Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST.
FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors
several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons abovenamed and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means
of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers
and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March
20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining RespondentsProsecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized
or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches
and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29,
1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations
above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of
the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure

is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it
has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a
seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor
could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence
based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose
property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June
29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein RespondentsProsecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating
that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit
and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the

aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the
things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting
in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing
that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion
is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous
decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion,
and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of
words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from
all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of
this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally
necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of
the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of
its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason
of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against
the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can
no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name
of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and,
to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it
is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches
or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in
general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they
do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of
the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is
watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms
Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of
the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry
S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects
seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers
and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search
of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted,
insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned
motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on
this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed
by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures
therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents,
papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the
suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion

written by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as
illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am
not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other
than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the
exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case should
not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the
search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us
assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places
other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants
and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said
warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the
words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the
requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other
than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably
regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Am
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of
two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively,
were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged
to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City
Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of

the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having previously
sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants
before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to
mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized
in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its
rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power
of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16,
1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because
they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from
release of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to
President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a
letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they
were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for
an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they
had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized
documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow
the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them,
within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the
search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This
objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August
9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant
No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based
on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885
as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the
purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in
the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that
might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant

No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the
opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant
No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held
"that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true
where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in
the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal
property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that
may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may
be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom
the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have
in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled
that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not
so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of
the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the
premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or
has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant
and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned
and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and
to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6
Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking
the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording
equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and
all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 133703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia
which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was
held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the
Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not
be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of nonconformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and
growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with
implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration
could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the
request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing
presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the
equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister
Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing
alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and
confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized
articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for holding
that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross violation of
the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be
alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated
only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C
Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take
possession, among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them
subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the
warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the
items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.
Teehankee, J., concur.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for holding
that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross violation of
the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be
alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated
only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C
Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take
possession, among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them
subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the
warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the
items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.
Teehankee, J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26731 June 30, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELINO PUDPUD, ELEUTERIO CUBELO and PASTOR CERILIGA, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista for
plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Alberto as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:
The plea for reversal of appellants Angelino Pudpud, Eleuterio Cubelo and Pastor Cereligia from a judgment of conviction by the lower
court for murder and attempted murder, a killing motivated by a long-standing grudge caused by a dispute over a piece of land that
brought deep-seated resentment and bitterness in its wake, is premised on the absence of any culpable act on their part, outside of the
presence at the scene of the crime. They would place sole responsibility on one of the other accused likewise convicted Icasiano
Pudpud, brother of Angeline and brother-in-law of the two other appellants, as it was he who fired the shot that resulted in the death of
one of the offended parties and inflicted the bolo wound on the other victim. 1 The competent evidence of record, here to be discussed,
point unerringly however, to the existence of a conspiracy. There is no justification then for a reversal. We affirm.
As noted in the appealed decision, 2 an information for murder and attempted murder was filed on October 29, 1964 against the abovenamed four accused worded thus: "That on or about March 27, 1964, in the Municipality of Baganga, Province of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another
armed with firearms and sharp cutting instrument, with treachery evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and intent to kill
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shot, and hack with said weapon Alfonso Milagrosa thereby
inflicting upon him physical injury which caused his instantaneous death; that on the same occasion thereof, the above-mentioned,
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another armed with the same weapons, with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
shot and hack with said weapons Federico Postrero, thus the accused commenced the commission of the crime of murder directly by
overt act but did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of soap cause other than his own
spontanious desistance." 3
The cause for ill-feeling that existed between the Pudpud brothers and the intended victim, Federico Postrero, a close relative, was
narrated in the appealed decision thus: "Federico Postrero on one hand and Icasiano Pudpud. Angelino Pudpud and the wives of
Eleuterio Cubelo and Pastor Cereligia, on the other, are first degree cousins. And all of them are residents of Mercedes, Mahanob,
Banganga. Postrero and the Pudpuds used to be in cordial relation until the former filed with this Court, Branch III in 1956, a complaint
for recovery of possession of a parcel of land situated at Mercedes, Baganga, Davao, and damages against the Pudpuds. A judgment
by default was rendered against the defendants, but the same was subsequently amended in that decision based upon an amicable
settlement was entered. 'As a gesture of charity, Postrero bound himself to pay the Pudpuds the sum of P1,000.00 as 'additional
payment for the land in litigation containing 2 hectares which defendant agree to vacate and deliver to the Plaintiffs.' Postrero paid
P1,000.00 to the Pudpuds and they [were on good terms] then. But after they had spent the money, they told him that they wanted to
get back the land. More than that they threatened to liquidate him." 4 What happened on that (tragic day of March 27, 1964, before the
actual killing was likewise set forth in such decision in these words: "On March 27, 1964, Federico Postrero went to the Poblacion of
Baganga, which is about four kilometers from Mercedes, to file a criminal case of grave threat against Icasiano Pudpud committed on
March 26, 1964, and another criminal action of arson against Icasiano Pudpud also and Eleuterio Cubelo, likewise committed on March
26, 1964, in which the house of his mother-in-law Felicima Legaspi was burned. The case of grave threat [resulting from] Icasiano
Pudpud [threatening] 'to kill Federico Postrero as soon as he has a chance to do was decided by the Court, Branch II, on March 8,
1966, convicting the accused. The case of arson was tried by this branch of the Court on April 18 and the decision will be promulgated
in the 21st of this mouth of May. Postrero took along with him to Banganga that day of March 27, 1964, Felecito Langoay, Domingo
Nazareno and Alfonso Milagrosa in order to testify in said cases." 5 After noting that of the same afternoon the accused appellant
Eleuterio Cubelo inquired from the mother-in-law of Federico Postrero whether he would be returning to Mercedes from Baganga that
evening, the lower court continued its narration of facts thus: "As stated above, Postrero went to Baganga on March 27, 1964, with
Langoay, Nazareno and Milagrosa, to file the grave threats and arson cases, but only the grave threat cases was received or
entertained by the thief of police that day, for he was very busy. They left for Baganga [riding] on carabaos, because the passenger
jeeps plying between Mercedes and Baganga were not available that day as it was good Friday and returned at about 6:00 p.m. after
they had attended the good Friday celebration, passing through the carabaos as they did in coming. Postrero and Milagrosa were riding
on one carabao astride ... with Postrero in front. Langoay and Nazareno were following very closely on another carabao, ... It was a
moonlight night. At a place in the trail about 30 meters away from the house of Angelino Pudpud and 50 meters away from the house of
Anacleta Vda. de Pudpud Postrero and his passions "heard the creaking of the cogon grasses and [they] looked back our way and
immediately [they] heard shotgun fire." The sound came from the right side of the road and about three meters away from the carabao

