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Human rights,principled
and sovereignty
issue-networks,
Sikkink
in Latin America Kathryn
of
The humanrightsissue is an importantcase studyof how understandings
role
are beingreshapedin theworldand oftheimportant
sovereignty
currently
of transnationalactors in that process. The doctrine of internationally
protectedhumanrightsoffersone ofthemostpowerfulcritiquesofsovereignty
as currentlyconstituted,and the practicesof human rightslaw and human
of
understandings
rightsforeignpoliciesprovideconcreteexamplesof shifting
In thisarticle,I arguethathumanrightspoliciesand
the scope of sovereignty.
and probablyirreversible
to a gradual,significant,
practicesare contributing
in themodernworldand thatthisshiftcannotbe
transformation
ofsovereignty
nonstateactors.
explainedwithouttakingintoaccounttheroleoftransnational
In the post-WorldWar II period,a humanrightsmovementhelped create
organizaregionaland internationalhumanrightsregimes.Nongovernmental
tions(NGOs) formedpartof a networkof organizationsworkingtogetheron
behalf of human rights,a networkthat also included parts of global and
organizations(IGOs) and privatefoundations.I
regionalintergovernmental
referto thisbroader set of organizationsas an internationalissue-network.'
This researchwas assistedbyan awardfromtheSocial Science ResearchCouncilofan advanced
fellowshipin foreignpolicystudieswiththe supportof a grantfromthe Ford Foundation,and by
of Minnesota.I am gratefulto Douglas
at theUniversity
the McKnightLand-GrantProfessorship
Legro, Ellen Lutz, Thomas Risse-Kappen,
Chalmers,RaymondDuvall, MargaretKeck, Jeffrey
and JohnS. Odell for
Organization,
Welna, twoanonymousreviewersforInternational
Christopher
theirhelpfulcommentson earlier versionsof this article and related articlesand to Kristina
Thalhammerforresearchassistance.
1. There is a large literaturein organizationtheoryon networkanalysis,some of which is
relevantto the case presentedhere. For an overviewof thisliterature,see Howard Aldrichand
and Networks:MakingtheMostofSimplicity,"
Action-sets,
David A. Whetten,"Organization-sets,
Design (New York: Oxford
in Paul Nystromand W. Starbuck,eds., Handbook of Organizational
Press,1981),pp. 385-408. This organizationliteratureoccasionallyhas been applied to
University
internationalrelations. See ChristerJonsson, "InterorganizationTheory and International
30 (March 1986), pp. 39-57; and Gayl D. Ness and
StudiesQuarterly
Organization,"International
Steven R. Brechin,"Bridgingthe Gap: InternationalOrganizationsas Organizations,"Interna42 (Spring1988), pp. 245-73. Kamarotosapplies networktheoryto the human
tionalOrganization
47, 3, Summer1993
International
Organization
? 1993 byThe IO Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology
412 InternationalOrganization
These networksdifferfromother formsof transnationalrelations,such as
organizedinterestgroups,in that
epistemiccommunitiesor transnationally
ideas-ideas aboutwhatis
bysharedvaluesor principled
theyare drivenprimarily
goals.2
thansharedcausalideasorinstrumental
rightandwrong-rather
This argumentwillbe exploredthrougha comparativestudyoftheimpactof
internationalhumanrightspressureson Argentinaand Mexico in the 1970s
and 1980s.3Both are largecountrieswithtraditionsofjealouslyguardingtheir
sovereignprerogatives.Both have had problematichuman rightspractices,
althoughtheArgentinehumanrightsrecordwas muchmoreseriousduringthe
periodof the so-calleddirtywar from1976 to 1980. The internationalhuman
rightsnetworkworked intensivelyon Argentina,contributingto improved
practicesby the early1980s.The networkdid not focuson Mexico, however,
the 1980s.Onlyafter
and lower-levelbutendemicabuses continuedthroughout
on
international
attention
Mexico
after1987did the
thenetworkconcentrated
human
takemovesto improve
Mexicangovernment
rightspractices.
Sovereigntyand human rights
The debate overhumanrightsis embeddedin a morefundamentaldebate over
in the modernworld.Sovereignty
is often
the changingnatureof sovereignty
Claims
seen as a seriesofclaimsaboutthenatureand scope ofstateauthority.4
about sovereigntyare forceful,however,because they represent shared
and expectationsthatare constantlyreinforcedboth through
understandings
thepracticesofstates5and thepracticesofnonstateactors.
than
ofnetworkand oforganizationalenvironment
rightsissuebutuses muchnarrowerdefinitions
theresearchpresentedhere;see AlexanderS. Kamarotos,"A View intoNGO Networksin Human
RightsActivities:NGO ActionwithSpecial Referenceto the UN Commissionon Human Rights
paper presentedat a conventionof the InternationalPoliticalScience
and its Sub-commission,"
Association, Washington,D.C., 10-14 April 1990. Another recent discussion that mentions
WorldPolitics:The Emergence
networksin humanrightsis RonnieD. Lipschutz,"Reconstructing
Studies21 (Winter1992),pp. 389-420.
JoumalofIntemational
ofGlobal CivilSociety,"Millennium:
to
2. JudithGoldsteinand RobertKeohane classifybeliefsintothreegroupsin theintroduction
and PoliticalChange (Ithaca,
theiredited volume,Ideas and ForeignPolicy:Beliefs,Institutions,
whether
Ideas thatspecifycriteriafordetermining
Press,forthcoming).
N.Y.: CornellUniversity
actionsare rightor wrongand whetheroutcomesare just or unjustare called shared principled
beliefs. Beliefs about cause-effectrelationshipsare called shared causal beliefs. At a more
fundamentallevelis a thirdcategoryof ideas about the universeof possibilitiesforaction.Human
about a set of sharedprincipledideas, butto the degreethathumanrightsideas
rightsis primarily
of sovereignty,
theyalso workat the level of definingpossibilitiesfor
challengeunderstandings
see PeterM. Haas, ed., "Knowledge,Power,and International
action.On epistemiccommunities,
46 (Winter1992),pp. 1-390.
PolicyCoordination,"special issue,IntemationalOrganization
3. For a relatedstudythatexaminesthe impactof U.S. humanrightspolicyusinga two-level
game approach, see Lisa Martin and KathrynSikkink,"U.S. Policy and Human Rights in
Argentinaand Guatemala, 1973-1980,"in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson,and Robert Putnam,
and DomesticPolitics(Berkeley:University
Bargaining
eds.,Double-edgedDiplomacy:Intemational
ofCaliforniaPress,forthcoming).
