Professional Documents
Culture Documents
By
EMMANUEL MBATA
B.Tech. Physics/Electronics Technology
DECLARATION
I EMMANUEL MBATA declare that the presented and submitted work is my original
work and has not been submitted for any other degree award to any University.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am most grateful to my supervisor Dr H. Tan for his kind words of encouragement,
constructive feedbacks and support throughout this research. Most especially I want to
thank you for your patience and understanding.
My sincere appreciation to OPITO for the great opportunity granted me through the
Piper Alpha Memorial Scholarship. My profound gratitude goes to Bruce Lawson for
taking out time from your busy work schedule to guide me through this project work.
I want to say a big thank you to Les Linklater (Team leader Step Change in Safety),
Emily Taylor and Dr Gillian Simpson for your support and all the help rendered. I am
sorry for all the inconveniences caused. The Asset Integrity Steering Group of Step
Change in Safety for helping me ensure that the questionnaires where answered. I
would also like to use this opportunity to thank Bob Taylor and Valerie Wilson for their
valuable contribution to this work.
To my Parents Mr & Mrs Robert Mbata, you are the best, thank you for going the extra
mile to ensure that I do my Masters degree.
To my family, friends and loved ones, thank you so much for your help, understanding
and encouragement through it all.
Most especially, I am grateful to God.
ii
ABSTRACT
The offshore oil and gas industry on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) is a dynamic
and mature production area with an ageing infrastructure. Past and more recent
accidents have alerted the oil and gas industry of the need to manage their assets and
control the risks associated with production operations from design to abandonment.
Asset integrity is the fitness of an asset to be operated as intended in an effective and
efficient way with an acceptable risk of failure, and asset integrity management ensures
that the people, systems, processes and resources that deliver integrity are available,
functional and reliable over the whole life cycle of the asset.
Essential for the integrity of an asset are the safety critical elements. These are
components, systems (including computer programs) whose purpose is to control,
prevent or mitigate major accident hazards, and whose failure can lead to or contribute
substantially to a major accident.
Ensuring the functionality, availability, survivability and reliability of the safety critical
elements as offshore asset continually age is essential for an effective asset integrity
management. This responsibility lies with the Technical Authorities who acts as
backstop against continuous use of degraded safety critical elements.
The main objective of this research is to understand the current implementations of the
Technical Authoritys role within operating companies in the UKCS via a questionnaire
and the definition of key roles going forward.
The findings of the research highlighted the strengthening of the Technical Authoritys
role within operating companies and provide an insight into their functions, roles and
how they manage the integrity of assets.
The key roles identified in this research to be performed by Technical Authoritys going
forward includes definition of performance standards for safety critical elements,
ensuring the safety critical elements meets the defined performance standards, manage
maintenance deferral of safety critical elements, review deviations from the defined
performance standard, involve in accident/incident investigations and carry out reviews
and audit activities as required. This will ensure the continuous fitness for purpose of
the safety critical elements.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENT
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................ i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. vii
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... viii
1
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
1.1
Background ................................................................................................................ 1
1.2
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3
2.2
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
2.3.5
2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
Operational Integrity............................................................................................ 8
2.4.3
Personnel Integrity............................................................................................... 8
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.5.4
2.5.5
2.5.6
2.5.7
2.5.8
2.5.9
2.5.10
Leadership ......................................................................................................... 13
iv
2.5.11
2.5.12
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.7
Safety Critical Element (SCE), Major Accident Hazard (MAH), Risk Based
Inspections (RBI) and Performance Standard (PS) ............................................................. 16
2.7.1
2.7.2
2.7.2.1
2.7.2.2
2.7.2.3
2.7.2.4
2.7.2.5
Consequence Assessment........................................................................... 21
2.7.2.6
2.7.2.7
2.8
2.9
2.9.1
2.9.2
Verification ........................................................................................................ 27
2.10
3
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 30
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
Questionnaire ..................................................................................................... 31
3.2.3
3.3
3.4
3.4.1
Research Ethics.................................................................................................. 33
3.4.2
Limitations ......................................................................................................... 33
The Questionnaire.................................................................................................... 35
The Organisations .............................................................................................. 36
v
4.1.2
TA Standard/Framework ................................................................................... 37
4.1.2.1
4.1.3
TA Disciplines............................................................................................ 39
4.1.3.1
4.1.3.2
4.1.3.3
4.1.3.4
4.1.3.5
4.1.3.6
4.1.3.7
4.1.3.8
4.1.3.9
4.1.3.10
4.1.3.11
4.1.3.12
4.1.3.13
Defines PS .................................................................................................. 47
4.1.3.14
4.1.3.15
4.1.3.16
CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 50
