Civpro Addvitional Cases

FIRST DIVISION
MARIANO NOCOM,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 182984
Present:
- versus -
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
OSCAR CAMERINO, EFREN CAMERINO, CORNELIO MANTILE and MILDRED DEL ROSARIO, in her capacity as
legal heir and representative of NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
February 10, 2009
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
for lack of jurisdiction and its Resolution dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The present case is an offshoot of the prior case, G.R. No. 161029, entitled Springsun Management Systems
Corporation v. Oscar Camerino, Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez , which was
promulgated on January 19, 2005 (449 SCRA 65) and became final and executory on May 4, 2005 as recorded in the Book of Entries
of Judgment.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
G.R. No. 161029:
Respondent Oscar Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the deceased Nolasco Del
Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who were tilling on the parcels of land planted
to rice and corn previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 289237, now S-6135
(109,451 square meters); S-72244 (73,849 square meters); and 289236, now S-35855 (109,452 square meters). On February 9, 1983,
without notifying the respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold the said lots to Springsun Management Systems Corporation (SMSC)
for P9,790,612. The three deeds of sale were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and new titles were issued in the
name of SMSC.
Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its loans amounting to P11,545,000. As
SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, later, was adjudged the highest bidder. On May
10, 2000, SMSC redeemed the lots from BF. Earlier, on March 7, 1995, respondents filed a complaint against SMSC and BF for
Prohibition/Certiorari, Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-020, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256.
On January 25, 2002, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, found respondents to be tenants who have been tilling
on the subject land planted to rice and corn since 1967 and, thus, authorized them to redeem the subject lots. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby as follows:
1. Declaring that plaintiffs are entitled (sic) to redeem, and ordering the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation
(now petitioner) to allow plaintiffs to redeem the landholdings in question within 180 days from finality of this decision at the total
price of P9,790,612.00; upon full payment of the redemption price, the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation is
ordered to deliver plaintiffs the titles and the corresponding Deed of Redemption so that the titles to the properties in litigation can be
transferred in the name of the plaintiffs;
[if !supportLists]2.
[endif]Declaring plaintiffs entitled to possession, and ordering the

defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation and all
persons claiming under it to vacate the lands in question and to
surrender the same to the plaintiffs;
[endif]Dismissing the case against Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank;
4. Ordering the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
On September 23, 2003, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 72475, affirmed with modification the RTC by declaring the
respondents to be tenants or agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus, entitled to exercise their right of redemption, but
deleted the award of P200,000 attorneys fees for lack of legal basis.
On January 19, 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 161029, affirmed the CA and reiterated that being agricultural tenants of Victoria
Homes, Inc. that had sold the lots to SMSC without notifying them, respondents had the right to redeem the subject properties from
SMSC.
This Court denied SMSCs motions for reconsideration and for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and, on May
4, 2005, an Entry of Judgment was made.
The present G.R. No. 182984:
On December 3, 2003, petitioner Mariano Nocom gave the respondents several Philtrust Bank Managers Checks
amounting to P500,000 each, which the latter encashed, representing the price of their inchoate and contingent rights over the
subject lots which they sold to him.
On December 18, 2003, respondents, with the marital consent of their wives, executed an Irrevocable Power of Attorney
which was notarized by their counsel Atty. Arturo S. Santos. Thus,
IRREVOCABLE POWER OF
ATTORNEY[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

WE, OSCAR CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Teresita L. Magbanua: EFREN
CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Susana Camerino, CORNELIO MANTILE, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Maria Fe Alon, NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Mildred Joplo, and DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ, of legal age, Filipino, married
to Dionicia Enriquez whose residences are stated under our respective names, hereby APPOINT,
NAME, and CONSTITUTE MARIANO NOCOM, of legal age, Filipino, married to Anacoreta
Nocom and with office at No. 2315 Aurora Blvd, Pasay City, in an irrevocable manner, coupled
with interest, for us and in our stead, to do all or any of the following acts and deeds:
[endif]To sell, assign, transfer, dispose of, mortgage and alienate the properties described in TCT Nos.
120542, 120541 and 123872 of the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City, currently in the name of Springsun Management Systems
Corporation, consisting of 292,752 square meters subject matter of Civil Case No. 95-020 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 256. The said court, in its decision dated January 25, 2002 which was affirmed with modification of the Court of
Appeals in its decision dated September 24, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72475, adjudged that we are legally entitled to redeem the lands
from Springsun Management Systems Corporation;
[endif]To comply with the said decision by paying the redemption price to
Springsun Management Systems Corporation and/or to the court, and upon such payment, to
secure execution of the judgment so that the titles can be issued in the name of our attorney-infact;
[endif]To accept and receive for his exclusive benefit all the proceeds which
may be derived from the sale, mortgage, transfer or deposition thereof;
[endif]To sign and execute all the necessary papers, deed and documents that
may be necessary or the accomplishment of purposes of the Deed of Assignment, and to issue receipts and
proper discharges therefor;
[endif]To negotiate, deal and transact with all the persons and entities
involved in Civil Case No. 95-020, RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, with full power and authority to
compromise with them;
[endif]To procure all documents and papers in government agencies relative to
the said properties and case in court; and
[endif]To procure the necessary transfer certificate of titles in his name as the
absolute owner of said properties.
GIVING AND GRANTING full power and authority to our said attorney-in-fact to do all things requisite and
necessary with legal effects as if done by us when present.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto affixed [our] signatures this 18 th day of December, 2003.
(Sgd.) OSCAR CAMERINO
Principal
Sparrow St., Diamond Park
Victoria Homes, Tunasan
Muntinlupa City
(Sgd.) EFREN CAMERINO

Principal
San Antonio, San Pedro
Laguna
(Sgd.) CORNELIO MANTILE

(Sgd.) NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO
Principal
Principal
Victoria Ave., Tunasan
Esmido St., Diamond Park
Muntinlupa City
Victoria Homes, Muntinlupa City
(Sgd.) DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ
Principal
Tunasan Proper, Arandia
Tunasan, Muntinlupa City
WITH OUR MARITAL CONSENT:

(Sgd.) TERESITA MAGBANUA
Wife of Oscar Camerino
(Sgd.) MARIA FE ALON ALON

Wife of Cornelio Mantile
(Sgd.) SUSANA CAMERINO

Wife of Efren Camerino
(Sgd.) MILDRED JOPLO

Wife of Nolasco del Rosario
(Sgd.) DIONICIA ENRIQUEZ

Wife of Domingo Enriquez
CONFORME:
(Sgd.) MARIANO NOCOM
Attorney-in-Fact
Meanwhile, on July 21, 2005, the respondents, in Civil Case No. 95-020 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, filed a
Motion for Execution with Prayer to Order the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to divest SMSC of title to the subject lots and
have the same vested on them. As SMSC refused to accept the redemption amount of P9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 as commission
given by the petitioner, the respondents deposited, on August 4, 2005, the amounts of P9,790,612, P73,529.59, and P73,529.59, duly
evidenced by official receipts, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 granted
respondents motion for execution and, consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 in the name of SMSC were cancelled
and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in the names of the respondents. It also ordered that the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney, executed on December 18, 2003 by respondents in favor of petitioner, be annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances
of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897.
On October 24, 2005, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a complaint against petitioner, captioned as Petition to Revoke
Power of Attorney, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-172, in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, seeking to annul the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 18, 2003, the turnover of the titles to the properties in his favor, and the payment of
attorneys fees and other legal fees.
Respondent Oscar Camerinos complaint alleged that he and co-respondents were asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S.
Santos, to sign a document with the representation that it was urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC; that the
contents of the said document were not explained to him; that in the first week of September 2005, he learned that TCT Nos. 15895,
15896 and 15897 were issued in their favor by the Register of Deeds; that he discovered that the annotation of the Irrevocable Power
of Attorney on the said titles was pursuant to the Order of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 dated August 31, 2005; that the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney turned out to be the same document which Atty. Santos required him and the other respondents to
sign on December 18, 2003; that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to surrender the owner s duplicate copies of the said
titles; that petitioner had retained ownership over the subject lots; that he had no intention of naming, appointing, or constituting
anyone, including petitioner, to sell, assign, dispose, or encumber the subject parcels of land; and that he executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim which was annotated on the titles involving the subject lots.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner countered that on September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos informed him of the
desire of his clients, herein respondents, to sell and assign to him their inchoate and contingent rights and interests over the subject
lots because they were in dire need of money and could no longer wait until the termination of the proceedings as SMSC would
probably appeal the CAs Decision to this Court; that they did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject lots;
that on December 18, 2003, he decided to buy the contingent rights of the respondents and paid each of them P500,000 or a total of
P2,500,000 as evidenced by Philtrust Bank Managers Check Nos. MV 0002060 (for respondent Oscar Camerino), MV 0002061 (for
respondent Efren Camerino), MV 0002062 (for respondent Cornelio Mantile), MV 0002063 (for Nolasco Del Rosario), and MV
0002064 (for Domingo Enriquez) which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003; that on August 4, 2005, he also paid the
amount of P147,059.18 as commission; that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment, respondents and their spouses voluntarily
signed the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 18, 2003; that being coupled with interest, the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties; and that having received just and reasonable compensation for
their contingent rights, respondents had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint and the payment of P1,000,000 moral damages, P500,000 exemplary damages, and P500,000 attorneys fees plus costs.
On January 17, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his special and/or affirmative defense that
respondent Oscar Camerino had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots because the latter and his wife received the
proceeds of the Philtrust Bank Managers check in the sum of P500,000 which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003 and
that being coupled with interest, the Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties.
On January 26, 2006, respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir
and representative of Nolasco Del Rosario, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit the Complaint-in-Intervention with the
attached Complaint-in-Intervention, dated January 26, 2006, seeking the nullification of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney for
being contrary to law and public policy and the annotation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney on the titles of the subject lots with
prayer that petitioner be ordered to deliver to them the copies of the owners duplicate certificate of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and
15897. Their Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy and would
either be directly injured or benefited by the judgment in Civil Case No. 05-172; that they were co-signatories or co-grantors of
respondent Oscar Camerino in the Irrevocable Power of Attorney they executed in favor of the petitioner; that their consent was
vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, machination, mistake and undue influence perpetrated by their own counsel, Atty. Santos, and
petitioner; that sometime in December 2003, Atty. Santos called for a meeting which was attended by petitioner and one Judge
Alberto Lerma where petitioner gave them checks in the amount of P500,000 each as Christmas gifts; and that the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney was void ab initio as the same was contrary to law and public policy and for being a champertous contract.
On January 30, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that since the existence of
the Irrevocable Power of Attorney was admitted by petitioner, the only issue to be resolved was whether the said document was
coupled with interest and whether it was revocable in contemplation of law and jurisprudence; that Summary Judgment was proper
because petitioner did not raise any issue relevant to the contents of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney; and that in an Affidavit
dated January 23, 2005, he admitted receipt of a check amounting to P500,000.00 which was given to him by petitioner as financial
assistance.
On February 3, 2006, petitioner opposed respondent Oscar Camerinos motion on the ground that there were
factual issues that required the presentation of evidence.
On February 14, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the petition for
the cancellation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney was actually an action to recover the titles and ownership over the
properties; that since respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in paragraph 29 of his Motion for Summary Judgment that the
assessed value of the subject lots amounted to P600,000,000, the case partook of the nature of a real action and, thus, the
docket fees of P3,929 was insufficient; and that due to insufficient docket fee, his complaint should be dismissed as the
RTC was not vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
On February 22, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino opposed petitioners motion for preliminary hearing of special and/or
affirmative defenses alleging that it was dilatory and that he had a cause of action.
On March 9, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed his Reply to petitioners Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment claiming that the determinative issue of whether or not the amount of P500,000 given to him by petitioner rendered the
power of attorney irrevocable can be determined from the allegations in the pleadings and affidavits on record without the need of
introduction of evidence.
On May 5, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed an Opposition to petitioners Motion to Dismiss stating that the instant case
was a personal action for the revocation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney and not for the recovery of real property and, thus, the
correct docket fees were paid.
On June 9, 2006, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention because the movantsintervenors ([herein respondents] Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario)
have legal interest in the subject properties in litigation and in the success of the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar Camerino], who
was precisely their co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 95-020, entitled Oscar Camerino, et al. v. Springsun Management Systems
Corporation et al., where they are the prevailing parties against the defendant therein [SMSC], with respect to the same properties,
subject of this case, in a decision rendered by Branch 256 of this Court. The RTC, Branch 203, also granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment because a meticulous scrutiny of the material facts admitted in the pleadings of the parties reveals that there is
really no genuine issue of fact presented therein that needs to be tried to enable the court to arrive at a judicious resolution of a matter
of law if the issues presented by the pleadings are not genuine issues as to any material fact but are patently unsubstantial issues that
do not require a hearing on the merits. Thus,
The instant Motion to Dismiss by the respondent is therefore DENIED, PROVIDED, the petitioner should pay the balance of
the docket fees remaining unpaid, if any, pursuant to Rule 141, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The Motion for Intervention timely filed by intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and
Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario, as opposed by the
respondent, is hereby GRANTED.
xxx
Petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.
Consequently, respondents Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his Special and Affirmative Defenses
is deemed moot and academic.
On June 15, 2006, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 rendered a Summary Judgment annulling the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney for being contrary to law and public policy. The pertinent portions of the trial courts decision state that:
Irrespective of whether the Power of Attorney in question is coupled with interest, or not, the same can be revoked or annulled,
firstly, because it is contrary to law and secondly it is against public policy.
As aptly pointed out by the intervenors, the assailed Special Power of Attorney
which under its ultimate paragraph among others, authorizes the respondent (Nocom) to
procure the necessary Transfer Certificate of Title in his name, as the absolute owner of the
said properties is a disguised conveyance or assignment of the signatories statutory rights
of redemption and therefore prohibited under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, Sec.
62 which provides:
Sec. 62. Limitation on Land Rights.
Except in case of heredity succession by one heir, landholdings acquired under
this Code may not be resold, mortgaged, encumbered, or transferred until after the lapse of
ten years from the date of full payment and acquisition and after such ten year period, any
transfer, sale or disposition may be made only in favor of persons qualified to acquire
economic family-size farm units in accordance with the provisions of this Code xxx.
(underlining supplied)
The assailed power of attorney which was executed on December 18, 2003 is void ab initio for
being contrary to the express prohibition or spirit of the aforesaid law or the declared state
and public policy on the qualification of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. It
bears stressing that the redemption price of the subject lots was paid only on August 4, 2005
or 1 year, 8 months and 14 days after the execution of the assailed power of attorney.
If pursuant to the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Law, the tenant cannot even sell or dispose of his
landholding within ten (10) years after he already acquired the same or even thereafter to
persons not qualified to acquire economic size farm units in accordance with the provisions
of the Agrarian Reform Code, with more reason should the tenant not be allowed to alienate
or sell his landholding before he actually acquires the same.
The right of redemption of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 as upheld
by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is founded on a piece of social legislation
known as Agrarian Reform Code.
Enunciated in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, et al., vs. Hon.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989) is the policy of the State on
agrarian reform legislation. Said State policy emphasizes the Land for the Landless
slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of land among the people.
Furthermore, the assailed Special Power of Attorney is a champertous contract and therefore
void for being against public policy. The pleadings of the parties show that the same
special power of attorney was executed by the petitioner, et al. through the intercession of
Atty. Arturo Santos and at the behest of the respondent. In his own answer to the instant
petition which he is estopped to deny, the respondent alleges that the actual agreement was
for the respondent to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the rights of the
petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 without any provision for
reimbursement. In other words, the respondents, through the intercession of Atty. Santos,
petitioners attorney, had agreed to carry on with the action for the petitioner et al. at his
own expense in consideration of procuring for himself the title to the lots in question as the
absolute owner thereof, with the respondent paying the redemption price of said lots, as
well as separate amounts of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) to each of the five (5)
co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, including herein petitioner, or a total sum of Two
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00).
Under the premises, the aforesaid contract brokered by Atty. Arturo Santos has all really the
earmarks of a champertous contract which is against public policy as it violates the
fiduciary relations between the lawyer and his client, whose weakness or disadvantage is
being exploited by the former. In other words, the situation created under the given
premises is a clear circumvention of the prohibition against the execution of champertous
contracts between a lawyer and a client.
A champertous contract is defined as a contract between a stranger and a party to a
lawsuit, whereby the stranger pursues the partys claim in
consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered
under the judgment; a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit,
by which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation
at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if
successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be
recovered. (Blacks Dictionary; Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting
Co., Inc. Mo. App. 525 S.W. 2d 819, 823). An Agreement
whereby the attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the clients rights is champertous. [JBP Holding
Corporation v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements
are against public policy especially where as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at its own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in
dispute. [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al.,
225 F. 242 (1918). The execution of these contracts violates the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for
which the former must incur administrative sanction.
The intention of the law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer from acquiring
an interest in the subject of the litigation and to avoid a conflict of interest between him and
his client.
In the instant case, it seems that Atty. Santos and the respondent colluded and conspired to
circumvent these prohibitions. Considering therefore that Atty. Santos, then petitioners
counsel, brokered the alleged deal between petitioners et al. and the respondent with respect
to the lands subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 95-020, the deal contracted is illegal for
being a champertous agreement and therefore it cannot be enforced.
Be that as it may, granting the agency established in the assailed Power of Attorney is coupled with
interest, the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, who are the present
intervenors, are not revoking the Power of Attorney at will but have precisely gone to court
and filed the instant petition for its cancellation or revocation. What is prohibited by law
and jurisprudence is the arbitrary and whimsical revocation of a power of attorney or
agency coupled with interest, at will by a party, without court declaration.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Nullifying the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in question dated December
18, 2003, signed by the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar Camerino] and his co-plaintiffs
[herein respondents who were the movant-intervenors] in Civil Case No. 95-020 in favor of the
respondent [herein petitioner];
(2) Ordering the respondent to turnover the Certificates of Title Nos. 15895, 15896
and 15897 covering the lots, the subject of this case, to the petitioner and the intervenors;
(3) Ordering the respondent to pay the petitioner attorneys fees and all other legal
fees incurred by the latter in connection with this case;
(4) Ordering the petitioner and the intervenors to return to the respondent the
amount of P7,790,612 paid by the latter as redemption price of the lots in question plus
commission of P147,049.18; and
(5) Ordering the petitioner Oscar Camerino and the intervenors Efren Camerino,
Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario or his heirs and Domingo Enriquez, who are petitioner s
co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, to return to the respondent the total amount of
P2,500,000.00 or P500,000.00 from each of them paid by the respondent to them under Philtrust
Bank Check Nos. MV 0002060, MV 0002061, MV 0002062, MV 0002063, and MV 0002064
which checks were encashed by them with the drawee bank.
On July 3, 2006 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside the trial courts Joint Order dated
June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 which was opposed by the respondents.
On July 4, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Final Decision/Appeal which was opposed by petitioner.
On August 14, 2006, the trial court issued an order denying petitioners Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Within the
reglementary period, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and paid the corresponding appeal docket fees.
On February 14, 2008, the CA affirmed the trial courts Joint Order dated June 9, 2006 and Summary Judgment dated
June 15, 2006 and dismissed the petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The CA ruled that as the RTC rendered the assailed
Summary Judgment based on the pleadings and documents on record, without any trial or reception of evidence, the same did not
involve factual matters. The CA found the issues raised by the petitioner in his appeal to be questions of law, to wit: (a) whether
Summary Judgment was proper under the admitted facts and circumstances obtaining in the present case; (b) whether undue haste
attended the rendition of the Summary Judgment; (c) whether the Summary Judgment was valid for failure of the RTC to implead an
indispensable party; (d) whether the RTC erred in allowing the intervention of respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and
Mildred Del Rosario; and (e) whether the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case despite nonpayment of the required docket
fees. The CA concluded that since the issues involved questions of law, the proper mode of appeal should have been through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court directly to this Court and not through an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 thereof and, thus, petitioners appeal to the CA should be dismissed outright pursuant to this Courts Circular No. 2-90, dated
March 9, 1990, mandating the dismissal of appeals involving pure questions of law erroneously brought to the CA.
In its Resolution of May 23, 2008, the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26, 2008.
Hence, this present petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
DISMISSING PETITIONERS APPEAL.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT RAISED
IN PETITIONERS ANSWER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN NOT VOIDING THE ASSAILED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO IMPLEAD AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 05172 FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal as the case involves questions of fact; that summary
judgment was not proper as there were genuine issues of fact raised in his Answer; that respondents failed to implead their lawyer,
Atty. Arturo S. Santos, as an indispensable party-defendant, who, according to them, allegedly connived with him in making them
sign the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in his favor; and that since the case partakes of the nature of an action to recover ownership
and titles to the properties, respondents complaint should be dismissed for failure to pay the correct docket fees.
Respondent Oscar Camerino argues that the sole issue to be resolved pertains to the legal issue of whether the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) denominated as irrevocable may be revoked; that three material facts have been
established, i.e., that the SPA was executed, that Atty. Santos facilitated the signing and execution of the SPA, and that
petitioner paid P500,000 to each of the respondents in consideration for the signing of the SPA and, thus, summary
judgment was proper; and that pure questions of law are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules.
Respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir of
Nolasco Del Rosario, aver that petitioners petition is insufficient in form, i.e., due to defective verification as the word
personal was not stated when referring to personal knowledge, and in substance, i.e., there is no genuine issue to be
resolved as the factual allegations of the petitioner are unsubstantial and that Atty. Santos is not an indispensable party to
the case.
The petition has merit.
In dismissing petitioners appeal, the CA erroneously relied on the rationale that the petitioners appeal raised
questions of law and, therefore, it had no recourse but to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The summary judgment
rendered by the trial court has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and, thus, the petitioner, being the aggrieved
party, correctly appealed the adverse decision of the RTC to the CA by filing a notice of appeal coupled with the
appellants brief under Rule 41 of the Rules.
Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, the present case involves certain factual issues which
remove it from the coverage of a summary judgment.
Under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When
the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by
way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying
the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine
issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue
as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that
such issues are not genuine.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The present case should not be decided via a summary judgment. Summary judgment is not warranted when
there are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary
judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. [if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Summary judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or
admissions of the parties. In this present case, while both parties acknowledge or admit the existence of the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney, the variance in the allegations in the pleadings of the petitioner vis- -vis that of the respondents
require the presentation of evidence on the issue of the validity of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney to determine
whether its execution was attended by the vices of consent and whether the respondents and their spouses did not freely
and voluntarily execute the same. In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner denied the material allegations of
respondent Oscar Camerinos complaint for being false and baseless as respondents were informed that the document they
signed was the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in his favor and that they had received the full consideration of the
transaction and, thus, had no legal right over the three parcels of land. Indeed, the presentation of evidence is necessary to
determine the validity and legality of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dated December 18, 2003, executed by the
respondents in favor of the petitioner. From said main factual issue, other relevant issues spring therefrom, to wit:
whether the said Irrevocable Power of Attorney was coupled with interest; whether it had been obtained through fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation or other vices of consent; whether the five (5) Philtrust Bank Manager s checks given by
petitioner to the respondents amounting to P500,000 each were in consideration of the inchoate and contingent rights of
the respondents in favor of the petitioner; whether Atty. Santos connived with petitioner in causing the preparation of the
said document and, therefore, should be impleaded as party-defendant together with the petitioner; whether respondents
deposited the amount of P9,790,612.00 plus P147,059.18 with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256; and whether the
sale of respondents inchoate and contingent rights amounted to a champertous contract.
The incongruence and disparity in the material allegations of both parties have been evident. Respondent Oscar Camerino
alleged in his complaint that he and his co-respondents were required by their counsel, Atty. Santos, to sign a document on the
representation that it was urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC which turned out to be the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney; but petitioner disproved the vitiated consent on the part of the respondents as they knew fully well that the document they
signed, voluntarily and intelligently, on December 18, 2003, was the said Irrevocable Power of Attorney. Respondent Oscar
Camerino alleged in his complaint that he has no intention of naming, appointing or constituting anyone, including the petitioner, to
sell, assign, dispose or encumber the lots in question; but petitioner maintained that respondent Oscar Camerino agreed to sell and
assign to him his inchoate and contingent rights and interests over the subject lot for and in consideration of the sum of P500,000,
plus the redemption price of P9,790,612. Respondents claimed that the amount they received was grossly disproportionate to the
value of the subject land; but petitioner countered that the respondents did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the
subject lots, so he decided to buy their contingent rights and paid each of them P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by
five (5) Philtrust Bank Managers Check which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003, that he also paid the amount of
P147,059.18 as commission on August 4, 2005, that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment, respondents and their spouses
voluntarily signed the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 18, 2003, and that being coupled with interest, the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be revoked at will by any of the parties.
Respondents maintain that they were deceived into executing the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in favor of
the petitioner which was done through the maneuverings of their own lawyer, Atty. Santos, who, according to them, had
connived with petitioner in order to effect the fraudulent transaction. In this regard, respondents should have impleaded
Atty. Santos as an indispensable party-defendant early on when the case was still with the RTC, but they failed to do so.
However, their procedural lapse did not constitute a sufficient ground for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172.
In Domingo v. Scheer,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] the Court explained that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended, requires indispensable parties to
be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by
the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void. There is lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of
impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner or plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint or petition for the petitioner or
plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In the present
case, the RTC and the CA did not require the respondents to implead Atty. Santos as party-defendant or respondent in the
case. The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 would be the refusal of respondents to
comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case.
In his petition, petitioner prays for the reversal of the Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the CA which affirmed the
Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and
dismissed petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules for lack of jurisdiction and its Resolution dated May 23, 2008 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration; the annulment of the RTCs Summary Judgment rendered on June 15, 2006; and the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 05-172 filed with the RTC on the ground that respondents failed to pay the correct docket fees as the action
actually sought the recovery of ownership over the subject properties.
The record shows that Civil Case No. 05-172 is a complaint filed by respondent Oscar Camerino against petitioner,
denominated as Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney, that seeks to nullify the Irrevocable Power of Attorney coupled with
interest dated December 18, 2003; that petitioner be ordered to turn over TCT No. 15898, 15896, and 15897 to him; and that
petitioner be ordered to pay the attorneys fees and other legal fees as a consequence of the suit. This case is therefore not an action
to recover the titles and ownership over the subject properties. For now, the nature of the suit remains that of personal action and not
a real action in contemplation of Rule 4 of the Rules. Hence, the docket fees paid by the respondents were in order. Should the
complaint be amended to seek recovery of ownership of the land, then the proper docket fees should be paid and collected.
While the RTC erred in rendering the summary judgment, Civil Case No. 05-172 should not perforce be dismissed.
Instead, this present case should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and proper disposition according to the rudiments
of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 14, 2008 which
affirmed the Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No.
87656 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203,
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[if !supportFootnotes]
[endif]
[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Rollo, pp. 49-50.

Rollo, pp. 154-155.
Rollo, pp. 188, 190.
Rollo, pp. 500-503.
Solidbank Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 120010, October 3, 2002, 390 SCRA 241.
Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 172592, July 9, 2008.
Tan v. De la Vega, G.R. No. 168809, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 538.
G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 468.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148864. August 21, 2003]
SPOUSES EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA and EPIFANIA C. EVANGELISTA, petitioners, vs. MERCATOR FINANCE
CORP., LYDIA P. SALAZAR, LAMECS** REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BULACAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners, Spouses Evangelista (Petitioners), are before this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing their petition.
Petitioners filed a complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] for annulment of titles against respondents, Mercator Finance Corporation,
Lydia P. Salazar, Lamecs Realty and Development Corporation, and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioners
claimed being the registered owners of five (5) parcels of land[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] contained in the Real Estate Mortgage[if !
supportFootnotes][3][endif]
executed by them and Embassy Farms, Inc. (Embassy Farms). They alleged that they executed the
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Mercator Financing Corporation (Mercator) only as officers of Embassy Farms. They
did not receive the proceeds of the loan evidenced by a promissory note, as all of it went to Embassy Farms. Thus, they
contended that the mortgage was without any consideration as to them since they did not personally obtain any loan or
credit accommodations. There being no principal obligation on which the mortgage rests, the real estate mortgage is
void.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] With the void mortgage, they assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceedings conducted by
Mercator, the sale to it as the highest bidder in the public auction, the issuance of the transfer certificates of title to it, the
subsequent sale of the same parcels of land to respondent Lydia P. Salazar (Salazar), and the transfer of the titles to
her name, and lastly, the sale and transfer of the properties to respondent Lamecs Realty & Development Corporation
(Lamecs).
Mercator admitted that petitioners were the owners of the subject parcels of land. It, however, contended that on
February 16, 1982, plaintiffs executed a Mortgage in favor of defendant Mercator Finance Corporation for and in
consideration of certain loans, and/or other forms of credit accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee (defendant
Mercator Finance Corporation) amounting to EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTYFIVE & 78/100 (P844,625.78) PESOS, Philippine Currency and to secure the payment of the same and those others that
the MORTGAGEE may extend to the MORTGAGOR (plaintiffs) x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] It contended that since
petitioners and Embassy Farms signed the promissory note[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] as co-makers, aside from the Continuing
Suretyship Agreement[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] subsequently executed to guarantee the indebtedness of Embassy Farms, and
the succeeding promissory notes[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] restructuring the loan, then petitioners are jointly and severally liable
with Embassy Farms. Due to their failure to pay the obligation, the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgaged
properties are valid.
Respondents Salazar and Lamecs asserted that they are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, relying on the
validity of the title of Mercator. Lamecs admitted the prior ownership of petitioners of the subject parcels of land, but
alleged that they are the present registered owner. Both respondents likewise assailed the long silence and inaction by
petitioners as it was only after a lapse of almost ten (10) years from the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent
sales that they made their claim. Thus, Salazar and Lamecs averred that petitioners are in estoppel and guilty of laches.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
During pre-trial, the parties agreed on the following issues:

a.
Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage executed by the plaintiffs in favor of defendant Mercator
Finance Corp. is null and void;
b.
Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings undertaken on subject parcels of land to
satisfy the indebtedness of Embassy Farms, Inc. is (sic) null and void;
c.
Whether or not the sale made by defendant Mercator Finance Corp. in favor of Lydia Salazar and that
executed by the latter in favor of defendant Lamecs Realty and Development Corp. are null and void;
d.
Whether or not the parties are entitled to damages.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
After pre-trial, Mercator moved for summary judgment on the ground that except as to the amount of damages, there is
no factual issue to be litigated. Mercator argued that petitioners had admitted in their pre-trial brief the existence of the
promissory note, the continuing suretyship agreement and the subsequent promissory notes restructuring the loan,
hence, there is no genuine issue regarding their liability. The mortgage, foreclosure proceedings and the subsequent
sales are valid and the complaint must be dismissed.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Petitioners opposed the motion for summary judgment claiming that because their personal liability to Mercator is at
issue, there is a need for a full-blown trial.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
The RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. It held:
A reading of the promissory notes show (sic) that the liability of the signatories thereto are solidary in
view of the phrase jointly and severally. On the promissory note appears (sic) the signatures of Eduardo
B. Evangelista, Epifania C. Evangelista and another signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below the words
Embassy Farms, Inc. It is crystal clear then that the plaintiffs-spouses signed the promissory note not only
as officers of Embassy Farms, Inc. but in their personal capacity as well(.) Plaintiffs(,) by affixing their
signatures thereon in a dual capacity have bound themselves as solidary debtor(s) with Embassy Farms,
Inc. to pay defendant Mercator Finance Corporation the amount of indebtedness. That the principal
contract of loan is void for lack of consideration, in the light of the foregoing is untenable. [if !supportFootnotes][13]
[endif]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Thus, petitioners went up to the
Court of Appeals, but again were unsuccessful. The appellate court held:
The appellants insistence that the loans secured by the mortgage they executed were not personally
theirs but those of Embassy Farms, Inc. is clearly self-serving and misplaced. The fact that they signed the
subject promissory notes in the(ir) personal capacities and as officers of the said debtor corporation is
manifest on the very face of the said documents of indebtedness (pp. 118, 128-131, Orig. Rec.). Even
assuming arguendo that they did not, the appellants lose sight of the fact that third persons who are not
parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property (Lustan vs. Court
of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663, 675). x x x. In constituting a mortgage over their own property in order to
secure the purported corporate debt of Embassy Farms, Inc., the appellants undeniably assumed the
personality of persons interested in the fulfillment of the principal obligation who, to save the subject
realities from foreclosure and with a view towards being subrogated to the rights of the creditor, were free
to discharge the same by payment (Articles 1302 [3] and 1303, Civil Code of the Philippines).[if !
(emphases in the original)
The appellate court also observed that if the appellants really felt aggrieved by the foreclosure of the subject mortgage
and the subsequent sales of the realties to other parties, why then did they commence the suit only on August 12, 1997
(when the certificate of sale was issued on January 12, 1987, and the certificates of title in the name of Mercator on
September 27, 1988)? Petitioners procrastination for about nine (9) years is difficult to understand. On so flimsy a
ground as lack of consideration, (w)e may even venture to say that the complaint was not worth the time of the courts.[if !
A motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Thus, this petition
where they allege that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE MAY 4, 1998 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE
ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND ITS NON-ENTITLEMENT TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.[IF !SUPPORTFOOTNOTES][18][ENDIF]
We affirm.
Summary judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of the litigation.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] The crucial question in a motion for summary judgment is whether the issues raised in
the pleadings are genuine or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion. A
genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] To forestall summary judgment,
it is essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible
and fairly arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which a reasonable finding of
fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party. The proper inquiry would therefore be whether the affirmative
defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issue of fact requiring a full-blown trial.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
In the case at bar, there are no genuine issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not deny that they obtained a
loan from Mercator. They merely claim that they got the loan as officers of Embassy Farms without intending to
personally bind themselves or their property. However, a simple perusal of the promissory note and the continuing
suretyship agreement shows otherwise. These documentary evidence prove that petitioners are solidary obligors with
Embassy Farms.
The promissory note[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] states:
For value received, I/We jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of MERCATOR FINANCE
CORPORATION at its office, the principal sum of EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
TWENTY-FIVE PESOS & 78/100 (P 844,625.78), Philippine currency, x x x, in installments as follows:
September 16, 1982
P154,267.87
October 16, 1982
P154,267.87
November 16, 1982
P154,267.87
December 16, 1982
P154,267.87
January 16, 1983
P154,267.87
February 16, 1983
P154,267.87
xxx
xxx
x x x.
The note was signed at the bottom by petitioners Eduardo B. Evangelista and Epifania C. Evangelista, and Embassy
Farms, Inc. with the signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below it.
The Continuing Suretyship Agreement[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] also proves the solidary obligation of petitioners, viz:
(Embassy Farms, Inc.)
Principal
(Eduardo B. Evangelista)
Surety
(Epifania C. Evangelista)
Surety
(Mercator Finance Corporation)
Creditor
To: MERCATOR FINANCE COPORATION
(1) For valuable and/or other consideration, EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA and EPIFANIA C.
EVANGELISTA (hereinafter called Surety), jointly and severally unconditionally
guarantees (sic) to MERCATOR FINANCE COPORATION (hereinafter called Creditor),
the full, faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness of
EMBASSY FARMS, INC. (hereinafter called Principal) to the Creditor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) The obligations hereunder are joint and several and independent of the obligations of the Principal. A
separate action or actions may be brought and prosecuted against the Surety whether or not the action is
also brought and prosecuted against the Principal and whether or not the Principal be joined in any such
action or actions.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
The agreement was signed by petitioners on February 16, 1982. The promissory notes[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] subsequently
executed by petitioners and Embassy Farms, restructuring their loan, likewise prove that petitioners are solidarily liable
with Embassy Farms.
Petitioners further allege that there is an ambiguity in the wording of the promissory note and claim that since it was
Mercator who provided the form, then the ambiguity should be resolved against it.
Courts can interpret a contract only if there is doubt in its letter.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] But, an examination of the promissory
note shows no such ambiguity. Besides, assuming arguendo that there is an ambiguity, Section 17 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law states, viz:
SECTION 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. Where the language of the
instrument is ambiguous or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) Where an instrument containing the word I promise to pay is signed by two or more persons, they are
deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon.
Petitioners also insist that the promissory note does not convey their true intent in executing the document. The defense
is unavailing. Even if petitioners intended to sign the note merely as officers of Embassy Farms, still this does not erase
the fact that they subsequently executed a continuing suretyship agreement. A surety is one who is solidarily liable with
the principal.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Petitioners cannot claim that they did not personally receive any consideration for the
contract for well-entrenched is the rule that the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not pass
directly to the surety, a consideration moving to the principal alone being sufficient. A surety is bound by the same
consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] Having executed
the suretyship agreement, there can be no dispute on the personal liability of petitioners.
Lastly, the parol evidence rule does not apply in this case.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] We held in Tarnate v. Court of Appeals,[if !
that where the parties admitted the existence of the loans and the mortgage deeds and the fact of
default on the due repayments but raised the contention that they were misled by respondent bank to believe that the
loans were long-term accommodations, then the parties could not be allowed to introduce evidence of conditions
allegedly agreed upon by them other than those stipulated in the loan documents because when they reduced their
agreement in writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. Treble costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., on official leave.
[endif]
**
Sometimes spelled as Lamecs.
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 85, Rollo, pp. 23-29.
With Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-193458, T-192133, T-193136, T-193137 and T-193138; Id. at
30-39.
[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Id. at 40.
[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Id. at 72-73.
[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Id. at 134, dated May 4, 1998.
Id. at 159, dated July 17, 1998.

