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Journal compilation r 2008 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 39, Nos. 45, October 2008
0026-1068

PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES

SVEN OVE HANSSON

Abstract: This article offers a perspective on the role of philosophy in relation to

other academic disciplines and to society in general. Among the issues treated are
the delimitation of philosophy, whether it is a science, its role in the community of
knowledge disciplines, its losses of subject matter to other disciplines, how it is
inuenced by social changes and by progress in other disciplines, and its role in
interdisciplinary work. It is concluded that philosophy has an important mission
in promoting clarity, precision, and open-mindedness in academic research and in
society at large.
Keywords: applied ethics, applied philosophy, corpus of knowledge, denition of
philosophy, delimitation of philosophy, interdisciplinary research, philosophy,
science, scientic philosophy.

1. Introduction
Philosophy is unrivalled among academic disciplines in terms of its many
and deep connections with the subject matter of other disciplines. This is
not just a matter of the applicability of philosophical concepts and
methods to other subjects. When you probe into almost any eld of learning, interesting problems of a philosophical nature tend to emerge. In
spite of this, philosophers take less part in interdisciplinary research than
do researchers in most other elds. The relationship between philosophy
and other disciplines is underdeveloped, probably due largely to historical
burdens.
In this article I attempt to clarify how philosophy relates, and should
relate, to other disciplines. In sections 2 and 3, I discuss philosophys
place among the sciences and other knowledge disciplines. Section 4 is
devoted to the delimitation of philosophy, and section 5 to the consequences of its losses of subject matter to other disciplines. Section 6 is
devoted to how social changes and progress in other disciplines inuence
philosophy, section 7 to philosophys role in interdisciplinary co-operations, and section 8 to applied philosophy. In section 9, I draw some
general conclusions on the social usefulness of philosophy.
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2. Is Philosophy Science?
There is considerable disagreement concerning the relationship between
philosophy and science. It is a common view among philosophers that
philosophy is not a branch of science, but another type of activity, quite
distinct from science. Among those who see a close connection between
philosophy and science, there are at least three views on the nature of that
connection.
According to one view, philosophical treatments of a subject are, at
least in typical cases, an early phase in the scientic study of that subject.
Philosophy is then regarded as a form of protoscience, out of which
science can be developed. Hence, William James dened philosophy as
a collective name for questions that have not yet been answered to the
satisfaction of all by whom they have been asked (James 1979, 23).
A second view treats philosophy in toto as one of the disciplines of
science. This viewpoint was held by C. J. Ducasse, who identied
philosophy as the science whose subject matter consists of spontaneous
particular appraisalsFand whatever turns out to be implicit in them
(Ducasse 1941, 237).
A third standpoint considers some but not all forms of philosophy as
science. One of the most outspoken proponents of this view was Hans
Reichenbach. He distinguished between speculative and scientic
philosophy, also called old and new philosophy. Contrary to
speculative philosophy, scientic philosophy leaves the explanation of
the universe entirely to the scientist; it constructs the theory of knowledge
by the analysis of the results of science and is aware of the fact that neither
the physics of the universe nor that of the atom can be understood in
terms of concepts derived from everyday life. Furthermore, in its
legitimate elds of inquiry, scientic philosophy uses a method of
analysis designed after the pattern of scientic inquiry, with which it
can arrive by logical analysis at conclusions as precise, as elaborate, and
as reliable as the results of the science of our time. Whereas the
speculative philosopher believes that philosophical certainty is possible,
the scientic philosopher has given up such illusions and knows that
probable knowledge is a basis solid enough to answer all questions that
can reasonably be asked (Reichenbach 1954, 303, 305, 325).
It is a deeply troubling aspect of these discussions that the term
science is in itself vague. Its demarcation depends not only on
epistemological principles but also on historical contingencies. Originally,
the word science was used to denote any form of systematic knowledge,
practical or theoretical. In the nineteenth century, the meaning of the
term was restricted to certain forms of academic knowledge, mainly those
studying nature (Layton 1976). Today, science refers primarily to
studies of natural phenomena and individual human behaviour. Some
of the disciplines that study human societies are called scientic whereas
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SVEN OVE HANSSON