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 51
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................... 59
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 2.1: IMPORTANT CONCEPT OF INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT .............................................. 4
FIGURE 2.2: ASSET LIFE CYCLE.................................................................................................. 5
FIGURE 2.3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSET INTEGRITY ELEMENTS .......................................... 7
FIGURE 2.4: COMPETENCY VERIFICATION SCHEME ................................................................. 14
FIGURE 2.5: SCE GROUPS AND BOWTIE DIAGRAM ................................................................... 18
FIGURE 2.6: MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE RISK EVALUATION PROCESS .................................... 22
FIGURE 2.7: TYPICAL 4X4 RISK MATRIXES .............................................................................. 23
FIGURE 2.8: RISK RATINGS ....................................................................................................... 24
FIGURE 2.9: RBI, MAH, SCE AND PS LOOP ............................................................................ 28
FIGURE 3.1: OVERVIEW OF PROCESS ........................................................................................ 30
FIGURE 4.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFSHORE PLATFORM ACROSS RESPONDENT ..... 36
FIGURE 4.2: FLOW DIAGRAM FOR TA REPORTING STRUCTURE INTO SENIOR
MANAGEMENT.................................................................................................................. 37
FIGURE 4.3: THE BASIS FOR WHICH TA'S ARE SELECTED......................................................... 38
FIGURE 4.4: TA SELECTION BASIS % IN AGREEMENT .............................................................. 38
FIGURE 4.5: TA DISCIPLINE WITHIN DUTY HOLDERS IN THE UKCS ........................................ 39
FIGURE 4.6: TA DISCIPLINE % OF RESPONDENT IN AGREEMENT.............................................. 40
FIGURE 4.7: TA ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................... 43
FIGURE 4.8: TA ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES % OF RESPONDENTS IN AGREEMENT ...................... 44
FIGURE 4.9: PS DEVELOPMENT FLOW DIAGRAM ....................................................................... 47
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 2.1: DEFINITIONS OF LIKELIHOOD FOR TYPICAL 4X4 RISK MATRIX ............................. 24
TABLE 2.2: DEFINITIONS OF CONSEQUENCE FOR TYPICAL 4X4 RISK MATRIX... .................. 25
vii
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS
BP
British Petroleum
UKCS
HSE
OSD
Offshore Division
KP3
Key Programme 3
NUI
FP
Floating Production
FPSO
MAH
TA
Technical Authority
SMS
LTI
HAZOP
QRA
FMECA
HIPPS
MOC
Management of Change
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
PSV
PSD
RAM
RBI
RBM
UK
United Kingdom
AISG
SIS
PA
Public Address
GA
General Alarm
BS
British Standard
PS
Performance Standard
ISO
OPEX
Operational Expenditure
viii
ICP
EPC
P&ID
MMS
ix
1
1.1
INTRODUCTION
Background
Long dismissed by many as a potential source of oil or gas, the North Sea has, over the
last four decades, become the centre of one of the world most productive and dynamic
energy industries. Gas was first found in commercial quantity in the Groningen area of
The Netherlands in 1959. This was followed by the first British discovery of gas in the
West Sole field, off the coast of East Anglia, by the British Petroleum (BP) jack-up
drilling rig Sea Gem, late in 1965 [1].
The offshore oil and gas industry on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) of
the North Sea is now a matured industry with about 107 oil platform and 181 gas
platforms and many subsea installations. It operates in an increasingly more challenging
business environment due to rising energy demands, declining oil and gas production
rates and ageing infrastructures. It is a known fact today that more than 50% of the
offshore oil and gas production facilities has exceeded their design life and this
proportion is steadily increasing with time.
About a decade ago, in response to the deteriorating nature of assets especially the
Safety Critical Elements (SCE), the UK Health Safety Executives (HSE) Offshore
Division (OSD) responded with the Key Programme 3 (KP3) which was directed more
widely on asset integrity, and schedule to run between 2004 and 2007 [2].
The KP3 inspections were done by OSDs specialist and inspection management team
in about a 100 offshore installations representing about 40% of the total infrastructures
in the UKCS. These included all types of offshore installations Fixed, Manned and
Normally Unattended Installations (NUI), Floating Production (FP), Floating
Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessels and Mobile drilling rigs [2].
The main focus of the KP3 was on the maintenance management of SCEs i.e. the
management systems and processes which should ensure the reliability and availability
of the SCEs. The SCEs are essential for the integrity of any installation, these are the
parts of an installation or component (e.g. hardware, software, procedure etc.) which are
designed to prevent, control or mitigate Major Accident Hazards (MAH) and the failure
of which could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident [2].
1
In November 2007 a report was published by HSE detailing the findings of the KP3.
One of the main finding was that Technical Authorities (TAs) roles needs be
strengthened in many companies [2].
Although referred to frequently in HSE documents, and adopted widely in operating
companies within UKCS after the KP3, the role of the TA is not universally defined or
implemented.
This thesis will seek to assess and documents the implementation of TAs in duty holder
organisations via an industrial questionnaire, to understand the role TA plays in
managing asset integrity.
1.2
As the currently operating oil and gas installations in UKCS are ageing, it is very
important to ensure that they are still capable of performing their intended functions in
the safest possible manner to avoid any harm to personnel or the environment. It is
therefore important that the role of the TA be universally defined and implemented
because it acts as a backstop against degraded SCEs and safety related equipment and
structures.
My main aim in this work is to understand the current implementation of the TAs role
with operating companies and definition of the key roles to be delivered by TA going
forward.
