eight (8) exceptions recognized in this jurisidiction, and
they are: (1) Search incidental to a lawful arrest (Rule 126, Sec.13); (2) Search of
evidence in plain view; (3) Search of moving vehicles; (4) Consented warrantless
searches; (5) Customs searches; (6) Stop and Frisk Rule; (7) Exigent and Emergency
Circumstances (People vs. Sevilla, 339 SCRA 625); and (8) Routine Frisks of Plane
Passengers at Airports (People vs. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18,2000)
G. The law requires that, under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed
(People vs. Molina, G.R.No. 133917, Feb. 19, 2000). Implied acquiescence to a search
requires more than a mere passive conformity given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee (Ibid).For a warrantless search after a lawful arrest to be effected, the search
must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter, and
only at the place where the suspect was arrested or the premises or surrounding under his
immediate control. (People vs. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592 [2000]; People vs. Uy,
G.R. No. 144506, April 11, 2002)
H. If the seizure of certain articles enumerated in the search warrant is supported by
probable cause as established in the affidavits accompanying the application and the
searching questions asked by the court, the fact that the warrant is defective with respect
to the application for seizure of other articles enumerated in the search warrant does not
warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. It would be a drastic remedy if a
warrant which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be
seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not supported by evidence. (People vs.Salanguit,
G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19,2001)
I. The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on one hand,
and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are
proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the others findings
as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the
other. The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the
second, whether an information should be filed in court When the court, in determining
probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been
committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary
investigation. The court does not oblige the investigating officer not to file an information
for the courts ruling that no crime exists is only for purposes of issuing or quashing the

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warrant.x x x However, the effect of a quashal of a search warrant on the ground that no
offense has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the warrant
nadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding including the preliminary investigation.
(Solid Triangle Sales Corporation and Robert Sitchon vs. the Sheriff of RTC QC, Branch
93, et al., G.R. No. 144309, November 23, 2001).
J. The search and seizure without a search warrant of a suitcase and contraband items
contained therein by the private security personnel of a vessel, and not by government
law enforcement agencies, is not covered by the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11,
2002)
K. In determining probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant, the oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence
of probable cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of
fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. In this case, even if the affiants knowledge of the
accuseds illegal possession of firearms and prohibited drugs came from a confidential
informant, and therefore, initially hearsay, if subsequent surveillance and investigation
conducted by him on the basis of said confidential information enabled him to gain
personal knowledge of the illegal activities of the accused, his testimony contained in his
affidavit is therefore sufficient justification for the examining judge to conclude that there
was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. (Cupcuin vs. People, G.R. No.
132389, Nov. 19, 2002)
L. But the constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things
to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to (1)
readily identify the properties to be seized and thus present them from seizing the wrong
items, and (2) to leave said peace officers with no description regarding the articles to be
seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.(Microsoft Corporation vs.
Maxicorp.Inc.,G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004) What the Constitution seeks to
avoid are search warrants of broad and general characterization or sweeping
descriptions, which will authorized police officers to undertake a fishing expedition
to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.
It is not required that technical description be made, particularly, where by the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general since the requirement of a
technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. (People vs. Tee, G.R. No.
140546-47, January 20, 2003; Microsoft Corp. vs. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R.No. 140946,
September 13, 2004)

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M. Where the workshop where the packs of shabu were found is actually an integral part of
the residence of the accused, it cannot be argued that there are two houses in the address
stated in the warrants and that the same failed to particularly describe the place to be
searched. The rule is, a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to
be searched (Ibid)
N. When prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to
and occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in
possession of such drugs in violation of the law, and the fact of finding the same is
sufficient to convict. Otherwise stated, the findings of the drugs in the building owned by
petitioner raised the presumption of knowledge and, standing alone, was sufficient to
convict. (Ibid)
O. It is not the ownership of the place where the illegal items were seized that matters. What
is decisive is, whether the accused had access and control over a workshop room which is
an integral part of the house (Ibid)
P. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is
that, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a persons body, personal effects or
residence, except in conducted by virtue of a valid search issued in compliance with the
procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. (People vs.
Canton, G.R. No. 148825, Dec. 27, 2002)
Q. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction. (People vs. Libnao, et al., G.R. NO. 136860, January
20, 2003)
R. A distinction must have to be made to a stop and frisk rule and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, there must be a valid arrest before
the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a stop and frisk situation, while probable
cause is not required to conduct the same, nonetheless, a mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in the light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant a belief that the person
searched has weapons concealed about him. A stop and frisk serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances, and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal

Page 39 of 39
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit a police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer. (People vs. Chua, G.R. No. 136066-67,
February 4, 2003)
S. A stop and frisk search refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who
is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line
with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon which could be
unexpectedly and fatally used against him, he could conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him. In a search of passengers at airports, a search is made, not under the stop and frisk
rule, but under R.A. 6235 which allows routine airport security procedures. This
constitutes another exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures.
R.A. 6235 authorizes a search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action
of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and thereby
depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search
without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. (Ibid)
T. If there is no way of knowing if a person who was thereafter arrested had committed or
was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers, the
warrantless search that was made could not be considered as a search incident to a lawful
arrest. (People vs. Estella, G.R. No. 138539-40, January 21, 2003)
XIII. Provisional Remedies in Criminal Cases (Rule 127)

Provisional Remedies are those to which parties litigants may resort for the preservation
or protection of their rights or interest, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the
action.
The provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed
of in connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action (Sec. 1, Rule
127). They are: (1) Attachment (Rule 57); (2) Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58), Receivership
(Rule 59); Delivery of Personal Property (Rule 60), and Support Pendente Lite (Rule 61).
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THE 2000 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

By Justice Ricardo P. Galvez

THE 2000 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

shall be determined by that court (R.A. 8369, otherwise known

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6. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of

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7. Jurisdiction of courts over the subject-matter is conferred exclusively by the

II. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (Rule 110)

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trial court in cases where a preliminary investigation is required. In Manila and

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is no longer jurisdictional (People vs. Tanada,166 SCRA 360;

People vs. Bugtong, 169 SCRA 797)

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III. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111)

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IV. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (Rule 112)

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V.ARREST (Rule ll3)

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Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of

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VI. BAIL (Rule 114)

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IX. . MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

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X. JUDGMENT (Rule 120)

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such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the

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XIII. Provisional Remedies in Criminal Cases (Rule 127)

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