EPIFANIA Q.

BANTOLO,
Complainant,

Adm. Case No. 6589

A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to
be contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional
attachment to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the
decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those which were found
to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month. [14]

Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and

On 30 July 2004, the IBP

passed a resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation, to wit:

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 19, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997, [1] Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty.
Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or
willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed
the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly
showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to
attain his ends.
According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama,
Antique.[2]The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by
virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered the
disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein. [3] Plaintiffs were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in
contempt of court because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the
acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court. [4] On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his codefendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine. [5] Subsequently, on 26 July
1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were
ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each. [6]
In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint
was a form of harassment.[7] Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the
complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainants evidence was conducted. [8] While notices
were subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to
respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence.[9]
In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M.
Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were
not within the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of
willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he added. Thus,
according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. [11]
Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondents contumacious acts as final
and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the instant
disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative
to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis
on the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his
change of address.[12]
Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the circumstances, the Commission recommended
instead the penalty of suspension for one month. [13] As explained in the Report:

RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376

CBD Case No. 510
Epifania Q. Bantolo vs.
Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead
the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court
which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month.
The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.
Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that
willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. [15] Such is
the situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers commission of the contumacious acts have been
shown and proven, and eventually punished by the lower courts.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of
his client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth
and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts [16] and to show respect to its
processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him. [17]
Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to
support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily
caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP.
Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted
out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While
the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will
also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. [18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds
that a months suspension from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and will give
him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents
record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

GORETTI ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL M. GRIJALDO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and
distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual
lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times
maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession. [1] In this administrative case
for disbarment, respondent Atty. Joel M. Grijaldo failed to perform his sworn duty to preserve the dignity of the legal profession.
Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in Talayan Village, Quezon City. Sometime in the early part of 1996, she engaged
the services of respondent, a practicing lawyer in Bacolod City, as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 5, against Lemuel Sembrano and Arlene Villamil for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.[2] During one of the hearings of the case, the accused offered to amicably settle their civil obligation to
complainant by paying the amount of P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on the condition that payment shall be made in
cash.
At the hearing held on July 17, 1996, respondent advised complainant to wait outside the courtroom. When he came out, he
handed to complainant cash in the amount of P100,000.00 and Metrobank Check No. 0701263862 for P80,000.00, postdated August
16, 1996, drawn by Atty. Roger Reyes, counsel for the accused. Complainant objected to the check payment and refused to settle the
case, but he assured her that the check was drawn by a reputable lawyer. Complainant was prevailed upon by respondent into
signing an affidavit of desistance, but she instructed him not to file it in court until the check is cleared.
Upon presentment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to a stop-payment order from the drawer. Complainant
immediately informed respondent of the dishonor, and the latter told her that he will talk to Atty. Reyes about it. Later, when
complainant met with respondent in Manila, he relayed to her Atty. Reyes offer to replace the check with cash. Several weeks passed
without any payment of the proceeds of the check, despite complainants repeated telephone calls to respondent. Sometime in
December 1996, she suggested that respondent move for a hearing of the case, but he told her that courts are not inclined to set
hearings near the Christmas season.
On December 17, 1996, complainant personally went to Bacolod City to inquire about her case. She was surprised to learn
that the same was dismissed as early as September 26, 1996. [3] Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of Desistance [4] and,
on the basis thereof, the public prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case which was granted by the court. When complainant
confronted respondent, he admitted to her that he had already received the amount of P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the
same to pay for his financial obligations.
Thus, on April 2, 1997, complainant filed an Administrative Complaint against respondent for disbarment. [5]
Complainant further alleged in her complaint that respondent represented her in another case, entitled People of the
Philippines versus Norma Mondia, also for violation of B.P. 22, where she was the offended party. Respondent approached the
accused, Norma Mondia, and offered to delay the hearing of the case in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00. However, Mondia
did not have that amount of money. Attached to the complaint is the affidavit of Norma Mondia attesting to this fact. [6]
Furthermore, Henry Tiu, a former client of respondent, executed an affidavit, which is attached to the complaint, alleging that
he gave respondent the amount of P3,000.00 for the purpose of posting his bail bond, but respondent did not post his bail which
resulted in Tius arrest.[7]