In an attempt to fully achieve the aim of this work, the objectives would be as follows;
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Safe and reliable production is the cornerstone to efficient and profitable oil and gas
production operations. As majority of the offshore oil and gas installations in the UK
sector of the North Sea are operating beyond their design life, management and
prevention of unwanted incident especially those involving hydrocarbons, is essential to
achieving this desired safety and reliability. This sort of events can lead to multiple
fatalities with respect to people, contamination of the environment, economic loss and
reputational damage for example, the Texas City refinery disaster in 2005 and The Gulf
of Mexico Oil Spill in 2010 [3].
The effective Asset Integrity Management (AIM) is critical to the control of MAH,
preventing major accidents, improve availability, business and operational efficiency
and increase reliability in oil and gas production operations. To achieve this, it is
necessary that an aware workforce deploy quality practices to sound facilities [4].
2.2
Management of asset integrity in modern oil and gas industry is a complex and a crossfunctional activity made up of many components covering many disciplines, and it is a
birth to death journey for an asset.
The UK HSE defined Asset Integrity as the ability of an asset to perform its required
function effectively and efficiently whilst protecting health, safety and the environment
and AIM as the means of ensuring that the people, systems, processes and resources that
deliver integrity are in place, in use and will perform when required over the whole
lifecycle of the asset [2].
According to Sutton [5], AIM should be a core element in companies' total management
systems, strategies and activities. It seeks to ensure that all equipment, piping,
instrumentation, electrical systems, and other physical items in a unit are designed,
constructed, operated, inspected, and maintained to the appropriate standards. AIM is
built on the philosophy that prevention of major accident is reliant on the following
principles that;
The People are trained and competent with regards to their safety critical duties
(i.e. Personnel integrity).
The life cycle of an asset simply means the different phases/stages an asset goes through
before it is no longer fit for service. Over the life of an asset, the design intentions or
operational conditions may change. These changes can introduce risk or impose added
burden on the assets both in terms of operating practices as well as the asset reliability
and integrity [7].
To ensure the life cycle integrity of the asset is managed and maintain, it is required that
such changes are recognised and appropriate steps taking to mitigate the effect. This is
dependent on good leadership, senior management commitment, effective maintenance
and risk management conducted by a competent workforce for each phase of the asset
life [8].
The main phases of an asset life are summarized in the figure 2.2;
Construction
Commissioning
Design
Operations
Plan
Decommissioning
Asset Life
Cycle
Figure 2.2: Asset Life Cycle
Each of these phases has an impact on the integrity of the asset and is of itself a
significant event with the potential to change the risk profile of the asset [9].
These phases are discussed below;
2.3.1 Plan/Design Phase
The plan/design phase is crucial and the most important phase of any asset. Integrity in
design yields high reliability, availability, reduces downtime and cost of maintenance
[10]. Dreher et al [11] explain that, the most effective manner in which to reduce the
overall risk exposure for an asset is to reduce the risk during the planning and design
phases. Implementing the inherently safe design concept will minimise the hazards to
personnel during their operating phase and subsequent decommissioning.
A variety of studies may be undertaken during this phase to identify risk in order to take
appropriate step to mitigate the risk. These studies consider risk in a variety of areas,
including project, safety, and operational risk.
5
Operational risk assessments e.g. Failure Mode Effect (and Criticality) Analysis
(FMEA/FMECA), Reliability and Availability Studies.
ensure that all potential risks are evaluated, if necessary by repeating the whole design
control measures as in the earlier phases.
2.3.5 Decommissioning Phase
Applying appropriate risk management during planning and design phases of an asset
will anticipate potential problems and take them into consideration in the initial design
of the facility. This can in the long run eliminate or reduce the issues associated with the
decommissioning of the facility at the end of their useful life [11].
2.4
Mechanical Integrity
Operational Integrity
Personnel Integrity
Mechanical
Integrity
Asset
Integrity
Personnel
Integrity
Operational
integrity
[14]
The figure above shows the relation between asset integrity and its major elements, as
well as the interrelation between the elements. The way each of the elements performs
has effect on the others. The range for mechanical integrity is defined by the operations
and both of these elements depend on the personnel involved in dealing with them. This
enforces
the
requirement
of
personnel
7
integrity
to
define
asset
integrity
Design mechanical integrity into a process plant during the design stage
2.5
Asset register
Protective System
Emergency Management
Competence/Skills Assurance
Leadership
Description of the Elements and the Intended Purposes
One of the major threats to MOC is that a change might not be recognised in the first
place, and this can be followed by the failure to identify the impacts of the change and
implement appropriate actions that allow transition to the change [19].
This is evident from a number of globally reported major incidents, where it was
revealed that failure to manage change was the root cause or a significant contributor.
For example,
In most cases, MOC is applied well to permanent visible physical changes to an asset.
