MARTINEZ VS CA

G.R. No. 170409

FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who
during his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa
Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them from her own
mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged
that sometime in 1992, petitioner, Gregoria Merquines,
represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the
descendants of Celedoniaand under that name applied for free
patents over the properties with the CENRO. Unbeknownst to
private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in
the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later
filed an application for land registration over the same properties,
petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents
to file the instant complaint.
The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and
land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation
in their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering
the cancellation of petitioners titles. Before the Court of Appeals,
She argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of
the lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.
Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is
untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.

ISSUE:
Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and
incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their
issuance
RULING:
No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and
incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their
issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued
on the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in
the facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as
Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of
Celedonia.
Under the recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the
basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the
law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with
indefeasibility. Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing
where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.
The petition is denied.

CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
132 SCRA 718
FACTS:
Petitioner, Juliana Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano De Vera,
were first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one
roof in the care of a common aunt. In year 1951, Mariano De Vera
died. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966.
De Veras nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator
of De Veras estate. Prior to the widows death, she made an
inventory showing that De Veras property (located in Calasiao,
Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada
however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated
that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the
discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana. Estrada
sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the
concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been
paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947
but it only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches
has set in.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor

of De Veras estate

RULING:

No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was

erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered
woman, agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the
purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime;
that when de Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that
of Juliana, the latters land was erroneously included.

The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her

inventory before she died, attested that de Veras portion of land
is only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates
the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the
only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is
that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A
recalculation must however be made to specify the exact
measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained
by Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m.
should go to de Veras estate.

In the case at bar, the principle of indefeasibility applies only in

the claimed portion or property wherein it can be adjudged not on
the illegally included area.

IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE
208 PHIL 441

FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court
in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni
Cristo, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and the National
Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondent court upheld the
primacy of the respondent banks title and ordered the
cancellation of the petitioners title. Petitioner raised the sole
issue of: which of the two titles is superior, an earlier title
secured administratively or a latter title secured thru judicial
proceedings?.
The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the
name of the plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that said property was acquired by the
plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio Libunao in whose name
the same was previously registered by virtue of a homestead
patent; that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria
Maravilla who was the registered owner of a parcel of land
including the land in question under O.C.T. by virtue of a
decree/decision, of the CFI of Nueva Ecija . The lower court
declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the respondent Court
denied it. Failing to obtain a reversal of the decision, the
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired
earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent
land registration proceedings.
Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the
conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her
predecessor Mariano Padilla even several years before the
Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as private
land and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration
Case No. 3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the
petitioner attacks the validity of the homestead patent and title
issued to the respondent banks predecessor, Emilio Libunao.

In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this jurisdiction,

regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is
granted by the government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor, is recorded and the certificate of
title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically
brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title
issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the
expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title
becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding."
Applying the case of Pajomayo, Et. Al. v. Manipon, Et Al., (39
SCRA 676) Supreme Court held that once a homestead patent
granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered
pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued
in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title
under the Land Registration Act. Supreme Court should add that
the Director of Patents, being a public officer, has in his favor the
presumption of regularity in issuing the questioned homestead
patent.

HEIRS OF SPS, LIM VS. RTC JUDGE

G.R. No. 173891
FACTS:
Amparo E. Caosa (respondent Caosa) filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the reconstitution of
the original Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 169395 of the
Register of Deeds of the same city. The trial court had ex
parte presentation of evidence before the branch clerk of
court. Convinced that the jurisdictional requirements were
complied with and finding merit in the petition, the trial court
ordered the reconstitution of the original and owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. 169395.
Petitioners filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial
courts
decision.
According
to
petitioners,
their
parents, spouses Luciano P. Lim and Salud Nakpil Bautista, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land. They acquired it from
Domingo L. Santos. The lot contained an area of 795 square
meters
more
or
less
and
was covered by TCT
No.
27997. Furthermore, they alleged that their parents had been in
actual physical possession of the property. A fired razed
Quezon City Hall, the records destroyed was the original copy of
TCT No. 27997 and thus, one of the petitioners applied for and
was issued a reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-97223, in September
1994.
Petitioners claimed that when respondent Caosa filed a petition
for the reconstitution of TCT No. 169395. They insisted that the
petition for reconstitution did not comply with the requirements
found in Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as it

failed to state specifically the boundaries of the property subject

of the petition as well as the names of the occupants or persons
in possession of the property. Petitioners considered these
circumstances as extrinsic fraud. Caosa alleged that there was
no fraud and that the jurisdictional requirements of notice and
publication had been complied with.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners sought
reconsideration of the resolution, but their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have personality and right
to be notified of the reconstitution proceedings nor do they have
any right to file the petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the
reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No.
169395 will have no effect on their property, the latter being
different from, and not even a part of the property covered by the
reconstituted title. One having no right or interest of his own to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party
plaintiff in an action, thus petitioners petition for annulment of
judgment was rightfully dismissed.
Petitioners impute error to the Court of Appeals when it dismissed
their petition after it concluded, on the basis of its simple
comparison of petitioners and respondents TCTs, that the
properties
covered
by
the
two
titles
are
entirely
different. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should have
conducted a trial and received evidence; and having failed to do
so, its conclusion was allegedly not only flawed but was also
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion and without due
process. Supreme Court does not agree.
The Court of Appeals did not dismiss the petition for
annulment of judgment outright. In fact, it required
respondent Caosa to file her answer, and even allowed the

filing of an amended answerproof that it was predisposed to

consider the arguments of both parties before it even
decided to finally dismiss the petition. Mere filing of a petition
for annulment of judgment does not guarantee the holding of
trial
or
reception
of
evidence.
A
petition
for annulment of judgment may in fact be dismissed outright
if it has no prima facie merit. With more reason that the Court
of Appeals may dismiss a petition even without a hearing if it
finds that based on the averments in the petition and the
responsive pleading, the annulment of the assailed judgment
is not warranted.

TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANO
G.R. No. 152007
FACTS:
On September 19, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint against
respondents, the complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio
Tapuroc and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner
Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs of the original owners of
a parcel of land with an area of 5,795 square meters situated in
Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol; that in 1992, when petitioners decided to
partition the subject property, they discovered from the Office of
the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in
the name of a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest in
1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the
alleged vendors therein, did not sign the conveying deed; and
that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe, had already passed
away in 1960, ong before the purported Deed of Sale was said to
have been executed in 1967. Hence, Petitioners, pray for the

nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title

issued pursuant thereto and the restoration of the previous title in
their names, plus damages.
Respondents assert that they had been in open, continuous, and
peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said
sale, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due
thereon.
On June 7, 1999, the trial court finding that the evidence adduced
by the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim that the
questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. A motion for
reconsideration was filed with the CA, which affirmed the decision
of the trial court, ruling that petitioners are barred from filing their
petition due to laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse of the petitioners is valid.
RULING: No. The recourse must fail. As it is, the petitioners call
for a review of the facts of the case. Their action calls for the
determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a
matter not for this Court to resolve.
It appears that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public
document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo
Yap. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public
document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution.
More so, as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere
allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies
on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge
their burden.
A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question
on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or

not, can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that

purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in
a collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of
deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of
Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to
attack a Torrens certificate of title. Petition was denied.

NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ

173 SCRA 534
FACTS: Petitioner, Natalia Realty, filed separate ejectment cases
against respondents with the RTC of Rizal for allegedly unlawfully
occupying parcels of lands which were covered by the petitioners
transfer certificates. The respondents file a consolidated answer
moving to dismiss said case based on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Then the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding
that there is no valid issue raised by the respondents, but only

conclusions that they have been in actual possession of the

subject lands for more than 30 years. They were then ordered to
vacate the lots and to pay monthly rents. So the respondents filed
an appeal with the Intermediate Appellate Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a valid claim over the
disputed land?
RULING: The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the lower
court that the certificate of title issued to the petitioners in
accordance with the Land Registration Act is indefeasible after the
expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration.
After the lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all
persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the
registration proceedings. The said titles were issued to the
petitioners more than 30 years ago.
Furthermore, the SC averred that, under the law, Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a
certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can
be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless.
Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of
lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be
governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that
no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both
immaterial and inconsequential.
There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be
said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the
ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title.

Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that

they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole
country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform
area.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION VS CA

201 SCRA 165
FACTS:
On August 27, 1974, Widows and Orphans Association, Inc.
(Widora) filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of

land. It alleged that the parcel of land has an area of 156

hectares, more or less; and that the applicant acquired said
property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December
12, 1954.
Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to
14 hectares and praying for a decree of registration over said
portions of Lot 8. Same with Ortigas and Company Limited
Partnership (Ortigas) filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging,
among others, that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the
case, the land being applied for having been already registered
under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under TCT
77652 and TCT 77653.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas,
holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their
face show that they were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334,
pursuant to Decree 1425; Ortigas then filed a motion for
reconsideration praying the respondent court to reconsider its
order of March 30, 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
over the application for registration, the parcels of land subject
thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title.
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent court
praying for the annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19,
1989 orders of the trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be
ordered to dismiss the land registration case,the trial court then
rendered the decision in favor to Ortigas.
ISSUE: Do a Torrens Certificate of Title be subjected to a
collateral attack?
RULING:

Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied
for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that
Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila
while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by
the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an
area of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers
away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the
merits to ascertain the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the
decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission
which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of
title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to
and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240
[1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been
issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate
of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title
to nor bind the land and is null and void.

ESLANISLAO VS. HONRADA

114 SCRA 748
FACTS;
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals granting ex-parte the
cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor
of Pedro Asedillo.
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo
Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No.
N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original
Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register
of Deeds covering a parcel of land with an area of 51,852 square
meters.
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44
Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137
was issued on September 18, 1961.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts,
United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch III, Pasay
City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching
Leng. Alfredo Ching was appointed then asthe administrator of
Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of
administration issued on January 3, 1966.

Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was
commenced on December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City
docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the
abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his
favor based on possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No.
44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T.
No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in
private respondent's complaint).
The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo, declaring him to be
the true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo
ching to surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its
cancellation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was
cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in
favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa
Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979. Upon
knowing, Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He
filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as
null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the
court on May 29, 1980.
ISSUE: Where to file an action for the cancellation of a title?
RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole
world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will;
it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard
or given an opportunity to be heard. An action to recover a parcel
of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds

a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a

tangible thing.
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of
title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant
Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years
after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475) the decision of the
lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have
been validly served with summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of
legal relations, was lost through death.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must
be filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal,
sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112
of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI
Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case
No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in
interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when
the summons was published he could not have been notified at all
and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The
ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been
held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter one
year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree,
but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open
to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of

justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value.

FERRER VS. BAUTISTA

231 SCRA 748
FACTS:
Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the
Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims its
ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980

covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north of the land

in question. On the other hand, private respondents equally
assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation
and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of
respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent No.
309504 issued on 24 January 1966 .

On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint

with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to
"Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano
Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated
Civil Case No. A-514.

Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the
Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965,
against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also
handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint,
without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority
to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director
of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.

Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied.

Petitioner claimed that the respondent judge committed an error

in outright dismissing on the ground of collateral attack on Free

Patent Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion

and an excess of his jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not a void title can be subject to collateral

attack.

RULING: Yes. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a

free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and
which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued
or conveyed by him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not
from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority
being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that
are privately owned.

Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title

over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the
time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not
a part of the disposable land of the public domain.

Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year

after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not
apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare
the nullity of that void title does not prescribe; in fact, it is
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack.

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS IAC

157 SCRA 380

FACTS:
On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia
Lizards, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San
Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710
square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of
spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita
Magcamit ,herein private respondents, as evidenced by
"Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to
repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January
31,1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the sum of
P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of
the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after
being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the
"Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of P40,000.00
was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued.
From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have
remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject
property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728
covering the property in question was issued to and in the name

of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the

private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed
a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing
the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National
Grains Authority (NGA).
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the
Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea
Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property
involved in this case, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of
P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of
sale of the property in question, scheduling the public auction
sale. The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that
a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by
the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, NGA in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the
mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By
virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the
name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974.
A month after, the private respondents learned that a title in the
name of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property
in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in
favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered
to pay the NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of
the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the
absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused to accept the
payment and claimed ownership of the property in question and
has no intention of disposing of the same. The private
respondents are in possession of subject property were asked by
the NGA to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner filed a suit
for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court
of Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.

On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the

then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch
III, San Pablo City, against the NGA and the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared the owners
of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession
of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said
property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to
them under such terms and conditions as the court may find just,
fair and equitable under the premises.
In its answer to the complaint, the National Grains Authority
maintained that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the
property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is
now indefeasible, hence, cause of action of Nena Magcamit has
already prescribed.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in
question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same and
ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant
National Grains Authority.
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision
of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
rendered its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of
the trial court ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a
deed of reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration
and cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said

decision but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Grains Authority is the

rightful owner of the disputed land.

RULING:
Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a
registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a
better right than private respondents and that the deed of
absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and
is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and
private respondents.
It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real purpose
of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever
any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the
possibility of losing his land. An indirect or collateral attack on a
Torrens Title is not allowed.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a
certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full
knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered
as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to
the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Unquestionably,
therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an
innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as
innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
ROXAS ET. AL VS TAGAYTAY
FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in
which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and
adjudication made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses
Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed

of Sale, an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her

free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for
reconveyance. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.

ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the

respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of
ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title may be
introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel
One, covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half
portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she
sold the land to petitioners. An action for reconveyance prescribes
in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of
the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Records show that while the land was registered in the
name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for
reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus
still within the ten-year prescriptive period.

DIGRAN VS AUDITOR GENERAL

64 OG 19
FACTS:
On June 22, 1909, RupertaCabucos bought from, and fully paid to
the Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
situated in Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was
executed in her favor on November 27, 1915 by the Friar Lands
Agency. On February 28, 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT3918 (T-320) was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate
was among the friar lands acquired by the Government for resale
to actual tenants or occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the
Philippine Commission.
Sometime in 1914 or 1915, without prior expropriation
proceedings, the government constructed Mango Avenue, a
municipal road, passing through Lot No. 638. A claim for
compensation was filed with the Municipality of Cebu but it was
still unpaid when World War II broke out.RupertaCabucos died in
1940. In 1951 her heirs subdivided Lot No. 638 into eight lots.
On February 16, 1963 Raymunda S. Digran, a daughter of Candida
Samson, became administratrix of the estate of RupertaCabucos.
On February 18, 1963 the Deputy Auditor General, as stated,
denied the claim. This decision was the subject of two motions for
reconsideration, the later one having been denied on June 10,
1963. On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to
this Court from said decision altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an
amended claim for compensation with the Auditor General. On
August 7, 1963 the Auditor General desisted from rendering a
decision on the amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that
the case was already sub judice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of RupertaCabucos are entitled

to compensation for Lot No. 638-B, the road lot.
RULING: The Government denies the obligation to give due
compensation for Lot No. 638-B mainly on the grounds that
RupertaCabucos' title over Lot No. 638 was subject to the
Government's reservations for public use, such as rights of way
and other public servitudes under Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act
1120 and Section 39 of Act 496; and, that the right to enforce the
claim for compensation is barred by prescription and laches.
The grounds relied upon by the Government, stated above, lack
merit. Firstly, Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no
authority for the Government to take private lands covered by
said Act for public use without just compensation. Sections 19, 20
and 21 state:
SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any
exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other
irrigation works, or to any water supply upon which such
irrigation works are or may be dependent, but all of such
irrigation works and water supplies shall remain under the
exclusive control of the Government of the Philippine Islands
and be administered under the direction of the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands for the common benefit of those
interests dependent upon them. And the Government
reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the
right to levy an equitable contribution or tax for the
maintenance of such irrigation works, the assessment of
which shall be based upon the amount of benefits received,
and each purchaser under this Act, by accepting the
certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be given, shall
be held to assent thereto. And it is further provided that all
lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall remain subject
to the right of way of such irrigation canals, ditches, and
reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter
see fit to construct.

SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of
this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public
servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons
under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with
reference to the littoral of the sea and the banks of
navigable rivers and rivers upon which rafting may be done.
SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of the
Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or
tracts of said lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same
for public use, and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject
to sale, lease, or other disposition under this Act.
Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive
right to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to
any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be
dependent which were already existing at the time of purchase. It
also subjects the land so purchased to the right of way of such
canal, ditch, reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the
friar lands subject to public servitudes also imposed on other
lands owned by private persons. Section 21 gives the Civil
Governor, upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, the
authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as nonalienable and reserve the same for public use. Needless to say,
the road construction through Lot No. 638-B is not the servitude
contemplated in Sections 19 and 20, above quoted. Moreover, it
has not been shown that Lot No. 638-B was declared nonalienable
by the Civil Governor prior to sale to, and purchase by, Ruperta
Cabucos so as to prevent her from acquiring ownership thereover.

Ozaeta v Palanca,
63 OG 36, p. 7675

FACTS:
Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a
parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and
now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda,
Bulacan. Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of
Possession against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as
they have been occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March
of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge
Bautista. Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same
branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of
Possession against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a
motion to quash which was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which
was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground
that (1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the
complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for
reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or
laches from filing the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder
to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court. The sheriff

then, upon the courts order, delivered possession to Delfin

however he was barred in entering the premises. Delfin filed a
motion for an Alias writ of possession which was granted. The
sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin,
however, when the latter went to the premises he was again
barred by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and
he moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again,
granted. Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the
petitioner was dismissed. After which motions and motions have
been filed. The second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining
order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing
and/or carrying out the third alias writ of possession. Petitioner
then filed motion to amend the resolution and TRO, either
nullifying third alias writ of possession served orto issue a
mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court.

ISSUE: Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper

remedy.
RULING:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose
property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the
Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the
issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in
question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration,
but only to show that the person who secured the registration of
the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. An ordinary
civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the
decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no

longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from

the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent
that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof
of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings
incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed
intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year
within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired.
Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land should be
adjudicated to the registered owner that: "Justice is done
according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a
moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration
(meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty,
the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves
commiseration or sympathy." An action for reconveyance of real
property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of
title.

ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. FREEDOM

TO BUILD, INC.

G.R. No. 134692

August 1, 2000

FACTS:

Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost

housing, sold to petitioners, a house and lot in Barangka,
Marikina, Manila. The Contract to Sell and the Transfer Certificate
of Title covering the lot issued in the name of petitioners
contained a Restrictive Covenant providing prohibitions such as
easement of two meters in front, second storey expansion to be
placed above the back of the house and should not extend
forward beyond the apex of the original building, and the 2nd
floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front property
line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house.
Petitioners, despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended
the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the
second floor of their house to a point directly above the original
front wall. Respondent filed an action to demolish the
unauthorized structures. The RTC ruled against Spouses Fajardo
and directed them to immediately demolish and remove the
extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the
limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The spouses filed
petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid.

Whether respondent has the personality to enforce the provisions
of the covenant.

HELD:

The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are
not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the
use of land or the location or character of buildings or other
structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or
rights but it can also be contended that such covenants, being
limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property,
do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes (burden),
sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal
negative easements, which is the most common easement
created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the
owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement
existed, he would be entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive
covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected are
crafted not solely for creating easements nor as a restriction as to
the type of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on the
subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the
developer originally might have intended the stipulations to be.
Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive
covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is

intended. It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has

neither right nor interest in the land for the benefit of which the
restriction has been imposed. Thus, a developer of a subdivision
can enforce restrictions, even as against remote grantees of lots,
only if he retains part of the land. There would have been merit in
the argument of petitioners - that respondent, having relinquished
ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners, is precluded
from claiming any right or interest on the same property - had not
the homeowners' association, confirmed by its board of directors,
allowed respondent to enforce the provisions of the restrictive
covenant.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION

A. APPEAL
a. Reglementary period: 15 days from receipt.
i. As against the government.
REPUBLIC VS SAYO

191 SCRA 71
FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela,
but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
Act No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato
Bayaua opposed such registration. An order of general default
was thereafter entered against the whole world except the
oppositors. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until
a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the
parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded
portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development, Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao &
Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, 5,500
hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the
Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares
were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The parties also
mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over
Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981, the
respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have
that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void
and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy
in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land?
HELD:
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development
to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the

absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. It

was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for
approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal
counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that
"Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of
the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding
until they are actually received by the Solicitor General."
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null
and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however
indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that
the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by
competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge
complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration
Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court
of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings
therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter
rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant.

REPUBLIC VS CA
135 SCRA 156
FACTS:
In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the
registration of 885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the
Maxinos. The decision became final and executory so a decree of
registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the
decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with
the same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision, decree,
and title on the ground that they are void because the land in
question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. The
Maxinos opposed the petition. The CFI judge denied the petition
and when appealed, the same was dismissed on the ground that
the order had allegedly long become final and unappealable so
the Government was estopped thru the registration made by its
agents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the
registration order?
RULING:
No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of
land involved in the present case is a part of a forestland, thus
non-registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the government was
estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered
by its own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its
decision in Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of
Pampanga, (50 Phil. 975, 980), where it held that the Government
should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.

GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

168 SCRA 503
FACTS:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12
parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion
later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et
al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among
them. After notice and publication, and there being no opposition
to the application, the trial court issued an order of general
default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision
became final and executory hence the court directed the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels
of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already
granted by homestead patent in 1929.
Under the law, land
already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the
subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverios
recommendation. Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529
(Land Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of
the decree of registration and certificate of title. That once the
judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree
of registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on
approving the adjudication even after it had become final and
executory.
HELD:

Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a

cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final,
in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one
(1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The
Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not
been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA)
and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry
of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision
in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

Republic vs. Estenzo

158 SCRA 282
FACTS:
On 11 November 1961, the Land Tenure Administration,
representing the Republic, initiated and prosecuted expropriation
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the
acquisition of some 591.0654 hectares of private agricultural
lands situated in San Isidro, Leyte, and owned by respondents
Espeletas, Martinezes and Pachecos, for resale to tenants,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 1400.chanroblesv
On 14 June 1962, the lower court rendered a decision condemning
the said land for P411,995.78. 1 The Republic, having already
paid the partial sum of P206,850.00, was, accordingly, ordered to
pay the balance of P205,145.78, plus the further sum of
P20,000.00 for a farmhouse, copra drier and warehouses, or a
total of P225,145.78. This was supplemented by an amendatory
order providing for payment of 6% per annum interest starting 14
June 1962 on the unpaid balance. Implementing orders, the last of
which was dated 28 July 1962, were thereafter successively
issued.chanroblesi
Came 12 April 1963 and the balance of P143,150.00 still
remained unpaid despite an order directing payment thereof.
Respondents-landowners then filed a motion in the lower court
imploring the latter to (1) annul its amended decision of 24
August 1962 on the ground that its basis - the compromise
agreement - was secured through fraud; and (2) resuscitate its
original decision of 14 June 1962.chanroblesvanrob
The Republic went to the Supreme Court on
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary

a petition
mandatory

injunction. Before the Supreme Court could rule on the petition,

however, the parties entered anew into another compromise
agreement. The Republic, now represented by the Land Authority,
covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of
P143,150.00 plus 6% per annum interest from 24 August 1962.
Respondents-landowners, for their part, agreed to renounce "any
and all further claims against the former
which had been
recognized and ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26
April 1963 "in the event (of) full payment of said compromise
price . . . on or before said date,"
The Republic failed again to pay its obligation in full, as per
agreement. Out of P143,150.00, it was able to pay, as of 31
August 1964, P85,260.65 on the principal and P17,010.98 on the
interest, or a total of P102,271.63 only. This precipitated the filing
of respondents-landowners' motion, dated 10 November 1964, in
the lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the
Sheriff of the City of Manila to enforce the writ of execution of 28
July 1962. nroblesvirtualaw
The Republic moved for reconsideration of the lower court's order
alleging, in addition to the two basic arguments previously raised
in its oposition to respondents-landowners' motion of 10
November 1964, that the garnishment of the funds of the Land
Authority violates Sections 14 and 21 10 of Republic Act No. 992,
otherwise known as the Revised Budget Act, because the money
garnished was appropriated by Congress "for the operation and
maintenance of the nineteen (19) Settlement Projects and twelve
(12) Agencies under the administration of . . . (the) Authority,
pursuant to the provision of R. A. 3844, (and) to cover salaries of
personnel, travelling, supplies and materials and other
administrative expenses," and are, therefore, not funds for the
payment of expropriated estates. This was opposed by
respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14 and 21 of
Republic Act No. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure and/or
payment by the government official charged with custody of such
funds but are not applicable to forcible seizure through
garnishment pursuant to a writ of execution," as in the case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibr

Hence, this present petition for certiorari and prohibition with

preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.lnrob
HELD:
The first plea of herein petitioner, that the Court of First Instance
of Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section
154 (3) of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), enacted
on 8 August 1963, is plainly without merit. Said Section 154 (3)
provides that Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land Tenure
administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the time of
the effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and continued in
the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby the Republic
undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation price with
interest on or before 31 August 1964. Whatever writ of execution
could be issued by the respondent judge must necessarily be
predicated on the second compromise, and conform to the terms
thereof.chanroblesvir
and that it is undeniable that the petitioner Republic had not
made full payment of P143,150.00, plus legal interest from 24
August 1962, on or before 31 August 1964. Such default,
however, only entitled respondents to demand execution on the
basis
of
the
compromise
approved
by
this
Court.chanroblesblesvirtual
The lower court was, therefore, already divested of its control
over the cause when the motion of 12 April 1963 was filed; it was
already shorn of its jurisdiction when its controversial order of 26
April 1963 was issued pursuant thereto, ordering payment of the
original award made in 14 June 1962. All that the lower court
could do under the circumstances was to enforce the amended
decision of 24 August 1962. Instead of a motion for relief under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the proper move for respondentslandowners would have been to file a separate and independent
civil action to set aside, by annulment or rescission, both the first

compromise agreement and the amended decision embodying

the same.chanroblesvirtualawl libraryanroblesvirtualaw
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, and the
respondent Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further
proceeding in its Civil Case.The preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is made permanent. No costs. Let a copy of this opinion be
sent to the Honorable, the President of the Philippines, through
the Secretary of Justice.

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS VS DE BANUVAR

25 SCRA 316
Facts:
Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lots
in questions with reservations, and ordered the registration of
these lots in favor of the Benuvar.
A petition for reconstitution was made. At the pendency of the
reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired
lot 1 from Santiago de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a
party for the latter. The petitioners opposed, on a claim that they
have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted possession
and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since
time immemorial, long before the second world war.
For "lack of proper notices," the respondent court denied the
petition. However, in its later order the court reconsidered and

granted the petition.

The petitioners interposed an appeal from this last order.
Respondent court dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the
required bond," but withheld action on the motion for immediate
execution as to lot 1 "until after this order dismissing the appeal
shall have become final." The herein petitioners then filed a
petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, to compel the
trial court to give due course to their appeal. This petition was
finally dismissed.
De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree over lot
1. The petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not
final and executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have
appealed from the said decision by virtue of a notation the
counsel received the same "Con mi excepcion making the
execution of the said decision impossible. De Banuvar asserted
that the issuance of the decree is but a ministerial duty of the
respondent court.
Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De
Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision
in the land registration case had already become final and
executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory
because the La Urbana, Inc. appealed therefrom, as may be seen
from the notation of the reconstituted decision stating, "Recibi
copia. Con mi excepcion.
Ruling:
This contention is without merit.
Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had long
become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate,
dated March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by
the Director of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision
rendered." The notation found at the foot of the last page of the
reconstituted decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc. excepted
from that decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an

appeal. An appeal was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con

mi exception." The judgment rendered in a land registration case
becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted
from the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the
decision.
The requirement contained in the decision of March 24, 1938
regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an
agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while
it does leave something yet to be done, does not detract from the
finality of the decision, because the segregation adverted to
refers to a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and
may be accomplished anytime after the decision became final
and executory.

NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the
Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of
Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land
applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated

as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were
completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying
upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of
Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral
proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein.
However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several
lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino
was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included
in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands
nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to
inform the court that it was under homestead application. On
August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of
registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino,
a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to
Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12,
1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots
awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044.
Floretino sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD:
The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered
therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world,
including the Government. As a general rule, registration of title
under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable,
after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from
the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the
court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken
to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have

execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the

certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court,
without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of
title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting
registration of subsequent disposition the land where court
proceedings would no longer be necessary.

NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)

FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the
Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of
Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land
applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated
as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were
completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying
upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of
Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral
proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein.
However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several
lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino
was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included
in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands
nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to
inform the court that it was under homestead application. On
August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of
registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino,
a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to
Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12,
1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots
awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044.
Floretino sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD:
The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered
therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world,
including the Government. As a general rule, registration of title

under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable,

after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from
the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the
court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken
to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have
execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the
certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court,
without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of
title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting
registration of subsequent disposition the land where court
proceedings would no longer be necessary.

TALAVERA VS MANGOBA
8 SCRA 837, 1963
FACTS:
On December 2, 1957, Talavera filed before the CFI of Nueva
Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba
and his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of
B-Meg Poultry Feeds, which latter received from former.
Defendants presented separate Answers, wherein they admitted
some and denied other allegations in the complaint. Both also
interposed separate counterclaims of P1,000.00 each. In the
hearing scheduled on March 10, 1958, neither Mangoba et,. al nor
their counsel appeared, so that the trial court received Talaveras
evidence in their absence. On March 18, 1958, a decision was
rendered in favour of Talavera.
Appellant claims that the above decision was received by
him on March 25, 1958 and the next day, wherein it was stated
that the failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or
excusable negligence, counsel having been ill of March influenza
which was evidenced by a medical certificate. Counsel for
appellant asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April
2, 1958, however, one day ahead of the date, the trial court
denied said motion. In the appeal brief, appellant contends that in
denying the motion for new trial, the court a quo deprive him of
his day in court.