others are instead counted among the humanities. Hence, according to

the conventions of the English language, political economy is a science
(one of the social sciences), but medieval history is not.
In some other languages, the demarcation is different. In German and
several other Germanic languages, the corresponding term (Wissenschaft in German) covers both the sciences and the humanities.
However, this more inclusive demarcation is not strictly epistemological
either, but also has a socially contingent component. In particular, only
disciplines that have gained academic acceptance are regarded as
Wissenschaften. Hence, numismatics, the systematic study of coins,
medals, and their history, is counted as a Wissenschaft, but philately,
the equally systematic study of postage stamps and their history, is not.
This difference does not seem to depend on the nature of the study objects
or study methods of the respective disciplines. A more plausible explanation is that numismatics is more useful to other historical disciplines than
is philately.
Since categories such as science and Wissenschaft are demarcated
by a combination of epistemological and contingent criteria, the question
of whether philosophy belongs to them is partly a matter of conventions
rather than principles.
3. Philosophy in the Community of Knowledge Disciplines
There is, however, a much more important question underlying these
debatesFnamely, the question of philosophys role in the unied corpus
of systematic human knowledge that is formed by the community of
interdependent knowledge disciplines, including both the sciences and the
humanities.
The unity of that corpus is most clearly seen from the mutual respect
that widely divergent disciplines pay to each others results and methodologies. An historian will have to accept the chemists analysis of an
archeological artefact. In the same way, a zoologist will have to accept the
historians judgment on the reliability of an ancient text describing extinct
animals. This relationship of respect extends also to branches of learning
that have not received academic status, for instance when philatelists and
historians co-operate in dating a letter from the late nineteenth century
with a partly preserved postage stamp.
One of the most fascinating developments in modern learning is the
rapidly growing interdependence of the disciplines. In the early days of
science, the different disciplines were largely independent of each other.
A renaissance scientist could be both a biologist and a physicist, but
biology and physics were nevertheless well-separated branches of learning
that had very little of substance in common. Today the interdisciplinary
interconnections in science are strong and steadily strengthening. In the
past half-century or so, integrative disciplines such as astrophysics,
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evolutionary biology, biochemistry, ecology, quantum chemistry, the

neurosciences, and game theory have developed at dramatic speed and
contributed to tying together previously unconnected disciplines. The
increased interconnections concern not only those academic disciplines
covered by the restrictive English term science but also the wider range
of disciplines covered by the German term Wissenschaft.
Somewhat paradoxically, belief in the coherence of science seems to
have been much stronger in the rst half of the twentieth century than it is
today. Although the reductionist account of relations between the
disciplines that was popular at that time is not tenable, it is remarkable
that interdisciplinary interdependence has increased dramatically at the
same time as belief in it seems to have receded.
The important issue for philosophy is therefore not whether or not it is
a science (or a Wissenschaft) but whether or not it is part of this
community of interdependent disciplines. Historical evidence gives us
strong reasons to answer this question in the afrmative. Philosophers
have philosophized successfully on natural or social phenomena only
when they have made use of the systematic knowledge about these
phenomena obtained in other disciplines. The philosophy of time and
space was revolutionized by relativity theory, the philosophy of sense
perception by psychology and physiology, and so on.
Being a member of this community of disciplines is a matter of both
giving and taking. As philosophers we have to respect the knowledge
obtained in other disciplines, but we can also expect knowledge workers
in other disciplines to respect the achievements of philosophers. Hence,
philosophers should refrain from attempts to solve problems in physics
with purely conceptual methods that ignore results from experimental
physics. Similarly, physicists should refrain from trying to solve epistemological problems without making proper use of concepts and methods
that have been developed by philosophers.
In both cases respect must be distinguished from deference. The
consensus view among experts in a eld of study should not be ignored
or taken lightly, but it can be refuted with valid arguments.
4. What Is Specically Philosophical?
Disciplines can be demarcated according to their subject matter or
according to their methodology. Some disciplines are best dened in
the rst of these ways, others in the other. Hence, the distinction between
zoology and botany is based on the subject matter, whereas that between
sociology and economics is largely methodological. How, then, should
philosophy be demarcated?
Good arguments can be given for both types of demarcation.
Concerning subject matter, there is a range of issues, comprising
subdisciplines such as metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, that
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philosophers have studied throughout the history of the discipline.