However, temporary or insidious changes are sometimes overlooked or not noticed. In
addition, issues such as operations outside of acceptable operating envelops, chemical
addition modifications, change in physical properties etc. are often missed. According
to Ciaraldi [6], understanding what constitute a change and how different types of
change are governed is important for an asset operator to establish an effective MOC
process. To further improve the effectiveness of MOC, an audit procedure which feeds
back into process modifications and clarifications should be employed [6].
2.5.2 Assessment and Continuous Improvements
Another important element in AIM is the assessment or evaluation of the changing
condition of an asset and the continuous assurance and verification of its integrity. This
can be achieved if performance measures are in place to monitor progress and determine
if effective systems and procedures are in place [7].
The preservation of safety critical function of SCE to achieve the required level of asset
integrity is achieved by a programme of planned inspection, testing and maintenance
activities. This is supported by timely/focussed repairs, replacements and restoration of
asset condition so that the asset remains fit for its operational purposes. Without this,
asset will deteriorate, leading to degradation of performance, ageing and unreliability of
its SCE.
2.5.3 Ownership and Accountability
If the accountability is not defined, the ownership of any task or initiatives is diluted
and progress will not be recorded. As such, for any integrity management plan or
initiative to succeed, the responsibility for identifying the loop holes in the integrity of
10
the asset, the necessary actions required to close these identified gaps, monitoring of
progress made in the corrective actions and maintaining of the desired level of
performance must be defined [7].
2.5.4 Asset register
Palmer [21] explained that, data availability, accuracy and continued update are
necessary for the implementation of AIM initiatives and measure of progress towards
meeting the preset objectives.
Without integrity management data, it will be difficult for asset management to monitor
or to assert with any level of confidence that the plant or asset is in a safe condition or to
complete meaningful predictive work that will ensure the long term reliability of the
facilities. All supporting inspection, testing, investigative findings, modifications and
maintenance database should be aligned with the asset register. Therefore, periodic
reviews are required to ensure the asset register and supporting databases are maintained
and always up to date [22].
2.5.5 Risk Management and Hazard Evaluation
The core of AIM is risk and hazards evaluation. These involves the process of planning,
identifying, estimating, evaluating, selecting and implementing actions to prevent,
minimize, control or eliminate harm to personnel, environment and assets [23].
This emphasizes the need for continuous process that establishes and progressively
updates the understanding of the hazards and their management through the life cycle of
each asset.
The hazard analysis should produce a hazard register and SCE list (for prevention,
control and mitigation of the hazards) that includes the level of criticality based on the
likelihood and consequences of their failure in service [7].
2.5.6 Protective Systems
This are safety critical systems which contribute to preventing, detecting, controlling or
mitigate a major accident and ensuring the survival of people and protection of assets.
To ensure AIM, these systems should always be reliable, available and operational and
their operational functions continually verified to ensure they meet the performance
criteria. These systems include,
11
ESD
HIPPS
Regulatory requirements
12
Audited to provide assurance of conformance and identification of nonconformance for corrective action and this corrective action is assigned
ownership and target date to ensure it is carried out.
competency is not about training, intelligence or education level, but it is about the
specific skills required to properly do a particular job and the individuals level of
expertise.
Managing peoples competence is a critical part of managing overall safety and integrity
of an asset. Wherever people interface with complex work systems, skilled knowledge
and skilled performance are vital to operational integrity [29].
A proper competency assurance program defines the skills required for each job and the
minimum level of competency necessary to carry out the job. Additionally, there must
be a means in place to continually assess the individual skills of a worker so that
deficiencies may be identified and corrected with targeted training and testing [30]. See
figure 2.4
[6]
available and can respond quickly to mitigate the effect of an undesired event by having
robust emergency management plan. In addition to having the plans in place, they
should be regularly reviewed to be able to adapt to changes in the identified hazards, be
fully understood by all those likely to be impacted and regularly exercised and tested
through drills [28].
2.6
Risk based approach provides a detailed evaluation of failure modes and the assessment
of their corresponding likelihood and consequences if the failure eventually occurs.
Leading and lagging indicators are then developed to monitor the performance of the
asset to prevent potential incidents [31]. Two types of risk based approach are discussed
below.
2.6.1 Risk Base Inspection (RBI)
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) methodologies are becoming standard industrial practice
for the management and planning of in-service inspection activities. According to
Horrocks et al [32], these methodologies seek to define and manage the risk associated
with individual equipment, such that items that constitute the highest risk receive the
greatest attention from a planned inspection program.
RBI provides detailed evaluations of the mode of failure, the barriers to prevent, control
or mitigate these failures, and results in an inspection programme to effectively identify
potential failure before they occur at reduced cost [33]. RBI is discussed later in details.
2.6.2 Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM)
The oil and gas process plants and facilities require essential targeted continuous
maintenance to ensure high levels of reliability and safety. A Risk Based Maintenance
(RBM) strategy is a useful tool to plan and design a cost effective maintenance schedule
[34]. The unexpected failures, the down time associated with such failures, the loss of
production and, the higher maintenance costs are major problems in any process plant.
RBM approach helps in designing an alternative strategy to minimize the risk resulting
from breakdowns or failures [35].
The RBM methodology is comprised of four modules;
Risk assessment
15
Risk evaluation
Maintenance planning.