Likewise, a certain Luz Dimailig, whose affidavit is also attached to the complaint, averred that respondent represented her as
counsel for plaintiff in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52; that the case was dismissed by the trial
court; that the appeal filed by respondent to the Court of Appeals was dismissed due to his failure to file the appellants brief; and that
the petition for review before the Supreme Court was denied for lack of proof of service on the Court of Appeals, late filing and late
payment of docket fees. Moreover, Dimailig alleged that she gave respondent the amount of P10,000.00 for settling the said civil
case, but she later learned that he did not remit the money to the defendants or their counsel. [8]
On June 25, 1997, respondent was required to file his comment within ten days from notice. [9] Respondent filed a Motion for
Extension of Time, alleging that he has not received a copy of the complaint. [10] On February 5, 1998,[11] complainant furnished
respondent a copy of the complaint. However, despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, respondent still failed to file his comment.
On October 19, 1998, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failing to file his comment. [12] Respondent filed a Compliance, stating that the copy of the complaint he received from
complainant was not legible. Complainant again furnished respondent with a clearer and more legible copy of the complaint including
its annexes; but respondent still did not file his comment.
Consequently, on June 14, 2000, another show cause order was issued against respondent. [13] Respondent replied by stating
that the quality of the copy furnished him by complainant was worse than the first one he received.
Dissatisfied with respondents explanation, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00, which he complied with on
November 27, 2000.[14] However, he again failed to file his comment and, instead, moved for additional time to file said comment.
On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[15] The records of the IBP show that respondent has not filed his comment to the complaint. On January 18, 2002,
the Investigating Commissioner, Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report recommending the disbarment of respondent. [16]However, in
its Resolution No. XV-2002-553 dated October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty of disbarment and
recommended instead respondents indefinite suspension from the practice of law for grossly immoral conduct and deceit. [17]
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find the recommendation of Commissioner Manuel A. Tiuseco well-taken.
It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client, the complainant. Were it not for
complainants vigilance in inquiring into the status of her case, she would not have known that the same had already been dismissed
on September 26, 1996. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from her, notwithstanding that she talked to him sometime in
December 1996.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.
Respondent breached his duty to his client when he failed to inform complainant of the status of the criminal case. His
negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every lawyer. [18] His infraction is rendered all the more
deplorable by the fact that complainant is a resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in Bacolod City. It was precisely for this
reason that complainant engaged the services of respondent, a Bacolod-based lawyer, so that her interests in the case may be amply
protected in her absence. Respondents failure to look after his clients welfare in the case was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty
and a breach of the trust and confident which was reposed in him. In a similar case, we held:
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
decline employment subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take
up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him.
Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable

time to his clients request for information. Respondents failure to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its request
for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its
case.[19]
Worse, when respondent used the money which he received from Atty. Reyes to pay for his own obligations, he violated
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that [a] lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Furthermore:
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Respondents act of propositioning his clients .opponent and offering to delay the case against her was intended to benefit the
latter. Hence, such act amounted to double-dealing and conflict of interest, and was unethical practice of law. Attorneys, like Caesars
wife, must not only keep inviolate their clients confidence, but must also avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.[24]
Finally, respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the directives of this Court to file his comment constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A resolution of this Court is not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. [25] Respondents obstinate refusal to
comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of our lawful orders which is
only too deserving of reproof.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over
the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful lees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondents misappropriation of the money entrusted to him and his refusal to account for it to his client despite repeated
demands were competent proof of his unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him. His acts showed a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. He held the money in trust for his client as
settlement of the case he was handling. Upon receipt thereof, he was under obligation to immediately turn it over, in the absence of a
showing that he had a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should have been scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. [20]
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all
good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession. He should not
commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his clients consent. Respondent, by converting the
money of his client to his own personal use without her consent, was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Not only did
he degrade himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession. [21]
Aside from violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondents failure to promptly turn over the money to his client
and his conversion of the same for his personal use rendered him liable for contempt under Rule 138, Section 25 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Unlawful retention of clients funds; contempt.--- When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been
demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, respondent violated his oath of office and duties as counsel when he approached his clients opponent and
offered to delay the case in exchange for money. His offer to delay the case would have frustrated the interests of his client which he
had sworn to protect. As a lawyer, respondent should avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent the
speedy, efficient and impartial adjudication of cases.[22]

Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by
this Court as the disciplining authority. This is especially so, as in the instant case, where respondent even deliberately defied the
lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts. [26]
All told, respondents transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior
which caused dishonor, not only to complainant, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. [27] He
has proved himself unworthy of membership in the legal profession and must, therefore, be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior, respondent ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is
DISBARRED from the practice law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to PAY
complainant Goretti Ong the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to respondents personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the
Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their information and
guidance. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27396 September 30, 1974
JESUS V. OCCEA and SAMUEL C. OCCEA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, respondent. I.V. BINAMIRA, CoExecutor, Estate of W.C. Ogan, Sp. Proc. No. 423, CFI of Bohol, Intervenor.
Jesus V. Occea and Samuel C. Occea in their own behalf.
Hon. Paulino S. Marquez for and in his own behalf.
I.V. Binamira for and in his own behalf as intervenor.

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. [23]

ANTONIO, J.:p
In this petition for certiorari with mandamus, petitioners seek (1) to nullify the order of respondent Judge Paulino S. Marquez of the
Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, in Sp. Proc. No. 423 entitled "In the Matter of the Testate Estate of William C. Ogan," in
relation to petitioners' claim for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, dated November 2, 1966, fixing at
P20,000.00 petitioners' attorney's fees, "which would cover the period March 1963 to December 1965," and directing its immediate
payment minus the amount of P4,000.00 previously received by petitioners, and his second order, dated January 12, 1967, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and modifying the November 2, 1966 order by deleting therefrom the above-quoted phrase; (2)

to direct the said court to approve the release to them as attorney's fees the amount of P30,000.00 minus the amount of P4,000.00
already advanced to them by the executrix; and (3) to allow petitioners to submit evidence to establish the total attorney's fees to
which they are entitled, in case no agreement thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs.
The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than
P2 million. Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan
Occea, and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the
interests of the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter
into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants,
including co-executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial distribution of the corpus and income of the estate
was made to the heirs in the total amount of P450,000.00. On November 18, 1966, the estate and inheritance taxes were completely
settled by the executrix and the requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, dated November 18, 1965, asking the court to approve payment to
them of P30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the
executrix to withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay petitioners. Three of the heirs, Lily Ogan Peralta, William
Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan, moved to defer consideration of the motion until after the total amounts for the executrix's fees and the
attorney's fees of her counsel shall have been agreed upon by all the heirs. In July, 1966, five of the seven instituted heirs, namely,
Lily Ogan Peralta, Necitas Ogan Occena, Federico M. Ogan, Liboria Ogan Garcia and Nancy Ogan Gibson, filed with the court a
Manifestation stating that they had no objection to the release of P30,000.00 to petitioners as partial payment of attorney's fees and
recommending approval of petitioners' motion.
Their first motion dated November 18, 1965 being still unresolved, petitioners filed a second Motion for Payment of Partial Attorneys'
Fees, dated July 5, 1966, praying for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00 previously prayed for by them. Action on the
matter was, however, deferred in an order dated August 6, 1966, upon the request of the Quijano and Arroyo Law Offices in behalf of
heirs William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan for deferment until after all the instituted heirs shall have agreed in writing on the total
attorney's fees. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration under date of September 12, 1966, asking the court to reconsider its
deferment order and praying that payment to them of P30,000.00 be approved on the understanding that whatever amounts were
paid to them would be chargeable against the fees which they and the instituted heirs might agree to be petitioners' total fees.
On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December,
1965 at P20,000.00. Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. On January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate
proceedings at P20,000.00.