Id. at 222-223, Decision dated May 12, 2000.

[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Id. at 234, dated May 14, 2001.
Evadel Realty and Development Corporation v. Soriano, 357 SCRA 395 (2001).
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank v. Rafael Ma. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804,
February 19, 2003.
Spouses Guillermo Agbada & Maxima Agbada v. Inter-urban Developers, et al., G.R. No. 144029,
September 19, 2002.
[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] Rollo, p. 71.
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. (Civil Code of the Philippines); Ong Yong, et al., v.
David S. Tiu, et al., G.R. Nos. 144476 & 144629, February 1, 2002.
Goldenrod, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 217 (2001).
Charles Lee v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 117913-14, February 1, 2002.
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties of their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement.
The term agreement includes wills.
[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] 241 SCRA 254 (1995).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153126. September 11, 2003]
MONTEREY FOODS CORP. and RAMON F. LLANOS, petitioners, vs. VICTORINO E. ESERJOSE, and the Branch
Sheriff assigned to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, National Capital Judicial Region,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals dated
November 21, 2001, which upheld the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No.
Q-98-36421.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
It is alleged in the petition that for a period of twelve years, respondent bought from petitioner Monterey Foods
Corporation live cattle and hogs which he in turn sold and distributed to his customers. The transactions were covered
by invoices and delivery receipts and were payable within ten days from invoice date. Due to respondents inability to
pay for his purchases, his overdue account amounted to P87,434,689.37, and as a consequence, petitioner corporation
ceased its transactions with respondent.
Sometime in 1998, during the existence of the contractual relations between the parties, they entered into a contract
growing agreement whereby petitioner corporation supplied livestock for respondent to grow, care for and nurture in his
farm located in San Jose, Batangas. After five months of operation, petitioner corporation withdrew from the contract
without paying respondent for his services, alleging that respondent failed to post the requisite bond under the contract
and poorly performed his farm management functions to the detriment of the animals.
Respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioner corporation pay him for his services under the contract, amounting to
P1,280,000.00. His demands went unheeded; thus, he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, an
action for sum of money and damages against petitioner corporation and its President, petitioner Ramon F. Llanes, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-36421.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] After petitioners filed their Joint Answer, the case was
scheduled for pre-trial conference on May 14, 1999.
At the pre-trial conference, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, and an Order was issued declaring them as in
default and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] On May 24, 1999, the trial court
rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter to pay the former the following:
1.
P1,280,000.00 representing the principal obligation;
2.
3.
P100,000.00, jointly and severally, as damages; and

P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial,[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] which the trial court granted.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Hence, the case
was again set for pre-trial conference and both parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
After the pre-trial, respondent submitted a manifestation and motion alleging that petitioners have admitted their liability
under the contract growing agreement at least to the extent of P482,766.88 when they alleged in their Joint Answer: In
accordance with the standard contract growing fee provision plaintiff [respondent herein] was entitled to a compensation
of net P482,766.88.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Respondent thus prayed that reverse trial be conducted.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Petitioners opposed the manifestation and motion, stating that the reverse trial order has no basis since the amount
allegedly admitted was dramatically less than the total of P1,280,000.00 claimed by respondent.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
At the initial hearing of the case, petitioners confirmed in open court that they indeed entered into a contract growing
agreement with respondent and that the latter was entitled to a net compensation of P482,766.88 under the said
contract.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The trial court, acting on petitioners judicial admission, rendered partial summary judgment
insofar as the amount of P482,766.88 was concerned, and set the case for trial for the presentation of evidence on
petitioners claim for damages.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Respondent moved for the execution of the partial summary judgment,
which the trial court granted.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Accordingly, on
December 15, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to cause the execution of the partial
summary decision.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
On December 17, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
56305.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] On November 21, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Petitioners are now before us assigning the following errors:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
SANCTIONED THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT OF A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHICH WAS NOT YET FINAL IN CHARACTER.
B.
UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON AN EX-PARTE MOTION
THAT DENIED PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
C.
UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON THE BASIS THAT A
BOND IS SUFFICIENT REASON FOR DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION TO ISSUE.
D.
UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ON THE BASIS OF A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT IS PATENTLY
INVALID
E.
UPHELD THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT WAS RENDERED IN DISPARAGEMENT OF DUE PROCESS.
F.
UPHELD THE TRIAL COURTS PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON THE BASIS THAT THERE ARE NO
GENUINE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT
G.
SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE OF THE TRIAL COURT FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Simply put, the primordial question to be resolved hinges on whether summary judgment is proper in the case at bar.
A summary judgment or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts
appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Its
object is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial so that only
the latter may subject a party in interest to the burden of trial.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Moreover, said summary judgment must
be premised on the absence of any other triable genuine issues of fact.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Otherwise, the movant cannot
be allowed to obtain immediate relief. A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must
be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion
for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in
affirming the assailed orders of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition must be denied.
The record shows that at the hearing on November 25, 1999, petitioners admitted liability under the contract growing
agreement in the amount of P482,766.88.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] As a result, respondent agreed to waive all his other claims
in the complaint, including his claim for consequential damages.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] Correspondingly, insofar as the
complaint was concerned, there was no other genuine issue left for which the complaint for sum of money and damages
may be prosecuted. Also by reason of such admission, petitioners, in effect, likewise waived whatever defenses they
may have to deter recovery by respondent under the said contract. Thus, respondent became entitled, as a matter of
law, to the execution of the partial summary judgment. When there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules of
Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. In short, since the facts are not in dispute,
the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Clearly, the judgment finally disposed of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. The order granting summary judgment
was akin to a judgment on the merits made after a full-blown trial. Its consequent execution, therefore, may issue as a
matter of right in favor of respondent unless appeal was seasonably made therein, which petitioners failed to do. Instead
of filing a notice of appeal with the trial court, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Petitioners maintain that the order granting partial summary judgment was merely interlocutory in nature and did not
dispose of the action in its entirety. They cite the doctrines laid down in Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals[if !
and Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] where the Court categorically stated that a partial
summary judgment is not a final or appealable judgment.
Petitioners position is untenable.
The rulings in Province of Pangasinan and Guevarra is not applicable in the case at bar. The said cases specifically
delved on the appeal of a partial summary judgment, which did not dispose of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. In
the case at bar, other than the admitted liability of petitioners to respondents under the contract growing agreement, all
other reliefs sought under the complaint had already been expressly waived by respondent before the trial court.
Accordingly, the assailed November 25, 1999 Order of the trial court which granted partial summary judgment in favor of
respondent was in the nature of a final order which leaves nothing more for the court to adjudicate in respect to the
complaint. In Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] the Court distinguished a final judgment or
order from an interlocutory issuance in this wise:
The concept of a final judgment or order, distinguished form an interlocutory issuance, is that the
former decisively puts to a close, or disposes of a case or a disputed issue leaving nothing else
to be done by the court in respect thereto. Once that judgment or order is rendered, the
adjudicative task of the court is likewise ended on the particular matter involved. An order is
interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would only be provisional in character and would still
leave substantial proceedings to be further had by the issuing court in order to put the controversy to
rest.
We are not unmindful of petitioners counterclaim. However, our cursory evaluation of the same fails to convince us that
the issues raised therein are closely related to or intertwined with the growing contract agreement. The issues raised
therein clearly involved transactions distinct and separate from the growing contract agreement; they refer to the alleged
obligations of respondent under their separate contract for the sale and distribution of cattle and hogs. As such, these
are in the nature of permissive counterclaims which can be litigated independently of the main complaint.
Petitioners also argue that they were denied an opportunity to be heard on the motion to execute the summary judgment;
and that the summary judgment was rendered in disregard of due process.
The argument is not well-taken.
A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through
either oral arguments or pleadings.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Contrary to petitioners claims, the record shows that petitioners
were duly represented by counsel when the motion for summary judgment as well as the execution of the same were
heard by the trial court. Petitioners counsel did not register any opposition to respondents oral motion for summary
judgment, saying that under the Rules of Court it should be furnished a written motion for summary judgment at least 10
days before it is heard. We find, however, that the absence of the written notice did not divest the trial court of authority
to pass on the merits of the motion made in open court. The order of the court granting the motion for summary
judgment and its execution thereof despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an
irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive the court of its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The
remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by
the court, or to appeal from the final judgment, and not thru certiorari.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
In fact, the counsel for petitioners actively participated in disposing of the reliefs prayed for in the complaint when he
sought the reduction in respondents claim to P482,766.88. Besides, we find from the records that petitioners expressly
agreed to the summary judgment[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] and to the execution of the same after respondent posts a bond in an
amount fixed by the court.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] In short, petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Thus, they
cannot now be allowed to claim that they were denied due process. The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[if !
Thus, in Ley Construction and Development Corporation v. Union Bank of the Philippines,[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] it was held:
Admittedly, there is nothing in the records which indicates that Judge Arcangel conducted a hearing
before he resolved respondents motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, as explained in Carcon
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in proceedings for summary judgment, the court is merely
expected to act chiefly on the basis of what is in the records of the case and that the hearing
contemplated in the Rules is not de riguer as its purpose is merely to determine whether the issues are
genuine or not, and not to receive evidence on the issues set up in the pleadings.
xxx. In view of the fact that they admitted having incurred the obligation which is the basis of the
complaint, a hearing would have served no pertinent purpose. The records already provide sufficient
basis for the court to resolve respondents motion. Thus, we find that even if the trial court did not
conduct a hearing, this fact would not affect the validity of the summary judgment rendered by Judge
Arcangel.
Neither does the fact that respondents motion to resolve its motion for summary judgment was filed ex
parte affect the validity of Judge Arcangels resolution. The requirement in Rule 35, 3 that the opposing
party be furnished a copy of the motion 10 days before the time specified for the hearing applies to the
motion for summary judgment itself and not to the motion to resolve such motion. xxx. Thus, it could not
be said that they were deprived of the opportunity to question the motion.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56305, which affirmed the Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, directing the execution of partial summary judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-98-36421, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
[endif]
Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico
and Eliezer R. De Los Santos.
Rollo, pp. 96-99; penned by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.
[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Rollo, pp. 100-103.
[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Id., p. 131.
[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Id., pp. 134-152.
[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] RTC Record, Vol. I, p. 214.
Joint Answer, p. 9, par. (c); Rollo, p. 113.

[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 66.
Supra, note 2; TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 73-74.
[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Supra, note 3.

[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Rollo, pp. 65-95.
Petition, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 18-19.

Spouses Agbada v. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 144029, 19 September 2002, citing
Excelsa Industries, Inc. v. CA, 317 Phil. 664 (1995).
Solidbank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120010, 3 October 2002.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804, 19 February
2003.
Solidbank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 66.

TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 27-29.

G.R. No. 104266, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 726.

G.R. Nos. L-49017 and L-49024, 30 August 1983, 124 SCRA 297.
[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] 355 Phil. 804, 811 (1998).

Alauya, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 152151-52, 22 January 2003; See Rule 15, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court provides: All motions shall be in writing except those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial.
See Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 114046, 24 October 1994, 237 SCRA 685, 698, citing People, et al. v.
Vergara, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 101557-58, 28 April 1993, 221 SCRA 560, 570-571.
TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 42-50.
TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 68-69.
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] 389 Phil. 788, 799 (2000).
G.R. No. 159357

April 28, 2004
Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed
legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements
laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of
the bench and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision2 and July
29, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).4
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the RTC-Manila by herein
Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano
as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like
any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the
members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x
x."6
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed
a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a
separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:
"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and
to declare whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive
portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party
wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a
conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court."7
The Antecedent Proceedings
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde
and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions,8 specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the
acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to
vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:
"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently,
Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime
Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for
the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a
cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of
advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro.
Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L.
Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his
Memorandum. x x x.
"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro.
Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already
considered in the motions to dismiss x x x."9
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law." 10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the
issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background
of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific
candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."11
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision.
Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the
lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review.12
This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
submit their respective comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents
in the original case below --the opportunity to comment, if they so desired.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14
The Issues
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:
"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;
"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief;
"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
"4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial
determination;
"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,
"6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent."15
During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:
"A. Procedural Issues
"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent
have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
"B. Substantive Issues
"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of
Court?
"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public
office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?"
The Courts Ruling
The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.
Procedural Issues:
Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief
Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief, provides in part:
"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder."
Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a
judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.16 The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1)
there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.17
Justiciable Controversy
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, that there
existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being
violated or threatened to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere
speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an actual controversy. Thus, its
Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.18 The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably
failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the
Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and
what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,19 what exactly has he done that merited the attention of
SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the
RTC) "yields nothing in this respect." His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on
January 28, 2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved
in partisan politics.
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x."20 Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his
co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that
such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever
beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government"[;]21 and "pos[ing] a clear and present danger of
serious erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders
determine the ultimate result of elections,"22 which would then be violative of the separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a
justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the
respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a
particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable
violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable23 cannot be exercised when there is no
actual or threatened violation of a legal right.
All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved."24 In other
words, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective
candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask
for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared
rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.25
Cause of Action
Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need not be alleged
or proven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual
wrong committed by one party against the other.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a
contract (or other written instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter
of the SJS Petition is "the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for
elective office or to urge or require the members of the flock to vote for a specified candidate."26 According to petitioner,
this subject matter is "beyond the realm of an action for declaratory relief."27 Petitioner avers that in the absence of a
valid subject matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed outright by the
court a quo.
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to
the latter.28 Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.29
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal.30 However, in special civil
actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The
reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.31 Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent
or at least threatened.
A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in
its favor that it sought to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it "has
thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial
clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process
to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x."32
Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest
not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain.33 The Rules require that the interest
must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or
incidental interest in the question raised.34
To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the "[p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment
action does not seek to enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the
parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment
action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain
the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights
will be invaded."35
SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will
occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein
petitioner (and his co-respondents below) might actively participate in partisan politics, use "the awesome voting strength
of its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the government."36
During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all strongly asserted that they had
not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. They all firmly assured this Court that they had not
done anything to trigger the issue raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a
right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought
to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the
alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the
certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.
Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.37 Interest means a material interest in issue
that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved.38
Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse,
or require the members of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal
interest in the controversy";39 it has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure
it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show "not only that the law [or
act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way." 40 They must
demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or
that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.41
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.42 A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power.43 In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that
taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as
registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was
not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the
said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be
voted for a public office they are seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too
general44 and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest
impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.45
Transcendental Importance
In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing, considering that "the
issues raised are of paramount public interest."
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of
transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.46 Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus
standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP v. Zamora47 nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that "the IBP
has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents."48
Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount
interest to the Filipino people. The issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between church and
state, but ran smack into the governance of our country. The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in
nature, since it had never been decided before.
The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve the constitutional issue
despite the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court below. Much to its
chagrin, however, counsels for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or
clarifications that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case
from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot
be resolved anyway.
Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court
To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of the bench and the bar,
the Court reiterates the elementary procedure49 that must be followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil cases.50
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a complaint51 (or petition, in a
special civil action) that does not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causes of action.52 A complaint or petition
should contain "a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim
or defense."53 It should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.54
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue
the corresponding summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a directive that the defendant answer 55 within 15
days, unless a different period is fixed by the court.56 The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not
filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.57 The court,
however, may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules.58
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10) days from service.59 A reply
may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to.60
When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage or for legal separation).61 Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a summary
judgment in its favor.62 Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a
declaratory relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favor.63 After the motion is heard, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.64
Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss
based on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the motion, the
parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.65 After the
hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings. It shall not
defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every case, the
resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.66
If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period originally prescribed to file an
answer, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading
is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the
amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.67
After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial,68 which is a mandatory proceeding.69 A
plaintiffs/ petitioners (or its duly authorized representatives) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall
result in the dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof.70
The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the
pretrial.71 Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the
conference; the action taken on them, the amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if
any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters considered.72 The parties may further avail themselves of any of
the modes of discovery,73 if they so wish.
Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74 in which the parties shall adduce their respective evidence in support of their
claims and/or defenses. By their written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the court
may also order any or all of the issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed
upon by the parties.75 The trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before
the court.76
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a written report on the matters
referred by the parties.77 The report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying
or rejecting it in whole or in part; or recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence
before the commissioner or the court.78
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing,
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.79
Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial court in the instant case.
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its
gross inadequacy. It contained no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied for its claim. Furthermore, it
did not specify the relief it sought from the court, but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.
Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the
rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner.80 As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of
fact81 or of any specific violation of the petitioners rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency
amounted to a failure to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated. The Petition
evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we repeat, should have been dismissed at the outset.
Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to file their respective answers to the SJS
Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly
granted extended period, an Answer in which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. 82 SJS filed a Rejoinder
to the Motion of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were "several scheduled settings, in
which the "[c]ourt was apprised of the respective positions of the parties."83 The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial
or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the trial court issued an
Order84 dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was another
Order85 dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss.
In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:
"The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall
be deemed as submitted for resolution."86
Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Motions were not heard. Worse,
the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of
Section 3 of the said Rule 16. There was not even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less,
of the legal findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of these Motions for
Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties memoranda. But instead of separately
resolving the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial court again transgressed the Rules of Court when it
immediately proceeded to issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions.
Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision" without allowing the parties to file their answers. For this reason, there was
no joinder of the issues. If only it had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral
Argument revealed, that the petitioner and his co-respondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act
attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit.
Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, which was entitled to be heard
upon questions involving the constitutionality or validity of statutes and other measures.87
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court was utterly wanting in the
requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with
total ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse of
discretion.
Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow the process
described above -- the petition must state a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the
Rules of Court; and the decision must adhere to constitutional and legal requirements.
First Substantive Issue:
Fundamental Requirements of a Decision
The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor."88
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides:
"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be
in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court."
In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
"x x x
xxx
x x x."
Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all
judges "to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the
light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the
facts from which such conclusions are deduced."
In many cases,89 this Court has time and time again reminded "magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution." The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals,90 discussed at
length the implications of this provision and strongly exhorted thus:
"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount
component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and
just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so
he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it
was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for
review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless
vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must
ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision."
In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained:
"The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the
parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the
finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. x x x."
Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was
decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.92
In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions would
present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues
raised by the parties.
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts -- much less an
assessment or analysis thereof -- or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a
statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents
before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief
granted or denied, the trial judge ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise
to the question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the
trial court based its legal findings and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be
upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly
transgressed the constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply
the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the
ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called Decision. The importance of
such portion was explained in the early case Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards,94 from which we quote:
"The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive
or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein,
notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing."
The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To recall, the
original Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rights of the parties did it
conclusively declare? Its final statement says, "SO ORDERED." But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity
to label its issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact decided.
Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the assailed Decision. It claims that the
issue is disposed of and the Petition finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page
Decision, which reads: "Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the
separation clause."95
We cannot agree.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the obligation of the party imposed by the Court was allegedly contained in the text
of the original Decision. The Court, however, held:
"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of
the court and the rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former
must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a
statement ordering nothing." (Italics in the original)
Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph
of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question
and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to
the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a
dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must
be struck down as void.97
Parts of a Decision
In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of
facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and
resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as
an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.98
An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of the
case. In some cases -- particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific,
technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the
specific nature of the controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the important principles
applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance. It may also lay down an enduring
philosophy of law or guiding principle.
Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good decision.
1. Statement of the Case
The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the first instance, this part states
whether the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a
criminal case, this part describes the specific charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -and the plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal or on a petition for
certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.
In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in determining the nature and
the gravity of the offense for which the accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a
crime different from or graver than that charged.
Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a question on the sufficiency of the
charge, or on whether qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.
To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the proceedings regarding the plea
of the accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further
consideration by the appellate court would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be
useful to mention the fact of the appellants detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary query -- whether or not they
have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping bail.
Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating the consolidation of the
records of the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.
Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of how the appealed case was
decided by the court a quo.
2. Statement of Facts
There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or reportorial method, the judge
summarizes -- without comment -- the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the
synthesis method, the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is
summarized according to the judges best light. Third, in the subjective method, the version of the facts accepted by the
judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions are. Finally, through a combination of objective and
subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of the
facts.
In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense, in the interest of
fairness and due process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most
criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases, depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the
evidence. The plausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading of the
facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and conclusions should be explained.
On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and
legal issues involved may partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions
of the former. Conversely, the lower courts patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a
better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.
In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for resolution usually involve
questions of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by
the parties. With few exceptions, factual issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of
facts by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the material factual antecedents should
be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should be laid out, in order that the
parties may clearly understand why the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds no
reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.
3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, as mentioned in the appellants
brief, may be reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on
the ground that the court failed to consider all assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the
appellant presents repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these may be restated in
clearer and more coherent terms.
Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for
substantial justice to be rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal
cases in which the reviewing court is generally limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are
errors of jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors
that are closely related to those properly assigned, or upon which depends the determination of the question properly
raised.
4. The Courts Ruling
This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case
may be; as well as of other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case. Where there are several
issues, each one of them should be separately addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the
parties should also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is better
to resolve the former preliminarily.
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty
imposed, the participation of the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an
acquittal is decreed, the court must order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held
for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained) to report,
within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date when the accused were set free.
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted
or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness may be applied. First, the parties
should know their rights and obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative
contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should
be terminated by according the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually depends upon what the parties seek in their
pleadings. It may declare their rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to
abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.
The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be present and plainly identifiable in
the decision. Depending on the writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not
necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the
decision must be clear, concise, complete and correct.
Second Substantive Issue:
Religious Leaders Endorsement
of Candidates for Public Office
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS
LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems
this constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country
and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called
for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on
the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to
resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as
there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral
Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief.
Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a
hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts
constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.99
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts
and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to
review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a
constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection
of the rights of the parties concerned."100
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and
July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and
thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and recommend whether the
trial judge may, after observing due process, be held administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars of this Court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 3-37.
2
Id., pp. 39-52.
3
Id., p. 54.
4
Presided by Judge Concepcion S. Alarcon-Vergara.
5
Rollo, pp. 270-276. Docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105642 in the RTC.
6
Assailed Decision, p. 1; rollo, p. 39. Original in upper case.
7
Rollo, p. 54.
8
In particular, the following provisions of the Constitution were mentioned in the SJS Petition:
"The separation of church and state shall be inviolable." (6 of Article II)
"The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development." (10, Article II)
"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights." (5 of Article III)
9
Assailed Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 40-41.
10
Id., pp. 3 & 41.
11
Id., pp. 10 & 48.
12
The Petition was deemed submitted for decision on April 19, 2004, upon receipt of the parties Memoranda. Petitioners
Memorandum was signed by Attys. Joselito Guianan Chan and Cesar Becerro Tuozo. On the other hand, respondent s
Memorandum was signed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara. The Office of the Solicitor Generals Memorandum was signed
by Assistant Solicitors General Antonio L. Villamor and Ma. Antonia Edita C. Dizon, Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag
and Associate Solicitor Bernardino P. Salvador Jr. The Memorandum of Bro. Eddie Villanueva was signed by Atty. Eric
Paul I. Fetalino; while that of Cardinal Sin, by Atty. Maria Liza A. Lopez-Rosario. Iglesia ni Cristos counsel, Atty. Abraham
G. Espejo, filed a Manifestation adopting INCs Petition, which had been filed with the Court of Appeals, as
Memorandum.
13
Rollo, p. 126.
14
Atty. Joselito Guianan Chan argued for Petitioner Velarde; Atty. Samson Alcantara, for Respondent SJS; Atty. Eric Paul
Fetalino, for Bro. Eddie Villanueva; Atty. Maria Liza Lopez-Rosario, for His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin; Atty. Abraham
Espejo, for Executive Minister Erao Manalo; and Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag, for the OSG. Bro. Eliseo F.
Soriano, through Counsel Rene A.V. Saguisag, filed a Manifestation dated April 10, 2004, which the Court accepted in
lieu of oral argument.
15
Petition, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 11-12. Original in upper case.
16
Gozun v. Liangco, 339 SCRA 253, August 30, 2000; Vda. De Aviles v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 473, November 21,
1996.
17
Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, July 30, 1996; Gozun v. Liangco, supra; citing Galarosa v. Valencia, 227
SCRA 728, 737, November 11, 1993; Office of the Ombudsman v. Judge Ibay, 364 SCRA 281, September 3, 2001.
18
Board of Optometry v. Colet, supra.
19
Rollo, pp. 163-175.
20
1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
21
Petition for Declaratory Relief, p. 4; rollo, p. 273.
22
Ibid.
23
1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution.
24
Paragraph 9 of the SJS Petition reads:
"Whether or not the act of a religious leader, like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate
for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the
letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions herein abovequoted." (All capital letters in the original.)
25
PACU v. Sec. of Education, 97 Phil 806, October 31, 1955; People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937; Agra v.
Philippine National Bank, 368 Phil 829, June 29, 1999; Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, August 14, 2000; Pimentel
Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 393 SCRA 227, November 29, 2002; Gozun v. Liangco, supra.
26
Petition for Review, p. 16; rollo, p. 18.
27
Ibid.
28
Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800, February 28, 1989; Leberman Realty Corporation v. Typingco, 293
SCRA 316, July 29, 1998.
29
Paraaque Kings Enterprises, Incorporated v. Court Of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1184, February 26, 1997, citing Dulay v.
Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, April 3, 1995; Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 661, May 27, 1997.
1(g) of Rule 16 in relation to 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.

Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th revised ed., p. 693.
32
Petition for Declaratory Relief, p. 3; rollo, p. 272.
33
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81, August 15, 2000.
34
Ibid.
35
Comment, p. 3; rollo, p. 151.
36
Petition for Declaratory Relief, p. 4; id., p. 273.
37
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra; citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568, 576, August 24, 1993.
38
Id.
39
Petition for Review, p. 20; rollo, p. 22.
40
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Executive Secretary, 342 SCRA 449, October 10, 2000.
41
Ibid.
42
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485, November 29, 2000.
43
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phil., Inc. v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998; Sanidad v.
Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, October 12, 1976.
44
See IBP v. Zamora, supra.
45
Ibid. See also Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83, September 28, 1951.
46
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330, November 5, 1997; Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211
SCRA 219, July 3, 1992; Joya v. PCGG, supra; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona Jr., 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994.
47
Supra.
48
Id., p. 102, per Kapunan, J.
49
Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, which prescribes a uniform procedure in trial courts, reads thus:
"Section 1. Uniform procedure. The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial
Courts except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or (b) in civil
cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure."
50
3 of Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Cases governed. -- These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings."
xxx
xxx
x x x.
51
1(g) of Rule 16 in relation to 3 of Rule 17, id.
52
53
1 of Rule 8, id.
54
2(c) of Rule 7, id.
55
1 & 2(b) of Rule 14, id.
56
1 of Rule 11, id.
57
2(c) of Rule 14, id.
58
11 of Rule 11, id.
59
4, id.
60
6, id.
61
62
1 of Rule 35, id.
63
2, id.
64
3, id.
65
66
3, id.
67
4, id.
68
69
2, id. At the pretrial, the court shall consider the following:
"(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a
valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action."
70
5, id.
71
6, id. The pretrial briefs shall contain, among others:
"(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
30
31
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;

(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to
commissioners; and
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies."
72
7, id.
73
Rules 23-28 of the Rules of Court.
74
1 of Rule 30, id.
75
1 & 2 of Rule 32, id. 2 reads:
"x x x When the parties do not consent, the court may, upon the application of either, or of its own motion, direct a
reference to a commissioner in the following cases:
(a) When the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination of a long account on either side, in which case the
commissioner may be directed to hear and report upon the whole issue, or any specific question involved therein;
(b) When the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the court before judgment, or for carrying a
judgment or order into effect;
(c) When a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or
for carrying a judgment or order into effect."
76
3, id.
77
9, id.
78
11, id.
79
80
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I (1995 ed.), p. 165.
81
In fact, SJS, through counsel, admitted during the Oral Argument that its Petition contained no statement of facts and
argued that by the nature of an action for declaratory relief, no facts were necessary.
82
Assailed Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 40-41.
83
Id., pp. 3 & 41.
84
Annex "J" of the Petition for Review; rollo, p. 119.
85
Annex "I" of the Petition for Review; id., p. 117.
86
Ibid.
87
See 3 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
88
14 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
89
Yao v. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 202, October 24, 2000; Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, May 12, 1989;
Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 127, February 11, 1992; People v. Dumaguing, 340 SCRA
701, September 20, 2000; Madrid v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 570, May 31, 2000; Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 183, January 23, 1991.
90
Supra, p. 219.
91
339 Phil. 570, 580, June 13, 1997, per Mendoza, J.
92
Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 127, February 11, 1992; People v. Judge Bellaflor, 233 SCRA
196, June 15, 1994; Anino v. NLRC, 352 Phil. 1098, May 21, 1998.
93
Supra.
94
104 Phil. 254, July 31, 1958, per Felix, J.
95
Assailed Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 48.
96
120 Phil. 338, June 30, 1964, per Regala, J.
97
Yao v. Court of Appeals, supra; Madrid v. Court of Appeals, supra.
98
See Panganiban, "On Developing My Decision-Writing Style," Justice and Faith (1997), pp. 9-29.
99
Agra v. Philippine National Bank, 368 Phil 829, June 29, 1999; Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, August 14, 2000;
Pimentel Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 393 SCRA 227, November 29, 2002; Gozun v. Liangco,
supra; Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489, November 6, 1992.
100
National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 664, April 10, 1989, per Paras, J.
G.R. No. L-33007 June 18, 1976