Krishnasamy et al [36] explained that, using this methodology, one is able to estimate
risk caused by the unexpected failure as a function of its probability and consequence.
Critical equipment can be identified based on the level of risk and a pre-selected
acceptable level of risk. Maintenance of equipment is prioritized based on the risk,
which helps in reducing the overall risk of an asset.
2.7
Safety Critical Element (SCE), Major Accident Hazard (MAH), Risk Based
Inspections (RBI) and Performance Standard (PS)
loop) enable management and operators to analyse the ongoing conformance of the
SCEs with their PS. This provides opportunity for improvement and possibilities for
further risk reduction.
A comprehensive risk assessment is the best practice approach for the identification of
the SCE and the eventual definition of the required PS. This involves the detailed
identification of all hazards associated with different phases of the asset life [39]. This is
achieved by performing a number of HAZID exercises and representing the information
from the HAZID workshops using Bowtie diagram. Bowties are graphical
representations providing information related to hazard with threats which could release
the hazards potentials on the left hand side of the graph and the consequences on the
right hand side [40].
On each threat branch of the bowtie, there are shown barriers which are control
measures provided to prevent the threat from arising. Similarly, on each consequence
branch, there are mitigation barriers and recovery control measures which are
considered to provide risk reduction from the consequences [41].
The Figure 2.5 shows the barriers (SCE) on both sides of the top event (Hazard)
17
The PS for the SCE should be defined based on the MAH (more on PS in the
next sub-heading).
The PS which describes the equipment operating parameters at which the safety
system fulfils its safety functions, should be defined for the SCE based on
recognised industry standards e.g. The British Standard (BS), International
Standard Organisation (ISO) etc.
SCEs should be graded based on the risks associated, this assists in prioritizing
maintenance. It is important also to monitor the maintenance of non SCEs
because their failure can increase the workload of the SCE eventually resulting
in major accident.
The reliability and availability target for the SCE should be specified. The best
approach to achieve this is to use the risk based approach by performing Safety
Integrity Level (SIL) calculations.
In order to avoid ambiguity, the PS should have a clear pass/fail criterion. This
would assist the verification operator to document the results clearly which
could be used for further analysis of the performance of the SCE.
focussing on the critical areas of the asset, and reducing efforts on the non-critical areas
i.e. inspection effort is proportional to the criticality of the operating asset [45].
The RBI methodology provides a logical, documented and repeatable system for
making informed decisions on inspection frequencies, details of inspection, inspection
scope etc.
2.7.2.1 RBI Process
According to Peterson et al [42] The RBI process consists of;
Using the results of the assessment to determine the inspection frequencies and
scopes.
Before performing a criticality risk assessment, three basic questions should be asked,
this are;
Frequency assessment
Consequence assessment
Risk evaluation
Action forward
20
21
For a given risk event (e.g. accidental hydrocarbon release), each of the release criteria
is evaluated based on the likelihood and consequence. Likelihood is the probability of
occurrence and Consequence is the severity of impact. In quantitative risk assessment,
the risk is the product of the numerical consequence and the probability of occurrence
[48]. (See figure 2.6).
According to Clare et al [48], Consequence and likelihood can each be assessed using
various methods of varying complexity, ranging from qualitative to quantitative.
22
[48]
The simplest form of reporting risk is by simply grading the possible consequences and
likelihood of the failure events as high, medium or low. The preferred approach is to use
a Risk matrix to assign risk.
An example of a typical Risk Matrix is shown in Figure 2.7 below.
Each asset will fall within a cell in the matrix corresponding to the likelihood and
consequences of failure.
12
16
12
Low
Medium
High
Very High
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Marginal
Minor
Consequence
Serious
Very serious
Risk = LikelihoodConsequences
Likelihood
Figure 2.7: Typical 4x4 Risk Matrixes
23
Unacceptable
Urgent Attention
Undesirable
Action
Acceptable
Monitor
Desirable
No action
Figure 2.8: Risk Ratings
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show sample definitions for Likelihood and Consequence for
4X4 Risk Matrix
Table 2.1: Definitions of Likelihood for Typical 4X4 Risk Matrix
Likelihood Ranking
Likelihood Category
Definitions
Low
Not likely
Medium
May occur
High
Probable Occurrence
Very high
Occurred/Occurring
24
[42]
Consequence Ranking
Consequence Category
Impact
Minor
Marginal
Medical
aid,
response,
limited
equipment
Serious
Serious
injury(s),
major
Very serious
Fatality(s),
long
environmental,
term
permanent
shutdown
2.7.2.7 Action Forward
The underlying implicit assumption is that in a competent organisation, findings from
the RBI will be followed by proper actions that will actually reduce equipment risk and
ensures the integrity of the asset [42]. The action plan may include one or a combination
of the following activities [42];
2.8
Follow up inspection
Asset monitoring
Asset replacement
Instrumentation upgrade
Major Accident Hazards (MAH)
Major Accident can be thought of as an occurrence such as major emissions, spill, fire
or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of operations and
can lead to multiple fatalities or serious danger to the environment. MAH are hazard
that has the potential of resulting to a major accident e.g. hydrocarbon releases [49].