RULING:
Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or not,
motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into the

reasons for the exercise of such discretion. In this particular case,

however, it was shown that the absence of counsel was explained
and immediately upon receipt of the decision, a motion for new
trial, accompanied by an affidavit of merit, and a medical
certificate, were presented. Said motion for new trial could well be
considered as motion to set aside judgment or one for relief, since
it contained allegations purporting to show the presence of good
defenses. The ends of justice could have been served more
appropriately had the lower court given appellant the chance to
present his evidence at least. Furthermore, it appears that
payments had been made by appellant to appellee, which were
duly received and receipt for. This particular circumstance merits
consideration. After all, court litigations are primarily for the
search of truth, and in this present case, to find out the correct
liability of defendant-appellant to appellee. A trial, by which both
parties are given the chance to adduce proofs, is the best way to
find out such truth. A denial of this chance, would be too
technical. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of
legitimate grievances, should not be barred by technicalities
(Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11621, May 21, 1962; Santiago, et al. v.
Joaquin, L-15237, May 31, 1963). Had not the trial court resolved
the motion for new trial, one day before the date set for its
hearing, the defendant-appellant could have presented the
documents (receipts of payments), itemized in his brief, to
counteract appellant's claim. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and another
entered, remanding the case to the court of origin, for the
reception of appellant's evidence and for the rendition of the
corresponding decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

ANTONIO VS RAMOS
2 SCRA 731, 1961
FACTS:
On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for
recovery of a parcel of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas
Francisco. Only Francisco was able to answer, thus, declaring
Nicolas and Leonora in default. On the date of trial, neither
Francisco not his counsel appeared despite early notice. Hence,
evidence was presented by the plaintiffs. On August 23, 1956 a
judgment has been redndered in favour of the Antonios.
Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on September of 1956,
praying that the decision dated August 23 of 1956 be set aside,
alleging that their failure to appear during the hearing of the case
was due to accident, mistake and excusable negligence which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against(Counsel lost
the envelope containing the notice to the trial before he has the

opportunity to open the same). This, however, was denied by the

court. Francisco appealed to the CA, denied. Appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an
excusable mistake and negligence, so as to entitle his client, the
appellant herein, to be heard.
RULING:
The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the notice of
hearing in his calendar is flimsy. It does not constitute the
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, contemplated by the
Rules of Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence on his part
could have guarded against or avoided such mistake or
negligence. Counsel did not exercise ordinary prudence because
he did not perform his routine job or duty of noting down the
notice of hearing in his calendar. On this point, the learned trial
judge commented:
Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition
thereto, the court believes the negligence of the counsel is not
excusable in view of his admission that he received the registry
notice from the court on May 24, 1956, and that it was duly
registered and that its envelope shows it came from the
court which made the envelope and its contents so important that
he should have immediately opened the same and not just put it
aside, that he misplaced the same is also indicative of his
recklessness (See Gonzales vs. Amon, L-8963, Feb. 29, 1956).
Furthermore counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco had all
the time from March 24, 1956, until the date of the trial on Aug.
20, 1956 to inquire from the Court records or Clerk of Court about
the nature of the registered notice that was sent to him on March
24, 1956, if he really misplaced the same. This is what a diligent
counsel should do as required by ordinary prudence. All he had to
do was examine the records of this case. This Court noted that
since it reconvened June 18, 1956, counsel for the defendant
Nicolas Francisco has been appearing in Court almost every week
if not everyday. He had therefore, ample opportunity to verify the
nature of the said registered notice of hearing which he allegedly
misplaced upon his receipt thereof on March 24, 1956. Little need

be added to these observations of the trial court, except to state

that lawyers should always be vigilant and alert, in order to
properly safeguard the rights and interests of their clients. Upon
the lawyers specially devolve the duty to evaluate the urgency
and importance of registered letters coming from the courts
where they daily ply their trade.

PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ

207 SCRA 632 (1992)
FACTS:
In the early dawn of March 19, 1990, Cesar Soliven was
standing at the corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St.
in Aguilar, Pangasinan waiting for a ride back to his residence in
Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night around the
poblacion during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. 3-4, tsn, May 9,

1991). While standing at the aforementioned place, a man

smelling of liquor, who was identified later on as Eduardo dela
Cruz (appellant herein), stood beside him. Subsequently, Merly
Caburnay, a neighbor of Soliven, passed by, proceeding towards
the direction of Barangay Pogomboa. Appellant, who appeared
drunk followed the girl but Soliven did not mind. Instead, he went
home.
Early the following morning, Soliven, while in his house,
heard the cry of Carmelita Caburnay, mother of his neighbor,
Merly. When he went out of the house, he learned that Merly was
raped and her dead body was found in a nearby ricefield (pp. 5-6,
tsn, id.). Prior to Soliven's knowledge of the happening, Mayor
Domingo Madrid of Aguilar was already informed of the discovery
of the dead body of the victim and was able to proceed
immediately to the crime site. There, the Mayor was informed that
a man walking suspiciously has [sic] just left the place. So, Mayor
Madrid lost no time, took a tricycle and overtook the man. The
man was identified as appellant and he was found with dirty
clothes, his maong pants torn and his T-shirt stained with blood.
He also bore scratches on his neck and arms. When asked to
explain his dirty appearance and the presence of dried straws of
palay at the back of his pants, appellant only answered that on
his was home, he felt sleepy and lied down for a while on the
field. Because of his unsatisfactory explanation, the police
arrested him on that same morning on suspicion that he was the
perpetrator of the crime. (pp. 4-8, tsn, March 14, 1991).
Four days later, Cesar Soliven was invited to the police
headquarters for the purpose of identifying the man he saw in the
early dawn of March 19, 1990 following the victim Merly
Caburnay. Standing in front of the prison cell, Soliven pointed to
appellant, who was among the four men inside the cell, as the
person he saw. The victim, Merly Caburnay, was at the time of the
crime only ten years old while the accused was forty-eight years
old. In his defense, the accused asserted that on 18 March 1990
he was invited by one Andoy Versoza, his landlord, to cook and
prepare food for the latter's visitors. At around 6:00 p.m. of the
said date, he, together with his two aunts, went around the plaza
and watched some shows until midnight. Thereafter, he drank a
bottle of gin and another bottle of beer until 1:00 a.m. of the

following day. They then strolled about the plaza for two hours.
Afterwards, they rested for awhile near the highway beside the
church and at about 5:00 a.m., they attended mass. When he was
advised by his aunts to go home, he decided to walk because he
had no more money. Along the way, he was arrested by the police
for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He vehemently denied
having committed the crime. He likewise claimed that there were
no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he was arrested.
Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness,
the trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for
conviction. Moreover, the defense has not shown any improper or
ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the
accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing
to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was
not so actuated and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and
credit. Nor is the non-presentation of the victim's companions of
any help to the cause of the accused. In the first place, it was
never established that the two companions were with the victim
when she was on her way home or when she was raped and
killed. It was duly established that, after obtaining permission
from her mother, she went "to the fiesta in Aguilar" with her
cousin and her mother's sister-in-law, and that immediately
before the incident the victim was walking alone but "was
following persons." Accordingly, her two companions, who were
not eyewitnesses, could not have testified on the rape and killing
of the victim. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to
determine who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of
its own assessment of their necessity. Every objection to the
admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence
is offered, or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall
become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered
waived. Moreover, the bloodstains on the pants of the accused
were testified to by Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta 28 and Mayor
Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of scratches on his neck
and arms was not satisfactorily explained by the accused. Taken
together with the other circumstances present here, this fact
serves to buttress the prosecution's case.

ISSUES:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time
and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must
also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time the same was committed. 31 In this case, the
place where the accused claims to be 32 is more or less ten
meters away from the scene of the crime )a ricefield in Barangay
Pogomboa). 33 Furthermore, the place where he was questioned
by Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police
authorities is twenty meters away from the place where the naked
body of the victim was found. 34 Hence, the physical impossibility
of the accused's presence at the crime scene, which is necessary
is order that the defense of alibi may be considered, is lacking.
The accused committed a heinous crime. He was not content with
unleashing his bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10year-old; he also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which
caused her untimely demise. Another life was lost because a
beast in man's clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what
he did in prison, a place which, unfortunately, is definitely much
better than what he truly deserves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged
decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo dela Cruz
y Laoang.