on which Postrero and Milagrosa were riding. The gunshot also came from the same side of the road. Immediately after the gunshot or
explosion the eyes of Postrero were somewhat covered with smoke and [he] could notice that his companion [Milagrosa] was fatally hit
because he immediately fell down and [so did he.]' Both fell down at the same time. Immediately after, Postrero, Langoay and
Nazareno saw Icasiano Pudpud, armed with a shotgun and a bolo, and Eleuterio Cubelo, Angeline Pudpud and Pastor Cereligia, all
armed with bolos, corner of the cogon grasses. Icasiano Pudpud went to where Milagrosa was, who was lying on the ground, face
down. Upon noting that it was Milagrosa, Icasiano Pudpud said: 'He is not the one hit,' then proceeded to where Postrero was and
struck him with a bolo but Postrero jumped and ran away. Icasiano Pudpud and Eleuterio Cubelo chased him. As they were chasing
Postrero, Icasiano Pudpud said: "Do not run, I will finish you, putang Ina mo.' On the other hand, Angelino Pudpud and Pastor Cereligia
approached Langoay and Nazareno and so the latter two also ran away. Postrero ran as fast as he could 'through the thick bushes
where he hid until those chasing him had lost him and had left home. Then he went home passing through thick bushes and the
Mahanob River. It was about 11: 00 o'clock that evening when he reached home and saw Nazareno, who had related to his family what
had happened to them." 6 Alfonso Milagrosa died on the spot, having been hit at the right eyebrow, part of his head being blown off, with
fragments of his brain found scattered near his body.
In their brief, appellants did not dispute the above recital concerning the actual killing of Milagrosa and the wounding of Federico
Postrero. They would cast doubt, however, on the existence of the motive of the accused for wishing that Federico Postrero and would
not concede that they made threats against his life. Stress was laid in their brief on Icasiano Pudpud, not the appellants being the sole
culprit, as there was no conspiracy. Thus, the last paragraph of their narration of facts reads. "Moments after the shot the four accused
emerged from the cogon bushes. Icasiano Pudpud was carrying a home-made shotgun in his left hand a bolo in the right hand. The
other three, accused who followed Icasiano Pudpud were also armed each with a bolo ... Walking ahead of his party, Icasiano Pudpud
approached the body of Alfonso Milagrosa and then went to when Federico Postrero was lying on the ground. He made a slash at
Postrero with his bolo but he was not hit as he was able to get up immediately and run away. Icasiano Pudpud and Eleuterio Cubelo,
gave chase to Postrero but the latter was able to run and elude his pursuers ... In the meantime, Dominico Nazareno and Felicito
Langoay saw Angelino Pudpud and Pastor Cereligia approaching them whereupon they jumped, from their carabao and ran away,
heading towards the poblacion of Banganga ... Thus ended the unfortunate incident that befell the four traveler on that night of March
27, 1964 on the road to Mercedes." 7
On the above facts, the lower court rendered its decision of May 21, 1966 funding the appellants as well as the accused Icasiano
Pudpud guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder of Alfonso Milagrosa and sentencing therein reclusion perpetua as well
as to the penalty of indemnifying the heirs of the deceased Alfonso Milagrosa in the amount of P6,000.00, and likewise guilty of the
crime of attempted homicide against the person of Federico Postrero, for which they would be made to suffer one year of prision
correcional. An appeal was taken to this Court but, as noted at the outset Icasiano Pudpud had withdrawn his appeal. In the brief for
defendants-appellants filed, on September 30, 1967, they would a sail the appealed decision on the sole ground that error was
committed by the lower court in its finding of conspiracy, the only other error being a corollary of the above contention that appellants
should not therefore have been convicted as only Icasiano Pudpud should be held liable for the offenses in question. It is not to be in
sight of that in the lower court, the defense of alibi was interpreted but evidently, appellants realized how weak and insubstantial was
such a claim, thus prompting them to rely on the alleged of a conspiracy. Again, as was made clear at the opening of this opinion, such
is not the case at all. Reversal is not indicated.
1. A conspiracy in the statutory language "exists when two or more person come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it." 8 The objective then on the part of the conspiracy is to perform an act or omission punishable by law.
What is required is assent to the perpetration of such a misdeed. That must be their intent. There is need in the language of Justice
Mapa in the early leading of United States v. Magcomot, a 1909 decision, 9 for "concurrence of wills "or "unity of action and
purpose". 10 The usual phraseology employed in many of the later cases is "common and joint purpose and design." 11 At times
reference is made to "previous concert of criminal design." 12 Its manifestation could be shown by "united and concerted
action." 13 Thus, a conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deducted from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated. The conditions attending its commission and the acts executed may be indicative of a design to accomplish a
criminal purpose and objective. If to use the apt words of Chief Justice Bengzon, there is "a chain of circumstances" to that effect, then
conspiracy has been established. 14 If such be the case then, the act of one is the act of all others involved and each is to be held to the
same degree of liability as the others. So it has been our constant ruling from the 1905 decision of United States v. Maza. 15
2. Tested by the above controlling legal doctrines, the lower court decision, to repeat, cannot be overturned. The effort of appellants in
their brief to demonstrate that there was no conspiracy is doomed to futility. They did not deny because they could not deny that a land,
dispute existed among the appellants and Icasiano Pudpud on the one had and their near relation, a first-degree cousin of two of them
and cousin-in-law of the two others, Federico Postrero, dating back to a suit filed against the Pudpuds for squatting on such properly
when their uncle, the father of Federico, had acquired the same as far back as 1935. It is true that thereafter the suit was settled
amicably with the Pudpuds still getting an additional amount of P1,000.00, but later, as in the decision, there was evidence that
dissatisfaction once more rankled in the breast and a feeling of resentment at what they must have considered to be an advantage
taken by Postrero would not die down. At any rate, there was competent and credible testimony of threats being made against Postrero.
Mention was likewise made them that Icasiano Pudpud was found guilty of the offense of grave threats and that on or about the time
the decision in this case was rendered, another was expected from another sala regarding the case of arson filed not only against him
but against appellant Cubelo. In the face of such incontrovertible testimony, it thus clearly appears that a denial that no ill-feeling existed
between the parties involved is absolutely bereft, of credence.
The brief for appellants would likewise try to make light of the presence of all of them with Icasiano Pudpud at the place and at the time
of the commission of the criminal acts. The evidence for the prosecution clearly showed that they were there for one purpose alone,

