YOAN B.

BUENO
ALCAZAREN VS. UNIVET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, INC.
G.R. No. 149628, NOVEMBER 22, 2005
Facts:
Univet Agricultural Products, Inc. employed Edgardo Alcazaren as a casual
employee performing the work of a sales representative in Capiz and Aklan. He was
transferred as sales supervisor from west to east Visayas via inter-office memorandum
but refused to receive the same. He was also ordered to participate in the mid-year
meeting of sales supervisors of the west Visayas but failed to attend the same.
Alcazaren was ordered to report to his supervisor. He read the directive but refuses to
receive the same. His manager issued a memorandum requiring Alcazaren to explain
why no disciplinary action should be imposed upon him for his failure to attend the
conference despite notice. Alcazaren submitted his answer claiming that her
grandmother died and he had to attend her burial in Capiz.
Alcazaren was directed to report to Univet and turn over all accountable forms in
his possession and the service vehicle assigned to him. He was suspended for a period
for a period of 15 days to 30 30 days. He then filed a complaint against Univet claiming
that he was illegally suspended and his salaries were not paid.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the complaint but
the NLRC reversed the same wherein it declared was illegally dismissed and ordered
the respondent to reintestate him. Respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeal.
CA set aside the decision of the NLRC wherein it declared that Alcazaren was not
illegally dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the respondents petition for
certiorari
Held:
The court ruled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blng. 129, as amended
by RA No. 4902, the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction
over petition for certiorari, was specifically given power to pass upon the evidence, if
and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
When factual findings of the NLRC are contrary to those of the Labor Arbiter, the
appellate court may review the evidentiary facts. In this case, the factual findings of the
Labor Arbiter were reversed by the NLRC. Hence, the CA had to review the evidence of
the parties and determine for itself the evidentiary facts.

YOAN B. BUENO
ABC AUTO SUPPLY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
284 SCRA 218
Facts:
DASUDECO (Davao Sugar Central Company) contracted respondent Merced to
repair its trailers. The latter then bought on credit some vehicular parts from petitioner,
provided that the payments are made within 30 days. Upon demand, private respondent
refused payment of the balance on the ground that the said accounts had not yet
matured.
The pre-trial of the case was ended on January 1983 when Judge Patricia
Conizares-Nye was still presiding. When the judiciary was reorganized under the Aquino
administration, Judge Agton who was then the Judge of RTC Branch XVI was
transferred to another branch of RTC but within the same judicial region. Meanwhile,
Judge Romeo Marasigan was assigned to RTC Branch XVI.
Judge Marasigan acted on private respondents motion for extension of time to
file memorandum. A decision penned by Judge Agton was rendered in favor of the
petitioner. Private respondent moved to reconsider said decision, but the same was
denied in an order issued by Judge Marasigan. Private respondent appealed to the CA
which nullified Judge Agton decision on the ground that at time he rendered the
judgment, he was neither the judge de facto nor the judge de jure of RTC Branch XVI.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Agton acquired jurisdiction over the case
Held:
For a judgement to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during
the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. This line with the courts
en banc resolution of February 10, 1983 implementing BP 129 which mere requires that
the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge. Branches of the trial court
are not distinct and separate tribunals from each other. Hence, according to private
respondents allegation, Judge Agton could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the
case, because jurisdiction does not attach to the judge but to the court. The continuity of
the court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation,
or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it.
To remand a validly decided case to the incumbent presiding judge of Branch
XVI, as what the CA suggest, would only prolong this rather simple collection suit and
would run counter to the avowed policy of the court to accord a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition for every action