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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

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28

HON. CONCHITA CARPIOMORALES, in her capacity as

the OMBUDSMAN,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 217126-27
For: Certiorari and Prohibition,
with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order andfor Writ of
Preliminary Injunction

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS (6TH

DIVISION)
and
JEJOMAR
ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
Respondents.

x------------------------------------------x

COMMENT/OPPOSITION
(Re: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 25 March 2015)
Private Respondent JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., by
counsel, most respectfully opposes the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 25 March
2015, on the following presentation:
PREFATORY
The instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, although filed
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, clearly appears to be
seeking from this Honorable Court the resolution of two (2) purely
legal questions, i.e., (1) the exact interpretation or application of
Section 14 of RA 6770; and (2) whether an impeachable officer may
be subjected to contempt proceedings. Thus, it is respectfully
submitted that the remedy to which Petitioner resorted is erroneous,
and war~ants an outright dismissal by this Honorable Court for utter
lack of merit.

It must be remembered that the special civil action for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended to correct errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion an1ounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Thus, the action for certiorari "will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtua~ refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility." (Spouses Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189151, 25
January 2012)
In this case, it appears that the instant Petition for Certiorari has
been filed because Petitioner believes that there is a state of confusion
and that the "legal and judicial system is likewise in a state of limbo
today, with members of the legal profession divided sharply on
which side (between Acting Mayor Pena and respondent Binay) is in
the right." However, there has been no allegation that Respondent
Court of Appeals exercised specific acts in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. At most,
Petitioner has sought judicial review from the Honorable Court to
settle purely legal issues, and merely to question the judgment of the
court a quo.
Nevertheless, granting arguendo that Petitioner properly raised
the issue that Public Respondent conunitted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions, still, Certiorari will not lie.

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution specifically vests in

the Supreme Court and the lower courts the Judicial Power, which
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally de1nandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
In fact, it has been settled that the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over orders and findings of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases. (Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16
September 1998)
Accordingly, when Public Respondent took cognizance of
Private Respondent's Petition for Certiorari dated 11 March 2015, and

restrained the implementation of his preventive suspension for six (6)

months, Public Respondent was merely exercising its inherent Judicial
Power. Republic Act 6770 ("The 01nbudsman Act") recognizes such
power of review, when it provides that a court may issue a writ of
injunction in cases of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Office of
the Ombudsman. 1
On the other hand, Petitioner's allegation that Public
Respondent con1mitted grave abuse of discretion a1nounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in requiring the Petitioner Ombudsman, who
is an impeachable officer, to comment on the Petition for Contempt
filed by Private Respondent is without inerit.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of contempt is the
"preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and
consequently, to the due administration of justice. (Montenegro vs.
Montenegro, G.R. No. 156829, 8 June 2004) While it is submitted that
an impeachable officer may not be removed from office except by
impeachn1ent, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and
imprisonment without necessarily resulting in removal fron1 office.
Hence, the fact that Petitioner i's an iinpeachable officer should not
deprive the Court of Appeals of its inherent power to punish
contempt. Otherwise, one could si1nply disobey judicial directives
and invoke his status as an impeachable officer to avoid the
repercussions of such disobedience.

This has been made clear by the I-Ionorable Court in the case of

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 190529, 22 March 2011), where the Honorable Court found
the COMELEC (comprising of impeachable officers) guilty of indirect
conten1pt for having failed to comply with its Status Quo order.
In fact, even a sitting President, the highest impeachable officer
in the land, may not be exempt fron1 the Honorable Court's reach in
exercising its powers of contempt. In the case of]ones v. Clinton, 36
F.Supp.2d 1118 (1999), then President of the United States, Bill
Clinton, was cited in contempt for his false testimony in the case of
Jones v. Clinton, (858 F. Supp. 902). The Court construed his false
' Section 14, RA 6770 Restrictious. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
fade evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

..

testilnony as contemptuous of its Discovery Orders and fined him

$90,000.
Clearly, fro1n the foregoing, it cannot be said that the
Respondent Court of Appeals acted beyond its jurisdiction. Thus, as
long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing
111ore than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court2, not by the
instant petition.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On 5 March 2015, a special panel of investigators namely
Sandy D. Alcantara, Virgillo T. Pattugalan, Peter Kate C. Maningas,
Jose Ronald M. Bersales, Maria Merlinda S. Managhaya-Henson, and
Maria Teresa. L. Lee-Rafols, subn1itted with the Ombudsman a
Complaint dated 3 March 2015 against, among others, Private
Respondent.

2.
The Complaint alleged that Private Respondent along with
others purportedly violated several provisions of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
during the procure1nent of the five phases of the Makati City I--Iall
Parking Building. A copy of said Complaint was attached as Annex
"B" of Private. Respondent's Petition for Certiorari dated 11 March
2015.
3.
On 9 March 2015, Petitioner Ombudsman ordered, an1ong
others, Private Respondent to file his count.er-affidavit within ten
(10) days from receipt of the said Order. A copy of the said Order was
attached as Annex "C" of Private Respondent's Petition for Certiorari
dateci 11March2015.
4.
On 10 March 2015, without waiting for the counteraffidavit of Private Respondent, Petitioner Ombudsman issued the
assailed Joint Order, whereby Private Respondent was suspended for
six (6) months, due to the alleged anon1alies that occurred during the
five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati
City Hall. Parking Building. The assailed Joint Order directed the
Departn1ent of Interior Local Government (DILG) to immediately
implement the preventive suspension of Private Respondent.
2

Ibid.

5.
On 11 March 2015, Private Respondent received a copy of
the assailed Joint
for
. Order and on the same date filed his Petition
.
Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for Tenzporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
6.
On 16 March 2015, Public Respondent granted Private
Respondent's application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), aftached as Annex "B" to Private
Respondent's Amended and Supplenzental Petition for Contempt dated
18 March 2015, to wit:
"In view of the seriousness of the issues raised in the Petition
for Certiorari and the possible repercussions on the electorate who
will unquestionably be affected by the suspension of their elective
official, the Court resolves to grant petitioner's prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order for a period of sixty (60) days from
notice hereof, conditioned upon the posting by petitioner of a bond
in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PS00,000.00).
Meanwhile, let the hearing of the application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction be set on March 30, 2015 and
March 31, 2015 all at 2:00 o'clock on the afternoon, and the
Respondents, Hon. Conchita Carpio-Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman and the Department of Interior and Local
Government, are hereby ORDERED to file their Comment on the
Petition for Certiorari filed by herein petitioner within an
inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of a copy hereof.
SO ORDERED."

7.
Shortly upon receipt of the Public Respondent's Resolution
dated 16 March 2015, Private Respondent posted a cash bond in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 500,000.00) in
compliance with said Resolution as shown by Private Respondent's
Ex-Parte Compliance duly stamped received by the Honorable Court,
attached as A1u1ex "C" of Private Respondent's Petition for Conternpt.
8.
However, despite due notice and receipt of Public
Respondent's Resolution dated 16 March 2015, granting Private
Respondent's application for the TRO on the Joint Order preventively
suspending him, Petitioner, and those acting under her, nevertheless
willfully and maliciously ignored and refused to comply with the
Public Respondent's directive.

9.
On 17 March 2015, as Private Respondent's Petit-ion for
Contenzpt was on its way to being filed, Private Respondent, through
counsel, received a copy of the Manifestation filed by Petitioner in the
Petition pending before Public Respondent and docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453. A copy of the Manifestation dated 17 March 2015 was
attached as Annex "E" of Private Respondent's Amended and
Supplernental Petition for Contempt.
10. In her Manifestation, Petitioner Ombudsman simply
conveyed her own opinion to Public Respondent, i.e. that the
Temporary Restraining Order is already moot and academic and thus
without legal effect.
11. On 19 March 2015, Private Respondent filed an Amended
and Supplemental Petition for Contempt dated 18 March 2015,
impleading Petitioner as respondent in the conten1pt case.

12. On 20 .March 2015, Public Respondent issued its herein

assailed Resolution, requiring Petitioner to file her Comment to the
contempt case filed against her.

