The Dual Nature of European Identity

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The dual nature of European

identity: subjective awareness
and coherence
James A. Caporaso & Min-hyung Kim
Published online: 04 Dec 2008.
To cite this article: James A. Caporaso & Min-hyung Kim (2009) The dual nature of
European identity: subjective awareness and coherence, Journal of European Public
Policy, 16:1, 19-42, DOI: 10.1080/13501760802453155
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Journal of European Public Policy 16:1 January 2009: 19 42
The dual nature of European identity:

subjective awareness and coherence
James A. Caporaso and Min-hyung Kim
ABSTRACT We conceptualize European identity as a dual concept (subjective

awareness and coherence) that contains both perceptual and behavioral components.
We provide a set of indicators for European identity and analyze the data to assess
changes in European identity over the last 50 years. Our goal is to offer a conceptual
framework and method of assessing identity in an empirically sensitive way. Our
findings show that EU citizens have multiple identities of which EU identity
is part and that there is strong evidence for the development of a coherent EU.
We suggest that future research pay attention to a broader range of indicators
than examined here.
KEY WORDS Coherence; European identity; European integration; European
Union; subjective awareness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of identity has played an increasingly central role in the study of
European integration, especially in the last 15 years or so (Weiler 1997;
Herrmann et al. 2004; Bruter 2005; Green 2007). There have been numerous
efforts to define European identity (Habermas 1992; Cerutti 1992; Wintle
1996; Risse 2004; Bruter 2005), resulting in distinctions between personal
and social identity (Breakwell 2004: 28 31), civic and cultural identity
(Bruter 2005), and patriotism versus nationalism (Li and Brewer 2004: 728).
It is not surprising, nor is it necessarily a bad thing, that the concept of European
identity has meant different things to different people.
The distinction between civic and cultural identity is an important one.
Bruter (2005) distinguishes a civic component of European identity (referring
to the European Union (EU)) from a cultural one (referring to Europe as a
whole) and argues that when European citizens explain they feel European,
they have more a civic conception in mind. On the other hand, Wintle et al.
(1996) conceptualize European identity in more general cultural terms as
based on a shared historical heritage among Europeans. We accept this distinction and attempt to build on the concept of civic identity in this paper.
Also, as befits a concept newly applied to the field of integration, there is disagreement about the usefulness of the concept. Some analysts think that it will
play an increasingly important role in the process of integration (Follesdal and
Journal of European Public Policy
ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2009 Taylor & Francis
http://www.informaworld.com/journals
DOI: 10.1080/13501760802453155
20
Hix 2006; Schmidt 2006). It is plausible that, as the easy phase of market-making
and collective gains is exhausted, and as questions of redistribution become
prominent, citizens of the EU will be called upon to make sacrifices for the
common good. The move to redistributive politics, should it occur, would
require widespread trust and recognition of commonalities, if not affection,
across 27 states and diverse peoples. Other analysts are more skeptical about
identity and perhaps some even see identity talk as the misguided efforts of
academics and Euro-enthusiasts to conjure this concept up before it becomes
a reality (Majone 2006; Duchesne and Frognier 1995).
In this paper, our goal is a modest yet important one. First, we attempt to
conceptualize identity as a dual concept, distinguishing this term from its
close relatives such as interests and preferences. Second, we offer a set of indicators of identity that contains both perceptual and behavioral components
a subjective and objective side to the integration process. We refer to the
former as subjective awareness and the latter as coherence. Third, we provide
evidence for these indicators to assess whether there is change in the development of Europes subjective identity and coherence. Fourth, we assess the evidence for subjective identity and coherence and speculate about what it
means for European integration today and in the near future.
II. BACKGROUND
Before our comments on identity, a few words on the increasing prevalence of
usage of this concept may be helpful. First, as the borders of the EU have
expanded (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, and 2007) the question of what
is Europe? has acquired a sharper edge. Far from being a unified or homogenous entity, Europe is a large, diverse, and complex place. The European
Commissions map of Europe shows at least 35 European countries, 27 of
which are presently in the EU. The EU grouping does not include Turkey,
Belarus, Bosnia, Ukraine, Moldova, Croatia, Albania, Serbia, or the micro
states of Andorra, San Marino, and the Vatican City. A comprehensive list of
European states would exceed 40. As the EU has expanded, it has taken in
much of what used to be called Central Europe before the Cold War, Eastern
Europe, parts of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia), three Republics of the
former Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and several Balkan
countries (Greece and Bulgaria). In doing so, it has moved its external
borders right up to Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Turkey. The EU has
become a sprawling entity with little resemblance to its original Carolingian
core (Ash 1994) comfortably situated in a small corner of north-west Europe.
The EU has a presence in places where Catholic and Orthodox Christianity
meet, and where Western Christianity and Islam adjoin one another. Multiple
languages are spoken in the member countries and different traditions are
observed. As the EU expands, its members are bound to ask, Who are we?
and where does Europe begin and end?
J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity
21
Second, identity discussion is more prevalent because people (the people of

