Remedial Law Review Cases Rule 72-91

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats
G.R. No. 128781
August 6, 2002
TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and the HEIRS

NICOLAS, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P. INVENTOR
NICOLAS, respondents.
"3. A more complete list of the properties to be collated is as follows:

OF
and
ANTONIO
RAMON
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m., xerox copy hereto
attached as Annex "A", distributed as follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde, under TCT No. V-554 of Valenzuela
Bulacan (Annex "B"), and later sold by Estrellita to Amelia Lim Sy for P3,405,612.00 and the
Deed of Sale hereto attached as Annex "B-1";
"1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas, xerox copy hereto attached as Annex "C";
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which prays
that the Decision dated February 28, 1997 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1997 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42958, 1 be set aside; and, that another judgment be
entered ordering the Presiding Judge of Branch 123 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City to give due course to petitioners notice of appeal, to approve their record on appeal and
to elevate the records of Sp. Proc. No. C-1679 to respondent appellate court for further
proceedings.
The factual background:
Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C.
Nicolas in Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Rafael C.
Nicolas". Said case was subsequently consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C-1810 2 and Civil Case
No. C-17407.3 Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner
Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner
Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas
and Roberto Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositorapplicant in the
intestate proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas,
during his lifetime, had given the following real properties to his children by gratuitous title
and that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent:
"1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m. distributed as
follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde
1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
2. Title No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. given to son Antonio
Nicolas
3. Title No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. given to daughter
Teresita N. de Leon (herein petitioner)
4. Title No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283 sq. m. given to son Antonio
Nicolas
5. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N.
de Leon
6. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. given to son Ramon (OppositorApplicant herein)
7. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Ramon but was
somehow transferred to Antonio Nicolas, and the property is now titled in the name of the
latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas."
xxx
xxx
x x x."4
On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon "to submit pertinent
documents relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their
lifetime for proper determination of the court if such properties should be collated, and set it
for hearing with notice to the present registered owners to show cause why their properties
may not be included in the collation of properties." 5
On October 10, 1994, respondent Ramon filed an Amended Motion for Collation specifying the
properties to be collated and attaching to said motion, the documents in support thereof, to
wit:
2. Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m.
and TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. "given to daughter
Teresita N. de Leon by a Deed of Sale, xerox copies are hereto attached as Annex "D", "D-1"
and "D-2";
The 4,000 sq. m. lot was sold by Petitioner Teresita for the amount of P1,888,000.00, xerox
copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "D-3";
4. Son Antonio received additional properties under a Deed of Sale, hereto attached as Annex
"E", which are those covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283
sq. m.; TCT No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. and TCT No. T10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m., xerox copies hereto attached as
Annexes "E-1", "E-2" and "E-3";
The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. is supposedly earmarked for Oppositor-applicant Ramon but
was somehow included in the Deed of Sale to son Antonio, and the property is now titled in
the name of the latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas;
5. TCT No. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. where the ancestral
home is presently located;
6. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,876 sq. m. and sold for
P850,000.00, hereto attached as Annex "F";
7. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,501 sq. m. and sold for
P200,000.00, hereto attached as Annex "G";
xxx
xxx
x x x."6
A comparison with the original motion for collation reveals that the amended motion refers to
the same real properties enumerated in the original except Nos. 6 and 7 above which are not
found in the original motion.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit:
"Acting on the Amended Motion for Collation filed by oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas
and the comment thereto filed by petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds the following
properties to be collated to the estate properties under present administration, to wit:
(1). 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas described in paragraph 1.2 of the Amended
Motion For Collation, marked as Annex "C"; (the xerox copy of the transfer certificate of title in
the name of Antonio Nicolas did not state "the number and the technical description of the
property. The administratrix should get hold of a certified copy of the title of Antonio Nicolas
about subject property;
(2). Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq.
m. and TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to
daughter Teresita N. de Leon by a Deed of Sale;
(3). The property covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an area of 283 sq.
m.; the property covered by TCT No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an area of 1,000
sq. m. and another property covered by TCT No. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an
area of 310 sq. m. xerox copies of which are attached to the Amended Motion For Collation,
marked as Annexes "E1", "E-2" and "E-3";
(4). The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas which property is now
titled in the name of the latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas.
"Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered to include the foregoing properties which
were received from the decedent for collation in the instant probate proceedings.
"SO ORDERED."7

We note that only those lots described under paragraphs 3.1.2, 3.2 and 4 of the "Amended
Motion for Collation" were ordered included for collation.1wphi1.nt
On November 18, 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that the properties subject of the Order "were already titled in their names years
ago"8 and that titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On February 23,
1995, the RTC issued an Order denying said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of
the court to determine whether titled properties should be collated, 9citing Section 2, Rule 90
of the Rules of Court which provides that the final order of the court concerning questions as
to advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir.
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February
23, 199510 which respondent opposed. 11
On July 18, 1995, the RTC issued an Order, pertinent portions of which read:
"x x x Foremost to be resolved is the issue of collation of the properties of the deceased
Rafael Nicolas which were disposed by the latter long before his death. The oppositorapplicant Ramon Nicolas should prove to the satisfaction of the Court whether the properties
disposed of by the late Rafael Nicolas before the latters death was gratuitous or for valuable
consideration. The Court believes that he or she who asserts should prove whether the
disposition of the properties was gratuitously made or for valuable consideration.
The Court has already set for hearing on July 21, 1995, at 8:30 a.m., the reception and/or
presentation of evidence in the issue of collated properties disposed before the death of
Rafael Nicolas."12
On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her position as administratrix on
ground of conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for
the subject properties acquired by her from their deceased father and therefore the same
should not be included in the collation; 13 and, ordered the hearing on the collation of
properties covered by TCT No. T-V-1211 and T-V-1210 only. 14
On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the collation of the real properties
enumerated in the Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC, petitioner
Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment as
administratrix be maintained; and that the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36989, T-33658,
T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and a portion of TCT No. T-13206 described as Lot 4-A with 4,009
square meters be declared and decreed as the exclusive properties of the registered owners
mentioned therein and not subject to collation. 15
The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December 23, 1996.16
Petitioners Teresita N. de Leon, Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio Nicolas) and
the Heirs of Antonio Nicolas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction claiming that:
"I
"RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONERS OPPORTUNITY TO VENTILATE THEIR
APPEAL HE INSISTED ON HEARING THE MATTERS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF A REGULAR
ADMINISTRATOR AND COLLATION ON DECEMBER 24, 1996 AND RESETTING ITS
CONTINUATION TO JANUARY 21 and 28, 1997 INSPITE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE NOTICE OF
APPEAL AND/OR RE-AFFIRMATION OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM WHICH ACTS THERE IS NO
APPEAL NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
LAW."
"II
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE DID NOT INCLUDE
IN HIS ORDER-ANNEX J THE HEARING ON THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF TCT NOS. T-36734, T36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333 and T-10907 (WHETHER THEY ARE STILL PART OF THE
ESTATE OR SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INVENTORY/ESTATE) THEREBY ASSUMING
WITHOUT ANY BASIS THAT THESE PROPERTIES TO BE STILL PART OF THE ESTATE OF RAFAEL
NICOLAS WHEN THEY ARE NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN SOLD WAY BACK IN 1979 FOR
VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS TO PETITIONER TERESITA N. DE LEON AND ANTONIO NICOLAS
HUSBAND OF PETITIONER ZENAIDA NICOLAS."17
After private respondent Ramon had filed his comment, and petitioners, their reply, and after
hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the Order dated November 11, 1994 directing
the inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael
Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of
collation; that the appeal of the petitioner from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and
December 3, 1996 removing petitioner as administratrix is timely appealed; and, observing
that the notice of appeal and record on appeal appear to be unacted upon by the RTC, the
appellate court resolved:
"WHEREFORE, while finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, he
is hereby ORDERED to act on petitioners appeal on the matter of the removal of petitioner as
administratrix.
SO ORDERED."18
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignments of error:
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED
DECISION THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1994 WAS FINAL.
"SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR</P>
"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION THAT THERE WAS NO COGENT OR COMPELLING REASON TO DISTURB THE
QUESTIONED DECISION."19
Petitioners claim that: private respondent never presented any document to prove that the
properties transferred by their deceased parents to petitioners are by gratuitous title; private
respondent never notified petitioner of any hearing on said documents to give them
opportunity to show cause why their properties should not be collated; the assailed Order
dated November 11, 1994 is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, confiscatory, depriving them of
due process; the said order is interlocutory in nature and therefore non-appealable; the
properties acquired by petitioner Teresita N. de Leon and her deceased brother Antonio
Nicolas, married to petitioner Zenaida C. Nicolas and their children, were sold to them as
evidenced by public documents; and, the properties were already titled in their respective
names or sold to third persons.
Private respondent contends that: due process has been afforded the petitioners when the
RTC resolved the issue of collation of the subject properties after hearing; petitioner
deliberately omitted certain material facts in the petition to mislead the Court because
petitioners were actually given at least three (3) times the opportunity to ventilate and
oppose the issue of collation; as stated by the appellate court in the Resolution promulgated
on February 10, 1997, both parties affirmed that the RTC had proceeded to conduct hearings
on January 21 and 28, 1997 as originally scheduled; presentation of evidence had been
terminated and the twin issues of the appointment of a new administratrix and the collation of
two (2) properties covered by TCT No. T-V-1210 and T-V-1211 were already submitted for
resolution to the court below; 20 subject properties are collatable under Articles 1601 and 1071
of the Civil Code and Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Rules of Court and the ruling in Guinguing v.
Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil. 144; petitioner failed to present evidence that there was valuable
consideration for these properties and failed to rebut the evidence that petitioners do not
have the financial capability to pay for these properties as evidenced by the testimony of
credible witnesses who are relatives of spouses decedents.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Order of November 11, 1994 had
become final for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time, we hold that said Order
is interlocutory in nature. Our pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling:
"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the
filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties,
and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law
requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court
has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased
should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in

the properties of a deceased person duly call the courts attention to the fact that certain
properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts duty
to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to
or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such
determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said
properties."21(Emphasis supplied)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, 22 can only pass upon questions
of title provisionally. 23 The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party
are expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
"The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions
of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property,
can only be settled in a separate action.
"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so." 24
Further, In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, we held:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties
is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so."25
Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in
considering the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or
third persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a
third person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims.
Private respondents reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement
made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of
the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir."
in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final order and therefore appealable and
that due to petitioners failure to appeal in due time, they are now bound by said Order, is not
feasible.
What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the aforediscussed
jurisprudence that the Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more
apparent than real. This is because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an
order of collation both by the RTC and the appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said
Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent.
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or
inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and
for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted
by the parties.
In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order of collation and an order of
exclusion from or inclusion in the estates inventory, thus:
"We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that the two
disputed lots are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the
disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of the testators estate. The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early
stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the
controversial matter of collation.
"Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustias Torrens
titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all.
How those issues should be resolved, if and when they are raised, need not be touched upon
in the adjudication of this appeal.
"The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased
Valero spouses were consolidated, as ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so
that the conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly liquidated, as
contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act No. 3176.
"We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that the proceedings have
not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir may be
raised and decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net
remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been determined. On the
other hand, up to this time, no separate action has been brought by the appellants to nullify
Mrs. Rustias Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a
donation.
"In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether
Mrs. Rustias titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not
reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
have to be determined." 27
In the light of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of Section
1 of the same Rule, to wit:
"Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application
of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such person may demand
and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs."
Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an
Order of Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate
which, as we have already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was
filed with the probate court at the early stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have
examined the records of the case and we found no indication that the debts of the decedents
spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the conjugal estate have already been
determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing of the motion for
collation were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still
premature.
And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a collation order and a final
order, still, the same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook
doctrine that a final order is appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on which it is based as mandated by Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, which provides:
"SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore."