VICENTE MIRANDA, Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch VI, DY CHUN, DY SUAT HONG, DY LEE, DY SEKO, TAN HO NOLASCO DYCOTHAY (deceased),
substituted by JOSE KOO ENG LIN DY, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of NOLASCO DYCOTHAY,
"AGUSAN COMMERCIAL", "EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO" "HIAP BEE", and "EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO.,
INC.", respondents.
Pelaez, Pelaez & Pelaez for petitioner.
Tolentino, Garcia, Cruz & Reyes, Koh Law Offices and Cipriano C. Alviso, Sr. for private respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J:
The Court sets aside respondent appellate court's decision which unprecedentedly held that respondent judge could four
years later and beyond the thirty-day reglementary period change, alter and amend his predecessor's judgment on the
merits for recovery of properties with accounting and "promulgate another decision" as if were a mere interlocutory order
or process. When this Court in 1968 held respondents' proposed appeal as "premature" and remanded the case for
implementation of the accounting phase as a mere incident and necessary consequence, so that a single appeal could
be taken from both aspects of the judgment for recovery of properties and accounting, it was not to reopen the case all
over and have respondent judge assume reviewing if not appellate authority over his predecessor's judgment but to have
respondent judge enforce, consider and act on the accounting as ordered in the judgment for the completion of the relief
therein ordered. For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court declares as abandoned the doctrine of Fuentebella vs.
Carrascoso and adopts the opposite rule that judgments for recovery with accounting are final and appealable (without
need of awaiting the accounting) and would become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period.
From the records of the case, 1 the factual antecedents are undisputed, as follows:
In Special Proceedings No. 2205-R of the Cebu court of first instance for the settlement of the intestate estate of Hilarion
Dydongco, deceased, (a Philippine resident who died in China sometime in 1941) petitioner Vicente Miranda was
appointed as administrator. In 1962, petitioner as such administrator filed Civil Case No. R-7793 in the same Cebu court
of first instance against the private respondents (or their predecessors) for recovery of properties of the decedent alleged
to have been fraudulently and in bad faith and in breach of their fiduciary trust, concealed, appropriated and converted as
their own by respondents. The suit for recovery had been filed by petitioner-administrator after the principal respondents
pursuant to Rule 88, section 6 had been cited by the intestate court to appear and to be examined as to documents,
papers, properties, funds and other valuables deposited and left in trust with them by the decedent before his death. 2
In his complaint for recovery, petitioner-administrator alleged that "prior to and at the time of his death in China sometime
in 1941, Hilarion Dydongco, who resided in the Philippines since the beginning of the century, had, in Butuan, Agusan
and Cebu City, well-developed and established business and commercial enterprises with substantial bank deposits and
about 127 parcels of land or property; that Hilarion Dydongco went to China, in 1934, and, thereafter, became seriously
ill; that, at that time, his children, Dy Chun and Dy Suat Hong (both defendants in said case R-7793) as well as Dy Sick
Lee (who died subsequently and is not a defendant in case No. R-7793) and his protegees Dy Bee and Dy Seko were
working as his Manager and/or employees in the aforementioned business establishments; that taking advantage of the
absence and bad condition of the health of Hilarion Dydongco, particularly of his subsequent death, the defendants
therein took over said business, including its assets, goods, merchandise, chattels, machinery, stock-in-trade, cash on
hand and in banks, amounts receivable and other properties of the deceased, as well as his store known as "Dydongco
Store," and its branches, and organized first, a fake partnership with the business name of "Agusan Commercial
Company," and then the East Mindanao Lumber Co., which operated and did business, with the capital, assets, stock-intrade, merchandise, funds and other property of said deceased; that with funds belonging to the latter, the defendants
therein moreover purchased several parcels of land, on one of which a 20-door apartment building was constructed, with
funds of the same nature, and let to Chinese tenants and other lessees; that the defendants therein had received and
are receiving the rentals, earnings and profits derived from said business and property of the deceased; and that said
defendants hold, manage and operate the aforementioned business, properties and income in trust for the Intestate
Estate of Hilarion Dydongco but have not rendered any accounting thereof." 3
Petitioner-administrator prayed that "judgment be rendered declaring that said business, assets, income and other
property, are in the possession and under the management and control of said defendants as mere trustees thereof, and
sentencing them to turnover and deliver the same to him, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco
as well as to render accounts and to execute the corresponding deeds of conveyance, in addition to paying damages
and the costs." 4
After a protracted trial, Hon. Jose M. Mendoza (as presiding judge in whose court the intestate proceedings for
settlement of the decedent's estate were likewise pending) rendered a sixty-nine page decision on July 26, 1965 finding
that most of petitioner- administrator's allegations had been duly proven and sentenced respondents (as defendants) to
deliver to petitioner-administrator "all properties found by the court to belong to the estate," "to render full, accurate and
correct accounting of all the fuits and proceeds of (such) properties" during their period of possession ("from 1935 until
the present date") and to pay P60,000 exemplary damages to the two heiresses found to have been defrauded and
P30,000 attorney's fees and costs. 5
Respondents (as defendants) took steps to perfect their appeal from Judge Mendoza's adverse decision within the
reglementary thirty-day period. After submitting their record on appeal, however, they filed a motion for reconsideration
and new trial which was heard and denied per Judge Mendoza's order of October 18, 1965, Respondents thereafter
sought to revive their record on appeal and submit additional pages thereof but Judge Mendoza held that their filing of
their motion for reconsideration was an abandonment of their proposed earlier appeal and that his decision had become
final and executory.
Reconsideration having been denied, herein respondents then filed on December 21, 1965 a petition with this Court for
the issuance of writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul Judge Mendoza's orders disallowing their appeal
with mandatory injunction to give due course to their appeal and this Court meanwhile enjoined the enforcement and
execution of the challenged orders. The case was docketed as Dy Chun et al. vs. Mendoza. 6
The Court in its decision of October 4, 1968 in the said case of Dy Chun vs. Mendoza aborted the question of timeliness
of respondents' proposed appeal, remarking that "(T)he petition herein and the answer thereto filed by respondents
discuss rather extensively the question whether or not petitioners had perfected their appeal in the lower court within the
reglementary period. We find it, however, unnecessary to pass upon said question, for the reason presently to be stated."
This Court therein instead ruled that "(A)lthough declaring that most of the properties involved in the litigation belong to
the estate of Hilarion Dydongco, the decision of respondent Judge, dated July 30, 1965, moreover, required petitioners
herein to render a full, accurate and complete accounting of all the fuits and proceeds' of said properties. After analyzing
previous rulings thereon, this Court declared, in Fuentebella v. Carrascoso (G.R. No. 48102, May 27, 1942. See also
Salazar vs. Torres, L-13711, May 25, 1960; Zaldarriaga v. Enriquez, L13252, April 29, 1961; Zaldarriaga v. Zaldarriaga, L13424,, May 31, 1961 that a decision of such nature is interlocutory in character, because it does not dispose of the
action in its entirety and leaves something to be done to complete the relief sought and that, accordingly, it is not
appealable, until after the adjudications necessity the completion of said relief shall have been mad. Indeed, the very
counsel for petitioners herein now accept this view and concede that petitioners' appeal had been taken prematurely." 7
Hence, this Court therein ordered and adjudged that "this case should be as it is hereby dismissed and the writ prayed
for with costs against petitioners herein. The writ of preliminary injuction issued in this case on January 1 , 1966, is,
accordingly, dissolved." 8
It should be noted that this Court's judgment of October 4, 1968 in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza in dismissing herein
respondents' petition and denying the writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus prayed for with costs against them (as
petitioners therein) on the premise that their appeal should be taken after the rendition of the accounting of all fruits and
proceeds of the properties adjudged in Judge Mendoza's decision of July 26, 1965 to belong to the decedent's estate,
nevertheless the writ of preliminary injunction issued earlier on January 18, 1966 enjoining the enforcement and
execution of Judge Mendoza's said decision.
The case was remanded to the Cebu court of first instance as the court of origin for the rendition of "a full, accurate
and complete of all the fruits and proceeds" of the properties declared in Judge Mendoza's July 26, 1965 decision to
belong to the decedent's estate, i.e. for "the adjudications necessary for the completion of said relief (as granted in the
decision)", to use the very language of this Court in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, supra.
This time around, however, Judge Mendoza (who had since been promoted as associate justice of the Court of Appeals
and thereafter retired upon reaching the age of seventy) no longer presided the lower court, having been succeeded by
respondent Judge Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. as presiding judge of the lower court (but who likewise to get ahead of
the story-after rendering the questioned amended decision of October 4, 1969 has since been also promoted on
September 21, 1973, to and is presenting associate justice of the Court of Appeals).
Back in the court of origin in 1969 after seven years (the case was first filed in 1962), the parties filed several motions
following this Court's October 4, 1968 decision in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, as follows:
(1) Petitioner under date of January 29, 1969 filed a motion for execution of the portion of Judge Mendoza's decision
ordering respondents (as defendants) to deliver to petitioner all the properties adjudged belong to the decedent's estate
(citing the fact of dismissal of respondents' petition for certiorari and mandamus and dissolution of the preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement and execution of Judge Mendoza's decision in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza and for an order
directing respondents to render the required in the decision within thirty (30) days. Several pleadings were filed by the
parties in opposition and in rejoinder;
(2) Respondents Dy Chun, Vicente Dy Seko, Silvestre Dy Hee and the administrator of the estate of Nolasco Dycothay
filed under date of March 29, 1969 their urgent motion wherein they prayed that their previous opposition of March 14,
1969 to petitioner's motion for execution be captioned and considered further as a "motion for and reconsideration and
new trial;" 9 which was in effect a second motion for reconsideration almost four year after Judge Mendoza had denied
per his order of October 18, 1965 their first motion for reconsideration almost four years after Judge Mendoza had
denied per his order of October 18, 1965; and
(3) Respondents East Mindanao Lumber Co. Inc., Tan Ho and Dy Suat Hong further filed under date of May 5, 1969 their
motion for reconsideration as "a supplement of their motion for reconsideration of the decision dated July 26,.1965,"
wherein almost four years afterwards they prayed the lower court "to reconsider and set aside its decision dated July 26,
1965 and to dismiss the complaint" 10 notwithstanding that their first motion for reconsideration to the same end and
effect had already been turned down by Judge Mendoza per his order of October, 18, 1965 and they had sought to
appeal said decision resulting in this Court's 1968 decision in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza that their appeal from said decision
should await their rendition of for completion of relief and the lower court's action thereon.
Respondent Judge Tantuico who had succeeded Judge Mendoza as presiding judge of the lower court resolved the
three motions in a 44-page amended decision dated October 4, 1969 rendered over four years after his predecessor
Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965, as follows:
(1) He denied petitioner's 'emotion for partial execution of the July 26, 1965 order ... such a decision being interlocutory
in character", 11 while agreeing with petitioner's contention "that delivery of the properties and accounting of their two
fruits are two distinct acts. . . The accounting is not dependent upon delivery ... ;" 12 and ordered delivery of "all the other
properties not affected by [his] amendments" within forty-five days;
(2) He denied as without merit the motion for new trial of respondents Dy Chun, et al. as well as their claims therein of
lack of jurisdiction of the court to render the judgment; and
(3) He granted a major part of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents East Mindanao Lumber Co., Inc. and
without new trial or reception of new or additional evidence reviewed, reversed and set aside his predecessor's
appreciation of the evidence and pronouncements on the credibility of the witnesses (who were not heard at all by him)
and substituted his own appreciation of the evidence and impression of the witnesses' credibility or lack thereof and
therefore reversed Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965 on three major points involving very valuable
properties with an alleged estimated value of P5 million at the filing of the petition in January, 1971 14 on the premise that
"interlocutory orders are subject to change in the discretion of the court" and "it is only fit and proper that this court
believe in every part of the judgment he is to execute." 15
Respondent Judge Tantuico thus altered and changed his predecessor Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26,
1965 in his amended decision of October 4, 1969 by excluding certain valuable properties from the estate of the
decedent and absolving certain respondents from the obligation of turning. owner the possession to petitioner, reversing
Judge Mendoza's judgment holding respondent Dy Suat Hong to be a builder in bad faith, and reducing the P60,000
exemplary damages to P30,000. (see paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the dispositive part of his amended decision as
reproduced in the footnote. 16 ). Acting on petitioner's motion for rendition of the accounting, he ordered respondents to
submit "the written inventory and accounting [of the remaining properties held to belong to the estate of the decedent] to
this court within sixty (60) days from receipt of this judgment for approval." (see paragraph 5 of his amended decision 17 ).
He further fixed a period of forty-five (45) days from receipt of judgment for respondents to deliver to petitioner "all the
other properties not affected by the herein amendments and found by the court in the July 26, 1965 judgment to belong
to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco." (see paragraph 4 of amended decision 18 ).
Petitioner assailed in an action for certiorari 19, respondent judge's authority to issue such amended decision substantially
changing his predecessor's original decision (which merely awaited the rendition of accounting for completion of the relief
therein adjudicated of declaring the properties in possession of respondents to belong to the decedent's estate). The
action was referred by this Court to the Court of Appeals, which rendered its challenged decision of September 21, 1970
and resolution of December 23, 1970 denying reconsideration.
Respondent appellate court 20 in its decision correctly if not entirely accurately depicted the parties' conflicting stands
thus: "The petitioner's stand ... is that the first decision that of Judge Mendoza, is not interlocutory in nature, but is one
which is final in character and which left nothing to be done except for the requisite matter of accounting. ... On the other
hand, the respondents herein maintain that the original decision of the former presiding judge is merely interlocutory in
nature, as there remains something also to be done, citing therein for main support of this contention, the decision . . . of
the Supreme Court ... in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza." 21
Respondent appellate court, relying on Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, found for respondents, holding that "(I)n view of this ruling
of the Supreme Court, expressly declaring that the decision in question of former Judge Jose M. Mendoza is merely
interlocutory in character, and that the same is not appealable yet the issuance therefore of the controversial amended
decision of the now respondent Judge Francisco Tantuico, Jr. could hardly be said to have been issued with grave abuse
of discretion, much less, without or in excess of jurisdiction. The disputed decision (first) of the former Presiding Judge
Jose M. Mendoza, being interlocutory in essence, the succeeding Presiding Judge, therefore, now respondent Judge,
has jurisdiction and is clothed with authority to conduct further proceedings, consider additional motions, rule oil issues
presented by the parties and finally to issue any orders, processes and promulgate another decision." 22
In its split resolution denying reconsideration, with Justice Andres Reyes dissenting, respondent appellate court 23
reiterated that as Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965 was "still interlocutory," respondent Judge Tantuico
had authority to change, alter or amend the decision of July 26, 1965 was "still interlocutory," respondent Judge Tantuico
had authority to change, alter or amend the decision as he did over four year later per his amended decision of October
4, 1969, citing a court's "inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice." 24
The decisive issue at bar, then, is whether respondent appellate court correctly read and applied or not this Court's 1968
judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza.
Restated otherwise, on the premise of this Court's judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza that Judge Mendoza's decision
granting petitioner the recovery of the properties which were adjudged to rightfully belong to the decedent's estate and
for accounting of the fruits and proceeds thereof was "interlocutory in character" on the doctrine of Fuentebella vs.
Carrascoso 25 and was "not appealable, until after the adjudications necessary for the completion of said relief shall have
been made" (which view respondents through counsel expressly "accepted and conceded")
Did this mean, as held by the appellate court, that respondent Judge Tantuico as Judge Mendoza's successor had the
authority, four years later and beyond the thirty-day reglementary period and for as long as the final accounts have not
been rendered and approved by him, to review, revise or reverse the original decision on the merits or to "promulgate
another decision" as if it were a mere interlocutory order which affects preliminary or incidental matters and does not
determine the dispute between the parties on its merits, or
Rather, did it mean that respondents' appeal from the decision on the merits granting petitioner the principal relief of
recovery of real properties (which was final and definitive in character) had to await the rendition of the accounting and
the court's approval thereof as a secondary and incidental relief and hence the only remaining or residual authority of the
lower court in the premises (no matter whether it be presided by Judge Mendoza, respondent Judge Tantuico or still
another presiding judge) was and is to enforce, consider and act on the accounting ordered in the decision, so that
respondents' appeal from both aspects of the decision (for recovery of properties with accounting of fruits and proceeds)
may then take its course?
The Court holds that respondent appellate court misread and misapplied this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs.
Mendoza and erred in holding that respondent Judge Tantuico could change, alter and amend his predecessor's decision
on the merits for recovery of properties with accounting as if it were a mere interlocutory order or process, when all this
Court held (applying Fuentebella, supra) was that the decision was "not appealable" until after the accounting also
ordered was rendered and approved so as to complete the relief granted whereafter respondents' "premature appeal"
could then be given due course from both aspects of the decision for recovery of properties and accounting of the fruits.
Hence, the only remaining or residual authority of respondent judge in the premises was not to review, revise or reverse
Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965 (by submitting his own appreciation of the evidence and impression
of the witnesses' credibility or lack thereof from a mere reading of the record for that of Judge Mendoza who tried the
case and saw and heard the witnesses first hand) but to enforce, receive and act on the accounting as ordered in the
decision for the completion of the relief therein granted.
The Court's holding is founded and based on the controlling case of Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, the pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court and their mandate that they "be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding", the very concept of final
and definitive judgments as against mere interlocutory orders, and imperative considerations of public policy, stability of
judgments, comity of judges of the same or coordinate courts, and of an impersonal and orderly administration of justice
and system of adjudication of court litigation, as shall presently be expounded.
1. The original decision of July 26, 1965 of Judge Mendoza is manifestly a judgment determining the merits of the case,
in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court as defined in and required by Rule 36, section 1. 26 When
respondents' appeal therefrom was ruled out of time by Judge Mendoza, and on mandamus this Court in Dy Chun vs.
Mendoza declared the appeal premature, it remanded the case back to the lower court for the completion of the relief
awarded in the judgment, viz, for the rendition of the accounting therein also awarded, so that thereafter respondents'
"premature appeal" could be given due course from both aspects of the judgment: the principal relief of recovery of the
properties in favor of the decedent's estate and the secondary and incidental relief of accounting of the fruits and
proceeds of such properties.
2. This Court in thus remanding the case for the rendition of the accounting "for the completion of said relief" awarded in
Judge Mendoza's judgment on the merits could not conceivably be misconstrued, as did appellate court, to give
respondent judge or whoever presides the lower court carte blanche to exercise reviewing if not supervisory authority
over the judicial determination and findings on the merits of his predecessor and to "promulgate another decision" in lieu
thereof as if Judge Mendoza's basic decision on the merits were a mere interlocutory order dealing with postponements,
extensions, temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, or deferring action on, or denying, motions to dismiss
or provisional remedies applied for, instead of a definitive determination, of the main dispute between the parties.
There would be no firm and definite basis for the accounting yet to be rendered if the presiding judge or his successor
could for as long as the accounting has not yet been rendered revise and amend the decision or "promulgated another
decision" and thereby from time to time change and alter the basis for the accounting. Confusion worse compounded
could readily ensue and there may be no end in sight where as in the case at bar 127 parcels of land or property 27 are
involved in the original complaint filed in 1962 and the trial judge could include or exclude from time to time the lands or
properties for which an accounting must be rendered!
3. Hence, it was always been taken for granted from the lead case of Fuentebella (and all other cases adhering to it)
assuming its applicability here, that the remand of the case to the trial court for rendition of the accounting of the fruits of
the properties adjudged in favor of the prevailing party in order to complete the relief and have a single appeal including
the accounts was for no other purpose than to render the accounting and by no means to change, alter, revise or reverse
the basic judgment which ordered the accounting in the first place.
No case or precedent can be cited where the trial court, as did respondent judge in the case at bar as sustained by
respondent appellate court, departed from the purpose of the remand to receive and act on the accounting as ordered in
the basic judgment so that both could be the subject of a single appeal (and instead altered and revised the judgment
itself and the bases for the accounting ordered).
4. In the lead case of Fuentebella, respondent (plaintiff) Carrascoso obtained judgment against Fuentebella (as
defendant) "to render an accounting of the 216 mining claims belonging to the mining partnership formed between them
for payment to him of his participation therein. The court adjudged plaintiff entitled to share in the assets (if the
partnership and directed the defendant to render, within ten days after notice, an accounting of all the expenses incurred
in the acquisition and exploitation of the 216 mining claims aforementioned with a view to determining plaintiff's share
therein. Maintaining that the partnership did not own the 216 mining claims but only 9 placer claims acquired from
Alejandro C. Quito and associates, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals without rendering the accounting
required in the appealed judgment. Plaintiff thereupon filed a motion in the appellate court praying that the appeal be
dismissed on the ground that it was premature, the judgment being merely interlocutory and not final. The Court of
Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal." 28 This court dismissed petitioner's (defendant's) the action for
mandamus to compel the Court of Appeals to restore his appeal, affirming Carrascoso's contention that the appeal was
"premature", holding the judgment that "the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring plaintiff
entitled to share in the assets of the partnership and directing the defendant to render an accounting of the expenses
incurred in the purchase and exploitation of the mining claims, is not final but merely interlocutory and, therefore, not
appealable." 29
In the sequel of case of Carrascoso vs. Fuentebella, 30 after the lapse of over ten years from the 1942 judgment ordering
Fuentebella surrender the accounting within ten days without such accounting even having been rendered, this Court
sustained the lower court's dismissal of Carrascoso's action for revival and execution of the judgment in his favor for a s
long as the accounting had not yet been rendered holding that "at the present stage of the litigation, there is an
accounting still to be made, and not until this has been effected and the accounting acted upon can there be a final
judgment." In denying Carrascoso's plea that the money judgment in his favor should be satisfied, this Court through
Justice Tuazon noted that it was through his "vigorous objections that the appeal was declared premature" and he was
therefore estoppel, and pointed out that "the only course open to (him) is follow through the order for accounting and
liquidation that the case may be placed in a state to be decided definitely, as follows:
It is noticed that the plaintiffs complaint makes reference to only two items of the judgment in question, but the pleadings
and the briefs do not disclose whether these items are independent of the others or are subject to the results of the
accounting which hag been ordered. However that may be, this Court's decision declaring the judgment interlocutory
made no exceptions and by this decision the defendant's appeal was totally overthrown. In the circumstances, it would
hardly be fair to hold that part of the judgment which concerns the payment of P4,295.20 and the delivery of shares of
stock was separable from the rest and could or should have been dispose of in the appeal without waiting for decision on
the other details of the litigation. It should be noted that it was through the plaintiff's vigorous objections that the appeal
was declared premature, and dismissed in its entirety. having taken that position, plaintiff is at least estopped from
asserting that the judgment or some parts of it became executory by reason of the defendant's failure to prosecute his
appeal to its final conclusion. As matters stand, it seems obvious that the only course open to the plaintiff is follow
through the order for accounting and liquidation that the case may be placed in a state to be decided definitely.
5. In the case at bar, this Court in remanding the case for the rendition of the accounting "for the completion of said relief'
awarded in Judge Mendoza's judgment further ordered the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it had granted against
enforcement and execution of his orders declaring his judgment final and executory. This signified that the trial court was
left free under Rule 39, section 2 to order execution of his judgment on the merits for recovery of the properties pending
appeal. Hence, petitioner after the remand properly filed his motion for execution of the portion of the judgment ordering
delivery of the properties, supra, 31 while awaiting the accounting yet to be rendered and acted upon by the trial court.
Respondent judge in the exercise of his authority could either grant or deny such motion for execution pending appeal
and he opted to deny the same, since he reversed the original decision on three major points but in effect granted the
same as to "all other properties not affected by [his] amendments" by ordering their delivery to-petitioner within 45 days 32
(since recovery and delivery of the properties was the principal relief sought by petitioner with the accounting as a mere
incident and necessary consequence and without delivery, the accounting of the fruits would be a never ending process
and the case would never be ready for appeal!)
But respondent judge exceeded and went beyond his authority and Jurisdiction when he amended his predecessor's
judgment on the merits in major particulars and issued an amended decision, and notwithstanding that the case involves
properties undisputedly (as far as both judges were concerned) fraudtlently concealed, misappropriated and absconded
from the decedent's estate (as a consequence of which P60,000-exemplary damages were awarded in Judge Mendoza's
original decision and retained in hal the amount by respondent judge in his amended decision), ordered the exclusion of
several valuable properties from those ordered delivered to the estate on the basis of his own substituted impression
(from his reading of the record) of the credibility of witnesses seen, heard and observed by Judge Mendoza as the trial
judge and found by the latter to be totally discredited (having shown in the record "their utter disregard and disrespect
not only to truth but also to the meaning and value of the oath required of witnesses" 33 and their being "sadly wanting ...
in their sense of truth, probity and sacredness of an oath. To commit a lie is but human, this court realizes, but to lie
brazenly and knowingly is humanly unforgivable". 34
Judge Mendoza had heard respondents-witnesses both in the course of the inquiry conducted by him in the intestate
proceedings as to the whereabouts of the estate's properties (Sp. Proc. No. 2205-R) 35 and at the trial of the case at bar
and from their subsequent contradictory and conflicting changes and reversals of their testimony found them to have
given false testimony in pursuance of a scheme to conceal and misappropriate properties of the decedent. Respondent
judge also agreed with this finding in the main in his amended decision, sale for the valuable properties excluded by him
from Judge Mendoza's original decision on the basis that the decision was "subject to change in the discretion of the
court" and "it is only fit and proper 'Chat this court believe in every part of the judgment he is to execute". 36
As to the excluded properties, there is no question that respondent judge in ordering their exclusion in his amended
decision did so in all good faith and according to his best lights and from his own meticulous reading of the record as
discussed in his extended amended decision.
The basic question therefore is one of authority and jurisdiction, whether its erroneously held by respondent appellate
court itself, this Court's description of the original decision as "interlocutory in character" and the appeal taken as
premature" clothed respondent judge "with authority to conduct further proceedings, consider additional motions, rule on
issues presented by the parties, . and finally to issue any orders, processes and promulgate another decision."
The Court holds that there is no precedent nor justification for the course of action sustained by respondent appellate
court, since a judge who succeeds another as presiding judge does not assume reviewing and appellate authority over
his predecessor's judgment on the merits including the credibility of the witnesses (which is the subject of an appeal to
the appellate courts but has been remanded merely to complete the relief of accounting so that such accounting may be
threshed out together with the principal relief of recovery in a single appeal) and it may be added that the appellate
courts on appeal are called upon to review and pass upon a single decision and not two decisions (the original and the
amended). And it should deserve merely passing mention that such successor judge (prescinding from the principle of
comity of judges.) should be equally if not more bound by the settled doctrine binding upon this Court itself and the
appellate courts that the trial judge's findings of fact and on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and
respect and will be upheld in the absence of a clear and convincing showing of taint, mistake or arbitrariness. 36*
There is yet another more important consideration anchored on public policy. The cause of an impersonal and orderly
administration of justice and system of adjudication of court litigation would be greatly if not irreparably set back if parties
are subjected to the spectacle of one judge's judgment being radically altered, if not reversed, by his successor after four
years without any new trial or evidence simply because the successor reads the record in another light than his
predecessor who tried the case and chooses to believe witnesses disbelieved by his predecessor. The Ideal concept that
cases are impersonally tried and adjudicated on the basis of certain well defined rules of evidence, law and
jurisprudence (regardless of the personality of the judge and his predilections) subject to review only the higher appellate
courts which would pass upon and correct the errors, if any, of the trial judge, would thus be dealth a severe blow.
6. Rule 36 on judgments precisely recognizes that judgment at various stages may be rendered when more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, (as the present action for recovery of properties with accounting), and thus
provides that:
Section 5. Judgment at various stages When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court at any
stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may enter a judgment disposing of such claim. The
judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the
remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is so entered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the
entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the
benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered. (Rule 36, emphasis supplied)
The last part of the above-cited rule is what should have been properly applied by respondent judge in the case at bar:
the judgment of July 26, 1965 of Judge Mendoza terminated the action with respect to the claim for recovery of the
properties pertaining to the decedent's estate, and the action was yet to proceed with respect to the remaining relief of
accounting as ordered in the judgment as well as ordered to be done and completed per the remand of the case by this
Court in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza. Insofar as Judge Mendoza's judgment granting the claim for recovery of properties was
concerned, respondent judge was authorized by the cited Rule to stay enforcement until the rendering of the subsequent
judgment on the accounting or prescribe such conditions to secure the benefit of the judgment in favor of the estate
represented by petitioner. But the Rule grants him no , authority to review, revise, amend, alter or reverse Judge
Mendoza's original judgment on the merits ordering the delivery of the properties while awaiting completion of the
accounting.
7. Rule 39, section 4 which specifically governs actions for accounting expressly provides that "unless otherwise ordered
by the court, a judgment or order directing an accounting in an action, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an
appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal," as follows:
Section 4. Injunction, receivership and accounting, not stayed. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in
an action for injunction or in a receivership action, or a judgment or order directing an accounting in an action, shall not
be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. The trial court, however,
in its discretion, when an appeal is taken from a judgment granting, dissolving or denying an injunction, may make an
order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting such injunction during the pendency of the appeal, upon such terms
as to bond or otherwise as it may consider proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party."(Rule 39)
The pertinent rule accordingly recognizes that in actions involving the rendition of an accounting (as in the case at bar),
an appeal may be taken from the judgment ordering the accounting and directs that during the pendency of the appeal or
even before the appeal is taken, the rendition of the accounting shall not be stayed, unless otherwise ordered by the trial
court. Thus, if the judgment directing an accounting is upheld on appeal, there would be no time lost and the accounting
as rendered could be passed upon by the trial court at the stage of execution of judgment; and if the judgment were
reversed on appeal, reimbursement of the actual expenses incurred by the successful appellant in rendering the
accounting could be awarded.
Here, the rendition of the accounting as a consequence and incident of Judge Mendoza's judgment declaring the
properties to belong to the decedent's estate and ordering their delivery to petitioner-administrator was not ordered
stayed during the pendency of the appeal taken by respondents. In fact, Judge Mendoza had ruled that the proposed
appeal was filed out of time and that his judgment had become final and executory, and the accounting that his judgment
had become final and executory, and the accounting that he ordered would have been rendered at the stage of execution
of judgment.
That the cited Rule precisely provides for appeals from a judgment "directing an accounting" as in this case and that
such judgment is immediately enforced notwithstanding the taking of an appeal or the pendency of an appeal is lucidly
explained by the late Chief Justice Moran thus: "(A)s a general rule, the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the
judgment. But such is not the case when the judgment is rendered in an action for injunction, or in a receivership action,
or when the judgment is one directing an accounting in an action.
"For this, no special reason need even be invoked. While the trial court could also stay immediate execution in its
discretion, its refusal to do so must be established by petitioner to amount to grave abuse thereof." 36**
It should be noted that the cited Rule recognizes that the judgment "directing an accounting" is appealable, regardless of
whether the accounting is the principal relief sought or a mere incident or consequence of the judgment which grants
recovery and delivery of absconded properties as the principal relief and expressly provides that "a judgment or order
directing an accounting in an action, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal".
It is manifest from the Rule that if a judgment which directs solely an accounting is appealable notwithstanding that it
"does not finally dispose of the action" and the accounting has yet to be rendered "to complete the relief sought", much
more so is a judgment which orders the recovery or delivery of properties as principal relief and accounting as a mere
incident appealable, because the judgment which orders the delivery of properties does finally dispose of the action on
its merits.
8. If the basic and original judgment for recovery of properties with accounting could thus be altered at will by the trial
judge pending the rendition of the accounting on the misconception that the judgment is "interlocutory", rather than on
the merits, litigation for the enforcement of one's rights or redress of grievances would be rendered intolerable and
interminable.
Take the present case for recovery of properties of the decedent which dates back to his death in 1941. Petitioneradministrator's action for recovery of the properties with accounting was upheld in Judge Mendoza's original judgment of
July 26, 1965. Notwithstanding this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza remanding the case for rendition of
the accounting for completion of the relief, the accounting has not been rendered almost eleven years later because of
respondent judge's amended decision of October 4, 1969 excluding certain valuable properties from the estate and
absolving certain respondents from the judgment obligation of delivering them to petitioner.
If we upheld respondent judge's authority to change and alter the basic and original judgment at will for as long as the
accounting ordered has not been rendered, then as there is now another judge presiding the trial court since respondent
Judge Tantuico's promotion in 1973 to the Court of Appeals, 37 such successor judge of respondent Judge Tantuico must
likewise be deemed to have the authority at will to review, revise, change, alter and reverse both the original decision of
Judge Mendoza of July 26, 1965 and the amended decision of October 4, 1969 of respondent judge and "promulgate
another decision" as per his own criterion of the evidence (and applying respondent judge's same yardstick that it is only
"fit and proper" that the presiding judge "believe in every part of the judgment lie is to execute") including or excluding
certain properties from those ordered returned to the estate, with the frightening consequence that the accounting would
never be rendered, the judgment would never be final for purposes of appeal and the litigation would never end (Witness
this case commenced 14 years ago in 1962 for recovery of properties found by both Judge Mendoza and respondent
judge to have been fraudulently concealed, misappropriated and absconded from the estate of the decedent who died 35
years ago in 1941!)
As it is now, if the accounting ever got done, there would be two decisions, the original decision of Judge Mendoza and
the amended decision of respondent judge, that would be brought up on appeal with the party favored by one decision
assailing the other decision. If respondent judge's successors in the lower court were to be permitted also to promulgate
still one decision after another as if such decisions on the merits were mere interlocutory orders subject to the judge's
control and amendment, there would be as many decisions to be taken up on appeal as there were successor judges
inclined to review, revise, and reverse his predecessor's judgment on the evidence and on the law with none of the
parties adversely affected able to appeal from any of the fluctuating decisions for as long as the accounting has not been
terminated.
9. Imperative and controlling considerations of public policy and of sound practice in the courts to achieve the
desideratum of just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action militate against such a novel and
unprecedented situation where a judgment on the merits for recovery of properties would be left dangling and would be
considered as "interlocutory" and subject to revision and alteration at will for as long as the (accounting ordered as a
mere incident and logical consequence has not been rendered and acted upon by the trial court.
This Court, through Justice Carson over sixty-five (65 years ago in Arnedo vs. Llorente 38 stressed the utter untenability
of such a situation and the "disastrous consequences which would follow the recognition of unbridled power in a court" to
change, vacate or amend its judgments at will, when it stated that "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and
of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so
as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact
or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court, it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is
to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of
the parties. With the full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for judgment,
and they have a right at some time or other to have final judgment on which they can rely as a final disposition of the
issue submitted, and to know that there is an end to the litigation. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus
keep causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments about
from one party tot he other, and to change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chameleon may change its
hues, then litigation might become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' And no words would be
sufficient to portray the disastrous consequences which would follow the recognition of unbridled power in a court which
has the misfortune to be presided over by a venal and corrupt judge, to vacate and amend, in matters of substance, final
judgments already entered."
10. Respondent appellate court's fallacy lies in its failure to appreciate the substantive fact that Judge Mendoza's sixtynine-page decision of July 26, 1965 rendered after a full protracted trial (of over three years) wherein he received the full
evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the litigants was and is a definite judgment that decided finally the rights of the
parties upon the issue submitted, by granting the remedy sought by the action of recovery with accounting (as a mere
incident and logical consequence) of the properties of the decedent's estate.
As restated for the Court by then Associate now Chief Justice Castro in the case of DBP vs. Taada 39 "a definitive
judgment (is) one that 'decides finally the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted, by specifically denying or
granting the remedy sought by the action."' Thus, the Court held in said case that the earlier (1958) judgment ordering
the RFC (as predecessor of the DBP) to accept respondents' backpay certificates in settlement of their mortgage debt
specifically granted the remedy sought by respondents and that the non-specification of the amount chargeable against
the backpay certificates (at a discounted rate of 2% per annum in relation to its thirty-year maturity period as provided by
Republic Act 897, which was not specified in the judgment) did not make the judgment any less definitive or final. The
Court thus adjudged that when respondent del Mar filed his motion for execution of the judgment twelve years later (after
he had refused previously to negotiate his backpay certificate at its face value) he was already barred by Rule 39,
section 6 from seeking execution "by mere motion or to enforce the (judgment) by an independent action."
Similarly, Judge Mendoza's judgment for recovery with accounting of the properties of the decedent's estate was and is a
definitive and final judgment on the merits, although almost eleven years later, the accounting ordered has yet to be
rendered.
That petitioner-administrator is entitled to recover the properties absconded from the decedent's estate was definitively
settled and adjudged in the judgment. Such right of recovery of the properties and corollarily the obligation of respondent
to deliver and return the absconded properties to the estate, cannot in any way be affected or prejudiced by the
accounting to be rendered by respondents of the fruits and proceeds thereof during the long, long period of time (for
almost two generations since 1941) that they wrongfully held possession thereof. The fruits to be accounted for are mere
accessories or products of the properties pertaining to the estate, and the rendition and settlement of account with
respect thereto is a mere incident of the judgment which can be ,satisfied even at the execution stage.
This simply means that this definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal but must
stand to serve as the basis of the accounting ordered. Otherwise, if it were to be subject to change and amendment for
as long as the accounting has not been rendered and approved, the basis for the accounting would never be firmly fixed
and there would not be no accounting nor completion of the relief nor termination of the litigation since the accounting
would not be completed and the appeal would be left hanging and could never be prosecuted for final adjudication by the
appellate courts!
11. Respondent judge's fallacy in turn was in his failure to appreciate the vital fact that when this Court in Dy Chun vs.
Mendoza remanded in 1968 the case to him, it was for the sole purpose of implementing the standing 1965 judgment of
Judge Mendoza to render an accounting of the fruits and proceeds of all the properties ordered delivered and returned to
the decedent's estate. Respondent judge was to take the case at the stage it was then, namely, to require the accounting
on the basis of the standing judgment which was beyond his power of review or amendment; by no means was he to be
deemed authorized to go back and review the case all over again and render another judgment.
This is but in consonance with the constitutional mandate of just and speedy disposition of cases as well as with the
Rules of Court which proscribe multiplicity of motions. Here, motions for reconsideration of Judge Mendoza's judgment of
July 26, 1965 had been filed by respondents and denied per his order of October 18, 1965 after which respondents
sought to appeal the judgment.
Upon remand in 1968 (over four years after Judge Mendoza rendered judgment on the merits for recovery of properties
with accounting) of the case for rendition of the accounting for completion of the relief granted in the judgment, as per Dy
Chun vs. Mendoza, respondent judge no longer had jurisdiction (since the thirty-day reglementary period from notice of
judgment under Rule 37, section 1 to move for reconsideration or new trial had long expired) to entertain respondents'
motions for new trial and reconsideration, much less to set aside the judgment and render an "amended decision".
Certainly, a trial judge to whom the case has been remanded to complete the relief awarded by enforcing the accounting
cannot in the guise of holding that the judgment is "interlocutory" because an accounting was ordered and has to be
enforced by him entertain second and supplemental motions for reconsideration of and alter or change the judgment
and set it at naught!
Even from the strictly procedural point of view, respondent judge was barred by the omnibus motion rule under Rule 15,
section 8 (prescinding from his lack of authority to review or alter the standing judgment on the merits which was already
in the stage of appeal but merely remanded for implementation of the accounting phase to complete the relief granted for
purposes of a single appeal) from entertaining respondents' motions for new trial and reconsideration, much less to grant
them on the very same grounds already previously rejected by his predecessor.
As the now Chief Justice stressed in Dacanay vs. Alvendia. 40 "(T)he Rules of Court, looking with disfavor on piecemeal
argumentation, have provided the omnibus motion rule, whereunder "A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall
include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." 41 The salutary purpose
of the rule is to obviate multiplicity of motions as well as discourage dilatory pleadings. As we said in Medran vs. Court of
Appeals, 'Litigants should not be allowed to reiterate Identical motions speculating on the possible change of opinion of
the court or of judges thereof."
12. It seems evident that respondent judge's error lay in his misequating Judge Mendoza's 1965 judgment on the merits
with "interlocutory orders (that) are subject to change in the discretion of the court" 42 and that respondent appellate court
fell into the same error when from this Court's holding in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza that Judge Mendoza's 1965 judgment
"does not dispose of the action in its entirety and leaves something to be done to complete the relief sought and that
accordingly it is not appealable until after the adjudications necessary for the completion of said relief shall have been
made" 43 it leapt to the unwarranted conclusion that this Court thereby authorized respondent judge not merely to
complete the relief granted by enforcing and resolving the accounting as an incident to the level of interlocutory "process
and orders" subject to change, revision and reversal for as long as the accounting has not been rendered and
completed. 44
13. The late Chief Justice Moran, who penned the decision in Fuentebella, 45 stated that "(T)he test to ascertain whether
or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. 46
The key test to what is "interlocutory" is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case. It's more
reliable test than that loosely applied in Fuentebella that the decision therein for recovery of properties with accounting is
"interlocutory in character because it does not dispose of the action in its entirely and leaves something to be done to
complete the relief sought." 47 For strictly speaking, the only stage where nothing more can be done in the trial court to
complete the relief sought is after the judgment has been executed, and certainly, no one would contend that all
judgments are interlocutory before they are actually executed and satisfied.
The examples of interlocutory matters from our jurisprudence that Moran gives in his treatise deal therefore with
interlocutory orders, not judgments, such as orders denying motions for dismissal, for annulment of preliminary
attachment or injunction, for alimony pendente lite, for default, etc., since they deal with preliminary matters and trial has
yet to be held judgment on the merits rendered. 48
In Halili vs. CIR 48*, this Court in ruling that the lower court's judgment (ordering the payment of overtime pay although
the total amount was yet undetermined and awaited the computation yet to be rendered by the Court Examiner) had
already become final and executory for failure of the losing party to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period,
dismissed the contention that the judgment was "interlocutory" and still appealable for as long as the accounting had not
been completed by re-defining the terms in this wise: "(T)he word I interlocutory is defined as 'something intervening
between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the
whole controversy.' As stated by Bouvier, it is 'something which is done between the commencement and the end of a
suit or action which decides some point or matter which, however, is not a final decision of the matter in issue."' and ruled
that "(T)he decision, therefore, is a final adjudication on the main issue submitted to the court and cannot be considered
as interlocutory". By the same token, the original 1965 decision was and is a final adjudication on the main issue of
ownership and recovery of properties disputed between the parties.
The pertinent provision of Rule 41, section 2 that "only final judgment or orders shall be subject to appeal. No in
interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of the action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until
final judgment or order is rendered for one party or another," shows that the judgment rendered definitively by Judge
Mendoza after trial and on the merits in favor of petitioner and against respondents (for recovery of the properties with
accounting) could not conceivably be classified with interlocutory orders issued by a trial judge on incidental or
preliminary matters before or during the course of trial and before judgment on the merits,
14. Here, we have a case of definitive judgment on the merits rendered after trial ordering the recovery of properties as
prayed for in petitioner's complaint with payment of exemplary damages and attorney's fees as well as the accounting of
the fruits of the properties wrongfully possessed for so long by respondents. The mere incident that accounting since
1941 of the fruits of the properties adjudged to rightfully belong to the decedent's estate has been ordered as a
necessary consequence of the judgment on the merits which is merely to implement the judgment, by no means
makes the judgment an interlocutory one subject to change, alteration and reversion at the discretion and will of the trial
judge!
The best example of an analogous judgment to that of the case at bar (for recovery with accounting) is a judgment of the
court of industrial relations finding a respondent guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering his reinstatement with
backwages. Such a judgment has always been considered final for purposes of appeal, with nothing more to be done on
the merits. The mere circumstance that the judgment for backwages orders the accounting division of the industrial court
to compute and determine the amount of backwages to be paid to petitioner after an examination of the employer's
payrolls and after hearings to determine the reinstated worker's earnings elsewhere during the period of his dismissal for
purposes of deducting the same from the backwages to be paid him are deemd to be matters of implementation and
execution which in no way render the judgment interlocutory or subject to change or reversal at the judge's discretion
although in many instances such backwages accounting and computation proceedings take much longer (from 1 to 10
years) to finish than the trial and affirmance on appeal of the main action for reinstatement of the worker. (Which is really
another compelling reason to allow immediate appeal, for otherwise years will have dragged on during the accounting
without the principal question of the worker's right to reinstatement with backwages having been finally resolved on
appeal).
15. There have been cases of interlocutory orders, such as one for payment of alimony pendente lite, which have
nevertheless been the subject of appeal, where this Court has refused to stay the progress of the appeal or dismiss it
where the objection to the appeal has come too late and is deemed waived. The Court so held in Salazar vs. Salazar, 49
in affirming on the merits the appealed order for alimony pendente lite and rejecting the belated motion to dismiss the
appeal on the ground of its involving an interlocutory order, that "(T)he motion to dismiss filed by appellee during the
pendency of this appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is not appealable because it is merely interlocutory,
cannot be entertained. While an order denying or granting alimony pendente lite is interlocutory and consequently nonappealable (Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1952 ed., p. 120), however, if appeal is taken therefrom,
and no timely objection is interposed thereto, the objection is deemed waived. Thus, when objection is founded on the
ground that the judgment appealed from is interlocutory, but the appellee, before making such objection, has allowed the
record on appeal to be approved and printed, and has allowed the appellant to print his brief, such objection is too late
and is deemed waived (Slade-Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 223, 225; Luenco Martinez vs. Perkins, 17 Phil. 29, Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1952 ed., p. 987). This is the situation that obtains herein. The motion to
dismiss should therefore be denied." 50
Here, respondents themselves filed an appeal from Judge Mendoza's judgment of July 26, 1965 and the only issue in Dy
Chun vs. Mendoza, supra, was as to the timeliness of the appeal. No one interposed any objection that the appeal was
improper as the judgment was interlocutory, as indeed both respondents and petitioner were agreed that the judgment
for recovery with accounting finally resolved the issues between them on the merits and nothing more was left to be done
on the merits except to implement the judgment with the delivery of the properties and the accounting of the proceeds
thereof.
Respondents obtained a reprieve when this Court in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza remanded the case to implement the
accounting to complete the relief awarded for purposes of a single appeal from the judgment's award of recovery of
properties 16th accounting and they expressly acceded thereto. This reprieve does not mean that they can now take the
contrary and inconsistent stand that the judgment should be considered interlocutory and subject to alteration, revision or
reversal. The Court's manifest intent in making the remand was to complete the relief with the accounting so that
respondents' appeal may then take its course.
If in Salazar a belated objection to an appeal from an interlocutory order (of alimony pendente lite) was deemed a waiver,
so much more should respondents be deemed to have waived any belated contrary or inconsistent stand that the very
judgment they were appealing was "interlocutory," much less that it was subject to alteration, change or reversal pending
the accounting of fruits therein awarded.
Following the ruling in Salazar eleven years later in 1953 (rather than the earlier 1942 ruling of Fuentebella) the Court
should have resolved in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza in 1968 respondents' appeal on the merits of Judge Mendoza's 1965
judgment (if it considered respondents' appeal timely) or upheld Judge Mendoza's order ruling that respondents' appeal
was filed out of time since neither petitioner nor respondents had ever presented any objection or afterthought that the
judgment sought to be appealed from was "interlocutory" and that the challenged appeal was therefore "premature". Had
this Court so resolved in 1968 the appeal on the merits of the question of timeliness of the appeal, then the parties would
not still be here eight years later in 1976 still groping for an end to their litigation dating back to decedent's death in 1941!
The validity of this position may be further shown in this wise: If besides the recovery and exemplary damages, Petitioner
had sought and been awarded in the judgment a lump sum as actual and compensatory damages (through proof of the
value of the properties and their potential earnings) instead of an accounting of the fruits, interest, profits, etc., of the
misappropriated and absconded properties, it would be beyond question that such a judgment was final and appealable.
That petitioner had sought and been awarded an accounting instead (as another means to determine the actual and
compensatory damages suffered by the estate) makes the judgment no less final and appealable. The reason simply is
that the principal relief is the recovery of the properties and the damages or accounting is but an incident and
consequence. Hence, the judgment for delivery of the properties is final and appealable. If it is affirmed on appeal, then
damages or accounting must go with it; otherwise if it is reversed on appeal, then there is no damage or accounting.
But one thing should certainly be clear. Respondents having been granted a reprieve by this Court's 1968 decision in Dy
Chun vs. Mendoza when they readily embraced and expressly accepted and acceded to the view motu proprio raised by
this Court that the accounting ordered in the judgment be first enforced and implemented before giving due course to
their appeal, so that a single appeal would cover both the recovery and accounting (which thereby aborted the cardinal
question of timeliness of their appeal, which Judge Mendoza had already ruled was filed out of time) are estopped and
could not now claim after the remand that the adverse judgment against them sentencing them to return the fraudulently
absconded properties to the decedent's estate was after all a mere "interlocutory" or fleeting judgment without
permanence or finality and subject to change, alteration or reversal at the will and discretion of Judge Mendoza as the
trial judge and of respondent judge and of as many other judges as may succeed him in presiding over the lower court
for as long as the accounting has not been rendered and acted upon
II
The Court's reversal of respondent Court of Appeals' decision which upheld respondent judge's amended decision
changing and amending substantially his predecessor's judgment on the merits for recovery of properties with accounting
on the main ground, inter alia, that this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza was misread and misapplied,
since the only remaining or residual authority of respondent judge was to enforce, consider and act on the accounting
ordered in the original decision for the completion of the relief therein granted before considering private respondents'
proposed appeal, suffices to dispose of the case at bar itself.
The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to now declare as is clearly indicated from
the compelling reasons and considerations hereinabove stated:
that the Court considers the better rule to be that stated in H.E. Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co. 51, to wit, that
where the primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who between plaintiff and defendant is the true owner
and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property, "the judgment ... rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on
the merits as to those questions, and (that) the order of the court for an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to
the judgment on the merits. That is to say, that the judgment ... (is) a final judgment ...; that in this kind of a case an
accounting is a mere incident to the judgment; that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgment as rendered ..." (as
is widely held by a great number of judges and members of the bar, as shown by the cases so decided and filed and still
pending with the Court) for the fundamental reasons therein stated that "this is more in harmony with the administration
of justice and the spirit and intent of the [Rules]. If on appeal the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, it would not in
the least work an injustice to any of the legal rights of [appellee]. On the other hand, if for any reason this court should
reverse the judgment of the lower court, the accounting would be a waste of time and money, and might work a material
injury to the [appellant]; 51* and
that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso 52 which expressly reversed the Heacock case and
a line of similar decisions 53 and ruled that such a decision for recovery of property with accounting "is not final but merely
interlocutory and therefore not appealable" and subsequent cases adhering to the same 54 must be now in turn
abandoned and set aside.
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting decisions mostly in partition proceedings and exemplified by
Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 928 (under the old Code of Civil Procedure) that an order for partition of real property is not final
and appealable until after the actual partition of the property as reported by the court-appointed commissioners and
approved by the court in its judgment accepting the report. It must be especially noted that such rule governing partitions
is now so expressly provided and spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, with special reference to sections 1, 2, 3,
6, 7 and 11, to wit, that there must first be a preliminary order for partition of the real estate (section 2) and where the
parties co-owners cannot agree, the court-appointed commissioners make a plan of actual partition which must first be
passed upon and accepted by the trial court and embodied in a judgment to be rendered by it (sections 6 and 11). In
partition cases, it must be further borne in mind that Rule 69, section 1 refers to "a person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate", so that the general rule of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution
proceedings are terminated will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies
the adverse party's right to any partition, as was the ruling in Villanueva vs. Capistrano and Africa vs. Africa, supra, 55
Fuentebella's express reversal of these cases must likewise be deemed now also abandoned in view of the Court's
expressed preference for the rationale of the Heacock case.
The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations of public policy and of sound practice in the courts and
adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action call for
considering such judgments for recovery of property with accounting as final judgments which are duly appealable (and
would therefore become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period) with the accounting as a
mere incident of the judgment to be rendered during the course of the appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be
implemented at the execution stage upon final affirmance on appeal of the judgment (as in Court of Industrial Relations
unfair labor practice cases ordering reinstatement of the worker with accounting, computation and payment of his
backwages less earnings elsewhere during his lay-off) and that the only reason given in Fuentebella for the contrary
ruling, viz, "the general harm that would follow from throwing the door open to multiplicity of appeals in a single case" is
of lesser import and consequence.
Furthermore, the premise that the accounting portion of the judgment would give rise to a second appeal in the same
case is erroneous because taken as a mere incident to the judgment as provided in the cited Rule or as a matter to be
implemented in the execution stage, no appeal would lie from the lower court's action approving or disapproving the
accounting unless there were gross error, oppression, fraud or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
that would be correctible on a special writ of certiorari. It must also be noted that the resort to multiple appeals in a single
case has been considerably lessened since the enactment on September 9, 1968 of Republic Act 5440 which did away
with the right of appeal to this Court save in the three special cases therein provided 56 and provides only for review on
certiorari in this Court of all other final judgments and decrees of inferior courts at its judgment and discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent appellate court's decision is set aside and instead judgment is rendered declaring null and
void and setting aside respondent judge's amended decision of October 4, 1969 and reinstating the original decision of
July 26, 1965. The judge now presiding the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-7793 thereof (and
whoever may hereafter succeed him) is ordered to proceed forthwith with the implementation of this Court's 1968
judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza by making the necessary adjudication within thirty (30) days from finality of this
judgment on the full, accurate and correct accounting of all fruits, interest, profits, assets and properties required of the
defendants therein 'which accounting private respondents (defendants) are hereby ordered to render within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof. Good grounds having been set forth and found to order delivery pending appeal of the
properties found in the July 26, 1965 judgment to belong to the decedent's estate, private respondents (defendants) are
hereby ordered to deliver all such properties to petitioner-administrator within thirty (30) days from finality of this
judgment, regardless of any appeal they may take from the said July 26, 1965 judgment and adjudication that the lower
court may make on their accounting (as allowed in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza), subject to the provisions of Rule 39, section 3
on stay of execution upon approval of a sufficient supersedeas bond. In view of the reversal herein of the doctrine of
Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and the length of time that this dispute between the parties has been pending final
determination, private respondents are herein given the option within thirty (30) days from finality of this judgment to take
an immediate appeal from the said July 26, 1965 judgment without waiting for the trial court's adjudication on the
accounting therein ordered.
With costs against private respondents jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz-Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr. J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, just so this case may be terminated without further delay. The unanimous vote in favor of the
judgment herein should discourage any motion for reconsideration. It should be obvious from the result of our voting as
reflected in the main opinion and in this separate concurrence that any attempt to have the procedure outlined in the
main opinion altered is from the practical standpoint doomed not to be sanctioned. Besides, as to the points of law in
dispute, it may be stated that with Justices Fernando 1 and Aquino and myself having actually qualified our votes, the
seven unqualified votes supporting the main opinion are, to my mind, not enough to impart full doctrinal status to the
pronouncements of the majority.
It is my firm conviction that the holding in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, 25 SCRA 431, which resolved the prelude incident to
the case at bar, in the sense that the decision of Judge Mendoza of July 26, 1965 is interlocutory is the law of the case
for the purpose of the present controversy. The action of the Court in that case of merely dismissing the petition for
mandamus to compel Judge Mendoza to give due course to the appeal of respondents does not constitute, contrary to
what is inaccurately stated in the main opinion, a remand of the case to the trial court, if only because neither the case
itself nor the records thereof were with this Court then, hence there was nothing to remand in any sense. Much less did
this Court's decision qualify in any manner the meaning and import of what it considered to be the interlocutory character
of the Mendoza decision, as may be plainly seen in the complete text of Chief Justice Concepcion's decision which I am
reproducing in the annex of this opinion. I hold that as in any other case of an interlocutory order or judgment, the
Mendoza decision was subject to modification and even reversed at any time before an appeal therefrom is taken, any
adverse resolution of a prior motion for reconsideration thereof notwithstanding. Accustomed as I am to instances
wherein the decisions or orders of judges who have either died, resigned or been removed from office, before the finality
of said judgments have been either modified or reversed by their successors, upon motions in due course of the parties
concerned, I cannot share the view that in rendering his amended decision, Judge Tantuico improperly arrogated unto
himself the attributes of a reviewing appellate authority, just because he based his own findings on no more than the
same evidence which was before his predecessors. Withal, since not a scintilla of the evidence presented in the court
below is before the Court in this proceeding, I consider it unfair for the Court to make reference to Judge Tantuico's
amended decision in any manner that might leave the impression that the same is in anyway either capricious or ill
considered. Truth to tell, I cannot condemn Judge Tantuico for having acted as he did, because with my own
understanding of the law, in the light of the Fuentebella ruling before me, I would have probably acted the way he did.
Speaking for myself, and judging from the contents and ratiocination of said amended decision, which I have read very
carefully, I would say that, contrary to the thrust of the main opinion, the decision of Judge Mendoza ought not to be
projected as if it were the last word in the disposition of the questions of fact and law in this case, thereby to enable the
appellate court in due time to consider the evidence in this case without feeling hindered by any thought that the
Supreme Court intentionally or not, has already formed its opinion as to the correctness of said decision.
Originally, I was resolved to dissent. To be sure, when this case was first deliberated on about five years ago, the
consensus among the incumbent justices then, even if not definitely conclusive, was more inclined towards the dismissal
of the instant petition, so much so that I was assigned to prepare the main opinion, which I did, as may be seen in the
draft thereof, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A of this separate opinion. It was only because of the desire of
Justice Teehankee, the writer of the present main opinion, to have the case further studied that no final vote was taken.
Since then, there have been several changes in the membership of the Court, and as usually happens in human courts,
the consensus remained inconclusive, until Justice Teehankee was able to secure the conformity of six other justices to
his draft, at which point, We finally decided to at long last terminate this case before the retirement of Justice Esguerra,
hence the marathon session of June 18th last which started at 10:30 o'clock in the morning and continued without any
break until past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, with the justices partaking of only sandwiches and juices at the
discussions, at some points emotional and truly heated, went on. At the final voting, Justice Fernando voted pro hac vice
in favor of the judgment, which I understand means, "only for this occasion" or for the purposes of the case at bar only.
(See, Philippine Law Dictionary by Moreno, p. 374, citing Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Summers, 42 Phil. 7.) Justice Aquino
also qualified his vote as a concurrence only in the result, and when I voiced the possibility of changing my vote from
dissent to concurrence in the result, on the condition that respondents would be allowed to appeal immediately from the
Mendoza decision and with the reservation to file this separate opinion, Justice Aquino said he would join me. And since
it became obvious then that with only seven votes unqualifiedly supporting the main opinion, I felt that the purported
reversal of the Fuentebella doctrine in the main opinion could only have academic worth, I deemed it to be a more
practical position for me to definitely give my vote in favor of the result, to the end that, as I have said at the outset, the
controversy among the brothers and sisters involved in this case may come to an earlier definite conclusion on the
merits, after almost a quarter of century of procedural delays. Anyway, notwithstanding that the procedure actually
ordered to be followed in this case hereafter is not in accordance with the Fuentebella ruling, and inasmuch as the Court
has agreed to my suggestion that respondents be allowed to appeal immediately, I am satisfied that substantial justice
will just the same be ultimately achieved fully, when this case is resolved on the merits by the proper appellate court.
As earlier indicated, I am submitting herewith as Annex A hereof the draft of a decision I prepared more than four years
ago when there were less votes in the Court to overturn the Fuentebella ruling. Therein my differences of views with my
brethren in the majority now can best be appreciated, particularly as to my position on the law of this particular case and
the true and correct concept of an interlocutory order or judgment.
My exercise in matters of adjective law as an active practitioner, actually dealing with court procedure all the time, and as
an avid student of remedial law before I came to this Court, cautions me against precipitately joining my learned
colleagues in making reference, in resolving the main issue of procedure before Us to the rules on judgments at various
stages (See. 5 of Rule 36; and immediate execution of judgments directing an accounting (See. 4 of Rule 39) and to the
ruling in Arnedo vs. Llorente, 18 Phil. 257, none of which, to my mind, contemplates the situation in the present case.
Surely, the Fuentebella ruling cannot, in my opinion, be in anyway considered as violative of any injuction that cases be
speedily and justly disposed of, whether that injunction be deemed as emanating from the Constitution, established
jurisprudence or any statutory or moral code.
Likewise, I am not persuaded that the order of immediate execution contained in the judgment herein is in accordance
with law, if only because the motion of petitioners in the court below was not premised on Section 2 of Rule 39 but on the
insistence of petitioner, despite the Dy Chun decision, that the Mendoza decision has already become final and
executory, but I cannot disregard the pragmatic consideration that any dissent on my part on this point would be purely
academic, considering there are enough votes to carry out the judgment as it is.
I am fully aware of the power of this Court to exempt certain cases from the application of the rules when demanded by
the necessity of doing what clearly appears to be a matter of substantial justice to the parties, I honestly believe,
however, that there is nothing in the factual situation before Us now that warrants such invocation of Our extraordinary
prerogatives. Indeed, I always want to be careful and sparing in departing from unequivocal rules and precedents or
established doctrines which leave no room for misunderstanding or misconstruction. It is certainly disconcerting to
visualize litigants as being players in a game the governing rules of which are susceptible to being changed in the middle
of play, with the referee immediately enforcing the modified rules. Unless it is manifest that denial of substantial justice
would result otherwise, the consequent inequity of unnecessarily resorting to such practice is to my mind, beyond
debate.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee. Without intending to detract in any way from Mr. Justice
Barredo's recollection of certain incidents in his concurring opinion, I write this brief concurrence to set forth my own
recollection thereof after I joined the Court in August, 1970 as follows:
1. During the many past deliberations of the Court on the case, no consensus was reached for dismissal of the instant
petition. A tentative consensus in favor of ruling that the original judgment of Judge Mendoza could no longer be
amended or modified beyond the thirty-day reglementary period and that the only residual authority of the trial judge
under this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun v. Mendoza was to enforce the accounting for completion of the relief
before the proposed appeal could be given due course was eventually reached.
2. In December, 1974, Justice Teehankee, as agreed, prepared and circulated among the members of the Court his own
draft opinion to be considered together with Justice Barredo's draft opinion for dismissal of the petition.
3. In the course of further deliberations, the seven other members of the Court expressed concurrence with Justice
Teehankee's draft opinion for the required majority of eight for the rendition of a decision en banc (excluding Justices
Fernando, who reserved his vote, and Barredo, and Justice Concepcion who is on leave). The majority further agreed
that the Court expressly declare as abandoned the doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso for the guidance of the bench
and bar, and this was incorporated as Part II (pages 27-30) of the main opinion.
4. At the long session of June 18, 1976 when the case was deliberated once more at Justice Barredo's request, and at
the end he announced that he would also concur and make the decision unanimous, Justice Fernando gave his
concurrence pro hac vice which to my mind implies that there is now an authoritative statement of doctrine, expressly
abandoning as it does, the contrary ruling in the Fuentebella case. The governing rules have not been changed "in the
middle of play". The Court's decision adhered to the Fuentebella case as applied in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, but
respondents have been given the option, at Justice Barredo's instance, to file their appeal now instead of waiting for the
completion of the accounting, in order to expedite final determination of this long-pending case.
DRAFT OF DECISION
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
petitioner with the appellate court against respondent judge to annul the amended decision rendered by him and to
compel him to order the issuance of a writ of execution of the original decision rendered by his predecessor sentencing
private respondents to deliver certain properties to petitioner in order that they may be included as part of the estate of
the deceased Hilarion Dydongco and to render an accounting of the fruits and proceeds of said properties, upon the
ground that said original decision has already become final and executory.
The antecedent facts may best be stated by quoting the decision of this Court of October 4, 1968 G. R. No. L-25461,
penned by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, between practically the same parties and regarding basically the
same issues:
It appears that as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, deceased, the settlement of which is the
subject matter of Special Proceedings No. 2205-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, its Clerk of Court, Vicente
Miranda hereinafter referred to as the Administrator-commenced Civil Case No. R-7793 of the same Court against
most of the petitioners herein, namely, Dy Chun, Dy Suat Hong, Dy Bee, Dy Seko, Tan Ho, Nolasco Dycothay (who died
later and was substituted by the Administrator of his estate, Jose Kee Dy), Agusan Commercial Company, New Agusan
Commercial, East Mindanao Lumber Company, Hiap Bee and East Mindanao Lumber Company, Inc.
In his amended complaint, Miranda alleged that prior to and at the time of his death in China sometime in 1941, Hilarion
Dydongco, who resided in the Philippines since the beginning of the century, had, in Butuan, Agusan and Cebu City, welldeveloped and established business and commercial enterprise with substantial bank deposits and about 127 parcels of
land or property; that Hilarion Dydongco went to China, in 1934, and, thereafter, became seriously ill; that, at that time,
his children, Dy Chun and Dy Suat Hong (both defendants in said case R-7793) as well as Dy Sick Lee (who died
subsequently and is not a defendant in case No. R-7793) and his protegees Dy Bee and Dy Seko were working as his
Manager and/or employees in the aforementioned business establishments, that taking advantage of the absence and
bad condition of the health of Hilarion Dydongco, particularly of his subsequent death, the defendants therein (petitioners
herein') took over said business, including its assets, goods, merchandise, chattels, machinery, stock-in-trade, cash on
hand and in banks, amounts receivable and other properties of the deceased, as well as his store known as 'Dydongco
Store', and its branches, and organized first, a fake partnership with the business name of 'Agusan Commercial
Company', and then the East Mindanao Lumber Co., which operated and did business with the capital, assets, stock-intrade, merchandise, funds and other property of said deceased; that with funds belonging to the latter, the defendants
therein (petitioners herein) moreover purchased several parcels of land, on one of which a 20-door apartment building
was constructed, with funds of the same nature, and let to Chinese tenants and other lessees that the defendants therein
(petitioners herein) had received and are receiving the rentals, earnings and profits derived from said business and
property of the deceased; and that said defendants (petitioners herein) hold, manage and operate the aforementioned
business, properties and income in trust for the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, but have not rendered any
accounting thereof.
The Administrator prayed, therefore, that judgment be rendered declaring that said business, assets, income and other
property, are in the possession and under the management and control of said defendants (petitioners herein) as mere
trustees thereof, and sentencing them to turn over and deliver the same to him, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Hilarion Dydongco, as well as to render accounts and to execute the corresponding deeds of conveyance, in addition
to paying damages and the costs. After appropriate proceedings, said Court, presided over by respondent Judge,
rendered a decision finding that most of the allegations of the Administrator had been duly proven and, accordingly,
sentenced the defendants therein (petitioners herein):
1. (To) Deliver all properties found by the Court (in body of its decision) to belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco, to
plaintiff as administrator of the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco;
2. To render full, accurate and correct accounting of all the fruits and proceeds of the properties which each of the
defendants had possessed and which has been found by this Court as properties belonging to the estate of Hilarion
Dydongco, from 1935 until the present date;
3. To render full, accurate and correct accounting of all the fruits, interest, profits and assets as well as properties
acquired by the Agusan Commercial Company, New Agusan Commercial Company, East Mindanao Lumber Company,
East Mindanao Lumber Company, Inc., from 1935 up to the present date;
4. To pay by way of exemplary damages, jointly and severally, the sum of P60,000.00 to Dy Sio Pong and Dy Suat Ngo;
5. To pay to counsel for plaintiff, jointly and severally the sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, including the cost of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Copy of this decision was, on July 30, 1965, served upon the defendants. On August 9, 1965, they filed their notice of
appeal and appeal bond and the next day, they submitted their record on appeal. On August 16, 1965, they filed,
however, a motion for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on October 18, 1965. Copy of the order to this
effect was served upon them on October 19. On October 26, they filed a notice to the effect that, on October 30, 1965,
they would submit for consideration the record on appeal filed on August 10. On November 13, defendants filed
additional pages to be attached to said record on appeal, whereas the administrator objected to the approval thereof,
upon the ground that the decision was already final and executory. On November 29, respondent Judge issued an order
declaring that 'the defendants (petitioners herein) have not perfected their appeal on time' and that the aforementioned
decision had, consequently, become final and executory.
A reconsideration of this order was denied on December 15, 1965, whereupon said defendants petitioners herein
instituted the present original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, against the administrator and respondent Judge, alleging that the latter had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing said orders of November 29 and December 15, 1965, and praying,
accordingly, that said orders be declared null and void, and that respondent Judge be directed to give due course to the
aforementioned appeal of petitioners herein as defendants in said case No. R-7793. Soon after the commencement of
these proceedings, or on December 24, 1965, we issued a writ restraining respondents therein, until January 4, 1966,
from implementing, enforcing and executing the orders of respondent Judge dated November 29 and December 15,
1965. On January 13, 1966, said writ was incorporated into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting and
approval of a bond, filed by the petitioners, in the sum of P5,000.00.
The petition herein and the answer thereto filed by respondents discuss rather extensively the question whether or not
petitioners had perfected their appeal in the lower court within the reglementary period. We find it, however, unnecessary
to pass upon said question, for the reason presently to be stated.
Although declaring that most of the properties involved in the litigation belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco, the
decision of - respondent Judge, dated July 30, 1965, moreover, required petitioners herein to render a "full, accurate and
complete accounting of all the I fuits and proceeds" of said properties. After analyzing previous rulings thereon, this Court
declared, in Fuentebella v. Carrascoso (G.R. No. 48102, May 27, 1942. See, also, Salazar v. Torres, L- 13711, May 25,
1960; Zaldarriaga v. Enriquez, L-13252, April 29, 1961; Zaldarriaga v. Zaldarriaga, L-13424, May 31, 1961) that a
decision of such nature is interlocutory in character, because it does not dispose of the action in its entirety and leaves
something to be done to complete the relief sought, and that, accordingly, it is not appealable, until after the adjudications
necessary for the completion of said relief shall have been made. Indeed, the very counsel for petitioners herein now
accept this view and concede that petitioners' appeal had been taken prematurely.
WHEREFORE, this case should be as it is hereby dismissed and the writ prayed for denied, with costs against
petitioners herein. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on January 18, 1966, is, accordingly, dissolved. It
is so ordered.
After this decision became final, three incidents arose in the court below: (1.) motion of petitioner for the execution of the
portion of the decision of Judge Mendoza ordering the delivery by defendants of certain properties to plaintiff and to
render an accounting with 30 days of the fruits and proceeds of the same during the period of defendants' possession
thereof; (2) motion for reconsideration and new trial of the defendants Dy Chun, Vicente Dy Seko, Silvestre Dy Bee and
the Administrator of the Estate of Nolasco Dycothay; and (3) motion for reconsideration of co-defendants East Mindanao
Lumber Company, East Mindanao Lumber Co. Inc., Tan Ho and Ty Suat Hong. The trial court denied the first motion and
granted partially the motions for reconsideration and new trial as follows:
1. Dismissing the complaint embodied in the first cause of action in the amended complaint against the East Mindanao
Lumber Company and the Mindanao Lumber Co., Inc.;
2. Dismissing the second cause of action of the amended complaint regarding the Plaridel lot, not having been proved
and the right to recover the Plaridel property having prescribed;
3. Declaring that Dy Suat Hong is a builder in good faith on lots Nos. 841-B4 and 841-B-3;
4. Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff as administrator of the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, within forty-five
(45) days from receipt of this judgment all the other properties not affected by the herein amendments and found by the
Court in the July 26,1965 judgment to belong to the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco.
5. Ordering the defendants who are in possession of the properties found by the Court to belong to the Estate of Hilarion
Dydongco to render a full and accurate accounting of all the fruits, assets, proceeds and expenses of said properties
including the Agusan Commercial Company and the New Agusan Commercial Company from 1935 until the present
date, the written inventory and accounting to be submitted to this Court within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
judgment for approval;
6. Denying the motions for execution, and for new trial and the claim of lack of jurisdiction;
7. Consistent with the amendments here made, the exemplary damages to be paid to Dy Siu Pong, and Dy Suat Ngo is
reduced to P30,000.00, and the attorney's fees maintained at P30,000.00 both to be paid jointly in equal proportion by
the remaining defendants Dy Chu, Dy Suat Hong, Dy Bee, Dy Seko, Tan Ho and Nolasco Dycothay, including the costs
of this suit.
In other words, respondent judge reconsidered and set aside or modified the previous decision of Judge Mendoza, and
so, against the above judgment, a petition for certiorari was filed with this Court, and We referred the same to the Court
of Appeals. In due time and after proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the said petition
thus:
In view of this ruling of the Supreme Court, expressly declaring that the decision in question of former Judge Jose M.
Mendoza is merely interlocutory in character and that the same is not appealable yet, and issuance therefore of the
controversial amended decision of the now respondent Judge Francisco Tantuico, Jr. could hardly be said to have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, much less, without or in excess of jurisdiction. The disputed decision (first) of the
former Presiding Judge Jose M. Mendoza, being interlocutory in essence, the succeeding Presiding Judge, therefore,
now respondent Judge, has jurisdiction and is clothed with authority to conduct further proceedings, consider additional
motions, rule on issues presented by the parties, and finally to issue any orders, processes and promulgate another
decision. We, therefore rule out the petitioner's other argument that the original decision in the case has already become
final and executory, in view of the Supreme Court ruling that said decision is interlocutory, hence unappealable. As the
office of certiorari only lies to correct acts of the lower court committed without or in excess of jurisdiction, and with grave
abuse of discretion. We find the present petition devoid of merit.
with Justice Andres Reyes dissenting.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, with the same vote in a resolution reiterating practically the same
considerations of the original decision. Petitioner has come to this Court with the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE, HON.
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR.,: "CAN, AS HE DID, AMEND THE DECISION OF THE PRIOR PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE SAME CFI AND THAT IN SO DOING HE ACTED WITHIN HIS JURISDICTION AND ACCORDING TO HIS DUTY
AS COURT ..."
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION (ANNEX "E")
OF NOW RETIRED JUSTICE JOSE M. MENDOZA WHO PRESIDED BRANCH VI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU, IS INTERLOCUTORY IN ESSENCE HENCE THE SUCCEEDING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE SAME COURT
HAS JURISDICTION AND IS CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, CONSIDER
ADDITIONAL MOTIONS, RULE ON ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES, AND FINALLY TO ISSUE ANY ORDERS,
PROCESSES AND PROMULGATE ANOTHER DECISION.
THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PROPRIETY,
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION AND QUESTIONS THAT ARE INVOLVED WHEN RESPONDENT JUDGE, HON.
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR. PROCEEDED TO CLOTHE HIMSELF AND ASSUMED APPELLATE AUTHORITY BY
REVIEWING, REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORIGINAL DECISION (ANNEX 'E') AND PROMULGATING AN
"AMENDED DECISION" (ANNEX 'D') ALL IN GROSS, EVIDENT ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND WITHOUT
BASIS IN LAW, IN FACT AND IN JURISPRUDENCE.
FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR
THAT HON. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT BY HOLDING
THAT THE DECISION IS INTERLOCUTORY IN ITS ENTIRETY PETITIONER IS DENIED UNJUSTIFIABLY,
UNREASONABLY AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP.
The first two assigned errors present no difficulty. In effect, the contention of petitioner is that the decision of Judge
Mendoza is not interlocutory. At this stage, We do not believe it is legally possible, much less proper, for the Court to
sustain petitioner's pose. Assuming that the disposition of an action of such nature as that filed by petitioner, which is for
the recovery of properties allegedly belonging to the estate of a deceased person, with accounting of fruits, profits and
proceeds received by private respondents during the period of supposed illegal possession, may be divided into two
separate stages, namely, (1) the determination of whether or not the said properties really belong to such estate and (2)
the approval of the accounting prayed for, it is very clear from the decision of this Court aforequoted that what was
declared therein as interlocutory was precisely the order of Judge Mendoza upholding the estate's right of ownership
over the properties in question. This cannot be doubted because at the time the said order was appealed, the second
aspect aforementioned regarding the accounting had not yet been started. There is absolutely nothing in the opinion of
Chief Justice Concepcion to indicate that the interlocutory character attributed by it to the said order is of the nature now
proposed by petitioner to the effect that the tenor and contents of the same may not be modified, altered or amended and
that the only remaining authority of the court is to consider and approve the accounting ordered to be made. In other
words, whatever merit there may be in petitioner's well presented arguments regarding the need to re-examine the ruling
of this Court in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-48102, May 27, 1942, XIV Lawyers Journal 305, as reiterated
and elucidated further in Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga, on April 29, 1961, G.R. No. L-13252, 1 SCRA 1188, this is not the
appropriate occasion for such suggested endeavor. In the instant case, We are bound by Our above decision of October
4, 1968 as the law of the case. Definitely, We cannot anymore reverse Our holding that Judge Mendoza's order or
decision is interlocutory.
In any event, We are not inclined to go along with petitioner's posture. Relying on the dissertation made by Justice
Andres Reyes of the Court of Appeals in his dissenting opinion from the majority decision of the appellate court in this
case, petitioner makes a vigorous plea for a re-examination of this Supreme Court's ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,
supra, as suggested by the distinguished appellate justice in his critical analysis of said precedent. Brushing aside, as
inconsequential in the final disposition of this case, the matter of possible impropriety of a lower collegiate court judge
insisting by casting a dissenting vote on the reversal of a ruling of the Supreme Court instead of abiding by it, albeit
expressing his disagreement therewith, We are now faced with the task of deciding whether or not to accede to the
reexamination suggested. In this connection, it is but proper to note what Mr. Justice Manuel Moran, later on Chief
Justice, author of the most commonly cited work on remedial law, entitled Comments on the Rules of Court, held for a
unanimous Court in Fuentebella:
We would deem, however, the impropriety of the action of no moment and would consider it as an appeal by certiorari
had we found merits in petitioner's contention. But we find that defendant's appeal was rightly dismissed. The judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring plaintiff entitled to share in the assets of the partnership and
directing the defendant to render an accounting of the expenses incurred in the purchase and exploitation of the mining
claims, is not final but merely interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable.
Rule 41, section 2, of the Rules of Court, provides that 'no interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the
progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the
other.' This provision has been taken substantially from section 123 of our Code of Civil Procedure which recites as
follows:
No interlocutory or incidental ruling, order, or judgment of the Court of First Instance shall stay the progress of an action
or proceedings nor shall any ruling, order, or judgment be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court until final judgment
is rendered for one party or the other.
In commenting on this article, we observed in Go Quico v. Municipal Board of Manila, 1 Phil. 502, that in considering the
American authorities it must be borne in mind that probably not one of the statutes therein construed contained such
strong prohibitions against appeals from interlocutory resolutions as are found in our article 123. The evils resulting from
such appeals under the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil were well known. It was to cure such evils that this article was
adopted. It expressly prohibits appeals not only from interlocutory orders but also from interlocutory-judgments. This
prohibition is reiterated in article 143, which says: 'upon the rendition of final judgment disposing of the action, either
party shall have the right to perfect a bill of exceptions
xxx xxx xxx
Under the Spanish procedure, appeals could be taken from any interlocutory order or judgment, with the result that in a
single case there were so many appeals and the proceedings were so delayed that in many instances parties could not,
or hardly, survive the litigation. Either they died before the rendition of the final judgment or, if they survived, the winning
party not infrequently found himself sustaining more losses than the benefits he expected to derive from his judgment.
This is the judicial irony which section 123 of our Code of Civil Procedure, now Rule 41, section 2, of the new Rules of
Court, was intended to prevent. The purpose of the provision is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single case, and to
that effect if prohibits appeal until the case has been definitely and completely disposed of by the court, that is, until a
final judgment is rendered therein.
We have on several occasions defined what a final order or judgment is as distinguished from what is merely
interlocutory. In Mijia v. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 572, we said that 'a resolution, order of judgment is appealable when it finally
disposes of the legal proceeding pending before it, so that nothing more can be done with it in that court.' This definition
has been strictly and uniformly adhered to by this Court in subsequent cases. (CF. Government v. Bishop of Nueva
Segovia, 17 Phil. 487, 489; People v. Macaraig, 54 Phil. 904, 905). In Roa v. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328, the action was for
partition of real property and from the judgment rendered designating the persons entitled to participate in the partition,
defendant therein appealed. This Court held that the judgment was not final but merely interlocutory. Something had yet
to be done for the complete disposal of the action, to wit, the appointment of commissioners of partition if the parties did
not come to an amicable partition among themselves, the making of partition by said commissioners, the filing of their
report and the rendition of judgment of such report. In Natividad v. Villarica, 31 Phil. 172, plaintiff sought to recover his
contribution to the partnership formed between him and the defendant. The latter averred that the partnership had been
dissolved after due accounting to which plaintiff refused to assent. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
partnership dissolved as of the date therein stated and ordered the defendant to render an accounting. In dismissing
defendant's appeal, we held that the judgment did not terminate the case in the Court of First Instance and was,
therefore, not appealable until 'the accounts to which plaintiff was entitled to have rendered her were either approved or
disapproved.' We reaffirmed this ruling in Vivencio V. Borja, 50 Phil. 148, and Sancho v. Lizarraga, 55 Phil. 601.
The foregoing cases supply a clear and unequivocal criterion for determining what a final order or judgment is, as
distinguished from what is interlocutory. If the judgment completely disposes of the action, it is final and therefore
appealable; if it does not and leaves something to be done for the completion of the relief sought, it is not final and no
appeal therefrom will be allowed.
Unfortunately, however, other cases decided by this Court have thrown this rule into confusion and thwarted,
undesignedly to be sure, the intent of the law they purport to interpret. Thus, in Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934, the action
was for partition of real property, but the defendants alleged exclusive ownership. On the issue thus joined, judgment
was rendered declaring plaintiffs and defendants co-owners of the property and ordering that the same be partitioned
among them. On appeal, this Court held that the judgment was final and therefore appealable, as it disposed of the
claims of the defendants. This ruling was reiterated in Villanueva v. Capistrano, 49 Phil. 484. Again, in Heacock v.
American Trading Co., 53 Phil. 481 judgment was rendered declaring the trademark therein disputed to belong to the
plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to render, within fifteen days, an accounting of the profits it had obtained from the
illegal use of the trade-mark. Defendant, without rendering an accounting, interposed an appeal from the judgment. Upon
the question as to whether the judgment was final or merely interlocutory, this Court held: 'In this kind of a case, in
particular, and in accord with the weight of authority, we hold that, under the issues made by the pleadings, the primary
purpose in both cases was to ascertain and determine who was the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the
disputed trade-mark, and that the judgment which was rendered by the lower court was a judgment on the merits as to
those question, and that the order of the court for an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to, the judgment on
the merits. That is to say, that the judgment which the lower court rendered was a final judgment within the meaning of
section 123 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to the judgment;
that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgment as rendered; and that for such reason it was the legal duty of the
lower court to sign and certify the bills of exceptions as tendered.' This ruling was reiterated in Prophylactic Brush Co. et
al. v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 46254, November 23, 1938 (Unpublished).
The Africa case was distinguished by this Court from the Mojica case in that, in the former the defendants alleged
exclusive ownership which the defendant in the latter did not. Similarly, the Heacock case was distinguished from that of
Villarica in that, while in the latter the accounting was the main action, in the former, it was merely incidental to the
question of trade-mark. In both cases (the Africa and the Heacock), the cardinal consideration which apparently induced
this Court to a different conclusion from that reached in the other cases is that the judgments rendered therein disposed
of the contentions of the respective defendants. We are now convinced that, if we are to achieve the true purpose of
section 123 of Act No. 190, now Rule 41, section 2, the distinctions thus established are of no consequence and the
rationals which induced the conclusion arrived at in the Africa and Heacock cases mistakes the true test of what a final
judgment is for purposes of appeal. Whether or not the defendant alleged exclusive ownership in an answer to a
complaint for partition, if the judgment therein rendered is for partition, said judgment though disposing of defendant's
contention, does not dispose completely of the case. Other proceedings have yet to be taken for the completion of the
relief sought, such as, the appointment of commissioners; their report to the court; and the rendition of the court's
judgment thereon. Likewise, whether or not the action for accounting is the principal one or is merely incidental to
another, the judgment requiring such accounting cannot be final. The actual rendition of such account and the judgmentof the court thereon are other links in a chain of proceedings essential for the complete termination of the case. And the
true test for determining whether an order or judgment is final for purposes of appeal is not whether the judgment
disposes of the contentions of the parties, or whether it touches the merits of the case, but whether 'it finally disposes of
the legal proceeding, so that nothing more can be done with it on the court where it is determined (Mejia v. Alimorong,
supra), or in the language of section 143 of Act No. 190, whether "it disposes of the action." To supply any other criterion
is to bring confusion to what otherwise is a plain and unequivocal rule of law.
It may be true that actual partition in the Africa case or actual accounting in the Heacock case may greatly prejudice the
defendant if, on appeal, the judgment is reversed, for in such eventuality the proceeding for partitioner accounting, which
may have been expensive, will have become unnecessary. But a like prejudice may be imagined for the plaintiff in the
event of affirmance of the judgment, for then he will have to go back to the trial court for actual partition or accounting
with the possibility of a second appeal from the judgment that may be rendered thereon. These possibilities on both sides
of the question were, undoubtedly, present in the minds of the lawmakers when section 123 of Act No. 190 was passed,
but they considered the latter as of a graver mischief when, without distinction, they prohibited an appeal from any kind
of interlocutory orders or judgments. And we think the choice is not without reason because the affirmance of a judgment
is more probable than its reversal by virtue of the presumption of its correctness. (People v. Wilson, 532 Phil., 907).
That the true rule is to prohibit generally and without distinction appeals from any kind of interlocutory orders or
judgments, is attested by a consideration of analogous instances where the law entirely ignores the inconveniences to a
party wishing to appeal. For example, the defendant, filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff has no
capacity to sue, is compelled, if his motion is overruled, to file his answer and proceed to trial so that the court may
render a final judgment. If on appeal, the order overruling one motion is reversed, then, certainly, all the proceedings had
after the overruling of such motion by the trial court would have been useless and vexatious to the defendant. But may
those inconveniences he validly pleaded to support the contention that an appeal lies against the order overruling a
motion to dismiss? The reason for the law seems clear, therefore, that even if, in compelling the defendant in the
Heacock case for instance, to render an accounting, so much of his commercial secrets would have been unnecessarily
revealed should the judgment be thereafter reversed, this private and exceptional loss cannot compare with the general
harm that would follow from throwing the door open to a multiplicity of appeals in a single case.
In the light of these considerations, we reverse the ruling laid down in Africa v. Africa, 42 Phil. 934, as reiterated in
Villanueva v. Capistrano, 49 Phil. 460, as well as the ruling laid down in Heacock v. American Trading Co., 53 Phil., 481,
as reiterated in Prophylactic Brush Co. et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 46254, November 23, 1938
(unpublished), and reaffirm the doctrine laid down in Ron v. Mojica, 8 Phil. 172, and Natividad v. Villarica, 31 Phil. 172 as
reiterated in Vivencio v. Borja, 50 Phil. 148, and Sancho v. Lazarraga, Phil. 601.
The order of dismissal of petitioner's appeal rendered by the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner.
In the light of the consideration thus luminously and logically put forth by a member of the Court recognized to be more
than ordinarily knowledgeable in matters of procedure, and considering that the arguments adduced by Justice Reyes
and petitioner's counsel, which are more or less mere repetitions of those already taken into account in the above
opinion, We are loathe to further confuse the bench and the bar with another ruling inconsistent therewith, which would
make it patent that the Supreme Court cannot make up its mind on a point of procedure, as to which it should not be
uncertain precisely because it promulgated the rules on the matter 1 subsequent already to the conflicting decisions in
Roa vs. Mojica and the ones that followed it on the one hand, and in Africa vs. Africa and the ones that reiterated it, on
the other. It is to be presumed that the Court had these two lines of decisions in mind and that in formulating Section 2 of
Rule 41 and the other provisions related thereto it meant to remove any doubt as to which line to follow. It was precisely
to this end that Mr. Justice Moran elucidated on the true import of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. Indeed,
We cannot perceive any cogent reason for returning to the overruled doctrine in Africa vs. Africa. If any modification of
the Fuentebella ruling is believed desirable, it should be done only by amending the corresponding rules, in order that
the change may have prospective effect only and proceedings in which the parties and the Court had to adhere to said
ruling, it being the prevailing one, may not be placed at a disadvantage merely because they have followed the existing
rule and its interpretation by the Supreme Court. For the present, the Court does not contemplate any such modification
or amendment of the existing rules.
Withal, in Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. L-13252, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1188, Mr. Justice Arsenio Dizon, who was
a well known and respected professor and reviewer of remedial law in many law schools for a long time, explained
further that the order recognizing the right of the plaintiff to a partition is not the judgment, for under Section 7 of Rule 71,
2
it is only after hearing (the report of the commissioners) that the court is supposed to render a final judgment, Here is
how Mr. Justice Dizon spoke for a unanimous court in that case:
While upon the facts above stated, the respondent court, in our opinion, erred firstly, in not allowing petitioner to adopt
the appeal bond and the record on appeal filed by the other defendants and which court had already approved, and
secondly, in sustaining the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Basilia F. Vda. de Zaldarriaga, because (a) the appeal
bond and record on appeal filed by the other defendants were sufficient for the purposes of the appeal interposed by the
herein petitioner, and (b) because the latter filed her separate record on appeal within the extension granted by the lower
court itself, still we are constrained to deny the present petition for mandamus to compel the respondent court to give
due course to petitioner's appeal, for the reason that the decision from which she and her co-defendants are appealing is
not final but interlocutory (Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-48102, May 27,1942). It is true that in Africa vs. Africa,
42 Phil. 934 and other cases it was held contrary to the rule laid down in Roa vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328; Rodriguez vs.
Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63- that in a partition case where defendant relies on the defense of exclusive ownership, the action
becomes one for title and the decision or order directing partition is final, but the ruling to this effect has been expressly
reversed in the Fuentabella cue which, in our opinion, express the correct view, con that a decision or order directing
partition is not final because it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the
case, namely, the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings to be had before them, the submission of their report
which, according to law, must be set for hearing. In fact, it is only after said hearing that the court may render a final
judgment finally disposing of the action (Rule 71, section 7, Rules of Court). Precisely in accordance with this procedure
the decision from which petitioner and her co-parties intend to appeal provides for the appointment of the Clerk of Court
and Segundo Hipolito as Commissioners "We make an equitable separation, delineation and partition of the respective
share of the land pertaining to each co-owner, etc".
Thus, the only point which We have to determine is whether or not, because of the interlocutory character of said
decision or order, the respondent judge acted illegally or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
practically setting aside and modifying the same substantially, upon a review of the record made by him and for the
reasons stated in the amended decision. In other words, the broad fundamental issue here revolves around the power of