GROUNDS
l.

THE PRESENT PETITION MUST BE

DISMISSED FOR BEING AN ERRONEOUS
REMEDY.
A.

THE PETITION RAISES ERRORS IN

JUDGMENT AND NOT ERRORS IN
JURISDICTION
AS
REQUIRED
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF .
COURT.

B.

THE
PETITIOlV
IS
FATALLY
DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE OF
PETITIONER TO FILE A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS.

C.

THE
PETITIO~NCONSTITUTES
WILLFUL FORUM-SHOPPING ON
THE PART OF PETITIONER.
6

II.
THE PRESENT PETITION
DISMISSED FOR UTTER
MERIT.

MUST
LACK

BE
OF

A.

PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
HAS
JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
PETITION
FOR
CERTIORARI,
ASSAILING PETITIONER'S JOINT
ORDER DATED 10 MARCH 2015
AND
THE
AMENDED
AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR .
CONTEMPT DATED 17 MARCH 2015.

B.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT CORRECTLY

ISSUED THE RESOLUTION DATED
16 MARCH 2015 BASED ON THE
FACTS
OF
THE
CASE
AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

C.

PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
HAS
JURISDICTION
TO
REQUIRE
PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN, EVEN
IF SHE IS AN IMPEACHABLE
OFFICER, TO FILE HER COMMENT
TO THE CONTEMPT CASE FILED
AGAINST HER.

UL

PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT

SHE IS ENTITLED TO ANY INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF.

DISCUSSION
I.

THE PRESENT PETITION MUST BE

DISMISSED
FOR
BEING
AN
ERRONEOUS REMEDY.
A.

THE PETITION RAISES ERRORS IN

JUDGMENT AND NOT ERRORS IN
JURISDICTION
AS
REQUIRED
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

1.1 In the guise of assailing the jurisdiction of Pubic

Respondent, a closer examination of the records would show that
what the Petitioner truly intends is for this Honorable Court to
determine whether Public Respondent was correct in issuing the TRO
on the preventive suspension order such that Petitioner Ombudsn1an
was duty-bound to obey the same under pain of contempt. Being an
interlocutory order, Petitioner automatically, albeit erroneously,
resorted to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In the case of Eric U. Yu vs. Honorable Judge Agnes
Reyes-Carpio, et. Al., G.R. No. 189207, 15 June 2011, the Supreme
Court stressed the fact that certiorari does not lie to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling, thus:
1.2

"While certiorari may be maintained as an

appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order in cases where. the tribunal has issued
an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie
to correct every controversial interlocutory
ruling. In this connection, we quote with
approval the pronouncement of the appellate
court:
In this jurisdiction, there is an
'erroneous hnpression that interlocutory
[orders] of trial courts on debatable legal
points may be assailed by certiorari. To
correct that impression and to avoid clogging
the appellate court with future certiorari
petitions it should be underscored that the
8

office of the writ of certiorari has been

reduced to the correction of defects of
jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be
used for any other purpose.'
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly
extraordinary cases wherein the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
void. Moreover, it is designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors in
judgment. The rationale of this rule is that,
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so ~ngaged does not deprive
it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake
made by a court will deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
will be a void judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case
and person of the defendant, any mistake in
the application of the law and the appreciation
of evidence committed by a court may be
corrected only by appeal. The determination
inade by the trial court regarding the
admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of
its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have
perpetrated in making such a determination is
an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction.
I-Ience, settled is the rule that rulings of the
trial court on procedural questions and on
ad1nissibility of evidence during the course of
a trial are interlocutory in nature and n1ay not
be the subject of a separate appeal or review
on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors
and reviewed in the appeal properly taken
from the decision rendered by the trial court
on the merits of the case." (Emphasis
supplied)
1.3 Thus, unless it is convincingly proved that the lower
court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the

trial court exercised its power in an arbihary and despotic manner by

reason of passion or personal hostility, certiorari will not lie.
1.4 In the instant case, Petitioner assails the Resolufions dated
16 March 2015 on the alleged ground that the san1e were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part Public Respondent since it was issued in violation of
Section 14 of RA 6770.

1.5
However, it must be pointed out that while the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate may not be restrained, such power is
not without li1nits. As discussed above, Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution specifically vests in the Supre1ne Court and the lower
courts the Judicial Pmuer, which includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual conhoversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

1.6 In fact, the Section 14 of RA 6770 itself provides for an

exception, i.e., if there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman, thus:

"Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of

injunctions shall be issued by any court to
delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
1.7 In this case, there was a prima facie showing to
Respondent Court of Appeals that the Ombudsn1an committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when she issued
the preventive suspension order despite the glaring fact that Private

10

Respondent Binay cannot be removed for administrative misconduct

committed during a prior term.

1.8 Thus, it is clear that there has been no violation by Public

Respondent Court of Appeals of Section 14 of RA 6770, such that the
same would be tantamount to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law, by reason of passion or hostility.
1.9 Further, it is already settled that courts have the power to
interfere and even disregard the findings of the adn1inistrative
agencies, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in cases of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Office
of the Ombudsman vs. Jose T. Capulong, G.R. No. 201643, 12 March
2014) Likewise, it is settled that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over orders and findings of the Office of the Ombuds1nan in
administrative cases. (Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16
September 1998)
1.10 Petitioner is very much aware of this, considering that
when she was an Associate Justice of the Honorable Court, she even
concurred in the Honorable Court's ruling in the case of Alacolalrrg v.
0111b11dsmn11 (G.R. No. 147995, Nla-rcl1 4, 2004) which reiterated the
ruling in FnlJinn v. Desierto that "all appeals from decisions of the
On1budsnrnn in administrative disciplinary cases are instead to be
taken to the Court of Appt~a ls under Rule 13 of tht" 1997 Rules of Ci vi]
l 1s
. re1terateu
.
I . .
. c~Jrcu
I.ar.N. o. 00
.I')roceci ure ...l.'I1e rue
m A
- c1n1n1strahve
/]- 201-SC."
_J

1.11 Thus, issuing the TRO against the imple1nentation of

what could be determined by it to be a void and illegal preventive
suspension issued by Petitioner, Public Respondent merely acted
within its jurisdiction to do so. The same is true in 1nerely requiring
Petitioner to comment on Private Respondent's Petition for Contempt.
What is apparent from the face of the instant Petition is that Petitioner
disagrees with the way Respondent Court of Appeals has been acting
on the issues before it.
1.12 In the instant case, even Petitioner's own acts betrayed
her apparent knowledge of the fact that Public Respondent had
jurisdiction over the Petition for Certiorari filed by Private Respondent
to assail the validity of the Joint Order dated 10 March 2015 that she
issued. This is clear from the fact that she filed a Manifestation without
reservations and even prayed that she be furnished a copy of said
Petition for her to file her comment thereto. In fact, Petitioner herself

11

admits on page 5, paragraph 7 of her Petition, that the issues involved

in this case are pure questions of law.

1.13 Obviously, such questions are not proper subjects of a

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 but rather issues to be included in
an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court at the appropriate time.
Clearly, since Public Respondent has jurisdiction over the inain case,
any order it makes in the exercis(~- of said jurisdiction is merely
considered errors of judgment, which may be properly raised in such
appeal.
1.14 As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any
alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will ainount
to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court3,
not by the instant petitio_n.
B.

THE
PETITION
IS
F'ATALLY
DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE OF
PETITIONER TO FILE A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS.

1.15 Further, the instant Petition for Certiorari is fatally

defective considering that the Petitioner failed to file a .Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Resolutions.
1.16 Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that a Petition for Certiorari may only be resorted to when
there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law available to the aggrieved party. However, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a speedy and adequate re1nedy that
Petitioner could and ought to have availed of because it provided
Public Respondent with an opportunity to correct itself for any error
it might have committed. This is especially true considering that
Petitioner was even able to file a Manifestation to express its position
on the assailed Resolution dated 16 March 2015. "Before a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to
afford an opportunity for the correction of the error or mistake
complained of." (Pidltranco vs. Philtranco, G.R. No. 180962, 26
February 2014)

Julie's Franchise Corporation, et al. vs. Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. 180988, 28 August 2009.

