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B5-118

CIGRE 2012

Performance assessment of an IEC 61850-9-2 based protection scheme

for the mesh corner of a 400kV transmission substation
P. A. CROSSLEY*, L. YANG, H. Y. LI, U. ANOMBEM
A. WEN
The University of Manchester
National Grid Co.
U.K.
U. K.
R. CHATFIELD, J. WRIGHT
M. REDFERN, X. SUN
ALSTOM Grid
University of Bath
U.K.
U.K.

SUMMARY
The primary plant and instrument transformers used in transmission substations generally
remain in-service for many decades, typically 40 70 years, and are renewed only when
physically or mechanically life-expired. However, the secondary systems, which include
protection and control, are changed significantly more frequently. The current replacement
rate for protection and control on the UK transmission network is about 5% per annum, i.e. it
take approximately 20 years to complete the replacement cycle. However, the asset life of
numerical protection and control is often considered to be 15 years, although 10 years may be
more realistic due to declining technical knowledge and support, product obsolescence and
difficulties in obtaining spares.
One way to overcome the problem is to develop a new architecture for substation secondary
systems by deploying technologies such as standard interface modules, the bay process bus
and the IEC 61850 communication protocol. IEC 61850-9-2 Process Bus proposes a local
communication network that replaces traditional hard-wiring with serial communication of
analogue and binary signals using Ethernet messages. A Process Bus solution reduces the lifetime cost of the system, improves flexibility and functionality and allows substation
secondary equipment retrofitting to proceed without the long circuit outages normally
required. Once the new technology is installed, secondary equipment renewals, particularly
those occurring mid-life in the primary plant lifecycle, can be undertaken in a safer, quicker
and easier way with reduced or no outages of primary systems. This enables vendor
interoperability and provides easier modification and extension of the secondary schemes;
particularly those related to reconfiguration and feature enhancement by software means,
rather than the hardwiring changes required in the past.
As a precursor to the widespread deployment of IEC 61850 technology within the UK utility
AS3 (Architecture of Substation Secondary System) project, it must be ensured that the
reliability and performance of IEC 61850 based protection and control schemes meets or
peter.crossley@manchester.ac.uk

exceeds that of its hardwired SICAP (Substation Information, Control and Protection)
predecessors. The aims of the AS3 Architectures are to allow the replacement of faulty
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) without outages; enable the refurbishment of bay level
secondary systems with minimal disruption to the primary system; simplify the isolation
procedures between the primary and secondary systems; and reduce the risk of mal-operation.
This paper presents the research outcomes of two industry-university projects (Working
Stream 1 & 2) aligned to the AS3 projectWS 1: Evaluation of the IEC 61850 Process Bus Architecture and Reliability. This was
designed to study the AS3 generic architecture, the process bus reliability and the optimal
architecture when considering the life cycle costs and the design of a testing system;
WS 2: Protection Performance Study for Secondary Systems with IEC 61850 Process Bus
Architecture. The objective was to design and evaluate the performance of a prototype
protection scheme, implemented using the Process Bus architecture and applicable to the
corner of a mesh transmission substation. The scheme was evaluated in a laboratory, using a
series of test scenarios designed to verify the operating performance, and the results are
reported in this paper.
KEYWORDS
Substation Automation System (SAS) Protection - IEC 61850 - Process Bus Architecture Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) - Merging Unit (MU) Reliability Performance Testing
1. INTRODUCTION
The IEC 61850 standard on Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility
Automation ushers in a new era in substation design. It offers new possibilities for
maximising the economic and effective utilisation of the transmission assets and the network
topology. The 61850-9-2 sub-set of the IEC 61850 standard, referred to as Process-Bus,
allows the replacement of conventional analogue and binary signals with Ethernet messages
and enables the use of a digital communication link between Merging Units (MUs), which
provide the interface between the current & voltage transformers and the switchgear, and the
bay devices, such as the protection relays, bay controllers or meters [1].
Sufficient confidence must be demonstrated in the application of this new technology before
it can be widely applied on a transmission network. The projects aim to investigate, quantify
and optimise the level of security, dependability and operating speed of secondary schemes,
implemented using the IEC 61850 process bus architecture and operating within a UK
utilitys mesh topology substation. Prototype protection schemes were evaluated for practical
use, including actual interoperability between different manufacturers, degree of maturity,
robustness, and other operating advantages and disadvantages. The paper describes how a
comprehensive test and validation facility, based on multiple test-sets, can assess the
peter.crossley@manchester.ac.uk