a court relative to an interlocutory order or judgment. In this respect, We need only to recall that in Manila Electric Co. vs.
Arciaga, et al, 50 Phil. 144, this Court explained the nature of an interlocutory order or judgment thus:
As to the legal question whether or not the decision of this court revoking the order of the lower court sustaining the
demurrer to the complaint constitutes res judicata, since the facts involved are the same, it is sufficient to cite the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Reilly vs. Perkins (56 Pac., 734), which reads as
follows:
The doctrine of res judicata amounts simply to this: That a cause of action once finally determined without appeal,
between the parties on its merits, cannot afterwards be litigated by new proceedings, either before the same or any other
tribunal. It is only, however, a final judgment upon the merits to which this doctrine applies. Until final judgment is
reached, the proceedings are subject to change and modification, are imperfect and inchoate, and can avail nothing as a
bar until the judgment, with its verity as a record, settles finally and conclusively the questions and issues. An
interlocutory order or decree made in the progress of a case is always under the control of the court until the final
decision of the suit, and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment,
though it be after the term in which the interlocutory order or decree was given, and is not, therefore, a final judgment, to
which the doctrine of res adjudicata can apply. (Foster vs. Richard Busteed, 100 Mass., 412; Webb vs. Buckelew, 82
N.Y., 555; Black, Judge., 308.)
An interlocutory order, overruling a general demurrer to a complaint, is not res judicata of its sufficiency to support a
judgment for plaintiff, and hence is no bar to the subsequent vacation of such order at a subsequent term, and the entry
of judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant, since the doctrine of res judicata applies only to a final judgment on
the merits.'
Moreover, it must be borned that in the juridical sense, the prayer for accounting or partition in relation to a controversy
wherein ownership of property is in issue or where the right to an accounting or to a partition is disputed, is not a mere
incident or consequence of the main issue but is one of the reliefs arising from a single cause of action together with the
ownership or right to accounting or partition alleged in the complaint. Viewed in this light, it is easy to understand that
only a single judgment can be rendered by the court in a case of such nature, for the simple reason that in the same
manner that a single cause of action cannot be split in order to be made the subject of more than one complaint or
action, the judgment in regard to a single cause of action may not also be split into several parts, each having a final
character of its own. It is in the very nature of these kinds of action that some sort of a preliminary finding has to be made
before the longer and more complicated matter of accounting or partition is taken up, tried and determined by the court.
And because such finding is intended to be merely preliminary, since it is conceivable that the same may be affected by
incidents or questions related to the actual accounting or partition, it is but proper and wise to leave room for the court to
make such modification, amendments and alteration of its preliminary findings and holdings as it may deem demanded
by the circumstances and interests of justice. It is not, therefore, correct to say, as Justice Reyes asserts in his dissenting
opinion, that multiplicity of appeals is more tolerable than the impairment of the stability of a judgment, since there is no
judgment to speak of but merely a preliminary finding which is not supposed to acquire any stability until the final
judgment is rendered. Furthermore, the point of policy underlying is the Fuentebella ruling as stated in the opinion
penned by Chief Justice Moran, is the avoidance of multiple appeals, hence the test of the finality of a judgment is not
whether or not it dispose of the contention of the parties or touches on the merits of the case but whether it finally
disposes of that legal proceeding, so that nothing more can be done with it in the court where it is determined or whether
it disposes of the action. Accordingly, We cannot accept the theory that the preliminary finding must be considered as
beyond reconsideration by the court, even if he should find the same erroneous after a review of the record. And the fact
that herein respondent judge was not the one who made the preliminary finding is immaterial, for what the original judge
can do, his successor can also do. (Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318).
Thus, We find no error in the following holding in the resolution of the Court of Appeals under review:
The decision of then Judge Mendoza being still interlocutory, the main issue is whether a presiding Judge of a Court of
First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a total lack of jurisdiction in changing or amending a
decision which was still interlocutory, made by the prior presiding Judge of the same Court of First Instance.
We reiterate our finding that respondent Judge can, as he did, amend the decision of the prior presiding Judge of the
same CFI and that in so doing he acted within his jurisdiction and according to his duty as a court, with the inherent
power to amend and control his processes and orders so as to make them conform to the law and justice (Sec. 5, Rule
124, Rules of Court). This principle has been decided time and again, with the holding that a presiding judge, may
amend, modify and correct a decision of a previous presiding judge of the same court where said decision is not yet filial
and executory (Daleon vs. CFI of Quezon, CA-G.R. No. 22416-R, March 31, 1958; Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil, 318;
Dunning & Co. vs. See Pua, CA-G.R. .No. 8325-R, Oct. 26, 1942; Tan Le Po vs. Amparo, CA-G.R. No. 5615-R, June
23,1950; San Miguel Brewery, Inc, vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 178).
On the same point is the case of Chuakay vs. Herrerias, CA-G.R. No. 3893-R, June 30, 1952.
It can be done upon evidence received by the former presiding Judge (People vs. Samsono, CA-G.R. No. 1099-CR, Oct.
29,1947).
The respondent Judge having acted within his jurisdiction, any errors in the amended decision promulgated by him would
be errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction, hence, correctible by regular appeal and not by the special civil action of
certiorari.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals under review are affirmed, with
costs against petitioner.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, just so this case may be terminated without further delay. The unanimous vote in favor of the
judgment herein should discourage any motion for reconsideration. It should be obvious from the result of our voting as
reflected in the main opinion and in this separate concurrence that any attempt to have the procedure outlined in the
main opinion altered is from the practical standpoint doomed not to be sanctioned. Besides, as to the points of law in
dispute, it may be stated that with Justices Fernando 1 and Aquino and myself having actually qualified our votes, the
seven unqualified votes supporting the main opinion are, to my mind, not enough to impart full doctrinal status to the
pronouncements of the majority.
It is my firm conviction that the holding in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, 25 SCRA 431, which resolved the prelude incident to
the case at bar, in the sense that the decision of Judge Mendoza of July 26, 1965 is interlocutory is the law of the case
for the purpose of the present controversy. The action of the Court in that case of merely dismissing the petition for
mandamus to compel Judge Mendoza to give due course to the appeal of respondents does not constitute, contrary to
what is inaccurately stated in the main opinion, a remand of the case to the trial court, if only because neither the case
itself nor the records thereof were with this Court then, hence there was nothing to remand in any sense. Much less did
this Court's decision qualify in any manner the meaning and import of what it considered to be the interlocutory character
of the Mendoza decision, as may be plainly seen in the complete text of Chief Justice Concepcion's decision which I am
reproducing in the annex of this opinion. I hold that as in any other case of an interlocutory order or judgment, the
Mendoza decision was subject to modification and even reversed at any time before an appeal therefrom is taken, any
adverse resolution of a prior motion for reconsideration thereof notwithstanding. Accustomed as I am to instances
wherein the decisions or orders of judges who have either died, resigned or been removed from office, before the finality
of said judgments have been either modified or reversed by their successors, upon motions in due course of the parties
concerned, I cannot share the view that in rendering his amended decision, Judge Tantuico improperly arrogated unto
himself the attributes of a reviewing appellate authority, just because he based his own findings on no more than the
same evidence which was before his predecessors. Withal, since not a scintilla of the evidence presented in the court
below is before the Court in this proceeding, I consider it unfair for the Court to make reference to Judge Tantuico's
amended decision in any manner that might leave the impression that the same is in anyway either capricious or ill
considered. Truth to tell, I cannot condemn Judge Tantuico for having acted as he did, because with my own
understanding of the law, in the light of the Fuentebella ruling before me, I would have probably acted the way he did.
Speaking for myself, and judging from the contents and ratiocination of said amended decision, which I have read very
carefully, I would say that, contrary to the thrust of the main opinion, the decision of Judge Mendoza ought not to be
projected as if it were the last word in the disposition of the questions of fact and law in this case, thereby to enable the
appellate court in due time to consider the evidence in this case without feeling hindered by any thought that the
Supreme Court intentionally or not, has already formed its opinion as to the correctness of said decision.
Originally, I was resolved to dissent. To be sure, when this case was first deliberated on about five years ago, the
consensus among the incumbent justices then, even if not definitely conclusive, was more inclined towards the dismissal
of the instant petition, so much so that I was assigned to prepare the main opinion, which I did, as may be seen in the
draft thereof, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A of this separate opinion. It was only because of the desire of
Justice Teehankee, the writer of the present main opinion, to have the case further studied that no final vote was taken.
Since then, there have been several changes in the membership of the Court, and as usually happens in human courts,
the consensus remained inconclusive, until Justice Teehankee was able to secure the conformity of six other justices to
his draft, at which point, We finally decided to at long last terminate this case before the retirement of Justice Esguerra,
hence the marathon session of June 18th last which started at 10:30 o'clock in the morning and continued without any
break until past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, with the justices partaking of only sandwiches and juices at the
discussions, at some points emotional and truly heated, went on. At the final voting, Justice Fernando voted pro hac vice
in favor of the judgment, which I understand means, "only for this occasion" or for the purposes of the case at bar only.
(See, Philippine Law Dictionary by Moreno, p. 374, citing Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Summers, 42 Phil. 7.) Justice Aquino
also qualified his vote as a concurrence only in the result, and when I voiced the possibility of changing my vote from
dissent to concurrence in the result, on the condition that respondents would be allowed to appeal immediately from the
Mendoza decision and with the reservation to file this separate opinion, Justice Aquino said he would join me. And since
it became obvious then that with only seven votes unqualifiedly supporting the main opinion, I felt that the purported
reversal of the Fuentebella doctrine in the main opinion could only have academic worth, I deemed it to be a more
practical position for me to definitely give my vote in favor of the result, to the end that, as I have said at the outset, the
controversy among the brothers and sisters involved in this case may come to an earlier definite conclusion on the
merits, after almost a quarter of century of procedural delays. Anyway, notwithstanding that the procedure actually
ordered to be followed in this case hereafter is not in accordance with the Fuentebella ruling, and inasmuch as the Court
has agreed to my suggestion that respondents be allowed to appeal immediately, I am satisfied that substantial justice
will just the same be ultimately achieved fully, when this case is resolved on the merits by the proper appellate court.
As earlier indicated, I am submitting herewith as Annex A hereof the draft of a decision I prepared more than four years
ago when there were less votes in the Court to overturn the Fuentebella ruling. Therein my differences of views with my
brethren in the majority now can best be appreciated, particularly as to my position on the law of this particular case and
the true and correct concept of an interlocutory order or judgment.
My exercise in matters of adjective law as an active practitioner, actually dealing with court procedure all the time, and as
an avid student of remedial law before I came to this Court, cautions me against precipitately joining my learned
colleagues in making reference, in resolving the main issue of procedure before Us to the rules on judgments at various
stages (See. 5 of Rule 36; and immediate execution of judgments directing an accounting (See. 4 of Rule 39) and to the
ruling in Arnedo vs. Llorente, 18 Phil. 257, none of which, to my mind, contemplates the situation in the present case.
Surely, the Fuentebella ruling cannot, in my opinion, be in anyway considered as violative of any injuction that cases be
speedily and justly disposed of, whether that injunction be deemed as emanating from the Constitution, established
jurisprudence or any statutory or moral code.
Likewise, I am not persuaded that the order of immediate execution contained in the judgment herein is in accordance
with law, if only because the motion of petitioners in the court below was not premised on Section 2 of Rule 39 but on the
insistence of petitioner, despite the Dy Chun decision, that the Mendoza decision has already become final and
executory, but I cannot disregard the pragmatic consideration that any dissent on my part on this point would be purely
academic, considering there are enough votes to carry out the judgment as it is.
I am fully aware of the power of this Court to exempt certain cases from the application of the rules when demanded by
the necessity of doing what clearly appears to be a matter of substantial justice to the parties, I honestly believe,
however, that there is nothing in the factual situation before Us now that warrants such invocation of Our extraordinary
prerogatives. Indeed, I always want to be careful and sparing in departing from unequivocal rules and precedents or
established doctrines which leave no room for misunderstanding or misconstruction. It is certainly disconcerting to
visualize litigants as being players in a game the governing rules of which are susceptible to being changed in the middle
of play, with the referee immediately enforcing the modified rules. Unless it is manifest that denial of substantial justice
would result otherwise, the consequent inequity of unnecessarily resorting to such practice is to my mind, beyond
debate.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee. Without intending to detract in any way from Mr. Justice
Barredo's recollection of certain incidents in his concurring opinion, I write this brief concurrence to set forth my own
recollection thereof after I joined the Court in August, 1970 as follows:
1. During the many past deliberations of the Court on the case, no consensus was reached for dismissal of the instant
petition. A tentative consensus in favor of ruling that the original judgment of Judge Mendoza could no longer be
amended or modified beyond the thirty-day reglementary period and that the only residual authority of the trial judge
under this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun v. Mendoza was to enforce the accounting for completion of the relief
before the proposed appeal could be given due course was eventually reached.
2. In December, 1974, Justice Teehankee, as agreed, prepared and circulated among the members of the Court his own
draft opinion to be considered together with Justice Barredo's draft opinion for dismissal of the petition.
3. In the course of further deliberations, the seven other members of the Court expressed concurrence with Justice
Teehankee's draft opinion for the required majority of eight for the rendition of a decision en banc (excluding Justices
Fernando, who reserved his vote, and Barredo, and Justice Concepcion who is on leave). The majority further agreed
that the Court expressly declare as abandoned the doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso for the guidance of the bench
and bar, and this was incorporated as Part II (pages 27-30) of the main opinion.
4. At the long session of June 18, 1976 when the case was deliberated once more at Justice Barredo's request, and at
the end he announced that he would also concur and make the decision unanimous, Justice Fernando gave his
concurrence pro hac vice which to my mind implies that there is now an authoritative statement of doctrine, expressly
abandoning as it does, the contrary ruling in the Fuentebella case. The governing rules have not been changed "in the
middle of play". The Court's decision adhered to the Fuentebella case as applied in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, but
respondents have been given the option, at Justice Barredo's instance, to file their appeal now instead of waiting for the
completion of the accounting, in order to expedite final determination of this long-pending case.
DRAFT OF DECISION
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
petitioner with the appellate court against respondent judge to annul the amended decision rendered by him and to
compel him to order the issuance of a writ of execution of the original decision rendered by his predecessor sentencing
private respondents to deliver certain properties to petitioner in order that they may be included as part of the estate of
the deceased Hilarion Dydongco and to render an accounting of the fruits and proceeds of said properties, upon the
ground that said original decision has already become final and executory.
The antecedent facts may best be stated by quoting the decision of this Court of October 4, 1968 G. R. No. L-25461,
penned by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, between practically the same parties and regarding basically the
same issues:
It appears that as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, deceased, the settlement of which is the
subject matter of Special Proceedings No. 2205-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, its Clerk of Court, Vicente
Miranda hereinafter referred to as the Administrator-commenced Civil Case No. R-7793 of the same Court against
most of the petitioners herein, namely, Dy Chun, Dy Suat Hong, Dy Bee, Dy Seko, Tan Ho, Nolasco Dycothay (who died
later and was substituted by the Administrator of his estate, Jose Kee Dy), Agusan Commercial Company, New Agusan
Commercial, East Mindanao Lumber Company, Hiap Bee and East Mindanao Lumber Company, Inc.
In his amended complaint, Miranda alleged that prior to and at the time of his death in China sometime in 1941, Hilarion
Dydongco, who resided in the Philippines since the beginning of the century, had, in Butuan, Agusan and Cebu City, welldeveloped and established business and commercial enterprise with substantial bank deposits and about 127 parcels of
land or property; that Hilarion Dydongco went to China, in 1934, and, thereafter, became seriously ill; that, at that time,
his children, Dy Chun and Dy Suat Hong (both defendants in said case R-7793) as well as Dy Sick Lee (who died
subsequently and is not a defendant in case No. R-7793) and his protegees Dy Bee and Dy Seko were working as his
Manager and/or employees in the aforementioned business establishments, that taking advantage of the absence and
bad condition of the health of Hilarion Dydongco, particularly of his subsequent death, the defendants therein (petitioners
herein') took over said business, including its assets, goods, merchandise, chattels, machinery, stock-in-trade, cash on
hand and in banks, amounts receivable and other properties of the deceased, as well as his store known as "Dydongco
Store", and its branches, and organized first, a fake partnership with the business name of "Agusan Commercial
Company", and then the East Mindanao Lumber Co., which operated and did business with the capital, assets, stock-intrade, merchandise, funds and other property of said deceased; that with funds belonging to the latter, the defendants
therein (petitioners herein) moreover purchased several parcels of land, on one of which a 20-door apartment building
was constructed, with funds of the same nature, and let to Chinese tenants and other lessees that the defendants therein
(petitioners herein) had received and are receiving the rentals, earnings and profits derived from said business and
property of the deceased; and that said defendants (petitioners herein) hold, manage and operate the aforementioned
business, properties and income in trust for the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, but have not rendered any
accounting thereof.
The Administrator prayed, therefore, that judgment be rendered declaring that said business, assets, income and other
property, are in the possession and under the management and control of said defendants (petitioners herein) as mere
trustees thereof, and sentencing them to turn over and deliver the same to him, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Hilarion Dydongco, as well as to render accounts and to execute the corresponding deeds of conveyance, in addition
to paying damages and the costs. After appropriate proceedings, said Court, presided over by respondent Judge,
rendered a decision finding that most of the allegations of the Administrator had been duly proven and, accordingly,
sentenced the defendants therein (petitioners herein):
1. (To) Deliver all properties found by the Court (in body of its decision) to belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco, to
plaintiff as administrator of the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco;
East Mindanao Lumber Company, Inc., from 1935 up to the present date;
4. To pay by way of exemplary damages, jointly and severally, the sum of P60,000.00 to Dy Sio Pong and Dy Suat Ngo;
5. To pay to counsel for plaintiff, jointly and severally the sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, including the cost of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Copy of this decision was, on July 30, 1965, served upon the defendants. On August 9, 1965, they filed their notice of
appeal and appeal bond and the next day, they submitted their record on appeal. On August 16, 1965, they filed,
however, a motion for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on October 18, 1965. Copy of the order to this
effect was served upon them on October 19. On October 26, they filed a notice to the effect that, on October 30, 1965,
they would submit for consideration the record on appeal filed on August 10. On November 13, defendants filed
additional pages to be attached to said record on appeal, whereas the administrator objected to the approval thereof,
upon the ground that the decision was already final and executory. On November 29, respondent Judge issued an order
declaring that 'the defendants (petitioners herein) have not perfected their appeal on time' and that the aforementioned
decision had, consequently, become final and executory.
A reconsideration of this order was denied on December 15, 1965, whereupon said defendants petitioners herein
instituted the present original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, against the administrator and respondent Judge, alleging that the latter had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing said orders of November 29 and December 15, 1965, and praying,
accordingly, that said orders be declared null and void, and that respondent Judge be directed to give due course to the
aforementioned appeal of petitioners herein as defendants in said case No. R-7793. Soon after the commencement of
these proceedings, or on December 24, 1965, we issued a writ restraining respondents therein, until January 4, 1966,
from implementing, enforcing and executing the orders of respondent Judge dated November 29 and December 15,
1965. On January 13, 1966, said writ was incorporated into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting and
approval of a bond, filed by the petitioners, in the sum of P5,000.00.
The petition herein and the answer thereto filed by respondents discuss rather extensively the question whether or not
petitioners had perfected their appeal in the lower court within the reglementary period. We find it, however, unnecessary
to pass upon said question, for the reason presently to be stated.
Although declaring that most of the properties involved in the litigation belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco, the
decision of - respondent Judge, dated July 30, 1965, moreover, required petitioners herein to render a 'full, accurate and
complete accounting of all the I fuits and proceeds' of said properties. After analyzing previous rulings thereon, this Court
declared, in Fuentebella v. Carrascoso (G.R. No. 48102, May 27, 1942. See, also, Salazar v. Torres, L- 13711, May 25,
1960; Zaldarriaga v. Enriquez, L-13252, April 29, 1961; Zaldarriaga v. Zaldarriaga, L-13424, May 31, 1961) that a
decision of such nature is interlocutory in character, because it does not dispose of the action in its entirety and leaves
something to be done to complete the relief sought, and that, accordingly, it is not appealable, until after the adjudications
necessary for the completion of said relief shall have been made. Indeed, the very counsel for petitioners herein now
accept this view and concede that petitioners' appeal had been taken prematurely.
WHEREFORE, this case should be as it is hereby dismissed and the writ prayed for denied, with costs against
petitioners herein. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on January 18, 1966, is, accordingly, dissolved. It
is so ordered.
After this decision became final, three incidents arose in the court below: (1.) motion of petitioner for the execution of the
portion of the decision of Judge Mendoza ordering the delivery by defendants of certain properties to plaintiff and to
render an accounting with 30 days of the fruits and proceeds of the same during the period of defendants' possession
thereof; (2) motion for reconsideration and new trial of the defendants Dy Chun, Vicente Dy Seko, Silvestre Dy Bee and
the Administrator of the Estate of Nolasco Dycothay; and (3) motion for reconsideration of co-defendants East Mindanao
Lumber Company, East Mindanao Lumber Co. Inc., Tan Ho and Ty Suat Hong. The trial court denied the first motion and
granted partially the motions for reconsideration and new trial as follows:
1. Dismissing the complaint embodied in the first cause of action in the amended complaint against the East Mindanao
2. Dismissing the second cause of action of the amended complaint regarding the Plaridel lot, not having been proved
and the right to recover the Plaridel property having prescribed;
3. Declaring that Dy Suat Hong is a builder in good faith on lots Nos. 841-B4 and 841-B-3;
4. Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff as administrator of the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, within forty-five
Court in the July 26,1965 judgment to belong to the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco-,
5. Ordering the defendants who are in possession of the properties found by the Court to belong to the Estate of Hilarion
judgment for approval;
6. Denying the motions for execution, and for new trial and the claim of lack of jurisdiction;
7. Consistent with the amendments here made, the exemplary damages to be paid to Dy Siu Pong, and Dy Suat Ngo is
reduced to P30,000.00, and the attorney's fees maintained at P30,000.00 both to be paid jointly in equal proportion by
the remaining defendants Dy Chu, Dy Suat Hong, Dy Bee, Dy Seko, Tan Ho and Nolasco Dycothay, including the costs
of this suit.
In other words, respondent judge reconsidered and set aside or modified the previous decision of Judge Mendoza, and
so, against the above judgment, a petition for certiorari was filed with this Court, and We referred the same to the Court
of Appeals. In due time and after proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the said petition
thus:
In view of this ruling of the Supreme Court, expressly declaring that the decision in question of former Judge Jose M.
Mendoza is merely interlocutory in character and that the same is not appealable yet, and issuance therefore of the
controversial amended decision of the now respondent Judge Francisco Tantuico, Jr. could hardly be said to have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, much less, without or in excess of jurisdiction. The disputed decision (first) of the
former Presiding Judge Jose M. Mendoza, being interlocutory in essence, the succeeding Presiding Judge, therefore,
now respondent Judge, has jurisdiction and is clothed with authority to conduct further proceedings, consider additional
motions, rule on issues presented by the parties, and finally to issue any orders, processes and promulgate another
decision. We, therefore rule out the petitioner's other argument that the original decision in the case has already become
final and executory, in view of the Supreme Court ruling that said decision is interlocutory, hence unappealable. As the
office of certiorari only lies to correct acts of the lower court committed without or in excess of jurisdiction, and with grave
abuse of discretion. We find the present petition devoid of merit.
with Justice Andres Reyes dissenting.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, with the same vote in a resolution reiterating practically the same
considerations of the original decision. Petitioner has come to this Court with the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE, HON.
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR.,: "CAN, AS HE DID, AMEND THE DECISION OF THE PRIOR PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE SAME CFI AND THAT IN SO DOING HE ACTED WITHIN HIS JURISDICTION AND ACCORDING TO HIS DUTY
AS COURT"...
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION (ANNEX "E")
OF NOW RETIRED JUSTICE JOSE M. MENDOZA WHO PRESIDED BRANCH VI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU, IS INTERLOCUTORY IN ESSENCE HENCE THE SUCCEEDING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE SAME COURT
HAS JURISDICTION AND IS CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, CONSIDER
ADDITIONAL MOTIONS, RULE ON ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES, AND FINALLY TO ISSUE ANY ORDERS,
PROCESSES AND PROMULGATE ANOTHER DECISION.
THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PROPRIETY,
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION AND QUESTIONS THAT ARE INVOLVED WHEN RESPONDENT JUDGE, HON.
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR. PROCEEDED TO CLOTHE HIMSELF AND ASSUMED APPELLATE AUTHORITY BY
REVIEWING, REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORIGINAL DECISION (ANNEX 'E') AND PROMULGATING AN
'AMENDED DECISION' (ANNEX 'D') ALL IN GROSS, EVIDENT ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND WITHOUT
BASIS IN LAW, IN FACT AND IN JURISPRUDENCE.
FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR
THAT HON. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT BY HOLDING
THAT THE DECISION IS INTERLOCUTORY IN ITS ENTIRETY PETITIONER IS DENIED UNJUSTIFIABLY,
UNREASONABLY AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP.
The first two assigned errors present no difficulty. In effect, the contention of petitioner is that the decision of Judge
Mendoza is not interlocutory. At this stage, We do not believe it is legally possible, much less proper, for the Court to
sustain petitioner's pose. Assuming that the disposition of an action of such nature as that filed by petitioner, which is for
the recovery of properties allegedly belonging to the estate of a deceased person, with accounting of fruits, profits and
proceeds received by private respondents during the period of supposed illegal possession, may be divided into two
separate stages, namely, (1) the determination of whether or not the said properties really belong to such estate and (2)
the approval of the accounting prayed for, it is very clear from the decision of this Court aforequoted that what was
declared therein as interlocutory was precisely the order of Judge Mendoza upholding the estate's right of ownership
over the properties in question. This cannot be doubted because at the time the said order was appealed, the second
aspect aforementioned regarding the accounting had not yet been started. There is absolutely nothing in the opinion of
Chief Justice Concepcion to indicate that the interlocutory character attributed by it to the said order is of the nature now
proposed by petitioner to the effect that the tenor and contents of the same may not be modified, altered or amended and
that the only remaining authority of the court is to consider and approve the accounting ordered to be made. In other
words, whatever merit there may be in petitioner's well presented arguments regarding the need to re-examine the ruling
of this Court in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-48102, May 27, 1942, XIV Lawyers Journal 305, as reiterated
and elucidated further in Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga, on April 29, 1961, G.R. No. L-13252, 1 SCRA 1188, this is not the
appropriate occasion for such suggested endeavor. In the instant case, We are bound by Our above decision of October
4, 1968 as the law of the case. Definitely, We cannot anymore reverse Our holding that Judge Mendoza's order or
decision is interlocutory.
In any event, We are not inclined to go along with petitioner's posture. Relying on the dissertation made by Justice
Andres Reyes of the Court of Appeals in his dissenting opinion from the majority decision of the appellate court in this
case, petitioner makes a vigorous plea for a re-examination of this Supreme Court's ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,
supra, as suggested by the distinguished appellate justice in his critical analysis of said precedent. Brushing aside, as
inconsequential in the final disposition of this case, the matter of possible impropriety of a lower collegiate court judge
insisting by casting a dissenting vote on the reversal of a ruling of the Supreme Court instead of abiding by it, albeit
expressing his disagreement therewith, We are now faced with the task of deciding whether or not to accede to the
reexamination suggested. In this connection, it is but proper to note what Mr. Justice Manuel Moran, later on Chief
Justice, author of the most commonly cited work on remedial law, entitled Comments on the Rules of Court, held for a
unanimous Court in Fuentebella:
We would deem, however, the impropriety of the action of no moment and would consider it as an appeal by certiorari
had we found merits in petitioner's contention. But we find that defendant's appeal was rightly dismissed. The judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring plaintiff entitled to share in the assets of the partnership and
directing the defendant to render an accounting of the expenses incurred in the purchase and exploitation of the mining
claims, is not final but merely interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable.
Rule 41, section 2, of the Rules of Court, provides that 'no interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the
progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the
other.' This provision has been taken substantially from section 123 of our Code of Civil Procedure which recites as
follows:
No interlocutory or incidental ruling, order, or judgment of the Court of First Instance shall stay the progress of an action
or proceedings nor shall any ruling, order, or judgment be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court until final judgment
is rendered for one party or the other.
In commenting on this article, we observed in Go Quico v. Municipal Board of Manila, 1 Phil. 502, that in considering the
American authorities it must be borne in mind that probably not one of the statutes therein construed contained such
strong prohibitions against appeals from interlocutory resolutions as are found in our article 123. The evils resulting from
such appeals under the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil were well known. It was to cure such evils that this article was
adopted. It expressly prohibits appeals not only from interlocutory orders but also from interlocutory-judgments. This
prohibition is reiterated in article 143, which says: 'upon the rendition of final judgment disposing of the action, either
party shall have the right to perfect a bill of exceptions
xxx xxx xxx
Under the Spanish procedure, appeals could be taken from any interlocutory order or judgment, with the result that in a
single case there were so many appeals and the proceedings were so delayed that in many instances parties could not,
or hardly, survive the litigation. Either they died before the rendition of the final judgment or, if they survived, the winning
party not infrequently found himself sustaining more losses than the benefits he expected to derive from his judgment.
This is the judicial irony which section 123 of our Code of Civil Procedure, now Rule 41, section 2, of the new Rules of
Court, was intended to prevent. The purpose of the provision is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single case, and to
that effect if prohibits appeal until the case has been definitely and completely disposed of by the court, that is, until a
final judgment is rendered therein.
We have on several occasions defined what a final order or judgment is as distinguished from what is merely
interlocutory. In Mijia v. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 572, we said that "a resolution, order of judgment is appealable when it finally
disposes of the legal proceeding pending before it, so that nothing more can be done with it in that court." This definition
has been strictly and uniformly adhered to by this Court in subsequent cases. (CF. Government v. Bishop of Nueva
Segovia, 17 Phil. 487, 489; People v. Macaraig, 54 Phil. 904, 905). In Roa v. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328, the action was for
partition of real property and from the judgment rendered designating the persons entitled to participate in the partition,
defendant therein appealed. This Court held that the judgment was not final but merely interlocutory. Something had yet
to be done for the complete disposal of the action, to wit, the appointment of commissioners of partition if the parties did
not come to an amicable partition among themselves, the making of partition by said commissioners, the filing of their
report and the rendition of judgment of such report. In Natividad v. Villarica, 31 Phil. 172, plaintiff sought to recover his
contribution to the partnership formed between him and the defendant. The latter averred that the partnership had been
dissolved after due accounting to which plaintiff refused to assent. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
partnership dissolved as of the date therein stated and ordered the defendant to render an accounting. In dismissing
defendant's appeal, we held that the judgment did not terminate the case in the Court of First Instance and was,
therefore, not appealable until "the accounts to which plaintiff was entitled to have rendered her were either approved or
disapproved." We reaffirmed this ruling in Vivencio V. Borja, 50 Phil. 148, and Sancho v. Lizarraga, 55 Phil. 601.
The foregoing cases supply a clear and unequivocal criterion for determining what a final order or judgment is, as
distinguished from what is interlocutory. If the judgment completely disposes of the action, it is final and therefore
appealable; if it does not and leaves something to be done for the completion of the relief sought, it is not final and no
appeal therefrom will be allowed.
Unfortunately, however, other cases decided by this Court have thrown this rule into confusion and thwarted,
undesignedly to be sure, the intent of the law they purport to interpret. Thus, in Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934, the action
was for partition of real property, but the defendants alleged exclusive ownership. On the issue thus joined, judgment
was rendered declaring plaintiffs and defendants co-owners of the property and ordering that the same be partitioned
among them. On appeal, this Court held that the judgment was final and therefore appealable, as it disposed of the
claims of the defendants. This ruling was reiterated in Villanueva v. Capistrano, 49 Phil. 484. Again, in Heacock v.
American Trading Co., 53 Phil. 481 judgment was rendered declaring the trademark therein disputed to belong to the
plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to render, within fifteen days, an accounting of the profits it had obtained from the
illegal use of the trade-mark. Defendant, without rendering an accounting, interposed an appeal from the judgment. Upon
the question as to whether the judgment was final or merely interlocutory, this Court held: 'In this kind of a case, in
particular, and in accord with the weight of authority, we hold that, under the issues made by the pleadings, the primary
purpose in both cases was to ascertain and determine who was the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the
disputed trade-mark, and that the judgment which was rendered by the lower court was a judgment on the merits as to
those question, and that the order of the court for an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to, the judgment on
the merits. That is to say, that the judgment which the lower court rendered was a final judgment within the meaning of
section 123 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to the judgment;
that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgment as rendered; and that for such reason it was the legal duty of the
lower court to sign and certify the bills of exceptions as tendered.' This ruling was reiterated in Prophylactic Brush Co. et
al. v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 46254, November 23, 1938 (Unpublished).
The Africa case was distinguished by this Court from the Mojica case in that, in the former the defendants alleged
exclusive ownership which the defendant in the latter did not. Similarly, the Heacock case was distinguished from that of
Villarica in that, while in the latter the accounting was the main action, in the former, it was merely incidental to the
question of trade-mark. In both cases (the Africa and the Heacock), the cardinal consideration which apparently induced
this Court to a different conclusion from that reached in the other cases is that the judgments rendered therein disposed
of the contentions of the respective defendants. We are now convinced that, if we are to achieve the true purpose of
section 123 of Act No. 190, now Rule 41, section 2, the distinctions thus established are of no consequence and the
rationals which induced the conclusion arrived at in the Africa and Heacock cases mistakes the true test of what a final
judgment is for purposes of appeal. Whether or not the defendant alleged exclusive ownership in an answer to a
complaint for partition, if the judgment therein rendered is for partition, said judgment though disposing of defendant's
contention, does not dispose completely of the case. Other proceedings have yet to be taken for the completion of the
relief sought, such as, the appointment of commissioners; their report to the court; and the rendition of the court's
judgment thereon. Likewise, whether or not the action for accounting is the principal one or is merely incidental to
another, the judgment requiring such accounting cannot be final. The actual rendition of such account and the judgmentof the court thereon are other links in a chain of proceedings essential for the complete termination of the case. And the
true test for determining whether an order or judgment is final for purposes of appeal is not whether the judgment
disposes of the contentions of the parties, or whether it touches the merits of the case, but whether "it finally disposes of
the legal proceeding, so that nothing more can be done with it on the court where it is determined (Mejia v. Alimorong,
supra), or in the language of section 143 of Act No. 190, whether 'it disposes of the action." To supply any other criterion
is to bring confusion to what otherwise is a plain and unequivocal rule of law.
It may be true that actual partition in the Africa case or actual accounting in the Heacock case may greatly prejudice the
defendant if, on appeal, the judgment is reversed, for in such eventuality the proceeding for partitioner accounting, which
may have been expensive, will have become unnecessary. But a like prejudice may be imagined for the plaintiff in the
event of affirmance of the judgment, for then he will have to go back to the trial court for actual partition or accounting
with the possibility of a second appeal from the judgment that may be rendered thereon. These possibilities on both sides
of the question were, undoubtedly, present in the minds of the lawmakers when section 123 of Act No. 190 was passed,
but they considered the latter as of a graver mischief when, without distinction, they prohibited an appeal from any kind
of interlocutory orders or judgments. And we think the choice is not without reason because the affirmance of a judgment
is more probable than its reversal by virtue of the presumption of its correctness. (People v. Wilson, 532 Phil., 907).
That the true rule is to prohibit generally and without distinction appeals from any kind of interlocutory orders or
judgments, is attested by a consideration of analogous instances where the law entirely ignores the inconveniences to a
party wishing to appeal. For example, the defendant, filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff has no
capacity to sue, is compelled, if his motion is overruled, to file his answer and proceed to trial so that the court may
render a final judgment. If on appeal, the order overruling one motion is reversed, then, certainly, all the proceedings had
after the overruling of such motion by the trial court would have been useless and vexatious to the defendant. But may
those inconveniences he validly pleaded to support the contention that an appeal lies against the order overruling a
motion to dismiss? The reason for the law seems clear, therefore, that even if, in compelling the defendant in the
Heacock case for instance, to render an accounting, so much of his commercial secrets would have been unnecessarily
revealed should the judgment be thereafter reversed, this private and exceptional loss cannot compare with the general
harm that would follow from throwing the door open to a multiplicity of appeals in a single case.
In the light of these considerations, we reverse the ruling laid down in Africa v. Africa, 42 Phil. 934, as reiterated in
Villanueva v. Capistrano, 49 Phil. 460, as well as the ruling laid down in Heacock v. American Trading Co., 53 Phil., 481,
as reiterated in Prophylactic Brush Co. et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 46254, November 23, 1938
(unpublished), and reaffirm the doctrine laid down in Ron v. Mojica, 8 Phil. 172, and Natividad v. Villarica, 31 Phil. 172 as
reiterated in Vivencio v. Borja, 50 Phil. 148, and Sancho v. Lazarraga, Phil. 601.
The order of dismissal of petitioner's appeal rendered by the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner.
In the light of the consideration thus luminously and logically put forth by a member of the Court recognized to be more
than ordinarily knowledgeable in matters of procedure, and considering that the arguments adduced by Justice Reyes
and petitioner's counsel, which are more or less mere repetitions of those already taken into account in the above
opinion, We are loathe to further confuse the bench and the bar with another ruling inconsistent therewith, which would
make it patent that the Supreme Court cannot make up its mind on a point of procedure, as to which it should not be
uncertain precisely because it promulgated the rules on the matter' subsequent already to the conflicting decisions in
Roa vs. Mojica and the ones that followed it on the one hand, and in Africa vs. Africa and the ones that reiterated it, on
the other. It is to be presumed that the Court had these two lines of decisions in mind and that in formulating Section 2 of
Rule 41 and the other provisions related thereto it meant to remove any doubt as to which line to follow. It was precisely
to this end that Mr. Justice Moran elucidated on the true import of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. Indeed,
We cannot perceive any cogent reason for returning to the overruled doctrine in Africa vs. Africa. If any modification of
the Fuentebella ruling is believed desirable, it should be done only by amending the corresponding rules, in order that
the change may have prospective effect only and proceedings in which the parties and the Court had to adhere to said
ruling, it being the prevailing one, may not be placed at a disadvantage merely because they have followed the existing
rule and its interpretation by the Supreme Court. For the present, the Court does not contemplate any such modification
or amendment of the existing rules.
Withal, in Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. L-13252, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1188, Mr. Justice Arsenio Dizon, who was
a well known and respected professor and reviewer of remedial law in many law schools for a long time, explained
further that the order recognizing the right of the plaintiff to a partition is not the judgment, for under Section 7 of Rule 71,
2
it is only after hearing (the report of the commissioners) that the court is supposed to render a final judgment, Here is
how Mr. Justice Dizon spoke for a unanimous court in that case:
While upon the facts above stated, the respondent court, in our opinion, erred firstly, in not allowing petitioner to adopt
the appeal bond and the record on appeal filed by the other defendants and which court had already approved, and
secondly, in sustaining the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Basilia F. Vda. de Zaldarriaga, because (a) the appeal
bond and record on appeal filed by the other defendants were sufficient for the purposes of the appeal interposed by the
herein petitioner, and (b) because the latter filed her separate record on appeal within the extension granted by the lower
court itself, still we are constrained to deny the present petition for mandamus to compel the respondent court to give
due course to petitioner's appeal, for the reason that the decision from which she and her co-defendants are appealing is
not final but interlocutory (Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-48102, May 27,1942). It is true that in Africa vs. Africa,
42 Phil. 934 and other cases it was held contrary to the rule laid down in Roa vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328; Rodriguez vs.
Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63- that in a partition case where defendant relies on the defense of exclusive ownership, the action
becomes one for title and the decision or order directing partition is final, but the ruling to this effect has been expressly
reversed in the Fuentabella cue which, in our opinion, express the correct view, con that a decision or order directing
partition is not final because it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the
case, namely, the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings to be had before them, the submission of their report
which, according to law, must be set for hearing. In fact, it is only after said hearing that the court may render a final
judgment finally disposing of the action (Rule 71, section 7, Rules of Court). Precisely in accordance with this procedure
the decision from which petitioner and her co-parties intend to appeal provides for the appointment of the Clerk of Court
and Segundo Hipolito as Commissioners "W make an equitable separation, delineation and partition of the respective
share of the land pertaining to each co-owner, etc".
Thus, the only point which We have to determine is whether or not, because of the interlocutory character of said
decision or order, the respondent judge acted illegally or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
practically setting aside and modifying the same substantially, upon a review of the record made by him and for the
reasons stated in the amended decision. In other words, the broad fundamental issue here revolves around the power of
a court relative to an interlocutory order or judgment. In this respect, We need only to recall that in Manila Electric Co. vs.
Arciaga, et al, 50 Phil. 144, this Court explained the nature of an interlocutory order or judgment thus:
As to the legal question whether or not the decision of this court revoking the order of the lower court sustaining the
demurrer to the complaint constitutes res judicata, since the facts involved are the same, it is sufficient to cite the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Reilly vs. Perkins (56 Pac., 734), which reads as
follows:
The doctrine of res judicata amounts simply to this: That a cause of action once finally determined without appeal,
between the parties on its merits, cannot afterwards be litigated by new proceedings, either before the same or any other
tribunal. It is only, however, a final judgment upon the merits to which this doctrine applies. Until final judgment is
reached, the proceedings are subject to change and modification, are imperfect and inchoate, and can avail nothing as a
bar until the judgment, with its verity as a record, settles finally and conclusively the questions and issues. An
interlocutory order or decree made in the progress of a case is always under the control of the court until the final
decision of the suit, and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment,
though it be after the term in which the interlocutory order or decree was given, and is not, therefore, a final judgment, to
which the doctrine of res adjudicata can apply. (Foster vs. Richard Busteed, 100 Mass., 412; Webb vs. Buckelew, 82
N.Y., 555; Black, Judge., 308.)
An interlocutory order, overruling a general demurrer to a complaint, is not res judicata of its sufficiency to support a
judgment for plaintiff, and hence is no bar to the subsequent vacation of such order at a subsequent term, and the entry
of judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant, since the doctrine of res judicata applies only to a final judgment on
the merits.'
Moreover, it must be borned that in the juridical sense, the prayer for accounting or partition in relation to a controversy
wherein ownership of property is in issue or where the right to an accounting or to a partition is disputed, is not a mere
incident or consequence of the main issue but is one of the reliefs arising from a single cause of action together with the
ownership or right to accounting or partition alleged in the complaint. Viewed in this light, it is easy to understand that
only a single judgment can be rendered by the court in a case of such nature, for the simple reason that in the same
manner that a single cause of action cannot be split in order to be made the subject of more than one complaint or
action, the judgment in regard to a single cause of action may not also be split into several parts, each having a final
character of its own. It is in the very nature of these kinds of action that some sort of a preliminary finding has to be made
before the longer and more complicated matter of accounting or partition is taken up, tried and determined by the court.
And because such finding is intended to be merely preliminary, since it is conceivable that the same may be affected by
incidents or questions related to the actual accounting or partition, it is but proper and wise to leave room for the court to
make such modification, amendments and alteration of its preliminary findings and holdings as it may deem demanded
by the circumstances and interests of justice. It is not, therefore, correct to say, as Justice Reyes asserts in his dissenting
opinion, that multiplicity of appeals is more tolerable than the impairment of the stability of a judgment, since there is no
judgment to speak of but merely a preliminary finding which is not supposed to acquire any stability until the final
judgment is rendered. Furthermore, the point of policy underlying is the Fuentebella ruling as stated in the opinion
penned by Chief Justice Moran, is the avoidance of multiple appeals, hence the test of the finality of a judgment is not
whether or not it dispose of the contention of the parties or touches on the merits of the case but whether it finally
disposes of that legal proceeding, so that nothing more can be done with it in the court where it is determined or whether
it disposes of the action. Accordingly, We cannot accept the theory that the preliminary finding must be considered as
beyond reconsideration by the court, even if he should find the same erroneous after a review of the record. And the fact
that herein respondent judge was not the one who made the preliminary finding is immaterial, for what the original judge
can do, his successor can also do. (Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318).
Thus, We find no error in the following holding in the resolution of the Court of Appeals under review:
The decision of then Judge Mendoza being still interlocutory, the main issue is whether a presiding Judge of a Court of
First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a total lack of jurisdiction in changing or amending a
decision which was still interlocutory, made by the prior presiding Judge of the same Court of First Instance.
We reiterate our finding that respondent Judge can, as he did, amend the decision of the prior presiding Judge of the
same CFI and that in so doing he acted within his jurisdiction and according to his duty as a court, with the inherent
power to amend and control his processes and orders so as to make them conform to the law and justice (Sec. 5, Rule
124, Rules of Court). This principle has been decided time and again, with the holding that a presiding judge, may
amend, modify and correct a decision of a previous presiding judge of the same court where said decision is not yet filial
and executory (Daleon vs. CFI of Quezon, CA-G.R. No. 22416-R, March 31, 1958; Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil, 318;
Dunning & Co. vs. See Pua, CA-G.R. .No. 8325-R, Oct. 26, 1942; Tan Le Po vs. Amparo, CA-G.R. No. 5615-R, June
23,1950; San Miguel Brewery, Inc, vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 178).
On the same point is the case of Chuakay vs. Herrerias, CA-G.R. No. 3893-R, June 30, 1952.
It can be done upon evidence received by the former presiding Judge (People vs. Samsono, CA-G.R. No. 1099-CR, Oct.
29,1947).
The respondent Judge having acted within his jurisdiction, any errors in the amended decision promulgated by him would
be errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction, hence, correctible by regular appeal and not by the special civil action of
certiorari.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals under review are affirmed, with
costs against petitioner.
Footnotes
1 Notably, the appellate court's challenged decision of Sept. 21, 1970 and resolution of Dec. 23, 1970 (Annexes A and B,
petition); the trial court's original decision of July 26, 1965 (Annex E, petition); and this Court's previous decision of
October 4, 1968 involving the same parties in L-25461, Dy Chun, et al. vs. Hon. Jose M. Mendoza and V. Miranda.
reported in 25 SCRA 431.
2 Annex E, petition, pp. 1-2.
3 Decision in L-25461, Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, 25 SCRA 431; emphasis supplied.
4 Idem .
5 Judge Mendoza's original judgment of July 26, 1965 thus read: "FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court renders judgment against the defendants and orders defendants to:
1. Deliver all properties found by the Court to belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco, to plaintiff as administrator of the
Estate of Hilarion Dydongco;
East Mindanao Lumber Co., Inc., from 1935 up to the present date;
4. To pay by way of exemplary damages, jointly and severally, the sum of P60,000.00 by Dy Sio Pong and Dy Suat Ngo.
5. To pay counsel for plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, including the cost of this
suit."
6 25 SCRA 431, 435.
7 Idem at p. 435: emphasis supplied.
8 Idem, emphasis supplied.
9 Petition in L-31929, Miranda vs. Tantuico, referred to and docketed in Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 45332-R,
Annex K.
10 Idem, Annex L.
11 Amended decision, Annex D, petition, page 7; emphasis supplied.
12 Idem, page 5.
13 Idem, pages 7-8.
14 Petition, page 17, filed on January 11, 1971.
15 Amended decision, annex D, petition, page 9.
16 "FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court amends the July 26, 1965 judgment hereby:
"1. Dismissing the complaint embodied in the first cause of action in the amended complaint against the East Mindanao
"2. Dismissing the second cause of action of the amended complaint regarding the Plaridel lot, not having been proved
and the right to recover the Plaridel property having prescribed
"3. Declaring that Dy Suat Hong is a builder in good faith on lots Nos. 841-B-4 and 841-B-3;
"4. Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff as administrator of the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, within forty five
Court in the July 26,1965 judgment to belong to the Estate of Hilarion Dydongco;
"5. Ordering the defendants who are in possession of the properties found by the Court to belong to the Estate of Hilarion
judgment for approval.
"6. Denying the motions for execution, and for new trial and the claim of lack of jurisdiction;
"7. Consistent with the amendments here made, the exemplary damages to be paid to Dy Siu Pong and Dy Suat Ngo is
reduced to P30,000.00 and the attorney's fees maintained at P30,000.00 both to be paid joint in equal pro portion by the
remaining defendants Dy Chun, Dy Suat Hong, Dy Bee Dy Seko, Tan Ho and Nolasco Dycothay, including the costs of
this suit."
17 See footnote 16.
18 See footnote 16.
19 See footnote 9.
20 Third special division composed of Rodriguez, Yatco, ponente and Barcelona, JJ.
21 Annex A, petition, pages 5-6-. emphasis supplied.
22 Idem, page 8. emphasis supplied.
23 With Rodriguez, ponente, Caizares and Barcelona, JJ. voting for the resolution, Reyes J. dissenting and no Note
recorded for Serrano, J.
24 Rule 135, section 5 (g), mis-cited by the appellate court as Rule 124, sec. 5.
25 Unreported in Phil. Rep but reported in XIV Lawyers Journal 305. The decision was penned by Justice Moran on Man.
27, 1942 for a five-member Supreme Court, composed of Yulo, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras and Bocobo, JJ. The sequel case of
Carrascoso vs. Fuentebella is reported 92 Phil. 948 (April 22, 1953).
26 Cf. Moran's Rules of Court, Vol. 2,1970 ed., pp. 197-204.
27 Supra, at page 2.
28 XIV Lawyers Journal 305.
29 Idem.
30 Phil. 948 (April 22, 1953).
31 At page 6 hereof.
32 Supra at pages 7 and 8.
33 Petitioner's brief, page 83.
34 Idem, page 84.
35 Supra, at page 2 hereof.
36 Supra at page 7 hereof. See petitioner's brief, pp. 76, 80, 84, 89, 102, 112, et seq.
36* The late Chief Justice Moran thus stresses that "that judge who tries a case in the court below has vastly superior
advantages for the ascertainment of truth and the detection of falsehood over an appellate court sitting as a court of
review. The appellate court can merely follow with the eye the cold words of the witness as transcribed upon the records,
knowing at the same time, from actual experience, that more or less of what the witness actually did say is always lost in
the process of transcribing. ... There is an inherent impossibility in determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is
justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the Identity of the
words. ..." (Moran's Rule of Court, Vol. VI, 1970 ed., p. 146).
36** 2 Moran's Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. pp. 271-272 and cases cited.
37 Supra, at page 6.
38 18 Phil. 257, 263; emphasis supplied. (1911).
39 L-32532, March 29, 1974.
40 30 SCRA 31(Oct. 31, 1969), per Castro, CJ., emphasis supplied.
42 Supra, at page 7, hereof.
45 Supra, at page 10; see fn. 25.
46 2 Moran's Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 400.
47 Supra at page 5.
48 Thus, Moran in Vol 2 of his treatise, 1970 ed., pp. 399-400, gives the following, instances which all deal with
interlocutory orders, not judgments: "For instance, an order denying a motion of dismissal founded on lack of jurisdiction
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof, is interlocutory because after such denial there are things to be
done at the trial court before the case may be said to be completely terminated, such as the filing of the answer, the
holding of the trial and the rendition of the judgment on the merits. An order denying a motion for the annulment of a
preliminary attachment, or an order denying a petition for alimony pendente lite, or denying a motion for default an order
declaring the defendant in default, an order denying or granting preliminary injunctions, or appointing as receiver, or an
order denying a motion for relief from an order declaring a defendant in default when no judgment had yet been
rendered, or an setting aside the original judgment rendered pursuant to a compromise agreement and setting the case
for trial on the merits, is merely interlocutory, for, after such order is issued there are still many things to be done for a
complete disposition of the case. This is without prejudice to the special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition in
connection with interlocutory orders issued with excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion." (emphasis supplied.)
48* 22 SCRA 785, 789, emphasis supplied.
49 L-5923, April 29, 1953, per Bautista Angelo J.: 92 Phil. 1084. 1084 (Unreported); emphasis supplied.
50 Emphasis supplied.
51 53 Phil. 481 (1929); notes in parentheses and emphasis supplied.
51* Notes in parenthesis and emphasis supplied.
52 See fn. 25; pp. 13, 23 et seq. hereof.
53 Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934; Villanueva vs. Capistrano; Prophylactic Brush Co., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
46254, Nov. 23,1938 (Unpublished).
54 Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, 1 SCRA 1188.
55 See f n. 53 hereof.
56 The three executions are criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment, naturalization and d naturalization cases and decisions of the Auditor General where appellant is a private
person or entity.
Barredo, J., concurring:
1 Justice Fernando made it clear that at the beginning he was thinking of abstaining, but since there was an evident
sentiment for rendering without effect the amended decision of Judge Tantuico, he would concur in the main opinion pro
had vice, just so the eight votes necessary for a judgment may be had.
Makasiar, J., concurring:
1 The Rules of Court of 1940.
2 Section 7 of Rule 61,4 of the Revised Rules of 1964.
[G.R. No. 155108. April 27, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) under
Secretary Simeon Datumanong and Undersecretary Edmundo V. Mir, then Chairman Of Bid and Awards
Committee (BAC), Assistant Secretary Bashir D. Rasuman, BAC Vice-Chairman, Director Oscar D. Abundo, BAC
Member Director OIC-Director Antonio V. Malano, Jr., BAC Member and Project Director Philip F. Menez,
petitioner, vs. EMILIANO R. NOLASCO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
An obiter dictum is a nonessential, welcome and sublime like a poem of love in a last will or unwanted and asinine as in
brickbats in a funeral oration. It is neither enforceable as a relief nor the source of a judicially actionable claim. However,
by reason of its non-binding nature, the pronouncement does not generally constitute error of law or grave abuse of
discretion, even if it proves revelatory of the erroneous thinking on the part of the judge. It is chiefly for that reason that
this petition is being denied, albeit with all clarifications necessary to leave no doubt as to the status and legal effect of
the controvertible Order dated 6 September 2002 issued by Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr. (Petitioner) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 32.
The root of the dispute is a public works project, the Agno River Flood Control Project (Project), the undertaking of
which has been unfortunately delayed due to the present petition. Funding for the project was to be derived primarily
through a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). A Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) was
constituted by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the purpose of conducting international
competitive bidding for the procurement of the contract for Package IIthe Guide Channel to Bayambang under Phase II
of the Project.[1] Six (6) pre-qualified contractors submitted their bids for the project, among them the present intervenors
Daewoo Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. (Daewoo), and China International Water and Electric Corp. (China
International).
However, even before the BAC could come out with its recommendations, a legal challenge had already been posed to
preempt the awarding of the contract to Daewoo. On 19 February 2002, Emiliano R. Nolasco, a self-identified taxpayer
and newspaper publisher/editor-in-chief,[2] filed a Petition, seeking a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, with the RTC of Manila, naming the DPWH and the members of the BAC as respondents. He alleged having
obtained copies of Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH Consultant, which he attached to his petition.
Nolasco argued that based on the confidential reports it was apparent that Daewoos bid was unacceptable and the
putative award to Daewoo, illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and the Filipino taxpayers. Invoking his
right as a taxpayer, Nolasco prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and
Daewoo disqualified as a bidder.[3]
The petition was raffled to the sala of Judge Nabong and docketed as Civil Case No. 02-102923. An ex-parte hearing
was conducted on the prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO), with Nolasco alone in attendance. Petitioner
issued an Order dated 4 March 2002 directing the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the DPWH and the BAC from awarding
the contract to Daewoo and that [Daewoo] be disqualified as bidder and its bidders be rejected from carrying out the
Project.[4] The term of the TRO was for a period of twenty (20) days.
Upon learning of the TRO, the DPWH and the BAC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss Petition with Motion for Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order Dated March 4, 2002.[5] While noting the
impropriety of a twenty (20)-day TRO without prior notice or hearing, they pointed out that Republic Act No. 8975
precisely prohibited the issuance by any court, save the Supreme Court, of a TRO or preliminary injunction which
restrains or prohibits the bidding for or awarding of a contract/project of the national government. Accordingly, they
prayed that the petition be dismissed and the TRO dissolved.
This new motion was set for hearing on 21 March 2002, and thereupon the parties were afforded the opportunity to argue
their case. Then, on 27 March 2002, the RTC issued an order dismissing Nolascos petition. The dismissal of the petition
was warranted, according to the RTC, as it was a suit against the State, which had been sued without its consent.[6] The
RTC also noted that Nolasco had not established that he would sustain a direct injury should the contract be awarded to
Daewoo, and that the general interest which may have been possessed by Nolasco along with all members of the public
would not suffice.[7]
Interestingly, on 2 April 2002, the OSG claims to have received a copy of an alleged order dated 22 March 2002
purportedly signed by Judge Nabong which denied the motion to dismiss, gave the petition due course, and granted the
preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).[8] However, in a Certification signed by Loida P. Moralejo, Officer-in-Charge of RTC Branch 32, it was
attested that the signature in this order was spurious, and affirmed instead the Order dated 22 March 2002 dismissing
the petition.[9]
In the meantime, the BAC issued Resolution No. MFCDP-RA-02 dated 1 April 2002. The BAC noted therein that among
the three lowest bidders were Daewoo and China International, and that based on the bid amounts as corrected, the
bid of Daewoo was the lowest of the three, followed by China Internationals.[10] As a result, the BAC resolved to
recommend the award of the contract for the Project to Daewoo. Then DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong approved
the recommendation by affixing his signature on the Resolution on the same day.[11] A copy of the Resolution and the Bid
Evaluation Report was furnished to JBIC for review and concurrence.[12]
For his part, Nolasco filed a motion for reconsideration dated 3 April 2002, seeking the reversal of the Order dated 27
March 2002 dismissing his petition. Nolasco set this motion for reconsideration for hearing on 18 April 2002, but none
apparently ensued.[13] The OSG filed its Opposition/Comment/Manifestation dated 24 April 2002 wherein it prayed that it
be allowed to adopt its earlier motion to dismiss as its opposition to the motion for reconsideration. The RTC granted
OSGs prayer in an Order dated 13 May 2002.[14] In the same Order, the RTC likewise stated that in the spirit of
comprehensive fairness, this Court must, and hereby, [set] the hearing on the reception of petitioners evidence on this
Motion [for Reconsideration] on 17 May 2002.[15]
During the hearing of 17 May 2002, the OSG asked Judge Nabong to clarify his directive that a hearing be had for the
reception of Nolascos evidence. Judge Nabong clarified that his bent was for petitioner to present his evidence but no
longer on the question of whether a TRO or injunction should be issued. The RTC granted the OSGs prayer to submit a
motion for reconsideration of this order, which the OSG did on 31 May 2002.[16] In the motion for reconsideration, the
OSG argued that it was unnecessary to receive Nolascos evidence, considering that the dismissal of the petition was
grounded on pure questions of law. It also sought clarification of Judge Nabongs remarks during the 17 May 2002
hearing, which seemed to imply that this new hearing would actually be on the merits of the petition.
This new OSG motion was submitted to the RTC during the hearing of 28 June 2002, wherein Petitioner announced that
the motion was to be resolved in due time. At the same time, the RTC allowed Nolasco to adduce his evidence over the
objections of the OSG. Nolasco presented a witness, Engineer Shohei Ezaki, a DPWH consultant hired by JBIC who
testified pursuant to a subpoena earlier issued by the court. Ezaki testified as to the Evaluation Report and Result
prepared by his consultant firm and which had been earlier attached to Nolascos petition. Nolasco also intimated its
intention to present DPWH Director Philip F. Meez as a witness on his behalf. In the hearing of 2 August 2002, the OSG
manifested that it would file motions opposing the presentation of witnesses by Nolasco and the issuance of subpoenas
requiring their testimony. In its order issued in open court on 2 August 2002, the RTC deferred the further presentation of
Nolascos witnesses pending the filing of OSGs motions.
At that point, the proceedings thus far undertaken had been unorthodox. Then the course veered sharply to the bizarre.
Nolasco filed a motion dated 12 August 2002, seeking the rendition of a partial judgment and dismissal of his own
petition, based on the proceedings that had transpired during the hearings held on 28 June and 2 August 2002.[17] In the
motion, Nolasco reiterated his submission that based on the evidence presented thus far, Daewoo should have been
disqualified from bidding on the project. While the prayer for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration was
anchored on the need to abbreviate the proceedings so as to implement the projects, the motion nonetheless urged the
court, to issue a partial judgment and award the bid for the Project to China International. Nolasco likewise filed a
Formal Offer of Evidence dated 29 August 2002. The offered evidence included various documents and the testimony of
Nolasco and his witnesses previously heard by the court. Both submissions of Nolasco were vigorously objected to by
the OSG in pleadings filed to that effect.[18]
Then, on 6 September 2002, the RTC issued the Order now assailed before this Court. It included a brief discussion of
the factual antecedents, as well as the 27 March 2002 Order dismissing the petition and the various pleadings filed by
the parties prior and subsequent to the dismissal of the petition. The last two pages of the four (4)-page Order
proceeded to dissect the testimonies and ultimate dispositions therein. The last three paragraphs of the Order and its
fallo are replicated below in full:
In the hearing, however, on August 21, 2002, Atty. Abelardo M. Santos for petitioner in open court,
formally offered the testimony of Mr. Ezaki, although, before the start of his testimony Atty. Santos
Manifested: Your Honor, the purpose of the testimony of this witness is to show that they had made a
technical study of all the pre-qualified bidders referring to the Agno River Flood Control Project, Phase II.
Engr Shohel Ezaki, hired by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) through which the
funding, granted by the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), is covered and flows through, and the
DPWH and President, Philippines Office, Nippon Koie Company, Ltd., (testifying under an issued subpoena
duces tecum ad testificandum) testified that the Evaluation Report and Result of their consultant firm in
association with the PKII and the Basic Team Inc., (doing evaluation works for the DPWH) disqualified
DAEWOO and ITALIAN THAI on Packages 1 and 2, Phase II. Insofar, moreover, as regards Package 1, Phase
II, the bids submitted by TOA Corporation is the lowest evaluated responsive bid. The second lowest
evaluated responsive bid is that of China State Construction Engineering. In open court, on August 2,
2002, Director Engr. Philip F. Menez, Major Floor Control & Drainage Project-Project Management Office,
Cluster II, DPWH, confirmed the award to TOA Corporation, the evaluated responsive bid, Package 1.
All told, and presently, and urgently, there is the need to implement the PROJECTS in this petition so as
not to affect the ODA funding, harnessed through JBIC. More so, in addition, and a thoughtful
consideration of pleadings and argument, from the Formal Offer of Evidence ADMITTED, facts, hearing,
respondent BAC has strayed from fairly applying the Bidding Laws, Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations,
and Bid Tender Documents and, as a matter of fairness, and in the interest of justice, considering other
bidders whose bids have been evaluated by the Technical Working Group including the consultant, Nippon
Koie Company, Ltd., in association with the PKII and the Basic Team, Inc., to be substantially responsive,
the Honorable Simeon P. Datumanong must now seriously consider and effect the award of
Package 2, PHASE II, of the Agno River Floor Control Project, as duly recommended by the
Consultants and the Technical Working Group, DPWH, to China International Water & Electric Corporation
being the lowest evaluated responsive bid.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)[19]
The OSG received a copy of the Order dated 6 September 2002 on 17 September 2002. It opted to file a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court, instead of resorting to a motion for reconsideration, to avert
unnecessary delay of the implementation of the Project which would result in millions of pesos in damages. The OSG
thus alleges that the petition raises pure questions of law, thereby dispensing with recourse to the Court of Appeals.[20]
The OSG also notes that in a letter to the DPWH dated 21 June 2002, JBIC, through Chief Representative Mitsuru
Taruki, let it be known that it had decided to hold in abeyance its concurrence to the project, as the issue [was] now
under the jurisdiction of the appropriate Philippine courts and other relevant organizations of the Philippine government,
and that it would be prudent to wait for the decisions of the proper authorities before taking any action on the matter.[21]
It is likewise worth noting at this juncture that Nolasco had also filed a verified complaint against the Chairman and
members of the BAC with the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, as well as another complaint with the National
Economic Development Authority and a complaint-letter with JBIC itself requesting that the bank reject the award to
Daewoo.[22]
Since the filing of the present petition, both Daewoo and China International have since participated in the case. Daewoo
filed a Comment-in-Intervention dated 10 January 2003, which this Court treated as a petition-In-intervention.[23] Upon
order of this Court, China International filed a Comment-in-Intervention dated 5 February 2003.
Petitioner imputes error to the RTC in taking notice of and resolving Nolascos Motion to Issue Partial Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss Petition, which they characterize as a trifle. Substantively, it asserts that the RTC erred in directing
the DPWH to perform an affirmative act even though the court had no more jurisdiction over the petition, considering that
the RTC never resolved the motion for reconsideration filed by Nolasco. It also avers that Nolascos original petition had
been substantially amended, without leave of court and without notice to the Petitioner, and that they had not been
afforded the opportunity to file an answer to the petition. Moreover, the RTC is alleged to have erred in directing the
award of the subject package to China International, a stranger to the case, without ordering the inclusion of Daewoo as
an indispensable party.
We can recast the legal question within the framework of whether the RTC committed a reversible error in assailed
Order dated 6 September 2002. It is a mark of the strangeness of this case that Petitioner seeks the nullification of a
dispositive order that affirms the very dismissal of the case they likewise seek. However, given the circumstances, the
dilemma of Petitioner is understandable. While the fallo of the assailed Order is indeed favorable to them, the body
thereof is a palpable source of mischief.
The Petitioner assails only the Order of 6 September 2002. However, it behooves this Court to be more comprehensive
in approach, in part to elucidate on the proper steps that should be undertaken by lower court judges when confronted
with complaints or petitions affecting national government infrastructure projects. Our review will necessarily entail an
examination of the propriety of the procedure adopted by the RTC in disposing of Nolascos petition. It would be best for
the Court to diagram the procedures undertaken below like a grammar school teacher to illustrate the multiple errors
attendant in this case. From a chronological standpoint, the first matter for discussion would be Nolascos Petition before
the RTC.
The caption of the Petition states that it is for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction.[24] In the Petition, Nolasco averred that he received a letter from a resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan,
regarding the latters observations on the Public Bidding made on the Project; that Nolasco contacted his sources at the
DPWH and learned that the Project would be awarded to Daewoo; that he obtained a Confidential Report from an
Unnamed DPWH Consultant which allegedly concluded that Daewoos bid was unacceptable. From these premises,
Nolasco argued that he was entitled to the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, as the
award to the contracts to Daewoo would probably cause injustice to him as a taxpayer. As prayer, Nolasco asked that the
respondents therein (herein Petitioner) be restrained from awarding the contracts to Daewoo and that Daewoo be
disqualified as a bidder and its bid rejected.
It would be difficult to ascertain the nature of Nolascos action if the Court were obliged to rely alone on the caption of his
pleading. The caption describes the Petition as one for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction; hence, implying that the action seeks only provisional reliefs without the necessary anchor of a final relief.
Moreover, the use of Petition in lieu of Complaint seemingly implies that the action brought forth is the special civil
action of prohibition under Rule 65, yet this is not supported by the body of the pleading itself as it is bereft of the
necessary allegations of grave abuse of discretion or absence/excess of jurisdiction and the absence of any other plain
speedy and adequate remedy.[25]
Nonetheless, the principle consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that it is not the caption but the allegations in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading may
be legally characterized.[26] An examination of the petition reveals that it should be considered as a complaint for
injunction, with a prayer for the provisional relief of temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction. After all, the
Petition prayed that respondents therein (Petitioner herein) be restrained from awarding the contracts to Daewoo, citing
as basis thereof its unacceptability, as purportedly established by the evaluation report.
Nonetheless, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction affecting the bidding or
awarding of a national government contract or project, would have called for the application of Republic Act No. 8975
and the corresponding denial of the prayer for provisional relief. Still, the RTC instead issued a TRO in its Order dated 4
March 2002.
Republic Act No. 8975 definitively enjoins all courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or compel the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the
national government,[27] precisely the situation that obtains in this case with respect to the Agno River Project. The only
exception would be if the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless the temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.[28] The TRO issued by the RTC failed to take
into consideration said law. Neither did it advert to any extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, as required by
the statute. The law ordains that such TRO is void,[29] and the judge who issues such order should suffer the penalty of
suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.[30]
Nevertheless, there is no need to belabor this point since the TRO no longer subsists. It appears that the RTC
subsequently realized the import of Republic Act No. 8975 as it cited the same in its 27 March 2002 Order dismissing the
Petition:
Applying Republic Act No. 8975, most particularly Section 3 thereof, and Administrative Circular No. 112000 issued on November 13, 2000 by the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme
Court, all parties having copies, the Petition at bench ought to be dismissed outrightly (sic). [31]
However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of any
complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive relief from the implementation of national
government infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is the issuance of the provisional reliefs of
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the
lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or
implementation of a national government infrastructure project. A statute such as Republic Act No. 8975 cannot diminish
the constitutionally mandated judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.[32] Section 3 of the
law in fact mandates, thus:
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a
rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing
laws.
Thus, when a court is called upon to rule on an initiatory pleading assailing any material aspect pertinent to a national
government infrastructure project, the court ordinarily may not dismiss the action based solely on Republic Act No. 8975
but is merely enjoined from granting provisional reliefs. If no other ground obtains to dismiss the action, the court should
decide the case on the merits. As we recently held in Opia v. NHA:[33]
Unquestionably, the power to issue injunctive writs against the implementation of any government
infrastructure project is exclusively lodged with this Court, pursuant to Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 8975. But
while lower courts are proscribed thereunder from issuing restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary
injunction to stop such projects, the proscription does not mean that such courts are likewise bereft of
authority to take cognizance of the issue/issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action and
the relief sought are within their jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it was not proper for the RTC to cite Republic Act No. 8975 as basis for the dismissal of Nolascos petition
since the statute does not bar the institution of an action that seeks to enjoin the implementation of a national
government project, but merely the issuance of provisional orders enjoining the same. However, the RTC cited two other
grounds for the dismissal of the casethat Nolascos general interest as a taxpayer was not sufficient to establish any
direct injury to him should the Project be awarded to Daewoo; and that the petition was a suit against the State, which
may not be sued without its consent.
We shall defer for now a review of these two grounds cited by the RTC for the dismissal of Nolascos petition, and
instead focus on the proper steps that should have been undertaken owing to the dismissal of the case. Nolasco filed a
motion for reconsideration or the dismissal of the case, a remedy available to him since the 27 March 2002 Order is a
final order that disposed of the case.[34] Petitioner responded with an all-encompassing Opposition/Comment/Manifestation (Re: Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration). Both of these submissions were set for hearing before the RTC.
The RTC could have very well resolved the motion for reconsideration based on the pleadings submitted. Yet, in its
Order dated 13 May 2002, it declared:
However, be that as it may, in the spirit of comprehensive fairness, this Court must, and hereby, sets the
hearing on the Reception of Petitioners evidence on this Motion on May 17, 2002 at 9:00 A.M. [35]
As far as determinable, there is no legal or jurisprudential standard of comprehensive fairness, a phrase that reeks of
pomposity without admitting to any concrete meaning. Neither is there any mandatory rule directing a court to conduct a
hearing to receive evidence on a motion for reconsideration. Nonetheless, a motion for reconsideration, as with all other
motions which may not be acted upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, is required to be set for hearing
by the applicant,[36] and to be heard with due notice to all parties concerned.[37]
It is certainly within acceptable bounds of discretion for the trial judge to require or allow the movant for reconsideration
to present evidence in support of the arguments in the motion, and in fact desirable if such evidence should be
necessarily appreciated for a fair and correct disposition of the motion for reconsideration. Yet caution should be had. At
this stage, the issues and evidence submitted for appreciation and resolution of the trial court should be limited to the
matters pertinent to the motion for reconsideration. In this case, the RTC in hearing the motion for reconsideration,
should have focused on the issues of lack of standing on the part of Nolasco and non-suability of the State, as these
were the grounds on which dismissal of the petition was predicated. It would entail a fundamental reconsideration of
these two key concerns for Nolascos motion to have been granted and the petition readmitted.
Instead, the RTC, upon Nolascos insistence, proceeded instead to hear the case on the merits. The RTC allowed
Nolascos witness, Engineer Ezaki to testify as to the authenticity and veracity of the bid evaluation report attached to
Nolascos petition, and to affirm the conclusion that Daewoo was not a qualified bidder.[38] This unusual turn of events
arouses suspicion. The RTC had earlier dismissed the petition on legal grounds, yet it was now considering factual
matters as basis for review on reconsideration. The petitioner, through counsel, appears to have strenuously objected to
this furtive and dubious recourse by Nolasco, but to no avail.
Then, despite the fact that other witnesses of Nolasco were still scheduled to be heard, Nolasco filed the Motion to Issue
Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition. He expressly prayed that his very own motion for reconsideration of the
petition be dismissed. From this motion, it is difficult to ascertain why exactly Nolasco wanted the RTC to deny his own
motion for reconsideration and to affirm the dismissal of his own petition, though there is the expressed concern in order
to abbreviate the proceedings in view of the need to implement the subject projects of this petition the soonest possible
time.[39] At the same time, and in the same pleading, Nolasco still asserted that Daewoo was not qualified to be awarded
the project, and emphasizes that such contention was borne out by the evidence he had presented thus far. Accordingly,
he likewise prayed that partial judgment be rendered on the petition, calling on the RTC to conclude that China
International won the Project, it being the lowest evaluated responsive bid.[40]
It bears noting that at this stage, there were two pending motions before the RTC, both filed by Nolasco, which had at
issue whether or not his petition should be dismissed. The first was Nolascos motion for reconsideration praying for the
reinstatement of his petition. The second was Nolascos Motion for Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition, praying for
the dismissal of his petition. Palpably, Nolasco had opted to hedge his chips on both red and black, which is not normally
done for obvious reasons. Neither did Nolasco, in his latter pleading, expressly withdraw his earlier motion for
reconsideration, although his subsequent prayer for the dismissal of his own earlier motion sufficiently evinced such
intent.
This Motion for Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition is truly an odd duckling of a pleading, which unfortunately did
not blossom into a swan but from it instead emerged an even uglier duckthe 6 September 2002 Order, which dismissed
the petition yet intoned that DPWH Secretary Datumanong must now seriously consider and effect the award of the
project to China International.
There is no doubt that the assailed Order dated 6 September 2002 sought to resolve the Motion for Partial Judgment
and to Dismiss Petition. This is evident from the first sentence of the Order, which states: Before the Court is
petitioners Motion to Issue Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition filed on August 16, 2002. No other pending
motion, such as the motion for reconsideration, was adverted to as being subject for resolution by the said Order.
Now, the Motion for Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition seeks reliefs A and B that China International be awarded
the project; and that the motion for reconsideration be dismissed. There is no doubt that relief B was unequivocally
granted by the trial court, with the following disposal:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[41]
But did the trial court grant relief A that China International be awarded the project?
All told, and presently, and urgently, there is the need to implement the PROJECTS in this petition so as
not to affect the ODA funding, harnessed through JBIC. More so, in addition, and a thoughtful
consideration of pleadings and argument, from the Formal Offer of Evidence ADMITTED, facts, hearing,
respondent BAC has strayed from fairly applying the Bidding Laws, Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations,
and Bid Tender Documents and, as a matter of fairness, and in the interest of justice, considering other
bidders whose bids have been evaluated by the Technical Working Group including the consultant, Nippon
Koie Company, Ltd., In association with the PKII and the Basic Team, Inc., to be substantially responsive,
the Honorable Simeon P. Datumanong must now seriously consider and effect the award of
Package 2, PHASE II, of the Agno River Floor Control Project, as duly recommended by the
Consultants and the Technical Working Group, DPWH, to China International Water & Electric
Corporation being the lowest evaluated responsive bid.[42] (emphasis supplied)
Contrast this with Nolascos prayer on the same relief in his Motion for Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, and in consideration of equity and petitioners moral
obligation and in order to abbreviate the proceedings in view of the need to implement the subject
projects of this petition the soonest possible time so an not to jeopardize the funding granted by the
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) fund through the Japan Bank For International Cooperation
(JBIC), it is respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Court to issue its partial judgment on the petition. An
[sic] in view of the foregoing findings that clear violation of bidding laws, rules and regulations, the
respondents Bid Tender Documents, has been committed by the respondents members of the BAC, and in
fairness to the other bidder whose bids have been evaluated by the Technical Working Group including the
consultant, Nippon Koie Company, Ltd., in association with the PKIII and the Basic Team, Inc. to be
substantially responsive, the Bid of China International Water & Electric Corporation being the lowest
evaluated responsive bid must be awarded the project, package 2, Phase II, of the Agno River
Flood Control Projects as recommended by the Consultants and the Technical Working Group
of the respondents. The respondent, Honorable Secretary Simeon Datumanong is hereby
directed to take steps to attain this end.[43] (Emphasis supplied)
Unmistakably though, the controverted portion of the Order, urging the DPWH Secretary to consider awarding the
Project to China International does not form part of the dispositive portion or fallo. What should be deemed as the
dispositive portion in this case is the final paragraph of the Resolution, which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court recently explicated the contents of a proper dispositive portion in Velarde v. Social Justice Society:[44]
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the complaint or
petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness
may be applied. First, the parties should know their rights and obligations. Second, they should know how
to execute the decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further
proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the proper relief.
The "proper relief" usually depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their
rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain from
specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs. [45]
We have ruled before against recognizing statements in the body of a decision as part of the dispositive portion. In
Velarde, the respondents insisted that a statement by the trial court found on page ten (10) of the fourteen (14)-page
decision should be considered as part of the dispositive portion. The Court disagreed,[46] and cited the precedent in
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Hon. Caluag:[47]
. . . The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a mere
opinion of the court and the rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and
the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final
order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. [48]
In Contreras v. Felix,[49] the Court reasoned:
More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment as rendered is the judgment
of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be
distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot
prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion
forms no part of the judgment. So, . . . there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a
court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment,
they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of
course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6.) At the root of the doctrine
that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to
litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to
right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience
of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which
the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review,
pp. 9, 51.) It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court,
especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions,
lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently
opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the
dispositive part, so called, of the decision. [50]
Moreover, we are guided by the evident fact that the respondent-judge did not intend to make his conclusions on who
should be awarded the Project as part of the dispositive portion of his order. The language deliberately employed in the
order, must now seriously consider and effect the award, indicates that the judge was hesitant to definitively grant the
relief sought by Nolasco, which was that the trial court award the bid to China International and direct Sec. Datumanong
to take steps towards this end. Instead, it stated that Sec. Datumanong must now seriously consider and effect the
award to China International. Undoubtedly, the word must is mandatory in character, but it is used in conjunction with
consider. In short, the trial court noted that the DPWH Secretary must think about effecting an award to China
International.
Imagine if Nolasco had tried to judicially enforce this portion of the decision. Agents of the court would be sent over to the
DPWH offices to confront the DPWH Secretary. What else could they say but, Sir, have you seriously considered
effecting the award to China International? Of course, the DPWH Secretary can reply, Yes, but I decided to award the
bid anyway to Daewoo, and such averment would evince satisfactory compliance with the assailed Order. After all, the
Order did not require that the DPWH award the bid to China International, only that the DPWH consider such a measure.
These premises considered, we cannot agree with Petitioner characterization of this portion of the Order as granting
affirmative relief in favor of China International.[51] No such affirmative relief was rendered in favor of China International,
as such was not included as part of the fallo. Nor was there an evident intent on the part of the judge to grant such
affirmative relief, on account of the language he employed, recommendatory in character as it ultimately was.
Still, if the Court were to construe this assailed portion of the Order as belonging to the dispository part, such disposition,
effectively concluding that China International and not DAEWOO should be awarded the bid, would run contrary to law.
It must be remembered that Nolascos prayer that the trial court award the bid to China International utilized as legal
basis the power of the trial courts to issue partial or separate judgments. Yet by any objective standard, there is no merit
in allowing for such a relief in this case. Section 5, Rule 36 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs separate
judgments, states:
Sec. 5. Separate judgments. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at
any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising
out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate
judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so
disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. . . .
On paper, Nolascos petition prays for two reliefs, that the petitioner be restrained from awarding the Project to Daewoo,
and that Daewoo be disqualified as a bidder and its bid be rejected. Yet these reliefs are obviously intertwined for the
allowance of one would necessarily lead to the grant of the other. The multiple reliefs referred to in the provision refer to
those sufficiently segregate from each other that the allowance of one at a preliminary stage will not preclude litigation on
the merits of the others.
More importantly, the rule is explicit that partial judgment with regards one of the reliefs is warranted only after a
determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim. Herein, the partial judgment was sought even before the
respondents had the chance to file their answer to the petition. Moreover, it was prayed for at a point when, at even such
a preliminary stage, the claimant was actually somehow able to already present evidence in support of his claim, but
before the respondents had the chance to rebut this claim or support countervailing evidence.
At bare minimum, the allowance of a partial judgment at this stage would constitute a denial of constitutional due
process. It would condemn before hearing, and render judgment before trial.[52] Had indeed partial judgment been
granted in the assailed Order, it would have been rendered before the Petitioner were afforded the opportunity to rebut
the evidence of Nolasco, or to present their own countervailing evidence. While the allowance of partial judgments may
expedite the litigation of claims, it cannot be sanctioned at a stage when the trial judge has not had the opportunity to
hear all sides to the claim. In fact, it was highly imprudent for the respondent judge to have concluded, as he did in his
Order, that it was an admitted fact that the BAC had strayed from fairly applying the Bidding Laws, Guidelines, Rules,
and Regulations, and Bid Tender Documents, considering that the Petitioner had not even filed an answer or been
allowed the opportunity to present any evidence on its behalf.
And there is the fact that as of the moment the assailed Order was rendered, Nolascos petition had already been
dismissed by the earlier Order dated 27 March 2002. In order that the prayer for partial judgment could have been
granted by the RTC, it would have been first necessary to reinstate Nolascos dismissed petition, such as by granting
Nolascos motion for reconsideration. The respondent judge never reinstated the petition, which has stood dismissed
since 27 March 2002. Thus, none of the reliefs prayed for by Nolasco in his Petition, much less the prayer for partial
judgment, could have ever been granted by the respondent-judge.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed Order correctly limited itself to the denial of Nolascos motion for
reconsideration without allowing any other relief that Nolasco prayed for in his Motion for Partial Judgment and to
Dismiss Petition. Had the respondent judge instead opted to grant partial judgment and direct the award of the Project to
China International, the Court would not hesitate to strike down such award. Yet the respondent judge did not act so
unequivocally, and merely advised that the DPWH Secretary should consider such an option. Perhaps the propriety of
such advice can be appropriately questioned, in light of our view that such conclusion was derived without allowing the
DPWH or an injured party such as Daewoo opportunity to be heard and to present their own evidence. Nonetheless,
such advisory opinion has no binding effect, especially if construed as directing the award of the Project to China
International. Accordingly, for that reason alone and with the necessary clarifications made, there is no reason to set
aside the assailed Order dated 6 September 2002, especially considering that its final disposition dismissing Nolascos
motion for reconsideration is ultimately correct.
Nolascos petition had been correctly dismissed by the RTC on two grounds: that Nolascos general interest as a
taxpayer was not sufficient to establish any direct injury to him should the Project be awarded to Daewoo; and that the
petition was a suit against the State, which may not prosper without its consent. Given that none of the parties are
actually praying that Nolascos motion for reconsideration be granted or that Nolascos petition be reinstated, we need
not review in depth the rationale of the RTC in dismissing Nolascos petition. The mere invocation of standing as a tax
payer does not mean that in each and every instance where such a ground is invoked courts are left with no alternative
except to hear the parties, for the courts are vested with discretion whether or not a taxpayers suit should be
entertained.[53] We likewise find no error on the part of the RTC when it cited as basis for the dismissal of Nolascos
petition, our ruling in Bugnay Construction & Development Corp. v. Laron[54] that the taxpayer-plaintiff must specifically
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.[55]
We also find no error on the part of the RTC in regarding Nolascos petition as a suit against the State without the latters
consent. An unincorporated government agency such as the DPWH is without any separate juridical personality of its
own and hence enjoys immunity from suit.[56] Even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily
governmental functions, an unincorporated agency still cannot be sued without its consent.[57] Moreover, it cannot be
said that the DPWH was deemed to have given its consent to be sued by entering into a contract, for at the time the
petition was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had not yet entered into a contract with respect to the Project.
Surprisingly, and with no apparent benefit on its behalf, Petitioner imputes error on the part of the RTC when the court, in
the fallo of the assailed Order, directed the dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petition, pointing out that
such pleading was never filed by Nolasco,[58] and accordingly prays that the order dismissing the alleged Motion for
Reconsideration of Petition be declared null and void.[59] However, Nolasco did file a Motion for Reconsideration to the
order dismissing the petition, and in his Motion for Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition, Nolasco similarly prays that
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petition be dismissed. We have no doubt, infelicitous wording aside, that the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Petition adverted to in the fallo refers to Nolascos own motion for reconsideration,
the denial of which Nolasco also prayed for in the Motion for Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition that was the
subject of the assailed Order. And as just discussed, the denial of the Nolascos motion for reconsideration was in order.
Notably, this Court has not engaged in a review of the award of the Project to Daewoo. Notwithstanding the fact that the
parties have prayed that the Court either effect the award of the Project to Daewoo or direct the award to China
International, the Court deems it improper to conduct a de novo factual finding on which entity should be awarded the
project. The Court is not a trier of facts, and it would be offensive to established order and the hierarchy of courts for this
Court to initiate such factual review. Had the RTC conducted a valid trial on the merits, perhaps this Court could
eventually review the lower courts findings on the matter, but the RTC properly dismissed the case, and it would be
unbecoming on the part of this Court to suddenly engage in an initial trial on the merits on appellate review.
This is a stance not borne out of hesitance to tackle the issue, or avoid the sort of ruling that may satisfy one party or the
other as definitive, but arrived at out of necessity to preserve the integrity of our civil procedure, including the hierarchy
of our courts and the limits of this Courts power of judicial review. Precisely, the messy milieu presented before us
occurred because the RTC and Nolasco compromised our court processes to destructive ends, and it is this Courts
function to reassert the rules, to restore order, and not compound to the sloppiness by itself violating procedural order.
The executive department is acknowledged to have wide latitude to accept or reject a bid, or even after an award has
been made, to revoke such award. From these actions taken, the court will not generally interfere with the exercise of
discretion by the executive department, unless it is apparent that the exercise of discretion is used to shield unfairness or
injustice.[60] This policy of non-interference can hardly be countermanded by reason of a claim anchored on an unofficial
document such as the Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH Consultant presented by Nolasco, especially
when the probative value thereof has hardly been passed upon by a proper trier of facts.
More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the public at large are bound to respect the fact that official acts of the
Government, including those performed by governmental agencies such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty. and cannot be summarily, prematurely and capriciously set aside.[61] Such
presumption is operative not only upon the courts, but on all persons, especially on those who deal with the government
on a frequent basis. There is perhaps a more cynical attitude fostered within the popular culture, or even through
anecdotal traditions. Yet, such default pessimism is not embodied in our system of laws, which presumes that the State
and its elements act correctly unless otherwise proven. To infuse within our legal philosophy a contrary, gloomy
pessimism would assure that the State would bog down, wither and die.
Instead, our legal framework allows the pursuit of remedies against errors of the State or its components available to
those entitled by reason of damage or injury sustained. Such litigation involves demonstration of legal capacity to sue or
be sued, an exhaustive trial on the merits, and adjudication that has basis in duly proven facts and law. No proper and
viable legal challenge has emerged impugning the award of the Project by DPWH to Daewoo, Nolascos Petition being
woefully insufficient to that purpose. It is tragic perhaps that the irresponsible actions of Judge Nabong, and their ultimate
embodiment in his obiter dicta in the assailed Order, somehow fostered the illusion that there was a serious legal cloud
hovering over the award by DPWH to Daewoo. We rule that there is none, that the RTC acted correctly in granting the
Petitioners motion to dismiss Nolascos Petition and in denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration to the
dismissal. These are the only relevant matters properly brought for judicial review and everything else is unnecessary
verbiage.
For the same reason, we cannot allow the Petitioners prayer for damages against Nolasco. The matter of damages is
one that has to be properly litigated before the triers of fact, and certainly has not been passed upon by the RTC. Yet it
does not necessarily follow that no liability arises from the filing of the initiatory petition, or the facts succeeding thereto.
It does not escape our attention that on 2 April 2002, the OSG was served a spurious order purportedly giving due
course to Nolascos petition and granting the sought-for preliminary injunction. This incident cannot pass without
comment by this Court, which cannot sanction the circulation of fake judicial orders, and should be duly investigated by
the National Bureau of Investigation for appropriate action.
Finally, it likewise appears that Judge Nabong, by issuing the temporary restraining order dated 4 March 2002, violated
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8975, which penalizes the judge who issues a temporary restraining order enjoining the
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government.[62] Yet to his credit, Judge Nabong recalled the
TRO upon realizing his error, thus a REPRIMAND should suffice under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated 6 September 2004 is
AFFIRMED, with the QUALIFICATION that last paragraph of the body of the Order, which states that the DPWH
Secretary must now seriously consider and effect the award of Package 2, Phase II of the Agno River Flood Control
Project is OBITER DICTA and hence of no binding force.
The National Bureau of Investigation is hereby DIRECTED to investigate the circumstances surrounding the
alleged spurious order dated 22 March 2002 served on the Office of the Solicitor General and determine possible
criminal liabilities for the creation of such forged document.
Judge Juan Nabong is hereby REPRIMANDED for failure to observe Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8975, and
WARNED that a subsequent repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 84. The designated members of the Bids and Awards Committee were DPWH Undersecretary Edmundo V.
Mir as Chairman; Bashir D. Rasuman, Oscar D. Abundo, Faustino A. Timbol and Antonio V. Molano as
Members; and Philip F. Meez as Project Director. Id. at 353.
[2]
Of the Weekly Gazette. Id. at 524.
[3]
Id. at 526.
[4]
Id. at 201.
[5]
Id. at 202.
[6]
Id. at 217-218.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 252 and 265.
[9]
Id. at 266.
[10]
Id. at 352.
[11]
Id. at 353.
[12]
Id. at 354.
[13]
The OSG noted in their Opposition/Comment/Manifestation dated 24 April 2002 that they received a copy of Nolascos
Motion for Reconsideration only on 16 April 2002, or only two days before the date of hearing, in violation of
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Id. at 240.
[14]
Id. at 247.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Id. at 96.
Id. at 294. The motion is entitled Motion to Issue Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition.
[18]
See Rollo, pp. 315-341.
[19]
Id. at 151-152.
[20]
See Section 2(c), Rule 41, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[21]
Rollo, p. 374.
[22]
Id. at 235.
[23]
In a Resolution dated 5 February 2003. Id. at 718.
[24]
Id. at 524.
[25]
See Section 2, Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[26]
Heirs of Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 585; citing Ras v. Sua, 134 Phil.
131 (1968); Cajefe v. Fernandez, 109 Phil. 743 (1960).
[27]
See Section 3(b), in relation to Section 2(a), Republic Act No. 8975. See also Section 2(c), (d), and (e), Rep. Act No.
8975.
[28]
See Section 3, Rep. Act No. 8975.
[29]
[30]
[31]
Rollo, p. 225. Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, Re: Ban On The Issuance Of Temporary Restraining Orders Or
Writs Of Preliminary Prohibitory Or Mandatory Injunctions In Cases Involving Government Infrastructure
Projects, enjoins all judges of lower courts to strictly comply with Rep. Act No. 8975.
[32]
See Section 1, Article VIII, Constitution.
[33]
G.R. No. 161649, 17 November 2004.
[34]
[35]
Supra note 14.
[36]
[37]
See Sections 4 & 5, Rule 15, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[38]
Rollo, pp. 297-298.
[39]
Id. at 301.
[40]
Ibid.
[41]
Id. at 36.
[42]
Ibid.
[43]
Rollo, p. 36.
[44]
G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283.
[45]
Id. at 313.
[46]
Id. at 308.
[47]
120 Phil. 338 (1964).
[48]
Id. at 343; cited in Velarde, supra note 41 at 308.
[49]
78 Phil. 570 (1947).
[50]
Id. at 577-578.
[51]
Rollo, p. 134.
[52]
This safeguard, the first listed in the Bill of Rights, includes what is known as procedural due process that guarantees
a procedure which, according to Daniel Webster, hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial. Pagasian v. Judge Zura, A.M. No. RTJ-89-425, 17 April 1990, 184
SCRA 391. See also, e.g., U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104, 111; NPC Supervisors Union v. NPC, 193 Phil.
696 (1981).
[53]
Macasiano v. NHA, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 244.
[54]
G.R. No. 79983, 10 August 1989, 176 SCRA 240.
[55]
Id. at 251-252. However, for the above rule to apply, it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he
would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest.
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of the money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.
[56]
Farolan v. CTA, G.R. No. 42204, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 298, 306. [W]hen a suit is directed against said
unincorporated government agency which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality
of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal, i.e., the State. Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board
of Liquidators, G.R. No. 84992, 15 December 1989, 180 SCRA 171.
[57]
A.B. NACHURA, OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW, 2000 Ed., at 22.
[58]
Id. at 115.
[59]
Id. at 142.
[60]
Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited v. SBMA, G.R. No. 131367, 31 August 2000, 339 SCRA 434, 443.
[61]
See Republic v. De los Angeles, G.R. No. L-30240, 25 March 1988. The [Garments and Exports Textile Board], as an
administrative agency, has in its favor the presumption that it has regularly performed its official duties,
[17]
including those which are quasi-judicial in nature. In the absence of clear facts to rebut the same, said
presumption of regularity must be upheld. GTEB v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 723 (1997).
[62]
[G.R. No. 144882. February 04, 2005]