period March, 1963 to December, 1965 from his November 2, 1966 order is that there are miscellaneous payments appearing in the
compromise agreement and in the executrix's accounting which cover expenses incurred by petitioners for the estate; (d) co-executor
I. V. Binamira should be included as party respondent to comply with Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (e) it is
the duty of respondent Judge not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is at the same time the wife of said
counsel and is herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent Judge's duty is to see to it that the estate is
administered "frugally," "as economically as possible," and to avoid "that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the
process of such division," in order that there may be a worthy residue for the heirs. As special defenses, respondent Judge alleged
that the seven instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this case; that mandamus cannot control the actuations of the trial court
because they involved matters of discretion; and that no abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to
administer the estate frugally.
On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners' motion for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of
P30,000.00, and that since petitioners Samuel C. Occea and Jesus V. Occea are the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of
executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, the latter cannot be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the coexecutor as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the estate, Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the
Ogan estate, filed with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a resolution of August 9, 1967.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution of August 9, 1967 and an Opposition to "Motion for Leave to Intervene,"
contending that Atty. Binamira ceased to be a co-executor upon his resignation effective October 29, 1965. On August 15, 1967, Atty.
Binamira filed Intervenor's Opposition to Petition (answer in intervention) traversing the material averments of the petition.
On August 25, 1967, intervenor filed a Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Exicutrix's Motion for Reconsideration. On
September 18, 1967, intervenor filed Intervenor's Comments on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
August 9, 1961. On September 21, 1967, petitioners filed against intervenor a Petition for Contempt asking this Court to hold
intervenor in contempt of court. We required intervenor to comment thereon. On October 9, 1967, petitioners filed a Supplemental
Petition for Contempt. Invervenor filed on October 20, 1967, Intervenor's Comments and Counter Petition, asking this Court to
dismiss petitioners' motion for indirect contempt and instead to hold petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for gross breach of legal
ethics. We deferred action on the contempt motion until the case is considered on the merits. On January 15, 1968. Intervenor I. V.
Binamira filed an Answer to Supplemental Petition. This was followed on February 12, 1968, by another Petition for Contempt, this
time against one Generoso L. Pacquiao for allegedly executing a perjured affidavit dated December 20, 1967, to aid intervenor I. V.
Binamira to escape liability for his deliberate falsehoods, which affidavit intervenor attached to his Answer to Supplemental Petition.
On the same date, February 12, 1968, petitioners filed against intervenor a Second Supplemental Petition for Contempt. On February
19, 1968, petitioners filed Petitioners' Manifestation Re Documentary Evidence Supporting Charges.
We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the petitions for contempt.
I

Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in fixing the entire
attorney's fees to which they are entitled as counsel for the executrix, and in fixing the said fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The
reasons given by petitioners in support of their contention are: (1) the motion submitted by petitioners for the court's resolution was
only for partied payment of their attorney's fees, without prejudice to any agreement that might later be reached between them and
the instituted heirs on the question of total attorney's fees, yet respondent Judge resolved the question of total attorney's fees; (2)
considering that the only question raised by petitioners for the court's determination was that of partial attorney's fees, they never
expected the court to make a ruling on the question of total attorney's fees; consequently, petitioners did not have the opportunity to
prove to total fees to which they were entitled, and, hence, they were denied due process of law; (3) of the seven heirs to the estate,
five had agreed to petitioners' motion for partial payment to them of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, while the remaining
two did not oppose the motion; (4) in his order, respondent Judge stated that he based the amount of P20,000.00 on the records of
the case, but the amount of attorney's fees to which a lawyer is entitled cannot be determined on the sole basis of the records for
there are other circumstances that should be taken into consideration; and (5) contrary to respondent Judge's opinion, the mere fact
that one of the attorneys for the executrix is the husband of said executrix, is not a ground for denying the said attorneys the right to
the fees to which they are otherwise entitled.
Only Judge Paulino S. Marquez is named respondent in the present petition, for, according to petitioners, "no proper party is
interested in sustaining the questioned proceedings in the Lower Court."
In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a) petitioners' proper remedy is appeal and not a special civil action,
considering that there is already a final order on the motion for payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. Samuel Occea is the husband of
executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, hence, Samuel Occea's pecuniary interest now goes against the pecuniary interest of the four heirs
he is representing in the special proceeding; (c) one reason why respondent Judge ordered the deletion of the phrase containing the

The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust,
his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for
payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to
reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to
make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as
administrator, 1 or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and interested
parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of administration. 2 Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons
interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value, of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his
employment. In the case at bar, petitioner filed his petition directly with the probate court.
There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate, and as such trustee it should jealously guard the estate
under administration and see to it that it is wisely and economically administered and not dissipated. 3 This rule, however, does not
authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as trustee of the estate, to act in a whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the
amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled to without according to the latter opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services.
Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due process.
What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 as lawyers
for the executrix for the period February, 1963, up to the date of filing of the motion on or about November 18, 1965. Five of the seven
heirs had manifested conformity to petitioners' motion, while the remaining two merely requested deferment of the resolution of the
motion "until the total amount for Executrix's fees and attorney's fees of her counsel is agreed upon by all the heirs." The court,