12

\,

1.15 Thus, while Petitioner had the opportunity to file a Motion

for Reconsideration before Respondent Court of Appeals, she chose not
to do so, and instead filed a mere lv1anifestation dated 16 March 2015,
stating her opinion that its TRO is moot and academic, thereby
announcing that she would not be cmnplying therewith. Such failure
makes the instant Petition for Certiorari of the Petitioner dismissible
for being premature. In the case of Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L18957, 23 April 1963, the Supreme Court held:
"True, that petitioner had filed a motion
to lift order of default, and a motion for new
trial and to set aside the default judgment, but
before they could be resolved, petitioner had
already brought the matter to this Court, on a
petition for Certiorari and Injunction, without
giving the respondent court an opportunity
to pass upon the said 1notions, which act
renders the filing of the present petition
premature." (Emphasis supplied)

1.16 In the case of Novateknika Land Corp. vs. Philippine

National Bank, G.R. No. 194104, 13 March 2013, the Supreme Court,
held:
"Unmistakably, before a petition for
certiorari can prosper, the petitioner must be
able to show, among others, that he does not
have any other "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordipary course of law." This
remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a
n1otion for reconsideration of the questioned
order.
Well established is the rule that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite
to the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari, xxx." (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted)

1.17 In the case of Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals, 512 Phil.

210 (2005), the Supreme Court ruled:
"It must be emphasized that a writ of

certiorari

is

prerogative

writ,

never

13

de1nandable as a matter of right, never issued

except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must
apply for it only in the n1anner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law
and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to
himself the determination of whether a
motion for reconsideration is necessary or
not. To dispense with the require1nent of filing
a 1notion for reconsideration, petitioner must
show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason
for doing so, which petitioner failed to do."
(Emphasis supplied)

1.18 Clearly, Petitioner has 1niserably failed to show a

"concrete, compelling and valid reason" for not availing of the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy of a inotion for reconsideration before
filing the instant Petition for Certiorari. Such failure of Petitioner
makes her Petition defective and vulnerable to a dis1T1issal.

C.

THE
PETITION
CONSTITUTES
WILLFUL FORUM-SHOPPING ON
THE PART OF PETITIONER.

1.19 In the case of Michelle Araneta vs. Juan Ignacio Araneta,

G.R. No. 190814, 9 October 2013, the Supren1e Court explained that
forum-shopping occurs in the following instances:
"Thus, it has been held that there is foru1n
shopping (1) whenever as a result of an
adverse decision in one foru1n, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another; or (2) if, after he has filed
a petition before the Supreme Court, a party
files another before the CA since in such case
said party deliberately splits appeals 11 in the
hope that even as one- case in which a
particular remedy i's sought is dismissed,
another case( offering a similar re1nedy) would
still be open 11 ; or (3) where a party atte1npts to
obtain a preliminary injunction in another
court after failing to obtain it fro1n the original
court."

14

1.20 In the instant case, it is apparent that Petitioner resorted

to the instant Petition in the hope of obtaining a more favorable action
from the Honorable Court after Public Respondent granted Private
Respondent's prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO).
1.21 In the guise of assailing the jurisdiction of Public
Respondent, what Petitioner truly seeks is a confirmation from the
Honorable Court that she correctly issued the preventive suspension
order against Private Respondent so as to invalidate the TRO issued
by Public Respondent, which she refuses to obey.
1.22 Undoubtedly, her action constitutes forum-shopping and
resulted in the evil sought to be prevented by the rule, which is the
clogging of the dockets of the courts.
1.23 As earlier pointed out, the issuance of a TRO by Public
Respondent was merely in exercise of its jurisdiction. Whether the
same is erroneous or not merely constitutes an error of judgment, the
proper remedy for which is a Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
1.24 Thus, the ,proper course of action for Petitioner to have
taken was to await the final decision of Public Respondent and
appealed the saine before the I-Ionorable Court, assigning the
issuance of the TRO as one of the errors.
1.25 Unfortunately, Petitioner, in order to forestall the
possibility that Public Respondent might issue a writ of injunction in
favor of Private Respondent and ultimately annul the Joint Order
dated 10 March 2015 she issued, filed the instant Petition.
Undoubtedly, her actions constitute forum-shopping and warrants
an outright dismissal of her present Petition.

II.
THE PRESENT PETITION
DISMISSED FOR UTTER
MERIT.
A.

MUST
LACK

BE
OF

PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
HAS
JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
PETITION
FOR
CERTIORARI,
ASSAILING PETITIONER'S JOINT
ORDER DATED 10 MARCH 2015
AND
THE
AMENDED.
AND
15

SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITION FOR
' , :. C0MTEMPT DATED 17 MARCH 2015.

2.1 Petitioner submits that Public Respondent has no

jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order over a suspension
order issued by her office under Section 14, RA 6770, which states:

"Section 14, Restrictions. - No writ of

injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of
the Office of the Ombudsrnan.
No court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supre1ne Court,
on pure question of law."

2.2. However, as earlier pointed out, said provision of law

ad1nits of exceptions. Section 1, Rule VIII of the Constitution is quite
clear:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving
rights
which
are
legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
2.3 The foregoing constitutional provision specifically grants
Public Respondent the power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman in case of grave abuse of discretion ainounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

16

2.4 In fact, Section 14 of RA 6770 itself provides for an

exception when courts may issue an injunctive relief, which is if
there is prima fade evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
On1budsman. In this case, there was a prirna facie showing to
Respondent Court of Appeals that the 01nbudsman c01nmitted grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction when she issued
the preventive suspension order.
2.4.1 Without having to require the sub1nission of
counter-affidavits fron1 Private Respondent Binay in the
complaint filed before her, it is respectfully submitted
that Petitioner Ombudsman could have easily determined
fr01n looking at the allegations in the Complaint and the
annexes attached thereto, that the acts alleged against
Petitioner were done prior to his incumbent term as
Mayor of Makati City.
2.4.2 As such, it was incumbent upon Petitioner
Ombudsman to have been apprised of the doctrine in
Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992),
where the Supre1ne Court declared that "a public official
cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
hin1 therefor."

2.4.3 This would have weighed heavily in

determining whether the there was strong evidence of
guilt to warrant the issuance by Petitioner of a preventive
suspension order pursuant to the requisites laid down in
Section 24, RA 6770, but it .was sun1marily ignored .
2.4.4 Moreover, that Petitioner Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion ainounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is readily apparent, as shown by her
precipitate haste in issuing the unwarranted Joint Order
against Respondent Binay and his co-respondents in the
con1plaint before Petitioner.

2.4.5 It inust be noted that the Complainant Special

Panel filed the Complaint on 5 l\!larch 2015, and barely five
(5) days thereafter, and despite the voluminous records

17

and large number of respondents involved, the Petitioner

Ombudsman clearly failed to review the same and simply
lun1ped together all respondents without evaluating the
evidence against each of them, or if she even had
jurisdiction to investigate them ad1ninistratively. This
therefore puts in serious question the Petitioner
On1buds1nan' s motive in issuing the Joint Order.