LUISA BRIONES-VASQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF MARIA MENDOZA VDA. DE
OCAMPO, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39025, dated June 9, 2000, which denied petitioners motion for clarificatory judgment and
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 3, 2000, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Under an agreement denominated as a pacto de retro sale, Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo acquired a parcel of land
from Luisa Briones. The latter thereunder reserved the right to repurchase the parcel of land up to December 31, 1970.[1]
Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo passed away on May 27, 1979.[2] On June 14, 1990, Hipolita Ocampo Paulite and
Eusebio Mendoza Ocampo, the heirs of Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo, filed a petition for consolidation of ownership,
alleging that the seller was not able to exercise her privilege to redeem the property on or before December 31, 1970.[3]
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 rendered a Decision[4] on January 30, 1992 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
declaring that exh. A is a true pacto de retro sale;
2.
declaring that the defendant can still redeem the property within 30 days from the finality of this judgment, subject
to the provisions of Art. 1616 of the New Civil Code;
3.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Plaintiffs therein -- herein private respondents -- appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.[6] On June 29, 1995,
the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision[7] and disposed of the case in the following manner:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested decision is hereby set aside; and declaring the 1970 sale
with right of repurchase, Exhibit A, as one of an equitable mortgage.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied through a Resolution,[9] dated
December 15, 1995. The Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory and entry of judgment was made on
July 17, 1996.[10]
Subsequently, at the RTC, both petitioner and respondents filed their respective motions for a writ of execution. The
RTC issued a writ of execution. However, the writ was returned unserved per sheriffs return which reads as follows:
Respectfully returned to this Court thru the Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Pili, Camarines Sur the herein attached
original copy of the Writ of Execution issued in the above-entitled case with the following information, to
wit:
That the plaintiffs [herein private respondents] were informed that the writ of execution was already
issued for implementation and that they should pay the necessary sheriffs and kilometrage fees;
That [one of] the plaintiff[s] came to the Office of the Clerk of Court VI but did not deposit any amount for
the kilometrage fee and for the expenses in the implementation of the said writ, but instead plaintiff said
that he is not interested to implement such writ;
That the 60-day period within which the said writ should be implemented has already expired.
WHEREFORE, the original copy of the Writ of Execution is hereby returned unserved.
Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur July 8, 1997
For the Clerk of Court VI and
Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff
by:
(signed)
EDDIE M. ROSERO
Sheriff IV[11]
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for an alias writ of execution. This was granted by the RTC:[12]
ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION
T O:
THE SHERIFF or any person authorized
to serve process, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, C.s.
THRU :
THE CLERK OF COURT VI and EX-OFFICIO
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
Regional Trial Court
Pili, Camarines Sur

