FIRST DIVISION

BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S.

RAMISCAL, JR.,
Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 169727-28

- versus SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division)

Promulgated:
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
August 18, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the
Resolution[1] of the Sandiganbayan (4th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 28022 and 28023, as well as its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and on
National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) carried out an extensive joint inquiry into
the coup rumors and the alleged anomalies in the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits
Systems
(AFP-RSBS). In its Report dated December 23, 1998, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, among others, the
anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and
described the modus operandi of the perpetrators as follows:
The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions with two deeds of sale. One
deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed). Another deed of sale would be signed by
the seller or seller and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed).
The devious gimmicking was uncovered by your Committee which also found out that the buying prices
stated in the unilateral deeds did not match those stated in the bilateral deeds. To borrow a word from lawyers, the
consideration (i.e., prices) in the unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral deeds of sale did not tally even if
they covered the same transaction.
Without exception, the deed(s) signed by the seller(s) only (unilateral deeds) were the one registered
with the registrar (sic) of deeds. These Unilateral Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid by the
System to the buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The motivation was obviously to evade
payment of the correct taxes to the government and save money for the seller(s), broker(s) and who knows,
probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officials of RSBS, the buyer.
xxxx
The bilateral deeds were kept in the dark files [of] the System over the years. They were uncovered only
recently as a result of your Committees investigation. Your Committee submits that the reason why the bilateral
deeds were kept in the vaults of the System was to justify the huge lot payments made by the System just in case
any soldier-member of RSBS would be bold or curious enough to inquire about the matter directly with the
System. The curious soldier would then be shown the bilateral deed to impress upon him/her that indeed the
System has spent huge amounts for the purchase of the lots in question.
Until the investigation uncovered the anomaly, the matter of the two sets of documents covering the
purchases of the same parcels of land made by the System were, like the Clinton-Lewinsky trysts, kept from the
prying eyes officials of the System but so unfair because the public continues to shoulder, in behalf of the RSBS,
the payments for the pension and retirement benefits of the soldiers. (Emphasis supplied)

TheInitialReportoftheSenateBlueRibbonCommittee,whichwascitedbytheFelicianoCommissioninits
ReporttothePresidentofthePhilippines,includedthefollowingdiscussion:

Essentially,theBlueRibbonCommitteefoundthattherealestatepurchasesbyRSBSwereuniformly
documented,bytwo(2)setsofinstruments:Firstly,aunilateralcoveringthesamepieceofland,executedbothby
thesellerandbyRSBSasbuyer.Thepricestatedinthesecondbilateralinstrumentwasinvariablymuchhigher
thanthepricereflectedintheunilateraldeedofsale.Thediscrepanciesbetweenthepurchasepricebookedby
RSBSandthepurchasepricereflectedintheunilateraldeedofsaleactuallyregisteredintherelevantRegistryof
Deeds,totaledaboutsevenhundredthreemillionpesos(P703Million).Thetwosetsofpurchasepricefigures
obviouslycouldnotbothbecorrectatthesametime.EitherthepurchasepricebookedandpaidoutbyRSBSwas
thetruepurchasepriceofthelandinvolved,inwhichcaseRSBShadobviouslyassistedorabettedthesellerin
grosslyunderstatingthecapitalgainsrealizedbyhimandindefraudingtheNationaltreasury;orthepurchaseprice
intheunilateraldeedofsalewastheconsiderationactuallyreceivedbythesellerfromRSBS,inwhichcase,the
buyerRSBShadgrosslyoverpaid,withthedifferential,inthebeliefoftheSenateBlueRibbonCommittee,going
intothepocketsofRSBSofficials.Athirdpossibilitywasthatthedifferentialbetweenthepurchasepricebooked
andpaidbythebuyerRSBSandthesellingpriceadmittedbytheselleroftheland,hadbeensharedbythebuyer
andsellerinsomeundisclosedratio.[2]

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to prosecute and/or cause the prosecution
of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the
acquisition of certain parcels of land, Ombudsman Investigators Ricardo Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio
Alejandrino of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They
executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint,[3] stating that based on their findings, the following may be charged with
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019: petitioner B/Gen.
Jose Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-RSBS president; Atty. Meinrado Enrique Bello, Head of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department
in charge of Land Acquisition; Capt. Perfecto Enrique Quilicot, AFP-RSBS Project Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land
Acquisition; and Notaries Public Alfredo Nasser and Manuel Satuito.
The matter was further looked into by a panel of Ombudsman Investigators, which issued on March 30, 2001 a
Joint Resolution[4] finding probable cause to file the corresponding Informations for 148 counts of violation of Article 315,
in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Meinrado
Bello and Atty. Manuel Satuito. However, it was likewise recommended that the complaint against petitioner be
dismissed, without prejudice to a thorough fact-finding investigation on his liability in light of this Courts ruling in Arias
v. Sandiganbayan.[5]
The Ombudsman did not act on this recommendation. Instead, another panel of prosecutors was directed to
review the Joint Resolution and conduct a thorough investigation of the case. After conducting clarificatory hearings, the
investigating panel issued a Memorandum[6] dated June 15, 2004, recommending to the Ombudsman that petitioner be
charged with 148 counts of estafa through falsification of public documents, and one count violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. Petitioners allegation that he merely relied on the legal staff of the AFP-RSBS when he signed the
unregistered bilateral deeds of sale was considered untenable. The panel declared that the deeds were used purposely to
facilitate the payment of amounts in excess of that paid to the landowners. Moreover, petitioner, as AFP-RSBS president,
could not claim that he was merely involved in top- level policy implementation.
The Memorandum also stated that the AFP-RSBS had an Investment Committee tasked to screen project
proposals, which was headed by petitioner, Oscar Martinez and other AFP-RSBS officers; these potential investments
were then elevated for further screening and approval to the Executive Committee, of which petitioner and Martinez were
also members. The panel found that petitioner knew of the unilateral deeds of sale, considering that they were duly
registered with the Register of Deeds and titles were issued on the basis thereof. The investigating panel clarified that the
ruling of this Court in Arias does not apply because petitioners participation consisted of signing and approving