An examination of the subject Order as quoted earlier, 28 readily reveals that the presiding
Judge failed to comply with the said constitutional mandate. The assailed Order did not state
the reasons for ordering the collation of the properties enumerated therein. The Order simply
directed the inclusion of certain real properties in the estate of the deceased. It did not
declare that the properties enumerated therein were given to the children of the deceased
gratuitously, despite the title in the childrens names or deeds of sale in their favor. Moreover,
in his Comment, private respondent makes mention of the testimonies of his witnesses but
these were not even mentioned in the Order of November 11, 1994. Petitioner would have
been deprived of due process as they would be divested of the opportunity of being able to
point out in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal, any errors of facts and/or law
considering that there were no facts or laws cited in support of the assailed Order of collation.
As a final Order, it is, on its face patently null and void. It could have never become final. A
void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to
it.29 For it to be considered as a valid final order, the RTC must then first rule and state in its
order whether the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T40333, T-10907 and the 4,009 square meter lot were acquired by petitioners from the
deceased parents of the parties by onerous or gratuitous title; and must specifically state in
its order the reasons why it ordered the subject properties collated. It is only then that the
order of collation may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the
15-day reglementary period. Until and unless the constitutional mandate is complied with,
any appeal from said Order would have been premature.
Either way therefore, whether the Order in question is a final or interlocutory order, it is a
reversible error on the part of the appellate court to rule that the so-called order of collation
dated November 11, 1994 had already attained finality.
As to the prayer of petitioners that the RTC be ordered to give due course to their notice of
appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 23, 1996 removing petitioner
Teresita N. de Leon as administratrix of the estate of private parties deceased parents, 30 to
approve their record on appeal31 and to elevate the records of Special Proceeding No. C-1679
to the Court of Appeals It is not disputed by the parties that said Orders are appealable. In
fact, the Court of Appeals had correctly directed the RTC to give due course to petitioners
appeal and this is not assailed by the private respondent.
But, the approval or disapproval of the record on appeal is not a proper subject matter of the
present petition for review on certiorari as it is not even a subject-matter in CA-G.R. SP No.
42958. Whether or not the record on appeal should be approved is a matter that is subject to
the sound discretion of the RTC, provided that Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
are observed by appellant.
Finally, the elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No. C-1679 to the Court of Appeals
for the purpose of petitioners appeal from the order removing the administratrix is
unnecessary where a record on appeal is allowed under the Rules of Court. The court a
quo loses jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal upon the approval of the record on appeal
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties; but retains jurisdiction over the
remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 28, 1997
and Resolution dated April 3, 1997 of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED. The Order dated
November 11, 1994 issued by the Regional Trial Court and all other orders of said court
emanating from said Order which involve the properties enumerated therein are considered
merely provisional or interlocutory, without prejudice to any of the heirs, administrator or
approving parties to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
The Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 123) is directed to immediately act, without
further delay, on petitioners appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December
23, 1996, subject to Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150164
November 26, 2002
GLORIOSA V. VALARAO, petitioner,

DIAZ,1 respondents.
vs. CONRADO C. PASCUAL and MANUEL C.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme sole, leaving a substantial
inheritance for her querulous collateral relatives who all appear disagreeable to any sensible
partition of their windfall.
To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs which include respondents
Conrado C. Pascual, a brother of the deceased, and Manuel C. Diaz, a nephew, son of her
sister Carmen P. Diaz, and petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao who is the decedent's niece. The
bloodlines marking the groups of heirs are: (a) the legitimate children of her late sister
Leoncia P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her
late sister Carmen P. Diaz including respondent Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of
her late brother Macario Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de
Leon; and, (e) the decedent's surviving sister Augustia C. Pascual and brothers Leonardo C.
Pascual and Conrado C. Pascual, the latter being one of respondents herein.
On 27 May 1998 petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City special proceedings docketed as SP No. 98-061 for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor over the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual. On 29 September 1998
respondent Conrado C. Pascual and some of his co-heirs, including respondent Diaz, filed with
the same probate court a petition for probate, docketed as SP No. 98-0124, of an alleged
holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated.
On 26 January 1999, by agreement of the parties in the proceedings a quo, petitioner Valarao
and respondent Diaz were appointed joint administrators of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual.
On 8 February 2000, RTC-Br. 260 of Paraaque City rendered a Decision which dismissed SP
No. 98-0124, denying probate of the alleged holographic will of the decedent and giving due
course to the intestate settlement of the estate. 2 On 22 March 2000 respondent Pascual
appealed the Decision to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal.
On 2 May 2000, in view of the appeal taken from the disallowance of the holographic will,
petitioner Valarao moved in the probate court for her appointment as special administratrix of
the estate. On 9 May 2000 respondent Diaz also asked for his designation as special coadministrator of the estate alongside petitioner. On 10 May 2000 the motions were heard
wherein petitioner opposed the request of respondent Diaz on the ground that he had
allegedly neglected his previous assignment as co-administrator of the estate.
On 7 June 2000 the probate court issued an Order appointing petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix based on this observation Weighing the pros and cons of the situation, considering the unanimity of choice by the heirs,
of Mrs. Valarao as special administratrix, and the vigorous objection to Mr. Diaz as coadministrator, not to mention the fact that the heirs on the side of Mrs. Valarao represent a
numerical majority of the legal heirs of the deceased, the Court believes that it will be to the
best interest of the estate and the heirs themselves if Mrs. Gloriosa Valarao is appointed
special administratrix. 3
On 29 June 2000 the probate court approved petitioner's bond of P500,000.00, and on 6 July
2000 she took her oath of office as special administratrix.
On 19 July 2000 respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration of his rejection as special coadministrator of the estate. He contested the allegation of petitioner Valarao that he had been
remiss in his duties as co-administrator. He cited as examples of his services the collection of
rentals for properties included in the estate, the payment of estate taxes and the deposit of
about P4,000,000.00 in a joint bank account held in trust for the estate by him and petitioner
as co-administrators. Respondent Diaz further alleged that justice and equity demanded that
his group of heirs be also represented in the management of the estate.
On the other hand, petitioner reiterated the alleged uncooperative conduct of respondent Diaz
in discharging his tasks as co-administrator, and at the same time moved that he and his
group of sympathetic heirs be compelled to surrender to her as special administratrix the

books and records of a corporation where the estate owned substantial interests.
On 11 September 2000 the probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered
respondent Diaz and all the heirs to respect the authority of petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix, especially by furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the
properties comprising the estate. Anent the charges of nonfeasance in his tasks as coadministrator, the probate court found x x x [respondent] Diaz has not disputed these charges beyond making a mere general denial,
stating that he had been diligent and regular in the performance of his duties when he was
still the estates co-administrator. Considering the allegations of both Manuel Diaz and
Gloriosa Valarao and assessing the circumstances surrounding the case, this Court is of the
considered view that the best interest of the estate will be best protected if only one
administrator is appointed for, in that way, conflicting interests which might work to the
detriment of the estate may be avoided.4
On 25 September 2000 respondents Pascual and Diaz along with other heirs moved for
reconsideration of the 11 September 2000 Order on the ground that petitioner Valarao as
special administratrix was not authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of
properties in the absence of proof that the same properties were being dissipated by them,
and that the possessory right of petitioner as special administratrix had already been
exercised by her "constructively" when the heirs on her side took possession of the estate
supposedly in her behalf. Respondents further alleged that the motion was pending resolution
by the probate court.
On 10 October 2000, while the motion for reconsideration was pending resolution,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61193, to reverse and set aside the
Orders dated 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 insofar as the probate court appointed only
petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, and to order the appointment of respondent Diaz
as special co-administrator of the estate.
On 15 May 2001 the probate court upon motion cited respondents for indirect contempt of
court for refusing to turn over to petitioner Valarao documents covering properties belonging
to the estate and ordered them arrested until compliance with the order to hand over the
documents. The warrant of arrest was subsequently lifted by the probate court after
respondents promised to deliver the documents.
On 13 June 2001 respondents filed their supplemental petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
61193 seeking permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Orders of 7 June 2000
and 11 September 2000 also as they mandated the turn over of documents to petitioner
Valarao.
On 28 September 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing and setting
aside the Order of 7 June 2000 of RTC-Br. 260, Paraaque City, appointing petitioner Valarao
as lone special administratrix although the fallo of the CA Decision was silent on whether the
probate court should also appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator of the estate of
Felicidad C. Pascual. 5 The appellate court explained that since the heirs were divided into two
(2) scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded that both factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased, citing Matias v. Gonzales, 6 Corona v. Court of
Appeals,7 and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete.8 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Valarao claims that the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it rejected the application of respondent Diaz for appointment as special coadministrator of the estate because of his indubitable uncooperative attitude towards
effective administration of the estate. She also argues that diverse interests among different
groups of heirs do not give each of them the absolute right to secure the appointment of a coadministrator from within their ranks since it remains the discretion of the probate court to
designate the administrators of an estate. She further asserts that as special administratrix of
the estate she possesses the authority to demand the surrender of documents pertinent to
the estate insofar as necessary to fulfill her mandate.
On 26 February 2002 respondents filed their Comment on the petition alleging the absence of
special reasons to justify a review of the assailed Decision and of the partiality of the trial
judge in favor of petitioner.