GREETINGS:
WHEREAS, on January 20, 1992, a decision was rendered by this Court, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
declaring that Exh. A is a true pacto de retro sale;
2.
declaring that the defendant can still redeem the property within 30 days from the finality of this judgment, subject
to the provisions of Art. 1616 of the New Civil Code.
3.
No costs.
WHEREAS, in an order of this Court dated June 16, 1992, the notice of appeal filed by counsel for the
defendant has been granted and the Clerk of Court V of this Court transmitted the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals, Manila;
WHEREAS, on June 29, 1995, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals, Manila, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested decision is hereby set aside; and declaring the 1970 sale
with right of repurchase, Exh. A as one of an equitable mortgage.
WHEREAS, on March 5, 1997, the Hon. Nilo A. Malanyaon, Presiding Judge of this Court issued an order
granting the issuance of a writ of execution, hereunder quoted as follows:
It appearing that the decision of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory, and an entry of
final judgment had already been issued by the Honorable Court of Appeals, let a writ of execution issue.
WHEREAS, on July 10, 1997, Sheriff Eddie M. Rosero submitted his return:
WHEREFORE, the original copy of the Writ of execution is hereby returned unserved.
WHEREAS, on July 18, 1997, the Hon. Nilo A. Malanyaon issued an Order:
The motion for issuance of alias writ of execution filed by counsel for the defendant, Atty. Lucille Fe R.
Maggay-Principe, is hereby granted.
Consequently, the Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to issue alias writ of execution.
WHEREFORE, you the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur or his lawful deputy is hereby commanded to
effect the satisfaction of the above-quoted decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Manila. Return this
writ to this Court within sixty (60) days from your receipt hereof.
WITNESS THE HON. NILO A. MALANYAON, Judge of this Court, this 21 st day of July, 1997, at Cadlan, Pili,
Camarines Sur.
(Sgd.) LALAINE P. MONSERATE
Officer-In-Charge
Legal Researcher II
The Sheriff was unable to effect the satisfaction of the alias writ as stated in the sheriffs report, which is worded thus:
This is to report on the status of the implementation of the Alias Writ of Execution issued in the aboveentitled case, to wit:
That on August 6, 1997 the plaintiff[s] represented by Sps. Policarpio Paulite and Hipolita Ocampo and
Eusebio M. Ocampo personally received copy of the Alias Writ of Execution but they refused to sign on the
original copy of the said writ, together with the letter of advise informing them to withdraw at any time
the amount deposited to the Office of the Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Pili, Camarines Sur by defendant Luisa
Briones so that the mortgage may now be deemed released or cancelled.
That until this time the said plaintiff[s] failed and or did not bother to withdraw the said amount deposited
by defendant Luisa Briones despite letter of advice and the alias writ of execution having been personally
received by them.
Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur September 9, 1997.
For the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff
by:
(signed)
EDDIE M. ROSERO
Sheriff IV[13]
Unable to effect the execution of the Court of Appeals decision, petitioner filed with the RTC an omnibus motion, dated
May 25, 1999, praying:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order issue:
a) Declaring the equitable mortgage, Exhibit A, discharged;
b) Directing the issuance of a Writ of Possession against the plaintiffs for the delivery of possession of the
land in question to the defendant.[14]
The RTC denied the omnibus motion in an Order dated November 16, 1999, which states:
Acting on the omnibus motion of plaintiff dated 25 May 1999 and the opposition thereto of defendant, and
considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals referring the decision of this Court has become final
and executory, hence, this Court can no longer alter, modify or add anything thereto, the prayers set forth
in the omnibus motion is, as it is, hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[16] of the above Order, which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated
February 23, 2000.[17]
Petitioner then filed a motion for clarificatory judgment, dated April 5, 2000, with the Court of Appeals. [18] The motion was
denied in a Resolution, dated June 9, 2000, which reads as follows:
The only issues that reached Us, through an appeal, was whether the 1970 Sale with Right of Repurchase
was actually an equitable mortgage. We ruled, it was, necessarily there is nothing to clarify.
If it is a matter however whether the prevailing party should be entitled to a right to repossess the
property, then the remedy is not with Us, but with the Court below.
For lack of merit, the Motion for Clarificatory Judgment is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Resolution. The Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution dated August 3, 2000.[20]
Petitioner now comes to this Court raising the following issues:
PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED ARBITRARILY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTIONS:
A) RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 9, 2000, DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT.
B) RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 3, 2000, DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[21]
The sole issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in refusing to grant petitioners motion for clarificatory judgment.
It must be noted, as narrated above, that the Decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory at
the time that the motion for clarificatory judgment was filed. With regards to final judgments, this Court has pronounced
that:
nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the
highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where
the judgment is void.[22]
As a general rule, therefore, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable except under the three
exceptions named above: a) clerical errors; b) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and c) void
judgments.
In the present case, petitioner claims the second exception, i.e., that her motion for clarificatory judgment is for the
purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc amendment of the final and executory Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and characterized by this Court in the following manner:
The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which was
not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing
upon the record evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken. It may be used to make the
record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have
spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if
it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or
omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in
entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but
only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not been
entered of record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro
tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish the
basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to
make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to
render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment
may have been. (Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.)
A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something which was actually previously done,
to have effect as of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to
supply an omission in the record of action really had, but omitted through inadvertence or
mistake. (Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672.)
It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after the term at which the transaction
occurred, even though the rights of third persons may be affected. But entries nunc pro tunc will not be
ordered except where this can be done without injustice to either party, and as a nunc pro tunc order
is to supply on the record something which has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted
action by the court . . . (15 C. J., pp. 972-973.)[23]
From the above characterization of a nunc pro tunc judgment it is clear that the judgment petitioner sought through the
motion for clarificatory judgment is outside its scope. Petitioners did not allege that the Court of Appeals actually took
judicial action and that such action was not included in the Court of Appeals Decision by inadvertence. A nunc pro tunc
judgment cannot correct judicial error nor supply nonaction by the court.[24]
Since the judgment sought through the motion for clarificatory judgment is not a nunc pro tunc one, the general rule
regarding final and executory decisions applies. In this case, no motion for reconsideration having been filed after the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision on June 29, 1995 and an entry of judgment having been made on July 17, 1996,
the same became final and executory and, hence, is no longer susceptible to amendment. It, therefore, follows that the
Court of Appeals did not act arbitrarily nor with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued
the aforementioned Resolution denying petitioners motion for clarificatory judgment and the Resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, for purposes of guiding the parties in the execution of the aforesaid Decision of the CA, without altering the
same, the following should be noted:
The Court of Appeals pronounced in its Decision that the contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage. Since
the contract is characterized as a mortgage, the provisions of the Civil Code governing mortgages apply. Article 2088 of
the Civil Code states:
The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any
stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
This Court has interpreted this provision in the following manner:
The essence of pacto commissorio, which is prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil Code, is that ownership
of the security will pass to the creditor by the mere default of the debtor (Guerrero v. Yigo, et al., 96 Phil.
37, 41-42; Puig v. Sellner, et al., 45 Phil. 286, 287 88) [25]
The only right of a mortgagee in case of non-payment of a debt secured by mortgage would be to
foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness.
The mortgagors default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered
property, for any such effect is against public policy, as enunciated by the Civil Code [26]
Applying the principle of pactum commissorium specifically to equitable mortgages, in Montevergin v. CA,[27] the Court
enunciated that the consolidation of ownership in the person of the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of the
mortgagor in equity to pay the obligation, would amount to a pactum commissorium. The Court further articulated that an
action for consolidation of ownership is an inappropriate remedy on the part of the mortgagee in equity. The only proper
remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in equity. And if the mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the
mortgaged property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure sale.
The private respondents do not appear to have caused the foreclosure of the mortgage much less have they purchased
the property at a foreclosure sale. Petitioner, therefore, retains ownership of the subject property. The right of ownership
necessarily includes the right to possess, particularly where, as in this case, there appears to have been no availment of
the remedy of foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground of default or non-payment of the obligation in question.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The parties are directed to proceed upon the basis of the
final Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 29, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 39025, that the contract in question was
an equitable mortgage and not a sale.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1]
See, RTC Decision, CA Rollo, p. 47, and CA Decision, CA Rollo, pp. 77-78.
Ibid.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Penned by Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon.
[5]
RTC Decision, CA Rollo, p. 49.
[6]
CA G.R. CV No. 39025.
[7]
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL. Salas and concurred in by Justice Jaime M. Lantin (Chairman, Eighth Division) and
Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now Associate Justice of this Court).
[8]
CA Rollo, p. 83.
[9]
Id., at 100.
[10]
Id., at 113.
[11]
Rollo, p. 24.
[12]
Id., at 25-26.
[13]
Rollo, p. 27.
[14]
Rollo, p. 28.
[15]
Id., at 30.
[2]
[16]
Id., at 31.
Id., at 36.
[18]
Id., at 37.
[19]
Rollo, p. 42.
[20]
Id., at 43.
[21]
Id., at 8.
[22]
Nual vs. CA, 221 SCRA 26, 32 (1993), citing Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 155, 166
(1991).
[23]
Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862, 879 881 (1923). (Emphasis Supplied)
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Northern Motors, Inc. v. Herrera, 49 SCRA 392, 399 (1973).
[26]
Guanzon v. Argel, 33 SCRA 474, 478 479 (1970).
[27]
112 SCRA 641 (1982).
[17]
THIRD DIVISION
ANTONIO NAVARRO,
G.R. No. 165697

