05 Material Degradation Johnsen NTNU Sintef

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AGING MATERIAL DEGRADATION

Roy Johnsen, NTNU/SINTEF
Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
NRK DAGSNYTT 06.04.2010:

The aging goes too fast we do
not have control over the
material degradation and the
system integrity!
Adm.dir. Elisabeth Enger, Jernbaneverket
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
CATEGORIES OF AGING
AGEING MANAGEMENT
A. Material degradation
- Material properties
- Operation conditions
- Environmental conditions
- Maintenance practices
B. Obsolescence
- Equipment out of date

- New needs
- New technology
- New requirements
C. Organisational issues
- Reorganisation
- Ageing of personnel
- Transfer of knowledge
Adopted from: Ageing of Components and Systems. Edited by Lars Pettersson and Kaisa Simola. An ESReDA Working Group Report.
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
Pore in the weld

during fabrication
Subsea template retrieved after 4 years

roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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Modeling
Monitoring
Inspection
Initial
Technical Integrity
START
TODAY
END LIFE
Minimum
History
Future - Prediction
END LIFE
Time in operation
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
WHAT INFLUENCE THE TECHNICAL

INTEGRITY?
Design conditions
As-built /
commissioning
Process parameters
Operation conditions
Maintenance and/or
modification
Leak due to freezing

NTNU January 2010
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
MODELS FOR DEGRADATION

Deterministic
Corrosion in AISI 316
Probabilistic
Veslefrikk structures
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DEGRADATION MECHANISMS
A. Blockage (III)
B. Corrosion (I)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Bacterial
Crevice
CUI
Galvanic
General
Pitting
SCC
C. Creep (III)
D. Flow induced metal loss (I)
1. Erosion from solids
2. Flow induced corrosion
3. Cavitation
F. Hydrogen related cracking (I)

1. Blistering
2. HE
3. SSC
G. Material deterioration (I)

H. Overload (II)
I. Physical damage (II)
J. Temper/Thermal embrittlement (III)
K. Wear (II)
L. Temperature Exp./Contraction (II)
M. Quick pressure change (III)
N. Accumulated plastic deformation
(Ratcheting) (III)
E. Fatigue (I)
1. General
2. Vibration
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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DEGRADATION MECHANISMS AND

FAILURE MODES
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PREDICTION OF CO2-CORROSION OF CS
through modeling
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ESTIMATION OF CORROSION RATE

DeWard & Milliams Nomogram - 1 975
pCO2 = 4 bar
T = 500C
Vcorr = 8 mm/y
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ESTIMATION OF CORROSION RATE
Modification of DeWard & Milliams Nomogram
Effect of iron carbonate

development
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STATE-OF-THE-ART
NORSOK
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INPUT TO THE NORSOK CO2

MODEL
Pressure
Temperature
CO2-content
Oil content
Gas content
Water content
Dimensions
Fluid composition
Bicarbonate
Acid
Ione strength
pH
Condensed or
formation water?
Shear force
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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INTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION

MODELING
Service offered by FORCE Technology
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CARBON STEEL
Corrosion under insulation (CUI)
DNV
API -- Model
Model
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CORROSION IN WATER
INJECTION SYSTEM WITH CS
Source: Mamdouh Salama NACE Corrosion Paper No. 63, 1993

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EROSION CAUSED BY SOLIDS

Erosion rate E = K * mp * D * F() *Vn
Where:
E:
[mm/y]
K:
Constant depending on the actual material
Mass of solid [kg]
mp:
D:
Average particle diameter [m]
F(): Constant depending on the impact angle
V:
Particle velocity ( fluid velocity) [m/s]
n:
Exponent indicating the effect of velocity on
erosion (n = 2 4)
Reference: DNV RP O501 Erosive wear in piping systems

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EROSION RATE
different ceramic materials
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ESTIMATED WALL THICKNESS

REDUCTION
INFORMATION SOURCES:
Monitoring (WTMon)
Inspection (WTIns)
Model (WTMod)
ACTUAL WT REDUCTION RATE WTAct

WTAct = a * WTMon + b * WTIns + c
Weight functions: a + b + c = 1
WTMod
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TYPE OF FAILURE
Leakage
Cracking fracture burst - collapse
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
SOUR SERVICE
Hydrogen embrittlement
Solution pH
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Hydrogen Sulphide Partial Pressure (bar)
Key document:
NACE MR0175 ISO 15156
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CRACKS IN SUBSEA MANIFOLD

made from 25% Cr DSS
CRACKS
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HYDROGEN INDUCED STRESS