documents prepared by his subordinates relative to the transactions, from the time of conceptualization until payment by
AFP-RSBS.
The panel further found that the culpability of petitioner, Quilicot, Bello and Satuito is evidenced by the fact that
they signed documents in manifest bad faith, with full knowledge of the anomalous transactions. The bilateral deeds of
absolute sale were prepared by the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS where Bello and Satuito were assigned, later enabling
them to amass enormous profits. The investigating panel confirmed the observations of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee as follows:
We have also noted that in all the 148 transactions of lot acquisition, the Bilateral Deeds of Sale never bore
the marks/annotations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, as would
always appear, if they were used as basis for transfer of title. These Bilateral Deeds of Sale were attached to the
payment vouchers to justify the payment of the much higher price considerations of the acquired lots, yet, no one of
the respondents and the concerned AFP-RSBS officials and employees questioned the fact that the Bilateral Deeds
of Sale never bore the marks and annotations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue indicative that the proper taxes have
been paid nor that of the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas particularly the assigned Entry Number and the
date of said entry as reflected in its Primary Entry Book.
From the concerted silence and inaction of the respondents on the glaring irregularities attendant to the
transaction, we can draw the conclusion that these officers of the AFP-RSBS who passed upon the Disbursement
Voucher and the Status Transaction Forms were aware of the forgeries and the result thereof. All the respondents
were acting under a common design and purpose to give a semblance of regularity to the acquisition of the subject
one hundred forty eight (148) lots at a price very much higher than what was actually paid to the individual lot
owners. The element of conspiracy was therefore present.[7]

The panel opined that the AFP-RSBS funds used to purchase the parcels of land were trust funds and for
administration purposes.[8] Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, the charter of the AFP-RSBS, intended to create
a trust fund for the specific purpose of benefiting the members of the armed forces, hence contributions thereto were
compulsory. Since soldiers and military personnel rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement,
pension and separation benefits, petitioner and his co-officers occupy positions of trust, with obligations and
responsibilities akin to those imposed on directors and officers of a corporation; and considering that the responsible
officers are not mere directors but trustees, there is all the more reason to apply the fiduciary relationship principle in this
case.
The Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the Panel of Prosecutors without prejudice to the liability of
the landowners involved in the transactions.
Petitioner and his co-accused filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the investigating panels June
15, 2004 Memorandum. Petitioner alleged the following:
1. RESPONDENT RAMISCALS PARTICIPATION IN THE SUBJECT SALE TRANSACTIONS, WHICH
WERE DULY APPROVED BY THE RSBS BOARD, WAS PURELY MINISTERIAL AS PART OF HIS
LIMITED FUNCTIONS AS PRESIDENT OF RSBS.
2. THE CONSPIRACY THEORY LINKING RESPONDENT RAMISCAL TO THE CHARGES IS DEVOID OF
FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASIS. IN FACT, THE MEMORANDUM FAILED TO SHOW, AS THERE IS
NONE (SIC) ANY OVERT ACT OF CONSPIRACY COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
3. IN ANY EVENT, THE CHARGES OF FALSIFICATION BASED ON THE BILATERAL DEEDS HAVE NO
LEGAL LEG TO STAND ON AS AGAINST RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
4. MORE THAN THAT, THE CHARGES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) R.A. 3019 HAVE
NO FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASES INASMUCH AS THE AMOUNTS PAID BY AFP-RSBS TO THE
VENDORS ARE THOSE THAT WERE INDICATED IN THE BILATERAL DEEDS OF SALE, HENCE, NO

UNWARRANTED BENEFITS WERE AFFORDED THE SELLERS NOR DID THE [AFP-RSBS] AND THE
GOVERNMENT SUFFER UNDUE INJURY INCIDENT THERETO.[9]