the EU) have a greater stake in what the EU does. The passage of the Single
European Act (SEA) and the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
striking down obstacles to free movement have led to the creation of a
unified market. As the free movement provisions of the treaties are realized,
individuals are increasingly affected by market and policy externalities, i.e.
they increasingly have a stake in the EU.
III. CONCEPTUALIZATION: SUBJECTIVE IDENTITY
AND COHERENCE
Our basic argument is that the term identity is most usefully seen as containing
two separate but closely related components, which we call subjective identity
and coherence. At the moment we simply stipulate this twofold definition of
identity, recognizing that it departs from the standard approach. By subjective
identity we refer to shared feelings about the we-group, shared values, and
common mental frames. The subjective aspect of identity is often all that is
meant by the term. The second aspect of identity is coherence. Coherence
has to do with how the parts of the group fit together in some orderly ensemble,
how the group works together to solve problems and how interdependent its
parts are (Li and Brewer 2004). We address each component in turn.
Identity as subjective awareness
If the most basic question people can ask is Who am I?, social identity theory
(see Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1986) provides an answer in terms of the
social groupings to which individuals are attached and to which they feel
some sense of belonging. Identity involves a conception of self rooted in attachments and feelings of belonging to a group. Social identities have two faces; one
turning inward to the individual person, the other outward toward the group
with which one identifies (Mayer and Palmowski 2004: 577). In terms of
basic orientations, identities can have cognitive, affective, and evaluative components (Risse 2001). Following Risse (2001: 201), individuals may hold
many different identities which may or may not conflict. Thus, it may be
helpful to see identities as parts of a repertoire that can be selectively activated
under different circumstances.
Identities are different from related concepts in a number of ways. First, identities rest on a more stable core than preferences, which can change rapidly
depending on varying situational factors. As Brubaker and Cooper put it, identity is often invoked to point to something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or
foundational (italics in original) in contrast to the more superficial, accidental,
fleeting, or contingent aspects or attributes of the self (2000: 7). This statement
does not at all deny the mutable character of identities (see the extended discussion by Risse (2001: 2012). Second, following Brubaker and Cooper, identities are invoked to describe and explain the more non-instrumental modes of
22
human interaction, as opposed to changing calculation of costs and benefits

(2000: 6). Bruter makes the non-instrumental nature of identities the methodological cornerstone of his attempt to construct an indirect (residual) measure of
identity (see 2005: appendix 3, pages 195 210).
Identity as coherence
We argue that we can usefully employ a second component of identity that is
less subjective and more behavioral or process-oriented. We call this second
component coherence. Taking the individuals, roles, institutions, and processes
of the member states of the EU as the starting point, we can ask to what extent
they fit together in a coherent syndrome. To use the language of Karl Deutsch
et al. (1966) in their study of national and international community formation,
we can ask to what degree the separate parts have amalgamated, merged, and
formed a distinct new entity at the supranational level. To the extent that amalgamation takes place, a new entity comes into existence with a problematic identity of its own.1 From this perspective, the question of identity is not exclusively
subjective nor is the existence of the group taken as given.
We are aware that this conceptual move in the direction of a bifocal view of
identity is likely to be controversial. Since we are interested in accumulation of
research findings, we would be hesitant to strike out in new directions if we did
not believe that doing so may be productive. Still, the departure requires a
rationale.
Our response comes in two parts. The first has to do with the framing of identity and how we think about it. The second has to do with the conceptual and
theoretical affinity of the two facets of identity. We argue, regarding the framing
issue, that our move is not as radical as some might think, in that identity
requires some external aspect. While it may be customary to think of identity
as a purely internal concept, a good part of what we know about it comes
from observations of peoples behavior in their relation to groups. Assertions
about ties to a group, testimonials about the positive value of ones group,
and demonstrations of loyalty inscribed in efforts on behalf of the collectivity
sometimes quite costly efforts all allow us to make inferences about group
attachments that are not directly observable. As formulated by social psychologists such as Roger Brown (1965: 421) and Donald Campbell (1988), attitudes
and identities are inferences based on dispositions to act in certain ways.
We trust we can say this without denying an individuals internal identity
experience.
Second, we argue that there is a solid basis for the position that group coherence and subjective identity are so closely related that it is best to either see them
as tightly connected or as part of the same phenomenon. It is theoretically possible to detach these two properties from one another, as in the identities of
people in diasporas, but in almost any other conceivable situation, group function and group perception are best seen together. Li and Brewer argue that there
are two different bases for group formation, one having to do with perception of
23
shared attributes and the other with regard to perception of common problems,
joint or coordinated problem-solving, and the interdependence of parts (Li and
Brewer 2004: 729). We hypothesize that the second form of group formation is
more relevant for our purposes, because the diversity of the member states
makes shared attributes a less likely candidate for group formation, and
because the activities and civic practices of the EUs institutions highlight the
connection between group function and group identity.
IV. INDICATORS OF SUBJECTIVE IDENTITY
AND COHERENCE
In this section we offer some indicators of our two components of identity. Indicators serve as a bridge between conceptual definitions and empirical observations. We sense that there is a great deal of distance between concept and
observation so we attempt to close the gap.
Identity as subjective awareness
The first component of identity is a subjective awareness of individuals that they
are members of a group. There are three indicators that, we hypothesize, tap into
subjective awareness. We call them self-reference, presumption of relevant unit,
and common attitudes and values.
Before getting to each of these indicators, we would like to add a few words on
the data we use. To measure subjective awareness of European identity, we use
Eurobarometer survey data. Several scholars, most notably Michael Bruter
(2003: 1154; 2005: 101 2), have identified problems with some of the questions in the Eurobarometer survey. One problem lies in the forced choice
nature of some of the questions and response categories whereby individuals
are forced to choose among several identities. This imposes a zero-sum structure
on the overall pattern of identities whereby one is less European to the extent
that one is more British or French. A second problem arises because of the
time frame imposed by questions such as In the near future, will you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and then European? Questions like this
assume that individuals can correctly predict their future attitudinal states, thus
confusing predictive and attitudinal issues.
We do share these concerns about Eurobarometer data. Nevertheless, we
chose to use them to measure the subjective component of European identity
for the following reasons: first, despite some weaknesses, they are the best database we have at the moment, in terms of comprehensiveness, accessibility, and
comparability; second, the repetition of some questions at least twice a year
enables the analysis of trends that is critical for time-series analysis (Cautres
2007: 130); third, it is worth noting that a number of scholars (to name only
several, Carey 2002; Citrin and Sides 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Green
2007) still rely on Eurobarometer surveys to measure European identity. This
enables us to carry out a conversation with other researchers.
24
Self-reference, the we-group