4. Stephen Krasner, "Westphalia," in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and ForeignPolicy.
5. Wendt stresses that sovereigntyis an institutionthat exists "only in virtue of certain
414 InternationalOrganization
and practicesof statesas
almostexclusivelyon statesand the understandings
are usually abstractand
views
These
of
the sole determinant sovereignty.8
are so
of sovereignty
of
standard
understandings
critical
theorists
static.Even
and
constructed
is
of
sovereignty
the
discourse
how
with
exposing
concerned
maintainedthattheyoftenignorethe waysin whichconceptionsof the state
are evolving.9
and expectationsabout the
is a shared set of understandings
If sovereignty
authorityof the state and is reinforcedby practices, then a change in
and practices.In
understandings
willcome about bytransforming
sovereignty
thissense,the expansionof humanrightslaw and policyin thepostwarperiod
representeda conscious, collective attemptto modifythis set of shared
protected
and practices.Althoughthe idea of internationally
understandings
agenda whentheUnitedNations
humanrightswas placed on theinternational
(UN) General Assemblyadopted the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights
of sovereignty
in 1948,thatidea was notinitiallytranslatedintoa modification
protectionofhumanrights.The onlyexceptionwas in
in practiceor to effective
Europe, wherethe European Conventionon Human Rightsand the practices
of the European humanrightssystembegan to have a gradual but profound
statesovereignty.10
impacton modifying
the means had to be found to translatethe human
To become effective,
rightsideals of the declarationand treatiesof the postwarperiod intowidely
and practices.The humanrightsnetworkhelped foster
sharedunderstandings
these means in two ways. Internationalorganizationsdeveloped formal
humanrightssituationsin memberstates.
proceduresto discussand investigate
if not used. The workof NGOs made
But formalproceduresare ineffective
states' repressivepracticesmore visible and salient,thus forcingstates that
otherwisewouldhave remainedsilentto respond.As theybecame moreaware
of human rightsviolations,some states demanded explanationsfromothers.
Faced withincreasedpressures,repressivestatestriedto providejustifications.
ofexposingviolations,demandingexplanations,providing
In thegive-and-take
and changingpractices,states and NGOs graduallyquestioned
justifications,
the elements
and began constructing
of sovereignty
traditionalunderstandings
When a state recognizesthe legitimacyof internaof a modifiedsovereignty.
on the topic of human rightsand changes its domestic
tional interventions
Politics(Reading, Mass.:
8. See Krasner,"Westphalia";KennethWaltz,TheoryofIntemational
2d ed. (Cambridge:Cambridge
Addison-Wesley,1979), pp. 95-96; and F. H. Hinsley,Sovereignty,
Press,1986).
University
9. See, for example, Wendt, "AnarchyIs What States Make of It"; and Richard Ashley,
"Untyingthe SovereignState: A Double Reading of the AnarchyProblematique,"Millennium:
JoumalofIntemationalStudies17 (Summer1988),pp. 227-61.
10. Sieghartregardsthe European Conventionon Human Rightsas "a substantialretreatfrom
see Paul Sieghart,The LawfuilRightsof
the previouslysacred principleof nationalsovereignty";
Mankind:An Introductionto the IntemationalLegal Code of Human Rights(Oxford: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1985), pp. 67-68. See also Rosalyn Higgins,"The European Conventionon
Law: Legal and PolicyIssues
Human Rights,"in TheodorMeron,ed.,HumanRightsinIntemational
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),p. 538.
The internationalhumanrightsissue-network
An internationalissue-networkcomprisesa set of organizations,bound by
shared values and by dense exchangesof information
and services,working
on an issue. The diverseentitiesthatmake up theinternational
internationally
and
humanrightsissue-network
includepartsofIGOs at boththeinternational
416 InternationalOrganization
regional levels, internationalNGOs on human rights,domestic NGOs on
will include a
human rights,and privatefoundations.Other issue-networks
and domesticNGOs play
somewhatdifferent
arrayof actors;but international
Theyare themostproactivemembersofthe
a centralrolein all issue-networks.
morepowerfulactorsto take
actionsand pressuring
networks,
usuallyinitiating
positions.
helpsexplainthe
The role of sharedvalues as thebasis oftheissue-networks
in
networks.
Activists
NGOs
join NGOs
of
centralinvolvement manyvoluntary
not
the
because
in
the
of
organizations,
principles
they
believe
strongly
because
Since
these
receive
from
that
membership.
benefits
they
of any tangible
of
and
the
dedication
on
survive
voluntary
labor,
donations,
organizations
theNGOs thatsucceed and thriveare thosethathave a strong
underpaidstaff,
and publicopinion."
membership,
messagecapable ofmobilizingtheirstaff,
The organizationsin the networkthathave been mostimportantforhuman
rightsin Latin America include the UN Commissionon Human Rights,the
Inter-AmericanCommissionon Human Rights(IACHR), AmnestyInternational(Al), AmericasWatch,theWashingtonOfficeon LatinAmerica,domesticNGOs liketheMothersofthePlaza de Mayo inArgentinaand theAcademy
of Human Rightsin Mexico,and the Ford Foundation,as well as foundations
and domestichumanrightsNGOs.
based in Europe thatfundinternational
To have a strongnetwork,it musthave a certainsize and density.In other
words,enoughactorsmustexistand be connectedin orderto speak meaningfullyof a network.Much of the historyof the emergenceof the humanrights
and linkingoftheorganizationsin
growth,
networkis thestoryofthefounding,
the network.Groups in a networkshare values and frequentlyexchange
and services.'2The sharedvalues thatbindtheactorsin thehuman
information
rightsnetworkare embodied in internationalhumanrightslaw, especiallyin
the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights.This bodyof law servesto justify
actionsand providesa commonlanguageto makeargumentsand proceduresto
amongactorsin the networkreveals
advance claims.The flowof information
an extremely
amongthesegroups.In mostcases,
denseweb ofinterconnections
throughtheexchangeofreports,
thisflowofinformation
takesplace informally
telephonecalls, and attendanceat conferencesand meetings.In othercases,
11. Mansbridgehas made a similarpoint discussinggroupsthatorganizedaround the Equal
RightsAmendmentdebate in the United States. See Jane J. Mansbridge,Wy WeLost theERA
of ChicagoPress,1986),p. 3.
(Chicago: University
12. Organizationtheoryuses a varietyof ways to thinkabout relationsamong organizations.
Mitchellrefersto threetypesof contentof relations:(1) communicative
content,or thepassingof
information
fromone organizationto another,(2) exchangecontent,and (3) normativecontent.
See J. Clyde Mitchell,"Networks,Norms,and Institutions,"in JeremyBoissevain and J. Clyde
Mitchell,eds. NetworkAnalysis
(The Hague: Mouton,1973),pp. 2-35. To documenttheselinkages,
researchersinvestigatethe exchange of resources,communicationamong staff,friendshipor
kinshipties,and overlappingboards of directorsamongorganizations.See Aldrichand Whetten,
"Organization-sets,
Action-sets,and Networks,"p. 391.
418 InternationalOrganization
largelyresponsibleforthe human rightsprovisionsof the Charter,"in John
Humphrey'swords.19
actors were central to the campaign against
Althoughnongovernmental
slaveryand to theworkof includinghumanrightslanguagein theUN Charter,
therewere relativelyfew actors and there
theywere not yet issue-networks:
were not the dense and constant flows of informationthat characterize
networks.In the 1970s,as the numberof humanrightsactorsincreasedand
these actorsconsciouslydevelopedlinkageswitheach other,the humanrights
emerged.Althoughinternationalhumanrightsnormsemerged
issue-network
out of theworldreactionto the Holocaust,these normswere subordinatedto
duringthe periodof the cold war. Withthe adventof detente
anticommunism
in the early 1970s, a more permissiveenvironmentwas created for the
considerationof humanrights,and the convergenceof some shockingcases of
In
humanrightsabuses,suchas in Chile and in Greece,movedworldopinion.20
in
the
organizations
reactionto these conditions,all typesof human rights
networkincreased in the 1970s,withthe expansionof NGOs, in particular,
givingimpetusto thegrowthofthenetworkas a whole.