operating performance of a system that integrates merging units, accurate time

synchronisation, process communication buses and IEDs.
The operating characteristics of conventional hardwired relays and IEC 61850-9-2LE relays
were verified individually and the complete system performance further evaluated under
various process bus architectures and test scenarios. MUs from different manufactures were
wired into the protection schemes to assess system compatibility and interoperability. The
worst case scenario of process bus traffic based on the current 100Mbps network was
simulated and the system response investigated. Recommendations for process bus
architectures and the corresponding communication requirements are presented and analysed,
one of the priorities is to avoid degradation of system performance. Evaluation of the
reliability and performance of a process bus based protection and control scheme, applied to
the mesh-corner of a transmission substation, is a significant step towards increasing the
acceptance of IEC 61850 and the implementation of copper-less secondary systems.
2. IEC 61850-9-2 PROCESS BUS BASED PROTECTION SCHEMES
In conventional hardwired substations, primary voltages and currents are measured and
scaled-down using voltage and current transformers. The analogue outputs of these
transformers are then connected to protective relays using copper hardwired cables. The
secondary voltages and currents are processed in a suite of relays using various protection
algorithms designed to detect and locate faults or abnormal conditions. Appropriate
commands (e.g., trip, block and reclose) are then issued and disseminated to the switchgear
via hardwired cables.
Recent development of non-conventional instrument transformers (NCIT), Merging Units
(MUs) and the widespread deployment of processor based relays permits truly effective
implementation of all-digital protection and control system. The concept of a digital
substation is based on the use of intelligent primary equipment and networked secondary
devices, which share digital information and realise distributed protection and control
functions via a common Ethernet network implemented according to IEC 61850. Figure 1
illustrates the conceptual architecture of a digital substation.
The process bus increases the possibilities for using radical and new substation designs and
the associated protection and control solutions. The utilisation of high-speed peer-to-peer
Ethernet communications of Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages
and multicast Sampled Analogue Values (SV) from Merging Units allows for future
introduction of distributed and wide area protection and control. Such applications deliver
significant advantages as compared to a conventional system, but do require an assessment of
how they impact on the operating performance of the overall protection and control scheme;
since a novel implementation must not degrade the system performance.

peter.crossley@manchester.ac.uk

Figure 1 Architecture of IEC 61850 Substation Automation System

The reliability and operating performance study into a complete protection system
implemented using IEC 61850-9-2 process bus architecture and applied to the mesh-corner of
a UK 400kV transmission substation, is presented in this paper, as shown in Figure 2. The
local substation (A) uses process bus architecture and the remote conventional double
busbar substation (B) uses traditional hardwired protection.

Figure 2 Schematic diagram of a mesh substation

Different configurations for the bay and inter-bay process bus architectures are discussed and
the results of laboratory trials presented with respect to reliability, security, dependability,
interoperability and operating speed. The performance is compared with that of a similar
protection system implemented using traditional hard-wiring.
3. PROCESS BUS ARCHITECTURE AND RELIABILITY
3.1 Architectures
Figure 3a shows a simplified version of the National Grid connectivity diagram for a mesh
corner transformer bay. This diagram shows the hard wired copper connections between the
Current Transformers (C10, C11, C13, C14, C15, C18 and C19), Voltage Transformers (V2
and V3) and the Transformer Protection. The Transformer protection is represented by the
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Intelligent Electronic Device(s) - IED(s) - which perform main and backup protection
functions for this bay.
A. Scenario 1
Figure 3b shows the bay after the implementation of the process bus. Each CT and VT is
connected to a merging unit (MU) and each circuit breaker is connected to a circuit breaker
controller (CBC). The MUs and CBCs are connected to an Ethernet switch (SW1). These new
connections are made using fibre optic cables (FIOC). This scenario is based on a star
topology.
a