For a group identity to exist, it must think of itself as a group. The process of
collective self-reflection and collective self-reference is crucial. If there is no collective self-reflection, then there is no group identity.
This fits in with our understanding of the evolution of European identity as
part of the process of community building. Deutsch emphasized that a crucial
part of the protracted process of integration had to do with the development of a
we-feeling.
While conceptions of group identification are notoriously difficult to assess,
since 1992 the Eurobarometer has included a question intended to measure
European identity: In the near future, will you see yourself as [nationality]
only, [nationality] and then European, European and then [nationality], or
European only? Table 1 shows the change of Europeans identification with
their own countries and Europe as a whole between 1992 and 2005.
Some findings are worth noting. To begin with, if we look at the bottom two
rows, we see that the percentage of respondents who identify themselves as
European first is very low. We can easily see this if we compare the bottom
two rows with the top two rows. Next, while there was no overall change in
European identification between 1992 and 2005, the number of respondents
who put their nationality first and European next exceeded the number of
respondents who say that they think of themselves only in terms of their nationality, except for the period between 1996 and 1999 (in 1998 and in 2001, the
percentage of respondents for these two groups was the same).
A couple of inferences can be drawn from this observation. First, despite the
absence of strong evidence for European identity at the non-elite level, the data
show that a majority of respondents do have either a primary or secondary
identification with Europe. This was the case even when the overall support
for European integration substantially declined in the 1990s (Citrin and
Sides 2004: 167). Second, European and national identity go hand in hand
most Europeans think country first, but Europe, too. Since maintaining a
European identity does not hurt peoples feeling about their own countries, it
seems that European identity is compatible (as opposed to competitive) with
national identity.
Presumption of the relevant unit
Closely related to self-reference is the question of what unit one thinks of when a
problem presents itself. In any multi-level system, a given problem could end up
at different levels of government. What we are trying to get at in our word
presumption is the more or less automatic, presumptive tendency to turn to
the EU to solve a broad range of problems previously within the purview of
the member states.
To assess Europeans preference for joint problem-solving, the Eurobarometer asked EU citizens the following question: For each of the following
areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the [nationality] government or made jointly within the European Union? Since the number as well as
Table 1
Europeans identification with their own countries and Europe as a whole in percentages
1992 1993 1994 1995
[Nationality] only
[Nationality] and European
European and [nationality]
European only
38
48
6
4
40
45
7
4
33
46
10
7
40
46
6
5
1996 1997 1998 1999

46
40
6
5
45
40
6
5
43
43
7
4
45
42
6
4
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, and 64.
Note: Percentage for dont know is not shown.
2000 2001 2002