International NGOs
Althoughsome humanrightsorganizationshave existedformanyyears,in
and increasedin diversity
the 1970sand 1980shumanrightsNGOs proliferated
(38 in 1950, 72 in 1960, 103 in 1970, 138 in 1980, and 275 in 1990).21This
explosion of NGOs is indicated not only by the increasingnumber of
organizationsbut also by the formationof coalitions and communications
In turn,these international
networksdesignedto linkthosegroupstogether.22
human rightsorganizationsdeveloped stronglinksto domestichuman rights
humanrightsviolations.This growthin
organizationsin countriesexperiencing
(Dobbs Ferry,
19. JohnP. Humphrey,Human Rightsand theUnitedNations:A GreatAdventure
N.Y.: TransnationalPublishers,1984), p. 13. Also see U.S. Departmentof State, The United
San Francisco,Califomia,April25 to June26,
on IntemationalOrganization,
Nations Conference
1945: SelectedDocuments(Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1946).
in
20. This discussionon whyhumanrightsgainedimportancein the 1970sis developedfurther
of Human Rights
KathrynSikkink,"The Power of PrincipledIdeas: The Originsand Continuity
Policies in the United States and WesternEurope," in Goldsteinand Keohane, Ideas and Foreign
Policy.
Society,was foundedin 1839,but
theAnti-slavery
21. The oldestofhumanrightsorganizations,
most internationalhuman rightsNGOs have emergedsince World War II. For a discussionof
NGOs in the area of human rights,see David Weissbrodt,"The Contributionof International
Organizationsto the Protectionof Human Rights,"in Meron,Human Rightsin
Nongovernmental
Law, pp. 403-38.
Intemational
22. Laurie S. Wisebergand HarryM. Scoble, "MonitoringHuman RightsViolations:The Role
of NongovernmentalOrganizations,"in Donald P. Kommers and Gilbert D. Loescher, eds.,
of Notre Dame Press,
Human Rightsand AmericanForeignPolicy(Notre Dame, Ind.: University
pp. 183-84. These pointsabout the growthand interconnec1979), pp. 179-208,and particularly
withdirectorsand
tionsof internationalhumanrightsNGOs were also emphasizedin interviews
humanrightsNGOs.
staffofninekeyinternational
420 InternationalOrganization
whichwere set up afterWorld War II, became more dynamicin the 1970s
NGOs,
underthe influenceof thenew rulesand thepressuresof international
The Human
and some European governments.26
the Carter administration,
RightsCommitteebegan to functionafterthe InternationalCovenanton Civil
and PoliticalRightscame intolegal forceforadheringstatesin 1976,providing
yetanotherarena forhumanrightsdebate and activismin theUN system.27
The IACHR oftheOrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS), firstestablished
in 1959, was reorganized and strengthenedin 1979 when the American
Conventionon Human Rightsenteredintoforce.The reorganizedcommission
was able to playa moreimportantrole in thepromotionofhumanrightsin the
region,especiallyin itsinfluential1980 reporton humanrightsin Argentina.28
Foundations and funders
A handfulof privateand public foundationshave been active in funding
human rightsorganizations.The most importantU.S.-based foundationfor
Latin America has been the Ford Foundation,but a numberof European
fundersalso have playedkeyroles,especiallyEuropean churchfoundations.29
In additionto privatefoundations,officialdevelopmentassistanceagenciesin
Canada, theNetherlands,Scandinavia,and theUnitedStatesalso have funded
humanrightsNGOs.
Prior to 1975, large U.S. foundationshardlyever funded international
human rightswork.30From 1977 to 1987, U.S. foundationgrantsforhuman
rightswork grew dramatically,in terms of both the total number and,
especially,the absolute dollar amounts of grants. The Ford Foundation
accounts for much of this change, but a numberof other foundationsalso
redirectedtheirgivingtoward human rights(see Figure 1). Althoughnot
conreflectedin the figure,European foundationsalso became increasingly
26. Economic and Social Council resolutions1235 (passed in 1967) and 1503 (passed in 1970),
which authorized the commissionto review communicationsand investigatecomplaintsthat
appear to reveal a consistentpattern of gross violations of human rights,fundamentally
strengthened
theUN humanrightsmachinery.
27. The CovenantforCivil and Political Rightsand the CovenantforEconomic, Social, and
draftedby 1954butnot approvedbythe General Assemblyand
CulturalRightswere substantially
opened forsignatureuntil1966.The twocovenantsreachedtherequirednumberof adherentsfor
entryintolegal forcein 1976.
Commissionon Human Rights,Reporton
28. OrganizationofAmericanStates,Inter-American
(Washington,D.C.: OAS General Secretariat,1980).
theSituationofHumanRightsinArgentina
work,see PeterD. Bell, "The Ford Foundationas a
29. On theFord Foundation'sinternational
M.
TransnationalActor,"IntemationalOrganization25 (Summer 1971), pp. 465-78; and Jeffrey
Puryear,"Higher Education, Development Assistance, and Repressive Regimes," Studies in
Development17 (Summer1982),pp. 3-35.
Intemational
Comparative
30. The subjectof humanrightsdid not appear in the indexof major foundationgrantsin the
United States until1975; see The FoundationCenter,The FoundationGrantsIndex (New York:
The Foundation Center, 1975). Before this,a few human rightsgrantswere listed under the
subjectsof civilrightsor social sciences,but thesecompriseda smallportionof totalinternational
grants.
$17$16$15-
$14$13-
FordFoundation
SISX
$12
1@
All otherdonors
c $10$8
$$7-
$111
$ 5- 9'
$4$ 3$ 2$1
0
FIGURE
1.
197 78
80
8-2 '83
'84,
85
'86
81
'88
'89
190 lc91
humanrights
forintemational
grants
U.s. foundation
work,1977-91
422 InternationalOrganization
For
provide arenas and points of leverage for the work of the network.32
groupto workactively
example,in theUnitedStates,theearliestgovernmental
on humanrightswas the House Subcommitteeon InternationalOrganizations
ofDonald Fraser,laterrenamedtheSubcommitteeon
underthechairmanship
Human Rights and InternationalOrganizations.Beginning in 1973, this
subcommitteeheld a series of hearingson human rightsabuses around the
worldthatput itin contactwithmanyhumanrightsadvocatesin thenetwork.33
in these
The primarywitnessesprovidinghumanrightsdata and information
of humanrightsNGOs. In its initialyears,
hearingswere the representatives
the Bureau of Human Rights and HumanitarianAffairsof the U.S. State
Department,formed during the Carter administration,maintained close
ofNGOs. In European countries,
contactswithand soughtout theinformation
pointsof influencewithinthe state centeredon Ministriesof ForeignAffairs
instituand DevelopmentCooperation.In some cases, European governments
tionalizedthe linkswithotherpartsof the network.Both the Dutch and the
Norwegianexecutives,forexample,initiatedhuman rightsadvisorycommitand
parliamentarians,
tees,whichincorporatedNGOs such as Al, ministries,
scholars.34
betweenthe networkand bureaucraticgroupswithin
Oftenthe interactions
but not congenial.The U.S. annual
were mutuallyreinforcing
governments
Because State
humanrightsreportsprovidea clear exampleofthatinteraction.