On September 27, 2004, the Panel of Prosecutors issued a Memorandum [10] to the Ombudsman recommending
that the motion be denied, which the latter duly approved.
Thereafter, the panel of Prosecutors and the Special Prosecutors had a series of meetings with the Ombudsman,
where it was agreed upon that only five Informations for estafa through falsification of public documents and five
Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 would be initially filed with the Sandiganbayan instead of the
148 counts previously recommended by the Ombudsman. This was due to the lack of prosecutors who would handle the
voluminous cases.[11]
Of the Informations filed, two were raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, one of which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28022 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The accusatory portion reads:
That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas and Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused public officers,
namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., a high-ranking public official, being then the President
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement, Separation and Benefit System (AFP-RSBS); Atty. Meinrado
Enrique A. Bello, Head of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal
Division; Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and certain John and John Does, also of the AFPRSBS, a government entity, being a government owned or controlled corporation, while in the performance of their
official functions and committing the offense in relation to their office, acting with evident bad faith, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with private individuals John Does and Jane Does, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to AFP-RSBS and its members by purchasing a parcel
of land covering an area of seven thousand five hundred eighty-two square meters (7,582 sq. m.), more or less,
situated at Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of Marianito V. Plaza, Glicerio V. Plaza and Petra Maunahan
and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT 65973 of the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, under a bilateral Deed
of Absoute Sale dated April 23, 1997, making it appear therein that the afore-described real property was sold by the
said owners and purchased by the AFP-RSBS, represented by accused BGen. Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., for the
amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR
PESOS (P1,531,564.00), Philippine Currency, paid under AFP-RSBS General Voucher No. 61789 dated May 28,
1997 with corresponding Philippine National Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997, when in truth and in fact,
accused knew fully well that the true and real consideration thereof is only TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00), Philippine Currency, as correctly indicated in a
unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1997 executed by the said owners, thereby resulting to an overprice
of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00) to
the damage and prejudice of AFP-RSBS and its members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

The other, for estafa thru falsification of public documents, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023. The
accusatory portion reads:
That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas and Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused public officers,
namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., a high ranking public official, being then the President
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement Separation and Benefit System (AFP-RSBS); Atty. Meinrado
Enrique A. Bello, Head of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal
Division;Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and certain John and Jane Does, also of the AFPRSBS, a government entity, being a government owned or controlled corporation, while in the performance of their
official functions and committing the offense in relation to their office, acting with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with private individuals John
Does and Jane Does, and with intent to defraud the AFP-RSBS and its members, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified a bilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 23, 1997
covering seven thousand five hundred eighty-two square meters (7,582 sq. m.), more or less, of real property
situated at Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of Marianito V. Plaza, Glicerio V. Plaza and Petra Maunahan

and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT 65973 of the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, by making it appear
therein that the aforedescribed real property was sold by the said owners and purchased by the AFP-RSBS,
represented by accused BGen. Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., for the overpriced amount of ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00), Philippine
Currency, from its funds held by the accused AFP-RSBS officials in trust and for administration, when in truth and
in fact, accused knew fully well that the true and real consideration thereof is only TWO HUNDRED TWENTYSEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00), Philippine Currency, as correctly
indicated in a unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1997 executed by the said owners, and thereafter, to
facilitate the payment of the said overpriced amount by the AFP-RSBS, the accused used the said falsified bilateral
Deed of Absolute Sale as supporting document, among others, to the AFP-RSBS General Voucher No. 61789 dated
May 28, 1997, and relying on said fraudulent acts, AFP-RSBS released the amount of ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00) by way of
Philippine National Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997, which amount included the overprice of ONE
MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00) and which
the accused subsequently misappropriated and converted to their personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the AFP-RSBS and its members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]

Raffled to the First Division of the anti-graft court were two other cases docketed as Criminal Case No.
28026[14] for
violation
of
Section
3(e)
of
[15]
R.A. 3019, and Criminal Case No. 28027 for estafa through falsification of public documents. Criminal Case No.
28028[16] for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Criminal Case No. 28029 [17] for estafa through falsification of
public documents were raffled to the Second Division, while Criminal Case No. 28021 [18] for estafa through falsification
of public documents was raffled to the Third Division. Criminal Case No. 28024 [19] for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 and Criminal Case No. 28025[20]for estafa through falsification of public documents were raffled to the Fifth
Division.
Petitioner filed in the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court (in Criminal Case Nos. 28022 and 28023) an Urgent
Motion for Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and Consolidate All Cases in One Information with Prayer to Defer
Issuance of An Arrest Warrant Pending Resolution Hereof. [21] The Sandiganbayan denied the motion onJanuary 17, 2005,
holding that the judicial determination of probable cause is not an adversarial proceeding but summary in nature. While it
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, it resolved to hold in abeyance the resolution on the matter
of consolidation of all the cases until after it had acquired jurisdiction over their persons. [22] After petitioner posted bail
for his provisional release, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for the consolidation of the cases, considering that the
other cases filed were pending in its other divisions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution and sought to have the cases dismissed for lack of
probable cause.[23] He alleged that, in finding probable cause, the Sandiganbayan merely relied on the findings of the
Ombudsman and did not take into account the other affidavits on record. The Sandiganbayan again denied the motion
on February 22, 2005.[24]
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash [25] in Criminal Cases Nos. 28022 and 28023 on the following
grounds:
I.

This Court has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged in both Informations;

II.