2.4.6 Further, the fact that Petitioner Ombudsman

preventively suspended some of the respondents in the
complaint despite their separation from governn1ent
service at the tin1e of filing of the c01nplaint, is reflective
of the quality of investigation and discretion that the
Petitioner Ombudsman lent to the instant case.
2.4.7 Surely, if Petitioner Ornbuds1nan could not
even verify whether those whom she placed tinder
preventive suspension are still connected or employed by
government offices, its exercise of discretion in assessing
and weighing the alleged evidence presented against the
respondents in the said case would likewise be rendered
questionable.
2.4.8 The only conclusion that n1ay be had fro1n
such act is that the Petitioner On1budsman was either
grossly negligent in performing her duty, or that she was
impressed with ill motive against the respondents
therein, including Private Respondent Binay. Thus, the
foregoing
circumstances
indubitably
show
that
Respondent Binay properly asked that Petitioner's Joint
Order be struck down as patently illegal and invalid.
2.5 Clearly, such acts con11nitted by Petitioner are badges of
how she gravely abused her discretion, which may be reviewable by
the Respondent Court of Appeals. In the case of Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Jose T. Capulong, G.R. No. 201643, 12 March 2014,
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the courts may review the
acts of the Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
"As a rule, it is the consistent and general
policy of the Court .not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and
prosecutory powers. The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and

18

prosecutory
powers
granted
by
the
Constitution to the Ombudsn1an but upon
practicality as well. It is within the context of
this well-entrenched policy that the Court
proceeds to pass upon the validity of the
preventive suspension order issued by the
01nbudsman.
While it is an established rule in
administrative law that the courts of justice
should respect the findings of fact of said
adminishative agencies, the courts 1nay not
be bound by such findings of fact when
there is absolutely no evidence in support
thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial; and
when there is a clear showing that the
administrative agency acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion or in a
capricious or whimsica1_ manner, such that
its action may amount
... to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied)
2.6 Undoubtedly, based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
courts, including Public Respondent, has jurisdiction to review the
acts of the Office of 01nbudsman and issue an injunctive relief if
warranted.
2.7 In fact in the case of Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 185132, 24April 2009, the Supreme Court considered the Public
Respondent Court of Appeals to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to act on the prayer for injunctive relief
inade by Petitioner Garcia as regards his preventive suspension
order. After making such pronouncen1ent, the Supre1ne Court then
referred the matter of determination of the validly of the suspension
order to the Court of Appeals, thus:
"In this case, for the CA to defer action on
petitioners' application for an injunctive relief
pending the filing of respondents' con1111ent is
to foreclose altogether the very remedy
sought by petitioners when they questioned
the alleged illegal preventive suspension. This
is so, because the Ombudsman's Order is

19

immediately effective and executory, and the

filing of the comment by all of the
respondents will entail considerable time.
While we do not entirely blan1e the CA for,
being too cautious in not granting any
injunctive relief without first considering the
counter-arguments of the opposing parties, it
would have been 1nore prudent for it to
have, at the very least, on account of the
issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued
a TRO while it awaits the respective
com1nents of the respondents and while it
judiciously contemplates on whether or not
to issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
Verily, the basic purpose of the restraining
order is to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction. It is a preservative re1nedy for the
protection of substantive rights and interests.
At this point we must emphasize that the
suspension from office of an elective official,
whether as a preventive measure or as a
penalty, will undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they
have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office.
Thus, as the appelfate c:ourt failed dutifully
and prudently to exercise its discretion, in
violation of fundamental principles of law
and the Rules of Court, its action is
correctible by a certiorari writ from this
Court. Xxx
Xxx
We are cognizant that, apart from the
propriety of the CA' s deferment of action on
the application for injunctive relief, there
remains the question of the validity of the
01nbudsman' s order of preventive suspension
which is yet to be resolved by the appellate
court. The latter clearly involves factual
20

issues. Since we are not a trier of facts,

following
our disposition in Benguet
Management Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
should re1nand this case to the CA for a
speedy resolution on the inerits." (Citations
0111itted and emphasis supplied)

2.8 Clearly, Public Respondent has jurisdiction to entertain

Private Respondent's Petition for Certiorari dated 11 March 2015 and
to issue its Resolution dated 16 March 2015.
2.9 Further, since the Amended and Supplemental Petition for
Contempt stemmed from failure of Petitioner to obey the lawful order
of Public Respondent in the original action of Petition for Certiorari,
Public Respondent has jurisdiction over said conten1pt case, the same
being auxiliary to the main case. (People vs. Godoy, G.R. No. 11590809, 29 March 1995)

B.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT CORRECTLY

ISSUED THE RESOLUTION DATED
16 l'vIARCH 2015 BASED ON THE
FACTS
OF
THE
CASE
AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

2.10 In her Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, Petitioner

alleges that she correctly issued the suspension order against Private
Respondent in her Joint Order dated 10 March 2015. Further, she
maintains that Public Respondent com1nitted grave abuse of
discretion in issuing a TRO on the suspension order since Private
Respondent failed to show that he is entitled thereto.
2.11 Such claims, however, are without merit. It must be
pointed out that under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an
injunctive relief may be granted upon compliance with the following
requisites, to wit: i) Right in Esse; ii)rviaterial and Substantial Invasion
of said right; iii) No plain, speedy, and adequate re1nedy; and
iv)Irreparable Damage.
2.12 All said requirements are present in the case of Private
Respondent.

21

1. Right in Esse
2.13 It is a inatter of judicial notice that Private Respondent is
the duly elected Mayor of the City of Makati having been
overwhelmingly elected to serve as such until 2016. Hence, Petitioner
has a clear and unmistakable mandate to act as the local chief
executive of Makati City for the duration of his term.
2.14 However, Petitioner asserts that Private Respondent has
no clear right to the public office of the Mayor of Makati City since
there is allegedly "no vested right in public office, nor an absolute
right to hold office." 4
2.15 Nonetheless, the fact that Private Respondent was elected
as Mayor of Makati City, he is entitled to hold such office and
discharge its functions for the duration of his term and he inay not,
without valid cause, be ren1<Jved therefrom or prevented fro1n
occupying the saine. This is so because" although public office is not
property under Section 1 of the Bill of rights of the Constitution, and
one cannot acquire vested right to public office, it is nevertheless, a
protected right." (Namil vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150540, 28 October
2003.

Tl. Material and Substantive Invasion of Said Right

2.16 An exa1nination of the Joint Order and the ComplaintAffidavit with its supporting docu1nents would show that the
preventive suspension order was a blatant violation of well
established jurisprudence in administrative law.
2.17 It must be emphasized that Private Respondent was
charged with the administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best ,Interest of
the Service for the alleged irregular contracts entered into by the City
of Makati in the construction of Makati City Hall Building II,
particularly the contracts with MANA Architecture and Interior
Design Co. (MANA) and Hilmarc's for Phases III to V.
2.18. However, it is very clear fro1n the Complaint-Affidavit and
its supporting documents that the contracts with MANA and
Hilmarc's were entered into by the City of Makati prior to or during
Private Respondent's previous tern1, thus:

Paragraph 58, Page 21 of Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari nnd Prohibition

22

"4. The negotiation was held on 22 Noven1ber

2007 and the project was awarded to MANA
ARCI--IITECTURE & INTERIOR DESIGN CO.
(MANA) on 23 Nove1nber 2007. On 28
November 2007, MANA, represented by
Orlando M. Mateo, and the City Govern1nent
of Makati, represented by forn1er Mayor
Binay, Sr., entered into the Contract of
Architectural and Engineering Services with a
conhact ainount of Phpll,974,900.00.

xxx

PHASE III
78. On 21 September 2.010, Mayor Jejomar
Erwin Binay, Jr. (Mayor Binay, Jr.) issued the
Notice of Award. On 28 September 2010, the
Contract was executed by the City of Makati
represented by Mayor Binay, Jr. and
Hilmarc' s represented by Efren Canlas.