X120
C1

C8

C9

X420
X428

X124

X126
C2
X113
C10
C11

X103

C5

C3
C4

C7

C6

V1

C12
T1

C13
C14
IED(S)

C15
V2
C16
C17

V3

X110
C18
C19

Figure 3. Transformer bay (a) before and (b) after the introduction of the process bus

For system success the MU would need to be able to receive current and voltage information
from the connected CT and VT and be able to send CT and VT sampled values to the
appropriate IED(s) via the SW. In addition, the CBC should be able to receive trip signals
from the appropriate IED(s).
Figure 4 shows Figure 3b redrawn with the focus on the CBCs, MUs and SW.

Figure 4. Process Bus Scenario 1

B. Scenario 2
In scenario 2, as shown in Figure 5, each device is duplicated; for example, Circuit Breaker
X110 is connected to both CBC1 and CBC2. If CBC1 fails, a trip signal from the bay level
IED(s) can still be sent via CBC2. Each duplicated device is boldly outlined.

Figure 5. Process Bus Scenario 2

C. Scenario 3
As in Scenario 2, each device is duplicated, but now each CBC and MU is connected to both
SWs. Hence, if one SW fails, the connected CBCs and MUs still can be accessed via the other
SW. Scenario 3 is shown in Figure 6.
SW1
CBC1
MU1
MU2
MU3

SW2
MU4
MU5
MU6
MU7

CBC2
MU8
MU9
MU10

MU11
MU12
MU13
MU14

Figure 6. Process Bus Scenario 3

3.2 Reliability and Life Cycle Cost Evaluation

A. Reliability Analysis
Device reliability is the probability that the device can perform its intended function for a
specified interval under stated conditions. Equation (1) was used for the evaluation of device
reliability [2].

t
Device Reliability r = exp
MTBF

(1)

where: t = period under consideration and MTBF= Mean Time Between Failures (years).
An MTBF of 100 years means that in a statistical population of 100 devices, on average one
device is expected to fail each year. It is assumed there is a constant failure rate and the period
under consideration is the first year, thus t = 1.
The process bus scenarios shown above are systems made up of a combination of devices and
in order to evaluate the system reliability, the event tree methodology was used [2].
B. Life Cycle Cost Analysis
The minimum life cycle cost can be used to determine an optimal solution. The life cycle cost
was estimated as follows:

LCC (t) = CIRM(t) + CF(t)

(2)

where: LCC: life cycle cost, CIRM: sum of investment cost, renewal cost and maintenance
cost and CF: failure cost including replacement cost and penalty cost
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within the CIRM, the investment cost (CI) is the cost of acquiring the devices, the renewal
cost (CR) is the cost of replacing the devices at their end of useful life, and the maintenance
cost (CM) is the cost of carrying out scheduled maintenance on each component/device.
3.3 Methodology Application
In this paper, the device reliability and availability figures were calculated based on the
MTBF data presented in [3], and engineering judgement (see Table 1 for the MTBF,
Investment Cost and device lifetime estimates).

Table 1: Device MTBF, Investment Cost and Lifetime Data

Device MTBF Investment Lifetime
(years)
Cost
(years)
SW
106
1000
15
MU
57
3500
15
CBC
57
3500
15
FIOC
30
200
25
Table 2 shows the (investment, failure and life cycle) costs for each process bus scenario for
the mesh corner transformer bay. Figure 7 shows the cost versus reliability curves for these
scenarios.