CRACKING - HISC
Garn West Hub
Foinaven
HUB
Tune pipeline
Aaasgard anode pad

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WHAT IS NEEDED TO GET HISC?
Susceptible microstructure
Microstructure
Local stress and strain

above certain levels
StressStrain
Hydrogen
Availability of hydrogen
All three elements

present at the same time
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An Industry Design Guideline that defines the best practice for design
and fabrication of duplex stainless steels for subsea equipment
exposed to Cathodic Protection.
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DNV RP F112
Max. strain to avoid HISC
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HISC OF SUBSEA BOLTS
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NOBLE ALLOYS
e.g. stainless steels and nickel alloys
WILL CORROSION BE INITIATED?
Yes?
No?
SAFE OPERATION WINDOW
AISI 316L exposed to SCC

Operation window for a stainless steel alloy
exposed to chloride containing environment
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6Mo STAINLESS STEEL
Operation outside design (safe operation window)

Seawater piping system on an offshore platform
made from 6Mo (UNS S31254) and with oil coolers
(plate heat exchangers in Titanium)
According to design: Max. outlet temperature 250C
Wax deposition on the oil sides of the plates
reduced the cooling capacity
Whats the easiest way to remove wax? Increase
the temperature inside coolers periodically
Brilliant solution temperature increased and

outlet temperture was 50-600C a few hours once a
week and the wax melted
RESULT: Severe corrosion on 6Mo outlet piping
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KEY IMPORTANCE FOR AGING

Keep track record of important historical information:
As-built documentation
Information from commissioning
Process parameters
Operation conditions
Monitoring data
Inspection data
Maintenance history
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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PROCESS-/OPERATION PARAMETERS
Process parameters
1. Fluid composition (oil / gas / water)

2. Temperature
3. Pressure / pressure impact
4. CO2 content
5. H2S content
6. pH
7. Oxygen
8. Water/brine salinity
9. Water content
10. Dew point
11. Velocity (flow rate)
12. Sand / Solid particles content
13. Wax content
14. .
Operation parameters
1. Operation frequency (continuous or

periodically)
2. Testing and maintenance frequency
3. Corrosion inhibitor
4. Chemical addition (composition and
frequency)
5. Vibrations
6. Loads
Environmental loads (i.e. wind,
hydrodynamic, ice, earthquake)
Functional loads (i.e. internal and
external pressure loads)
Interference loads (i.e. trawl
interference, dropped object,
anchoring)
7. Potential for plugging of hydrates /

asphaltenes
8. Operation pigging
9. ..
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SYSTEMS TO BE DISCUSSED
Wells (including
X-mas tree)
Subsea systems
Topside process
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WELLS INCLUDING X-MAS TREE
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WELL BARRIERES
According to NORSOK D-010
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WELL INTEGRITY ISSUES
Based on 400 production/injection wells

Tubing problems; leakage in production tubing above DHSV,
tubing to annulus leakage or internal leakage in tubing hanger
necks seal
Annulus safety valve (ASV) problems; leakage or failure of
ASV
Casing problems; casing leakage (non-gastight connections) or
collapsed casing
Cement problems; no cement behind casing and above
production packer, leaks along cement bonds or leak through
cement micro annulus
Wellhead problems; leakage in wellhead from annulus A to B
because of wrong seal type in the wellhead.
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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DEGRADATION MECHANISMS AND

FAILURE MODES1)
Drilling equipment
Mechanical wear, corrosion and fatigue
Drilling control system

Upgrading of control systems results in unforseen events
Production casing
Sand production causing erosion
Produced water / water injection causing corrosion
Wellhead
Fatigue due to riser load during workover
Subsea X-mas tree

Internal degradation due to stimulation chemials
Metallic and polymer seal degradation
External coating and insulation failure causing corrosion
Well supporting structures

1)
DNV, Material risk Aging offshore facilities, DNV 2006

Ptil "Aging
seminar"Fatigue
April 7th 2010
DNV, Aker Kvrner Subsea AS Marathon Alvheim
Wellhead
HAZOP, 2007
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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LIFE EXTENSION OF WELLS