In Criminal Case No. 28023 (estafa through falsification), the facts charged being an essential part of the
continuing crime of Estafa separately charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 28021, 28025, 28027 and 28029,
pending in the 3rd, 1st, 5th and 2nd divisions, respectively, only one Information must be filed for all these
cases including those covered by the OSP memorandum dated June 15, 2004; and,

III.

In Criminal Case No. 20822 (violation of RA No. 3019), the said case is abated by Criminal Case No. 20823
(Estafa through falsification) because the very facts alleged in the former are also the very facts alleged in
the latter.[26]

On June 2, 2005, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny the motion, holding that contrary to petitioners claim,
it had jurisdiction over the crimes charged. [27] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied
on August 17, 2005.[28] Petitioner then posted bail for his provisional liberty.
When arraigned on September 1, 2005, petitioner refused to enter a plea, prompting the anti-graft court to enter a
plea of not guilty in both cases.[29]
On October 7, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the said
Resolution be nullified on the following grounds:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE OMBUDSMANS FINDING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE COMMISSION OF ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT (148) COUNTS OF
ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT
(148) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE
INFORMATIONS.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATIONS AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE CASES NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 28023 (ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE FACTS
CHARGED THEREIN WERE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ONE CONTINUING CRIME OF ESTAFA
SEPARATELY CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 28021, 28025, 28027 AND 28029, PENDING IN THE
THIRD, FIRST, FIFTH AND SECOND DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPECTIVELY,
CONSIDERING THAT BASED ON THE DOCUMENTS ADDUCED BY THE PEOPLE AND FOR OBVIOUS
WANT OF RELIABLE EVIDENCE, ONLY ONE INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED
FOR ALL THESE CASES INCLUDING THE REMAINING ONE HUNDRED FORTY THREE (143) COUNTS
COVERED BY THE OSP MEMORANDUM DATED JUNE 15, 2004, ANNEX T;
IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 20822 (VIOLATION OF RA NO. 3019) NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAID CASE WAS
ABATED BY CRIMINAL CASE NO. 20823 (ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION) BECAUSE THE VERY
FACTS ALLEGED IN THE FORMER WERE ALSO THE VERY FACTS ALLEGED IN THE LATTER, THUS
VIOLATING THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY.[30]

Petitioner insists that, in finding probable cause against him for estafa through falsification of public document
and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, as it relied solely on the Memorandum of the investigation panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors. He posits that it
behooved the anti-graft court to review the Ombudsmans findings and scrutinize the evidence, the affidavits on record,
including the transcript of stenographic notes. As gleaned from the Joint Resolution dated March 30, 2001, the initial
finding of the Ombudsman Prosecutors was that there was no probable cause to charge him for the acts complained of, in
the light of the Courts ruling in the Arias case. He asserts that there was no evidence of bad faith on his part relative to
the deeds of sale subject of the Informations filed against him. He insists that based on the Joint Resolution, and even the
report of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, he had no part whatsoever in the commission of the crimes charged. The
disparity of the prices of the properties in the bilateral deeds of sale, vis--vis the unilateral deeds of sale, do not support

the finding of probable cause against him made by the investigating panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors. Petitioner asserts
that there is no evidence on record that he conspired with the other accused in the commission of the crimes charged.
Petitioner further posits that the Sandiganbayan likewise committed grave abuse of its discretion when it found
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him instead of setting the case for hearing. He insists that the
anti-graft court failed to consider the other evidence on record and erred in relying solely on the evaluation and resolution
of the investigating panel of Prosecutors; the fact that he posted bail bonds for his provisional liberty does not estop him
from raising the issue in his Motion to Quash.
Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged as provided in Section 4 of
R.A. 8249. He insists that the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that he does not fall
under Salary Grade 27 as required in Section 4 of the law, inasmuch as his position as AFP-RSBS President is not even
included under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989. Petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan[31] to support his claim.
Petitioner asserts that the charges filed against him constitute only one crime of estafa through falsification of
public document, in the nature of delito continuado, or a series of repetition of the same acts arising from one and the
same criminal intent. He maintains that while there are 148 bilateral deeds of sale signed by him and 145 unilateral deeds
of sale signed by the sellers, it cannot thereby be concluded that he is criminally liable for each deed executed. The
number of transactions purportedly entered into is not a gauge in ascertaining criminal intent for the several transactions.
The best test should be the presence of clear, convincing and positive evidence showing distinct criminal intent for each
sales transaction, which in any event, is wanting in this case. Petitioner further alleges that for multiple transactions to be
considered as separate and distinct crimes, there must be a series of acts with individual sellers such as (a) negotiations;
(b) discussion of the terms of the sale; (c) finalizing the terms thereof; and (d) instruction to prepare payment and (e)
actual payment. He points out that there is no evidence that he and the other accused involved ever met with any of the
sellers. While he admits the possibility that he could have signed the bilateral deeds of sale in one sitting, he insists that
these documents were notarized separately; there is even no evidence on record that the sellers of the property transacted
separately with him. He points out that the corporate officers of AFP-RSBS, especially its President, do not personally
deal with any of the sellers. The bare fact that he executed the bilateral deeds of sale and that the project was approved by
the higher level of the management, cannot lead to the conclusion that he took part in the implementation of the
transactions.
Petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess
of jurisdiction in filing the charges against him. He insists that the delictual acts contained in the two Informations,
Criminal Case No. 28022 (for violation of R.A. 3019) and Criminal Case No. 28023 (for estafa through falsification of
public document), are one and the same; to charge him under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 despite his indictment for estafa is
to duplicate the very same charge under another name, which under the principle of double jeopardy, is proscribed. He
further argues that while it is true that, in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the charge against him for said crime is in addition
to his criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code, the phrase connotes cumulativeness and simultaneity of liability.
Petitioner points out that the panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors recommended the filing of only one count of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, but the Ombudsman filed five (5) counts thereof.
The issues are the following: (1) whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioner for estafa through falsification of public
document and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019;
(2) whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioner for the issuance of
warrants for petitioners arrest without first conducting a hearing; (3) whether petitioner may be charged and prosecuted