Table 2: Reliability and Cost data for transformer bay process bus scenarios
Scenarios Reliability Investment Renewal Failure Cost Life Cycle Cost
and Maintenance
(IRM) Cost
1
2
3

0.859113
0.980151
0.993327

106180
212360
220680

185055
44469
48652

291235
256829
269332

It can be seen from both Table 3 and Figure 7 that the minimum LCC occurs in Scenario 2.
Based on this, the proposed optimum architecture would be that of scenario 2.
IRM Cost

Failure Cost

Life Cycle Cost

350000
300000

Cost

250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
0.850

0.875

0.900

0.925

0.950

0.975

1.000

Reliability

Figure 7. Cost Versus Reliability

4. PROTECTION PERFORMANCE TESTING

The IEC 61850 based SAS is a viable solution for use in both new substations and in
older/refurbished substations where it is necessary to integrate the IEC 61850 based solution
into the legacy SAS. A typical application of process bus is a substation extension project,
where a new line, capacitor bank or transformer needs to be added to an existing substation.
Process bus based protection must integrate into a substation, where existing conventional
relays are already in service and must remain in service during the upgrading process. Some
of the advantages of a process bus based application are that they are able to:- achieve plug
and play installation/replacement; realise vendor interoperability between MUs and IEDs;
facilitate vendor inter-changeability to simplify Post Delivery Support Agreement (PDSA);
and apply fibre-optic connections to reduce the EMC requirements.
4.1 Experiment platform and procedure
This paper investigates the performance of the feeder protection schemes shown in Figure 8.
The Local Top (LT) and Remote Top (RT) relays of the panels are configured as Feeder
Main-1 current differential scheme while Local Bottom (LB) and Remote Bottom (RB) relays
are configured as Feeder Main-2 distance scheme. Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables
with RJ45 connectors have been used to connect the Local Panels IEC 61850 version
protective IEDs to the Ethernet communication network. Test set A provides analogue
signals to the remote hardwired relay and IEC 61850 SVs (direct injection or via Merging
Unit) signals to the local 61850 relay. Test set B is able to generate up to 3 synchronised SV
data streams. Ethernet switches from two suppliers are integrated into the system using Star
and Bridge architectures and are then used to test the Ethernet switch inter-changeability
and time offset and the delays associated with the MU. The packet delays of the SVs when
using the three architectures (point-to-point, star and ring topology) are simulated and
calculated in a dynamic communication network simulation tool. The operating performance
and characteristics of the four relays are first tested and compared. Next the distance and
differential scheme responses were evaluated according to four test scenarios and the detailed
results reported in [4] and [5].

Figure 8 Test setup for feeder local (IEC 61850) and remote (hardwired) panels

4.2 Dependability and stability test for current differential scheme

The term reliability when applied to a protection system can be considered in terms of
dependability and security. Dependability is defined as the probability that the protection
operates satisfactorily when required, i.e. it does not fail to trip. Security is defined as the
probability that the protection does not operate when not required to do so, i.e. it does not
produce unwanted trips.
For test scenario 1, the test set was configured to generate a pre-fault condition (nominal
current, relays expected to remain stable) followed by an external fault (three times nominal
current and the relays must not trip). The fault current was next switched off and finally the
scenario was switched to an internal fault (3 x nominal current) and the relays were now
expected to trip. Tests were repeated 100 times; the combined scheme remained stable during
external faults and healthy conditions; the average trip time when the scenario was switched
to an internal fault was 26.30ms. Figure 9 demonstrates an example for test scenario 1.

Figure 9 Example of scenario 1 test for current differential scheme.

For test scenario 2, the test set was configured to generate a pre-fault set of signals (nominal
current and the relays were expected to remain stable). The scenario was then switched to an
internal fault (3 x nominal current and the relays must trip) and after an appropriate delay the
currents were switched off. The test set then waited for the close command of the relays and
when received the scenario was switched to an external fault; note, the relays were expected
to remain stable and not trip. Tests were repeated 100 times and the combined scheme
remained stable during external faults and healthy conditions, the average trip time when
switched to internal fault was 27.60ms. Figure 10 demonstrates an example for test scenario
2.

Figure 10 Example of scenario 2 test for current differential scheme.