Craddock [50] explains that, major accident occurs because of failure to identify or
recognise MAH and take adequate steps to manage the associated risks. Major accidents
25
are low frequency very high consequence events requiring careful management. This
needs to be supported by a safety culture that has all levels of an asset organisation
engaged in the common goal of major accident prevention. This starts with committed
leadership. Leadership that is complacent about low frequency high consequence events
will be leading an organisation that is closer to triggering a major incident than a
leadership that is mindful about such events.
It is important to recognise that for this class of failures, the primary risk control
measures are built into the system at the planning selection, design, construction, and
installation phases (i.e. ensuring the integrity of the asset in all phases). Major incidents
are not driven by operational considerations i.e. they do not necessarily require
operational failures to be realise, and may occur even if a system is operated within its
design envelop [51].
2.9
Reliability i.e. the ability of the system to perform its required functions when
its needed.
Survivability i.e. the ability of the element to deliver its function if exposed to an
undesired event e.g. fire, blast, vibrations, etc.
Interdependency i.e. other systems necessary for the function of the SCE to
perform adequately e.g. emergency power supply for SIS [37].
26
27
An Asset
Definitions of Performance
Standards (PS) for the SCE
phase and secondly the performance criteria that ensures the on-going suitability of the
SCE in the operational phase. The defined PS detail the goal of the SCE, functionality,
suitability, availability, reliability and interdependency and also the acceptance pass/fail
criterion for which the performance of the SCE will be measured and recorded.
29
METHODOLOGY
This chapter includes a review of the research method and design appropriateness, a
discussion of the population and sample, methods used in the collection of data, the
approach used in the analysis of collated data, ethical consideration and limitations.
This research was carried out in three main parts. The first was aimed at identifying key
background issues/studies relating to AIM. The second concentrated on the collation
and assimilation of available data. Specifically, it examined information relating to the
KP3 reports, review and studies on integrity management together with the data from
the questionnaire and notes made from the unstructured interviews with some TAs and
asset integrity managers. The final phase involved the analysis of all of the available
data, draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the findings.
An overview of the process is shown below with colour codes representing the different
parts.
TASK 1
Literature Review
TASK 2
TASK 3
Pilot interview/Brainstorming
Section with AISG
TASK 6
Conclusions &
30
Recommendations
Figure 3.1: Overview of Process
3.1
The main focus of this research was on the UK oil and gas industry. This involves dutyholders operating in the UKCS of the North Sea. A form of sampling was introduced.
As explained by Silvermann [52], the purpose of this sampling was to study a
representative subsection of a precisely defined population in order to make inferences
about the whole population. Within the duty holders, the participant includes Asset
Integrity managers and TAs.
The above participants were chosen because of their relevance and experience to answer
the research question. It was necessary to employ this form of sampling techniques
because of the time and resources available to the research.
3.2
31
Nevertheless, the cons also include, the response rate was low, the fear of given some
confidential documents out and there were no one present to help the respondents if
they are having difficulty answering questions. In other to mitigate some of the cons, a
good covering letter explaining the reasons for the research, why it is important and
why the recipient has been selected and a guarantee of confidentiality was attached to
the questionnaire (see Appendix A). Furthermore, a simple questionnaire with clear
instructions and an attractive layout was designed.
The questionnaire contains 22 questions in total including open and close -ended
questions. It is assumed that the likelihood of response to this format considering their
busy schedule is more compared to using all open-ended questions. In addition, the
weakness associated with either form of question is the strength of the other.
The administration of the questionnaire to the target participants and the persistent
contact of the respondent to ensure quick response to the questionnaire were made
possible through the AISG of Step Change in Safety.
3.2.3 Unstructured Interview
These involved informal interviews and discussions conducted to explore or get a wider
understanding on the topic being researched. There was no predetermined list of
questions to work through in this situation, just knowledge of the aspect I want to
explore. As mentioned earlier, the interview was purely informal. The interviewee is
given the opportunity to talk freely about events, behaviour and beliefs in relation to the
topic area [54].
I was able to have three different unstructured interviews, two of which were from TA
working in the UK and the third was with TA in the United State of America. The
information obtained from this interviews where used to explore and explain themes
that have emerged from the use of the questionnaire.
3.3
Various methods of data collection produce different types of data that requires different
handling strategies. The main method of data collection for this research was the use of
the questionnaire and an unstructured interview to explore on findings.
32
First step involves reproducing the collated data so that they provide a fair summary of
what has been studied and so that they can be analysed readily to answer the
researchers questions.
The questionnaire as stated earlier, contains both closed and open-ended question, the
first step was to code this data, i.e. transforming the data from the questionnaire into a
form in which we can analyse efficiently. For the unstructured interviews, the analysis
of the data was a bit challenging since there was no interview agenda. This was finally
overcome by constantly visiting the note made from the discussions and ideas that form
in my head. This process continued until I felt fairly confident that I had identified the
set of variables that I needed and could measure, and had also identified some of the
main categories of each variable. The data extracted was also coded. The themes arising
from the coded data will be linked to the research objective in analysis providing a
framework with which findings will be reported and discussed.