namely, to waylay their intended victim, Federico Postrero. They made certain first that he was going to return in the early evening of
that day from the poblacion where be filed the action for grave threats. All four of them were together behind a clump of cogon grasses.
Significantly, as admitted in their brief, the three appellants were each armed with a bolo. What better proof can there be that all of the
accused were just waiting for the opportunity to ambush the unsuspecting Federico Postrero. When they saw him riding astride a
carabao with the unfortunate Alfonso Milagrosa behind him, Icasiano Pudpud, as was intended, he having the shotgun, took aim and
did fire. 16 Fortunately for Postrero and unfortunately for Milagrosa, it was the latter who was hit near the right eyebrow; death as a
result was instantaneous. As a further proof of the persistence in giving bent to their hatred of Postrero when they found out that he
escaped unharmed, Icasiano Pudpud slashed at him with his bolo and with appellant Eleuterio Cubelo, chased him after he ran away.
On the other hand, the other appellants approached menacingly the two other companions of Postrero. Could there be any doubt then
that all the accused, including the three appellants, did plan to take the life of Postrero? To assert that there was no conspiracy is to
close one's eyes to the undeniable facts.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of May 21, 1966 is affirmed with the modification that the indemnification to the heirs of the
deceased Alfonso Milagrosa should be in the amount of P12,000.00. Appellants are sentenced to pay the proportionate share of the
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Castro J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23051

October 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of
resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to four months and one day
imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the
resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary
Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the
manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed,
on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25,
1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge
Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of
the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including
policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke
in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso.
Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was
Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was
considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him
the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen
insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso
bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through
the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de
monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey and shouted
offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso
resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon. 1awph!l.net
In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them were eventually
acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a
gambling house. This case reached the appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for
the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except that he stresses certain points as more favorable to the case of his
client. The defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the
search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this
defense makes it advisable to set forth further facts, relating particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the search warrant. The
application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.
APPLICATION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

(G)

Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduo, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.

Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47 Revellin, detective.
Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C., City of Manila? A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? A. I do not know. According to the best of my information the house is occupied by
John Doe.
Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? A. It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be
reliable that in said premises there are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists
of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are
or there will be gambling conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises are known as gambling house. I have watched the
foregoing premises and believed it to be a gambling house and a place where instruments and devices used in gambling games, such
as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.
I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing questions and answers and that I find the same
to correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.)

L. GARDUO

Judge, Municipal Court

The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant alone. This document reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE, Defendant.
SEARCH WARRANT

(G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to believe and does believe that
John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to
wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly known as
monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in
violation of the Gambling Law.
Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10) days on or after this date to make a
search on the person of said John Doe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest
of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before
me as provided for by law.
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.)
L. GARDUO
Judge, Municipal Court
Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, the
security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right to be secured against unreasonable

searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although naturally entering more into detail. It is
therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported
by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized." (Section 97.) After the judge or justice
shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing
(section 98), and after the judge or justice is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the following form:
. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of ............................, or in the house
situated ...................................... (describing it or any other place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case may be) for
the following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with a crime may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. (Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued.
Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of
which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy.
No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711,
et seq.; Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D,
947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are material differences between the two,
in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe search warrants we propose to take into consideration the authorities relied
upon by the appellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of the
issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal Procedure. In that text at pages
51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is found the following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is unknown there must be
such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be apprehended is void, except in those cases
where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.
xxx

xxx

xxx

John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential requirements of warrants for the
apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is
unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further
descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in
addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description
must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his
personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he
can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will not be illegal,
or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court, is the case of
Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the police court
Lee, charging that "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown," had committed an assault
and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issued against "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to
your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description
or means of identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant was invalid. Mr. Chief
Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:
We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of the defendant at the time of the alleged riot
was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain the name of the defendant, nor any description or designation by which he could be
known and identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was in effect a general warrant, upon which any other individual

might as well have been arrested, as being included in the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to
elementary principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of Rights, article 14,
which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that all
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected persons or to
seize their property be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This is in fact
only a declaration of an ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express the name or give some description of a party to
be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and without other designation of the person to be arrested, it
was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases
cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is unknown. In such case the
best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it
is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances
by which he can be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)
The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person on whom he attempted to serve it. He
acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by force, using no more than
was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in question, if they were guilty of no improper or
excessive force or violence, did not do an unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be
convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional and statutory, requires that the
search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly" describe the person to be seized. A failure thus to name the person is
fatal to the validity of the search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process must be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly
resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as the law was summarized by the trial
judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings forth certain points of paramount force and exercising a decisive
influence. We will now make mention of them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched as "the building
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be
searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 19241925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building
occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a
prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest may
take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used
as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit, and the search
warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe
has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124
Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this
connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition,
contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the
warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will
enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the
warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied
by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not the home of Veloso;
not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was,
moreover, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended for nefarious practices. In a
club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly be varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes
whose names would be unknown to the police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man has a right to employ
all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much less so in a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or to be
searched should use no more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of
the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. There was no

case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs.
Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified therein. Mention was made by his
Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or
information, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a
warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of
their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far
fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant was valid, and that
the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member of the House of Representatives.
The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accused
accordingly. We doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position when he resisted the officers of the
law. The offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma.
Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty,
accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the trial judge, and concurring with the
trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with
the sole modification that the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with
the costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this judgment into effect issue.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villa-Real, JJ., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135503. July 6, 2000]
WILLIAM A. GARAYGAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
WHICH COURT should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a case where the court that issued it is not the court with which
the case is filed as a consequence of the service of the warrant?
On 30 July 1996 the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presiding over Branch 23, issued Search Warrant No. 96505[1] upon application of the Presidential Task Force on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (PTFIC). The warrant authorized a search
of the house of petitioner William A. Garaygay located in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, a place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court. Thereafter the PTFIC through its Regional Task Group conducted a raid on the house of petitioner resulting in the seizure
of several items of firearms, explosives, ammunition and other prohibited paraphernalia.
On 7 August 1996 an Information for violation of PD 1866[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City[3] against
petitioner who upon being arraigned pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude
Illegally Seized Evidence dated 26 September 1996 on the ground that the search warrant was issued in violation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 19,[4] and that it was a general warrant.
On the other hand, the prosecution argued that the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC of Manila which issued the
warrant. But petitioner reminded the trial court of People v. Bans[5] where we ruled Generally, an order of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be modified or altered by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Given the
facts of this case, however, this rule cannot be applied.
There could have been no problem had the court which issued the search warrant was likewise the same court before which the
criminal case is pending as a result of its issuance. But if the criminal case which was subsequently filed by virtue of the serach warrant
is raffled off to a different branch, all incidents relating to the validity of the warrant issued should be consolidated with that branch trying
the criminal case (see Nolasco v. Pao, 139 SCRA 152 [1985]), the rationale is to avoid confusion as regards the issue of jurisdiction
over the case and to promote an orderly administration of justice.