or undermineother
did notwantto offendforeignofficials
Departmentofficials
policygoals, theirearlyhumanrightsreportswere oftenweak. However,the
State Departmentreportsdid serveas a focal pointforhumanrightsgroups,
whichwere able to create annual public eventsby issuingresponsesto the
attractedpress coverageon human
The reportsand counterreports
reports.35
rights,and the critiquesof the State Departmentreportsheld the department
up to higher standards in its future reporting.Domestic human rights
organizationsin repressivecountriesin turnlearnedthattheycould indirectly
on
to change practicesby providinginformation
pressuretheirgovernments
in U.S. embassiesforinclusionin
humanrightsabuses to humanrightsofficers
reports.
theU.S. annual country-specific
32. This pointabout networkleverageon morepowerfulactorswas firstdevelopedbyMargaret
Keck and is elaborated in furtherdetail in MargaretKeck and KathrynSikkink,"International
and Human Rights,"paper presentedat the 17thcongressof
Issue Networksin the Environment
theLatin AmericanStudiesAssociation,Los Angeles,24-27 September1992.
33. InterviewwithJohnSalzberg,formerspecial consultanton humanrightsto theU.S. House
of RepresentativesCommitteeon ForeignRelations,Washington,D.C., April 1991.Althoughthe
ithas continuedto holdhearingson
committeehas been less activeundersubsequentchairpersons,
humanrightsabuses in countriesaroundtheworld.
of Human
Small State:Potentialsand Limitations
34. JanEgeland, ImpotentSuperpower-Potent
Press,
RightsObjectivesin theForeignPoliciesof theU.S. and Norway(Oslo: NorwegianUniversity
1988),p. 193,fn.
35. See, forexample,Human RightsWatch and the LawyersCommitteeforHuman Rights,
Reportson Human RightsPracticesfor 1987
of State's Country
Critique:Reviewof theDepartment
(New York: Human RightsWatch and the LawyersCommitteeforHuman Rights,June 1988).
Argentina
Even before the militarycoup of March 1976, internationalhuman rights
verydecisionto use the
pressuresalreadyinfluencedthe Argentinemilitary's
political
opponentsrather
practiceof so-called disappearingtheirperceived
The
them
publicly.36 Argentinemilitary
than imprisoningthemor executing
from
the
international
reactionto the humanrights
believedtheyhad learned
When
the Chilean military
after
the
Chilean
coup.
abuses that occurred
initiallyexecutedand imprisonedlarge numbersof people, the uproarled to
the internationalisolation of the Pinochet regime.The Argentinemilitary
decided instead to secretlykidnap, detain, and execute its victims,while
hoped
denyinganyknowledgeoftheirwhereabouts.Bythismeans,themilitary
to diffuseinternationalcondemnationand maintaina moderateinternational
image.37
Although this method initiallysucceeded in muting the international
responseto the coup, humanrightsgroupseventuallywere able to document
36. This sectiondrawsupon some materialfroman earlierwork;see Martinand Sikkink,"U.S.
Policyand Human Rightsin Argentinaand Guatemala,1973-1980."
37. Mignone recalls, "One phrase I heard repeatedlyin that period fromthe mouths of
Generals, Colonels, Admirals,and Brigadierswas, 'we aren't going to do it like Franco and
Pinochetwho executedpeople publicly,because theneven thePope willbe askingus notto do it.' "
(Human rightsand society:the
See EmilioMignone,Derechoshumanosysociedad:el caso argentino
Argentinecase) (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del PensamientoNacional and Centro de Estudios
Legales y Sociales, 1991), p. 66. This process of perverselearningis also discussed in Claudio
Uriarte,AlmiranteCero:BiografiaNo Autorizadade EmilioEduardo Massera (AdmiralZero: The
unauthorizedbiographyof Emilio Eduardo Massera) (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992),p. 97; and in
Carlos H. Acufia and Catalina Smulovitz,"Ajustando las FF.AA. a la Democracia: Exitos,
Fracasos, y Ambiguidadesde las Experienciasdel Cono Sur" (Adjustingthe armed forcesto
democracy:Successes, failures,and ambiguitiesof the experiencesof the southerncone), paper
justice,and societyin Latin America,organizedbythe
presentedat a workshopon humanrights,
Social Science ResearchCouncil,Buenos Aires,22-24 October 1992,p. 4.
424 InternationalOrganization
and condemnthe new formsof repressivepractices.Al and groupsstaffedby
Argentinepoliticalexilesfirstbroughtthe humanrightssituationin Argentina
to world attentionafterthe coup in 1976. To counteractthe risingtide of
the Argentinejunta decided to inviteAl foran
internationalpublic criticism,
coup,
ofthemilitary
on-sitevisitin 1976.In March1977,on thefirstanniversary
Al publishedthe reporton its visit,a well-documenteddenunciationof the
abuses of the regimewithemphasison the problemof the disappeared. Al
estimatedthat the regimehad taken six thousand political prisoners,most
withoutcharges,and had abductedbetweentwo thousandand ten thousand
people. The Al reporthelped demonstratethatthe disappearanceswere part
of a concerted governmentpolicy by which the militaryand the police
kidnappedperceivedopponents,took themto secretdetentioncenterswhere
theytortured,interrogated,and killed them,and secretlydisposed of their
bodies.38When Al won the Nobel Peace Prize later that same year, its
its denunciationsof the Argenreputationwas enhanced,furtherlegitimizing
tineregime.
In response to increasingdisseminationof informationon human rights
abuses in Argentina,a number of governments,most notablythe Carter
denouncedthe
but also the Frenchand Swedishgovernments,
administration
rightsviolationsof the Argentinejunta. Althoughthe Argentinegovernment
in their
claimed thatsuch statementsconstitutedunacceptableinterventions
theactionsofU.S. and
internalaffairsand a violationofArgentinesovereignty,
European officialsindicatethattheydid not accept Argentineclaims.In 1977,
reduced the planned level of militaryaid forArgentina
the U.S. government
due to human rightsabuses. Later, Congress passed a bill eliminatingall
militaryassistance to Argentina,which went into effecton 30 September
1978.39A numberof high-levelU.S. delegationsmetwiththejunta members
duringthisperiodto discusshumanrights.
Early U.S. action on Argentinawas based primarilyon the human rights
received
documentationprovidedbyAl and otherNGOs, not on information
For
a 1977
or
the
State
during
example,
the
Department.40
through embassy
carried
a
list
of
to
Vance
people
disappeared
of
State
Cyrus
visit,Secretary
of
The
list
had
been
prepared
by
to
members
the
junta.
Argentine
present
Missionto Argentina(London:
38. AmnestyInternational,Reportof an AmnestyInternational
AmnestyInternationalPublications,March 1977).
39. CongressionalResearch Service,ForeignAffairsand National Defense Division,Human
(1977-1978),
Rightsand U.S. ForeignAssistance:Experiencesand Issues in PolicyImplementation
report prepared for U.S. Senate Committeeon Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st sess.
(Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,November,1979),p. 106.
40. Afterthe coup in 1976,Argentinepoliticalexilesset up branchesof the ArgentineHuman
Rights Commissionin Geneva, Mexico City,Paris, Rome, and Washington,D.C. Two of its
memberstestifiedon human rightsabuses in Argentinaduringhearingsin the U.S. House
Subcommitteeon Human Rightsand InternationalOrganizationin October 1976.See lain Guest,
Behind theDisappearances:Argentina'sDirtyWarAgainstHuman Rightsand the UnitedNations
of PennsylvaniaPress,1990),pp. 66-67.
(Philadelphia:University
426 InternationalOrganization
cause celebre in U.S. policy circles. In 1980, the Nobel Peace Prize was
awardedto ArgentinehumanrightsactivistAdolfoPerez Esquivel. Peace and
humanrightsgroupsin the United States and Europe helped sponsorPerez
Esquivel's speakingtourto the United Statesexactlyat the same timethatthe
OAS was consideringthe IACHR reporton Argentinaand the U.S. Congress
was consideringtheend ofthe armsembargoto Argentina.
concernedabout internawas extremely
government
The Argentinemilitary
tional human rightscondemnationsand pressures.It adopted a series of
to a
varyingresponsesto internationalpressures,each roughlycorresponding
Theyfirsttried
stageon the continuumof the erosionof sovereignty.
different
concernoverhumanrightsin Argentina,
ofinternational
to denythelegitimacy
itsmemberswerepartof a
to discreditthehumanrightsnetworkbysuggesting
campaign,and to mobilizenationalistpublicopinion
subversiveanti-Argentine
in internalaffairs.When thatapproach
againstwhatit definedas interference
protest,thejunta triedto placate international
was unable to stillinternational
and domesticoppositionbycooperatingwithsome partsof the networkwhile
manyrepressivepractices.The thirdstageinvolved
at thesame timecontinuing
in repressivepracticesin responseto internamakingconcreteimprovements
tional and domesticpressures.Althoughthese stagesprogressedin a roughly
in part
chronologicalmanner,therewas continualoverlap and backtracking,
because the Argentinemilitarygovernmentwas not a unitaryactor but a
coalition of differentfactions with differentattitudes about the proper
pressures.
responseto international
From 1976 to 1978, the Argentinemilitarypursued the firststrategyof
denyingthe legitimacyof internationalconcernover humanrightsin Argentina.At the same time,it took actionsthatappear to contradictthisstrategy,
thevisitof the Al missionto Argentinain 1976. The failureof
like permitting
of
thestrategy
pointofview,appeared to reaffirm
theAl visit,fromthemilitary
was mostobvious
resistanceand denialofhumanrightspressures.This strategy
at the UN, where the Argentinegovernmenttried everymeans to silence
internationalcondemnationin the UN Commissionon Human Rights.IroniArgentineregimefounda diplomaticallyin the
callytherabidlyanticommunist
SovietUnion, an importanttradingpartnerforArgentinewheat,and the two
countriesworkedtogetherto blockUN considerationof the Argentinehuman
thisblockagebycreatingthe
Concernedstatescircumvented
rightssituation.45
UN WorkingGroup on Disappearances in 1980 to draw attentionto the
practiceof disappearancesin Argentinaand elsewherein the world.Human
rightsNGOs contributedto the debates over human rightsat the United
delegations,and pursulobbyinggovernment
Nations,providinginformation,
delegations.
ingjointstrategieswithsympathetic
By 1978, however,the Argentinegovernmentrecognizedthat the greatest
variable"and thatsomethinghad
weaknessofitsregimewas the"international
45. Guest,BehindtheDisappearances,pp. 118-19 and 182-83.
5,000
4,105
t_ ~~~~~~~~~~3,098
3,000-
2,000-
;~~~~~~
1,000-96
1971 172
FIGURE
2.
K7
'74
75
76~7~8'9
81'8~2
1971-83
NumberofdisappearancesinArgentina,
in theUnitedStates
to be done to improveitsinternational
image,particularly
this
andeconomicaid floWS.46To confront
andEurope,andtorestoremilitary
428 InternationalOrganization
cooperation with the human rightsnetwork,and eventuallyto concrete
improvementsin its human rightspractices in response to international
commissionand discovered
pressures.Once it had invitedthe Inter-American
moved
thatthecommissioncould notbe co-optedor confused,thegovernment
to end the practice of disappearance,to release political prisoners,and to
restoresome semblanceof politicalparticipation.Full restorationof human
rightsin Argentinadid not come untilafterthe Malvinas/FalklandsWar and
the transitionto democracyin 1983,but after1980 theworstabuses had been
curtailed.
Mexico
thanthat
The politicaland humanrightssituationin Mexicowas quitedifferent
thathad been under
in Argentina.Mexico had an elected civiliangovernment
the controlof the officialpoliticalparty,the InstitutionalizedRevolutionary
Party(PRI) sincethepartywas formedin 1929.Althoughmassiveabuses ofthe
kindthatoccurredin Argentinaafterthe coup were not the case in Mexico,
endemichumanrightsabuses were common.
The mostseriousepisode of humanrightsviolationsin Mexico occurredin
October1968,whenarmytroopsopened fireon a peacefulstudentdemonstration in one of the centralplazas in Mexico City.The governmentofficially
admittedforty-three
deaths,but knowledgeableobserverssuggestthatat least
three hundredto fivehundredpeople were killed,over two thousandwere
hundredto twothousandpeople weretakenprisoner.49
wounded,and fifteen
the massacre attractedverylittleinternationalcondemnation
Surprisingly,
or attention.The InternationalOlympicCommittee,whichwas to hold the
OlympicGames in Mexico Cityonlyten dayslater,confirmedthatthe games
of solidarityin a
would go on as planned.Aside fromstudentdemonstrations
thearrest
numberofcities,a telegramfromPEN Club Internationalprotesting
of variousauthors,and a telegramfroma groupof Frenchintellectuals,there
Why
action.50
was no international
condemnationoftheMexicangovernment's
of
Tiananmen
massacre,
not
Square
this
a
1968
version
China's
1989
did
event,
response?One keypartof the answerto thisquestion
inspirean international
is that the internationalhuman rightsnetwork,and the human rights
consciousnessand practicesthatit created,did not yetexistin 1968. Al later
adopted as prisonersof conscience some of the political prisonerswho
49. These figuresare taken fromMichael C. Meyer and WilliamL. Sherman,The Courseof
Mexican History,4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1991), p. 669; from Amnesty
International,
AnnualReport1968-69 (London: AmnestyInternationalPublications,1969), p. 12;
withMexicanhumanrightsactivists.
and frominterviews
50. Ramon Ramirez, El MovimientoEstudiantilde Mexico: Julio-Diciembre1968, Tomo 2,
Documentos(The Mexican studentmovement:July-December1968,vol. 2, Documents) (Mexico
City:Ediciones Era, 1969).
430 InternationalOrganization
in El Salvador), and the absence of Mexican humanrightsorganizationskept
Mexico frombecominga concernofthenetwork.