The data was analysed using EXCEL, a personal computer based analysis software.
This was chosen because it is particularly useful in basic statistical analysis.
3.4
33
the AISG was organised to brainstorm on the available data and make relevant
contributions.
34
In 2009, following the findings from KP3 as regards the declining nature of the
influence of the TAs; the OSD of HSE conducted a review of the industrys progress.
The review concluded that there have been real changes to, and strengthening of, the TA
functions in a number of companies which are showing tangible benefits. The challenge
remaining for the industry according to OSD is to ensure that the enhancements to the
TAs role and resources are replicated uniformly and consistently across the industry
[56].
Based on the findings of the OSD of HSE, a questionnaire was developed to understand
the current implementation of the role of TAs across duty holders in the UKCS. This
chapter contain the data presentation, analysis and discussion of the findings.
4.1
The Questionnaire
role
definition
and
organisation
approach:
To
understand
the
35
`
Figure 4.1: Percentage Distribution of Offshore Platform across Respondent
4.1.1 The Organisations
The question around the organisation was asked based on the findings by OSD in 2009
that .much needs to be done to strengthen this TA function and wider consideration
needs to be given as to the role of the TA function at senior levels in companies. [2].
In order to understand how this has been incorporated into the industry, the duty holders
were asked to describe the company structure within which the TAs seats in, and how
they report into the senior management level.
36
Figure 4.2: Flow Diagram for TA reporting Structure into Senior Management
The flow diagram shown in figure 4.2 above summarises the organisational structure
within which the TAs seat in, and how they report into the senior management within
the respondent organisation. The responses show a strengthening of the TAs within the
organisational structure of the respondent.
4.1.2 TA Standard/Framework
The TA in a company as mentioned by HSE act as a backstop against continuing
operations with degraded SCE, their function is to provide expertise and judgement on
key operational engineering issues [2]. This is an important strategic role particularly in
decision making relating to the continuing operations with degraded SCE, equipment
integrity and MAH management. To get a clear understanding about TAs and the
required qualification for this strategic role, the duty holders were asked to state the
basis upon which they select their TAs.
37
The stacked bar chart below (figure 4.3) summarises the responses from the respondents
with the colour code matching each respondent, and the bar chart in figure 4.4 showing
the percentage of respondent in agreement.
4.1.2.1 TA Disciplines
The duty holders where ask to list the TAs discipline within their organisation. This
question was asked to have an understanding on the critical discipline occupy by TAs
across the industry. The stacked bar chart below (figure 4.5) summarises the responses
from all respondent and the bar chart in figure 4.6 shows the percentage of respondent
in agreement.
39
40
As stated earlier, the duty holders are involved in various operational activities within
UKCS; this explains the weak percentage of agreement notice in most of the TAs
discipline. Different organisations select their TAs discipline based on their specific
MAH operational activities or the relevance of the discipline to the organisation.
Nevertheless, there were some TAs disciplines that had strong agreement across all
respondents, disciplines such as the mechanical/pressure vessels TA, structural TA,
electrical, instrumentation and control TA, process/technical safety TA, materials and
corrosion TA. These are disciplines with high potential of resulting in major accident if
not properly managed and they are susceptible to degradation as asset age. An
explanation of the TAs discipline is given below;
support systems such as ESD and public address/general alarm (PA&GA) are
reliable and available when called upon.
Materials and Corrosion TA: If corrosion is not controlled, it can lead to the loss
of hydrocarbon containment and structural failure, with the possibility of
resulting in major accident with serious human, asset, environmental and
reputational implications. The Materials and Corrosion TA are accountable for
ensuring that adequate systems are in place for the control and monitoring of
plant, pipe work corrosion and selection of suitable materials in the design of
site modifications, or projects. For example, the close relationship between the
Materials and Corrosion TA and chemist to manage the chemical injection
systems to ensure adequate protection against corrosion
Maintenance of SCEs
Backlog
Deferrals
Corrective maintenance
The specific questions were tailored to understand the industrys step in improvement
this areas of poor performance. (See Appendix B section 3).
42
The summary of the roles/responsibilities from the respondent are shown in the stacked
bar chart in figure 4.7 below.
43
44
On the other hand, auditing is done to identify loop holes or cracks on the safety
equipments.
4.1.3.2 Risk Assessments
Understanding of hazards present in an asset or operation is the first step in managing it.
It is a process of identifying hazards, the consequence if the hazard is released, the
likelihood that the hazard will be released, and the risk to personnel, environment,
assets, reputation and taking step to set up barriers to ensure the risk is reduced to a
level that is as low as reasonably practicable. Risk assessment is also a continuous
process done over the life cycle of an asset to ensure that hazards are identified over the
different phases of the asset.
4.1.3.3 Defines Regional Technical Standard
Technical Standard is the established norm or requirements for technical systems/assets.
