Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

1. BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PASTOR

334 SCRA 127 June 20, 2000
FACTS:

Barangay filed in MTC a complaint to expropriate the said property.

It was dismissed by the MTC on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the Subject
Matter. It said it was incapable of pecuniary estimation so the RTC had
jurisdiction.
It filed with the RTC. Dismissed also because it said it was based on assessed
value.
In this case the property was worth 1, 740.
Appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Did the RTC have jurisdiction? Yes.
RATIO:

RTC has jurisdiction.

It is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Basic issue in expropriation is exercise by the government of its authority and
right to take property.
In fact issue of money here is merely incidental.
There are 2 phases:
o
The determination of whether the government has the right to take
property
o
The issue of Just Compensation
These do not involve title and possession to land. Even the commentary of
Justice Feria states the RTC has jurisdiction.

2. NPC v. JOCSON
206 SCRA 521 February 25, 1992
FACTS:

ISSUE

NPC filed 7 complaints for expropriation before the RTC of Bacolod.

They were using it for the Negros Panay Interconnection Project.
This is after negotiations failed for voluntary purchases.
It was raffled but consolidated, again re-raffled because the Judge was sick.
Re-raffled to Hibionada. Issued order for defendants to appear.
But he ordered it returned to Judge Jocson (who was originally sick).
JFound paramount interest, fixed provisional amount in compliance with which,
NPC deposited 23.2 million in PNB accounts.
But the owners say it was too low so filed MR.
Increased it by 23 million. Asked defendants whether they were satisfied with it,
and said he would issue a writ of possession after they accept.
Since they did ordered to pay within 24 hours. Unable to accept these orders,
NPC filed a Rule 65.

Whether the Orders are valid?

RATIO:

GAOD.
Under PD 42, after depositing the assessed value of amount equal to assessed
value to taxation, they are entitled to WP.
Judge ignored it and himself made the provisional amounts, not based on assessed
value.
Afterall, PD 42 was reiterated in other laws.
It removed discretion of Judge to fix provisional amount.
Here he even allowed the owners to affix their conformity subordinating his
judgement for theirs.
If indeed as found in ordere that no objecton, should have appointed 3
commissioners to help determine JC.
Remand.

3. VISAYAN REFINING CO. v. CAMUS

40 Phil. 550 (1919)
Facts:
The Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to
be begun for the purpose of expropriating a tract of land of about 1,100,463 square meters,
called Camp Tomas Claudio. It is located in Paraaque, Province of Rizal, and lies along the
water front of Manila Bay. It is going to be used for military and aviation purposes
The Attorney-General asked the court in the condemnation proceedings to give the
Government the possession of the land to be expropriated, after the necessary deposit should
be made as provided by law. The possession of land was granted in an order by the CFI
Judge after the deposit of P600,000 as the total value of the property. It being made to appear
that a certificate of deposit for the amount stated had been delivered to the provincial
treasurer. It seems that the money had been taken from the unexpended balance of the funds
appropriated by Acts Nos. 2748 and 2785 of the Philippine Legislature for the use of the Militia
Commission. The respondents who are owners of the different portions of the property filed a
demurrer and asked that the CFI order be revoked.
Issue:
1. W/N an Act of the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise of the power of
eminent domain to acquire land for military or aviation purposes is needed before
expropriation?
2. W /N land can be expropriated by the Government in the absence of a legislative
appropriation especially destined to pay for the land to be taken?
Ruling:
1. General authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is expressly conferred on
the Government of the Philippine Island.
We are of the opinion that the contentions of the petitioners, in whatever way they may be
understood or expressed, are not well founded. There is one point at least on which all must
agree, namely, that if land can be taken by the Government for a public use at all, the use
intended to be made of the land now in question, that is, for military and aviation purposes, is

Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

a public use. It is undeniable that a military establishment is essential to the maintenance of
organized society, and the courts will take judicial notice of the recent progress of the
military and naval arts resulting from the development of aeronautics.
Expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive initiative of the
Governor-General, without the aid of any special legislative authority other than that
already on the statute books. Furthermore, if the Government complies with the
requirements of law relative to the making of a deposit in court, provisional
possession of the property may be at once given to it, just as is permitted in the case
of any other person or entity authorized by law to exercise the power eminent
domain. Special legislative authority for the buying of a piece of land by the Government is
no more necessary than for buying a paper of pain; and in the case of a forced taking of
property against the will of the owner, all that can be required of the government is that
should be able to comply with the conditions laid down by law as and when those
conditions arise.
The contention that the authority to maintain such a proceeding cannot be delegated by the
Legislature to the Chief Executive, is in our opinion wholly erroneous and apparently has its
basis in a misconception of fundamentals. It is recognized by all writers that the power
of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence
of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. Philosophers
and legists may differ as to the grounds upon which the exercise of this high power is to be
justified, but no one can question its existence. No law, therefore, is ever necessary to
confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any government exercising sovereign or quasisovereign powers.
The power of eminent domain, with respect to the conditions under which the
property is taken, must of course be exercised in subjection to all the restraints
imposed by constitutional or organic law. The two provisions by which the exercise
of this power is chiefly limited in this jurisdiction are found in the third section of the
Jones Act, already mentioned, which among other things declares (1) that no law
shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of property without due process of
law and (2) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The latter of these provisions is directly aimed at the taking of property
under the exercise of the power of eminent domain; and as this requirement, in connection
with the statutes enacted to make sure the payment of compensation, usually affords all the
protection that the owner of property can claim, it results that the due process clause is
rarely invoked by the owner in expropriation proceedings.
2. Counsel for the petitioners say that money appropriated for the purpose of the Militia
Commission cannot be lawfully used to acquire the land which is now the subject of
expropriation, because no authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is to be
found in any of the Acts appropriating money for said Commission; from whence it is argued
that the certificate of deposit affords no protection to the owners of property.
The point appears to be one of little general importance, and we will not multiply words over
it. Suffice it to say that in our opinion the Insular Auditor was acting within his
authority when he let this money out of the Insular Treasury; and being now within
the control of the lower court, it will doubtless in due time be applied to the purpose
for which the deposit was made.

4. MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN V. GARCIA

G.R. No. 69260
December 22, 1989
FACTS
Petitioner Municipality of Bian filed a complaint for expropriation against the owners of eleven
adjacent parcels of land in Bian. The land was intended for use as the new site of a modern
public market as authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bian. One of the
defendants, Erlinda Francisco, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Respondent Judge Garcia then
issued a writ of possession in favor of the Municipality. Francisco subsequently filed a Motion
for Separate Trial, alleging that she had a vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational
Clearance from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and until revoked, it was
premature to file a case for expropriation. The trial court granted the motion. The fiscal, in
representation of the Municipality, called the courts attention to the irregularity of allowing
Francisco to present evidence ahead of petitioner and argued that the MTD was in truth an
answer. Nevertheless, the court allowed the presentation of evidence. Thereafter, the court
issued an order on July 24, 1984 dismissing the complaint as against Francisco and amending
the writ of possession so as to exclude her from its force and effects. Petitioner filed a MR
dated August 17, 1984 which was dismissed for having been filed out of time or beyond the
15-day period for appeal. The court promulgated another order directing the issuance of a writ
of execution and a certificate of finality of order. Petitioner filed a MR for the two orders but the
motion was denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUES
1) Whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is
a case wherein multiple appeals are allowed, as regards which the period of appeal shall
be 30 days, instead of 15 days.
2) Whether or not the trial court may treat the MTD filed by one of the defendants in the
action of eminent domain as a MTD under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, reverse the
sequence of trial in order and hear and determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter
dismiss the expropriation suit as against the movant.
3) Whether or not a locational clearance issued by the HSRC relative to use of land is a bar
to an expropriation suit involving that land.
HELD
1) Yes. Actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than 2 appeals
are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is 30 days
counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of 15 days prescribed for actions
in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of BP Blg. 129, in relation to par.
19(b) of the Implementing Rules to the effect that in appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be 30 days, a record of appeal being
required.
The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore
timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it was
error for the trial court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought
to be considered had become final and executory.
2) No. Nothing in the record reveals any valid cause to reverse the order of trial. Assuming
that the trial court had in mind Rule 16 allowing any of the grounds for dismissal in Rule
16 to be pleaded as an affirmative defense and authorizing the holding of a preliminary
hearingthereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed, the reception of Francisco's
evidence first was wrong, because her asserted objection or defense that the locational

Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

3)

clearance issued in her favor by the HSRC was a legal bar to the expropriation suit
was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant to prove the
Municipality's lack of cause of action; but lack of cause of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action under Rule 16; the ground is the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action, which is obviously not the same as plaintiff's not having a cause of
action.
Nothing in the record, moreover, discloses any circumstances from which a waiver by
the Municipality of the right to present contrary proofs may be inferred. So, in deciding
the issue without according the Municipality that right to present contrary evidence, the
trial court had effectively denied the Municipality due process and thus incurred in
another reversible error.
No. The locational clearance did become a worthless sheet of paper, as averred by the
Municipality, upon the lapse of 1 year in light of the explicit condition in the clearance
that it shall be considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of one 1
year from date of issue, and the unrebutted fact that Francisco had not really made
use of it within that period. The failure of the Court to consider these facts, despite its
attention having been drawn to them, is yet another error which must be corrected.

5. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF RIZAL V. CARO DE ARAULLO

Facts:
The Provincial Government of Rizal filed the complaint for expropriation on May
31, 1928. The purpose of the expropriation was the extension of Taft Avenue from the limits
of the City of Manila, through the municipality of Pasay, to its intersection with the Manila
South Road. Defendants appeared and admitted plaintiffs right to expropriate the property
in question, and the court appointed four commissions to hear the parties and view the
premises, and assess the damages to be paid for the condemnation, and to report their
proceedings to the court. The only question involved in the case was the determination of
the damages to which the defendants were entitled.
In the case of most of the lots the evidence consists of the owners estimate of
the value of his land at the time of the hearing in 1929 or 1930, and for the plaintiff the
testimony of Colin M. Hoskins. Hoskins is a real estate broker and appraiser of real
property, and at the time of the hearing had been engaged in that business for seven years,
and had participated in real estate transactions in the municipality of Pasay and in the land
taken for the extension of Taft Avenue. He had examined the property to be condemned,
and was in a position to express a reliable opinion as to its market value. He testified as to
the value of the property in question in 1927 before the extension of Taft Avenue was laid
out, and as to its increased value at the time of the hearing.
Issue:
Are the damages to be based upon the value of the property when the district
engineer of Rizal Province entered upon the land and laid out the extension of Taft Avenue
in 1927, or the value on May 31, 1928 when the condemnation proceedings were filed, or
on the value of the property at the time of the hearings before the commissioners in 1929
and 1930?
Held:
The lower court erred in declaring that the properties expropriated should be
appraised according to their value on June 1, 1928, and not that in 1927.
The value of the property in question was greatly enhanced between the time
when the extension of the street was laid out and the date when the condemnation
proceedings were filed, because of the fact that one of the widest and most important

streets in the City of Manila was to be extended through the municipality of Pasay, thereby
making the land affected practically a part of the City of Manila and giving it a frontage on one
of the citys principal boulevards. The property had further increased in value when the
commissioners held hearings a year and a half after these proceedings were filed. In other
words, the value of the property was enhanced by the purpose for which it was taken. The
owners of the land have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment resulting
from the construction of the public improvement for which the land was taken. To permit them
to do so would be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it
was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would
discourage the construction of important public improvements. The property is to be
considered in its condition and situation at the time it is taken, and not as enhanced by
the purpose for which it is taken.
It is generally held that the valuation of the property taken should be made as of the
time of the filing of the condemnation proceedings. That is a fixed and convenient date, and it
usually precedes or coincides with the taking of the property; but in the case at bar the plaintiff
appropriated the property with the consent of the landowners, and without the filing of any
expropriation proceedings, in the expectation that the parties would be able to reach an
agreement out of court as to the value of the property taken, and the condemnation
proceedings were not filed until it was found much later that no such agreement could be
reached as to part of the property. Under those circumstances the value of the property
should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings.
The defendants are entitled to recover legal interest on the value of their
property from the time when it was taken by the plaintiff.
Note: Fifty-two lots and the improvements on ten lots were involved in the appeal, and the
Supreme Court indicated in the decision how much each lot was appraised by the
commissioners and by Hoskins before fixing the amount each lot was worth. This is why the
decision was kinda lengthy.
6. REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVIN
No. L-20620
August 15, 1974
Facts:
Philippine Government filed an eminent domain case against the estate of Castellvi
for a 760,000 sqm. Parcel of land in Pampanga. Government alleged that the valuation should
not be more than 2000 pesos per sqm or a total of 259000 peso and prayed that the
provisional value should be set at that price. Castellvi contended that it is actually worth 15
pesos per sqm or a total of 11,400,000.00. The alleged taking started when the Government
through the Philippine Air Force has been occupying the lot under lease since 1947 but on
1956 Castellvi refused to renew lease contract and opted to have the lot subdivided and sold
to the public. Government opposed since they introduced improvements to the lot worth
500,000 pesos.
The Government alleged that the taking should be counted from 1947 by virtue of
the lease agreement. Castellvi insists that it should start from the time the lease contract had
expired on 1956. They filed the case on June 1959.
Issue:
Is the Governments position correct?

Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

Held:
No. Castellvi is Correct.
Ratio:
First, the expropriator must enter the property, which is admitted in this case.
Second, the entrance must be more than a momentary period. In this case, the
lease contract was renewable annually. The entry on 1947 under lease was temporary and
considered transitory. Even if AFP constructed improvements, it does not alter the fact that
the entry was not permanent, in that it was meant to last only for a year. Lease contract
contained express provision that Government would return lot at the end of the agreement.
Express contract provision prevails over intent to take.
Third, the public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In this case, the entry of the AFP into the property
did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi
remained as owner during the lease period.
Neither is the Governments contention that the fact that the lease provision was
year to year it had the permanent right to occupy.
The determination of just compensation should be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint under Sec. 4, Rule 67. Government was placed in possession
over the property only on August 1959. The value should be based on June 1959, the date
the case was filed.
On the issue of the value of the land, Government insists that the land is still
agricultural land, hence should be valued at around 20 centavos per sqm. However, the
land has not been used for agriculture since the occupation by the AFP. It was even
declared under its Tax declaration to be a residential lot of which they have been paying
taxes. The court valued the lot at 5 pesos per sqm instead of the 10 pesos per sqm as
declared by the Commissioners. SC decided this was the fair price.
On the issue of interest, 6% interest is imposed beginning August 10, 1959 or the
time the lots possession was given to the Government.
7. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY (EPZA) VS. DULAY | GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987 | 149 SCRA 305
Facts:

The President issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the
public domain situated in Cebu, for the establishment of an export processing zone by
petitioner EPZA.

However, the proclamation included 4 parcels of land registered in the name of private
respondent San Antonio Devt. Corp. (SADC). Since the parties failed to reach an
agreement as to the purchase and sale of the properties, EPZA filed a complaint for
expropriation against SADC.

Respondent Judge Dulay authorized the petitioner to take possession of the property
immediately, and appointed commissioners to ascertain just compensation. The
commissioners reported a value of P15.00/sq.m.

Petitioner filed a MR and objection to the Commissioners Report on the ground that
PD No. 1533 has superseded Rule 67 on the ascertainment of just compensation
through commissioners. The MR was denied, hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N Rule 67 has been repealed or deemed amended by PD No. 1533. Stated differently, is
the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD No. 1533 valid
and constitutional?

Petitioner: Respondent judge acted with GADALEJ, because under PD No. 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the
owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

Ruling:
THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.

DECREES

ON

JUST

COMPENSATION

ARE

The decrees categorically and peremptorily limited the definition of just compensation,
thus: For purposes of just compensationthe basis shall be the current and fair market
value declared by the owner or administrator, or such value as determined by the
Assessor, whichever is lowe.
This method constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although
the court would technically still have the power to determine just compensation, its task
would be relegated to simply stating the lower value; and it would be useless to appoint
commissioners. Thus, its strict application would be a mere formality; and the court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
The trial court correctly stated that the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts
own judgment.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
conditions of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. The values given out by the assessor are usually uniform, so the individual
differences of the property are not taken into account. The value of the land is based on
generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.

Petition dismissed. PD No. 1533 is unconstitutional and void.

Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

8. CITY OF MANILA V. CORRALES | JOHNSON
G.R. No. L-10076, October 28, 1915 | 32 Phil 85
FACTS

The complaint alleged that the property in question was necessary for the purpose of
opening or building a street running from Calle Marques de Comillas to Calle
Nozaleda, crossing Calle San Marcelino and Taft Avenue.