Treating the argument of the prosecution as a prejudicial question, the trial court resolved the same ahead of the merits of petitioner's
motion to quash and held x x x x Thus, the Court cannot afford to ignore the long established rule that "courts of equal rank and jurisdiction are proscribed from
interfering with or passing upon the orders or processes of its coordinate counterpart, except in extreme situations authorized by
law," People vs. Woolcock, et al., May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 235.Further, in the light of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court
in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249, this present motion under consideration should have been filed with the
RTC-Branch 23 of Manila. Said guidelines are quoted below, thus:
1) The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for
purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter which may or may not give due course to the application
depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2) When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate high court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived (emphasis supplied).
x x x x Moreover x x x x we are of the considered view that the issuing court (RTC-Br. 23, Manila) is in a vantage position to resolve this
instant motion inasmuch as it has in its possession all the available records and can, therefore, make an intelligible assessment of the
evidence on hand.[6]
On 17 January 1997 the trial court thus denied petitioners motion to quash and ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to set the case for
pre-trial conference.[7]
Petitioner questioned the denial of his motion to quash in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed Decision of
18 May 1998 the appellate court dismissed the petition and on 11 September 1998 rejected likewise his motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals explained x x x x This ruling (People v. Bans) is, however, applicable only when, as in the Bans case, two different branches of the same Regional
Trial Court are involved. With regard to the case at bar, the search warrant was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
23). On the other hand, the criminal case is pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54). Thus, the ruling in
the case of People v. Woolcock, 244 SCRA 235, is applicable. That case involved two courts having different geographical jurisdictions
x x x x[8]
For resolution now before this Court are these issues: (a) whether the trial court of Lapu-Lapu City where the criminal case was filed is
clothed with authority to resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant . . . ; and, (b) whether the search warrant issued by the RTC of
Manila is valid.
Aside from invoking People v. Bans anew, petitioner cites Nolasco v. Pao[9] which was quoted in Bans It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is
initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant
proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully
obtained.
Assuming that the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City is not vested with authority to resolve the issue of the validity of the search warrant, petitioner
now submits to this Court the issue for resolution. He argues that a search warrant to be valid must particularly describe the place to be
searched. In the present case, the search warrant merely stated, among others, that "William Garaygay a.k.a. William Flores/Willy
Ybaez of Brgy. Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu x x x x" When the shanty where he was then sleeping was searched by the
authorities they found one (1) 9mm Glock pistol duly licensed in his name. Thereafter, he was dragged to an abandoned building about
ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters away. It was in that abandoned building where the authorities allegedly found the firearms, explosives,
ammunition and other paraphernalia alluded to in the Information. Petitioner next argues that the search in his shanty and in the
abandoned building was made by elements of the PTFIC without any witness, in violation of Sec. 7, Rule 126, of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that "[n]o search of house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or, in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality." Petitioner submits that, necessarily, all the items confiscated by the authorities on the basis of
the invalid search warrant should be excluded in the criminal case for being "fruits of the poisonous tree."
In 1967, in Pagkalinawan v. Gomez,[10] we ruled that relief from a search warrant claimed to be invalid should be sought in the court that
issued it. We emphasized that any other view would be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose
of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of
coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful orders. This doctrine was reiterated in Templo v. de la
Cruz[11] where the accused likewise questioned the validity of the search warrant before a court of concurrent jurisdiction, different from
the court which issued the warrant. Subsequently however, in Nolasco v. Pao, we declared that "the pendency of the Search Warrant
Case and of the Subversive Documents Case before two (2) different courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It

should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court or Branch and a criminal prosecution is initiated in
another Court or Branch as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the Search Warrant Case should be consolidated with the
criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding
Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained."
People v. Bans substantially restated the doctrine in Nolasco v. Pao, i. e., when a search warrant is issued by one court, if the criminal
case by virtue of the warrant is raffled off to a branch other than the one which issued the warrant, all incidents relating to the validity of
the warrant should be consolidated with the branch trying the criminal case. We explained further therein the underlying reason for the
rule
x x x x If the rule had been otherwise, i.e., if the issuing court had been allowed to resolve the Motion to Quash the search warrant
despite the pendency of a criminal case arising therefrom before another court, it would give rise to the absurd situation where the
judge hearing the criminal case will be bound by the declaration of of the validity of the search warrant made by the issuing judge, and
the former will thereafter be restrained from reviewing such finding in view of the doctrine of non-interference observed between courts
of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction. Such a situation will thus make it difficult , if not impossible, for respondent court to make an
independent and objective appreciation of the evidence and merits of the criminal case. For this reason, the court trying the criminal
case should be allowed to rule on the validity of the search warrant in order to arrive at a judicious administration of justice.
People v. Woolcock upon which the trial court and the Court of Appeals heavily relied, appeared to have reverted to Templo v. de la
Cruz when this Court said that "the remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant can be sought in the court that issued it, not
in the sala of another judge of concurrent jurisdiction." At any rate, the latest jurisprudence on the matter is People v. Court of
Appeals[12] where, as in the present case, the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals was
interpreted. The subject guideline, cited in the reasoning of the trial court, concerns possible conflicts in the exercise of jurisdiction
where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property
intended to be used as evidence in the criminal case. We clarified the principle in People v. Court of Appeals thus x x x x Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards
commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed
only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is
pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of
the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly
stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same
is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to
quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum
shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher
court (underscoring supplied).
Conformably therewith, we hold that petitioner's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence was
properly filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City.
The second issue raised by petitioner involves factual matters which should be properly addressed to the trial court. No compelling
reason exists for this Court to impinge on a matter more appropriately within the province of the trial court.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the Regional Trial Court of
Lapu-Lapu City in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence, as well as its
Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is SET ASIDE. Instead, we rule that the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City has
jurisdiction to resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence; accordingly, the Regional Trial
Court of Lapu-Lapu City, particularly Branch 54 thereof, or whichever branch the case may be properly assigned therein, is directed to
conduct its proceedings thereon with deliberate dispatch taking into account the time already lost. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an Information[1] filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5,
petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,[2] as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
At arraignment[3] on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2,[4] while the prosecution admitted that
the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.[5]
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino
G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo,
Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot
patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at
Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes
moving very fast.[6]
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers
then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line.[7] Yus
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner
and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it
to his commander.[8]
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a
grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at
Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen
chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner
and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not
creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.[9]
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt.
Saquilla[10] for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent
and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness
to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners uncounselled confession (Exh. E), there
being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of
arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action
Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit for examination.[11]
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners confession knowing it was inadmissible in evidence.[12]
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other things, the examination of
explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO
Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date
and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination of the grenade, he [f]ound that [the] major components
consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present, and concluded that the grenade was [l]ive and capable of exploding.
On even date, he issued a certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991.[13]
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in
Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly
after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found
nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was
accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner [i]to
ang tama mo sa akin. This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioners mouth and said, [y]ou are the one who shot
me. Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled
him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only
in court when it was presented.[14]
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure
can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.[15] Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had
been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been

premature.[16] The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were [c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary
to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence[17] and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions
were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in
different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the
purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence.[18]
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner [l]ater
voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient
evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of
illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as
minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal[20] indicating that he was appealing to this Court. However, the record of the
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs.[21]
In his Appellants Brief [22] filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE
SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote.[23] As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized,
inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto.
[24]

In its decision of 24 January 1996,[25] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original
theory before the court a quo that the grenade was planted by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that
the grenade was seized from petitioners possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility
in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was attempting to commit an offense, thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other suspicious
character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of
terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is
historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an
unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacats posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioners failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they
received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latters
arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the accumulation of which was more than
sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross
incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous
others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We
are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to
convict, but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will
ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote,[26] which petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light
of [c]rucial differences, to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in
possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of
terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the
historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the
area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza
Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST
OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless arrest and search, then
disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was attempting to commit a crime, as the evidence for the prosecution
merely disclosed that he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and
that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not
more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into
account. Since the maximum of the penalty isreclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129),[27] in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948,[28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution[29] and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.[30] The term life
imprisonment as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to
include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioners Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial courts decision to this Court, yet the trial court transmitted
the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having
been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioners Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the
Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioners guilt with moral
certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioners
possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to his
commander after putting an X mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other
hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo
Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioners arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19 March 1991;
further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his
testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not,
and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that
seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in
cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to detonate an explosive at
Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers
were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner
simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close
enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio,
such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution, which provide as follows:

SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not
have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the
investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it
executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, as will be
discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same.[31] The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant,
[32]
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto,"
while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches;[33] (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;[34] and (6) a "stop and frisk."[35]
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the grenade from the
accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These
two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. [36] In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed.[37] At
bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime,
or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.[38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been
one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment ***[39]

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"[40] it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.[41] Finally, a "stop-and-frisk"
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two
days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly
chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason
existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that
petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares
otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that
his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and
were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q

And what were they doing?

They were merely standing.

You are sure of that?

Yes, sir.

And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any commotion?

None, sir.

Neither did you see them create commotion?

None, sir.[42]

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible
to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to
the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his
waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person.[43]
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article
III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED
immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, finding accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. 1
However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the prosecution of criminal cases, recommends the acquittal
of appellant for the reasons stated in his Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief) filed with the Court. We have reviewed
and analyzed the testimonial and documentary evidence in this case and we find said recommendation to be well taken.
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-accused, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, with
allegedly having in their custody and possession 100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100
grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00. 2
During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. At the trial, the prosecution and the defense
presented several witnesses after which the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras but
convicting and penalizing herein appellant as hereinbefore stated.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court and the evidence presented by the prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their
commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was given
P200.00 in different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the Philippine Constabulary
Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain
Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked
Segovia where be could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be returned, he was
accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant. 3
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He
boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was
later identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report
regarding his said purchase of marijuana. 4
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the
same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested appellant, Antonio Lonceras
and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused.
The arrestees were brought to the headquarters for investigation. 5
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant.
Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others.
The search, however, was not authorized by any search warrant. 6
The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but appellant was detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken
from and executed by him, was sworn to by him before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no counsel when his sworn
statement was taken during that custodial investigation. The arrestees were also examined by personnel of the PCCL and were found
positive for ultraviolet powder. 7
The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations.
Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the evening of July 1, 1987 listening to the radio. Later, he ate his merienda and
then went out to buy cigarettes from the store. While he was at the store, a jeep stopped behind him. Several armed men alighted
therefrom and ordered him to get inside the jeep. He refused but he was forced to board the vehicle. He was even hit by the butt of a
gun. 8

He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was investigated and was repeatedly asked regarding the whereabouts of
Rodrigueza. He was manhandled by the NARCOM agents and was detained while inside the camp. He was then made to hold a
P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he was taken to the PCCL and examined he was found positive of the ultraviolet
powder. He was also made to sign some papers but he did not know what they were all about. 9
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there
overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him that their father was taken by some
military men the preceding night. Appellant went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of July
2, 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the
negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From that time on,
he was not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his complicity in
the alleged sale of marijuana. 10
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) admitting in evidence the sworn statement of
appellant which was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that
the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves allegedly bought from him were not properly identified; (3) convicting appellant of the crime
charged despite the fact that the evidence for the prosecution is weak and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of selling or at least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of marijuana to CIC Taduran late in the afternoon of
July 1, 1987, despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11
We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In disposing of this case, however, we feel that the issues
raised by appellant should properly be discussed seriatim.
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. 12 Applied
to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling
marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very
evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the
supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated
purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been subjected to the sanctions
imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.
2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by appellant was squarely placed in issue and, as correctly pointed out
by the defense, said sworn statement is inadmissible in evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted
by counsel during custodial examination. He was also asked if he was waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and he answered in
the affirmative. However, while the rights of a person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. 13 In the present case, the waiver
made by appellant being without the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is sufficient to invalidate said sworn statement. 14
3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in admitting in evidence against appellant the articles allegedly
confiscated during the raid conducted in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the
proper government authority. 15 True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and
seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; 16 when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; 18 when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 19 when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view; 20 or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, 21 a
search may be validly made even without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by
any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right
against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put

under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could,
have first secured a search warrant during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited
drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant.
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and
thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled
"Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then
further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
seventeen grams.
Exh. "E" One plastic syringe. 22
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's
conviction. 23 In People vs. Rubio, 24 this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness.
Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
5. It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness will not affect his credibility. It even enhances such
credibility because it only shows that he has not been rehearsed. 25 However, when the inconsistencies pertain to material and crucial
points, the same detract from his overall credibility.
The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are tainted with serious flaws and material inconsistencies rendering the same incredible. 26
CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting surveillance of the place where the buy-bust operation was
to take place. It turned out, however, that he did not even know the exact place and the identity of the person from whom he was to buy
marijuana leaves. Thus:
FISCAL TOLOSA
Q What place in Tagas were you able to go (to)?
WITNESS
A I am not actually familiar in (sic) that place, in Tagas, although we occasionally passed there.
Q Now, upon your arrival in Tagas, what did you do that afternoon?
A I waited for the suspect because previously, we have already been conducted (sic) surveylance (sic) in the vicinity.
Q Upon arrival in Tagas, were you able to see the suspect?
A By the road, sir.
Q Who was the first person did you see (sic) when you arrived at Tagas?
A The first person whom I saw is Samuel Segovia.
Q Were you able to talk with this Samuel Segovia?
A According to him, we could get some. 27
The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct examination, he declared that they arrested the three accused
all at the same time on the fateful night of July 1, 1987. But, in his cross-examination and as corroborated by the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest 28 submitted by him and Molinawe, it appeared that Lonceras and Segovia were arrested on different times and that appellant
Don Rodrigueza was not among those who were arrested. Instead, it was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a
much later time.

With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to give more credibility to the testimony of appellant Rodrigueza. While it is
true that appellant's defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless,
some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his testimony that he was
not among those who were arrested on the night of July 1, 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that appellant Rodrigueza was
not with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents.
Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the accused was also revealed during the trial of the case.
Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia, testified that Sgt. Molinawe,
who has since been reportedly dismissed from the service, asked for P10,000.00 from each of them in exchange for the liberty of the
accused. 29 This allegation was never refuted by the prosecution. Hence, the rule laid down by this Court that the statements of
prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit 30 has no application in the case at bar.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its
cause. It has not overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant should not be allowed
to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against him.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Don
Rodrigueza is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It is hereby ordered that he be immediately released from custody unless he
is otherwise detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990, 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO
ANI, two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of
Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the
9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P.
Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The
evidence of the prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:

Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND
(NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari
Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian
informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described
to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt.
Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected
the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for
which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which
Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal
was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams
proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani,
poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at
strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari
Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted
some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and
came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the
contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two
NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women,
one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to
Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari
Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the
NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried
marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville,
Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name Mari Musa. T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana
(bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari
Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC
Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC
Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the
same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson
reported the results of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4"
and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1"
and "D-1"). She also identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her
markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words
"December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN
GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his
signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1"). 4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial
court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his
wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that
afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep.
Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house
whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM
agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM
agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not
know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten
arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.

Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM
Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or document was
interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign
it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to
the assistance of counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful.
The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the
NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was
brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not."
After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated
by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had received from them a
P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law and that the person
selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been
arrested for selling marijuana before. 5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art
II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary
imprisonment. 6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation,
neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to
the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy operation on the
appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter. 7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt.
Belarga on the same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas
went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani
was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by
T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the
house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked
P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to
Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right hand. 15 The
NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable
to find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the
apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by
contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is without merit. The
day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through this
previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following
day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and
the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and
delivery of the marijuana. 17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his
wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be
not crucial 18 and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the
illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the
instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given him some
assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.

The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits that since
T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the
sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette from
ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant
contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were certain that the
appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected
this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with
inaccuracies.
Bian testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of
ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where they were
observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters. 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he
said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads: 22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house
near the road and he was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I saw
that Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and came back later and handed
something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters,
Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was marijuana
because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing,
presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy
operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their
office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then
organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of
NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be
used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the
house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places; 28 the appellant
met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place. 29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that
the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseurbuyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or
circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents
found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter
moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being
questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the
kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen." 32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves.
At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order
ruling that these are admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing
in Article III, Section 2, the following:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence
obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are
recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the
right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the
person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to
entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They
then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the defendant husband was selling
marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they
found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying
himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package
containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting
defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which
held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant
wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was
placed before him in full view. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of
the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course,
the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. 46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. 47 Stated differently, it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which
they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was,
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from
one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to
walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from
room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents.
They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM
agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their
"plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in
the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the
appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138881. December 18, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, finding accusedappellant Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, each bag weighing:
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and
#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,
or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[3] whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, duty frisker Olivia
Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented accused-appellant who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side,
California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had since been working
as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
[4]

On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998.[5]
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to
frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.
[6]

When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912,
she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as
she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.[7]
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying Sir, hindi po ako
naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.) She was directed to take accused-appellant to the
nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina
Bernal. Embile stayed outside.[8]
Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and accusedappellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accusedappellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room.[9]
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI
Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[10]
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of
the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized.[11]
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile
and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was
then subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes,
garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was
issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo.[12]
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white packages on the table. They told
her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the 1st
RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest.[13] She claimed that throughout the period of
her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S.
Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines.[14]
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:[15]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits G, C-2 and C-3) are hereby
confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay City during the pendency of this case
provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) despite failure of the prosecution in proving the negative allegation in
the information; (2) despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride; (3) despite violation
of her constitutional rights; and (4) when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She argues that the
shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she
was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights.
Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been excluded from the evidence.[17]
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used in evidence
against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is
involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person.

The trial court held:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested
without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
offense;

when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an

(b)
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the
allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate.[18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport
security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.[19] Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel.[20] Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since
it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been obtained while she was in the
custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records
is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and
Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal
effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her signature thereon. Rule
126, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a)

Subject of the offense;

(b)

Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

(c)

Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.
Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to
justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:
Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of The Crime The penalties for
offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;
6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements as determined and promulgated by
the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for her possession of 580.2
grams of shabu.
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the substance contained in Exhibits
C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the examination conducted by the NBI forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely yielded
positive findings for shabu, but failed to establish its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains indeterminate and unproved.
This contention is likewise without merit.
The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have indicated the presence of impurities if there were
any. He testified:
PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities, it will be discovered by just mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer chromatographic examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness?
WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which resembles or the same as the Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride sample
....
PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have examined, in chemical examination,
what color it will register, if any?
WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the reagent, therefore it will not dissolve. In my
examination, all the specimens reacted on the re-agents, sir.
PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in laymans term?
WITNESS It is only a tawas.
....
COURT

In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the specimen?

WITNESS None, your Honor.

....
ATTY. AGOOT
I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed with 200 grams of tawas,
you will submit that to qualitative examination, what will be your findings, negative or positive, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
ATTY. AGOOT

That is qualitative examination.

WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate.[21]

A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative analysis requires the determination of the
percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence, a qualitative identification of a powder may reveal the presence of

heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent
quinine.[22]
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. Chromatography is a
means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a mixture. It is particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent
specimens that are frequently received in a crime lab. For example, illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any
material that is at the disposal of the drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made available to prospective
customers. Hence, the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one without the aid of chromatographic
methods to first separate the mixture into its components.[23]
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but also that the scientifically correct method of obtaining
an accurate representative sample had been obtained.[24] At any rate, as the Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant was
not satisfied with the results, it would have been a simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by
another chemist. This she did not do.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the information that she did not have a
license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,a regulated drug, is not unlawful
unless the possessor or user does not have the required license or prescription. She points out that since the prosecution failed to
present any certification that she is not authorized to possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof
needed to sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan Toco.[25] The accused in that case was charged with
smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred to the information on the ground that it failed to allege that the use of opium
had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said:
The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of opium in these Islands. But the
legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of smokers who smoked under the advice and by
prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . . . . Hence where one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the
Opium Law, it is more logical as well as more practical and convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician,
that he should set up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be called upon to prove that every smoker, charged
with a violation of the law, does so without such advice or prescription. Indeed, when it is considered that under the law any person
may, in case of need and at any time, procure the advice of a physician to use opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of
things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or can be required to be kept, it is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable
and absurd to impose on the prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium does so without the advice of
a physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a particular case, that one using opium does so without the advice or prescription
of a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without the aid of the defendant himself, while a defendant charged with
the illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in establishing the fact that he used it under the advice and on the prescription of a
physician, if in fact he did so.[26]
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect
the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do,
he has no one but himself to blame.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended,
which requires the prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere
possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a
license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to support a finding that she
is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected.
Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no
motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been
presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. This Court accords great

respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or arbitrariness
in its findings.[27]
It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other witness was presented in her behalf. Her denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[28] As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense,
particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been
invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29]
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly charged with and convicted of illegal
possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, have been complied with by the prosecution in this
case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law.
[30]
Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2) grams of shabu were confiscated from accused-appellant, the fine imposed by
the trial court may properly be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of 16 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against appellant.
The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered
returned to her.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting
defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges ,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General Order No. 7, dated
September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not
used in the circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben
Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to
reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with
accessory penalties, as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial
No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise, the
subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion in an
information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above- named accused with intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the proper
government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control
and custody one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm was issued to
and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's
Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

through lawless and violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in the
performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection of contributions from the
members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by
the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily
surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he
refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution
to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain
Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben
Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of
Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October
14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar
Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with the
wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, HearingOctober 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds, after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38
revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of
qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon grass and
likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet
consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas,
Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and another
pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as
Exhibit "D" for the prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in
the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and
Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972,
in his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos,
Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is
now a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he and his family will be killed. He was also warned
not to reveal anything with the government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok joined the group.
Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his
waistline a .38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from accused, which make him easily
Identified said firearm, as that marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to
the house of accused and attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar
Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to assure the
unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who attended the seminar
were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.

Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok
likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77,
Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It
was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the contribution from the
members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19, 1982, he administered the subscription of th extrajudicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by
counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in the subscription of
his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question
No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the
allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right
to answer any question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of
military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused. (TSN,
pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and
explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the lists of
firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the
lists of persons who applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite
objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and
arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by soldiers, whom
he cannot Identify because they were wearing a civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator,
wished him to admit but accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting him on the left and right
side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional
attachment, described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he
repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony. Accused said, his
eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in
his body and over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle, terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating, mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in
similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery of his
senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse
to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain and agony, accused
admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, Hearing-June 15,
1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of explanation and commentary in details, and going one
by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those questions involuntarily
made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was

subjected by an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his admission of the subject firearm, by force
and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also to support his denial to the truth of his alleged
extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those questions,
involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions
embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such NPA personalities, as
Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was personally charged with subversion in the Office of the
Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed without reaching the Court. She
likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her crossexamination, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga
was presented, who declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being his neighbor and member of
his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by the authorities in his barrio involving subversive
activities but they were released and were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the
government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and who testified that the subject
firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left the gun,
alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind, temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it.
She said, her husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform him about said firearm neither did
she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him.
(TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in support of accused's through counsel manifestation for
the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession of firearm, 'under the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages
113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO
BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT
VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF
P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents
allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting him
upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not
have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his
person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally
protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [19661) What is
sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality
can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and
Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value
the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no legs than to value
human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of the instances when arrests may
be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities received an urgent report of
accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even
without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the
matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an incident
to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense
must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety
from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing
any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by
the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full
protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of
reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission
of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the
accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the
subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a
poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see
why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of
flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his
allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24,
October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes
even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure
which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed
to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to
make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V.
Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed
his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the constitution considering that he was purposely under
arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?

A It was buried down in his horse.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution presented the two arresting officers
who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The
officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were
hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest.
So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after
questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the
Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the
testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the
appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported
by reliable evidence but the failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower
court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his
statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the
custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in evidence against the accusedappellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony
of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial court found
Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches
to a particular witness. As stated in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect
upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the
trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must
reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly
appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges on how much credence can be accorded to him.
The first consideration is that said testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the mimeographing
incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended upon how much he cooperated with the
authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony We
discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly
his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The tradeoff appears to be his membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an

interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even
fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father
,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's
testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution
never presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after stressing that accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64 SCRA
126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA
634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117
SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to be a well-organized plan to
overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance
against duly constituted authorities has resulted in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country
and abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their legitimate efforts to
maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court
stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its
command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and
our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards constitutional liberties and protections will
only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged
subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements
headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time,
various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "toratora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base,
while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively,
which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several John Does whose true names and identities have not
as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion,
penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No. 1866, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, and without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control, the
following to wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the proper authorities, and armed with said
dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by common
designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly taking
arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were
charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who
was shot and hit on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not authorized to possess any
firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30
up to December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region
Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino,
one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M.,
was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of
the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P.
Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered
near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged
themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in
front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the
group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the
wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the
car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader,
M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided
the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, Mshells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the
right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A
uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso

Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of
the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the
rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is
supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to
help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he
contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa
hut which is adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right
side of the building. He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had
explosives in his possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and made to lie
on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know anything
about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PCINP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the 1987coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant
again went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the
marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may
atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely
executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that
Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have either
physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant
of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was
guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims that
intent to possess, which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at
bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended
to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part
of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion,
the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the
proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which criminal acts have resulted in
loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in
the country during the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing
importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts
which tend to disturb public peace and order.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's
control and management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public
security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish
the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7

But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must
there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, 8in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are
not valid defenses. 9
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has
the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without
criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. 11 Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal
or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the
accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith
and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a
statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally
possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt.
Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the
same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At
first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for
and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material
possession does not and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and
coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range
of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
separation from the service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the
dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former
soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot
feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place
where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a
gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this
nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade
of firearms and ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the
articles confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. While the matter has not
been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the
warrantless search conducted by the raiding team, considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be
convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The
raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid,
there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for
them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in
the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within
the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding
areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had

reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a
search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court
was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in People vs. Malmstedt
reiteration:

20

and bears

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of
accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused
was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that
accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, against
persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was
acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when
faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and
the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of
accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his
identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe
that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers
in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered
to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to
hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including,
to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so
in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.

III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989,
there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized
and recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the
personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well
known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the
lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the degree
of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense
of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime
of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two separate statutes penalizing different
offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other
offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree
No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a
rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has explained that
said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized under two different statutes with different
penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the
presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise
to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special
law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements.
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised Penal Code in this prosecution for a
crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for executive clemency in favor of appellant De
Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive
prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against any tenuous importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia were illegally
possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. In the words of the court a quo:
2. the nature and quantity of the items 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs
indicate that the reports received by the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the rebels was not without basis.
Those items are clearly not for one's personal defense. They are for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per instruction of
Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that office is not credible for: (a) he was a former
military personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-soldiers were present which
self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his boss, was still very much at home and constantly in touch with soldiers
and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 was a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only
person tasked with caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano;
and (d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of the AFP intelligence agents. 25
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in
furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of
the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection
therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein for executive clemency
and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch
41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana
is a prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his possession, control and custody one (1) bag of dried
marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City, without authority of law to
do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is narrated by the trial court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and
Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting
surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the
surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be
engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in the evening that said
Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person
was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on
when the patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper
and weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave
his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the
accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo
submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report (Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo asked his copoliceman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who has had special training on narcotics, to conduct a field test
on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found positive result for
marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat.
Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the same were also found to be marijuana
(Exhibit C and C-1). (At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:
The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a child on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly
employed in the poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is engaged in the business of selling poultry
medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in connection
with his business and whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in Manila; that he
never left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to collect a balance of P100.00
from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in
Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila
from Olongapo City but he failed and was able to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he
rode and because he was tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only bound for San Fernando, Pampanga; that upon alighting at the
Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus waiting for
a bus, a man whom he came to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any residence certificate; that
when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and took all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat.
Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as he may be an NPA member; that at the municipal
building, he saw a policeman, identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he arrived that Pat.
Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may get the
same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling him that it shall be returned to him
but that it was never returned to him; that he was thereafter placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged

with possession of marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to help him; and, that when he was visited by his
wife, he told his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not to complain anymore as it would
be useless. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48,Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died. Thereafter, this court appointed
a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court, required the
new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter complied and, in her brief, raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES
SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANTAPPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was
caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco V. Pao, 147 SCRA
509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case the PC officers had
earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected
the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence
since it was seized illegally. The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the
Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at react two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9.
His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort
was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic
notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with
such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot
therefore apply the ruling inAminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers,
illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was never authenticated and
therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana package brought by patrolman
Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule,
however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package together with a letter-request for examination,
and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said
letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with.
The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly authenticated, still, we cannot discount
the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive results for marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented before the lower court. We
discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation
of the informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v. Asio,
G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988];
People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that
is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of
witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989;
People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clean to show
the commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to
foist a very serious offense against the accused. The knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the
official performance of their duties and then, (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies
deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were
corroborated by the examination findings conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the PCCL, with station at camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo, p. 11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was
accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be "salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still bring
the accused to the municipal Building for interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the
accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid
never returned the same to him. If the policemen really got any money from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to
the accused, why will the two policemen still produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken
from the accused and which contained the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the prosecution in this case were all based on personal
knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties and there is nothing in their
testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have any prejudice against the herein accused. Between the testimonies of
these prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo,
p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself through compulsory court
processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was presented nor was any justification for the
non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive
testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the lower court, is an added circumstance
tending to establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:

The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1) kilo, more or less. The intent to transport the same
is clear from the testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that when he confronted the accused that night,
the latter told him that he (accused) is bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the quantity of the
marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place
where the accused is not residing, it can be said that the intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been clearly established. (Rollo,
pp. 13-14)
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically denied in court, that he is transporting
the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be
admitted because it does not appear in the records that the accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People v. Duero 104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch
as the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and
to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in
evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts relative to admissibility of statements taken
during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is
now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally
protected rights.
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding extracted a clear intent to transport the
marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the information stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the
forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is not a
considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe penalty must be based on evidence
which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in this case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but his actual session.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00)
Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.