We grant the petition. To begin with, the probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint
petitioner Valarao as special administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions,
even after respondents had filed a notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of
the holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. This is because the appeal is one where multiple
appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required. 9 In this mode of appeal, the probate
court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over
the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies
which the parties may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator. 10
Moreover, there is nothing whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not to
appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator since the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 clearly stipulate the grounds for the rejection. The records also manifest that
the probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants for special administrator before
concluding not to designate respondent Diaz because the latter was found to have been
remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his
administration. Verily, the process of decision-making observed by the probate court evinces
reason, equity, justice and legal principle unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion
correctible by the special civil action of certiorari under which the appellate court was bound
to act. Finally, the extraordinary writ does not operate to reverse factual findings where
evidence was assessed in the ordinary course of the proceedings since perceived errors in the
appreciation of evidence do not embroil jurisdictional issues. 11
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, 12 Corona v. Court of
Appeals13 and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, 14 cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to
appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling
heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to
designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now
whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among
themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion. 15
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual
circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent
from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special coadministrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated
in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the
pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already
deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of
discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the
selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,
considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the
testatrix in her will," 16 for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It
is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among
the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special
administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona,
to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of
kinship."17
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special coadministrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns
one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests." 18 The special status of a surviving spouse in the
special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals 19where we
held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper
administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership
for which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more
critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals 20we recognized the
distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased
spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case
to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was
based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee
that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.
We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11 September 2000 did not err in
commanding respondents to turn over all documents pertinent to the estate under special
administration and in enforcing such order by means of contempt of court. The powers of a
special administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting
upon him the authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits
and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed x x x x"
Contrary to respondents' assertion, there is nothing in Sec. 2 requiring a special administrator
to take possession of the estate only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting
properties of the estate which are in their possession. The law explicitly authorizes him to take
possession of the properties in whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them
for the regular administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the special administrator enjoys
not merely subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but
the primary and independent discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular
administration.
Moreover, respondents cannot deprive the special administratrix of access to and custody of
essential documents by arguing that their possession thereof allegedly in behalf of petitioner
is already the equivalent of "constructive possession" which constitutes full compliance with
the possessory powers of petitioner as special administratrix under Sec. 2 of Rule 80. Contrary
to what respondents seem to understand by "constructive possession," the right of possession
whether characterized as actual or constructive invariably empowers the special
administrator with the discretion at any time to exercise dominion or control over the
properties and documents comprising the estate. 21 Hence, even if we are to give credence to
the theory that petitioner also has "constructive possession" of the documents alongside
respondents' actual possession thereof, respondents would nonetheless be under the
obligation to turn them over whenever the special administratrix requires their actual delivery.
In any event, as we have held in De Guzman v. Guadiz, 22 the partisan possession exercised by
litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special
administrator under the Rules of Court. Quite obviously, with this distinction, the possession of
portions of the estate by respondents as heirs necessarily excludes the possessory right over
the same properties inherent in the mandate of a special administrator.
The language of Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, also unmistakably gives a special
administrator the discretion to take actual custody of the properties of the estate for the
purpose of preserving them for regular administration. This appreciation of the powers of a
special administrator is fairly evident from the combination of the words "possession" and
"charge" in Sec. 2, so much so that even if we have to concede that "possession" means only
the fictitious custody of a thing as respondents suggest, the word "charge," i.e., the
commitment of a thing to the care and custody of another, 23 would emphasize the
requirement of actual possession of the properties of the estate whenever vital according to
the discretion of the special administrator. When taken together, the words "possession" and
"charge" serve to highlight the fact that a special administrator must be able to subject the
properties of the estate to his control and management when in his good judgment such
action is needed. Indeed, this understanding of the possessory right of a special administrator
is indispensable in fulfilling his mandate to preserve the properties of the estate until a
regular administrator is designated, for fiction and illusion cannot stand in place of the
concrete and tangible exercise of possession if he is to function effectively.
Finally, respondents cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a special
administrator on the dubious ground that the order appointing petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix had not in the meantime become final and executory because of a pending
motion for reconsideration filed by them. The fallacy of this reasoning is apparent, for an
interlocutory order is not instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor action to
suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration; 24 it is even well settled that a special
civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory
order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction. 25 In the same manner, the
appointment of a special administrator being an interlocutory order is not interrupted by a
motion for reconsideration and thus must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court

progress.26 The ruling in PAFLU v. Salvador 27 reiterated in Republic Commodities Corporation v.
Oca28 is enlightening [The] refusal to accord due respect and yield obedience to what a court or administrative
tribunal ordains is fraught with such grave consequences x x x x If such a conduct were not
condemned, some other group or groups emboldened by the absence of any reproof or
disapproval may conduct themselves similarly. The injury to the rule of law may well-nigh be
irreparable x x x x When judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be
obeyed; what they ordain must be followed. A party dissatisfied may ask for reconsideration
and, if denied, may go on to higher tribunal. As long as the orders stand unmodified, however,
they must, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on jurisdictional grounds be faithfully
complied with.
Needless to state, the special administratrix appointed by the probate court must be
constantly aware that she is not a representative nor the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment but the administrator in charge of the estate and in fact an officer of the court.
As an officer of the court, she is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court
and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
administration and earliest settlement. 29 Whatever differences that may exist between the
heirs shall be ironed out fairly and objectively for the attainment of that end. She ought to be
sensitive to her position as special administratrix and neutral possessor which under the Rules
of Court is both fiduciary and temporary in character upon which accountability attaches in
favor of the estate as well as the other heirs, especially respondents Pascual and Diaz in light
of her alleged rivalry with them.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 September 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193, "Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel P. Diaz v.
The Hon. RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 260, and Gloriosa V. Valarao," is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 260, of Paraaque City, rejecting the application of respondent Manuel C. Diaz 30 as
special co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual and ordering respondents
Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel C. Diaz and all other heirs who may have in their possession
or custody papers, records, certificates of titles over parcels of land, etc., pertaining to
properties of the estate of the late Felicidad C. Pascual to turn over such papers, records and
titles to petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao as special administratrix thereof, are REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149926
February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ
and
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CAG.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No.
18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement 3 in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for
the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of
the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations ofP43,745.96 due on
May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, 4 this time
in the amount ofP123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of
another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1)
unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note,
they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. 6 Subsequently in March
1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed
as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. 7 During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola,
executed a Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities 9 was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters 10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus,
on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint 11 for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. 12 Accordingly, the
complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer 13 and alleged that the
loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63.14Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by
the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum
of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also
found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on
July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said
agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that
there can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further
declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities
of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the
decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void,
the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola
must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals
(CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG
THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT
TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING. 16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of
the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that
she cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by
both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before
the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of
those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation
of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was
tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the
petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner
should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and
void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to
the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors)
in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the
active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver.
Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER
RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL
DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY
AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.

V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER
13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR
EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to
approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased
and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the
joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position
contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did
not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond
the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the
right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the
heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors
under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the
damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing thevinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim
Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the
Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim
Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation
solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering
the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes
executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable
thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate
court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their
respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is
trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should
have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the
joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner
knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.1a\^/phi1.net
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the
agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval
of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should
be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in
estoppel.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless
a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose
of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will. 23In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic
will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding
paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that
time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein
are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors
among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement 25 executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers
holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the
Court cannot allow. 26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. 27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that
part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the
signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed,
the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine
who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the
other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of
the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides
that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of
First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that
they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to
receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any
such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and
effect.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable
on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.nt
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim
with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all
the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered. 20 The said court is primarily concerned
with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions . All
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated:

claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if
final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent,
may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires
the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S.
Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as
co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the
matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that
it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC
assigned its assets and liabilities. 33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of
the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside
Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines"34 However, the documentary
evidence35 clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of
liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of
Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party
be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to
show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or
did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union
Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice
is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative." (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting.
Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of
Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140929
May 26, 2005
MARGARITO R. JAMERO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ACHILLES L. MELICOR, in

his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 4, ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the appointed SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, and ERNESTO R. JAMERO, respondent.
DECISION
Hence, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46, the petition may be dismissed
outright. In any case, even if we consider the date of the Motion for Reconsideration
(December 26, 1998) as the date of its filing, the petition would be late by three (3) days.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied due course and accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution,
promulgated on November 24, 1999, to wit:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari seeking that the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 14, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed with it
by petitioner Margarito R. Jamero and the Resolution promulgated on November 24, 1999
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration be set aside and declared null and void on the
ground that said Resolutions were issued in a way not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
1
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. 1618 for the Administration and Settlement of the
Estate of his deceased mother Consuelo Jamero with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tagbilaran City. Private respondent Ernesto R. Jamero, a brother of petitioner, opposed the
latters petition for appointment as regular administrator of the estate.
Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and over the objections of petitioner, the
respondent court, in its Order dated December 4, 1998, 2 appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista as
special administrator pending the appointment of a regular administrator. Petitioner received
said Order on December 11, 1998 and filed a motion for reconsideration on December 28,
1998, the last day of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, December 26, 1998, falling on a
Saturday during which, according to petitioner, the Bureau of Post Office held no office. The
court a quo denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Order dated February 26,
1999 which petitioner received on March 4, 1999.3
On April 21, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 53020, entitledMargarito R. Jamero, Petitioner vs. Hon. Achilles L. Melicor, as Judge RTC of
Tagbilaran City, Branch 4, and Alberto Bautista.
On June 14, 1999, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution, to wit:
A perusal of the petition indicates no statement as to the date when the petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the public respondents decision, in violation of Section 3,
paragraph 2, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular No. 39-98
dated August 18, 1998 of the Supreme Court, to wit:
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject hereof was received when a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof
was received.
The attention of the petitioner is likewise called to the amended Section 4, Rule 65 (Ibid.).
SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the
Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court
of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of
said judgment, order or resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension
of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution of dismissal dated June 14,
1999, imploring us to use merciful discretion by relaxing the rules on technicality to effect
substantial justice, and citing the importance of the legal issues involved herein.
We find the motion devoid of merit. This Court has no authority to extend the definitive period
fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
In any case, the appointment of a special administrator is discretionary to the appointing
court. Being an interlocutory order, the same is not appealable nor subject to certiorari.
WHEREORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner against Judge Achilles L.
Melicor, Atty. Bautista and, this time, including oppositor Ernesto R. Jamero, based on the
following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITY TO OVERRIDE, AND TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER, THE DEMONSTRATED SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE PETITION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR IS DISCRETIONARY TO THE APPOINTING COURT, AND THAT BEING AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER THE SAME IS NOT APPEALABLE NOR SUBJECT TO CERTIORARI.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT
APPOINTING ATTY. ALBERTO Y. BAUTISTA AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE CONSUELO R. JAMERO, IN THAT:
(A) THE LATE CONSUELO R. JAMERO DIED INTESTATE, LEAVING NO DEBTS. HENCE, THE
APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS NOT NECESSARY AS IT WOULD ONLY UNDULY
BURDEN OR OTHERWISE EXPOSE THE ESTATE TO BEING WASTED OR SQUANDERED.
(B) ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS NECESSARY, THE ORDER OF
PREFERANCE PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES IN THE APPOINTMENT OF REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR
SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. THUS, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DESIGNATED THE
PETITIONER WHO POSSESSES BENEFICIAL INTERESTS AS A CO-OWNER OF THE ESTATE,
RATHER THAN ATTY. ALBERTO Y. BAUTISTA WHO IS ONLY A THIRD PARTY.
(C) ASSUMING, FURTHER, THAT THE DESIGNATION OF ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA WHO IS A
THIRD PARTY IS PROPER, THE AUTHORITY OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR CANNOT BE
EXERCISED IN DEROGATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS A CO-OWNER OF THE
PROPERTIES FORMING PART OF THE ESTATE. 6
Private respondent Ernesto Jamero who was not a party in CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 filed
Comment contending that in the absence of clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that
decision is outrageously wrong, conspicuously mistaken and whimsically arrived at,
judgment of the CA must be regarded as final, citingMacapagal vs. CA,
al.7 and Bustamante, Jr. vs. NLRC.8
his
the
the
et
In his Reply, petitioner pointed out that the issue on the timeliness of the filing of the petition
for certiorari with the CA has now become moot and academic in view of A.M. Circular No. 00-