After hearing the respective parties agreed that the opening or construction of said
proposed street was necessary. By agreement of all the parties, Prieto, Tiaoqui, and
Mahoney were appointed as commissioners to view and appraise the property
involved in the present action and to report their findings and conclusions to the court.

The commissioners allowed as the reasonable value of said land the sum of
P10,637.28. The commissioners, however, reduced said total amount by the sum of
P1,353.13, which was the necessary cost, in their estimation, to properly grade the
street.

Judgment was rendered in favor of defendant-appellants but both parties appealed.

The defendant-appellants insist that they should have been allowed the sum of
P13,617.63. In support of their claim they cite the declaration of several of the
witnesses who testified during the trial of the cause with reference to the value of the
land in question.

The plaintiff-appellant argues that the commissioners arbitrarily, without any proof
whatever, reduced the cost of filling the street and grading the land

Plaintiff claims that amount to be paid for the tienda should be based on reconstruction
costs, while defendant claims it should include the value of the rent at the time of
expropriation
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether the amount allowed for all of the land belonging to the defendants,
appropriated for the opening or construction of the street was correct

Whether the value of the tienda can be deduced from its rental value at the time of
expropriation or from the cost of its reconstruction
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

In taking private property for public use under the power of eminent domain, the
persons whose property is thus taken, should be paid the reasonable market price of
their property. The owners of property should not take advantage of the necessity of
the public for the purpose of requiring the Government to pay more than their property
is worth, neither should the Government be permitted to take the property of private
persons at a less price than it is reasonably worth at the time of the expropriation.
Market value of property taken under the power of eminent domain means the value,
which purchasers generally would pay for it. This does not mean what a purchaser
would pay who had no particular object in view in purchasing, and no definite plan as
to the use to which to put it. The owner has a right to its value for the use for which it
would bring the most in the market.
It is difficult to understand upon what theory the plaintiff could insist upon having the
actual value of the land at the time of expropriation reduced by what it would cost to
grade the street after the land had been turned over to it. The plaintiff was attempting
to expropriate the land in the condition under which it was found. The commissioners

were appointed for the purpose of ascertaining its value in that condition. The question
was as to the value then, not its value after it was appropriated for public street purposes.
It is difficult to understand upon what theory the plaintiff could require the defendants to
bear the cost of the construction of the proposed street. In fact, a condition might be
imagined where the street might be so graded as to result in actual damaged to the rest
of the property of the defendants. For example, if the city should establish a grade much
higher than the property belonging to the defendants, actual damages might result to the
defendants by virtue of the grading of the street. We do not believe that the cost of
grading the proposed street should be charged to the defendants. We are of the opinion,
therefore, and so hold, that the value of the property, P10,637.28, should not have been
reduced by P1,353.13
2nd Issue:

There may be cases where the value of property can be fixed upon its actual rental
value. For example, where the property has been rented for a number of years at a fixed
rate, then such rate ought to be used as the basis of the actual value of the property. It
must not be overlooked that there is a difference between the actual rental value of the
property and the price for which it is rented at any particular time. What property will rent
for is a variable quantity. The amount paid for the use of property is not always a constant
quantity. The amount, which the tenant will pay, may depend upon his particular
necessities at the time.

The theory of the defendants would fix the rent for all time as a constant quantity. The
constant changing of centers of population and of business, as well as the fluctuation of
business, depending upon good or so-called hard times, affect that value of property for
rental purposes. For example, had property been expropriated upon the Escolta in the
city of Manila early in the year 1898, and had its value been capitalized upon the basis of
its rental value then, the owner would have received a much less amount for his property
than if the same property had been expropriated in the year 1906, the difference
depending upon what the particular property rented for in the two periods. Thus, within a
period of seven or eight years, an absolute readjustment of the value of the properties
had taken place. Thus it will be seen that the contention of the defendants that the rental
value of the property should be fixed for all time by what happens to be its rental value at
the time of the expropriation would seem to be untenable.

Neither can the rental value be determined upon a consideration of the cost of the
construction of the property. For example, a building in the principal part of the city might
be worth much more than one on the outskirts, which cost twice as much. A building on
the Escolta, in the city of Manila, which cost P50,000 might rent for twice as much as a
building on the outskirts of the city which cost P100,000. Thus it is clear that the cost of
construction cannot be used as a basis for determining the value of property.

In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The
inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not
merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to
the uses to which it is plainly adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from its availability
for valuable uses?