for five (5) counts of estafa thru falsification of public documents; and (4) whether petitioner may be prosecuted for both
estafa through falsification of a public document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 without violating his right
against double jeopardy.
The petition has no merit.
On the first issue, the rule is that as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the
determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that
belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion,
whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. Whether
or not the Ombudsman has correctly discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct assessment of the
evidence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court may not be compelled to pass upon.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsmans investigatory power, exercised through the
Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause, [32] except when the
finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such case, the aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [33] Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take
essential facts into consideration in the determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion. [34] As we ruled
in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), [35] a writ of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied.[36]

In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to charge him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 and for estafa through falsification of a public document.
We are not convinced by petitioners claim that there is no probable cause on record for the filing of the
Information against him. It bears stressing that probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would
justify conviction.[37] The Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against petitioner is buttressed by his encompassing
and comprehensive resolution, independent of the findings of the Senate Committees, as well as the documents appended
to the Informations. Petitioners bare claim to the contrary cannot prevail over such positive findings of the Ombudsman.
In fine, the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause prevails over petitioners bare allegations of grave abuse of
discretion; that he was not involved in the step-by-step consummation of the anomalous transaction; and that as President
he was involved only in the top level policy formulation and implementation.
It is true that in the Joint Resolution dated March 30, 2001, the Panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors found no
sufficient evidence that petitioner acted in bad faith and that he merely relied on the recommendations of his subordinates.
However, after a thorough investigation, another panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors found that, indeed, petitioner not
merely relied on the recommendations of his subordinates but likewise perpetrated overt acts, which, along with those of
the other accused, resulted in the consummation of the crimes charged. Thus, as maintained by the respondents in their

Comment on the petition, petitioner signed documents, indicating his evident bad faith on the highly anomalous
transactions; petitioner was aware of the forgeries and anomalies in the buying of the parcels of land, yet gave his
conformity thereto, causing grave injury to its members and to the public in general. Thus, it was also found that
petitioner, together with his cohorts, conspired to perpetuate clear fraud on the government and the AFP-RSBS members
by giving a semblance of regularity to real estate acquisitions at bloated prices.
The fact alone that petitioner was aware, in each transaction, that the two (2) deeds of sale contain contradictory
costs for every acquisition, and that he failed to rectify the same eloquently speak of his participation in the criminal
malevolence. He was a member of the Investment Committee of the AFP-RSBS, which screened potential investments,
that were thereafter subjected to further screening and approval by the Executive Committee of which he was also a
member; hence, petitioner had full knowledge of the transactions, from the time they were conceptualized until the
properties were paid for. The records show that the Tanauan, Batangas properties alone were overpriced by about 600%.
Thus, petitioner consented to the crimes charged by the following overt acts:
(1) Petitioner and his co-accused prepared or caused to be prepared two (2) deeds of sale covering the same
transactions: a deed of sale with the seller or sellers as the sole signatory or signatories therein (unilateral deeds); and a
deed of sale with the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner (bilateral deeds);
(2) The considerations in the unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral deeds of sale did not tally, notwithstanding
the fact that they covered the same subject matter and transaction, with the bilateral deeds of sale bearing a bloated price;
and,
(3) Of these two deeds, the unilateral deeds of sale bore the correct value given to the seller(s) as evinced, among
others, by the fact that the same were the ones registered with the Registry of Deeds.
The bilateral deeds of sale could not possibly be the basis of the transfer of the properties because the supporting
bilateral deeds carried dates much later than the date of issue of the titles, which were likewise not filed with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas. The Court cannot supplant the findings of the
Ombudsman that the unilateral deeds of sale were prepared by the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, in as much as both
the unilateral and bilateral deeds of sale have exactly the same print and form. The residence certificate number of
petitioner which is indicated in the bilateral deeds of sale is likewise printed in the unilateral deeds. Petitioners fraudulent
intent is further proven by the fact that the Status of Transaction Form (STF), where the subject lots were endorsed for
payment, bore his signature. The unilateral deeds of sale resulted in the issuance of the titles, which were also the
supporting documents enumerated in the STF. In many instances, the bilateral deeds of sale carry dates much later than
the dates their corresponding titles were issued.
Petitioner was likewise unable to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. His bare claim that the Sandiganbayan merely relied
on the Memoranda of the Panel of Prosecutors to the Ombudsman and did not scrutinize the evidence appended thereto is
not supported by the records. In the first place, the Sandiganbayan is presumed to have performed its duty as provided in
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which can likewise be gleaned from its February 22, 2005 Resolution:
[1] While accused Ramiscal is correct in stating that this Court, in determining the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused, had evaluated the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman and its supporting documents, he is, however, wrong in presuming that such process failed to consider
the evidence the accused adduced during preliminary investigation. It should be noted that the supporting
documents submitted by the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court included, among others, the counteraffidavits submitted by the accused at the preliminary investigation. Parenthetically, there is no need, and the rules
do not require this Court, to enumerate in detail what were the supporting documents it considered in determining
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest because the same are matters of record that
the parties can easily verify.[38]