Petitioner,
[if !supportLists]- [endif]versus
METROPOLITAN BANK
& TRUST COMPANY,
Respondent,
x ---------------------------------------------x
CLARITA P. NAVARRO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 166481

Present:
- versus -
METROPOLITAN BANK
& TRUST COMPANY,
Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 4, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The tendency of the law must always be to narrow down the field of uncertainty. Judicial process was conceived in this
light to bring about a just termination of legal disputes. Although various mechanisms are in place to realize this fundamental
objective, all of them emanate from the essential precept of immutability of final judgments.
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 separately filed by petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita
Navarro, respectively docketed as G.R. No. 165697 [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] and G.R. No. 166481,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] assail the July 8,
2004 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76872 which ordered the dismissal of the complaint
filed by petitioner Clarita Navarro in Civil Case No. 02-079 -- a case for declaration of nullity of title and for reconveyance and
damages.
Petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro were married on December 7, 1968. [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] During their
union, they acquired three parcels of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City on which they built their home. These pieces of land were
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 155256, 155257 and 155258 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City. The
TCTs, however, are registered in the name of Antonio N. Navarro married to Belen B. Navarro. [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Sometime in
1998, respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) had caused the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
which Antonio had earlier constituted on the subject properties as security for a loan he allegedly obtained from MBTC. In
December of that year, the properties were sold at public auction where MBTC, as the lone bidder, [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] was issued a
certificate of sale.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Clarita brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 an action for the declaration of
nullity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-177, named as defendants
Antonio, MBTC, the Sheriff of Makati City and the Register of Deeds of Makati City. In it, Clarita alleged that the properties
involved belonged to her and Antonios conjugal partnership property as the same were acquired during their marriage and that
Antonio, with the connivance of a certain Belen G. Belen, had secured the registration thereof in their names without her knowledge.
She pointed out that Antonio and Belen then mortgaged the properties to MBTC in 1993 likewise without her knowledge. She
ascribed fault and negligence to MBTC because it failed to consider that the properties given to it as security belonged to her and
Antonios conjugal partnership property. Accordingly, she prayed for reconveyance as well as for payment of damages. [if !supportFootnotes]
[8][endif]
MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of laches. With the denial of its motion, MBTC
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. The Court of Appeals
found merit in the petition and ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same was already barred by laches,
pointing out that it had taken Clarita 11 long years since the issuance of the TCTs on May 27, 1988 before she actually sought to
annul the mortgage contract.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] The decision had attained finality without a motion for reconsideration being filed or
an appeal being taken therefrom.
Subsequently, on April 17, 2002, Clarita instituted another action also before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 [if !
but this time for the declaration of nullity of the TCTs covering the same properties and for reconveyance and
damages. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-079 and it impleaded Antonio, Belen, MBTC and the Registers of
Deeds of Makati City and Muntinlupa City as defendants. This constitutes the root of the two petitions at bar.
The said complaint was basically a reiteration of Claritas allegations in Civil Case No. 99-177. Specifically, it alleged that
the conjugal properties involved were fraudulently registered in the name Antonio N. Navarromarried to Belen B. Navarro and
that the mortgage on the properties were likewise fraudulently secured by Antonio and Belen to acquire a loan from MBTC the
proceeds of which, however, did not inure to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Accordingly, she prayed that at least her onehalf conjugal share in the properties be reconveyed to her without prejudice to MBTCs rights against Antonio and Belen.[if !
MBTC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was already barred by the prior judgment in Civil Case No.
99-177, and that Claritas claim had already been waived, abandoned and extinguished. [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss in its November 8, 2002 Order, noting that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 did not constitute res judicata
because a dismissal on laches and failure to implead an indispensable party could never be a dismissal on the merits. [if !supportFootnotes][13]
[endif]
MBTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of merit in the trial court s April 21, 2002 Order.[if !
Aggrieved, MBTC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an
application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, attributing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court
in denying its motion to dismiss.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
In the meantime, a compromise agreement was executed by Antonio and Clarita in which the latter waived and
condoned her claims against the former, who in turn acknowledged his wifes share in the properties subject of the case. Antonio
likewise stipulated therein that he had not availed of any mortgage loan from MBTC and that it was the bank manager, Danilo
Meneses, who facilitated the manipulation of his account with the bank which led to the constitution of the mortgage and the eventual
foreclosure thereof.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] The trial court approved the compromise on November 5, 2003, [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] thereby
leaving the case to proceed against MBTC.
On July 8, 2004, the Court of Appeals, finding merit in MBTCs petition, rendered the assailed Decision.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] It
held that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 on the ground of laches should preclude the filing of Civil Case No. 02-079 because
the former had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. Also, it pointed out that inasmuch as the two cases presented identical
issues and causes of action and prayed for the same relief, the second complaint must likewise suffer the effect of laches. Citing
Section 3,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, it emphasized Claritas neglect to prosecute her claim since it took her
another two years since the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 to file Civil Case No. 02-079. In conclusion, it held that the trial
court indeed gravely abused its discretion when it denied MBTCs motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the dismissal of the
complaint as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order dated November 8, 2002
issued by the Regional trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 02-079 is ordered DISMISSED.
Antonio and Clarita are now before this Court assailing the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals. They believe that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in directing the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 02-079.
Both Antonio and Clarita advance that it was error for the Court of Appeals to direct the dismissal of the complaint in the
present cases despite the fact that the prior dismissal of the complaint for declaration of nullity of mortgage and foreclosure in Civil
Case No. 99-177 was predicated on Claritas failure to implead Belen as an indispensable party therein which, in effect, amounted to
the courts lack or jurisdiction to act on the parties present and absent. [if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Additionally, Clarita posits that the
principle of laches is not applicable because an action to declare the nullity of a mortgage contract is imprescriptible. [if !supportFootnotes][22]
[endif]
MBTC, for its part, argues that because the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780 ordering the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 99-177 had already become final, then the same should bar the filing of Civil Case No. 02-079 inasmuch as the two
cases raised identical causes of action and issues and prayed for the same relief. [if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] In particular, it also notes that
Clarita had failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision and that the motion for reconsideration filed by
Antonio himself should not be considered to redound to Claritas benefit since Antonio, in the complaint filed before the trial court,
was impleaded as one of the defendants.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
The petitions are utterly unmeritorious.
A perusal of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No.
99-177, tells that the complaint therein was dismissed not on the ground of non-joinder of Belen as an indispensable party, but rather
on the ground of laches. Indeed, what is clear from the said decision is that the dismissal of the case was due to Clarita s
unjustifiable neglect to timely initiate the prosecution of her claim in court -- a conduct that warranted the presumption that she,
although entitled to assert a right, had resolved to abandon or declined to assert the same. [if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of limitations, the
fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at the first instance has already been settled by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the proceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of
laches vis--vis the imprescriptibility of Claritas cause of action because the said decision is not the one on appeal before us. But
more importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision rendered in that case had already become final without any motion for
reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are left with no other recourse than to uphold the
immutability of the said decision.
No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject
to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. [if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] The underlying reason for the rule is twofold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial
controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. [if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] As the Court
declared in Yau v. Silverio,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts
must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as
they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to
thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down. [if !
Thus, in Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v. Reciproco-Noble,[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] we had occasion to emphasize the
significance of this rule, to wit:
It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system that every litigation
must come to an end x x x Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto.
Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party
should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be
encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the
administration of justice.
Moreover, laches, or what is known as the doctrine of stale claim or demand, is the neglect or omission to assert a right, taken
in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It
is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the
condition of the property involved or in the relations of the parties. [if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] It is based on public policy which, for the
peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. [if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
As a ground for the dismissal of a complaint, the doctrine of laches is embraced in the broad provision in Section 1 [if !
of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the various grounds on which a motion to dismiss may be
based. Paragraph (h) thereof states that the fact that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on the relation of
the words abandoned and otherwise extinguished to the phrase claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading is broad
enough to include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches. [if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
Moreover, what is striking is that a reading of the two complaints filed by Clarita one after the dismissal of the other
discloses that apart from the nature of the actions, the allegations in support of the claims and the reliefs prayed for in both
complaints were but the same. In her complaint in Civil Case No. 99-177, denominated as an action for declaration of nullity of
mortgage and foreclosure and sale of real property and reconveyance with damages, Clarita principally demanded the reconveyance
of at least her conjugal share in the subject property, while claiming that the registration of the properties as well as the mortgage
thereof in favor of MBTC had been made without her knowledge and consent. [if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] Yet in the complaint in Civil Case
No. 02-079, denominated as one for declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. 155256, 155257, 155258 and for reconveyance with
damages, Clarita relied on the same allegations embodied in her first complaint and prayed for the same relief of reconveyance of at
least her conjugal share in the property, while additionally seeking the declaration of nullity of the TCTs registered in the name of
Antonio and Belen.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif]
Verily, we find no reason not to adhere to the finding of the Court of Appeals that inasmuch as the two cases
successively instituted by Clarita were founded on the same claim and would have called for the same set of or similar evidence to
support them, then Civil Case No. 02-079 which is the subject of the present petitions may well be deemed already barred by the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177.
Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court materially provides:
Section 5. Effect of dismissal.Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and
(i) of Section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.
In United Coconut Planters Bank v. Belus [if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] and Strongworld Construction Corporation v. Perello, [if !
the Court held that where the complaint is dismissed on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations; or that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff s pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; or that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds, such dismissal operates as one with prejudice and which therefore precludes the filing of another action based on
the same claim. Hence, according to Madrigal v. Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[if
dismissal already constitutes res judicata.
!supportFootnotes][39][endif]
such
The principle of res judicata denotes that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in their former suit. [if !
It obtains where a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment or order on the merits of the case,
which operates as an absolute bar against a subsequent action for the same cause. [if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] A substantial identity is
necessary to warrant the application of the rule, and the addition or elimination of some parties or the difference in form and nature of
the two actions would not alter the situation. [if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] In other words, when material facts or questions in issue in a former
action were conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions constitute res judicata and may not be again
litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. [if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Petitioners furthermore raise that the constitution of the mortgage was the result of the fraudulent act committed by
MBTCs branch manager and Belen, and for that reason the proceeds derived from it did not redound to the benefit of their conjugal
partnership.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] But because this issue is factual in nature and hence, not appropriately cognizable in a Rule 45
petition where only questions of law may generally be raised, the Court is left with no other option than to decline to rule on the
same. Anent the question raised by MBTC of whether Clarita had timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals, we find no necessity to expound on the matter since in view of the foregoing, the petitions at bar must be
denied in any event.
As a final word, it needs no elucidation that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed
organs, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at
rest. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some
definite time fixed by law. For, after all, the very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. [if !
All told, we find this basic rule decisive of the present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165697 and 166481 are DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 76872, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-079, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[endif]
Rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 11-25.

Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 13-34.
Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and
Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 31-31-35; rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 38-42.
Records, p. 8.
Id. at 9-17.
Records, pp. 124-125.

Id. at 108-110.

See the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780, CA rollo, pp. 38-39.
Presided by Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
Records, pp. 1-6.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 213.
Records, p. 90.
CA rollo, pp. 2-27.

Id. at 500-501.
CA rollo, pp. 140-144.

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on
the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
to comply with these Rules or nay order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.
This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
CA rollo, p. 538.
Rollo, (G.R. No. 165697), p. 17; Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 19-20.
Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 19-20.
Rollo (G.R. No. 165697).
Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 179-184.
See Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil 19, 33-34 (1997).
Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 520.
Social Security System v. Isip, G.R. No. 165417, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 310.
Supra note 26, at 531, citing Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211 (1983).
Yau v. Silverio, Sr., supra note 26, at 531, citing Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v. Oriental
Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 140613. October 15, 2002.
G.R. No. 142594 June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 515, citing Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 516
(1982).
De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518.
Id.
Section 1. Grounds.Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
[if !supportLists](a) [endif]That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
[if !supportLists](b) [endif]That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
[if !supportLists](c) [endif]That the venue is improperly laid;
[if !supportLists](d) [endif]That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
[if !supportLists](e) [endif]That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
[if !supportLists](f)
[endif]That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
[if !supportLists](g) [endif]That the pleading asserting a claim states no cause of action;
[if !supportLists](h)
[endif]That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished;
[if !supportLists](i)
[endif]That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of
frauds; and
[if !supportLists](j)
[endif]That a condition precedent for filing the claim has been complied with.
Pineda v. Heirs of Guevarra,
See the Complaint in Civil Case No. 99-177, records, pp. 136-141.
See the Complaint in Civil Case No. 02-078, id. at 1-6.
G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 567, 602.
G.R. No. 148026, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 700, 716.
G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 138
Taganas v. Emuslan, G.R. No. 146980, September 2, 2003, 410 SCRA 237.
State Investment Trust Inc. v. Delta Motors Corporation, G.R. No. 144444, April 3, 2003, 400 SCRA
509; Dela Rama v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 135394, April 29, 2003401 SCRA 704.
Dela Rama v. Mendiola, supra note 41.
Id.
Rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 378-380; Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. pp. 21-25.
Mata v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 525(1999), citing Legarda v. Savellano, 158 SCRA 194 (1988).

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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 182984

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby as follows:

[endif]Declaring plaintiffs entitled to possession, and ordering the

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

(Sgd.) EFREN CAMERINO

(Sgd.) CORNELIO MANTILE

WITH OUR MARITAL CONSENT:

(Sgd.) MARIA FE ALON ALON

(Sgd.) SUSANA CAMERINO

(Sgd.) MILDRED JOPLO

(Sgd.) DIONICIA ENRIQUEZ

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Rollo, pp. 49-50.

During pre-trial, the parties agreed on the following issues:

Id. at 159, dated July 17, 1998.

[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Id. at 223.

P100,000.00, jointly and severally, as damages; and

Joint Answer, p. 9, par. (c); Rollo, p. 113.

[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] Rollo, p. 161.

Supra, note 2; TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 73-74.

[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Supra, note 3.

Petition, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 18-19.

[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 66.

TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 27-29.

[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Supra, note 26.

G.R. No. 104266, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 726.

[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] 355 Phil. 804, 811 (1998).

G.R. No. 159357

1(g) of Rule 16 in relation to 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.

(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;

G.R. No. L-33007 June 18, 1976

[G.R. No. 155108. April 27, 2005]

[G.R. No. 144882. February 04, 2005]

Pili, Camarines Sur

G.R. No. 165697

[if !supportLists]- [endif]versus

G.R. No. 166481

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 11-25.

Records, pp. 124-125.

Records, pp. 136-140.

Records, pp. 1-6.

CA rollo, pp. 2-27.

Records, pp. 497-499.

CA rollo, pp. 140-144.

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