A reasonable demarcation of philosophy can be made by enumerating
these subdisciplines, in much the same way as physics can be demarcated
by enumeration of subdisciplines such as optics, mechanics, particle
physics, and so forth.
On the other hand, philosophy has an equally long tradition of
employing specic methodologies, including the systematic use of counter-examples, precise denitions, and logical analysis of the validity of
arguments. An alternative denition of philosophy can be made in terms
of these methodologies. An advantage of such a denition is that it
facilitates the accommodation of emerging new discourses that make use
of the traditional philosophical methodologies.
The Oxford English Dictionary, widely regarded as the authoritative
dictionary of the English language, denes philosophy in the modern
sense as the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and
existence, and the basis and limits of human understanding; this considered as an academic discipline. This is clearly a denition in terms of
subject matter. A study of other dictionaries gives the impression that this
is common lexicographical practice.
Either way, if we choose to dene philosophy according to its subject
matter or its methodologies, philosophy will be much more difcult to
demarcate than disciplines such as linguistics and cardiology. This difculty is part of the (small) price that we have to pay for the wide range of
our discipline.
5. Losing Territory?
Philosophy is often seen, not least by philosophers, as a discipline that
time and again loses territory to other disciplines. Although most of the
subjects discussed in Platos dialogues still belong to the provinces of
philosophy (some topics in the Timaeus being the main exceptions),
Aristotles work ranges over a much wider ambit, and arguably it was
Aristotle who set the standard for delimiting philosophy.
As measured against the Aristotelian standard, the losses in ground
have been substantial. When natural philosophy became less speculative,
it developed into the natural sciences. In the nineteenth century, psychology became a discipline of its own, and more recently much of logic has
moved to mathematics and computer science.
The emigration of subjects from philosophy is a rather complex
process, with at least three components. First, and least dramatically,
there has been a change in terminology. Physics, chemistry, and biology
are no longer called natural philosophy. Secondly, there have been
changes in the methodologies with which certain issues are attacked.
When experiments were introduced into the study of human behaviour,
psychology parted from philosophy. Other disciplines have gone their
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own way for similar reasons. As James noted, As fast as questions got
accurately answered, the answers were called scientic, and what men
call philosophy to-day is but the residuum of questions still unanswered (James 1979, 12; see Rescher 1978, 22223).
Thirdly, there have been occasions when practitioners of other
disciplines have, more or less independently, taken up issues and methods
that traditionally belonged to philosophy. The clearest example of this is
computer science. Already in 1979 Arthur W. Burks wrote: There are
many research areas of computer science which overlap philosophy,
either in the problems guiding inquiry or the answers produced. I think
that these areas will have a profound impact on philosophy in the next
twenty years (Burks 1979, 1). Since Burks wrote this, computer scientists
have investigated the structures of concepts and thought processes and
have made signicant advances, not least in the study of non-deductive
reasoning. In a period when formalized philosophy has often failed to
attract the enthusiasm of a new generation of philosophers, parts of it
have been revivedFand to some extent reinventedFunder the auspices
of another discipline.
Burks believed that philosophy would lose some of its traditional
subject matter to computer science. There are signs that this may now be
happening. Although not a direct outgrowth from philosophy, computer
science may very well join the long row of disciplines that have taken over
issues from philosophy.
It is often taken for granted that such losses in subject area are
regrettable from the viewpoint of philosophy. But this is not necessarily
so. By and large, philosophy has received much more from other
disciplines than it has lost to them. From the natural sciences, philosophy
has received new perspectives on space and time, matter, life, mind,
andFnot leastFthe place of the human species in the order of things.
We have only just begun to see the inuences of computer science on
philosophy (Bynum and Moor 2000).
Of course, the metaphor of losses and gains in territory is deeply
misleading. The disciplines are not ghting over a xed territory, and
there is no zero-sum game going on among them. To the contrary, they all
benet from each others successes. This applies not least to philosophy.
Game theory and decision theory have provided moral philosophy with
more precise formulations of age-old issues, and at the same time they
have supplied new fascinating problems for ethical analysis. Modern
philosophy of mind would not have been possible without the advances of
psychology and the neurosciences. Linguistics has provided similar
services to the philosophy of language. Set theory, quantum mechanics,
and evolutionary biology are other examples of new disciplines that have
enriched philosophy with new subject matter and new insights. In
summary, no discipline has gained more than philosophy from the
advances of other disciplines.
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6. A Changing Territory
Philosophy is often seen as dealing with eternal issues that have
remained the same since antiquity. On a very basic level, this is true.
We are still concerned with the nature of knowledge, with the proper
understanding of beauty, with the distinction between valid and invalid
arguments, and with the delimitation between right and wrongful actions.
But this is not different from many other disciplines. On a similar basic
level, mechanics is still concerned with understanding the movements of
objects, and astronomy with the nature and movement of extraterrestrial
bodies.
When we go beyond that basic level, the subject matter of philosophy
turns out to be liable to change as much as that of other disciplines. As
already mentioned, developments in other disciplines continuously provide us with new philosophical issues and with new perspectives on old
ones. Furthermore, since much of philosophy is concerned with social
relations, it is deeply inuenced by changes in human societies. Seen over
a longer period, the combined effects of developments in human society
and in human knowledge have thoroughly changed the range of philosophical issues. New philosophical problems and problem areas have
been created. Some of the old ones have been elucidated in new ways
whereas others have become obsolete. It is easy to give examples of
developments in the previous century that had a deep inuence on
philosophy: the emergence of democracy, the Holocaust, nuclear weapons, computers, environmental pollution, neurobiology, biotechnology,
and so on.
Many philosophers, however, have a far from untroubled attitude to
these developments. In the natural sciences, scientists are drawn to the
elds where the most promising new discoveries are made, and in the
social sciences new social developments attract the attention of researchers. In philosophy, there is much less interest in new subject matter.
A possible explanation may be that many philosophers prefer to see their
discipline as concerned with eternal truths, and therefore in some sense
independent of empirical facts. The idea seems to be that whereas the
empirical sciences deal with synthetic truths, philosophy is devoted to an
analytic realm in which empirical facts have no relevance.
This view of the boundary of philosophy is in itself philosophically
problematic. At least since Quines 1951 article Two Dogmas of
Empiricism it should be clear that the chances are small of drawing a
sharp and uncontroversial line between the analytic and the synthetic
domains. If there is an area for philosophical inquiry that is protected
from the inuence of fallible empirical knowledge, then that area is small
and probably excludes a large proportion of the problems that we have
traditionally called philosophical. However, some philosophers still act as
if the boundary was uncontestable. To mention just one example,
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philosophy of time is still sometimes conducted as if relativity theory did

not yet exist. The idea behind such endeavours is to obtain results that are
more reliable than empirical science because they are analytically true.
Unfortunately they will instead be demonstrably wrong. In this way,
unrealistic strivings for eternal truths can prevent philosophers from
being efcient participants in the search for increasingly better approximations of the truth that is the joint project of the community of
knowledge disciplines.

7. Co-operating with Others

There are two major philosophical approaches to other disciplines that
can be called philosophy of and philosophy with, respectively. They
can be exemplied by the relationship between philosophy and economics. Philosophy of economics consists of philosophical studies of how
economists reason and analyses of their theories with the tools of
philosophy. This line of study has given rise to important scholarly
achievements, and it has sometimes helped economists to put their own
discipline into perspective. When performing this type of research, the
philosophers relation to economists is not unlike that of a social scientist
to his or her study objects. In addition to the philosophy of economics
there are many other philosophy of disciplines, such as: philosophy of
history, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of
biology, philosophy of technology, and philosophy of medicine.
To illustrate the other approach, let us return to economics. One of the
most exciting recent developments in this subject has been the construction and application of new and more sophisticated representations of
human beliefs, preferences, norms, and interactions, laying new foundations for important parts of economic theory. These developments are
closely related to advances in the elds of philosophical value theory,
moral theory, and epistemology. It is in many cases not easyFand
probably not even meaningfulFto determine if a certain problem area
belongs primarily to philosophy or to economics. Philosophers who are
active in this fertile interdisciplinary area conduct philosophy with
economists. They are participants in, not (mere) observers of, the progress
of economic theory. Interestingly enough, they do not typically call
themselves philosophers of economics. The phrase philosophy of
does not adequately reect their deep involvement in economic research.
It is certainly a demanding task to perform research that requires high
competence in two disciplines. Some of the foremost contributions to the
economic-philosophical eld have been made by researchers who are both
philosophers and economists (Sen 1982; Broome 1991). But double
competence is not necessary. Joint efforts by philosophers and economists
can be equally productive.
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Other examples of the philosophy with approach can be found in