Main question: Which information is available TODAY?
According to OLF for well integrity:
Wellhead data with
schematic
Xmas tree data with
schematic
Casing program (depths,
sizes)
Casing and tubing data,
including test pressures
Cement data
Fluid status, tubing and
annuli
Wellhead pressure tests

Tree pressure tests
Completion component
tests
Perforating details
Equipment details (?)
Well barriere schematic
Completion schematic
Actual status of valves
Operation limits for wells
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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ACCORDING TO PSA REGULATION

A major overhaul/inspection with verification of
BOPs and other pressure control equipment used
for drilling, completion and workover operations,
should be performed every five years.
Review of original
documentation with special
focus on traceability
Review of maintenance
history/records, to verify
the amount of use and
extent of maintenance
Stripping/dismantling of
equipment
Visual inspection
NDT
Dimensional check of
selected components/review
of dimensional check reports
Change out of seals, treads
etc.
Reassembly recoating
preservation
Load/pressure testing and
functional testing.
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
45
CHALLENGES AND LACK OF

KNOWLEDGE
Lack of knowledge of material properties (including degradation
mechanism)
Methods for down hole inspection and monitoring of material
behavior. (The cement level between the surface casing and
conductor casing may be of particular interest regarding stress
and fatigue lifetime of subsea wellheads).
Lack of knowledge of fatigue and fatigue models. Especially
fatigue of subsea wellheads and X-mas trees due to weight and
movement from BOP, riser and rig from well intervention and
from side track drilling. How long is it reasonable to operate
with respect to fatigue impact on the wellhead?
Lack of knowledge of leakage frequencies, especially for X-mas
trees.
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
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KNOWLEDGE, cont.
Lack of knowledge of wear and wear models. Especially wear in
the production tubing and wellhead due to rotating of drill
string during Through Tubing Rotary Drilling (TTRD) (platform
wells and subsea wells) and wear on risers (subsea wells) due to
rotating drill string in combination with loads.
Lack of knowledge of loads during drilling, production and work
over. The critical sections below the wellhead are not
accessible neither for inspection nor instrumentation. One
method may be to locate proper sensors on the X-mas tree
and/or the BOP to obtain load and deflection date during
drilling and well intervention.
Lack of knowledge of new equipment and methods, or
alternative operaional procedures to reduce loads and fatigue
of subsea wellhead and X-mas trees.
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THROUGH TUBING ROTARY

DRILLING
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KNOWLEDGE, cont.
Lack of knowledge about geological effects from subsidence,
such as slippage between layers (faults)
Lack of knowledge of fatigue of wellhead (suface casing and
conductor casing) including horizontal X-mas tree (subsea)
Actual loads and boundary conditions

Load frequency
Soil condition impact
Remaining fatigue life estimation
Lack of knowledge of sand production

Modelling of erosion caused by sand particles
Challenges related to hand-over documentation and and

transfer of critical information /essential well-data during
licence acquisitions, change of operater and difficulties for key
personnel.
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WORKOVER RISER
Schematic
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SUBSEA SYSTEMS
Foundation structure
Separator
Riser
PLEM
Template
Pipeline
Manifold
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SUBSEA SYSTEM
Main elements
Pipeline/flowline
Riser
Pipeline End Manifold (PLEM)
Subsea wellhead and X-mas tree
Manifold piping, valves and connection
Control and monitoring systems
Control umbilical
Subsea power and frequency converters
Subsea separation and boosting systems
Template with protection structure
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DEGRADATION OF PIPELINES AND

RISERS
1. Corrosion, specifically internal corrosion
2. Hydrogen cracking (from cathodic protection or
welding)
3. Maritime activities (e.g. anchor- or trawlingdamage and vessel collisions)
4. Natural forces (e.g. storms and mudslides).
5. Other typical threats are:
seabed erosion
development of free spans (causing fatigue)
buckling
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FLEXIBLE PIPE
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FLEXIBLE PIPES
Failure cases
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CHALLENGES WITH MODELING

LIFETIME OF A FLEXIBLE PIPE
Fatigue of armor
Corrosion and/or
erosion of internal
carcass
Degradation of
internal liner
Damage of external
liner
Diffusion of fluid and
gas through the liner
Flexible pipe test machine at

Marintek
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PIPELINES AND RISERS