REPUBLIC V DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Private respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole
of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother. In 1952, she donated a
portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the
purpose of high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision.
However, in 1963, she discovered that more or less 4 ha. of the
parcel of land, was used by petitioner, as a cemetery from 1934.
On 1963, respondent wrote the Mayor of the municipality
regarding her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals and
requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by
petitioner. On 1964, respondent filed a complaint in the CFI for
recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the
municipal cemetery. However, the petitioner defended its alleged
ownership of the subject lot, having bought it from Simeona
Ditching in 1934. The lower court decided in favor of the
Municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are estopped from
questioning the possession and ownership of the petitioner which
dates back to more than 30 years.

RULING:
It is certain that petitioner failed to present before the Court
a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which
is included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma
Leuenberger. Thus, it has been held that where the land is
decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such

person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an implied

trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the property
comes. The beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust,
notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title and the
trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to execute the
deed of reconveyance.

GARCIA VS MENDOZA
203 SCRA 732 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her
husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in
San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently
sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps.
Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who
then took possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the
cadastral court issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in
favor of Dominador G. Mendoza, their son.
Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza
falsely claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the
property from Hermenegildo Mendoza; that Mendoza made it
appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo
Mendoza, who had been in possession of the lot since October 15,
1987, and subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza.
The petitioners filed with the court a petition for review of
judgment but denied, so they appealed. Mendoza countered that
a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496,
does
not
apply
to
a
cadastral
proceeding.
ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment

exists or is warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act).
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11, Act 2259
clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the Cadastral
Act, all the provision of the Land Registration Act are applicable to
cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and certificates of
title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.

RUBLICO VS ORELLANO
30 SCRA 511 (1969)
FACTS:
Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. IL-N2, L.R.C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with the
Court of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership and praying
that the said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. On 20
November 1964, the court a quo approved the report and
recommendation of the clerk of court and rendered judgment
adjudicating Lots 1664 and 1665 in favor of respondent-appellee
Orellana. Petitioners-appellants filed a petition to annul the
judgment and/or review the decree of registration, alleging
ownership of the lots adjudicated to the respondent; that
respondent, "by means of fraud, made the court to believe that
he is the owner" and that said judgment "was secured by means
of fraud". Orellana filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The
court, on 23 September 1965, sustained the motion, holding that
petitioners-appellants had no personality to file their petition
because they did not file an answer and were declared in default
and that they should have first secured the lifting of the order of

general default, with respect to themselves, before they filed their

petition for review.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a petitioner for review under Section 38 of
Act 496 need not be an original claimant in a cadastral
proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order of general
default with respect to himself
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that a petitioner for review under
Section 38 of Act 496, as amended, need not be an original
claimant in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting
of the order of general default with respect to himself. The aim of
the law in giving aggrieved parties, victimized by registration
proceedings of their estate in land by means of fraud, the
opportunity to review the decree would be defeated if such
parties would be limited to those who had filed their opposition to
the petition for registration or to first require them to procure the
lifting of the order of general default before they could file a
petition for review. The essential requisites or elements for the
allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (a) that the
petitioner has a real or dominical right; (b) that he has been
deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed
within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the
property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser. The provision does not require that the petitioner be an
original claimant who had filed an answer and because fraud
might intervene precisely to prevent a person from filing an
answer.

CRISOLO vs. CA
68 SCRA 435 (1975)
FACTS:
On August 20, 1965, judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance, Branch VII, of Pangasinan, ordering the registration
of Lots 1 and 2, situated in the Poblacion of Mabini, Pangasinan,
and more particularly bounded and described in the technical
descriptions (Exhibits B and B-1) in the name of applicant
spouses, Pedro C. Crisolo and Soledad de G. Crisolo. On
September 20, 1965, the court ordered the issuance of the
Decree, followed three months later by writ of possession in favor
of the spouses. Within a year from the issuance of this decree of
registration, respondent-ward, represented by his guardian, filed a
petition for review of the decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on
the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in petitioners

taking advantage of the insanity of respondent-ward to secure the

execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and between the
petitioner and said respondent-ward, and in petitioners instituting
the land registration proceedings while said ward was confined at
the National Psychopathic Hospital. The trial court dismissed the
petition and held that Section 38 of Act 496 was not applicable
because respondent had opportunity to oppose the registration
proceedings
but
abandoned
his
opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when
petitioner moved to have the appeal certified to the Supreme
Court because it involved purely questions of law, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion and instead sustained the allegation of
fraud. It rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court and
remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the reopening of the land registration proceedings.

RULING:
NO. Respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section 38
of Act 496 because respondent-ward was given opportunity to
oppose the registration but abandoned his opposition. Under
Section 38 of Act 496, the persons entitled to a review of the
decree of registration are those who were fraudulently deprived of
their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case and
not those who were not denied for their day in court by fraud,
which the law provides as the sole ground for reopening the
decree of registration. Thus, where an oppositor, through counsel,
announced his opposition to the registration of the land involved
but later abandoned the same, he cannot claim that he was
fraudulently deprived of his day in court to entitle him of the
remedy under Section 38 of Act 496; and a petition for review of a
decree of registration will be denied where the petitioner had

notice of the original proceeding but failed to substantiate his

claim.

CRUZ vs. NAVARRO

54 SCRA 109 (1973)

FACTS:
Sometime in 1966 the respondent Alfonso Sandoval filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II, Pasig) an

application for registration (under Act 496) of five (5) parcels of

land with an aggregate area of four and one-half hectares, more
or less, situated in the municipality of Antipolo, province of Rizal.
Under date of August 1, 1966, the respondent Judge Pedro C.
Navarro issued a notice of initial hearing. On December 1, 1966,
no oppositor having appeared, the court a quo, after a hearing ex
parte, declared the respondent spouses the owners of the five
parcels of land. On January 3, 1967 the court ordered the issuance
of the corresponding decree of registration.
On March 20, 1967 the petitioners filed a "Petition for Review
of Decree of Registration" in the court below alleging, among
others, that actually, petitioners ROSA CRUZ, CELEDONIA
CABRERA, and LEONCIA CABRERA are the absolute owners and
possessors of, and/or the person having an irrevocable vested
interest in, aforementioned Lots 1, 2 and 3 for the reason that lots
form a part of respective petitioner's Lot, Plan Psu-136628, which
was originally a public land but to which said petitioners had
perfected a homestead right long before respondents secured
aforementioned decrees and certificates of title, their homestead
applications thereof having been duly approved by the Bureau of
lands and they having fully complied with all requirements for the
acquisition of a homestead and possessed and cultivated the
same as their respective private property. On April 24, 1967,
acting on the petition, but without receiving any evidence in the
premises, the respondent Judge issued an order stating that "the
Court ... finds the petition for review to be without sufficient merit
and therefore DENIES the same." The petitioners then filed a
"Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration" of the mentioned
order, but this was denied on May 25, 1967.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners has legal personality,

homestead applicants, to file this petition for review.

as

RULING:
YES. In Mesina vs. Pineda vda. de Sonza, the Supreme Court,
citing Susi vs. Razon, held that once a homestead applicant has
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant,
he acquires "not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government.
In Nieto vs. Quines, the Court affirmed the doctrine in these
words:
Considering the requirement that the final proof must be
presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead
application (sec. 14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that
Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923
and that the Director of Lands approved the same not long
thereafter or before the land became the subject of cadastral
proceedings in 1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the
ministerial act of in suing the patent and the same was actually
issued only after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to
Maria Florentino. Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms
and conditions which would entitle him to a patent, Bartolome
Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has
unquestionably acquired a vested right in the land and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof.
It is the Courts view that the petitioners have amply alleged
below such real, legally protected interest over the parcels in
question sufficient to clothe them with the necessary personality
to question, independently of the Director of Lands, the validity of

the grant of title over the said properties to the private

respondents.