philosophys intersections with linguistics, computer science, and jurisprudence. But in most of philosophys intersections with other subjects,
such direct interaction is strikingly rare. The philosophy of approach is
much more common.
Obviously, excellent philosophy has been done, and remains to be
done, in the philosophy of tradition. If, however, we wish to develop
fully the potentials of our discipline, true interdisciplinary co-operation
must be given a more prominent role. We need to see much more of
philosophy withFthat is, philosophy joining forces with other disciplines in order to solve problems of common interest.
8. Applied Philosophy?
When philosophers discuss connections between philosophy and other
disciplines, one can be sure that the term applied will be used, typically
more frequently than co-operation. The term applied is, however,
much more problematic in this context than has usually been recognized.
It is well-established terminology to call bioethics applied ethics,
meaning that it is the application of an ethical theory to some particular
moral problem or set of problems (Bernard Gert, quoted in Beauchamp
1984, 51415). But why is not philosophy of science analogously called
applied epistemology? Similarly, why is business ethics called applied
ethics but not philosophy of law? Why is the philosophy of sport called
applied philosophy but not the philosophy of mathematics or of
religion?
Applied philosophy and applied ethics are relatively new terms,
apparently not much used before Rupert Lodges 1951 book, Applied
Philosophy. To understand the conventional meaning of these terms, it
may be helpful to compare them to similar terms from other disciplines,
such as applied mathematics. The latter term denotes activities in which
mathematics is used rather than developed. In applied mathematics, a
mathematical theory is used to solve some problem outside pure mathematics. The theory itself is not changed or signicantly extended in the
process of its application (Kopelman 1990).
The reason we do not call philosophy of science applied epistemology is that it does not constitute an application of epistemology in the
same way applied mathematics consists in the application of pure
mathematics. Philosophers of science do not transfer and use theories
from epistemology. Instead, they develop new theory that may be related
to epistemology but is not derivable from it.
Critics of the notion of applied philosophy have pointed out that the
areas of philosophy that are called applied are not applications in this
sense. It does not seem to be a realistic procedure in any subdiscipline of
philosophy rst to develop a theory independently of its use in any
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concrete issue and then apply it to such concrete issues without revising or
amending it (Beauchamp 1984). It is, for instance, not advisable to
approach bioethics armed with a moral theory and a strong conviction
that it will solve all the problems that come up. Many of the problems
that emerge from ethical studies of biomedical practice have at most weak
connections to the choice between ethical theories, such as different
variants of deontology or utilitarianism (Heyd 1996; Kymlicka 1993;
Toulmin 1981). Bioethics is an innovation-rich discipline that has
produced new insights on personhood, consent, and other issues that
are pertinent in all branches of ethics. It is not obvious today in which
direction the most important inuence operates between bioethics and
basic or general moral philosophy.
There is, however, another sense in which the term applied philosophy may be relevant. To see that, let us return to the comparison
between it and applied mathematics, and consider a physicist who uses
differential equations to solve a problem in mechanics. We then have
(1) a basic mathematical theory, with no reference whatsoever to nonmathematical reality, (2) a mathematical model of the movements of
bodies, expressed in terms of that basic mathematical theory, and (3) a
physical reality, typically a class of experimental situations. The term
applied can be used to refer to the relation between (1) and (2); the
model is an application of the basic mathematical theory. The same term
can also be used to refer to the relation between (2) and (3); the
mathematical model is applied to the physical problem.
Consider now the chain consisting of (1 0 ) basic ethical theory, (2 0 )
bioethics, and (3 0 ) the ethical problems encountered in medicine and
biological research. As we have seen, the relation between (1 0 ) and (2 0 )
is quite different from that between (1) and (2), and should not be
described as one of application. On the other hand, the relationship
between (2 0 ) and (3 0 ) is more similar to that between (2) and (3), at least in
the sense that it too can be described as an application. Hence bioethics is
applied ethics in the sense of ethica applicanda (ethics to be applied)
rather than in the sense of ethica applicata (ethics that has been
applied). However, in this sense of applied it would seem to be a
reasonable requirement of any ethical theory that it is applied, or is at
least capable of being applied.
9. The Social Usefulness of Philosophy
The skills and methodologies developed in philosophy are useful both in
other academic disciplines and in society generally. Philosophers can
contribute to complex discussions, for instance, by clarifying the meanings of central terms, by separating normative from empirical issues,
and by distinguishing between linguistic and substantial differences
among discussants. These and other philosophical abilities are valuable,
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and indeed needed, in various parts of modern societies, in both the

public and the private sectors.
What is even more important, philosophy can provide a systematic
account of socially important subject matter, most prominently in ethics
and social philosophy. In this way, philosophy can contribute to societys
ability to solve difcult and contentious issues through argumentation
and deliberation.
Needless to say, like other academic disciplines, philosophy can only
offer parts of the information and insights that society needs. We need
philosopher-investigators and philosopher-advisers, not philosopherkings. If philosophy has a mission, it is not to make other peoples
decisions for them but to promote clarity, precision, and open-mindednessFnot only in our own subject but also in other academic
disciplines and in society at large. Our ability to full this mission
depends crucially on our ability to interact constructively, intensely,
and respectfully with the other knowledge disciplines.
Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology
Royal Institute of Technology
Teknikringen 78 B
10044 Stockholm
Sweden
soh@kth.se

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