2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
...
Both petitioner and private respondent Ernesto filed their respective memoranda. Private
respondent Bautista, the special administrator designated by the RTC, failed to submit his
memorandum despite due notice of the Resolutions requiring him to do so. Consequently, on
October 20, 2004, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to arrest and detain him until he shall have paid the total amount
of P4,000.00 fine and shall have filed his explanation and memorandum. 9 The NBI has not
submitted its return.
The Court is dispensing with the filing of the memorandum by private respondent Bautista in
view of the Comments he filed on October 12, 2000 stating that he has no personal interest in
the subject matter of the petition and the subject matter of Special Proceedings No. 1618,
RTC, Bohol; and that he will abide by whatever judgment/order/resolution that the Court may
issue in this case. 10 However, Atty. Bautista is not relieved from paying the amount of
the P4,000.00 fine for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of the Court.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether or not the CA erred in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
53020 for having been filed out of time; (2) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the
appointment of special administrator is discretionary to the appointing court and that being
an interlocutory order, the same is not appealable nor subject to certiorari; and (3) whether or
not the appointment of a special administrator is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
As to the first issue, the Court finds merit to the claim of petitioner that A.M. Circular No. 00-203-SC as herein quoted earlier, further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
should be given retroactive effect. The Court held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals:11
The amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in
character. It does not create new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive
operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.12
Thus, applying the same to CA-G.R. SP No. 53020, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
with the CA should now be considered as having been filed within the reglementary period
provided under said circular. Petitioner would have had sixty days from March 4, 1999 or until
May 3, 1999 within which to file his petition in the CA. The petition for certiorari was filed on
April 21, 1999.
However, far from rendering the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 moot and academic, as
claimed by petitioner, the third issue will have to be passed upon by the CA in the petition
for certiorari filed with it.
As to the second issue, suffice it to be stated that indeed, the appointment of a special
administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable.
However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. As the Court held in Pefianco vs.
Moral,13 even as the trial courts order may merely be interlocutory and nonappealable,certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same when it is rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.14
It is for this reason that the third issue, as already stated, will have to be considered and
passed upon by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted. The assailed Resolutions dated June 14, 1999
and November 24, 1999 are SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
The Resolution of this Court dated October 20, 2004 is amended to the effect that the NBI is
directed to arrest and detain the person of Atty. Alberto Bautista until full payment of the fine
of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00); and to submit its return within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146006. April 22, 2005
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippine International Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, Petitioners, vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK
OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO
L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA
ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/public officers
acting for and in their behalf, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
For resolution is private respondent
petitioners in indirect contempt of
disciplinary sanctions on petitioners
executory decision of this Court dated
Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes omnibus motion to cite

Court and for the disbarment and/or imposition of
counsel 1 for their refusal to comply with the final and
February 23, 2004.
This case began with a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez filed 25 years ago on September 24, 1980. Forming part of the inventory
of the estate were 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company
(Philinterlife). During the pendency of these proceedings, Juliana, Jose and Rafael (all
surnamed Ortaez), the surviving legitimate spouse and legitimate children of the decedent
respectively, executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, partitioning it (including the
Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. Thereafter, Juliana and Jose sold the 2,029
shares to the Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG). 2
However, private respondent, one of the illegitimate children of the decedent, was in the
meantime appointed as special administratrix of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock. When
Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion seeking the approval of the sale of the shares of stock
to FLAG and the release of private respondent as special administratrix, the trial court in its
August 11, 1997 order, denied said motion. On August 29, 1997, the intestate court declared
the extrajudicial settlement made by Juliana, Jose and Rafael partially void ab initio insofar as
the transfer of the Philinterlife shares was concerned. These orders were later upheld by the
Court of Appeals (CA) and this Court.
In its order dated July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution filed by
private respondent:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares in the name of the Estate
of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in the
stock and transfer book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in the name of
the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for
violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock
certificates of Philinterlife for 2,029 shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez
as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for violation of pre-emptive rights
pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares; and
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes, has the power
to exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said shares, including the right to vote and to
receive dividends;
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or
otherwise, to acknowledge and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the
aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any action which may tend
(to) directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of
contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other
person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with
this Order within three (3) days from receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement the
writ of execution with dispatch to forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.3
Unfortunately, however, the writ of execution was not enforced due to the resistance of herein
petitioners. To block the execution, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736, questioning the order of execution, among others. The
petition was dismissed outright on July 26, 2000. Petitioners then elevated the case to us. On
February 23, 2004, a decision was promulgated by the Third Division of this Court: 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and affirming
the July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the execution of its (trial courts) August
11 and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.5
On April 27, 2004, petitioners filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and referral of this
case to the en banc allegedly in view of the conflicting rulings of two divisions of the Court. In
a resolution dated May 26, 2004, the Court denied the motion for lack of merit:
The Court deliberated on the petitioners omnibus motion for reconsideration of the decision
of February 23, 2004 which denied the petition for review on certiorari. It appears to the Court
that the motion merely reiterates the same arguments earlier raised and does not present
any substantial reason not previously invoked nor any matter not already considered and
passed upon by the Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
This denial is FINAL.6
Thus on July 9, 2004, the February 23, 2004 decision became final and executory, and was
recorded in the book of entries of judgments. On October 1, 2004, an alias writ of execution
was issued by the intestate court (the court of origin). In said writ, the deputy sheriffs were
ordered to enforce the August 11 and 29, 1997 and July 6, 2000 orders of the intestate court.
Instead of complying with the writ, petitioners filed on October 15, 2004, a motion to suspend
execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening events, raising the following
arguments: (1) the intestate court had already revoked the appointment of private respondent
as special administratrix; (2) there was a need to lay down the legal procedure in the
implementation of the writ and (3) there must be a declaration that the price per share of the
2,029 shares was only P1,000 which was its book value at the time the shares were sold in
1989 and 1991.7
Private respondent went back to this Court and filed this omnibus motion asserting that
petitioners "made a travesty of the final and executory decisions of the Lower Courts and this
Honorable Court when they refused to comply with the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the
Lower Court."8
Before we discuss the substance of private respondents motion, we note that attached to it
were mere photocopies of the supporting documents and not "certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein" as required by the Rules of Court. 9 However, given
that the motion was verified and petitioners, who were given a chance to oppose or comment
on it, made no objection thereto, we brush aside the defect in form and proceed to discuss the
merits of the motion.
Furthermore, as held in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA,10 Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court outlines the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect
contempt: (1) the filing of a written charge and (2) an opportunity to be heard by himself or
counsel. All that the law requires is that there is a charge in writing duly filed in court and an
opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is important
is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and
to be heard in his defense.11 Petitioners were given this opportunity; they in fact filed their
Opposition.12
Petitioners assert that private respondent engaged in forum-shopping because the latter had
previously filed a similar motion in the intestate court. The argument has no merit. The charge
for indirect contempt must be filed before the court against which the indirect contempt was
committed. Section 4, Rule 71 states:

SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for indirect contempt has been
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an
officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. xxx
Clearly, petitioners defiant non-compliance with these directives, as proved by the sheriffs
report dated October 13, 2004, constituted indirect contempt. The pertinent portion of this
report stated:
Hence, the charge for indirect contempt for disobedience to our February 23, 2004 decision
was correctly brought to us. As we explained in the case of Igot v. Court of Appeals:
That on October 12, 2004, when Sheriff Borja went to the Philenterlife (sic) Office to check
whether there was already compliance with the Alias Writ of Execution, one of their staff told
Sheriff Borja that Mr. Jose Lee wanted to talk with Sheriff Borja over the Telephone. In their
telephone conversation, Mr. Jose Lee told Sheriff Borja that he had already consulted his
lawyer regarding the matter.
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure
to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity
with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been
felt to properly rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Only the
court which rendered the order commanding the doing of a certain act is vested with the right
to determine whether or not the order has been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason
has been given for noncompliance, and, therefore, whether a contempt has been committed.
It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the existence of contempt of court
rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized to punish a contempt
against another.
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule ... is that, contempt proceedings
are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are
charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to
compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders
and processes and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the
right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question
of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its
efficiency.13
We now proceed to the merits of the motion to cite for indirect contempt and for imposition of
disciplinary sanctions.
The private respondent alleges that the following acts of the petitioners constituted indirect
contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court: (1) petitioners failure to comply with
the alias writ of execution served upon them on October 12, 2004 and (2) their act of filing a
patently baseless motion (to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of
supervening events) which was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of the final
and executory decision of this Court.
On the other hand, petitioners allege that the immediate execution of the subject decision
would be inequitable and should be suspended pending an order of clarification of certain
matters. According to them, the certificates of the shares of stock were turned over to the
intestate court and not to private respondent because her appointment as special
administratrix had already been revoked by the court.
Petitioners obstinate refusal to abide by this Courts February 23, 2004 decision
demonstrates a contumacious attitude which this Court cannot countenance. This contumacy
becomes all the more glaring because of the strongly worded admonition in our decision that
"(p)etitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby warned not to further
delay the execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29,
1997."14 The previously quoted July 6, 2000 order of the intestate court, which was affirmed
by this Court, also contained the following directives:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or
otherwise, to acknowledge and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the
aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any action which may tend
(to) directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of
contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other
person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with
this Order within three (3) days from receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement the
writ of execution with dispatch to forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.
15
(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we respectfully submit this report to the Honorable Court with the information
that up to this writing, Philenterlife (sic) has not submitted their compliance to the Sheriff or
to the Court.16
Petitioners act of filing their motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of
supervening events also showed their continuing, stubborn resistance to this Courts
judgment. Indeed, one of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is
the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which
develop afterthe judgment has acquired finality. 17
The private respondent alleges that the revocation of her appointment as special
administratrix was made by the intestate court in its May 12, 2003 and September 4, 2003
orders.18 This is not disputed by the petitioners. In short, this fact already existed before the
decision of this Court was promulgated on February 23, 2004 and beforeit became final and
executory on July 9, 2004. Therefore, the revocation of the appointment of private respondent
as special administratrix was evidently not a supervening event.
Furthermore, this issue had already been raised in petitioners motion for reconsideration 19 of
this Courts February 23, 2004 decision and passed upon by the Court in its resolution dated
May 26, 2004 denying the motion for lack of merit. Likewise, the increase in the value of the
shares from P1,000 to P4,000 was also raised in the same motion for reconsideration. 20 The
Court stated that "the motion merely reiterate(d) the same arguments earlier raised and (did)
not present any substantial reason not previously invoked nor any matter not already
considered and passed upon by the Court."21
Petitioners insist that there must be an order laying down the legal procedure for the
implementation of the writ, which implementation did not include taking over the
management of Philinterlife and obtaining possession of office premises. We disagree. The
execution should not be suspended for that reason.
Our February 23, 2004 ruling categorically stated that the estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez
was the lawful owner of 2,029 Philinterlife shares. As lawful owner of the Philinterlife shares,
the estate can exercise all the rights of ownership, including the right to vote the shares. If, by
voting the shares, the estate is able to elect its own representatives who succeed in attaining
management control of Philinterlife, then let it be as such would be a legitimate consequence
of our February 23, 2004 decision.
We call particular attention to the fact that in our February 23, 2004 decision, we noted that
petitioners, with the rest of the FLAG-controlled directors and stockholders, increased the
authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 2,029 shares of the
estate22 representing 50.725% of Philinterlife. We observed that this was obviously calculated
to make it difficult for the estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife. Thus, we
ruled that, considering the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 shares to FLAG, the increase in
Philinterlifes authorized capital stock was void ab initio.23 Consequently, any approval by the
Securities and Exchange Commission of this increase would likewise be void ab initio.
Moreover, the directives to petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, as president and
corporate secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife, were sufficiently clear and needed absolutely
no clarification in order to exact their compliance thereto. Since the nullity of the sale of the
2,029 Philinterlife shares to FLAG had been confirmed, they were ordered to:
(1) reinstate the shares in the name of the estate in the stock and transfer book;
(2) issue stock certificates in the name of the estate;
(3) acknowledge and allow the special administratrix to exercise all the rights appurtenant to
the shares;

(4) refrain from resorting to any action which may tend to directly or indirectly impede,
obstruct or bar the free exercise of these rights and
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. 26
(5) comply with the order within three days from receipt.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Moreover, the immutability of
the February 23, 2004 decision is all the more emphasized in this case since it is this Court,
the highest Court of the land and final arbiter of all legal controversies, that promulgated it.
Thus, petitioners are bound by the finality of our decision and cannot, under the guise of a
phony motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening events,
reopen a case already decided with finality. Nor should they be permitted to litigate anew
questions or issues already laid to rest.
The first two directives were undoubtedly covered by the duties and functions of the
corporate secretary and president of a corporation. The next two ordered them not to resist
the writ and the last directive provided a period for their compliance. Given the foregoing,
there was never any need to clarify the procedure for the implementation of the writ.
Pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court xxx
(c ) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx
In the recent case of Heirs of Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, we
explained the concept of contempt of court:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere
with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (12 Am. Jur. 389, cited in
14 SCRA 813).
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
courts orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice (17 C.J.S. 4).
This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil.
944; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38
SCRA 1).24
Petitioners disobedience to this Courts judgment is an affront to the Court and the dignity
with which it is clothed. Their attempt to raise issues already laid to rest by a final and
executory judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land constitutes a disrespectful
and insolent defiance of the authority of this Court and impedes the speedy administration of
justice.25 As mentioned in the beginning of this Resolution, this controversy has been pending
for 25 long years already. Apparently, petitioners want to prolong it to eternity.
In Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, we said:
Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it
is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to
prolong the controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
The fact is that virtually the same issues have been elevated to this Court no less than three
times: in G.R. Nos. 128525, 135177 and 146006. Private respondent obtained a writ of
execution in 2000 but her attempt to enforce the writ was unsuccessful. After our February 23,
2004 decision became final and executory, she obtained an alias writ of execution on October
1, 2004 but the petitioners again managed to frustrate her efforts to execute the decision and
torpedo its enforcement.
As we ruled in Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that [the]
controversy is finally laid to rest. "Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which
avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to
speak of delay in the disposal of the case. A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that
where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with
finality." In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with
finality.27
This Court is becoming impatient with the devious tricks and maneuvers of petitioners.
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court penalizes indirect contempt as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he
may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months or both. xxx
Petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, for their defiance and resistance to the October 1,
2004 alias writ of execution enforcing this Courts February 23, 2004 decision resulting in
the frustration of its execution are hereby adjudged guilty of indirect contempt.
Finally, with regard to the administrative charge against petitioners counsel, Atty. Teodorico
Fernandez, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this Court
resolves to refer it to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, president and corporate secretary,
respectively, of petitioner Philippine International Life Insurance Company, are hereby found
GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which the maximum FINE of P30,000 is hereby imposed on
each of them, payable in full within five days from receipt of this resolution. They are
furthermore given a final non-extendible period of five days from receipt of this resolution
within which to comply within our decision and orders as aforementioned. Petitioners are
hereby warned not to file any more pleadings in connection herewith. Failure to comply with
our decision, orders and P30,000 fine within the five-day period will subject them to
imprisonment till full compliance.
In view hereof, petitioners counsel, Atty. Teodorico Fernandez, is likewise strongly warned to
refrain from any further attempts to make a mockery of our judicial processes.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118671
January 29, 1996
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated
November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz 1 executed a holographic will naming as
his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate
was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the
decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any
action for the probate of his father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva
Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline4 was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of
Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease
of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the
amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for
repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on
the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently,
the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed
an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of
Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent
payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of
the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments,
in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but
granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered
the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered
the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to
respondent Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to
consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his
motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde
property had been renewed for another year.7
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the
release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three
granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The
court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three
granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors.8 The court stated thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties the court resolves to
allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited with
the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation and deductible from the
share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining
to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the abovenamed heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6)
months from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the
expenses necessary for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn
Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can
be withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the
probate court's order in a decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January
5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE
ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER
22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE
POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT
SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS
NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC
VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to
order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of
the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of
estate proceedings. He contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for
an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age,
married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the
deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the
"minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 13 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that
during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and
children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the estate. 14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to
support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. 15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It was
error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to
creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. Nothwithstanding a pending
controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its
discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the
estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules. 17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon
notice shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them
and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having
the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs. 18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made
to meet those obligations. 19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order
speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly
left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of
the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not
yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six
months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and extrinsic validity 21 and settles only the question of whether the testator, being
of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality
of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 23
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds 24 and his
motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. 25 Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will
included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of
his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of
the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to
hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases. 26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right
to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration," 27 Section 3 of Rule
84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer
estate not willed. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he
had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and
maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes
thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons
he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an
accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money
in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a
portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit
its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. 29 Neither did he render an accounting of such
funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As
executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are
trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the
fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness. 32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order
granting an allowance to the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to
the private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029
February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion
to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
1
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated
and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further,
she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On
May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in
his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed
their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of
the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab
initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration
said motions were denied. 28
26
and for the disqualification
27
of Judge Arcangel but
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place
of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee
was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the

enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and
effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
the Court of Appeals.
34
which were denied by
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which
was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time.
Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent
has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of
the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it
is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property.
She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letterenvelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang
address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential
basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged
that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The
Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless
to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer
be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. 53
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under

Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized
the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that
"the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in
the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
62
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph
2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to
one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings
in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably,
the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish
to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with
the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained
by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted
to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest
in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it
is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of coownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved
by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his
co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for

G.R. No. 150175
February 5, 2007
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely: ESTELA,

ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS
INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA
MENDOZA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S.
BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA
FORTUNA,
CRESENCIA
BRIONES,
FUGURACION
MEDALLE
and
MERCEDES
LAGBAS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision 1 in the above-entitled case, ruling in
favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion2 reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint
for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby DISMISSED.
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration 3 of the foregoing Decision was filed by Atty.
Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs of Maximino R.
Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz
Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration,4 to which the respondents filed a Rejoinder 5 on 23 May 2006. Thereafter,
Atty. Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his appearance as
collaborating counsel for the respondents. 6 Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June
2006, respectively, a Reply 7 and Supplemental Reply8 to the petitioners Opposition to
respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder 9 to the
respondents Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006.
Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda,
appear to be on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the
RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially
granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio
to collect rentals from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to
Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already
under his and his wifes administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios
Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by
the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed an Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They
alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino.
xxxx
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the
heirs of Maximino x x x.
xxxx
x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to of the real properties
covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda
to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the
fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC
Decision, x x x.
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision, 10 are as follows
xxxx
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the
other nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also
passed away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones
(Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed
the present Petition, x x x.
xxxx
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When
Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District,
designated as Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of
Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximinos estate. She submitted
an Inventory of Maximinos properties, which included, among other things, the following
parcels of land x x x.
xxxx
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding ownership of the
aforementioned real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata had the said CFI Order
recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received
new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donatas intestate estate.
Controversy arose among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three
parcels of land, covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of
Donation, both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt
Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This Court, however, was no
longer informed of the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition meritorious and, reversing
the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed by the
heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its findings, 11 thus
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate
of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata
was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but
pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the
entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the
other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court raising still the
arguments that Donata committed fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2
October 1952, which declared her as the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino and
authorized her to have Maximinos properties registered exclusively in her name; that
respondents right to succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or vested from
the moment of Maximinos death and which they could no longer be deprived of; that Donata
merely possessed and held the properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue
of this Courts ruling in Quion v. Claridad 12 and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los Angeles, 13 respondents
action to recover title to and possession of their shares in Maximinos estate, held in trust for
their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the latters successors-in-interest, is
imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2