Xxx

PHASE IV
93. On the (sic) 18 August 2011, the
Contract was executed by the City of Makati
represented by Mayor Binay, Jr. and
Hilmarc' s represented by Efren Canlas.
Xxx

PHASE V
106. On 13 September 2012, the Contract was
executed by the City of Nlakati represented by
Mayor Binay, Jr. and Hilmarc' s represented
by Efren Canlas with a contract amount of
P141,649,366.00." (Underscoring supplied)
2.19 In this case, it can be taken judicial notice of that Private
Respondent was first elected as inayor of the City of Makati on June
28, 2010 and subsequently re-elected on May 14, 2013. Undoubtedly,

23

the conhacts cmnplained of to be irregular were executed prior to or

during Private Respondent's first term as Mayor.
2.20 Accordingly,
Petitioner
could
not
be
held
administratively liable pursuant to the case of Aguinaldo v. Hon.
Santos, C.R. No. 94115, 21August1992), thus:
"Petitioner's re-election to the position of
Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administration case pending before Us moot
and academic. It appears that after the
canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
inost number of votes among the candidates
for governor of Cagayan province.
Xxx

xxx

xxx

Considering the fact narrated, the expiration

of petitioner's term of office during which the
acts charged were allegedly committed, and
his subsequent reelection, the petitioner inust
be dismissed for the reason that the issue has
become academic. In Pascual v. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959,
this Court has ruled: "The weight of
authority, however, seen1s to incline to the
ruled denying the right to re1nove from office
because of inisconduct during a prior term to
which
we
fully
subscribe.
Offenses
committed, or acts done, during a previous
tenn are generally held not to furnish cause
for removal and this is especially true were
the Constitution provides- that the penalty in
proceeding for re~oval shall not extend
beyond the removal frmn office, and
disqualification from holding office for a tenn
for which the officer was elected or appointed.
(6 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W.
2nd 4011; Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W.
23rd 418; People ex rel Bashaw v. Thompson,
130 P. 2nd 237; Board of Com'rs Kingfisher
County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v. Blake,
280 P. 388; In re Fedula, 147 A 67; State v.
Wald, 43 S.W. 217) The underlying theory is

24

that each term is separate fron1 other tenns,

and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's inisconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove hiin
therefor. (43 An1. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen.
v. Kasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A.
[NS] 553). As held in Cmnant v. Bregan [1887]
6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559,
50 [NE] 553."
The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior. to his present tern1
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or
inisconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such fault or
inisconduct, to practically overrule the will of
the people. (Lizares v. Hechanova et al., 17
SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v.
Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974])
Clear then, the rule is that a public official
cannot be removed for administrative
111isconduct committed during a prior term,
since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor. The foregoing
rule, however, finds no application to crin1inal
cases pending against petitioner for acts he
may have committed during the failed coup.
(Emphasis
supplied;
internal
citations
omitted)

2.21 While it is conceded that three specific acts, i.e., payments

to MANA on 24 July 2013, and to I-Iihnarc's on July 3, 2013 and July
7, 2013, occurred during Private Respondent's present term, still, it is
indubitable that said acts will still not result in any administrative
liability on the part of Private Respondent following the

25

pronouncement in the case of Salalima v. Hon. Guingona et al., G.R.

No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996, thus:
"I-Iowever, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that Aguinaldo does not apply
because the case against the official therein
was already pending when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for his reelection bid. It is of the
view that an official's reelection renders moot
and academic an adn1inistrative c01nplaint
against him for acts done during his previous
term only if the complaint was filed before his
reelection. The fine distinction does not
in1press us. The rule inakes no distinction. As a
matter of fact, in Pascual the administrative
complaint against Pascual for acts c01n1nitted
during his first term as Mayor of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, was filed only a year after he was
reelected.
The rule adopted jn Pascual, qualified in
Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are
concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is
not only founded on the theory that an
official's reelection expresses the sovereign
will of the electorate to forgive or condone
any act or omission constituting a ground for
ad111inistrative
discipline
which
was
committed during his previous term. We may
add that sound public policy dictates it. To
rule otherwise would open the floodgates to
exacerbating endless
partisan contests
between the reelected. official and his
political enemies, who may not stop to hound
the former during his new term with
ad111inistrative cases for acts alleged to have
been committed during his previous term.
His second tenn may thus be devoted to
defending hin1self in the said cases to the
detriment of public service. This doctrine of
forgiveness or condonation cannot, however,
apply to criminal acts which the reelected
official may have con1mitted during his
previous term.

26

We thus rule that any administrative liability

which petitioner Salalin1a might have incurred
in the execution of the retainer contract in O.P.
Case No. 5469 and the incidents related
therewith and in the execution on 6 March
1992 of a contract for additional repair and
rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public
Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deen1ed
extinguished by his reelection in the 11 May
1992 synchronized elections. So are the
liabilities, if any, of petitioner inembers of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay, who
signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing
petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer
contract in question and who were reelected in
the 1992 elections."

2.22 Based on the foregoing case, it is clear that Private

Respondent could not be held ad1ninishatively liable for alleged
irregular contracts executed prior to or during his previous term even
if the payments were only made during his present term. Such
doctrine was reiterated in the case of Garcia v. Hon. Mojica et al,
G.R. No. 139043, Septe1nber 10, 1999, thus:
"In a number of cases, we have repeatedly
held that a reelected local official may not be
held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term
of office. The rationale
.. for this holding is
that when the electorate put him back into
office, it is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, anned
with such knowledge, i1t still reelects him,
then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents
point out that the contract entered into by
petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just
four days before the date of the elections. It
was not inade an issue during the election,
and so the electorate could not be said to have
voted for petitioner with knowledge of this

27

particular aspect of his life and character.

For his part, petitioner that "the only
conclusive determining factor" as regards the
people's thinking on the matter is an election.
On this point, we agree with petitioner. That
the people voted for an official with
knowledge of his character is presun1ed,
precisely to eliminate the need to detennine,
in factual terms, the extent of this
knowledge. Such an undertaking will
obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the
matter do not distinguish the precise tin1ing
or period when the misconduct was
co1nmitted, reckoned from the date of the
official's reelection, except that it must be
prior to said date.
Xxx xxx xxx
I-Iowever, respondents argue that the contract,
although signed on May 7, 1998, during
petitioner's prior term, is to be tnade effective
only during his present term.
We fail to see any difference to justify a valid
distinction in the result. The agreen1ent
between petitioner (representing Cebu City)
and F.E. Zuellig was perfocted on the date the
contract was signed, during petitioner's prior
tenn. At that moment, petitioner already
acceded to the terms of the contract, including
stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to
the city government. Thus, any culpability
petitioner may have in signing the contract
already became extent on the day the
contract was signed. It hardly matters that
the deliveries under the contract are
supposed to have been made n1onths later."
(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
2.23 Clearly, the alleged payn1ents 111ade to MANA and
Hillmarc's Construction Corporation in 2013, during Private
Respondent's present term were only 111ade pursuant to the contracts
executed by the City of Makati prior to or during the previous term
28

of Private Respondent. As such, his subsequent re-election on May

14, 2013 absolves hiln from any supposed adn1inistrative liability
committed during his first tenn.
Consequently, since Private Respondent could not be
held ad1ninistratively liable, it stands to reason that he could not
likewise be preventively suspended.
2.24

2.25 Moreover, as admitted by Petitioner, one of the requisites

before a preventive suspension order may be issued by the
01nbudsman, pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 and
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
On1budsman) is that the evidence of guilt presented against
respondent must be strong.
2.26 Clearly, considering th1~t there was no basis to hold
Respondent Binay administrati..vely liable, there could not have been
a strong evidence of guilt to justify the issuance of a preventive
suspension order.
2.27 In fact, Petitioner simply relied upon the signature of
Respondent Binay appearing on the Disbursement Vouchers and on
the Award and Purchase/Contract in preventively suspending him
pursuant to the charges of Grave l\1isconduct, Serious Dishonesty,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. No overt
act was even attributed to Respondent Binay, and Petitioner 1nerely
relied on a theory of "conspiracy" among him and the other
respondents charged in the Complaint.
2.28 I-Iowever, in the case of Sabiniano v. Court of Appeals et
al., the Supreme Court explained that a mere signature or approval
appearing on a voucher is not enough to sustain a finding of
conspiracy ainong public officials and employees.
5

2.29 Since nothing else of real substance was submitted to

show Petitioner's alleged complicity in the purported offense, the
Ombudsman could not have relied on strong evidence of guilt in
issuing her Joint Order. As such, the issuance thereof constitutes a
material and substantive invasion of Respondent Binay' s clear legal
right, which invasion had to be restrained by Respondent Court of
Appeals.