We agree with the Sandiganbayans ruling that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require cases to be
set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the accused before any warrant
may be issued. Section 6, Rule 112 mandates the judge to personally evaluate the resolution of the Prosecutor (in this

case, the Ombudsman) and its supporting evidence, and if he/she finds probable cause, a warrant of arrest or commitment
order may be issued within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or Information; in case the Judge doubts the existence
of probable cause, the prosecutor may be ordered to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice. The
provision reads in full:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation
or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence
of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information. [39]

The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must
determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayans determination of probable
cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from
his determination of probable cause by needless motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.
We hold that petitioner likewise failed to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
authority in denying his motion to quash the Information.
First. The anti-graft court correctly ruled that it has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
In People v. Sandiganbayan[40] and Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[41] this Court ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)
(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents, directors,
trustees or managers of government owned or controlled corporations. [42] Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes. [43]
As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge against
petitioner is estafa through falsification of public document in the performance of his duties and in relation to his position
as president of the AFP-RSBS.
Second. On petitioners claim that he should be charged with only one count of estafa through falsification of
public document instead of five (5) charges, respondents counter that the criminal acts petitioner and his co-accused are
not continuous crimes. Respondents argue that a continuous crime may exist only if there is only a single criminal intent
and the commission of diverse acts is merely a partial execution of said single criminal resolution. In the instant cases, the
requirement of singularity of criminal intent does not exist because there are as many criminal intents as there are
anomalous transactions, causing grave damage to the government at each instance. There was no need for the accused to
perform another or other delictual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents maintain that petitioner was motivated by
separate intents as he signed each document, all of which are criminal in character; hence, it is but proper that
corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and every act of falsification committed.
The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the contention of respondents and ruled that the determination of (a) the
charge/s and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the sound discretion of the Prosecutors based
on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of
series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution. Thus:
In the first place, the question of the number of criminal charges that must be instituted against a criminal
respondent (whether one count or multiple counts of the same offense) is one addressed to the sound discretion of

the prosecution service. It is enough, as this Court has already ruled, that the informations filed in these cases are
based on facts establishing probable cause for the offenses charged. This Court will not compel the Office of the
Ombudsman to file only one information for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents when its preliminary
investigation established the commission of several counts thereof as such action on the part of this Court would
constitute undue interference with the Office of the Ombudsmans control over the prosecution of these cases.
In the second place, this Court is not persuaded that what is involved in these cases is a continuous crime,
that is to say, a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division, with each act in that series being merely the partial execution of a single delict. On the
contrary, the Court is of the view that what is involved herein are several completed and distinct purported criminal
acts which should be prosecuted as multiple counts of the same type of offense. Thus, as correctly perceived by the
prosecution, there are as many alleged offenses as there are alleged anomalous transactions involved in these cases.
[44]

When required to comment on the motion of petitioner and his co- accused for a consolidation of the charges filed
against them before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Prosecutor objected thereto, insisting that there were as many crimes
committed by the accused as there were sales contracts forged by them.
Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters addressed to the discretion
of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner and his co-accused under the
Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito continuado or classified as concurso de
delitos; or involve separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual issues.[45] Such factual issues
should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is being tasked to determine whether the
several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his co-accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and
operated by an uninterrupted force however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the
determination of the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan. [46]
Thus, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is hardly the appropriate
remedy and forum for petitioner to ventilate the issues he has raised, as only jurisdictional issues can be resolved
therein. As eloquently expressed by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, speaking for this Court in Iligan v. Court of Appeals:[47]
If, as petitioners seem to apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a scenario of
multiple prosecutions for the same offense or, more candidly expressed, of double jeopardy, then this is neither the
procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon that possibility. For, squarely imputable to petitioners is the
evident lack of factual basis for and a grossly defective presentation of that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this
proceeding and at this time.[48]

It must be stressed that our disposition of the matters in the present recourse will not foreclose petitioners right to
ventilate the same in the Sandiganbayan, for as declared in Iligan:
However, this observation would not foreclose relief to petitioners if at the trial of this case the evidence
presented and the developments therein suffice to establish the supervening fact that indeed there could possibly be a
breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule 117, they can still hereafter raise that defense of non
bis in idem, provided that they can lay the evidentiary bases therefor and refute from the standpoint of substantive
penal law what was earlier said on the nature and the non-identity of the several crimes of Estafa involved which, to
repeat, we pronounced purely on the bases of existing records sans the benefit of any evidentiary fact since none has
been adduced.[49]