BONIEL VS REYES
35 SCRA 218 (1970)
FACTS:
Petitioners therein alleged to be the bona fide actual
occupants and cultivators of a 46.2877-hectare parcel of public
agricultural land designated as Lot No. SI-17618-D and located at
Bo. Langka, Lupon, Davao province, and that on October 12,
1965, one Ramon Ombay, late husband of co-petitioner Mauricia
Ombay had filed a free patent application for the land; that
sometime on September 11, 1964, one Rafael S. Yap had
clandestinely filed a sales application for the very same parcel of
land, which was favorably by the land inspector of the Bureau of
Lands who certified in the records the findings of his investigation
as to the absence of any claimants of the land; and that as a
result of such alleged fraud and collusion between Yap and the

bureau personnel, Yap was issued, the sales patent in December,

1965 and the corresponding original certificate of title No. P18131 on February 11, 1966. Petitioners prayed of respondent
court that it annul Yap's title and instead award the land to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court validly dismissed the
petition.
RULING:
A person claiming to have been deprived of the land or an
interest therein, in which case within one year from entry of the
decree he may in the same proceeding ask for review and the
issuance of the decree in his own name and implead the adverse
party. But here, the land is not claimed to be private property of
petitioner nor of his co-petitioners but was admittedly formerly a
part of the alienable and disposable public land awarded under
sales patent to Yap. Accordingly, since petitioner and his copetitioners make no claim of their application for a free patent to
the land having been approved nor a patent their favor having
been awarded, they had no valid cause of action to file an action
for annulment of Yap's patent and for cancellation of the title
issued to Yap by virtue thereof. Their claim based on alleged
fraudulent issuance of title to the public land in favor of Yap
should be addressed in proper administrative proceedings to the
Director of Lands, who if he finds the claim substantiated, may
then take the necessary steps towards the reversion of the land,
to the public domain, and petitioners may then press for favorable
action on their application and the award of the land to the
tenant. The mere reversion of the land to the State would not
entitle them of itself to an award of the land to them, which is
beyond respondent court's jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition
for certiorari is hereby denied.

BALDOZ VS PAPA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)
FACTS:
On January 7, 1957, the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina
Agaceta, parents of herein appellees, applied for the registration
under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area
of 37,671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Case No. 2215, L.R.C. Record No. 12389). After the requisite
publication of the application in the Official Gazette, the case was
called for hearing on May 16, 1957 in the course of which an
order of general default was entered. On the same date, however,
Baldomero Baldoz father of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift

the order of default as against him and praying that his opposition
to the application, thereto attached, be admitted. Prior to October
1, 1958. oppositor Baldoz died. On October 10, 1958, the latter's
counsel filed a motion to set aside the order of default alleging
that the reason for the nonappearance of oppositor Baldoz was
his death on July 28, 1957 and praying that his son, appellant
herein, be substituted as party-oppositor. Although this motion
was denied on October 31 of the following year, appellant
appears not to have appealed from the order of denial aforesaid.
On February 16, 1959, the court rendered judgment decreeing the
registration of the parcel of land described in Psu 59688 in favor
of appellees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court in said case committed a reversible
error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having
filed a written opposition which was duly admitted by it and that
its order denying appellant's motion for substitution as oppositor
therein has deprived him of his day in court.
RULING:
The court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
grounds (1) that the final judgment in Registration Case No. 2215
is res judicata in the present action and (2) that the instant action,
being in the nature of a petition for review of a decree, cannot
prosper because it was filed more than one year from the date of
the issuance of the decree and because it is not based on fraud as
provided for in Section 38 of Act 496. The present is an appeal
from said order.

WALSTROM V. MAPA JR.

181 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Cacao Dianson, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, filed
for Free-patent application for Lot 1 and Lot 2 of Psu-15365. Josefa
Mapa,
predecessor-in-interest
of
respondent,
filed
for

miscellaneous sales application. The lot was awarded to Josefa in

1934. In 1956, Cacao filed a letter protesting the construction of
Josefa of a camarin in Portion A of Lot 1 of Psu-153657. Mapa
countered claiming that such area was awarded to her in public
bidding. Bureau of Lands Investigator then investigated and found
that Cacao sold the land to a certain Agripino Farol. Agripino Farol
also transferred the rights and interests to herein petitioner
Walstrom. The regional land director rendered a decision in favor
of Mapa, excluding Portion A from Lot 1 of Psu-153657. The
Director of Lands reversed the decision. Mapa appealed with
DANR but the appeal was dismissed. Upon reconsideration,
however, the DANR Secretary reinstated the order of the regional
land director. Wastrom filed for reconsideration but was denied for
being filed out of time. Subsequent motions for reconsideration
were also denied and the writ of execution in favor of Mapa was
granted. Original Title issued in the name of Mapa pursuant to
miscellaneous sales patent was issued in 1971. In 1972, Wastrom
filed with CFI Baguio-Benguet for judicial relief as the prescriptive
period is about to lapse but such petition was denied on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the case may be reopened by the RTC?
RULING:
No. a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by
the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five
essential requisites, to wit:
(a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right;
(b) that he has been deprived thereof;
(c) through fraud;
(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of
the decree; and
(e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an
innocent purchaser for value
The first element is patently not present because the petitioner
can not allege that she has already a real and dominical right to
the piece of property in controversy. The second element is also

absent since corollary to the aforecited ruling of the DANR

Secretary, the petitioner can not aver that she was deprived of
property because she did not have a real right over portion "A".
The third element, the records are bereft of any indication that
there was fraud in the issuance of the certificates of title.

STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION V. RUIZ

30 SCRA 318 (1969)

FACTS:
Teodorico Cabascas, the late father of respondent Alejandro
Cabasbas, owns a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT no. 815.
Petitioners allege that the controversy arose from Civil Case No.
4870 filed by Alejandro to recover the lot of his father against Jose
A. de Kastro and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo Reyes
and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus. Pursuant to a
compromise agreement entered into by the parties, the spouses
Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were
declared to be the registered owners of the western portion of the
land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per
Original Certificate of Title No. 615, the land subject of the
petition.
Subsequent transfers were then made until the petitioners
acquired ownership of the land subject of the petition. In 1968,
Alejandro filed another complaint praying for the nullification of
the compromise agreement with the allegation that it was
obtained through fraud as it was made to appear before the court
of first instance that the conveyance of title was made on
February, 1946 when in fact it took place on September 14, 1944,
in violation of the Homestead Law. Alleging res judicata,
petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the case. However, Judge
Ruiz refused to dismiss the case asserting that the sale of a parcel
of land was made on September 14, 1944 in violation of the fiveyear period within which a transfer of a homestead patent is
prohibited.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an actual or extrinsic fraud rendering the
judgment null?
RULING:
No. Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be
extrinsic to the litigation. Was this not the rule there would be no
end to litigations, perjury being of such common occurrence in
trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could
attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary
falsehood to his adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that
judicial determination however erroneous of matters brought

within the court's jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another

proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his
opponent's perjured evidence. Not every kind of fraud, however,
is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. Only extrinsic or
collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for
annulling a judgment.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful
party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud
refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the
use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not
affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.

RAMIREZ VS CA
144 SCRA 292 (1986)
FACTS:
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses filed an
application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. An order
of general default was issued. Thereafter, the petitioners
presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question
by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the
American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost
and no copy or record of the same was available. On March 30,
1960, the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree
of registration on the ground of fraud. After trial, the court found
that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents
took possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita
Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to
secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00 by way of
antichresis. The trial court then ordered the reconveyance of the
property. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Was there an actual or extrinsic fraud?