38
49
6
3
44
44
6
3
38
49
7
3
2003 2004 2005

40
47
7
3
41
47
7
3
41
48
7
3
26
the content of key policy areas included in the survey varies over time, we categorize them into two groups the EU policy domain and the national policy
domain. The EU policy domain refers to the policy areas that the plurality of
citizens prefer to be decided at the Union level whereas the national policy
domain points to the policy areas in which the public is least likely to
support EU decision-making.
Table 2 presents Europeans support for the level (joint or national) of
decision-making in the EU policy domain whereas Table 3 illustrates
Europeans support for the level of decision-making in the national policy
domain since 1992.
A few points need to be made. First, support for joint decision-making has
generally decreased in most policy areas of the EU domain (currency is an
exception here). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the number of policies
in the EU domain (i.e. a Union responsibility) has always exceeded that in the
national domain (i.e. a national responsibility) from 1992 to 2006. Second, a
majority of Europeans favor joint decision-making in the policy areas that
were traditionally regarded as the core of national sovereignty. These areas
include foreign policy,2 currency, immigration, defense, and political asylum.
Third, while EU citizens favor the European level decision-making in many
policy areas, they still want national governments to decide in the areas where
consideration of local contexts is necessary (e.g. education, health and social
welfare, cultural policy, broadcasting rules of the media, justice, and police).
Indeed, the data show that support for national decision-making in these
areas increased if we compare the starting and end year.
In sum, this tension between desired institutional level of decision-making/
problem-solving and the level at which loyalties and identifications are primarily
lodged may be important for understanding the EU in the years ahead.
Common attitudes and value
As much of the literature on social identity theory illustrates, the process of
forming a group identity is a process that involves not only an in-group but
an out-group. While there is controversy about the extent to which an ingroup needs to have an out-group which it can disparage, there is general agreement that the existence of an Other reinforces group solidarity. There are a
number of candidate out-groups that could be used for comparison. When
comparing themselves against large swathes of the rest of the globe, Western
Europeans are likely to frame the comparison in terms of civilizations, to see
themselves as representing Christendom and to set themselves apart from
Orthodox Christianity, Hindu civilization, and Islam. If civilization is not the
point of reference but rather economic and social differences with political
rivals, then the United States may be used as the other (Ash 2004; Reid 2004).
Despite the underlying commonalities between Europe and the US, there is a
growing sense that Europe considers the US to be different on economic, ideological, and political grounds. For instance, while the US is sometimes held up
as a model of jungle capitalism where there are few protections for workers
Table 2
Support for community or national decision-making in the EU policy domain
% Community
(national)
Science and
technology
Protecting
environment
Foreign policy
Defense
Currency
Immigration
Unemployment
Political asylum
Regional support
1992 1993 1994 1995
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
77
(17)
72
(24)
70
(21)
58
(40)
56
(38)
58
(38)
49
(47)
58
(36)
71
(22)
69
(26)
67
(23)
45
(49)
54
(39)
59
(34)
59
(37)
56
(35)
62
(30)
71
(22)
66
(30)
67
(24)
44
(51)
49
(44)
54
(40)
46
(50)
54
(38)
71
(22)
64
(31)
68
(22)
50
(45)
51
(41)
54
(40)
52
(44)
55
(38)
76
(18)
69
(27)
70
(20)
55
(40)
58
(36)
58
(36)
62
(34)
59
(33)
67
(26)
67
(26)
64
(32)
68
(22)
50
(44)
54
(39)
54
(40)
55
(41)
53
(58)
61
(31)
70
(24)
66
(31)
71
(21)
50
(44)
67
(28)
58
(37)
57
(40)
55
(37)
64
(29)
66
(29)
59
(37)
69
(22)
48
(46)
60
(35)
49
(46)
52
(44)
51
(43)
60
(33)
67
(28)
60
(37)
69
(23)
47
(48)
57
(39)
46
(49)
51
(45)
48
(46)
60
(34)
68
(27)
64
(33)
71
(22)
51
(45)
65
(31)
49
(48)
53
(44)
51
(45)
63
(32)
68
(27)
61
(35)
71
(20)
51
(45)
67
(29)
48
(47)
50
(46)
50
(44)
59
(34)
66
(28)
62
(34)
72
(20)
50
(45)
63
(32)
51
(45)
44
(53)
53
(41)
58
(36)
67
(28)
67
(29)
68
(25)
57
(38)
63
(32)
58
(37)
47
(50)
58
(37)
60
(35)
69
70
66
64
57
57
39
38
57
57
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, and 66.
Note: Several areas in the EU policy domain were omitted here owing to space concerns as well as lack of over-time data. These include
information on the EU, the fight against drugs, Third World cooperation, the fight against international terrorism, and agriculture and
fishing.
Table 3
Support for community or national decision-making in the national policy domain
% Community
(national)
1992 1993 1994 1995
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Justice
Police
Health and social
welfare
Education
Rules for media
Cultural policy
40
(56)
40
(55)
46
(46)
51
(42)
31
(65)
32
(64)
40
(51)
38
(55)
31
(64)
30
(65)
40
(51)
36
(58)
41
(54)
40
(56)
45
(46)
42
(50)
39
(56)
37
(58)
37
(54)
34
(57)
33
(62)
33
(62)
42
(50)
35
(57)
35
(61)
35
(60)
38
(55)
37
(56)
38
(58)
33
(63)
34
(62)
34
(62)
34
(58)
39
(53)
34
(62)
30
(67)
32
(64)
32
(64)
34
(60)
36
(57)
38
(58)
34
(63)
37
(59)
36
(61)
38
(56)
44
(49)
35
(61)
30
(66)
36
(60)
34
(61)
36
(58)
44
(48)
32
(65)
27
(70)
29
(67)
32
(64)
34
(60)
42
(51)
36
(60)
30
(66)
33
(63)
33
(62)
34
(59)
34
(60)
29
29
29
29
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, and 66.
Note: Some areas in the national policy domain omitted here are workers representation, taxation, pensions, urban crime prevention,
juvenile crime prevention, etc.
29
built into the labor market, Europe presents its social model as relentlessly
egalitarian and a unifying force among Europeans. Also, ideological opposition
across the Atlantic has occurred with regard to the International Criminal
Court, capital punishment, the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the
Kyoto Protocol on global warming, and, most recently, the Iraq War. In
addition, the presumed efforts of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and the realization of such nuclear ambitions by North Korea evoke different responses from
Europe and the US.
To assess Europeans perception about the international role of the US and
the EU, the Eurobarometer asked the following question: In your opinion,
would you say that the United States (or the European Union3) tends to play
a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor a negative role
regarding. . .? Table 4 presents the trends of Europeans perception of the
role of the US and the EU in five issue areas between 2002 and 2006.
First, in all the five issue areas, EU citizens think that the role played by the EU
is much more positive than that of the US. Second, the proportion of EU citizens
who feel that the US plays a positive role substantially decreased in the areas of
the fight against terrorism (from 54 percent in 2002 to 37 percent in 2006) and
peace in the world (from 32 percent in 2002 to 23 percent in 2006). While there
was no big change in the other three areas (the protection of the environment,
the growth of the world economy, and the fight against poverty in the world)
between 2003 and 2006, EU citizens perception of the positive role of the US
in these areas was very negative (e.g. 18 percent, 38 percent and 21 percent,
respectively in 2006). Third, EU citizens positive perception of the international role played by the EU had increased to a large extent since 2003,
except for the area of peace in the world (which was high to start with).
In sum, the trend data presented here for subjective awareness are partly contradictory. The data do not provide strong evidence for the existence of
Table 4 EU citizens perception of the positive role of the US and the EU in the world
The US (the EU)
in %
Fall
2002
Spring
2003
Fall
2003
Fall
2004
Spring
2005
Fall
2005
Fall
2006
Peace in the world
32
23
The protection of the

