Daza v.

Singson
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
Cruz, J.
Facts:
The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal
Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling
its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised
its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On
December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including
therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal
from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same
day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the
Commission on Appointments.
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be
removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto
is permanent. His claim is that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has
not yet attained political stability.
Issue:
whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature
and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Held:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The
issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that
may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

The term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it

means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
==============================================
===========
Tribunal and its Composition
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a
political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation
in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by
Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the
chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of
the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly
changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the
House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the

requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate

measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.
==============================================
Coseteng vs Mitra (G.R. No. 86649)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
0
Facts:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from
diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only
candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as
a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives
formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting
that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House
majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with
the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep.
Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the
12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and
void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and

Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them

from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from
recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the
theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
1. WON the question raised is political.
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Holding/
Held:
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner
of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution
is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio
Chairman,

twelve

Senators,

and

twelve

Members

of

the

House

of

Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and parties or organizations

registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall
act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote
of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the
House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are
160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members,
which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining
two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the
next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque
Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that
this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein. There is no merit in the petitioners contention that
the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been
nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself
shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the
House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the
Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and
one from the minority-is unassailable.
===
Facts:

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of

Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her
as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal
a request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12
congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth
member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the
House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the
replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and
injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan,
Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that
their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and
members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further
alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other
congressmen from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political
question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with
the proportional representation clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that
petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the
Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional
representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised
was a political question but because revision in House representation in
CA wasbased on proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP
members in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This
granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to
LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the
Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an
opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the
House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House
seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because
they are not members of her party and they signed identical endorsements
for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have
been nominated and elected by their parties because of members were
nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs
Singson in that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded
jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government
branches.
=====
GUINGONA V GONZALES
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN
senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP,
2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators
from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LPPDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant
to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN,
two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys

representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to
a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the
latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate
that membershipin the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of
one political party
either the LAKAS
NUCD or the NPC. A party should
have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one
member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve
such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations
with the other party.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005
Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to
Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of
1987 Constitution.

the
the
the
the

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute.
The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the
Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and

international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the
Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome
Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N.
even without the signature of the President.
The Supreme Court held NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the
external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with
foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign
affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the
Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for
the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive
in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political
maturity and growth.
===============
BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO DIGEST
G.R. NO. 159618: Feruary 1, 2011
BAYAN MUNA, Represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN
BELTRAN, Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner
v.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary , and BLAS
F.
OPLE,
in
his
capacity
as
Secretary
of
Foreign
Affairs, Respondents.
FACTS:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the
Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented
by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which
aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding
and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non Surrender
Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute.
Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the
concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Rome Statute
First issue
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from,
the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the
other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the
creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the
ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states]. the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary
jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their
respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into
play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a
State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a
signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by
the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the
Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And
even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still
recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between
States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence

Second issue
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct
in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, executive
altogether. The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding
executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
Petition is DISMISSED.
GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE 415
SCRA 44
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS FILING AND REFERRAL IMPEACHMENT MERCEDITAS
GUTIERREZOMBUDSMAN ONE-YEAR BAR
Certiorari and prohibition
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and
7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the petitioner,
simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and
substance on grounds that she was denied due process and that the said
resolutions violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
for impeachable officers. Court dismissed the petition.
Facts:
22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session,
private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestao

(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon

endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker
Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
the Order of Business
3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon
(Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner
endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De
Jesus
HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules
to include it in the Order of Business
11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House
Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both
complaints sufficient in form
2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
th
15 Congress was published
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance
Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging
Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and
that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings

Issue/s:
1.

Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

2.

Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment

Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner

3.

Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the

Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:
1.

1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

- Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
- the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to
the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable standards for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review
1.

2.
DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of
promulgation the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?

(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the
impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJs, Rep.
Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan
-

Presumption of regularity

The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant

of rule-making power in the HOR
the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or
resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a

recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of

the jurisdiction of the committee
The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of
promulgating the Rules.
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic,
and not for the punishment of the offender

1.

3.

THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26,
2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public
respondent.
INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee
on Justice)
-

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the one-year bar is twofold: 1)to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the
legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once
the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
----WALANG CORONA V SENATE----------GARCIA V. COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul

Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part
of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so,
they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They
solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang
Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative
and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely
a resolution and not an ordinance.
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the
event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting of public officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art.
17 which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter
therein.
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose

and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.

GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC

Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 AM
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding]
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors
and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia.
They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled
the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to
annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and
procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They
pointed out the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution:
the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging
to the political minority to equal protection of the law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole
and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not
provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.

The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization witheffective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the
effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress
deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former
mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2)
principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was
adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and
(b) to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the
political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides
that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The
members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as
representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on
mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system
for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic
system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials
belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a
preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all
the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The
law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in
session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary,
otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the
COMELEC.

Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC

Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997

FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on
the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition
published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the
COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law
passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON
the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of
such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft
petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The

people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved
or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local
Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means
that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No.
6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local
laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith
dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

----WALA AKONG PIRMA VS COMELEC----------

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the
support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition
changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and
by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of
government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling
law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision,
it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

======================
Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to
amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of
all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of
its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The
proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art
VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift
the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution this is in pursuant to the
ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the
aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents
secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are
not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the
people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the
proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text
of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the
proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners
merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text
of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a
proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposedamendment/s by petitioners
even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more
rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other
facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other
means to resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the Lambino
Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735 is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions
already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is
sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis. See discussion
here

****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
Posted by kaye lee on 9:14 AM
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of
Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds
under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2)
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be
made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and
29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is
exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R.

No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed
and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork
barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions,
as follows:
Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done
through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance
of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs
Law (R.A. No. 6675).
The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP
of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the
Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not
be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers
New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994:
(a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on
Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision
in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is
constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The
burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held
by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government
agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving
fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by
virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A.
No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission;
E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health

is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without
also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not
the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by
the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation
of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of
said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative
of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the
right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such
purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations
to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to
complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.
Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate.
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper
steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines

--WAKLA AKONG PCPF V REPUBLIC--------DEMETRIA VS ALBA

the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the
BudgetReform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section
44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under
the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the
tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in
the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer
from one department to another here.

====
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general
interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primary grounds that
Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys,
amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the
safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the
petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another,
coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged
that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under
consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that No law shall be passed

authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be authorized to

augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by
empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the
Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General
Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the
tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to
naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has
assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say
that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the
judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as
the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for
the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section
5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being
higher than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only
a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
=====================
Guingona v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by P.D. No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in
Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by P.D. No. 1967,
entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating
Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of
P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service
under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Issue:
Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution?
Held:
No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form
of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be
made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year
(as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in
general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned
decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the
past or in the present.

============WALANG KAY PICHAY V ODELA=========

DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635

(2013)
Facts:
1. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the
State to provide a program for human resources development in science
and technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and

manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.3 Section
7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta
benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the Department of Science
and Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the
year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
2. The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits
to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of
specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit
conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999,
June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17,
2001, several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were issued disapproving the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the use of savings in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President; hence, there was no basis for the payment of
the aforesaid allowances or benefits according to the State Auditor.
3. DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP)
through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings for
the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to
utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient portions of the
Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in the following manner: x x
x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation had not been provided in
the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts effectivity, the Department had
paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current years savings as provided for in the Budget
Issuances of the Department of Budget and Management while the 1999 MC benefits
were likewise sourced from the years savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000
GAA has no provision for the use of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot
continue the payment of the Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The
DOST personnel are looking forward to His Excellencys favorable consideration for the
payment of said MC benefits, being part of the administrations 10-point action program
to quote I will order immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for
Science and Technology Personnel in Government) as published in the Manila Bulletin
dated May 20, 1998.
4. Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte,
Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority to
use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its agencies for the payment

of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the said
request is hereby approved.
5. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in
Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging
the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY
1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April 12,
2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA
of 1998.
Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5) which provides
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Held:
NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings from one
item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control and supervision. This
is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would
authorize the department heads to use savings to augment other items of appropriations within
the Executive Branch. Such power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter
egos under the doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official acts of a
Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless disapproved or reprobated by
the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority granted to the DOST by the Executive
Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was legal and valid but in so far as the
use of agencys savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001,
the authority granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.