however, in spite of such conformity, and without affording petitioners the opportunity to establish how much attorney's fees they are
entitled to for their entire legal services to the executrix, issued an order fixing at P20,000.00 the entire attorney's fees of petitioners.
In his Order of January 12, 1967, respondent Judge explained:
The records of this case are before the Court and the work rendered by Atty. Samuel Occea, within each
given period, is easily visible from them; his work as revealed by those records is the factual basis for this
Court's orders as to attorney's fees.
Whatever attorney's fees may have been approved by the Court on October 28, 1965 were as a result of
compromise and were with the written consent of all the heirs and of all the signatories of the compromise
agreement of October 27, 1965. That is not so with respect to Atty. Occea's thirty-thousand peso claim for
fees; and so, this Court, after a view of the record, had to fix it at P20,000.00. The record can reflect what an
attorney of record has done.
In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to
prove what is the proper amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate, respondent
Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. Evidently, such fees could not be adequately fixed on the basis
of the record alone considering that there are other factors necessary in assessing the fee of a lawyer, such as: (1) the amount and
character of the service rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the
professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may
properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not. 4
It should be noted that some of the reasons submitted by petitioners in support of their fees do not appear in the records of the case.
For instance, they claim that in connection with their legal services to the executrix and to the estate, petitioner Samuel C. Occea
had been travelling from Davao to Tagbilaran from 1965 to March, 1967, and from Davao to Cebu and Manila from 1963 to March,
1967, and that in fact he and his family had to stay for almost a year in Dumaguete City. These claims apparently bear strongly on the
labor, time and trouble involved in petitioners' legal undertaking, and, consequently, should have been subject to a formal judicial
inquiry. Considering, furthermore, that two of the heirs have not given their conformity to petitioners' motion, the need for a hearing
becomes doubly necessary. This is also the reason why at this stage it would be premature to grant petitioners' prayer for the release
to them of the amount of P30,000.00 as partial payment of their fees.

3. To discredit petitioner Samuel C. Occea and his wife, the executrix, intervenor stated in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that
less than a month after the loan of P100,000.00 had been granted to the transportation company, petitioner Samuel C. Occea was
elected president by directors of his own choosing in the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., insinuating that in effect the
executrix loaned to her husband the said sum of money. The certification of the corporate secretary of the Bohol Land Transportation
Company, Inc. (Annex D-Contempt) states that petitioner Samuel C. Occea was not the president of the company at the time, nor
did he act as president or treasurer thereof, and that the president was Atty. Vicente de la Serna. This last fact is also shown in
intervenor's own Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition.
4. In intervenor's Opposition to this petition for certiorari, he stated that contrary to the executrix's statement in the 1965 income tax
return of the estate that an estate "income of P90,770.05 was distributed among the heirs in 1965, there was in fact no such
distribution of income. The executrix's project of partition (Annex E-Contempt) shows that there was a distribution of the 1965 income
of the estate.
5. To discredit petitioner and the executrix, intervenor alleged in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that petitioners caused to be
filed with the court the executrix's verified inventory which failed to include as assets of the estate certain loans granted to petitioner
Samuel C. Occea in the sum of P4,000.00 and to the executrix various sums totalling P6,000.00. The letters written by the late W. C.
Ogan to his daughter, the executrix (Annexes F, G. and H-Contempt), show that the said sums totalling P10,000.00 were in reality
partly given to her as a gift and partly for the payment of certain furniture and equipment.
6. Intervenor, in Order to further discredit petitioners and the executrix, stated in his Reply to Executrix's and Opposition to Executrix's
Motion for Reconsideration that the executrix and petitioners refused to pay and deliver to him all that he was entitled to under the
compromise agreement. The receipt dated October 29, 1965, signed by intervenor himself (Annex I-Contempt), shows that he
acknowledged receipt from petitioner Samuel C. Occea, lawyer for the executrix, the sum of P141,000.00 "in full payment of all
claims and fees against the Estate, pursuant to the Agreement dated October 27, 1965."
7. In his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor alleged that he signed
Atty. Occea's prepared receipt without receiving payment, trusting that Atty. Occea would pay the amount in full, but later Atty.
Occea withheld Chartered Bank Check No. 55384 for P8,000.00 drawn in favor of intervenor and P15,000.00 in cash. A receipt
signed by intervenor I. V. Binamira (Annex K-Contempt) shows that he acknowledged receipt of the check in question in the amount
of P8,000-00 "intended for Mrs. Lila Ogan Castillo ... ." Anent the sum of P15,000.00 in cash, Annex J-Contempt (Reply to the
Opposition for Authority to Annotate Interest, etc. filed by intervenor with the probate court) shows that intervenor, as movant, himself
had alleged that "no check was issued to movant, but withdrawn amount of P15,000.00 was included in purchasing Manager's check
No. 55398 for the Clerk of Court (deposit) for P75,000.00," for the said amount was voluntarily extended by intervenor as a favor and
gesture of goodwill to form part of the total cash bond of P75,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court, as shown by a receipt signed
by Atty. Samuel C. Occea (Annex K-11-Contempt) which forms part of the record in the court below.