III. No Plain, Speedy and Adequate Renzedy

s G.R. No. 76490, October 6, 1995.
29

2.30 It is a matter of record that Petitioner's Joint Order

expressly states that the preventive suspension of Private Respondent
was "imn1ediately executory." In fact, it is Petitioner's submission
that the TRO issued by Public Respondent was already inoot and
academic considering that the suspension order had already been
served upon Private Respondent on 11March2015.
2.31 Undoubtedly, there was grave urgency for the issuance of
an injunctive relief, otherwise not only Private Respondent but the
people who elected him would suffer irreparable dan1age.
2.32 In the case of Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeasl, supra,
where Petitioner Garcia, Jr., being the elected Governor of Bataan,
immediately filed with the Supren1e Court a Petition for Certiorari to
assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to act on his prayer for
injunctive relief without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, the High
Court held, thus:
"While the general rule is that a inotion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition
before the filing of a petition for certiorari, the
same admits of exceptions, namely: (1) where the
order is a patent nullity, as_ where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction; . . (2) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon
in the lower court; (3) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay will prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner, or the
subject matter of the. action is perishable; (4)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration will be useless; (5) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there
is extreme urgency for relief; (6) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (7) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (8) where the proceedings was ex parte
or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (9) where the issue raised is one

30

')

l__

purely of law or public interest is involved.

Without further belaboring the point, we find it
very clear that the extreme urgency of the
situation required art equally urgent resolution,
and due to the public interest involved, the
petitioners are justified in straightorwardly
seeking the intervention of this Court. Again, as
we repeatedly held in prior cases, the provisions
of the Rules should be applied with reason and
liberality to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding." (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted)
2.33 Thus, the extreme urgency of the situation justified
Private Respondent's immediate resort to the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for injunctive reliefs before Public Respondent.

JV. Irreparable Damage

2.34 Undoubtedly, unless reslTained, Private Respondent's
right to hold the office of the Mayor of the City of Makati would be
curtailed without legal basis therefor by the preventive suspension
order resulting in irreparable damage not only to him as the duly
elected official but to the electorate, who voted for him.
2.35 Thus, in the case of Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
supra, the Supreme Court cautioned:
"At this point we must en1phasize that the
suspension frmn office of an elective official,
whether as a preventive measure or as a penalty,
will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously
chosen and voted into office."

C.

PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
HAS
JURISDICTION
TO
REQUIRE
PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN, EVEN
IF SHE IS . AN IMPEACHABLE
OFFICER, TO FILE HER COMMENT
TO THE CONTEMPT CASE FILED
AGAINST HER.
31

2.36 At the outset, it must be emphasized that Petitioner

Ombuds1nan willfully refused to comply with the Resolution dated 16
March 2015 of the Public Respondent, granting a TRO on the
preventive suspension order against Private Respondent, on the
ground that said TRO had already become inoot and academic since
the suspension or_der had already been ilnplemented.
2.37 Petitioner insists that the status quo to be preserved is that
Private Respondent had already been suspended and should remain
as such, as this was the status at the time the TRO was issued.
2.38 Petitioner's contumacious act prompted Private
Respondent to implead her in the Amended and Supplemental Petition
for Contempt. Consequently, in its Resolution dated 20 March 2015,
Public Respondent directed Petitioner to file her Comment to the
contempt charge against her.
2.39 Petitioner took exception to said order of Public
Respondent on the ground that as an impeachable officer, she could
not be subjected to criminal proceedings like the contempt' charge
against her.

2.40 In resolving this particular issue, it is important,

therefore, to examine two issues: first) Whether the TRO issued was
already moot and academic such that Petitioner was no longer dutybound to comply with the same under pain of contempt; and second)
Whether Petitioner Ombudsman, as an impeachable officer, could be
subjected to a contempt proceeding. Private Respondent most
respectfully submit that the answer to both issues is in the
affirmative.

The TRO is not moot.

2.41 The TRO issued by Public Respondent was not rendered
moot by the fact that at the time it was issued, Vice Mayor Ro1nulo
Pena, Jr. was already sworn in as Acting Mayor.
2.4~

It is elementary that the purpose of a restraining order is

to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction. (Bacolod City Water District vs. Labayen,
G.R. No 157494, 10 December 2004)

32

2.43 In the case of Garcia vs. Mojica, G.R. No. 139043, 10

September 1999, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to maintain
the status quo until further orders fr01n it. This led Petitioner Garcia,
who was already preventively suspended then, to issue a
memorandum informing employees and officials of the Office of the
City Mayor that he was assuming the post of inayor effective
immec;liately. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman questioned the same,
arguing that the status quo referred to in the order should be that
where petitioner is already suspended and vice mayor Renatos
Osmefia.is the acting City Mayor. The Supreme Court rejected said
view, and held:
"Petitioner, in reply, argued that the status quo
refers to 11 the last actual peaceable uncontested
status
which
preceded
the
pending
11
controversy. Thus, status quo could not be
that where petitioner is preventively
suspended since the suspension did not
precede the present controversy; it is the
controversy.
We agree with petitioner in this regard."
(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
2.44 That the issuance of a TRO preserved the status, which is
the last actual peaceable uncontested between the parties prior to the
controversy was also ruled in the case of .PEZA vs. Vianzon, G.R. No.
131020, 20 July 2000, thus:
"The "status quo" is the last actual peaceable
uncontested situation, which precedes a
controversy. We agree with the petitioner's
position that the status quo should be that
existing at the time of the filing of the case.
2.45 In fact, Petitioner, when she was still an Associate Justice
of the Honorable Court, consistently held that the status ,quo is that
which exists at the time of filing of the case . In the case of CortezEstrada vs. Samut, G.R. No. 154407, 14 February 2005 , , she stated
thus:
"Status quo is defined as the last actual,
peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes

33

the actual controver~y, that which is existing at

the time of the filing of the case.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If the status quo is to be 1naintained in the

present case, it is the status quo before or at the

com1nencement of Civil Case No. 533, that is,
the properties were in the possession of
respondents."
(Citations
omitted
and
underscoring in the original)
2.46 In the case of Preysler vs. Court of Appeasl, G.R. No.
1581441, 11 July 2006, Petitioner also concurred in the decision of the
Supreme Court that:

"We have in previous cases said that the

objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case can be fully heard. Status quo is the
last actual, peaceable and uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy."
(Citations omitted and ernphasis supplied)
2.47 Likewise, in the case of City of Naga vs. Asuncion, G.R.
No. 174042, 9 July 2008, Petitioner concurred in the decision of the
Court:

"A writ of preliminary injunction is available

to
prevent
threatened
or
continuous
irremediable injury to parties before their
claims . can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard fully. Status quo is the last actual,
peaceable and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy." (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)
2.48 The foregoing clearly show that the TRO was not
rendered moot by the fact that Vke Mayor Pefia had been hastily
sworn in as Acting Mayor. The effect of the TRO is the preservation
of the status quo, which Petitioner knows to be the last actual
peaceable uncontested situation before the preventive suspension

34

order was issued, that is, that Private Respondent is the Mayor of
Makati City.
2.49 Hence, she was duty-bound to comply with the TRO
issued by Public Respondent and her failure to do so inakes her liable
for contempt.
Petitioner Ombudsman is not exetiq!t from
contempt proceedings.

2.50 Petitioner claims that Public Respondent gravely erred in

requiring her to cmnment on the contempt charge against her since
as an impeachable officer, she can only be subjected to criminal
proceedings after she steps down frmn office."6 Such contention is
gravely erroneous.
11

2.51 It must be noted that the purpose of contempt is the

preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and
consequently, to the due adminislTation of justice. (Montenegro vs.
Montenegro, G.R. No. 156829, 8 June 2004)
11

2.52 While it is submitted that an ilnpeachable officer may not

be removed from office except by ilnpeachn1ent, an action for
contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment without
necessarily resulting in removal from office. Hence, the fact that
Petitioner is an impeachable officer should not deprive the Court of
Appeals of its inherent power to punish conte1npt. Otherwise, one
could simply disobey judicial directives and invoke his status as an
impeachable officer to avoid the repercussions of such disobedience.