On the last issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that the crimes committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft Law do not exclude prosecution for
felonies defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and vice versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear then that one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised
Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the
Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong with Associate Justices Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada concurring; rollo, pp. 222-223.
See Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166, 190.
Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[4]
Id. at 84-109.
[5]
G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989, 180 SCRA 309.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 110-148.
[7]
Id. at 139-140.
[8]
In its Final Report No. 51, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee made the following findings on the nature of the AFP-RSBS funds:
By pouring in the Systems money in highly speculative investments, the RSBS managers, including Ramiscal, violated the spirit, if not the letter, of its charter. By its very nature, the
Systems funds are trust funds. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Ramiscal and other responsible officials of the RSBS to exercise utmost prudence and use the Systems funds only
in a conservative, secure manner in order to protect the soldiers money. (Emphasis supplied)
[9]
Rollo, p. 151.
[10]
Id at 150-161.
[11]
Id. at 163.
[12]
Id. at 165-167.
[13]
Id. at 169-171.
[14]
Id. at 173-176.
[15]
Id. at 177-180.
[16]
Id. at 181-184.
[17]
Id. at 185-188.
[18]
Id. at 193-196.
[19]
Id. at 197-200.
[20]
Id. at 201-204.
[21]
Id. at 205-220.
[22]
Id. at 222-223.
[23]
Id. at 224-232.
[24]
Id. at 233-235.
[25]
Id. at 236-249.
[26]
Id. at 236-237.
[27]
Id. at 250-260.
[28]
Id. at 268-273.
[29]
Id. at 274.
[30]
Id. at 23.
[31]
G.R. No. 143047, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 388.
[32]
Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 500 (2002).
[33]
Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, 344 Phil. 323, 329 (1997).
[34]
Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 129 (2002).
[35]
430 Phil. 101 (2002).
[36]
Id. at 113.
[37]
Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 922, 923 (1996), citing Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652.
[38]
Rollo, p. 233.
[39]
In Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC dated August 26, 2005, which took effect October 3, 2005, the rule reads:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint or information.
[2]
[3]

Rule 1, Section 2, of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan provides:

The Rules of Court, resolutions, circulars, and other issuances promulgated by the Supreme Court relating to or affecting the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals,
insofar as applicable, shall govern all actions and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
[40]

G.R. No. 141951, August 12, 2003, 408 SCRA 672.

G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166.
The provision reads in full:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or-controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
[43]
The pertinent portion reads [o]ther offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
[41]
[42]

[44]

Rollo, p. 256.
In People v. Zapata and Bondoc, 88 Phil. 688, 691 (1951), the Court held that [f]or a delito continuado to exist, there should be plurality of acts committed separately during a period of
time or even as to same occasions; unity of penal provisions infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
[46]
See Mallari v. People, No. L-58886, December 13, 1998, 168 SCRA 422, 429.
[47]
G.R. No. 110617, December 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 575.
[45]

[48]
[49]

Id. at 590.
Id.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in
Criminal
Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan,
disqualified
from
acting
in
said
criminal
case;
and
(b)
the
Resolution
of
said
court
promulgated
on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified"
aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v.
Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that
said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section
10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on
November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case
for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and
that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The motion stated that while the
information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and
advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of
the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On
November
12,
1992
and
upon
motion
of
petitioner
in
G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the
arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that they would file
only one amended information against petitioner.
However,
on
December
8,
1992,
the
prosecution
filed
admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

motion

to

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his
disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations and
ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice ( Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on

the
32
Amended
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).

Informations

was

set

for

Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding
Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this
Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations
and
from
proceeding
with
the
arraignment
on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of
the Philippine
Star,
which
to
petitioner
"prejudged"
the
validity
of
the
information
filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he has
subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine
Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said
order reflected a "perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would stop
Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some
of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores without Mr.
Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what
Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam
but I contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to travel, whether the
Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at
Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where her petition is still pending ( Rollo, p.
158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged
before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in
connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the
legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue
the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the
dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have
to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly,
there would have been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three
justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606,
Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).

Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the
information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction
on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the complexity of the issues
involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported
in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was
first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution
for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a draft
resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of
the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is selfdefeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children
of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan
erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603
[1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in
good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of
persons qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the
Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other words
the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable
element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there may be
instances where both elements concur.