II
As stated above, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor I. V. Binamira charging the latter of
having made false averments in this Court.
We have carefully considered these charges and the answers of intervenor, and, on the basis of the evidence, We conclude that
intervenor I. V. Binamira has deliberately made false allegations before this Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration
of justice, to wit:
1. To bolster his claim that the executrix, without approval of the court, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation
Company, Inc., intervenor submitted as Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition a so-called "Real Estate Mortgage" which he
made to appear was signed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna and the executrix. The certification of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Annex AContempt) shows that what intervenor claims to be a duly executed mortgage is in reality only a proposed mortgage not even signed
by the parties.
2. Intervenor, in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition, also stated that in December, 1965, the executrix, without the court's approval
or of the co-executor's consent, but with petitioners' consent, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. out
of the estate's funds. The record shows that only P50,000.00 was loaned to the company to protect the investment of the estate
therein, and that the same was granted pursuant to a joint motion signed among others, by intervenor, and approved by the court.

8. In his intervenor's Comments and Counter-Petition, intervenor denied the truth of petitioners' claim that intervenor had voluntarily
and willingly extended the sum of P15,000.00 as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of the P75,000.00-deposit. In the
Opposition to Motion of Executrix for Reconsideration of Order of February 19, 1966, dated April 16, 1966 (Annex K-2-Contempt),
intervenor had, however, admitted that "out of the goodness of his heart ... in the nature of help," he had "willingly extended as a favor
and gesture of goodwill" the said sum of P15,000.00.
9. To impugn the claim of petitioner Samuel C. Occea that he stayed in Dumaguete City for almost one year to attend to the affairs of
the estate, intervenor, in his intervenor's Opposition to Petition, alleged that said petitioner's stay in Dumaguete City was not to attend
to the affairs of the estate, but to enable him to teach in Silliman University. The certification of the Director of the personnel office of
Silliman University, dated December 4, 1967 (Annex V-Contempt) is, however, to the effect that their "records do not show that Atty.
Samuel C. Occea was teaching at Silliman University or employed in any other capacity in 1963, or at any time before or after
1963."
The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately
made false allegations in his pleadings.
We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by
dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the
court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly
make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of
opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no

falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and
conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately
made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath.
The charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of intervenor I. V. Binamira against petitioners have not been
substantiated by evidence, and they must, therefore, be dismissed.
We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed
the affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate
falsehoods. The said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge,
the charge must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the court a quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the
total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby
declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.

CRUZ, J.:
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one
years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended
petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after
fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for
reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the
respondent judge. 2
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and lawyers.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of
time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been
registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the
decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by
having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto. 4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same
not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights forthirty one years before it occurred to them
to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen
more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited
another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition for review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land
subject thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the
case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedy before the decree is
issued? 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in the world
because the land has not yet been registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was held:

G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987

ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).

... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act
provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after
entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition for
review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that
such could not have been the intention of the Legislatureand that what it meant would have been better
expressed by stating that such petitioners must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry
of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for
requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We
therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition of the
court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration.
(Emphasissupplied).
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting
their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years.Laches bars their petition now. Their position is
clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a

mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should
frown upon any attempt to prolong them." 8

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong Rizal, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION

There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this
Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation
of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence
of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive
force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision,
we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the
parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation.
We have done so before. We do so again. 10
Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it
suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the
petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to
ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the
land in dispute.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion
in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith
in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be
condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional
misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty
by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.

On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the
Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the
apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from
the practice of law. 1
On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized
Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the
President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's
secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found
guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge. 2 But
the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his
lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live
up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso
Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian
College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean
Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon
City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D.
Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City. 4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion. 5
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had been deprived of
his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of
extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission
of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes
to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6
His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone what her husband
had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family
had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7
On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte
Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus
I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it was
dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was merely following my instructions. The
intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it.