2.53 This has been made clear by the Honorable Court in the
case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. Commission on
Electiolls (G.R. No. 190529, 22 March 2011), which is on all fours with
the instant case. In the said case, the l-Ionorable Court found the
COMELEC (comprising of impeachable officers) guilty of indirect
contempt for having failed to comply with its Status Quo order. In
making such finding, the Honorable Court pronounced:
11

Conte1npt of court applies to all

persons, whether in or out of government.
Thus, it covers governn1ent officials or
6

Paragraph 47, Page 17 of Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari n11d Prlwbitio11

35

employees who retired during the pendency

of the petition for conten1pt. Otherwise, a civil
servant may strategize to avail himself of an
early retiren1ent to escape the sanctions from a
contempt citation, if he perceives that he
would
be
made
responsible
for
a
contumacious act. The higher interest of
effective and efficient administration of justice
dictates that a petition for conte1npt 1nust
proceed to its final conclusion despite the
retirement of the government official or
employee, more so if it involves a former
member of the bench." (citing Curata v .
. Philippine Ports Authority, C.R. Nos. 15421112, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214, 345;
emphasis supplied)
2.54 In fact, it is respectfully submitted that even a sitting
President, the highest impeachable officer in the land, may not be
exempt from the Honorable Court's reach in exercising its powers of
contempt. In the case of Jones v. Clinton, 36 F.Supp.2d 1118 (1999),
then President of the United States, Bill Clinton, was cited in
conte1npt for his false testimony in the case of Jones v. Clinton, (858 F.
Supp. 902). The Court construed his false testi1nony as contemptuous
of its Discovery Orders and fined him $90,000.
2.55 In this jurisdiction, the punishment for indirect contempt
if committed against the Court of Appeals is only a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) months, or both. (Section 7, Rule 71 of tlze Rules of Court) Thus,
Petitioner cannot get ahead of the wisdom of Respondent Court of
Appeals as to the penalty to be imposed on her should she be found
guilty of indirect contempt of court.
2.56 Further, contrary to Petitioner's allegation not all
contempt charges are criminal in nature. When the purpose of the
contempt charge is to compel a party to comply with a lawful order
of the court, the same is considered as 1nerely civil in nature.
2.57 In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Danny Godoy,
C.R. Nos. 115908-09, 29 March 1995, the Supreme Court extensively
discussed the nature and purpose of conte1npt proceedings, thus:

36

"The exercise of the power to punish for

contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the
proper punishment of the guilty party for
his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily,
his compulsory performance of some act or
duty required of him by the court and which
he refuses to perform. Due perhaps to this
two fold aspect of the exercise of the power to
punish the1n, contempts are classified as civil
or crilninal.
xxx

xx xx

xx xx

A. As to the Nature of the Offense

A criminal contempt is conduct that is

directed against the dignity and authority of
the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an
act obstructing the adn1inistration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute
or disrespect. On the other hand, civil
contempt consists in failing to do something
ordered to be done by a court in a civil action
for the benefit of the opposing party therein
and is, there ore, an offense against the party
in whose behalf the violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against
the dignity and authority of the court, is an
offense against organized society and, in
addition, is also held to be an offense against
public justice which raises an issue between
the public and the accused, and the
proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the
other hand; the proceedings to punish a civil
contempt are remedial and for the purpose
of the preservation of the right of private
persons. It has been.. held that civil contempt
is neither felony nor a misdemeanor, but a
power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a

necessary element in cri1ninal contempt, and

that no one can be punished for. a criminal
contempt unless the evidence makes it clear
37

that he intended to com1nit it. On the

contrary, there is authority indicating that
since the purpose of civil contempt
proceedings is remediaJ, the defendant's
intent in co1nmitiing the contempt is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence
of intent to violate the court's order is not a
defense in civil contempt.

B. As to the Purpose for which the Power

Exercised

is

A inajor factor in determining whether a

contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for
which the power is exercised. Where the
primary purpose is to preserve the court's
authority and to punish for disobedience of its
orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the
primary purpose is to provide a remedy for
an injured suitor and to coerce compliance
with an order, the contempt is civil. A
cri1ninal contempt involves no element of
personal injury. It is directed against the
power and dignity of the court; private parties
have little, if any, interest in the proceedings
for punish1nent. Conversely, if the conten1pt
consists in the refusal of a person to do an
act that the court has ordered hin1 to do for
the benefit or advantage of a party to an
action pending before the court, and the
contemnor is com1nitted until he complies
with the order, the cornmitment is in the
nature of an execution to enforce the
judgment of the court; the party in whose
favor that judg1nent was rendered is the real
party in interest in the proceedings. Civil
contempt proceedings look only to the
future. And it is said that in civil contempt
proceedings, the contemnor 1nust be in a
position to purge hhnself.
C. As to the Character of the Conternpt Proceeding
It has been said that the real character of the

proceedings is to be determined by the relief

38

sought, or the dominant purpose, and the

proceedings are to be regarded as criminal
when the purpose is. primarily punishment,
and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedfal.
Criminal
contempt
proceedings
are
generally held to be in the nature of criminal
or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive
in nature, and the Government, the courts,
and the people are interested in their
prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the
power and vindicate-the authority and dignity
of the court, and to punish for disobedience of
its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they
are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions,
even though the conte1nptuous act involved
is also a crime. The proceeding has been
characterized as sui generis, partaking of
some of the elements of both a civil and
criminal proceeding, but really constituting
neither. In general, crilninal conte1npt
proceedings should be conducted in
accordance with the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
procedure is consistent with the sun1mary
nature of contempt proceedings. So it has
been held th~t the strict rules that govern
criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution,
for criminal contempt, that the accused is to
be afforded 1nany of the protections provided
in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing the1n
are to be stric;tly conshued. However, criminal
proceedings are not required to take any
particular form so long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally
held to be remedial and civil in their nature;
that is, they are proceedings for the
enforcement of some duty, and essentially a
remedy for coercing a person to do the thing
required. As otherwise expressed, a
proceeding for civil conte1npt is one
39

instituted to preserve and enforce the rights

of a private party to an action and to compel
obedience to a judg1nent or decree intended
to benefit such a party litigant. So a
proceeding is one for civil contempt,
regardless of its form, if the act charged is
wholly the disobedience, by one party to a
suit, of a special order made in behalf of the
other party and the disobeyed order may
still be obeyed, and the purpose of the
punishment is to aid in an enforcen1ent of
obedience. The rules of procedure governing
crilninal contempt proceedings, or crilninal
prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to
civil contempt proceedings. It has been held
that a proceeding for conte1npt to enforce a
remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that
action. Accordingly, where there has been a
violation of a court order in a civil action, it is
not necessary to docket an independent action
in contempt or proceed in an independent
prosecution to enforce the order. It has been
held, however, that while the proceeding is
auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds
out of the original case, it is essentially a new
and independent proceeding in that it
involves new issues and n1ust be initiated by
the issuance and service of new process.
In general, civil contempt proceedings
should be instituted by an aggrieved party,
or his successor, or someone who has a
pecuniary interest in - the right to be
protected. In criminal contempt proceedings,
it is generally held that the State is the real
prosecutor."
2.58 Thus, Petitioner's contention that contempt proceedings
are criminal in nature and that she may be subjected to conte1npt
proceedings only when she steps down as Ombudsman, is without
any merit. Although the proceedings for conten1pt is in the nature of
a criminal action, "a contempt proceeding is sui generis. While it has
elements of both a civil and a criminal proceeding, it is not a criminal
proceeding even though the conten1ptuous act involved could be a
crime. It is remedial and civil in nature. It is for the enforcement of
40

.
a tduty. Contempt under Rule.. Tl of the Rules of Court is a special
civil action that cannot be converted into a criminal action. (Sevilla v.
Borreta, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1836, July 14, 2004)
"'

2.59 In the instant case, it is very apparent that the contempt

charge against her is civil in nature as shown in the allegations and
prayer in the Private Respondent's Arnended and Supplernental Petition
for Contempt, thus:
"15.1 On 17 March 2015, as the instant Petition
for Contempt was on its way to being filed,
undersigned counsel received a copy of the
Manffestation 7
filed
by
Respondent
Ombudsman in the Petition pending before the
Honorable Court's Sixth (6th) Division and
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453. Such
Man{festation was brought to the attention of'
Petitioner after the instant Petition for Contempt
had already been filed.
her
Man{festation,
Respondent
15.2 In
Ombudsman simply stated her own opinion to
the Honorable Court, without deferring the
saine for its judicial determination, i.e., that in
view of the fact that the DILG claimed to have
served and in1plemented the faint Order at
8:30AM on 16 March 2015, and that
Respondent Pena had supposedly been sworn
into office at 9:47 AM on even date, then there
is "no more act to be restrained by the
tenzporarit restraining order as it had become
inoot and academic."
xxx

xxx

xxx

23.
For their utter failure to comply with
the I--Ionorable Court's Resolution granting the
application for TRO, it is imperative that
contempt proceedings be commenced against
Respondents for their . contu1nacious and
willful disobedience ..to the Honorable Court's
lawful order.
A copy of the M1mifestntio11 dated 17 March 2015 is attached as Annex "E" of the l\111e11ded nlllf
S11pple111e11tnl Petitio11 for Co11telllpf

41

"

24.
Such
willful,
deliberate
and
contumacious
acts
and
01nissions
of
Respondents in craftily refusing compliance
with the TRO is a patent and willful contempt
of court as it constitutes disobedience of or
:resistance to a lawful wid!, process, order, or
judgment of a court, 8 and hnproper conduct
tending, directly o't indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice. 9

xxx

xxx

xxxx

30. Consequently, in the face of the

persistent and wanton refusal of Respondents
to honor and comply with the lawful order of
this Honorable Court, there is therefore an
urgent need to cite Respondents for indirect
contempt and immediately mete out the
appropriate punishment on them until they
shall have complied with the TRO. "
2.60 Indeed, the purpose of the conte1npt charge against
Petitioner is to compel her to comply with Public Respondent's
Resolution dated 16 March 2015, te1nporarily restraining Private
Respondent's preventive suspension until his application for
preliminary injunction has been heard and resolved. It does not seek
to hold her criminally liable nor remove her from her office.
2.61 Undoubtedly, the conternpt charge against her is civil in
nature. It is remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the
Private Respondent's rights. It is neither a felony nor a
misde111eanor, but a power of the court. (People vs. Godoy, supra)
2.62 Accordingly, Public Respondent correctly gave due
course to the conte1npt charge against Petitioner, not to protect
Respondent Binay' s right, but to protect itself and the entire
judiciary. This is so since "if the court is shorn of its power to punish
for conte1npt in all proper cases, it cannot preserve its authority, so
that even without any constitutional or statutory guaranty this power
is inherent in the court. (People vs. Godoy, supra)
Ii

Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

3( d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

2 Section

42

III.
PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT
SHE IS ENTITLED TO ANY INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF.
3.1 In the case of Los Banos Rural Bank, Inc., vs. Pacita 0.
Africa, et. al., C.R. No. 143994, 11 July 2002, the Supre1ne Court held,
thus:
"A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to
preserve the status quo ante, upon an
applicant's showing of two important requisite
conditions; nainely, (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts
sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injustice."
3.2 In the instant case, Petitioner miserably failed to meet
such requirements.
3.3 It must be pointed out that in support of her application
for an injunctive relief, Petitioner 1nerely alleged that as
Ombudsman, she "has the clear legal right - if not solen1n duty - to
preserve the integrity of the Office of the Ombudsman and its legal
proceedings, by ensuring that its Suspension Order is given full
force and effect and not circumvented." Moreover, petitioner has a
clear legal right not to be subjected to contempt proceedings."
3.4 Obviously, such allegations are not sufficient to establish
her Right in Esse. First, as previously pointed out, the Constitution
expressly grants the courts, including Public Respondent, the
judicial power to review the Ombuds1nan' s acts and orders to
determine if there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, it is beyond cavil that Public
Respondent has the power and jurisdiction over orders and findings
of the Office of the Ornbudsman in adn1inistrative cases (Fabian vs
Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16Septerr1ber1998)
3.5 Second, Petitioner herself failed to show the
01nbudsman's clear right under RA 6770 that she had to ask for its

43

determination, thus:
"5.5 Petitioner seeks to take this opportunity
to obtain a ruling, on behalf of the institution
she represents, that will clarify once and for all
the extent to which respondent Court of
Appeals and lower courts may interfere with
the On1buds1nan' s investigations. Index anirni
senna est - speech is the index of intention. The
language of the law, when clear and
unainbiguous, should be given effect. Indeed
the principle verba legis non est recedendum from the words of the statute there should be
nor departure - is "well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction. Given these universally accepted
rules of statutory construction, it is high time
that this Honorable Court decide, once and for
all, exactly what the law means when it
categorically states that No writ of injunction shall be issued by
any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombuds1nan under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject 1natter of the investigations is outside
the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman."
3.6 Clearly, that Petitioner had to ask for clarification from
this Honorable Court as to the On1buds1nan' s rights and the
interpretation of Section 14 of RA 6770, underscores the fact that she
has no clear and legal right to be protected in the instant case.
3.7 On the other hand, as earlier pointed out, the fact that
Petitioner is an in1peachable officer does not auton1atically result in
her being exe1npt from a contempt proceeding since in conten1pt,
especially in civil contempt as in the instant case, the purpose is
1nerely to compel her to obey th'e lawful order of the courts and not
to remove her from office.
3.8 Undoubtedly, the foregoing would show that Petitioner
failed to establish a clear legal right that rnust be protected by an
injunctive writ. In the case of Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United
Neon, G.R. No. 163406, 26 November 2009, the Supren1e Court held

44

that where the party's right is unclear and disputed, no writ of

injunction could be issued.
3.9 Moreover, Petitioner also failed to establish a 111aterial
and substantial invasion of her tights that would result in
irreparable dan1age or injury to her as Petitioner 0111buclsn1an and to
the office she represents. The allegation that Public Respondent's
orders "exposes her to sin1ilar fonns of intin1iclation and harass1nent
frorn_ other public officers that n1ay investigate in the future. Being
111ade to explain and justify her official functions before Respondent
Court of Appeals tarnishes petitioner's integrity and casts serious
doubt on the independence and autonon1y of her office" is too
speculative.
3.10. Considering the foregoing, it is clear that Petitioner is
not entitled to any injunctive relief.
PRAYER
WI-IEREFORE, pren1ises considered, it is respectfully prayed
that the instant Pef:if:ion for Certiorari and Prohibiholl be DISMISSED for
utter lack of 111erit.
Other just and equitable relief is prayed for.
Makati City for Manila, 6 April 2015.
SUBIDO PAGENTE CERTEZA
MENDOZA & BINAY
Counsel for Private RespoudeJLf
5Lh Floor, Prince Building, 117 Rada Street
Legazpi Village, 1129 Makati City
Tel. Nos.: (632) 893-t'.1115; (632) 817-5116
Fax No.: (632L8L15-0151
By:

Roll of Ahon1eys No. 33002

IBP No. 852816/Lifetin1e/Manila II
PTR No. 4760026/1-8-15/Makati City
MCLE Exen1ption No. IV-000L!L15/12-7-12/Pasig City

45

MARIA PATRICIA L.
Roll of Attorneys No. 49629
IBP No. 960973/Lifetime/Makati City
PTR No. 4760047 /1-8-15/Makati City
MCLE No. IV-001877 / 4-24-13/Pasig City

MARY CHRISTikft.RISSE G. CATRE

Roll of Attorneys No. 57330
Lifetime IBP No. 960974/Surigao City
PTR No. 4760046/1-09-15/Makati City
MCLE No. IV-0013116/3-11-13/Pasig City
Copy furnished:
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Petitioner
Ombuds1nan Building, Aghain Road
North Triangle, Dilimau
1101 Quezon Ci~y
.,/:''\

"

"

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

Counsel for Petitioner

134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City
COURT OF APPEALS
Ma. Orosa Street,
Ermita, Manila

EXPLANATION

'

A copy of the foregoing Connnent/Opposition was served by

registered n1ail due to thne and personnel constraints.

MARY CHRISTk!ARISSE G. CATRE

46