environment
The fight against
terrorism
The growth of the
world economy
The fight against
poverty in the world
16
14
54
45
38
34
20
18
27
(60)
14
(46)
43
(54)
34
(40)
17
(36)
22
(61)
17
(58)
39
(59)
35
(49)
18
(45)
25
(63)
18
(62)
43
(60)
38
(50)
20
(49)
24
(63)
17
(61)
38
(61)
37
(49)
20
(49)
23
(60)
18
(60)
37
(59)
38
(53)
21
(49)
Source: Eurobarometers 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, and 66.
30
European identity at the mass public level.4 Despite the fact that the majority of
EU citizens identified themselves not just in terms of their nationality but as
Europeans, the proportion with primarily national identity generally increased
while that of European identity did not really change between 1992 and 2005.
However, this does not necessarily imply that the deepening process of
European integration since the early 1990s has had a negative impact on
Europeans sense of belonging. Above all, Europeans taken-for-granted presumptions of the EU as the relevant unit for problem-solving as well as their
increasingly positive perception about the role of the EU (in contrast with
their increasingly negative perception about the role of the United States)
regarding critical global issues indicate that the EU is developing its own
sense of self. In addition, the fact that EU citizens attachment to Europe has
substantially increased5 since the mid-1990s, despite a remarkable decline of
public support for European integration in the same period, may illustrate
that the EU is gradually becoming a part of Europeans multiple identities.
The discussion so far has to do with one (perceptual) component of our conceptualization of European identity, i.e. subjective awareness assessed by shared
feelings of European and common attitudes/values. Now, we turn to the other
(behavioral) component of European identity, which is coherence.
Identity as coherence
As mentioned, Karl Deutsch and his collaborators talked about the formation of
political communities as a process of amalgamation and blending of the parts
(1966: 26 38). The actual process of amalgamation, i.e. the adoption of distinctive and autonomous institutions, is facilitated by a number of factors,
including a compatibility of main values, the weakening of discordant competing values, and the development of a distinctive conception of ones political
unit as separate from related political entities of which the new units may have
been a part. We read Deutsch and his collaborators as saying that the values
and subjective identity dimensions are closely related to the formation of autonomous political entities. The formation of these autonomous entities seems
similar to our basic notion of coherence. But how can coherence be observed
and measured? Donald Campbell (1958) held out a research method for assessing the degree of coherence, or what he called entitativity, in complex social
aggregates. While we usually take the entities on which we base our analysis as
given,6 Campbell argued that the degree to which something (an aggregate) constitutes an entity should be treated as a testable hypothesis.
Campbell proposed common fate and similarity as indicators of the coherence of a complex social aggregate (1958: 17 8).7 These indicators suggest a
number of questions. Concerning common fate, do the components exhibit
covariation whereby the parts prosper and suffer together, or where parts sacrifice for the good of the whole? Second, are the parts similar in key economic and
political aspects, i.e. are they convergent as one expects in an increasingly unified
area? What role does diffusion (imitation, interdependence, and competition)
31
play in the convergence process? (Botcheva and Martin 2001; Knill 2005;
Holzinger 2006).
Common fate, or interdependence of parts
Our first measure of common fate is a proxy based on export reliance between
member states and others within the region. When countries import and export,
they send and receive price movements, share cyclical economic activity, add
and subtract jobs from the economy, increase competition among firms, and
entangle themselves through financial movements associated with the balance
of payments. Our export figures were obtained by calculating each countrys
exports to the other five (or 11) in the EU and dividing by total exports. As
we follow these shares through time, we can trace the degree of concentration
of trade within the area. We use two membership groupings, based on the original six membership and the EU of 12.
Table 5 shows that it is not universally true that the original six members
of the European Economic Community increased their share of export reliance
on one another. Belgiums share increased from 0.59 in 1950 to a high of 0.71
in 1970 but steadily declined to 0.55 in 2000. Italy, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg increased their reliance on the original six, if we compare 1950
with 2000, but the high-water mark for these three countries was 1970 after
which export shares declined. Perhaps surprisingly, France and Germany show
a non-dramatic pattern no huge change either way. The high-water mark is
50 percent for France and 40 percent for the Federal Republic of Germany,
both again in 1970, just three years before the first oil crisis. Based on the
export data for the Six, there is no clear evidence for the conclusion that the original six members are moving more closely together.
However, there is evidence of growing interdependence within two distinct
sub-groups of the six member states. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg increasingly form one group and Italy, France, and Germany form
another. We can clearly see this if we examine the variation within these subgroups in the earlier periods and compare with the later periods. In 1950,
there was a significant disparity among the members in terms of their export
reliance. By 1980, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had identical
shares of within-EU exports (63 percent) while Italy, France, and Germany
came in at 41 percent, 44 percent, and 39 percent respectively. This pattern
holds up rather firmly to the year 2000.
Table 6 provides additional evidence for the trade patterns among the 12 and
the original six. In contrast to the figures for the original six, export patterns
for the 12 show that all countries except Ireland, Denmark, and Greece
increased their export reliance on the 12. Of course, we expect the absolute
values of exports to be larger, because we have added six countries to our definition of the EU. However, it is still valid to look at trends because whatever
inflation takes place by adding these six members should take place throughout
the time period. This table suggests not so much a weakening of the Carolingean
core (Ash 1994), the original six members, as a broadening of it to incorporate
Table 5
The proportion of exports to EU-6 among total exports, 1950 2000
Country
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Belgium
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
France
Germany
0.59
0.44
0.49
0.24
0.32
0.36
0.50
0.42
0.52
0.25
0.35
0.30
0.60
0.48
0.54
0.31
0.37
0.30
0.67
0.57
0.64
0.41
0.42
0.35
0.71
0.64
0.70
0.44
0.50
0.40
0.65
0.61
0.64
0.40
0.42
0.36
0.63
0.63
0.63
0.41
0.44
0.39
0.60
0.61
0.59
0.37
0.40
0.35
0.63
0.61
0.63
0.43
0.45
0.37
0.61
0.58
0.61
0.39
0.42
0.33
0.55
0.56
0.64
0.34
0.36
0.31
Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch.

Note: Owing to some abnormal values of the Gleditsch data, the figures for France 2000 were reproduced by Xun Cao using the IMF
DOT data.
Table 6
The proportion of exports to EU-12 among total exports, 1950 2000
Country
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Belgium
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Ireland
Denmark
Greece
Portugal
Spain
0.69
0.64
0.62
0.41
0.53
0.48
0.25
0.96
0.73
0.51
0.56
0.46
0.69
0.60
0.64
0.39
0.53
0.41
0.28
0.95
0.65
0.63
0.58
0.56
0.68
0.65
0.64
0.42
0.48
0.41
0.26
0.88
0.57
0.43
0.51
0.61
0.75
0.71
0.73
0.52
0.53
0.47
0.31
0.88
0.53
0.46
0.59
0.54
0.78
0.75
0.77
0.53
0.59
0.50
0.34
0.81
0.45
0.53
0.59
0.51
0.75
0.75
0.74
0.50
0.54
0.47
0.36
0.82
0.48
0.51
0.54
0.49
0.75
0.76
0.75
0.53
0.57
0.51
0.48
0.77
0.53
0.49
0.60
0.53
0.73
0.75
0.72
0.49
0.55
0.50
0.49
0.70
0.46
0.54
0.64
0.53
0.77
0.78
0.76
0.59
0.65
0.53
0.54
0.76
0.53
0.65
0.75
0.72
0.75
0.74
0.75
0.55
0.63
0.49
0.53
0.71
0.52
0.59
0.78
0.71
0.72
0.74
0.78
0.52
0.60
0.48
0.54
0.59
0.51
0.40
0.76
0.68
Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch.
34
other members. Within-EU export shares increase for Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. Germanys
figures are exactly the same if we compare the starting and end dates, though
they do show a small decline from the high-water mark of 1990 (the year of
German reunification), from 0.53 to 0.48. This interpretation (broadening
the core) seems strongest if we look at the trade patterns of the United
Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain (three states which are progressively incorporated) and less so if we look at Denmark, Ireland and Greece (three states
whose export reliance on the EU declines).
Irelands substantial decline from 0.96 in 1950 to 0.59 in 2000 is not so surprising if we take into account the dramatic growth of the Irish economy over
this time period, the diversification of their trade, and the decrease of their
reliance on their former colonial master, England. Greeces export reliance on
the EU declined from 0.51 in 1950 to 0.40 in 2000. Since 1990, Greeces
exports have increasingly gone to the countries of Eastern and Central
Europe, particularly Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Albania, not all EU
countries, of course. Indeed, the Eastern and Central European countries now
absorb about 25 percent of Greeces exports, compared to 14.5 percent in
1955 (Kakridis 2007).8
While international trade is important, it is just one part of the elaborate
network of interdependence in Europe. The flow of capital across countries is
also important in that it creates joint production facilities when capital flows
take the form of foreign direct investments. We have analyzed foreign direct
investment among EU countries in comparison to the world but space limitations prevent us from presenting this information here.9 Investment data
support the same basic patterns found in the trade data.
In summary, there is evidence from trade and investment data that there is a
strong and growing tendency to direct economic activity toward EU members,
in relation to the rest of the world. We believe such growth reflects more than
the high volume of trade accounted for by the EU. Rather, we think it reflects
increasingly a preference for intra-regional trade, a preference that is backed by
the elaborate commercial rules and regulatory environment of the EU.
Similarity and convergence
If an emerging regional system has a coherent identity, it should display similarities in certain relevant aspects. When the European Economic Community
formed, there were important differences. The south of Italy, along with
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece formed Europes semi-periphery. They
were relatively poor members when they joined, though their economies
(except for Greeces) grew rapidly and the gap was narrowed and sometimes
closed. The arrival of the United Kingdom and Denmark in 1973 brought
two quite Euro-skeptical members with strong ties to the European Free
Trade Association into the fold. The entry of Austria, Sweden, and Finland
in 1995 added three wealthy social democratic states whose welfare systems
were much more developed than those of other member states. And the
35
expansion of the EU to include ten new members from Central and Eastern
Europe in 2004 added difference and complexity on many different dimensions.
Given these differences, we ask to what extent, and in what ways, have the
member states converged or diverged along with the development of the EU.
Our working hypothesis is that membership pushes countries more closely
together. Since we want to capture the changes in similarities and differences over time, it makes sense to look at a measure of dispersion applied to
various indicators, such as rates of unemployment. Following Holzinger
(2006) and Holzinger and Knill (2005) we use changes in the standard deviation as our primary measure of convergence. Because of the possible bias introduced when comparing standard deviations based on different means, we also
employ the coefficient of variability (which is obtained by dividing the standard
deviation by the mean of the distribution). The first indicator is unemployment
rates for the member states from 1980 to 2004. If we look at Table 7 we can see
that the standard deviations rise from 2.78 in 1980 to a high of 5.30 in 1986
and then they slowly but systematically decline until in 2004 the dispersion
has dropped to 2.34. With autonomous national economic policies, measures
of unemployment are expected to vary in accordance with national priorities
regarding inflation and unemployment as well as natural cyclical fluctuations
in the economy. To the extent that economies are insulated, divergences may
be large. To the extent that countries are embedded in the same economic, political, and cultural networks, these gaps can be expected to narrow. Since passage
of the SEA in 1986, there has been a steady convergence in unemployment rates,
as measured by a decline in the standard deviations and coefficient of variability.
This convergence seems to be robust in light of up and down movements in
average unemployment rates.
Similarly, if we analyze inflation rates in Table 8 we see the same pattern the
standard deviations reach a high of 6.32 in 1984 and then decline, not dramatically at any one point, but the overall pattern is that the dispersion drops with
few small exceptions so that in 2004 it is 0.79 (or 0.42). The only substantial
increase after 1984 occurs in 1990, the year of German reunification. The
run-up to European monetary union narrowed inflation rates even further,
since the convergence criteria required individual national rates of inflation
not to exceed by more than 1.5 percent the inflation rates of the three best performing members. By 2004, the standard deviation for national rates of
inflation was 0.79.
Finally, Table 9 presents data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(constant dollars). Here we find an increase in the standard deviation over
time and almost no change in the coefficient of variability. The standard deviation increases from 4.88 in 1982 to 8.91 in 1990 to 12.04 in 2004 (though this
may be a one-time increase). The coefficient of variability ends slightly below
where it begins (0.37 in 2004 and 0.39 in 1980)
Two of our measures (unemployment and inflation) provide support for our
hypothesis about convergence while the data for changes in GDP per capita do
not provide conclusive support one way or the other.
Table 7
Means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variability of unemployment rates for EU-15
Year
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Mean
S.D.
COV
6.16
2.78
0.45
7.49
3.95
0.53
9.52
4.88
0.51
9.26
5.30
0.57
8.39
5.02
0.60
7.19
4.24
0.59
8.49
4.40
0.52
10.23
5.19
0.51
9.75
4.55
0.47
8.44
4.13
0.49
6.87
3.46
0.50
6.49
2.77
0.43
7.31
2.34
0.32
Source: World Development Indicators.