So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in determining the
value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is practically impossible to
formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will
modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the
compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the

Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community,
or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future.
Judgment entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, relating to the cost of
grading the street, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed,
9. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
143 SCRA 466 (1986)
Facts
The Republic filed wit the CFI a complaint for expropriation against 10
defendants, among them Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The Republic stated that it needed the
property for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a permanent site for the Philippine
Military Academy.
Benguet Consolidated filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that insofar as it is
concerned, the Republic did not need and has not occupied the areas covered by the
mining claims and neither have improvements been made on the said areas and that the
authority given by the President for expropriation proceedings refers to privately owned
mineral lands, mining interests and other private interests of private individuals and entities
of private individuals in certain portions of the site and that expropriation of Benguet
Consolidateds mineral claims is in violation of law.
The CFI issued an order declaring the Republic to have lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned. Benguet Consolidated took exception to this order of
condemnation by filing a motion stating that at no time had it manifested that it was no
longer challenging the Republics right to expropriate. The CFI made it of record that
Benguet Consolidated has not waived its right to challenge the Republics right to condemn
the mineral claims in question.
In the course of the proceedings, the Board of Commissioners formed to
establish the reasonable amount of compensation submitted its report recommending
payment of P43,703.37 to the 10 defendants as just compensation. The CFI rejected the
report and made its own findings and conclusions, promulgating a decision awarding
various sums to the defendants.
Benguet Consolidated filed a motion to clarify the decision since the dispositive portion
computed the respective amounts to be paid to the defendants without including the
amount to be paid to Benguet Consolidated. The CFI later issued an order fixing the just
compensation to be paid to Benguet Consolidated in the amount of P128,051.82. Benguet
filed a motion to reopen the case praying for new trial to allow it to present evidence as to
the value of the properties, but this was denied by the trial court. Benguet Consolidated and
the Republic appealed.
The IAC set aside the trial courts decision and awarded to Benguet Consolidated the
amount of P7,532.46. Benguet Consolidated now questions this award by the IAC saying
the condemnation of its mineral claims is contrary to law and the approval of the
Commissioners Report is contrary to law.
Issues
1.
2.

3.

Whether the amount of just compensation fixed by the Commissioners Report, as

approved by the IAC is ridiculously low and cannot be considered just and that in
fact the report was rejected by the trial court

Holding and Ratio Decidendi

1. Petitioners argument has no merit. The filing of expropriation proceedings
recognizes the fact that petitioners property is no longer part of the public
domain. The power of eminent domain refers to the power of government to take private
property for public use. If the mineral claims are public, there would be no need to
expropriate them. The mineral claims of petitioner are not being transferred to another
mining company or to a public entity interested in the claims as such. The land where the
mineral claims are located is needed for the PMA, a public use completely unrelated to
mining. The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar
the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain. The power of eminent
domain covers all forms of private property, tangible or intangible, and includes rights
which are attached to land.
2. When the CFI issued the order declaring that the Republic has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, it impliedly overruled Benguet
Consolidateds motion to dismiss which in expropriation cases takes the place of
an answer and what Benguet Consolidated could have done at the time would have
been to present evidence on the fair market value of its properties. Having slept on its
rights, it can no longer have the case reopened for presentation of its evidence.
Benguet Consolidated did not challenge this order. Instead, it filed a motion
for clarification and a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration where it said it
did not dispute the Republics right to exercise the power of eminent domain but
that the court failed to comply with the just compensation aspect of the power.
Under these circumstances, Benguet Consolidated is estopped from questioning the
proceedings of condemnation. The SC does not condone the inconsistent positions of
Benguet Consolidated. It is clear from its statements that it had already abandoned
its earlier stand on the propriety of expropriation and that its intent shifted to the
just compensation to be paid by the plaintiff for its condemned properties.
3. The conclusion of the Commissioners is the result of documentary evidence presented
by the parties, testimonies of several mining expers and executives of mining companies.
There is no reason to disturb the finding on the matter as Benguet Consolidated has not
advanced any reason for the SC to reject the findings.
While it is true that a court may reject a Commissioners Report on the ground that
the amount allowed is palpably inadequate, it is to be noted that Benguet Consolidated
has not supported its stand that the P7,532.46 just compensation for its mining claims is
by any standard ridiculously low and cannot be considered just. Further, it is to be noted
that unlike the Republic and the other defendants, Benguet Consolidated did not file any
opposition to the Commissioners Report in the lower court.

10. COSCOLLUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. 77765, August 15, 1988

Whether the perfection of the location of a mining claim has the effect of a grant
of exclusive possession with right to enjoyment of the surface ground as well as
of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, which right may not be infringed
Whether or not in expropriation proceedings, an order of condemnation may be
entered by the court before a motion to dismiss is denied

FACTS
In 1976, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the CFI of Iloilo to expropriate 2
parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo, owned by Sebastian Cosculluela and Mita
Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project.

Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

The trial court rendered a decision granting the expropriation and ordered the government
to pay Lumampao P20,000 less P4,001..82, which she already withdrew plus P3,000
attorney;s fees; and Cosculluela P200,000 (reasonable estimate of his actual and
consequential loss by reason of the taking of his 3 hectares of land, destruction of the
sugarcane and the reduce in the yield of his sugarcane farm due to water lagging and
seepage plus P10,000 attorney;s fees and P5,000 litigation expenses.
The CA modified the decision in that the attorneys fees and litigation expenses were
reduced from P10,000 and P5,000 to P5,000 and P2,500 respectively. This decision
became final and executor.
On motion of Cosculluela, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to
implement the judgment of the CA. However, this was opposed by the Republic claiming
that the funds of the National Irrigation Authority are government funds and therefore
cannot be disbursed without a government appropriation.
The trial court then issued an order directing instead that the Republic deposit with PNB in
the name of the petitioner the amount adjudged in favor of the latter. However, this was
again opposed by the Republic with the CA seeking to annul these orders. The CA issued
an order setting the decisions aside on the ground that the public or government funds are
not subject to levy and execution.
ISSUE
Whether or not Cosculluela is deprived of his right to just compensation and due process of
law when the CA reversed the decisions of the CFI granting him the writ of executionYES
RULING
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived
of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential
element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property
is taken for public use.
The property of the petitioner was taken by the government in 1975. The following year,
respondent NIA made the required deposit of P2,097.30 with the Philippine National Bank
and within the same year, the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project was finished. Since then, for
more than a period of ten (10) years, the project has been of service to the farmers nearby
in the province of Iloilo. It is, thus, inconceivable how this project could have been started
without the necessary appropriation for just compensation. Needless to state, no
government instrumentality, agency, or subdivision has any business initiating expropriation
proceedings unless it has adequate funds, supported by proper appropriation acts, to pay
for the property to be seized from the owner. Not only was the government able to make an
initial deposit of P2,097.30 but the project was finished in only a year's time. We agree with
the petitioner that before the respondent NIA undertook the construction of the Barotac

Viejo Irrigation Project, the same was duly authorized, with the corresponding funds
appropriated for the payment of expropriated land and to pay for equipment, salaries of
personnel, and other expenses incidental to the project. The NIA officials responsible for the
project have to do plenty of explaining as to where they misdirected the funds intended for the
expropriated property.
In the present case, the Barotac Viejo Project was a package project of government. Money
was allocated for an entire project. Before bulldozers and ditch diggers tore up the place and
before millions of pesos were put into the development of the project, the basic responsibility
of paying the owners for property seized from them should have been
met.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Another distinction lies in the fact that the NIA collects fees for the use of the irrigation system
constructed on the petitioner's land. It does not have to await an express act of Congress to
locate funds for this specific purpose. The rule in earlier precedents that the functions and
public services rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects (Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, supra, at p. 625) is not applicable here. There is no showing of any
public service to be disrupted if the fees collected from the farmers of Iloilo for the use of
irrigation water from the disrupted property were utilized to pay for that property.
We must emphasize that nowhere in any expropriation case has there been a deviation from
the rule that the Government must pay for expropriated property. In
the Commissioner of Public Highways case, the Court stressed that it is incumbent upon the
legislature to appropriate the necessary amount because it cannot keep the land and dishonor
the judgment.
This case illustrates the expanded meaning of "public use" in the eminent domain clause.
(Constitution, Article III, Section 9.) The petitioner's land was not taken for the construction of a
road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the
National Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects
for rent or sale to private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct irrigation systems
andsells water rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominy for the agencies
to start earning from those properties while ignoring final judgments ordering the payment of
just compensation to the former owners.
Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss.