Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who
during his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa
Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them from her own
mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged
that sometime in 1992, petitioner, Gregoria Merquines,
represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the
descendants of Celedoniaand under that name applied for free
patents over the properties with the CENRO. Unbeknownst to
private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in
the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later
filed an application for land registration over the same properties,
petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents
to file the instant complaint.
The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and
land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation
in their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering
the cancellation of petitioners titles. Before the Court of Appeals,
She argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of
the lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.
Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is
untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and
incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their
issuance
RULING:
No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and
incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their
issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued
on the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in
the facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as
Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of
Celedonia.
Under the recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the
basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the
law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with
indefeasibility. Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing
where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.
The petition is denied.
CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
132 SCRA 718
FACTS:
Petitioner, Juliana Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano De Vera,
were first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one
roof in the care of a common aunt. In year 1951, Mariano De Vera
died. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966.
De Veras nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator
of De Veras estate. Prior to the widows death, she made an
inventory showing that De Veras property (located in Calasiao,
Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada
however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated
that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the
discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana. Estrada
sued to evict Juliana.
Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the
concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been
paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947
but it only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches
has set in.
ISSUE:
RULING:
IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE
208 PHIL 441
FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court
in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni
Cristo, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and the National
Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondent court upheld the
primacy of the respondent banks title and ordered the
cancellation of the petitioners title. Petitioner raised the sole
issue of: which of the two titles is superior, an earlier title
secured administratively or a latter title secured thru judicial
proceedings?.
The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the
name of the plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that said property was acquired by the
plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio Libunao in whose name
the same was previously registered by virtue of a homestead
patent; that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria
Maravilla who was the registered owner of a parcel of land
including the land in question under O.C.T. by virtue of a
decree/decision, of the CFI of Nueva Ecija . The lower court
declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the respondent Court
denied it. Failing to obtain a reversal of the decision, the
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired
earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent
land registration proceedings.
Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the
conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her
predecessor Mariano Padilla even several years before the
Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as private
land and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration
Case No. 3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the
petitioner attacks the validity of the homestead patent and title
issued to the respondent banks predecessor, Emilio Libunao.
TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANO
G.R. No. 152007
FACTS:
On September 19, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint against
respondents, the complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio
Tapuroc and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner
Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs of the original owners of
a parcel of land with an area of 5,795 square meters situated in
Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol; that in 1992, when petitioners decided to
partition the subject property, they discovered from the Office of
the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in
the name of a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest in
1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the
alleged vendors therein, did not sign the conveying deed; and
that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe, had already passed
away in 1960, ong before the purported Deed of Sale was said to
have been executed in 1967. Hence, Petitioners, pray for the
Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied
for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that
Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila
while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by
the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an
area of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers
away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the
merits to ascertain the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the
decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission
which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of
title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to
and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240
[1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been
issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate
of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title
to nor bind the land and is null and void.
Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was
commenced on December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City
docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the
abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his
favor based on possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No.
44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T.
No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in
private respondent's complaint).
The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo, declaring him to be
the true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo
ching to surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its
cancellation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was
cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in
favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa
Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979. Upon
knowing, Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He
filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as
null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the
court on May 29, 1980.
ISSUE: Where to file an action for the cancellation of a title?
RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole
world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will;
it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard
or given an opportunity to be heard. An action to recover a parcel
of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds
justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value.
Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the
Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965,
against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also
handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint,
without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority
to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director
of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.
Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied.
FACTS:
On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia
Lizards, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San
Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710
square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of
spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita
Magcamit ,herein private respondents, as evidenced by
"Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to
repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January
31,1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the sum of
P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of
the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after
being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the
"Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of P40,000.00
was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued.
From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have
remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject
property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728
covering the property in question was issued to and in the name
RULING:
Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a
registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a
better right than private respondents and that the deed of
absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and
is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and
private respondents.
It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real purpose
of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever
any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the
possibility of losing his land. An indirect or collateral attack on a
Torrens Title is not allowed.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a
certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full
knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered
as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to
the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Unquestionably,
therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an
innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as
innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
ROXAS ET. AL VS TAGAYTAY
FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in
which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and
adjudication made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses
Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed
RULING:
Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of
ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title may be
introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel
One, covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half
portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she
sold the land to petitioners. An action for reconveyance prescribes
in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of
the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Records show that while the land was registered in the
name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for
reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus
still within the ten-year prescriptive period.
SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of
this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public
servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons
under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with
reference to the littoral of the sea and the banks of
navigable rivers and rivers upon which rafting may be done.
SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of the
Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or
tracts of said lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same
for public use, and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject
to sale, lease, or other disposition under this Act.
Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive
right to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to
any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be
dependent which were already existing at the time of purchase. It
also subjects the land so purchased to the right of way of such
canal, ditch, reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the
friar lands subject to public servitudes also imposed on other
lands owned by private persons. Section 21 gives the Civil
Governor, upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, the
authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as nonalienable and reserve the same for public use. Needless to say,
the road construction through Lot No. 638-B is not the servitude
contemplated in Sections 19 and 20, above quoted. Moreover, it
has not been shown that Lot No. 638-B was declared nonalienable
by the Civil Governor prior to sale to, and purchase by, Ruperta
Cabucos so as to prevent her from acquiring ownership thereover.
Ozaeta v Palanca,
63 OG 36, p. 7675
FACTS:
Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a
parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and
now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda,
Bulacan. Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of
Possession against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as
they have been occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March
of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge
Bautista. Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same
branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of
Possession against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a
motion to quash which was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which
was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground
that (1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the
complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for
reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or
laches from filing the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder
to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court. The sheriff
August 1, 2000
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are
not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the
use of land or the location or character of buildings or other
structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or
rights but it can also be contended that such covenants, being
limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property,
do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes (burden),
sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal
negative easements, which is the most common easement
created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the
owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement
existed, he would be entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive
covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected are
crafted not solely for creating easements nor as a restriction as to
the type of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on the
subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the
developer originally might have intended the stipulations to be.
Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive
covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is
191 SCRA 71
FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela,
but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
Act No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato
Bayaua opposed such registration. An order of general default
was thereafter entered against the whole world except the
oppositors. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until
a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the
parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded
portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development, Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao &
Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, 5,500
hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the
Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares
were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The parties also
mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over
Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981, the
respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have
that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void
and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy
in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land?
HELD:
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development
to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
REPUBLIC VS CA
135 SCRA 156
FACTS:
In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the
registration of 885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the
Maxinos. The decision became final and executory so a decree of
registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the
decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with
the same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision, decree,
and title on the ground that they are void because the land in
question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. The
Maxinos opposed the petition. The CFI judge denied the petition
and when appealed, the same was dismissed on the ground that
the order had allegedly long become final and unappealable so
the Government was estopped thru the registration made by its
agents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the
registration order?
RULING:
No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of
land involved in the present case is a part of a forestland, thus
non-registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the government was
estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered
by its own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its
decision in Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of
Pampanga, (50 Phil. 975, 980), where it held that the Government
should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.
a petition
mandatory
NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the
Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of
Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land
applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated
as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were
completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying
upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of
Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral
proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein.
However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several
lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino
was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included
in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands
nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to
inform the court that it was under homestead application. On
August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of
registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino,
a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to
Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12,
1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots
awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044.
Floretino sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD:
The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered
therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world,
including the Government. As a general rule, registration of title
under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable,
after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from
the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the
court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken
to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have
NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the
Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of
Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land
applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated
as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were
completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying
upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of
Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral
proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein.
However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several
lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino
was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included
in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands
nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to
inform the court that it was under homestead application. On
August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of
registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino,
a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to
Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12,
1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots
awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044.
Floretino sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD:
The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered
therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world,
including the Government. As a general rule, registration of title
TALAVERA VS MANGOBA
8 SCRA 837, 1963
FACTS:
On December 2, 1957, Talavera filed before the CFI of Nueva
Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba
and his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of
B-Meg Poultry Feeds, which latter received from former.
Defendants presented separate Answers, wherein they admitted
some and denied other allegations in the complaint. Both also
interposed separate counterclaims of P1,000.00 each. In the
hearing scheduled on March 10, 1958, neither Mangoba et,. al nor
their counsel appeared, so that the trial court received Talaveras
evidence in their absence. On March 18, 1958, a decision was
rendered in favour of Talavera.
Appellant claims that the above decision was received by
him on March 25, 1958 and the next day, wherein it was stated
that the failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or
excusable negligence, counsel having been ill of March influenza
which was evidenced by a medical certificate. Counsel for
appellant asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April
2, 1958, however, one day ahead of the date, the trial court
denied said motion. In the appeal brief, appellant contends that in
denying the motion for new trial, the court a quo deprive him of
his day in court.
RULING:
Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or not,
motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into the
ANTONIO VS RAMOS
2 SCRA 731, 1961
FACTS:
On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for
recovery of a parcel of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas
Francisco. Only Francisco was able to answer, thus, declaring
Nicolas and Leonora in default. On the date of trial, neither
Francisco not his counsel appeared despite early notice. Hence,
evidence was presented by the plaintiffs. On August 23, 1956 a
judgment has been redndered in favour of the Antonios.
Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on September of 1956,
praying that the decision dated August 23 of 1956 be set aside,
alleging that their failure to appear during the hearing of the case
was due to accident, mistake and excusable negligence which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against(Counsel lost
the envelope containing the notice to the trial before he has the
following day. They then strolled about the plaza for two hours.
Afterwards, they rested for awhile near the highway beside the
church and at about 5:00 a.m., they attended mass. When he was
advised by his aunts to go home, he decided to walk because he
had no more money. Along the way, he was arrested by the police
for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He vehemently denied
having committed the crime. He likewise claimed that there were
no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he was arrested.
Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness,
the trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for
conviction. Moreover, the defense has not shown any improper or
ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the
accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing
to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was
not so actuated and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and
credit. Nor is the non-presentation of the victim's companions of
any help to the cause of the accused. In the first place, it was
never established that the two companions were with the victim
when she was on her way home or when she was raped and
killed. It was duly established that, after obtaining permission
from her mother, she went "to the fiesta in Aguilar" with her
cousin and her mother's sister-in-law, and that immediately
before the incident the victim was walking alone but "was
following persons." Accordingly, her two companions, who were
not eyewitnesses, could not have testified on the rape and killing
of the victim. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to
determine who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of
its own assessment of their necessity. Every objection to the
admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence
is offered, or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall
become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered
waived. Moreover, the bloodstains on the pants of the accused
were testified to by Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta 28 and Mayor
Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of scratches on his neck
and arms was not satisfactorily explained by the accused. Taken
together with the other circumstances present here, this fact
serves to buttress the prosecution's case.
ISSUES:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time
and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must
also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time the same was committed. 31 In this case, the
place where the accused claims to be 32 is more or less ten
meters away from the scene of the crime )a ricefield in Barangay
Pogomboa). 33 Furthermore, the place where he was questioned
by Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police
authorities is twenty meters away from the place where the naked
body of the victim was found. 34 Hence, the physical impossibility
of the accused's presence at the crime scene, which is necessary
is order that the defense of alibi may be considered, is lacking.
The accused committed a heinous crime. He was not content with
unleashing his bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10year-old; he also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which
caused her untimely demise. Another life was lost because a
beast in man's clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what
he did in prison, a place which, unfortunately, is definitely much
better than what he truly deserves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged
decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo dela Cruz
y Laoang.
RULING:
It is certain that petitioner failed to present before the Court
a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which
is included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma
Leuenberger. Thus, it has been held that where the land is
decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such
GARCIA VS MENDOZA
203 SCRA 732 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her
husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in
San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently
sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps.
Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who
then took possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the
cadastral court issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in
favor of Dominador G. Mendoza, their son.
Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza
falsely claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the
property from Hermenegildo Mendoza; that Mendoza made it
appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo
Mendoza, who had been in possession of the lot since October 15,
1987, and subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza.
The petitioners filed with the court a petition for review of
judgment but denied, so they appealed. Mendoza countered that
a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496,
does
not
apply
to
a
cadastral
proceeding.
ISSUE(S):
RUBLICO VS ORELLANO
30 SCRA 511 (1969)
FACTS:
Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. IL-N2, L.R.C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with the
Court of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership and praying
that the said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. On 20
November 1964, the court a quo approved the report and
recommendation of the clerk of court and rendered judgment
adjudicating Lots 1664 and 1665 in favor of respondent-appellee
Orellana. Petitioners-appellants filed a petition to annul the
judgment and/or review the decree of registration, alleging
ownership of the lots adjudicated to the respondent; that
respondent, "by means of fraud, made the court to believe that
he is the owner" and that said judgment "was secured by means
of fraud". Orellana filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The
court, on 23 September 1965, sustained the motion, holding that
petitioners-appellants had no personality to file their petition
because they did not file an answer and were declared in default
and that they should have first secured the lifting of the order of
CRISOLO vs. CA
68 SCRA 435 (1975)
FACTS:
On August 20, 1965, judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance, Branch VII, of Pangasinan, ordering the registration
of Lots 1 and 2, situated in the Poblacion of Mabini, Pangasinan,
and more particularly bounded and described in the technical
descriptions (Exhibits B and B-1) in the name of applicant
spouses, Pedro C. Crisolo and Soledad de G. Crisolo. On
September 20, 1965, the court ordered the issuance of the
Decree, followed three months later by writ of possession in favor
of the spouses. Within a year from the issuance of this decree of
registration, respondent-ward, represented by his guardian, filed a
petition for review of the decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on
the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in petitioners
RULING:
NO. Respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section 38
of Act 496 because respondent-ward was given opportunity to
oppose the registration but abandoned his opposition. Under
Section 38 of Act 496, the persons entitled to a review of the
decree of registration are those who were fraudulently deprived of
their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case and
not those who were not denied for their day in court by fraud,
which the law provides as the sole ground for reopening the
decree of registration. Thus, where an oppositor, through counsel,
announced his opposition to the registration of the land involved
but later abandoned the same, he cannot claim that he was
fraudulently deprived of his day in court to entitle him of the
remedy under Section 38 of Act 496; and a petition for review of a
decree of registration will be denied where the petitioner had
FACTS:
Sometime in 1966 the respondent Alfonso Sandoval filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II, Pasig) an
ISSUE:
as
RULING:
YES. In Mesina vs. Pineda vda. de Sonza, the Supreme Court,
citing Susi vs. Razon, held that once a homestead applicant has
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant,
he acquires "not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government.
In Nieto vs. Quines, the Court affirmed the doctrine in these
words:
Considering the requirement that the final proof must be
presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead
application (sec. 14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that
Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923
and that the Director of Lands approved the same not long
thereafter or before the land became the subject of cadastral
proceedings in 1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the
ministerial act of in suing the patent and the same was actually
issued only after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to
Maria Florentino. Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms
and conditions which would entitle him to a patent, Bartolome
Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has
unquestionably acquired a vested right in the land and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof.
It is the Courts view that the petitioners have amply alleged
below such real, legally protected interest over the parcels in
question sufficient to clothe them with the necessary personality
to question, independently of the Director of Lands, the validity of
BONIEL VS REYES
35 SCRA 218 (1970)
FACTS:
Petitioners therein alleged to be the bona fide actual
occupants and cultivators of a 46.2877-hectare parcel of public
agricultural land designated as Lot No. SI-17618-D and located at
Bo. Langka, Lupon, Davao province, and that on October 12,
1965, one Ramon Ombay, late husband of co-petitioner Mauricia
Ombay had filed a free patent application for the land; that
sometime on September 11, 1964, one Rafael S. Yap had
clandestinely filed a sales application for the very same parcel of
land, which was favorably by the land inspector of the Bureau of
Lands who certified in the records the findings of his investigation
as to the absence of any claimants of the land; and that as a
result of such alleged fraud and collusion between Yap and the
BALDOZ VS PAPA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)
FACTS:
On January 7, 1957, the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina
Agaceta, parents of herein appellees, applied for the registration
under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area
of 37,671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Case No. 2215, L.R.C. Record No. 12389). After the requisite
publication of the application in the Official Gazette, the case was
called for hearing on May 16, 1957 in the course of which an
order of general default was entered. On the same date, however,
Baldomero Baldoz father of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift
the order of default as against him and praying that his opposition
to the application, thereto attached, be admitted. Prior to October
1, 1958. oppositor Baldoz died. On October 10, 1958, the latter's
counsel filed a motion to set aside the order of default alleging
that the reason for the nonappearance of oppositor Baldoz was
his death on July 28, 1957 and praying that his son, appellant
herein, be substituted as party-oppositor. Although this motion
was denied on October 31 of the following year, appellant
appears not to have appealed from the order of denial aforesaid.
On February 16, 1959, the court rendered judgment decreeing the
registration of the parcel of land described in Psu 59688 in favor
of appellees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court in said case committed a reversible
error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having
filed a written opposition which was duly admitted by it and that
its order denying appellant's motion for substitution as oppositor
therein has deprived him of his day in court.
RULING:
The court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
grounds (1) that the final judgment in Registration Case No. 2215
is res judicata in the present action and (2) that the instant action,
being in the nature of a petition for review of a decree, cannot
prosper because it was filed more than one year from the date of
the issuance of the decree and because it is not based on fraud as
provided for in Section 38 of Act 496. The present is an appeal
from said order.
FACTS:
Teodorico Cabascas, the late father of respondent Alejandro
Cabasbas, owns a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT no. 815.
Petitioners allege that the controversy arose from Civil Case No.
4870 filed by Alejandro to recover the lot of his father against Jose
A. de Kastro and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo Reyes
and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus. Pursuant to a
compromise agreement entered into by the parties, the spouses
Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were
declared to be the registered owners of the western portion of the
land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per
Original Certificate of Title No. 615, the land subject of the
petition.
Subsequent transfers were then made until the petitioners
acquired ownership of the land subject of the petition. In 1968,
Alejandro filed another complaint praying for the nullification of
the compromise agreement with the allegation that it was
obtained through fraud as it was made to appear before the court
of first instance that the conveyance of title was made on
February, 1946 when in fact it took place on September 14, 1944,
in violation of the Homestead Law. Alleging res judicata,
petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the case. However, Judge
Ruiz refused to dismiss the case asserting that the sale of a parcel
of land was made on September 14, 1944 in violation of the fiveyear period within which a transfer of a homestead patent is
prohibited.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an actual or extrinsic fraud rendering the
judgment null?
RULING:
No. Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be
extrinsic to the litigation. Was this not the rule there would be no
end to litigations, perjury being of such common occurrence in
trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could
attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary
falsehood to his adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that
judicial determination however erroneous of matters brought
RAMIREZ VS CA
144 SCRA 292 (1986)
FACTS:
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses filed an
application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. An order
of general default was issued. Thereafter, the petitioners
presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question
by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the
American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost
and no copy or record of the same was available. On March 30,
1960, the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree
of registration on the ground of fraud. After trial, the court found
that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents
took possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita
Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to
secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00 by way of
antichresis. The trial court then ordered the reconveyance of the
property. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.
RULING:
from which they were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994
by respondents. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition
is GRANTED.
sale
RULING:
In Caro v. Sucaldito, the Court held that an applicant for a
free patent cannot be considered a party-in-interest with
personality to file an action for reconveyance. Citing Spouses
Tankiko v. Cezar, the Court stated:
Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere
applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no
personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected
by the judgment in such suit.
Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to
the properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
ALEGRIA VS DIRLONG, GR. NO. 161317, 16 JULY 2008
558 SCRA 459 (2008)
FACTS:
sale
RULING:
In Caro v. Sucaldito, the Court held that an applicant for a
free patent cannot be considered a party-in-interest with
personality to file an action for reconveyance. Citing Spouses
Tankiko v. Cezar, the Court stated:
Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere
applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no
personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected
by the judgment in such suit.
Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to
the properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
Daclag v Macahilig
G.R. No. 159578 July 28, 2008
FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in
which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and
adjudication made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses
Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale, an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her
free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for
reconveyance. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the
respondents is proper.
RULING:
Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
BAUTISTA-BORJA v BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 136197 December 10, 2008
FACTS:
By petitioners claim, respondents, through fraud and
deception, convinced her to take possession and cultivate parcels
of land which would eventually be partitioned; and that unknown
to her, however, the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue
of Deeds of Sale purportedly executed on different dates by her
parents in favor of her siblings Simplicio and Francisco, a fact
which she came to know about only in 1994. Petitioner thus filed
a complaint before the RTC for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale
and/or Partition of Properties. The trial court held that petitioners
cause of action had prescribed as actions for reconveyance based
on implied trust prescribe in 10 years, and that laches had set in.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether
reconveyance
RULING:
the
petitioner
can
still
file
an
action
for
Yes, the petitioner can. If the trial court finds that the deed of
sale is void, then the action for the declaration of the contracts
nullity is imprescriptible. Indeed, the Court has held in a number
of cases that an action for reconveyance of property based on a
void contract does not prescribe. However, if the trial court finds
that the deed of sale is merely voidable, then the action would
have already prescribed. At all events, since the complaint on its
face does not indicate that the action has prescribed, an
allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to
dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the
action has already prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of
prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a fullblown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners
complaint for reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioners complaint for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful
and legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of
title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a
person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land
registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of
the land in the name of the defendant was procured through
fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed
to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed
after the certificate of title had already become final and
incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the
fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.
Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.