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.

Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children to
support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can
only turn to you for relief . . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to which I
owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly
according to its canons . . . . 8

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.
CARPIO,

On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make both ends
meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed
offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter. 10

On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court
I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at the time
with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and children who
have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my
punishment. 11
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to
soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be
capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement
show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the
Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as
well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume
the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Promulgated:
October 9, 2007
X ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis
Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In
an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus
presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel
for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor
and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable
with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. [1]
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the harsh
insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order
dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the
bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack
of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12,
2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order
granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go
out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who
stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY.
ADM. CASE No. 7006
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
Present:

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that
a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is
weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge
F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear
reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal
and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying
judicial arrogance. he said.[3]
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article,
Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited
for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the
prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge
Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open
court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he
lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the
publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When
asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent. [4] Mr. Francisco
clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase for an
unclear reason, was added by the newspapers Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez. [5]

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that
he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in
order to properly prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not
applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondents actions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his
absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the
chances he asks for, and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in
contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the
scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the
charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30,
2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not
fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the
latters instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech
and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the
Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to
suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the
maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more
severely.

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the
statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in
contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. [6] The Courts Order datedSeptember 30, 2003 reads:

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo. [10]

ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a
semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing
to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of
Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of
30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a
bond ofP100,000.00.

The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed,
showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:

SO ORDERD.[7]

TONY CONSING:

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your
mind yet?)
BAGABUYO

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt
order to the CA.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes
nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

xxx
BAGABUYO :

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly
aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by
Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent
allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of
the law should be disbarred. Thats it.)

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS,
and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show
cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court
and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]

Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamayng panahon ang samad sa
imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay
pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?

Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod
nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay
magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bagong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga
inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarmentniining di mahibalo
nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya .
. . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod,
pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagkaabogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton,
ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .
(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of
the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new

jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment
case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that
he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should
not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just
take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you
did not accord me due process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to
humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me
imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the
BMJP. For Gods sake, Mr. Tan, whats wrong with you, Mr.
Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are
a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you
did not accord me due process of law. . . .)

xxx
BAGABUYO

Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini,
nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa
dios, ang iyangorder sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad
nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
TONY CONSING:
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this
Order was given in open court, and in Gods mercy, he did not
state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO

Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug
miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said, Your Honor, I have the
right to appeal. Then he came back and said, BJMP, arrest
Bagabuyo.)
xxx

BAGABUYO

...

P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of
the law. . . .

So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this
problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the
problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO

Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes
nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka
Huwes. . . .Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa
niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw
na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are
ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law
has
he
been
reading? I
heard
that
he
is
a
mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying
mahjong.[11]

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his
gross ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx
TONY CONSING :

So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO

Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka
abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx

BAGABUYO

Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang
trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo
hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga
siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with
regards to the case of murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for
a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was
based on the law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of
the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)
xxx

BAGABUYO

Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang
katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya
akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero
kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP,
intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod,
naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw
Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court[12] for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27 [13] of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be
heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29, [14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension from the practice of law,
dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondents criticism
of the trial courts Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No.
5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with
when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial courts order of suspension dated February
8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v.
Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful
appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in
nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. [17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a
lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

GAUDENCIO S. URBINA and VEDASTO B. GESMUNDO complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, respondent.
RESOLUTION

