People's Broadcasting

vs. Secretary of Labor

Reformist Union vs.
NLRC

The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding

upon the private respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been
defined both as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a
government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make
an award which is binding on all the parties," and as mode of
arbitration where the parties are "compelled to accept the resolution of
their dispute through arbitration by the a third party." Clearly then, the
legality of the strike could no longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much
less by the NLRC, as this had already been resolved.

Davao City Water

District vs. CSC

Water districts are government-owned and controlled corporations.

It is clear therefrom that the power to appoint the members who will
comprise the Board of Directors belongs to the local executives of the local
subdivision units where such districts are located. In contrast, the members
of the Board of Directors or trustees of a private corporation are elected from
among the members and stockholders thereof.
This makes water districts to be outside the jurisdiction of the NLRC.

Zamoras vs. Su Jr.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there
is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of
harvests between landlord and tenant.
The element of personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm
household, essential in establishing a landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee
relationship, is absent in the relationship between Su and Zamoras.
Employee-employer relationship exists. Because of the following:
1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut
plantation.
2. His duties were specified by Su.
3. Su controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined
to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced from the plantation.
4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of the copra
sales every two months as compensation for managing the plantation.

Fortune Cement vs.

NLRC

The question of remuneration, involving as it does, a person who is not a

mere employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might
be said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter
that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is
in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation
Code

Southeast Asian

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity

Fisheries vs. NLRC

from local jurisdiction, i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and
processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.
The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization
to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium
thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or
even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of
such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states.

Boy Scouts of the

Philippines vs.
NLRC0

Boy scouts of the Philippines is not within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
"Government instrumentality" is in turn defined in the 1987 Administrative
Code in the following manner:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government
instrumentality" under the 1987 Administrative Code.

IBM vs. NLRC

"Internal Union Dispute" includes all disputes or grievances arising from

any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and
by-laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of
union membership provided for in the Code

TOLOSA vs. NLRC

It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over
actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely
incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source
of obligation such as a tort.
Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that
only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreement.

AUSTRIA vs. NLRC

Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of
employees, is comprehensive enough to include religious corporations, such
as the SDA, in its coverage. Article 278 of the Labor Code on postemployment states that "the provisions of this Title shall apply to all
establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not." Obviously,

the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a religious
corporation.
MONTOYA vs.
ESCAYO

Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before the barangay courts would

defeat the very salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor
proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the proper
court or office to decide it finally, the position taken by the petitioner
would only duplicate the conciliation proceedings and unduly delay the
disposition of the labor case.

PAL vs. NLRC

So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith

for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or
under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them

VIVIERO vs. CA

The use of the word "may" shows the intention of the parties to reserve
the right to submit the illegal termination dispute to the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter, rather than to a Voluntary Arbitrator. Petitioner
validly exercised his option to submit his case to a Labor Arbiter when he
filed his Complaint before the proper government agency.
Generally, termination disputes are under the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. However, any or all of these cases may, by agreement of the parties,
be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for
adjudication.

PIONEER
TEXTURIZING vs.
NLRC

In case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter

shall direct the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed or separated
employee even pending appeal. The order of reinstatement shall indicate that
the employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of
the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
In decisions regarding reinstatement, it shall be immediately executory.
Maranaw Case (Petitioner brought up this case)
It must be stressed, however, that although the reinstatement aspect of the
decision is immediately executory, it does not follow that it is self-executory.
There must be a writ of execution which may be issuedmotu proprio or on
motion of an interested party.
A closer examination, however, shows that the necessity for a writ of
execution under Article 224 applies only to final and executory decisions
which are not within the coverage of Article 223.
Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within
five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and
executory. It can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be
appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision

of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately

executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer
shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite
obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately
enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and
issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a
reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very
object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a
reinstatement order.
SAINT MARTIN
FUNERAL HOMES
vs. NLRC

Supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

GARCIA vs. PAL

Garcia was suspended
without pay; PAL went
under receivership.

Since petitioners claim against PAL is a money claim for their wages during
the pendency of PALs appeal to the NLRC, the same should have been
suspended pending the rehabilitation proceedings. The Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC, as well as the Court of Appeals should have abstained from
resolving petitioners case for illegal dismissal and should instead have
directed them to lodge their claim before PALs receiver.
However, to still require petitioners at this time to re-file their labor claim
against PAL under the peculiar circumstances of the case that their
dismissal was eventually held valid with only the matter of reinstatement
pending appeal being the issue this Court deems it legally expedient to
suspend the proceedings in this case.

EMCO PLYWOOD
vs. ABELGAS

"Not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by a company will justify

retrenchment. The losses must be substantial and the retrenchment must
be reasonably necessary to avert such losses." The employer bears the
burden of proving the existence or the imminence of substantial losses with
clear and satisfactory evidence that there are legitimate business reasons
justifying a retrenchment. Should the employer fail to do so, the dismissal
shall be deemed unjustified.
Retrenchment is a management prerogative consistently recognized and
affirmed by this Court. It is, however, subject to faithful compliance with the
substantive and the procedural requirements laid down by law and
jurisprudence.
Retrenchment requires:
1) written notices of the intended retrenchment be served by the employer on
the worker and on the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the actual date of the retrenchment.
2) separation pay. the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay
or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fract ion of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year.