Failure modes
Leakage; often associated with the presence of

local corrosion attacks (e.g. local CO2-corrosin,
pitting) or as a result of small cracks.
Burst; associated with a uniform wall thickness
reduction or more extensive crack propagation,
decreasing the pressure capacity of the pipeline.
Local buckling/collapse; often related to external
overpressure in combination with a wall thickness
reduction (e.g. as a result of corrosion)
Fracture; due to vibration (e.g. free span or
snaking)
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DEGRADATION OF SUBSEA
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
TEMPLATE/MANIFOLD
External corrosion due to poor coating and/or lack of
protection from anodes (lack of electrical contact)
Too high load due to
Operation outside original design criteria
Change in foundation due to seabed erosion
Include critical components like valves, connectors and

sensors which can fail due to material degradation
Piping made from 22% Cr DSS or 25% Cr SDSS can
suffer from HISC
HISC failure of bolts
Degradation of insulation
Friction and wear resulting in malfunction and leakage
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DEGRADATION OF SUBSEA
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS, cont.
CONTROL SYSTEM
Failures in electronics and electrical connectors, failure in
control valve and internal leakage.
Over time, failure in cables for power and signal
transmission due to migration of water through insulation,
etc., may take place.
Degradation of the control system takes place due to
wear, exposure to sea water and well fluids, high
temperatures, hydraulic fluids, etc.
SUBSEA SEPARATION/BOOSTING
Lack of experience
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SUBSEA
Challenges and lack of knowledge
Subsea production systems
Structural integrity monitoring system
Sand disposal system
Methods for subsea inspection

Structures
Pipelines
Flexible pipes
Modeling of pipeline integrity combining corrosion and flow

modeling including
inspection
Reliable corrosion monitoring system for installed pipelines

Systems for integrity monitoring and flexible pipes and
stiff risers
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LE - MAIN KNOWLEDGE GAPS

1. Understanding and assessing degradation mechanisms and
modeling of degradation mechanisms for materials and
equipment.
2. Developing and applying reliable methods for subsea
inspection and monitoring.
3. Understanding and increasing awareness of common cause
failures of equipment due to aging.
4. Understanding aging of electronic equipment and cabling.
5. Optimisation test interval for safety systems with respect
to material degradation.
6. Understanding the rsult of testing, inspection and monitoring
with respect to degradation mechanism.
7. Understanding the consequence of combining old and new
equipment
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61
PROPOSAL
Further research and development
8. Initiating an interdisiplinary project on analysis
of degradation mechanisms of critical systems
Modeling of the main degradation mechanisms
Development of systems for data collection
9. Developing a general guideline for design of the

LE process encompassing the entire facility.
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no
62
QUESTIONS?
roy.johnsen@ntnu.no

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1

AGING MATERIAL DEGRADATION

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

NRK DAGSNYTT 06.04.2010:

Adm.dir. Elisabeth Enger, Jernbaneverket

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

- Equipment out of date

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Pore in the weld

Subsea template retrieved after 4 years

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

WHAT INFLUENCE THE TECHNICAL

Leak due to freezing

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

MODELS FOR DEGRADATION

Corrosion in AISI 316

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

F. Hydrogen related cracking (I)

G. Material deterioration (I)

DEGRADATION MECHANISMS AND

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

ESTIMATION OF CORROSION RATE

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

ESTIMATION OF CORROSION RATE

Modification of DeWard & Milliams Nomogram

Effect of iron carbonate

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

INPUT TO THE NORSOK CO2

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

INTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION

Service offered by FORCE Technology

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Corrosion under insulation (CUI)

Source: Mamdouh Salama NACE Corrosion Paper No. 63, 1993

EROSION CAUSED BY SOLIDS

Reference: DNV RP O501 Erosive wear in piping systems

different ceramic materials

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

ESTIMATED WALL THICKNESS

ACTUAL WT REDUCTION RATE WTAct

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Cracking fracture burst - collapse

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Hydrogen Sulphide Partial Pressure (bar)

CRACKS IN SUBSEA MANIFOLD

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

HYDROGEN INDUCED STRESS

Aaasgard anode pad

WHAT IS NEEDED TO GET HISC?

Local stress and strain

All three elements

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

HISC OF SUBSEA BOLTS

AISI 316L exposed to SCC

Ptil "Aging seminar" April 7th 2010

6Mo STAINLESS STEEL

Operation outside design (safe operation window)

the temperature inside coolers periodically

Brilliant solution temperature increased and

KEY IMPORTANCE FOR AGING