Note: COV the coefficient of variability which is the standard deviation divided by the mean.
Table 8
Means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variability of inflation rates for EU-15
Year
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Mean
S.D.
COV
11.35
5.48
0.48
10.85
4.90
0.45
8.22
6.32
0.77
4.83
5.98
1.24
4.30
3.50
0.81
6.33
5.13
0.81
4.75
3.63
0.76
3.26
2.37
0.73
2.47
1.71
0.69
1.64
0.95
0.58
2.57
1.04
0.40
2.58
1.09
0.42
1.89
0.79
0.42
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Table 9 Means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variability of GDP per capita for EU-15, in 2,000 constant dollars
(in thousands)
Year
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Mean
S.D.
COV
21.79
8.52
0.39
14.51
4.88
0.34
12.40
4.46
0.36
16.29
6.16
0.38
21.10
7.86
0.37
24.45
8.91
0.36
24.73
8.60
0.35
22.71
9.04
0.40
26.99
10.10
0.37
26.99
9.13
0.34
23.22
8.49
0.37
24.05
8.62
0.36
32.66
12.04
0.37
Source: World Economic Outlook.
39
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Identity is a complex concept. The method we propose involves a dual
conceptualization of identity which includes subjective awareness and behavioral coherence. The former implies consciousness of a we and provides an
answer to the question who are we? in terms of attributes that distinguish
the group from those outside. The latter component (coherence) attempts to
come to grips with the extent to which the we fits into a coherent syndrome.
What did we find? Summarizing radically, we find that multiple identities
exist among the people of the EU member states, including identification
with the EU. When questions are of a forced choice nature (forcing respondents to pick one or the other level of identification), national identifications
trump EU identities. However, respondents are able to distinguish feelings of
identification and attachment from the level of decision-making they deem
most optimal. There are surprisingly high levels of support for Community
decision-making, far in excess of what one would predict from levels of identity.
We expect this gap between identity with the EU and belief that the EU is the
right level to make many policies to be a source of tension and hence change
in the years ahead.
The evidence for the emergence and development of a coherent EU is substantial. Intra-EU trade and investment levels are quite high, and for the
most part growing, though there are exceptions. The fact that levels of intraEU trade and investment are growing faster than trade and investment to
other destinations suggests a specialized process of European integration that
is not a simple regional spin-off of globalization (Verdier and Breen 2001).
We find that the gradual yet punctuated enlargement of the EU has not led
to a weakening of economic integration but to a more encompassing scope of
integration, often realigning economic patterns but in such a way as to keep
most economic activity within the region. This is more than an accounting artifact of expanding membership.
Further, there is strong evidence for growing convergence of EU economies
with respect to national rates of inflation and unemployment. This convergence
is no doubt fueled by the passage of the SEA in 1986 and the move to monetary
union during the 1990s. While we have not systematically explored the mechanisms of convergence, the progressive decrease of differences among countries
is possibly due to intensified competition and the regulatory harmonization,
institutional arbitrage, and adoption of best practices that such competition
begets.
We recognize that what we have attempted here is only a beginning. In terms
of the subjective awareness side of the research agenda, recent rejections of the
proposed constitution suggest closer attention to the differences between elite
and mass attitudes toward the EU. Second, future research should pay attention
to a much broader range of indicators than examined here. One could research
the development of a single EU legal personality, the growth of a public sphere,
the extent to which the EU speaks with one voice (as in commercial affairs), the
40
fashioning of a distinctive mission in world politics, perhaps centered around