October 1952, being based on the fraudulent misrepresentation of Donata that she was
Maximinos sole heir, was a void order, which produced no legal effect. Lastly, respondents
asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural presumptions in its Decision, dated 10 March
2006, this Court has sacrificed their substantive right to succession, thus, making justice
"subservient to the dictates of mere procedural fiats."14
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its previous Decision in
this case, it does not find any new evidence or argument that would adequately justify a
change in its previous position.
On the finding of fraud
As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations between petitioners
and respondents shall be examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that, "[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes." Hence, the foremost question to be answered is still whether an implied
trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the present
case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient evidence to
establish that Donata committed fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to
secure certificates of title to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle Maximinos intestate estate),
which declared her as Maximinos sole heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Court
accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and validity.
Reproduced below are the relevant portions15 of the Decision
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs covering the
real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners,
heirs of Donata, were unable to present a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising
considering that it was issued 35 years prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of their
Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order,
nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of
Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on the TCTs
covering the real properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of the
heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never questioned. The
allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order, but to the
manner or procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the nonpresentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a
willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that it would be
adverse to the heirs of Donata if produced. x x x.
xxxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively
settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as
its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity
pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced
below
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
if
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting
in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear
and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in
every respect; and it could not give credence to the following statements made by the Court
of Appeals in its Decision.
xxxx
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. First of all, the
Petition filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R before
the CFI was not even referred to nor presented during the course of the trial of Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 before the RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a finding that Donata
willfully excluded from the said Petition the names, ages, and residences of the other heirs of
Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing that the CFI actually failed to send
notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require
presentation of proof of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, which included sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service
of such notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk
such presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of Special Proceedings No.
928-R, at least until 1985. There was no testimony or document presented in which the heirs
of Maximino categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of the pendency of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The only evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of
such proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino,
x x x.
xxxx
Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not testifying on matters
within her personal knowledge. The phrase "I dont think" is a clear indication that she is
merely voicing out her opinion on how she believed her uncles and aunts would have acted
had they received notice of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was proceeding from an
evaluation of the evidence on record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI Order in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof on
15 June 2006, annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners opposition to their motion
for reconsideration of this Courts Decision. Respondents did not offer any explanation as to
why they belatedly produced a copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to have been
"fortunate enough to obtain a copy" thereof from the Register of Deeds of Cebu. 16
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late into the proceedings
of this case. Parties should present all their available evidence at the courts below so as to
give the opposing party the opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such evidence during the
course of the trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that the copy
submitted is a certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order may provide new
information vital to a just resolution of the present case, this Court is compelled to consider
the same as part of the evidence on record.
The CFI Order17 in question reads in full as
ORDER
This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960, that she be
declared the sole heir of her deceased husband, Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having
died without any legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate brother or sister,
nephews or nieces.
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the motion, and based on the
uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest surviving relative of the
deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the time of the latters death, and pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby declares the
aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased
Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after
paying all the obligations thereof, which properties are those contained in the Inventory,
dated October 2, 1952.1awphi1.net
Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order
was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated in the

Decision. It was the inventory of properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix of
Maximinos intestate estate, which was dated 2 October 1952. 18 Other than such observation,
this Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which could change its original position in the
Decision under consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings
and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the
intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,19 and that the publication in the newspapers of
the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner
prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of
the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of
the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the
estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those
who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission
was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate proceedings
instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the
manner by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication of the notice of
the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete
proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the
intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can
this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximinos siblings could have missed the
published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise
of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court
is not, as counsel for respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to
their share in the inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the
establishment of rules of procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De Dios v. Court of
Appeals20
Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious administration of justice
by providing for a practical system by which the parties to a litigation may be accorded a full
and fair opportunity to present their respective positions and refute each other's submissions
under the prescribed requirements, conditions and limitations. Adjective law is not the
counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is a symbiotic relationship between them. By
complying faithfully with the Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss,
analyze and understand substantive rights and duties and consequently to more effectively
protect and enforce them. The other alternative is judicial anarchy.
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and abandonment thereof
should only be done in the most exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by
this Court in the instant case are disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless
contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented by
respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her husbands sole heir, it was
not established that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to
conclude that she indeed committed fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the delay by
which respondents filed the present case, when the principal actors involved, particularly,
Donata and Maximinos siblings, have already passed away and their lips forever sealed as to
what truly transpired between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took
place when all these principal actors were still alive and each would have been capable to act
to protect his or her own right to Maximinos estate. Letters of Administration of Maximinos
estate were issued in favor of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question
was issued only on 15 January 1960. The intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Maximinos estate were thus pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden of the
respondents to establish that their parents or grandparents, Maximinos surviving siblings,
had absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As established in Ramos
v. Ramos,21 the degree of proof to establish fraud in a case where the principal actors to the
transaction have already passed away is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it thus removes
from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it
operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It

would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty,
real or apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in
such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that
the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are
dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is
to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the
legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not here to answer for
themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate
the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable
doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir does constitute fraud,
it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, 22 considering
the nature of intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the
regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering
the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donatas misrepresentation constitutes fraud that
would impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court
still cannot sustain respondents contention that their right to recover their shares in
Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied
trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription and laches.
The case of Ramos v. Ramos23 already provides an elucidating discourse on the matter, to wit
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor
or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code).
"No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by oral
evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a
trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs.
Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are
created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of
law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S.
724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or
construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law
and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is
to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of
conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in Article 1448 to 1455 of
the Civil Code. See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168,
179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by
operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a resulting trust,
a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing
a direct intention to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89
C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of
equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded
party." A constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of
the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property
entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to compel a trustee to
convey property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not

prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the
defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover property held by a person in
trust for the benefit of another (Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held
in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs.
Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. Zuiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4
SCRA 1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31,
37).
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a
trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the property
held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply
"in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261,
266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly apply
to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs.
Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grao, 42 Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O.
G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs.
Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon, 105
Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express
trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust and (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55
Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-owners found in the last paragraph of Article
494, Civil Code; Casaas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29,
1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-10228,
February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil.
973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boaga vs. Soler, 112
Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA
84).Prescription may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May
31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by
laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, supra; Compare
with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277). [Emphases supplied.]
A present reading of the Quion24 and Sevilla25 cases, invoked by respondents, must be made
in conjunction with and guided accordingly by the principles established in the afore-quoted
case. Thus, while respondents right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at
the time of Maximinos death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may
be barred by the prescription of the action.
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on implied trust
is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Article 1456
of the New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action for
reconveyance of their shares in Maximinos properties. The next question now is when should
the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action for
reconveyance of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration
and/or issuance of the title to the property, 26 not only because registration under the Torrens
system is a constructive notice of title, 27 but also because by registering the disputed
properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other
claim to the same.
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata
was able to register and secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in her name
on 27 June 1960. The respondents filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in
the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents action for recovery of possession of the disputed
properties had clearly prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794
also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce
their right to the said properties imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for
partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or
impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to
emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either
expressly or impliedly. 28 Her assertion before the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she
was Maximinos sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir
to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of
property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.
On laches as bar to recovery
Other than prescription of action, respondents right to recover possession of the disputed
properties, based on implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a
question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced, applies independently of
prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable. 29
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or
declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which
requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. 30
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for barring respondents
action for recovery of the disputed properties because of laches. This Court pointed out
therein31 that
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of Maximino even
emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as some of the siblings of Maximino and,
yet, she failed to inform them of the CFI Order, dated [15 January 1960], in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her name of new TCTs covering the real properties
which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court, however, appreciates such information
differently. It actually works against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby,
Maximinos siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the
estate of their deceased brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of
Maximino, were also located within the same area as their residences in Cebu City, and
Maximinos siblings could have regularly observed the actions and behavior of Donata with
regard to the said real properties. It is uncontested that from the time of Maximinos death on
1 May 1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She managed the real properties
and even collected rental fees on some of them until her own death on 1 November 1977.
After Donatas death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued to manage
the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so
obviously exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others,
which must have already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they
still had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did
not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximinos death before
one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of
Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was
already settled in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before
instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment
and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate of Maximino. x x x
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents
conduct before this Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of

new issues, respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without
any proffered reason or justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who
sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the
courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings. 32
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the petitioners
Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal
effect. Consequently, the registration of the disputed properties in the name of Donata
pursuant to such Order was likewise void.
This Court is unconvinced.
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents, 33 an order or judgment is considered void
when rendered by the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a
mandatory duty, circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable one, thus
"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to be made void
when a person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the proper steps to have its
invalidity declared. It always contains some defect which may become fatal. It carries within it
the means of its own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly annulled, it is attended with all
the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment. The party against whom it is given may
escape its effect as a bar or an obligation, but only by a proper application to have it vacated
or reversed. Until that is done, it will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or a source of title.
If no proceedings are ever taken against it, it will continue throughout its life to all intents a
valid sentence. If emanating from a court of general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the
ordinary presumptions of regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral
action. * * *"
But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment.
By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce
it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds
himself without title and without redress." (Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell
vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell
vs. Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35
Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9 Smedes
& M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and
Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan.,
391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)
It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment and a voidable
one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential to the
validity of a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In
the eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9
Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central
Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs.
Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)34
The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No.
928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case,
namely, the intestate estate of Maximino. Donatas fraud and misrepresentation may have
rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the
said Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set aside by direct action
to annul and enjoin its enforcement.35 It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack as is
being done in this case. Note that respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed
properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, but of the certificates of title over the properties issued in Donatas name. So
until and unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January
1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the assailed
Order remains valid and binding.
Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or judgment based on
fraud must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.36 If it is conceded
that the respondents came to know of Donatas fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the
course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement of Maximinos estate,
then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata for the settlement of Maximinos estate),
has likewise prescribed by present time.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183053
October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate
of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter
Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
(respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the
issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III)
and respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to
declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is
further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No
costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three
legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio
A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings,
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of
Isabels parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by
Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her
among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the
marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial
Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient
was already out of the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified
as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist
(sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958,
years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at
the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason.
The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist
handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication
of schizophernia (sic). 4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a
complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same
special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted
their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty
minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabels testimony in court that her
grandparents visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety. 5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristinas death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas estate docketed
as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that:
(1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the
decedents estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent,
he must be accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had
been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of
heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio
III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal
properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedents estate; (6)
the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7)
Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground
that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate
grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents marriage being declared null and void.
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all
represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate
on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III
filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-inIntervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of
the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of
his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the
same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required
by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his
favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of
the subject estate:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if
any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration
be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving
weight to his interest in Federicos estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III
and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as
forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristinas properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of
his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision in favor of
her sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose
estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the
order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that
Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had
demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an
heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent,
has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio IIIs
actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001
emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no
"opposing parties or factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel,
is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate. We did not choose.
Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III
should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a coadministrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider
our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down
in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment
of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving
spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been
reinforced in jurisprudence. 8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the estate. 9 This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is
that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedents estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the
estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a
decedents estate presupposes the surviving spouses interest in the conjugal partnership or
community property forming part of the decedents estate. 11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent 12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering
the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute
community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator of a decedents estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been
allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator
for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. 13 We recognized that the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a persons
suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment. 14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits
of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 15 (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause,
an intricate and perplexing one to settle; 16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; 17 and when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special coadministrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedents will.
Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias special interest in the decedents estate
as universal heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in
the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2)
factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir
(Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the management
of the decedents estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir
of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." 20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura 21 where we
allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as
co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of
kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The
"next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedents property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator. Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount
or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."
(citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person
or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 we maintained that the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that
case, we affirmed the legitimate childs appointment as special administrator, and eventually
as regular administrator, of the decedents estate as against the surviving spouse who the
lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia 24 as good law, we pointed out that
unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind
or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual, 25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over
the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate courts refusal to
appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate
of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed
by the probate court pointed to Diazs being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of
the estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of
Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of
Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to
appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling
heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to
designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now
whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among
themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual
circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent
from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special coadministrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated
in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the
pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already
deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of
discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the
selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,
considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the
testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is
also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the
heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special
administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona,
to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of
kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special coadministrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns
one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the
special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we
held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper
administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership
for which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more
critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the
distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased
spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case
to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was
based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee
that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule
on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set
aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor. 27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, 28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a
"next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When
the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent,
the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted
within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to
the late Francisco Angeles. 29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals, 30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the
estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that
where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the
appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the
estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to
Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in Cristinas estate and without a closer scrutiny of the
attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review
of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does
not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 31 Given Isabels unassailable interest in
the estate as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of
kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court 32 and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case. 33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out
in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the
other.