These rulings are applicable to the case at bar. Because the retrenchment
was illegal and of no effect, the Quitclaims were therefore not
voluntarily entered into by respondents. Their consent was similarly
vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims
and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers
minded to evade legal responsibilities
WYETH-SUACO vs.
NLRC

A quitclaim executed in favor of a company by an employee amounts to

a valid and binding compromise agreement between them. Article 227 of
the Labor Code provides that any compromise settlement voluntarily agreed
upon with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional
office of the DOLE, shall be final and binding upon the parties and the
NLRC or any court "shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved
therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or it there is prima facie
evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation,
or coercion." While Santos was not an ordinary employee and, therefore, the
assistance of any DOLE official was not entirely necessary when he executed
the release and quitclaim affidavit, the circumstances of this case call for a
holding that he should still be given the difference between what he had
received and that which he would have received through the retrenchment
package, a privilege granted and extended to all employees of ALPI.
Quitclaims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and
they are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers'
legal rights. The reason for this is because the employer and the
employee do not stand on the same footing, such that quitclaims usually
take the form of contracts of adherence, not of choice. Indeed, Santos
resigned because of the uncertainty as to the future of ALPI. Like the other
employees, he was made to believe that the deal between the two companies
was merely a merger but it really was a projected buy-out. While "dire
necessity" as a reason for signing a quitclaim is not acceptable reason to set
aside the quitclaim in the absence of a showing that the employee had been
forced to execute it, such reason gains importance if the consideration for the
quitclaim is unconscionably low and the employee has been tricked into
accepting it.

PHILIPS
INDUSTRIAL vs.
NLRC

The NLRC cannot just decide to force employees to join bargaining units
or labor unions. Firstly, in holding that they are included in the bargaining
unit for the rank and file employees of PIDI, the NLRC practically forced
them to become members of PEO-FFW or to be subject to its sphere of
influence, it being the certified bargaining agent for the subject bargaining
unit. This violates, obstructs, impairs and impedes the service engineers'
and the sales representatives' constitutional right to form unions or
associations and to self-organization.
Also, employees, although not managers in title but have direct influence
or works for the management, cannot be part of any union.

NAFTU vs. MAINIT

LUMBER

Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be

reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not
decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of

grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is so because "the

basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not
it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights."
Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the
Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one
another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company
needs them both. There may be difference as to the nature of their
individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant
the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
COOPERATIVE
RURAL BANK OF
DAVAO CITY vs.
CALLEJA

A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary business

concern, being run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its
owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while
the others are its employees. As above stated, irrespective of the number of
shares owned by each member they are entitled to cast one vote each in
deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative. Their share capital earn limited
interests. They enjoy special privileges as exemption from income tax and
sales taxes, preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and
even exemption from the minimum wages laws.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and coowner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for
certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. In the
opinion of August 14, 1981 of the Solicitor General he correctly opined that
employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative
have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective
bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative.
However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are
not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled
to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective
bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution
and existing laws of the country

CENECO vs.
SECRETARY OF
LABOR

The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason

why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed
out by CURE, the resignation of the member- employees is an expression of
their preference for union membership over that of membership in the
cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford fall protection to labor
and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the
employees' right to form and join unions for purposes of collective
bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

UNION OF NESTLE
WORKERS vs.
NESTLE
PHILIPPINES

"Company personnel policies are guiding principles stated in broad, longrange terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of an organizations top
authority regarding personnel matters. They deal with matter affecting
efficiency and well-being of employees and include, among others, the
procedure in the administration of wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and
other personnel movements which are usually not spelled out in the
collective agreement."

Considering that the Drug Abuse Policy is a company personnel policy,

it is the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, not the
RTC, which exercises jurisdiction over this case. Article 261 of the Labor
Code, as amended, pertinently provides:
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies x x x."
GENERAL
MILLING
CORPORATION vs.
CA

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the

unions proposals, GMC (the corporation) violated its duty to bargain
collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
The refusal to make a counter-proposal to the union's proposal for CBA
negotiation is indicative of bad faith.
The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall
continue to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one
is agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are
equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of
the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining
process, a departure from the general rule is warranted.

PHILIPPINE
APPLIANCE
CORPORATION vs.
CA

A bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. True, it may

nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when the giving of
such bonus has been the companys long and regular practice. To be
considered a "regular practice," however, the giving of the bonus should have
been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been
consistent and deliberate. The test or rationale of this rule on long practice
requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving
the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the
law requiring payment thereof.

NEPATCO vs. NLRC The rule although a CBA has expired, it continues to have legal effects as
between the parties until a new CBA has been entered into. It is the duty
of both parties to the CBA to keep the status quo, and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during
the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
The benefits under the CBA in the instant case should be extended to
those employees who only became such after the year 1984. To exclude
them would constitute undue discrimination and deprive them of
monetary benefits they would otherwise be entitled to under a new
collective bargaining contract to which they would have been parties.
Since in this particular case, no new agreement had been entered into after
the CBA's stipulated term, it is only fair and just that the employees hired

thereafter be included in the existing CBA. This is in consonance with our

ruling that the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining
agreement continue to have force and effect even beyond the stipulated
term when no new agreement is executed by and between the parties to
avoid or prevent the situation where no collective bargaining
agreement at all would govern between the employer company and its
employees.
MSMG-UWL vs.
RAMOS

Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the
collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals
pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the
fundamental requirement of due process.
The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this
is not without limitation. The employer is bound to exercise caution in
terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made
upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, . . . Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due
process must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not
only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should respect
and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor.
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its
autonomy. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is
free to serve the interests of all its members including the freedom to
disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the federation to which it
belongs when circumstances warrant, in accordance with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.

MANILA
MANDARIN
EMPLOYEE'S
UNION vs. NLRC

A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds

himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must
continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is
"the most prized achievement of unionism." It adds membership and
compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise of employment
in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity. It is a very effective form of
union security agreement.
This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and
such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of
the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.