Mexico had takena positionof firmrhetoricalsupportforthe humanrights
of internationalorganizationsand cultivatedits imageas a defenderof
efforts
human rights.In 1988, the Mexican delegate to the UN Human Rights
multilat"Our country'sadhesionto themostimportant
Commissionaffirmed,
entails a permanentdouble commitment:to
eral human rightsinstruments
and to contributeto theirobservance
preservetheirfullprotectioninternally,
thatthe internationalcommunity
in the worldwithinthe judicial framework
however,thatthe UN mandatewas to
has established."He wenton to clarify,
violationsof rightswheredomesticlegal
look intoonlymassiveand systematic
Mexico's verbal supportfor internationalhuman
recourse is inoperative.55
role in the
rightsnormsand its acceptance of the internationalcommunity's
supervisionof humanrightspracticeswere coupled witha failureto addressa
patternof domestichumanrightsviolations.
This situationbegan to change by the late 1980s, when human rights
consciousnessbegan to penetrateMexican civil society.In 1984, only four
humanrightsNGOs existedin Mexico,sevenyearslatertherewere sixty,and
by 1993 therewere over two hundredindependenthumanrightsmonitoring
and advocacyNGOs. Internationalattentionhelped create the politicalspace
A keyturning
pointcame whena group
withinwhichthisgrowthwas possible.56
of prestigiousMexican intellectuals,activists,and politicians set up the
Mexican AcademyforHuman Rightsin 1984.The academyfocusedattention
and
on human rightsissues in Mexico, trained human rightspractitioners,
fosteredresearchand educationon humanrights.The academywas explicitly
ratherthan an activistgroup,in hope of
designedas an academic institution
the
openingspace forthe humanrightsdebate in Mexico withoutconfronting
on specificissues.57The academyreceivedearlyand strongsupport
government
fromthe Ford Foundation,whichprovidedthe bulk of its fundingduringits
firstfiveyears.58The 1985 earthquake in Mexico City gave impetusto the
increasingconcernwithhumanrights.The discoveryof the bodies of several
prisonersshowingsignsof tortureduringthe excavationof the ruinsof the
headquartersof the officeof the Federal DistrictAttorneyGeneral stirred
was paralyzedin its
nationaloutrage.59
Second,whenthe Mexicangovernment
response to the earthquake,civil societyorganizedand internationalNGOs
55. "Statementbythe Chiefof the MexicanDelegation,Mr. Claude Heller,on theme12 of the
agenda in the 44th period of session of the Commissionof Human Rights," mimeograph,
CommissionofHuman Rights,Geneva,8 March 1988 (translationbyauthor).
Democracy:GrassrootsMovements,
56. JonathanFox and Luis Hernandez,"Mexico's Difficult
17 (Spring 1992), pp. 184-85; and Human Rights
NGOs, and Local Government,"Alternatives
Watch,HumanRightsWatchWorldReport(New York: Human RightsWatch,1993),p. 131.
57. InterviewwithRodolfoStavenhagen,foundingmemberoftheMexicanAcademyofHuman
Rights,Buenos Aires,26 October 1992.
58. This includedan initialtwo-yeargrantof $150,000and a follow-upgrantof $375,000.
59. AmericasWatch,HumanRightsinMexico,pp. 9-10.
432 InternationalOrganization
U.S. and Mexican press and attractedsignificantattentionin Washington,
D.C., wherethe initialnegotiationsforthe freetrade agreementwere under
way.
Until 1990,the U.S. Congresshad held no hearingson the generalhuman
rightssituationin Mexico. Over the years,Congresshad expressedconcern
of U.S. prisonersheld in Mexican prisonsbut had not
about the mistreatment
broadened its focusto look at Mexico's treatmentof its own citizens.Yet in
September 1990, only a few monthsafterthe Americas Watch reportwas
issued,the Subcommitteeon Human Rightsand InternationalOrganizations
and the Subcommitteeon Western Hemisphere Affairsof the House of
Representativesheld hearingson human rightsin Mexico. In addition to
fromthe State Department,these two subcommitteesheard testitestimony
monyfromAl and AmericasWatch.64
The IACHR did not consideradmissibleanyMexican cases until1989-90,
whenit tookon threeMexicancases. All threecases, broughtbymembersof a
major oppositionparty,the National Action Party(PAN), allege that PRI
In response to these cases, the Mexican
committedelectoral irregularities.
governmentadopted a rigidpositionthat a decision of a domesticelectoral
jurisdiction"and thatifa
body "is not and cannotbe subjectto international
withrespectto the
to
international
to
itself
jurisdiction
submit
"State agreed
electionof its politicalbodies, a Statewouldcease to be sovereign"and finally
that "any conclusion issued by the Commissionon the legitimacyof the
accordingto the
electoralprocess ... would constitutean act of intervention,
set forthin Article18 oftheCharter."65
definition
of
The IACHR respondedto each oftheseclaims,assertingtheadmissibility
the complaintsand the competenceof thecommissionto decide issues related
to elections,sincetheAmericanConventionon Human Rightsguaranteesthe
rightto vote and be elected. The commissionturnedto various sources to
about itssovereignrights:the
interpretthe claimsof the Mexicangovernment
embodied in the human rightstreaties,the Mexican governunderstandings
of these treaties,its failureto expressreservationsat that
ment'sratification
and
pointwithregardto the issue of elections,and the sharedunderstandings
practicesof otherstatesin the regionas indicatedbytheirstatementsor lack
thereof.The commissionconcludedthatthe Mexicanpositionwas unfounded,
reformitsinternalelectoral
and itrecommendedthattheMexicangovernment
This episode
law to make effectivethe political rightsof the convention.66
64. U.S. Congress,House Committeeon Foreign Affairs,CurrentDevelopmentsin Mexico:
and on Western
Organizations
on Human Rightsand International
HearingBeforetheSubcommittees
1990, 101stCongress,2d sess.
12 September
on ForeignAffairs,
oftheCommittee
Affairs
Hemisphere
(Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1990),pp. 1-97.
Commissionon Human Rights1989-1990
65. OAS, Annual Report of the Inter-American
(Washington,D.C.: OAS General Secretariat,1990),pp. 103-5,emphasisadded.
66. Ibid,pp. 106-23.
434 InternationalOrganization
purpose of the commissionis to provide a mask for internationalpublic
opinion.70Evidence suggests,however, that in many cases the national
commissionhas been an effectiveadvocate for human rights.7'Since the
formationof the national commission,the governmenthas taken several
concretesteps to improvehuman rightspractices.It has taken measures to
professionalizethe Federal JudicialPolice and has approved proceduresto
preventtheuse of evidencefromconfessionsin trials,whichhad led to routine
use of tortureduringinterrogation
afterarrests.72
Also, the National Human
RightsCommissionhas investigatedand condemnedconditionsin some of the
worstprisons.73
country's
One alternativeexplanationforthechangesin Mexico is to attributethemto
the will of the administration
of PresidentSalinas, since all of the changes
mentionedoccurredafterhe came to power.EvidencesuggeststhattheSalinas
in the absence of human rightspressures,would have been
administration,
unlikelyto have made thesechangeson itsown.For example,shortlyafterthe
took office,the mayorof the Federal District(Mexico
Salinas administration
City) appointedas the directorof intelligenceservicesof Mexico Citya man
witha reputationas a torturerand founderof a death squad, Miguel Nazar
Haro. Because the Presidentappointsthe mayor,Nazar Haro could not have
been named without Salinas's awareness. Yet, it was not until a major
campaignwas mounteddomesticallycallingforNazar Haro's resignationthat
he was givena so-calledleave of absence.74
There is no doubt, however,that Salinas is extremelysensitiveto his
country'sexternalimageand to theinternational
repercussionsofhumanrights
complaints.More thanmanyleaders,Salinas oftentakespreemptivemeasures
to projectthe image of his administration's
concernwithhuman rights.For
example, in late 1992, less than one week before he was to meet with
President-electBill Clinton,Salinas named Dr. Carpizo, the formerSupreme
Court Justicewho was the presidentof the National CommissionforHuman
Rights,as hisnewAttorneyGeneral.