RULING:

Yes. The averments in the petition for review of the decree of

registration constitute specific and not mere general allegations
of actual and extrinsic fraud. The petitioners in this case did not
merely omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the land.
They positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim
therein. This is clear misrepresentation. The omission and
concealment, knowingly and intentionally made, of an act or of a
fact which the law requires to be performed or recorded is fraud,
when such omission or concealment secures a benefit to the
prejudice of a third person.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON vs. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT

INC.
G.R. No. 170750. April 7, 2009
FACTS:
In October 1997, filed before the RTC separate Complaints
for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession
with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages
against respondents. Petitioners claimed in their Complaints that
they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of
the subject properties for more than 90 years until they were
forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991 and
that the subject properties from which they were forcibly evicted
were not covered by respondents certificates of title.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on

the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of

action; and (4) res judicata.
The RTC dismissed the complaints of petitioners. The trial
court determined that the subject properties were already
registered in the names of respondents, and that petitioners were
unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the
said properties. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners appeal
and affirmed the RTC Resolutions. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, the
petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the actions instituted by petitioners before the RTC
were for the reopening and review of the decree of registration
and reconveyance of the subject properties.
RULING:
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides that
a decree of registration may be reopened when a person is
deprived of land or an interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation obtained by actual fraud. On the other hand, an
action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as
incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons
names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to
have a better right. In both instances, the land of which a person
was deprived should be the same land which was fraudulently or
erroneously registered in another persons name, which is not the
case herein, if the Court considers the allegations in petitioners
Complaints.
While petitioners improperly prayed for the cancellation of
respondents TCTs in their Complaints, there is nothing else in the
said Complaints that would support the conclusion that they are
either petitions for reopening and review of the decree of
registration under Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree
or actions for reconveyance based on implied trust under Article
1456 of the Civil Code. Instead, petitioners Complaints may be
said to be in the nature of an accion reivindicatoria, an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of the subject properties,

from which they were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994
by respondents. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition
is GRANTED.

NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., vs. TANJUATCO

[G.R. No. 168800. April 16, 2009)
FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III,
its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the
acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of
accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name to
the Bureau of Lands. While the application for approval in the
Bureau of Lands is pending, Cuevas assigned his right to
Tanjuatco. Director of Lands released an Order, which approved

the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco on 1996,

wherefore TCTs were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of
Contract, Reconveyance and Damages. Tanjuatco argued that the
complaint stated no cause of action against him because it was
Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with
knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners
complaint for reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioners complaint for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful
and legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of
title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a
person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land
registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of
the land in the name of the defendant was procured through
fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed
to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed
after the certificate of title had already become final and
incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the
fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.
Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.

ALEGRIA VS DIRLONG, GR. NO. 161317, 16 JULY 2008

558 SCRA 459 (2008)
FACTS:
On 4 June 1992, Gabriel Drilon, husband of respondent
Eustaquia Drilon, applied for the issuance of titles by Free Patent
over the properties. On 8 October 1993, spouses Drilon sold the
properties to respondent spouses Alfredo and Fredeswenda Ybiosa
(spouses Ybiosa). Sometime in 1996, Eustaquia Drilon and
spouses Ybiosa demanded that petitioners vacate Lot Nos. 3658

and 3660. This prompted petitioners to file, on 23 January 1997,

an action for reconveyance and declaration of nullity of the sale of
Lot No. 3658 and Lot No. 3660.
Petitioners alleged that spouses Ybiosa were in bad faith
when they bought the properties as they were fully aware that
petitioners were actually and continuously occupying, cultivating
and claiming portions of the properties. The petition for
reconveyance was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners, although
occupants of the properties, have no legal personality to assail
the patents issued to Gabriel Drilon as well as the sale of
the properties to spouses Ybiosa.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners may question the validity of the
and ask for reconveyance of the properties.

sale

RULING:
In Caro v. Sucaldito, the Court held that an applicant for a
free patent cannot be considered a party-in-interest with
personality to file an action for reconveyance. Citing Spouses
Tankiko v. Cezar, the Court stated:
Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere
applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no
personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected
by the judgment in such suit.
Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to
the properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
ALEGRIA VS DIRLONG, GR. NO. 161317, 16 JULY 2008
558 SCRA 459 (2008)
FACTS:

On 4 June 1992, Gabriel Drilon, husband of respondent

Eustaquia Drilon, applied for the issuance of titles by Free Patent
over the properties. On 8 October 1993, spouses Drilon sold the
properties to respondent spouses Alfredo and Fredeswenda Ybiosa
(spouses Ybiosa). Sometime in 1996, Eustaquia Drilon and
spouses Ybiosa demanded that petitioners vacate Lot Nos. 3658
and 3660. This prompted petitioners to file, on 23 January 1997,
an action for reconveyance and declaration of nullity of the sale of
Lot No. 3658 and Lot No. 3660.
Petitioners alleged that spouses Ybiosa were in bad faith
when they bought the properties as they were fully aware that
petitioners were actually and continuously occupying, cultivating
and claiming portions of the properties. The petition for
reconveyance was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners, although
occupants of the properties, have no legal personality to assail
the patents issued to Gabriel Drilon as well as the sale of
the properties to spouses Ybiosa.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners may question the validity of the
and ask for reconveyance of the properties.

sale

RULING:
In Caro v. Sucaldito, the Court held that an applicant for a
free patent cannot be considered a party-in-interest with
personality to file an action for reconveyance. Citing Spouses
Tankiko v. Cezar, the Court stated:
Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere
applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no
personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected
by the judgment in such suit.
Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to
the properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.

Daclag v Macahilig
G.R. No. 159578 July 28, 2008
FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in
which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and
adjudication made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses
Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale, an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her
free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for
reconveyance. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the
respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.

In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of

ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title may be
introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel
One, covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half
portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she
sold the land to petitioners. An action for reconveyance prescribes
in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of
the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Records show that while the land was registered in the
name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for
reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus
still within the ten-year prescriptive period.

BAUTISTA-BORJA v BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 136197 December 10, 2008
FACTS:
By petitioners claim, respondents, through fraud and
deception, convinced her to take possession and cultivate parcels
of land which would eventually be partitioned; and that unknown
to her, however, the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue
of Deeds of Sale purportedly executed on different dates by her
parents in favor of her siblings Simplicio and Francisco, a fact
which she came to know about only in 1994. Petitioner thus filed
a complaint before the RTC for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale
and/or Partition of Properties. The trial court held that petitioners
cause of action had prescribed as actions for reconveyance based
on implied trust prescribe in 10 years, and that laches had set in.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether
reconveyance
RULING:

the

petitioner

can

still

file

an

action

for

Yes, the petitioner can. If the trial court finds that the deed of
sale is void, then the action for the declaration of the contracts
nullity is imprescriptible. Indeed, the Court has held in a number
of cases that an action for reconveyance of property based on a
void contract does not prescribe. However, if the trial court finds
that the deed of sale is merely voidable, then the action would
have already prescribed. At all events, since the complaint on its
face does not indicate that the action has prescribed, an
allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to
dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the
action has already prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of
prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a fullblown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere
motion to dismiss.

NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., vs. TANJUATCO

[G.R. No. 168800. April 16, 2009)
FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III,
its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the
acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of
accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name to
the Bureau of Lands. While the application for approval in the
Bureau of Lands is pending, Cuevas assigned his right to
Tanjuatco. Director of Lands released an Order, which approved
the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco on 1996,
wherefore TCTs were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of
Contract, Reconveyance and Damages. Tanjuatco argued that the
complaint stated no cause of action against him because it was
Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with
knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners
complaint for reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioners complaint for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful
and legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of
title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a
person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land
registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of
the land in the name of the defendant was procured through
fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed
to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed
after the certificate of title had already become final and
incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the
fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.
Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.