the projection of soft power in support of European ideals, and the construction
and enactment of external borders, i.e. the outer borders of the EU as distinct
from any of its members (Andreas 2003). Our limited effort suggests that the
EU is increasing its performative powers and that its performance has had an
effect on the attitudes and behavior of its member states and peoples, if not
on European identity.
Biographical note: James A. Caporaso is a Professor in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Washington, USA. Min-hyung Kim is a
Visiting Assistant Professor in Political Science at Hobart and William Smith
Colleges, Geneva, New York, USA.
Addresses for correspondence: James A. Caporaso, Department of Political
Science, Box 353530, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195, USA.
email: caporaso@u.washington.edu/Min-hyung Kim, Department of Political
Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY, 14456, USA.
email: mkim@hws.edu
NOTES
1 Note that if a pluralistic community comes into being, with the separate parts maintaining autonomy and distinctiveness, the issue of identity does not arise.
2 The Transatlantic Trends in 2005 reports that a majority of Europeans (60 percent of
EU-9), including 62 percent of French and 64 percent of German citizens, support a
single EU seat on the United Nations Security Council even if it would replace the
seats currently held by France and the UK. Only the majority of British respondents
(55 percent) opposed.
3 The question on the EU was added in 2003 for the first time and asked since then.
4 A different approach to the problem of measuring identity is taken by Michael Bruter
in his book Citizens of Europe ? (2005). Bruter attempts to construct a measure of
identity by a sophisticated process of cleaning (removing) the effects of several variables on an index of support for the EU, in effect leaving (as residual) the effect due to
identity. For a thorough description of this approach, see appendix 3 of his book,
pages 195 210.
5 We do not present our data on the degree of attachment of people to their city, their
region, their country, and Europe here for space reasons, but are happy to provide
them if requested by interested readers.
6 The working ontology of most social science research starts with entities (states,
organizations, institutions), and then goes on to explore variables and their relations
attached to these entities. The entities themselves do not enter the theoretical discussion. There are important exceptions, such as the work of Charles Ragins caseoriented analysis, but they are a distinct minority.
7 Campbell also proposed proximity as an indicator. We think proximity is at best a
proxy for diffusion processes which should result in greater similarity and convergence of countries in the region over time.
8 Denmarks declining reliance on its EU partners remains a puzzle to us.
9 If readers are interested in these data, they are welcome to write to the authors who
will be happy to provide a more complete version of the paper.
41
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The Dual Nature of European Identity

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This article was downloaded by: [National School of Political Studies and

Journal of European Public

The dual nature of European

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Journal of European Public Policy 16:1 January 2009: 19 42

The dual nature of European identity:

James A. Caporaso and Min-hyung Kim

ABSTRACT We conceptualize European identity as a dual concept (subjective

Journal of European Public Policy

J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity

Second, identity discussion is more prevalent because people (the people of

Journal of European Public Policy

human interaction, as opposed to changing calculation of costs and benefits

J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity

Journal of European Public Policy

Self-reference, the we-group

1996 1997 1998 1999

2000 2001 2002

2003 2004 2005

Journal of European Public Policy

Support for community or national decision-making in the EU policy domain

1992 1993 1994 1995

Support for community or national decision-making in the national policy domain

1992 1993 1994 1995

J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity

Peace in the world

The protection of the

Journal of European Public Policy

J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity

The proportion of exports to EU-6 among total exports, 1950 2000

Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch.

The proportion of exports to EU-12 among total exports, 1950 2000

Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch.

Journal of European Public Policy

J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity

Source: World Development Indicators.

Source: World Economic Outlook.

Source: World Economic Outlook.

J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity

V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Journal of European Public Policy

fashioning of a distinctive mission in world politics, perhaps centered around

J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity

Journal of European Public Policy

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