The case of Mexico providesthreeseparate historicalstages,each ofwhich
providessome evidence for the argumentpresentedhere. During the first
stage,in 1968-69,an episode of seriousviolationsof humanrightsprovokedno
international
responsebecause theinternational
humanrightsnetworkdid not
yet exist.During the second stage, from1970 to 1988, lower-levelendemic
70. Emilio Krieger,"Pr6logo" (Prologue), in Sierra Guzman et al., La Comisi6nNacional de
DerechosHumanos(The NationalHuman RightsCommission),p. ix.
71. Lutz discussesthenationalcommission's"hard-hitting
in over300 cases,"
recommendations
manyof whichincludedcases thathave been the focusof NGOs. See Lutz, "Human Rightsin
Mexico,"p. 80.
72. "Mexico: Human Rights Come to the Fore," Latin America Update, vol. 16, no. 1,
WashingtonOfficeon Latin America,January-April
1991,pp. 1 and 6.
73. Americas Watch,PrisonConditionsin Mexico (New York: Human RightsWatch, March
1991),p. 46.
74. MexicanAcademyforHuman Rights,Boletin5 (February1989),p. 12.
Conclusions
humanrightspressures
This articlehas arguedthatin some cases international
contributeto changingunderstandingsabout how states should use their
sovereignauthorityover theircitizensand to changingspecifichuman rights
to confirmthisargument,the
practices.Althoughtwo cases are not sufficient
forit and indicatesit is worthfurtherstudy.76
contrastprovidessubstantiation
humanrightsnetworkhas not
There are othercases in whichtheinternational
or practicesabout humanrights:in
in changingunderstandings
been effective
Latin America (for example, Haiti and Guatemala) and elsewhere (for
example,Cambodia and China).77The centralquestionthenbecomes: under
The
whatconditionscan the internationalhumanrightsnetworkbe effective?
cases hereoffersome evidenceoftheseconditions.
actors initiatedglobal
In both Argentinaand Mexico, nongovernmental
concernwithhumanrightsviolationsand documentedtheabuses. Later,when
were
internationaland regionalorganizationsproduced reports,theirefforts
aided by earlier reports formulatedby NGOs. NGOs also provided the
informationthat served as the basis for governmentalhuman rightspolicy.
where
Because domestichumanrightsNGOs are a cruciallinkin thenetwork,
human
international
thesegroupsare absent,as in thecase of Mexico initially,
rightsworkis severelyhampered.Since the human rightsnetworkhas been
strongestin regardto Latin America and to Eastern Europe and the former
75. One recentwork gives internationalpressureslittlecredit for promotingdemocracyin
Mexico.This workwas based on researchthatended in 1989,however,and was notable to observe
pressuresand domesticchangesin the 1989-92period thatare
and commenton the international
the basis of the argumentpresentedhere. See Lorenzo Meyer,"Mexico: The Exceptionand the
Rule," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., ExportingDemocracy: The United States and Latin
Press,1991),pp. 93-110.
America-Case Studies(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkinsUniversity
of the
dictatorships
76. Cases similarto Argentinacould be made forsome of theothermilitary
SouthernCone, such as Chile and Uruguay.Mexico is unique, both forthe lack of attentionit
receivedon humanrightsissues initiallyand forthe rapidityof its response once human rights
where targeted
issues became salient,but thereare othercases of semidemocraticgovernments
internationalhuman rightspressures have led to importantchanges-for example, in the
DominicanRepublic duringthe 1978electionsor morerecentlyin Paraguay.
rejectionof all
77. Even Guatemala has moved along the continuumfromuncompromising
to a middlepositionofaccepting
in sovereignty
interferences
humanrightspressuresas illegitimate
the legitimacyof internationalcriticismbut claimingthatit is not responsibleand cannotcontrol
mostoftheviolence.
436 InternationalOrganization
Soviet Union, the most forcefulhuman rightswork has been directed at
violationsin theseregions.
One possible alternativeexplanationis that foreigngovernmentpressure
and domesticpoliticalpressurewould have been able to changehumanrights
Whatthismissesis that
oftheissue-network.
practiceswithouttheinvolvement
foreigngovernmentsplaced pressure on human rightsviolatorsonly after
actorshad identified,documented,and denounced human
nongovernmental
to become involved.
rightsviolationsand had pressuredforeigngovernments
Because of the hiddennatureof repressionin Argentinaand the able and
activediplomaticstrategiesof the Argentinejunta,it is unlikelythatthe true
nature of human rightsabuses in Argentinawould have come to world
of information
by
attentionwithoutthe detailed documentationand diffusion
thehumanrightsnetwork.Unlikethecase ofChile,wheretelevisioncrewsand
embassyofficialscould attestto the scale of rightsviolations,the Argentine
for the practiceof disappearanceswas revealed
government'sresponsibility
onlythroughan intenselabor of manyparts of the networkworkingcollectively.The reports of human rightsorganizationsprovided the definitive
evidencenecessaryto mountthe internationalhumanrightscampaignagainst
would
foreigngovernments
the Argentinemilitary.Withoutthisinformation,
not have been able to bringdiplomaticpressureto bear on the Argentine
came almost
The firststrongpressuresfromforeigngovernments
government.
a year afterthe coup and afterthe release of the powerfulAl document
forthe practiceof disapresponsibility
detailingthe Argentinegovernment's
pearances.
The case of Mexico is even clearer because endemic human rightsabuses
persistedfor almost two decades withoutany pressure or commentsfrom
The Mexicancase showsthe humanrightsscenarioboth
foreigngovernments.
when the networkdid not exist and later, before the networkturned its
attentionto a case. When the networkdid not exist,therewas virtuallyno
international
responseto the1968studentmassacre.Whenthenetworkexisted
but did not focus on Mexico, there was no internationalawareness of the
human rightssituationin Mexico. It was only afterthe NGOs withinand
outsideof Mexico began to documenthumanrightsabuses and bringthemto
and onlywithinthe contextof the
the attentionof thepressand policymakers,
made concretechanges
freetradenegotiations,thatthe Mexican government
to improveitshumanrightspractices.