Re: Delito continuado

Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended
Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information ( Rollo,
pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the
splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into
the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one
information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as
"continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has
been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of
penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind
of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp.
53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same time and at the
same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time
(People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437
[1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf
of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156
[1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services
rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975
[1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the
other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on
two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said offenses
committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one
purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the
installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine
(People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made
on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special
laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits
(People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special
laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses has troubled also
American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to
the same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate
larceny doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the
government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims
(annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous
act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v.
Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for
the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate
charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d
1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her approving the
application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law Executive Order
No.
324
dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or
about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word
"aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one amended
information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the accusation against
Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications of 32
foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding directly to
the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations
but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done
by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single
harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is concerned,
the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect
on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and
its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one
information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the majority opinion inMiriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado
Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the issues there
involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by
Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one Information
under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations, for that court seriously erred in not
granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my dissenting
opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205 SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce
here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being the Commissioner of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not
allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said
accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved
applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the
position that the Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988,
was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which
provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may prescribe.

Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of
passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other things, that the alien "must
establish that he entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an
unlawful status from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It
is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the
spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter being alien spouses or parents who had entered the Philippines before
January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements under Executive Order No . 324 to apply
for waiver of passport requirements and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved such
"legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No.
324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324
with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was expressly authorized and
obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue
rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and administration of Executive
Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and
hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may waive
exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become public
charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates to a single
offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security and members of
subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in
two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this Act. 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be
granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted official acts of
petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no question that the
applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved
by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses and minor
children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is
similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that the fees specified in
paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use. It may be noted,
incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and
minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad
faith and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered absolutely no
basis for such an allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the preliminary
investigation showed noundue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or advantage" to the aliens outside of the
simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In
other
words, if
the
interpretation
or
construction
given
by
petitioner
to
Executive
Order
No. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children,
arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who
were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in

the interest of allowing or restoring family unity there would be no "injury," let alone an "undue injury," to the Government.
Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be
deemed
to
be
an
"unwarranted"
benefit
to
such
aliens if
petitioner's
interpretation
of
Executive
Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing
regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a stature or regulation, are
entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations
rendered by such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v.
Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an
administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible for such
interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as
firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error of
judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v.
Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on
which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to prevent this Court from
addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart from those already
admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this Court resolved at
the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and
expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime .Indeed, if the acts which
petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the administration of law
and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal information here would appear to be that public
officers interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding
the absence of any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and
ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The
Information,
quoted
internally
above,
was
filed
in
Criminal
Case
No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still going on, and
indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which
petitioner in effect had asked us to rule inSantiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I
respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal
trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations.
Romero, J., concurs.
# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the majority opinion inMiriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado
Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the issues there
involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by Mr.
Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one Information
under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations, for that court seriously erred in not
granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my dissenting
opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205 SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce
here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner as follows:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being the Commissioner of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not
allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said
accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved
applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the
position that the Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988,
was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which
provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of
passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other things, that the alien "must
establish that he entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an
unlawful status from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It
is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the
spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter being alien spouses or parents who had entered the Philippines before
January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements under Executive Order No . 324 to apply
for waiver of passport requirements and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved such
"legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No.
324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324
with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was expressly authorized and
obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue
rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and administration of Executive
Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and
hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may waive
exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become public
charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates to a single
offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security and members of
subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)

Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in
two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this Act. 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be
granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted official acts of
petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no question that the
applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved
by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses and minor
children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is
similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that the fees specified in
paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use. It may be noted,
incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and
minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad
faith and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered absolutely no
basis for such an allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the preliminary
investigation showed noundue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or advantage" to the aliens outside of the
simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In
other
words, if
the
interpretation
or
construction
given
by
petitioner
to
Executive
Order
No. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children,
arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who
were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in
the interest of allowing or restoring family unity there would be no "injury," let alone an "undue injury," to the Government.
Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be
deemed
to
be
an
"unwarranted"
benefit
to
such
aliens if
petitioner's
interpretation
of
Executive
Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing
regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a stature or regulation, are
entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations
rendered by such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v.
Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an
administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible for such
interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as
firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error of
judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v.
Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on
which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to prevent this Court from
addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart from those already
admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this Court resolved at
the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and
expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime .Indeed, if the acts which
petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the administration of law
and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal information here would appear to be that public
officers interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding
the absence of any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and
ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The
Information,
quoted
internally
above,
was
filed
in
Criminal
Case
No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still going on, and
indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which
petitioner in effect had asked us to rule inSantiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I
respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal
trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations.
Romero, J., concurs.

# Footnotes
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
1
Gutierrez,
Grio-Aquino
and
Romero, JJ., joined
in
the
Herrera, J. wrote a separate opinion, but adopted the substantive points made in my dissenting opinion.

dissent.

Melencio

2 It is also pertinent to note the following classes of excluded aliens:

(10) Persons who are members of a family accompanying an excluded alien, unless in the opinion of the Commissioner of
Immigration no hardship would result from their admission;
(11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who is helpless from mental or physical disability or infancy, when the protection or
guardianship of such accompanying person or persons is required by the excluded persons, as shall be determined by the
Commissioner of Immigration;
(12) Children under fifteen years of age, unaccompanied by or not coming to a parent, except that any such children may be
admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration, if otherwise admissible;
xxx xxx xxx"
(Section 29 (a), C.A. No. 613, as amended; emphasis supplied)