BELGICA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest
Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated
in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard
projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft
projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social
Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it

violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in
the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative
are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot
delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the
local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energyrelated ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall
be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.
The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can
be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No.

115455, August 25, 1994
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and
26(2) of the Constitution
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the

Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to

propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives
on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit
the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not
pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution
because the second and third readings were done on the same
day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630
as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the
President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
LUNG CENTER V QUEZON CITY
FACTS:
The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City. Erected in the
middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. The ground floor is being
leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private
parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and
Garden Center. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to outpatients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives
annual subsidies from the government.
Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its
claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim. When appealed to the QC-Local Board of
Assessment, the same was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits
paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.
HELD:
The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of
incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined
in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used
altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of
the persons managing or operating the institution.
Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt
from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
(strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:

income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to
be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the
Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and

taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion alterius/expressium facit
cessare tacitum).
==================

G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law Article VI: Legislative Department; Taxation ]
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by
virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real property
taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for
the land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on
its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was
denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA)
for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor.
Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is
exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI

of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and

the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within
the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.
2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property
taxes.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable
institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit
and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions
of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the
President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of
Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created
was to render medical services to the public in general
including those who are poor and also the rich, and
become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is
entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is
in the form of subsidies granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not

enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real
properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was
implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that
in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center
must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and;
its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively
used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions
occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt
from real property taxes while those leased to private
entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Tan v Del Rosario, Jr.

Facts:
This is a consolidated case involving the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net
Income Taxation (SNIT) scheme.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the
SNIT. In the 1st case, they contend that the House Bill which eventually became RA 7496 is a
misnomer or deficient because it was named as Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the
Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession while the actual
title contains the said words with the additional phrase, Amending Section 21 and 29 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
In the 2nd case, they argue that respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in
applying SNIT to general professional partnerships by issuing Revenue Regulation 2-93 to carry
out the RA.
Issue:
Whether or not general professional partnerships may be taxed under SNIT
Held:
No. A general professional partnership is not itself an income taxpayer. Income tax is imposed
not on the partnership (which is tax exempt), but on the partners themselves in their individual
capacity computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits. There is no distinction in
income tax liability between a person who practices his profession alone and one who does it
through partnership with others in the exercise of a common profession.

In the case, SNIT is not envisioned by the Congress to cover corporations or partnerships which
are independently subject to the payment of income tax.
***
Notes:
*2 KINDS OF PARTNERSHIPS UNDER TAX CODE
1. Taxable Partnerships no matter how it was created or organized, they are subject to income
tax by law.
2. Exempt Partnerships the partners, not the partnership (although obligated to file an income
tax return for administration and data) are liable for income tax in their individual capacity.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim

[GR 119775, 24 October 2003]

En Banc, Carpio-Morales (J): 9 concur, 2 took no part
Facts: Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of

Military Reservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases

Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds
Therefor and for other purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set
out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases
under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases
Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their
extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of
Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority'
(BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of
carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance
with the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic
Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of
which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President
of the Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax
and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and
national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized financial and business
climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government
units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas
covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station
in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA

entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with

Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc.
(ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the
development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist
destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16,
1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements
whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as
the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which
would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of
turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally
envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The
Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in
response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp
John Hay. By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or
totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan
or program for its development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19
January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or
quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of
9 barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still by another resolution
passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to
BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. The
sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development
that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented
type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio
residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the
city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of
the previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and
liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp."
BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the
other proposals of the sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp
John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in
accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian
passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty
taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John

Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in

determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the
sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's
property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation.
More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255,
(Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the
issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring
an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the
provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of
the proposed proclamation for consideration by the President. On 5 July 1994
then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating
and designating a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John Hay
as the John Hay Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition,
mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995
challenging, in the main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420
as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture
Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case

questioning the validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.

Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are

raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case."
RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government
units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The
grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the
bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is
in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of

Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being
challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an
incidental interest," for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation
420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City.
Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly
elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of
Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their
constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a
portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then,
Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian
Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now
challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to bring the present
petition.