The existenceofthenetworkand a networkdecisionto focuson a particular
conditionsfor changing
countryare necessarybut obviouslynot sufficient
humanrightspractices.Many arguethathumanrightspressureswould notbe
costs to the statesthat
effective
againststrongstatesthatcan raise significant
pressure them. Networkactivistsadmit that they have been less effective
againststatesperceivedas too importantto the nationalsecurityinterestsof
438 InternationalOrganization
completionof the free trade agreementand cooperation with Mexico on
antidrugoperations.Human rightspressuresare notwithoutcosts,evenin the
less importantcountriesofLatinAmerica.
strategically
relationstheory,cooperationresultswhen
In liberalversionsofinternational
statesand nonstateactorsface problemstheycannotresolveindividuallyand
fromwhichjoint gains are possible or mutuallyundesirableoutcomes are
avoided.These situationshave been characterizedas cooperationor coordinaThe human rightsissue,
tion games with particular payoffstructures.80
however,cannotbe easilycharacterizedin thisway.First,thesituationdoes not
fitthe standardviewof a cooperationor coordinationgame. In mostcases, the
internalhumanrightspracticesof statescan be ignoredbyotherstateswithout
causingundesirableeconomicor securityexternalities.
In the issue of human rights,it is primarilyprincipledideas that drive
changesand cooperation.We cannotunderstandwhycountries,organizations,
and individualsare concernedabout humanrightsor whycountriesrespondto
humanrightspressureswithouttakingintoaccounttheroleofnormsand ideas
in international
life.JackDonnellyhas arguedthatsuchmoralinterestsare no
less real thanmaterialinterestsand thata sense ofmoralinterdependencehas
led to theemergenceofhumanrightsregimes.81
In this sense, the workhere fitsinto a new literaturetryingto specifythe
relationsand foreign
influenceof ideas and normativechangeon international
This literature,however,continuesto be vague
and domesticpolicychanges.82
influenceinternational
relations.Whatare
on howideas and normsspecifically
the processes and mechanismsthroughwhichideas come to influencestate
policiesand practices?Whathas been lackingis a meansto conceptualizethese
emergingactors who are contributingto transformedunderstandingsof
In the case of humanrights,I conclude thatthe primarymovers
sovereignty.
networks.
behindthisformof principledinternationalactionare international
Similarcases could be made forotherissue-areaswhereinsharedvalues playa
80. See, for example, ArthurA. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an
36 (Spring1982),pp. 299-324.
AnarchicWorld,"IntemationalOrganization
HumanRightsin Theoryand Practice,pp. 211-12.
81. Donnelly,Universal
82. See, forexample,Goldsteinand Keohane, Ideas and ForeignPolicy;Peter A. Hall, ed., The
Political Power of Economic Ideas: KeynesianismAcross Nations (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton
Developmentalism
in Brazil and
UniversityPress, 1989); KathrynSikkink,Ideas and Institutions:
Press,1991); JudithGoldstein,"The ImpactofIdeas on
Argentina
(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agriculturaland ManufacturingPolicies," Intemational
and American
Organization43 (Winter1989), pp. 31-71; JudithGoldstein,"Ideas, Institutions,
Trade Policy,"IntemationalOrganization42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179-217; Ernst B. Haas, When
of
(Berkeley:University
KnowledgeIs Power:ThreeModelsof ChangeinIntemationalOrganizations
Policy:Markets,
Power,and Ideas
Monetary
CaliforniaPress,1990); JohnS. Odell, U.S. Intemational
Press,1982); Michael Shafer,Deadly
as Sourcesof Change(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Policy (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity
Paradigms:The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency
Autonomyin
Press,1988); and Emanuel Adler,ThePowerofIdeology:The QuestforTechnological
of CaliforniaPress,1987).
Argentina
and Brazil(Berkeley:University
440 InternationalOrganization
transnationalrelations.90Althoughthe "new transnationalism"attemptsto
of transnationalrelations,the
narrowand make more precise the definitions
onlyfactorsthatmanyof thesetransnationalrelationsshareis thatall operate
acrossnationalbordersand all are characterizedbypurposefulactors,at least
fail to
one of which is a nonstate agent. What the new transnationalists
distinguish,however,is how completelydifferentare the purposes of the
relations.
typesof transnational
different
differfromothertypesof transnationalrelationsin termsof
Issue-networks
three
thekindsofideas and purposesthatbindthemtogether.We can identify
goals and
main categoriesof transnationalrelations,based on the different
goals
ideas theyembody:(1) transnationalrelationsmotivatedbyinstrumental
such as the goal of profitor economic gain, (2) transnationalrelations
and (3) transnamotivatedby sharedcausal ideas (epistemiccommunities),91
tional relationsmotivatedby sharedvalues or principledideas-beliefs about
Each of thesesubsetsof transnational
whatis rightor wrong(issue-networks).
set of actors.Transnationalcorporations,
relationshas,in turn,a characteristic
of
organizedinterestgroupsare characteristic
globalbanks,and internationally
thefirstcategory,groupsof scientistsor knowledge-basedexpertscharacterize
Huepistemiccommunities,and activistNGOs characterizeissue-networks.
man rightshas its set of knowledge-basedexperts-the internationallawyers
who have definedinternationalhuman rightslaw-but in the human rights
issue-area,change comes about not throughexpertsexposingthe technical
actorsmobilizingshame by disseminatcomplexitiesbut by nongovernmental
repression.
about government
inginformation
Sovereigntyis not going to disappear. The sovereignstate remains the
and violatinghumanrights.But statesare altering
dominantforcein protecting
Sovereignty
ofthescope and limitsofsovereignauthority.
theirunderstandings
researchconferenceentitled"CrossingNational Borders: Invasion or Involvement,"Columbia
of the
University,
New York, 6 December 1991. Anotherway of theorizingthisinterpenetration
domestic and internationalspheres is the concept of two-levelgames. See Robert Putnam,
42
"Diplomacyand DomesticPolitics:The Logic ofTwo-LevelGames," IntemationalOrganization
(Summer1988),pp. 427-60; and Evans,Jacobson,and Putnam,Double-EdgedDiplomacy.
90. Thomas Risse-Kappen,"TransnationalRelations,Domestic Structures,and International
Institutions:
A ConceptualFramework,"paper presentedat the annual meetingof the American
PoliticalScience Association,Chicago,3-6 September1992.
sharecausal knowledge,
91. Epistemiccommunitiesalso sharesome values,and issue-networks
but each has a characteristictypeof shared idea that definesit and explainsthe natureof the
transnationalrelations created. Haas has stressed that epistemic communitiesshare both
principledand causal ideas, but it is clear fromhis discussionof the concept,as well as fromthe
are
cases chosento illustrateit,thatsharedcausal beliefsunderconditionsof technicalcomplexity
the hallmarksof the epistemiccommunity.
See Haas, "Introduction:EpistemicCommunitiesand
InternationalPolicyCoordination,"p. 18. This factis recognizedby the one essay on epistemic
communitiesin which activistgroups play a key role: M. J. Peterson, "Whalers, Cetologists,
and the InternationalManagementof Whaling,"IntemationalOrganization
46
Environmentalists,
groups concernedwith
(Winter 1992), pp. 147-86. Peterson argues that the environmentalist
The tendencyof thesegroupsto use the "time
whalingdo not qualifyas an epistemiccommunity.
honoreddeviceofmakingstarkcontrastsand dividingtheworldinto'good guys'and 'bad guys'" is
a clear descriptionof actionbased primarily
on principledratherthancausal beliefs(pp. 154-55).