4.3 Overload test for IEC 61850 distance relay

The need to restrict multicast traffic to specific subscribers and avoid overloading the network
with an excessive numbers of data streams was investigated using multiple Merging Units and
test sets. Figure 11 shows the SVScout capture of the SVs data stream traffic on a process bus
with star topology when operating as a part of an IEC 61850 distance relay.

Figure 11 Overload test for IEC 61850 Distance relay (8 SV streams)

Multiple tests were performed to verify the operating performance for three fault types, i.e. L-E (300
repeated shots), L-L (300 repeated shots), L-L-L (100 repeated shots), covering Zone 1 (tnom=0), Zone
2 (tnom=200ms), Zone 3 (tnom=600ms). The average trip times and standard deviations are shown in
Table . The typical size of a SV data stream is about 5~6Mbps. The results prove that the distance
relays operating speed performance is not degraded for L-E and L-L faults, but is slightly delayed and
has higher standard deviations for three phase faults, when eight SV data streams are running along

the current 100Mbps. Theoretically 20 SV data streams occupy the full network capacity, but
normal expectations are around 12~14 streams when using a star architecture.
Table Overload test result for IEC 61850 distance relay (8 SV streams)

Fault
Type

Zone 1 Trip time (ms)

4 tnom =0
Standard
Average
Deviation

Zone 2 Trip time (ms)

12 tnom =200ms
Standard
Average
Deviation

Zone 3 Trip time (ms)

20 tnom =600ms
Standard
Average
Deviation

L-E
(300 shots)

19.697

0.8256

218.439

0.9965

618.256

0.9464

L-L
(300 shots)

19.834

0.9140

218.591

1.2411

618.368

1.0132

L-L-L
(100 shots)

23.644

4.7230

229.607

6.6208

628.692

7.2794

5. CONCLUSION
A number of process bus architecture scenarios have been introduced for a UK utilitys mesh corner
transformer bay. The methodology for evaluating the reliability has been discussed, and this
methodology has been applied to the aforementioned architecture scenarios.
The paper described how a prototype feeder protection scheme was designed and the operating
performance evaluated when the process bus at the local terminal was heavily loaded with multicast
traffic. The relay at the remote terminal was a part of a traditional hardwired protection scheme and
was used as the reference with which to compare the local IEC 61850-9-2 distance relay. A

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comprehensive series of tests were used to evaluate the operating performance and characteristics of
the hardwired, IEC 61850-9-2 relays and the combined current differential and distance schemes in
terms of security, dependability and operating speed. Results indicate that given an appropriate
network configuration, the performance of a process bus based protection scheme is comparable with
a conventional hardwired scheme.
The optimal application of a process bus based protection scheme can be achieved by close
collaboration between protection specialists in academia and industry. These results provide a
reference to help increase the acceptance of process bus application to provide reliable and cost
effective protection applications.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1]
[2]

[3]
[4]
[5]

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD IEC 61850-9-2, Communication networks and

systems in substations Part 9-2: Specific Communication System Mapping (SCSM)
Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3, First edition 2003-05.
U. B. Anombem, H. Li, P. Crossley, R. Zhang and C. McTaggart, Process bus
architectures for substation automation with life cycle cost consideration, in Conf. Rec.
Managing the Change, 10th IET Int. Conf. on Developments in Power System Protection
(DPSP), 2010, pp. 1 - 5.
G. W. Scheer and R. E. Moxley, Digital Communications Improve Contact I/O
Reliability, presented at the Power Systems Conf. Advanced Metering, Protection,
Control, Communication, and Distributed Resources, March 2006.
Li Yang, Peter Crossley. Performance testing for a multivendor IEC 61850-9-2 process
bus based protection scheme. (International Protection Testing Symposium. Brand,
Austria, October 4-5, 2011).
Li Yang, Peter Crossley, Wen An, Ray Chatfield John Wright. Performance
assessment of a IEC 61850-9-2 based protection scheme for a transmission substation.
(The second European conference and exhibition on Innovative Smart Grid
Technologies (ISGT-EUROPE 2011), December 5-7, 2011).

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