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive,
which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to
Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as
co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedents estate, ultimately delaying
settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has not
looked after the estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the
estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has
turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that
after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked
after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in
the partial inventories 34 he filed therewith properties of the estate 35 including several parcels
of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal
properties, contrary to Section 1,36paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federicos settlement of the
decedents estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to
said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent
did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her
estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the
following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or
persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents; 38
Emilio III refutes Isabels imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing
the functions of administrator of Cristinas estate:
1. From the time of the RTCs Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her
pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio IIIs assumption of that office,
arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments
authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio IIIs filing of an inventory was due to Isabels vociferous objections to
Emilio IIIs attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the
Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and one
of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedents estate, such that it
cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedents properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu
propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio IIIs counsels explanation for the blamed delay in the filing
of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in
the course of the settlement of a decedents estate, we do not find any clarification on
Isabels accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted
in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven
fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on
two occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and
her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to
faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedents estate with the end in view of
distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio IIIs
omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as
administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted
litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for
each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two
to work as co-administrators of their grandmothers estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her
siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III
bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedents
estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said
estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to
facilitate the settlement of a decedents estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without
remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of
Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or
"any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased
"to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of
the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
allowance of the Administrators account "to persons interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an
order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are
either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2,
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings
upon death, resignation, or removal. If an executor or administrator neglects to render his
account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the
court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its
discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the
court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that
the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of
the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a
final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:

The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the
estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs. 45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment 46 of Emilio III
questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III
asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional
and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June
2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from
the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions
of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special
Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila. 47
For Emilio IIIs counsels edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different
division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of
Justice Nachuras retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed
resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special
Division. Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution
and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the
ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the
decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited
himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall
be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of
the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who
concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the
new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution
has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or
herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the
appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement
Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other
Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed
Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the
Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with
the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time
said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the
Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No.
183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138953
June 6, 2002
SO ORDERED.15
CASTORIO ALVARICO, petitioner, vs. AMELITA L. SOLA, respondent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated March 23, 1999 reversed the RTC. Thus:
QUISUMBING, J.:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint filed by plaintiff-appellee against defendant-appellant is hereby
DISMISSED.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 23, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54624, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 10, for reconveyance. Also sought to be reversed is the CA resolution dated June
8, 1999 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1wphi1.nt
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita Sola while Fermina
Lopez is petitioner's aunt, and also Amelita's adoptive mother.
On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales
Application (MSA) of Fermina over Lot 5, SGS-3451, with an area of 152 sq. m. at the
Waterfront, Cebu City.1
On May 28, 1983,2 Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights 3 over
Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions
imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of transfer was
filed with the Bureau of Lands.4 The pertinent portions of the deed provide:
xxx
That I, FERMINA A. LOPEZ, of legal age, Filipino, widow of Pedro C. Lopez and a resident of Port
San Pedro, Cebu City, Philippines, am the AWARDEE of Lots Nos. 4, 5, 3-B, 3-C and 6-B, Sgs3451 And being the winning bidder at the auction sale of these parcels by the Bureau of
Lands held on May 12, 1982, at the price of P150.00 per square meter taking a purchase price
of P282,900.00 for the tract; That I have made as my partial payment the sum of P28,290.00
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 1357764-B representing ten (10%) per cent of my bid,
leaving a balance of P254,610.00 that shall be in not more than ten (10) years at an equal
installments of P25,461.00 beginning June 17, 1983 until the full amount is paid.
the Transferee Mrs. Amelita L. Sola, agrees to assume, all the obligations, duties and
conditions imposed upon the Awardee in relation to the MSA Application No. V-81066 entered
in their records as Sales Entry No. 20476.
[I] hereby declare that I accept this Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights and
further agree to all conditions provided therein. 5
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. She paid a total amount
of P282,900.6
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and
granting the amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. 7 On May 2, 1989,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor of Amelita. 8
On June 24, 1993,9 herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-14191 10 for reconveyance against
Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him 11 and
immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him
had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita. 12
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was
no longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property
having been transferred earlier to her. 13She added that the donation was void because of lack
of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly acquired the land as Fermina's
rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner. 14
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the decretal portion of which
reads:
Costs against plaintiff-appellee.

SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner sought reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. 17
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari seasonably filed on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR, REFLECTIVE OF
UNMINDFUL RECKLESSNESS WHICH IS THE VERY OPPOSITE OF JUDICIAL CIRCUMSPECTION, IN
DECLARING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION DATED JANUARY 4, 1984 (ANNEX "C") IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER WAS EMBODIED ONLY IN A PRIVATE DOCUMENT (Page 6, Decision, Annex "A"),
ALTHOUGH, BY A MERE CASUAL LOOK AT THE DOCUMENT, IT CAN BE READILY DISCERNED
THAT IT IS NOTARIZED;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN APPLYING ON THE CASE
AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE IN LAW THAT IT IS REGISTRATION OF THE SALES PATENT THAT
CONSTITUTE THE OPERATIVE ACT THAT WOULD CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND TO THE
APPLICANT (Pp. 3-6, Decision, Annex "A") BECAUSE THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DOES NOT INVOLVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ON SALES PATENT
APPLICATIONS;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN MAKING A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ACQUIRED THE LAND IN
QUESTION, IN GOOD FAITH (Page 7, Decision, Annex "A"), ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO BASIS NOR
NEED TO MAKE SUCH A FINDING; and
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN ENUNCIATING THAT
POSSESSION MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 1544 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE INCLUDE SYMBOLIC
POSSESSION, UPON WHICH THE APPELLATE COURT BASED ITS CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT WAS FIRST IN POSSESSION BECAUSE THE DEED OF SELF-ADJUDICATION AND
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT DATED MAY 28, 1983 WAS EXECUTED MUCH
EARLIER THAN THE DEED OF DONATION IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER DATED JANUARY 4, 1984
(Pages 7-8, Decision, Annex "A").18
The crucial issue to be resolved in an action for reconveyance is: Who between petitioner and
respondent has a better claim to the land?
To prove she has a better claim, respondent Amelita Sola submitted a copy of OCT No. 3439 in
her name and her husband's, 19 a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights 20 over the
property dated 1983 executed by Fermina in her favor, and a certification from the municipal
treasurer that she had been declaring the land as her and her husband's property for tax
purposes since 1993.21
For his part, petitioner Castorio Alvarico presented a Deed of Donation 22 dated January 4,
1984, showing that the lot was given to him by Fermina and according to him, he immediately
took possession in 1985 and continues in possession up to the present. 23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and

against the defendant. Lot 5, Sgs-3451, is hereby declared as lawfully owned by plaintiff and
defendant is directed to reconvey the same to the former.
Petitioner further contests the CA ruling that declared as a private document said Deed of
Donation dated January 4, 1984, despite the fact that a certified true and correct copy of the
same was obtained from the Notarial Records Office, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City on June
11, 1993 and acknowledged before Atty. Numeriano Capangpangan, then Notary Public for
Cebu.24
No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees, plaintiff having opted to forego such
claims.
Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of the parties, we find that no
reversible error was committed by the appellate court in holding that herein petitioner's