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he
made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the
article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18,
2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144
was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge
Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of
the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and
maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica[19] held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the
court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the
oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without
such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue
and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and
Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as
an attorney, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
No costs.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
After the Court's resolution of February 6, 1974 dismissing the complaint "for failure to make out a prima faciecase without prejudice
to respondent's filing a separate administrative complaint for unwarranted harassment against complainant Atty. Vedasto B.
Gesmundo as sought in respondent's comment," there were belatedly reported to the Court (a) the verified Joint motion for
suspension and/or to declare respondent and Atty. Marcial Esguerra in contempt of court" filed by complainant Gaudencio S. Urbina
on December 27, 1973 for allegedly having made through said complainant's former counsel, Atty. Marcial Esguerra, grave threats
against complainant's life if he (complainant) did not withdraw his complaints against respondent * and (b) the 1st Indorsement dated
December 5, 1973 and received on January 9, 1974 of Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the
President referring for comment complainant Gesmundo's letter of October 31, 1973 submitting his "objection to re-appointment" of
respondent judge, both of which were referred to respondent for comment as per the Court's resolution of February 19, 1974.
In respondent's comment of March 8, 1974, he submitted the ten-page dismissal dated March 5, 1974 by the acting provincial fiscal of
Laguna of complainant Urbina's criminal complaint against respondent for "Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment" wherein the
fiscal correctly ruled that "(The decision of the respondent that is claimed to be unjust is now pending appeal. The question therefore
of whether or not it is unjust is sub-judice. It would not be proper for this Office at this time to determine whether or not the said
decision is unjust," and that assuming that he as a mere fiscal and a non-judicial officer could pass in judgment upon the justness or
unjustness of respondent's decision complained of as unjust by the losing party (who has appealed the same to a higher court), there
was no basis for concluding that the respondent judge knew that his judgment was unjust. Not only does he believe that his judgment
is just and correct; his view that a probate court cannot decide questions involving title or ownership of real properties is well
supported by the long line of decisions of the Supreme Court cited in his comment." (at pages 9-10)
Respondent convincingly denies as pointless the alleged threat thru Atty. Esguerra against complainant Urbina's life to compel him to
withdraw his charges in this administrative complaint since there would remain another complainant in the person of Atty. Gesmundo.
Respondent did admit that in a chance meeting in the courthouse with Atty. Esguerra, he requested the latter should meet his former
client (Urbina) who alone filed the criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" to inform Urbina that "respondent
bears no ill will against him and if he feels aggrieved by the decision why not limit his action to an ordinary appeal to the higher courts
as he has already done." Respondent categorically denied having made any threats whatsoever against Urbina, directly or through
another, confident as he was (although harassed) that the criminal complaint would ultimately be, as in fact it was, dismissed by the
fiscal for being without basis in law and in fact.

SO ORDERED.
Respondent further submitted the corroborative affidavit of Atty. Esguerra, stating that he merely telephoned Urbina to suggest that
the pending appeal rather than the criminal complaint for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment was his proper recourse
against respondent's adverse decision, and unqualifiedly stating that he never made any threats nor went to Urbina's house and that
"The statements I allegedly made as stated in the affidavit of Gaudencio Urbina did not come from my lips."

A.C. No. 288-J June 19, 1974

While there are thus conflicting factual averments on the part of complainant and respondent, the Court is satisfied from the factual
background of the administrative complaint which it has already dismissed previously for not making out a prima facie case and from
the baselessness of the criminal complaint for allegedly "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" which has also been correctly
dismissed by the fiscal, that the complainant's charge of threats cannot be sustained, resting as it does flimsily on complainant's bare
assertion as against the respondent's categorical denial supported by Atty. Esguerra's affidavit. In the light of ordinary human conduct
and experience, it is difficult to give any inherent credence to the complaint for it would have been extremely foolhardy and pointless
for respondent to have asked Atty. Esguerra to make the alleged threats against complainant. The Court finds respondent's comment
to be satisfactory and will not subject respondent to further needless harassment and distraction if it were to give due course to the
complaint-motion, as insisted by complainant in his reply to comment.

It is appropriate to enjoin complainants and members of the bar who file administrative complaints against judges of inferior courts
that they should do so after proper circumspection and without the use of disrespectful language and offensive personalities, so as
not to unduly burden the Court in the discharge of its function of administrative supervision over inferior court judges and court
personnel. The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary measures against erring judges, including dismissal and suspension
where warranted, and welcomes the honest efforts of the bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers should also bear in mind that they
owe fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and that the filing on behalf of disgruntled litigants of unfounded or frivolous
charges against inferior court judges and the use of offensive and intemperate language as a means of harassing judges whose
decisions have not been to their liking (irrespective of the law and jurisprudence on the matter) will subject them to appropriate
disciplinary action as officers of the Court.

erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable." Much less can a judge be so held accountable
where to all indications, as in this case, his verdict complained of (and now pending review on appeal) is far from erroneous.

The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or
decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part. As stressed by the now Chief Justice in Dizon vs. de Borja, 37
SCRA 46, 52, "(T)o hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has

SO ORDERED.

ACCORDINGLY, complainant Urbina's "joint motion" is denied.

The clerk of court is directed to furnish Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the President with a copy of
this resolution as well as of the previous resolution of February 6, 1974, by way of reply to his 1st indorsement dated December 5,
1973.