complaint against respondent should be dismissed. The evidence on record and the applicable
law indubitably favor respondent.
Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be governed by
the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more different persons.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she registered the land in her name
and, based on the abovementioned rules, he has a better right over the property because he
was first in material possession in good faith. However, this allegation of bad faith on the part
of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For one, the execution of
public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of
regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert them. 25 Second, it is
undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more
than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the Original Certificate of Title which on its face
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance. 26 A Torrens title, once registered,
serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead
ignorance of its registration. 27
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land
Act.28 Thus:
Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title
issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. 29 Since
Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.30 Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to
question the validity of Amelita's title. It follows that he cannot "recover" the property
because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.1wphi1.nt
Anent petitioner's contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the
property in trust for him, we held that if this was really the intention of Fermina, then this
should have been clearly stated in the Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the
Deed of Donation executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any persuasive
proof of that intention in any written instrument, we are not prepared to accept petitioner's
bare allegation concerning the donor's state of mind.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54624 is
hereby AFFIRMED. The complaint filed by herein petitioner against respondent in Civil Case
No. CEB-14191 is declared properlyDISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157536
May 16, 2005
MELCHOR CARO, petitioner, vs. SUSANA SUCALDITO, respondent.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
further alleged that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of
his predecessors-in-interest, and that the corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He
claimed that Assessors Lot No. 160 had actually been divided into two lots, namely, Lot No.
4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had actually been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512),
which was located two kilometers away. He lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence
proving his ownership and possession of the said property, the Bureau of Lands did not award
it to him.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503, affirming the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 15529 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, as well as the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in favor of
Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the subject lot.
Hence, as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return the same to him as the
lawful owner. The complaint contained the following prayer:
The antecedent facts are as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that judgment be rendered:
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessors Lot No. 160 from Ruperto Gepilano
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale 2 dated October 21, 1953. The said lot was situated
in Sitio Bangyan, Barrio Calaya, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or
less of 17.9849 hectares. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son
Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the
Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite
Sale3 dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.
1. Ordering the annulment and voiding of the decision of the Bureau of Lands, the free patent
and the Original Certificate of Title No. F-27162 or in the alternative;
On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands, District
Land Office No. 6-1, covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father.
The application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the
Regional Director rendered a Decision4 canceling the said application, thusly:
This is a claim of Deogracias de la Cruz to Lot No. 4512, Pls-775 of Calaya, Nueva Valencia,
Guimaras, covered by the above-noted application of Melchor Caro.
In the investigation, respondent claims preferential rights over the land as he acquired it
through sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had likewise bought the land from Ruperto
Cepellano (sic) in 1953. On the other hand, protestant De la Cruz testified that the land in
controversy was bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that he thereafter occupied,
possessed and improved the land by planting coconut trees; and that in 1968 he was forcibly
driven out by Gregorio Caro from the land in question.
Verification of the records disclosed that the land which was actually sold to Gregorio Caro by
Ruperto Gepellano (sic) is Assessors Lot No. 160. The description and physical identity of Lot
No. 160 is basically different and distinct from Lot No. 4512, the land in question. This could
be clearly seen in the Certified True Copy of the Sketch Plan from the Assessors Office of
Assessors Lot No. 160 and the Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit 9 of the Respondent-Applicant.
It has been established that Assessors Lot No. 160 corresponds to Lot No. 4511 and not Lot
No. 4512 claimed by the protestant. Moreover, Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in his affidavit testified
that what he sold to Gregorio Caro is a land distinct and different from the land in question.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, it is ordered that the F.P.A. No. (VI-1)8548 of applicantrespondent Melchor Caro be, as hereby it is, cancelled. Protestant Deogracias de la Cruz if
qualified, is given one hundred twenty (120) days from the finality of this decision to file an
appropriate public land application otherwise he shall lose his preferential right thereto.
SO ORDERED.5
Caro filed a notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City, docketed as MNR
Case No. 5207. However, the appeal was dismissed in an Order 6 dated June 29, 1982, on the
ground of failure to file an appeal memorandum within the reglementary period therefor.
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for
a Free Patent7covering the said lot, and was issued Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her
favor. Sucaldito then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession 8 before the RTC of Iloilo City, which
was granted in an Order9 dated May 7, 1984.
Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint 10 against Sucaldito for "Annulment of
Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages"
before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an amended complaint, 11 alleging that he was the
owner of the subject lot, and had been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even
prior thereto in the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He
2. Ordering defendant to reconvey the ownership and in the event she wrests possession from
plaintiff then, also the possession of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre,
back to plaintiff;
3. Declaring plaintiff as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre and ordering the issuance of a free patent or a torrens title in
favor of plaintiff;
4. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff P50,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as
attorneys fees andP2,000.00 as expenses on litigation plus exemplary damages in an amount
at the discretion of this Court.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises. 12
In her answer with counterclaim, Sucaldito interposed, as a special affirmative defense, the
fact that she intervened in the proceedings on Caros application for a free patent over Lot No.
4512 before the Bureau of Lands having bought the subject land from De la Cruz. Moreover,
contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, Lot No. 989 and Lot No. 4512 were one and the
same lot, as per the findings of the Bureau of Lands.
The parties thereafter presented evidence to prove their respective claims. In a
Decision13 dated December 7, 1993, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and
dismissed the petitioners complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by plaintiff is dismissed. The
counterclaim of defendant which is merely the result of the filing of the complaint, is likewise
dismissed.
Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.14
Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, 15 the trial court ruled that
Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free patent issued in favor
of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held that "an applicant
for a free patent who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to
recover the land, for the court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through administrative
proceedings under the Public Land Act," 16 or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The
trial court further stressed that the remedy of a rival-applicant for a free patent over the same
land was through administrative channels, not judicial, because even if the oppositor
succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former does not thereby become the
owner of the land in dispute. 17
The trial court also declared that contrary to Caros claims, the evidence clearly showed that
Lot No. 4512, with an area of 70,677 square meters, was not included in Assessors Lot No.
160, thus:
Assessors Lot 160 is Cadastral Lot 4511, which has an original area of around 17 hectares,
more or less, later on, increased to 21 hectares. If we add Lot 4512 to Lot 4511 following the
contention of the plaintiff, then the area would be more than 28 hectares. Thus, belying the
claim of plaintiff that Lot 4512 was formerly a part of Assessors Lot 160.

The contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is claiming Lot 989 which is owned by Felix
Galabo and located at Brgy. Olacon, is not well taken, because the identification of the lot as
stated in the tax declaration is not binding and conclusive. What is binding and conclusive is
what is stated in the title of the land and its technical description. In the technical description
as found in the title of the defendant [Sucaldito], it is clearly stated therein that the lot is Lot
4512 and is located at Brgy. Calaya and not Brgy. Olacon, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. 18
Aggrieved by the trial courts ruling, Caro elevated the case to the CA on the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO PERSONALITY TO BRING THE
ACTION;
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT EVEN IF THE PLANTIFF HAS THE PERSONALITY TO
BRING THE ACTION STILL HE CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CAD. LOT NO. 4512;
III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY THE LAND IN
QUESTION TO PLAINTIFF AND TO PAY DAMAGES.19
The CA dismissed the petition in its Decision 20 dated July 31, 2002. The appellate court agreed
with the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner had no personality to file the action under
Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, considering further that he was a mere applicant
for a free patent. Citing several cases, 21 the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact
made by administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence must be
respected, particularly where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge and experience. 22
Caro filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied
in a Resolution 23dated February 7, 2003.
Caro, now the petitioner, assails the ruling of the appellate court on the following grounds:
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THIS ACTION;
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY
PETITIONER ON THE GROUND THAT ONLY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL CAN FILE AN ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PATENT.24
The petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the CA, he has the legal personality to
bring and institute the present action against the respondent, considering that title issued on
the basis of a patent is annullable on the ground of fraud. Furthermore, the one-year period
within which to file an action to cancel a torrens title under Section 32 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 does not apply where the registered owner, or the successor-in-interest, knew that
the property described in the title actually belongs to another, as in this case. The petitioner
cites Vital v. Anore, et al. 25 to bolster his claim. The petitioner also cites Director of Lands v.
Abanilla 26 where the Court stressed that any false statement in the application, which is an
essential condition of the patent or title under Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
"shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted."
In her comment, the respondent points out that the decision of the Bureau of Lands itself
would show that the petitioner is not the true and lawful owner of the subject lot; as such, the
argument that he has the legal personality to file the action for annulment of patent based on
constructive trust is untenable. The respondent further contends that the CA did not err in
upholding the ruling of the RTC.
The petitioner merely reiterated his previous arguments in his Reply dated December 30,
2003.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that the petitioner has no
personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property.
The Court notes that the petitioners complaint before the RTC prays for the annulment of the
free patent issued in the respondents favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for
the respondent to "return" the subject property to him, it is in reality an action
for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 27 the Court held that "[t]he essence of
an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible

but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better
right."28 Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does
not go back to the State.29
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the
land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of
the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.30
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, 31 every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by
the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.32
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case,
the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free
patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for
reconveyance. The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko
v. Cezar33 as follows:
Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means
and, consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a
certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the
government, to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio [104
Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real
party-in-interest to institute an action for reconveyance.
...
Verily, the Court stressed that " [i]f the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real
party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action [Travel Wide v. CA, 199 SCRA 205, 209 (1991), per Cruz, J. See also Suguister
v. Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579, August 21, 1989]. In fact, a final judgment may be invalidated if
the real parties-in-interest are not included. This was underscored by the Court in Arcelona v.
CA [280 SCRA 20, October 2, 1997], in which a final judgment was nullified because
indispensable parties were not impleaded.
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land.
Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon,
respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the
judgment in such suit. 34
In De la Pea v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court, in dismissing the petitioners imputation of
fraud in securing a free patent and title over a parcel of land, declared that reconveyance is a
remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in anothers
name.36 The Court further expounded:
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued
by the State [Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936)]. In such cases, the real party-ininterest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever
established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is
indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the
conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot
ask for reconveyance. 37
In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 where the private respondents
therein were mere lessees of the property in question, the Court ruled that as mere lessees,
they had "no present substantial and personal interest with respect to issues involving
ownership of the disputed property." The Court went on to declare:
The only interest they have, in the event the petitioners title over the subject property is
cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is the hope that they become qualified buyers

of the subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly, such interest is a mere expectancy. Even the
private respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of ownership to the State, they
only have "pre-emptive rights" to buy the subject property; that their real interest over the
said property is contingent upon the governments consideration of their application as
buyers of the same. It is settled that a suit filed by a person who is not a party-in-interest
must be dismissed. 39
In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states
Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the
Philippines.
This provision was applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, et al.,40 a case on all fours with the present one, as follows:
Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in
his stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action
or any action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby
will again form part of the public domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding
legal personality from Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by
his application for a free patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be
a part of the public domain; this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that
lot 3633 was public land. Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the
public domain, Sumail does not automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public
land applicant like others who may apply for the same.
To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that
would result in the reversion of the land to the government. 41 The petitioner has no
personality to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503 and the Resolution dated February 7, 2003 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Remedial Law Review Cases Rule 72-91

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Remedial Law Review Cases Rule 72-91

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

G.R. No. 128781

TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and the HEIRS

"3. A more complete list of the properties to be collated is as follows:

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

November 26, 2002

GLORIOSA V. VALARAO, petitioner,

vs. CONRADO C. PASCUAL and MANUEL C.

group of sympathetic heirs be compelled to surrender to her as special administratrix the

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

The petition is bereft of merit.

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

May 26, 2005

MARGARITO R. JAMERO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ACHILLES L. MELICOR, in

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes omnibus motion to cite

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

January 29, 1996

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

and for the disqualification

of Judge Arcangel but

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

which were denied by

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Brief Historical Background

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely: ESTELA,

The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision, 10 are as follows

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

CASTORIO ALVARICO, petitioner, vs. AMELITA L. SOLA, respondent.

Costs against plaintiff-appellee.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and Escheats

May 16, 2005