This is an important role because all operational integrity and process safety plans are
built on a foundation of complete, accurate, and timely technical information [55]. For
example, for a proper HAZOP studies to identify possible deviations (in a process
plant), it is required that up to date and accurate Piping and Instrumentations Diagrams
(P&IDs) be provided to the team, operating procedures require information about
process limits, and the AIM plan requires information about equipment and piping. Also
with a good written technical standard, it is easier for duty holders or outside auditors to
evaluate the status of the integrity management systems [55].
4.1.3.4 Endorse waiver to Technical Standard
Waiver to technical standard is a sensitive activity that requires an engineering authority
with an understanding of the associated risks. The endorsement of waiver requires
proper risk assessments to determine the risk associated with the activity in other to
have proper barriers in place. Waivers to technical standards are issued on special
circumstances to allow certain critical equipment to continue to be on service provided
controls are in place. Each waiver to the technical standard should be recorded in the
asset register and subjected to regular review.
4.1.3.5 Interpretation of Good Engineering Practice
Sharing of good engineering practice is a good way of enhancing cross industrial
learning. The understanding of the good engineering practice from the industry by the
TAs will ensure proper implementation to manage the integrity of their assets.
45
The understanding when to apply each of this strategy is essential for AIM.
4.1.3.8 Approves Key Engineering Drawing
Integrity in design will ensure integrity during operations. Proper risk assessments are
done on key engineering drawings (e.g. P&ID) to ensure risk are identified and proper
steps are taking to manage it.
4.1.3.9 Ensure Conformity with Legislation and Standard
Standards and Legislations have been developed to guide duty holders on various areas
exploration, development, operations, design, construction, procedure etc. for example,
the ISO standard.
They are crucial for the technical definition of oil and gas
46
47
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Determine Safety Strategy
e.g. the role and need for
the risk reducing measure
48
discovered by OSD of HSE in 2009. As asset continues to age, more needs to be done in
other to ensure effective integrity management.
49
CONCLUSIONS
The finding of this research has given an insight into the current implementation of the
Technical Authoritys role within operating companies in the UKCS. It highlighted key
roles, functions and how they manage the integrity of assets.
Based on the findings, it is seen that the Technical Authoritys role has been
strengthened and embedded into the organisational structure of operating companies
within UKCS. The Technical Authorities are engineers whose combination of
education, experience and ability to lead make them the most appropriate person to
provide advice, guidance and decision making in their technical disciplines. They
occupy strategic technical disciplines within the operating companies with key roles of
evaluating and making engineering and other technical judgements as well as providing
advice and guidance on key operational issues. They also ensure major accident hazards
are managed by defining performance standards for safety critical elements and
ensuring they remain fit for operational purposes.
There is still need for the industry to ensure consistent and uniform implementation of
the Technical Authoritys role within operating companies to ensure integrity of assets
are continually managed even as assets age.
50
RECOMMENDATIONS
Review the suitability of safety critical elements. This should involve periodic
audit and review to ensure the safety critical elements meets the required
performance standards
Review changes and modifications to understand the risk associated with such
activities and take necessary steps to control, prevent or mitigate them
The Technical Authorities should define technical standard at regional level and
ensure they remain fit for purpose.
Technical Authorities should provide guidance, mentoring and training across
installations where required
The Technical Authorities should approves key engineering drawing to ensure
design integrity
51
The Technical Authorities should carry out review and audit activities as
required ensuring the safety critical equipment meet the required performance
standards.
In order to ensure consistent and uniform implementation of the technical authority role
across operating companies, the industry should develop a central reference standard
defining the role of Technical Authorities. This will guide operating companies within
the UKCS.
52
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58
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Best Regards,
(Anonymous)
59
APPENDIX B
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Section A: Organisation
RESPONDENTS
QUESTION 1
Number of Separate offshore facilities
operated in UK
Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
12
Company E
Company F
Company G
Nil
QUESTION 2
Central TA Function covering assets?
Company A
Yes
Company B
Yes
Company C
Yes
Company D
Yes
Company E
Yes
Company F
Yes
Company G
60
QUESTION 3
Describe the organisation structure within
which the TA function sits, in particular
describe the reporting lines
Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
Company E
Company F
Company G
Yes
Company B
Yes
Company C
Yes
Company D
Yes
Company E
Yes
Company F
Yes
Company G
Yes
QUESTION 5
If so, describe the role and accountabilities of a TA
Company A
62
63
Company D
64
65
Company F
Company G
4.
Establish and
maintain consistent and legally compliant
performance standards and provide technical
leadership for the execution of GENERIC
DISCIPLINE operations in the region
5.
Establish and
maintain consistent and legally compliant
66
To advise
HR, Functions and projects on the
recruitment, selection, training and
competency assurance of GENERIC
DISCIPLINE operatives.
7.
Ensuring
compliance with all statutory, client and
company requirements, assessing and
approving any deviations from these
requirements
8.
Promoting the
highest standards of safety and
environmental performance at all times
9.
Providing
expertise to management and to individual
projects as and when required
10.
To support
contracts in the planning, risk assessment
and execution of critical GENERIC
DISCIPLINE operations.
11.
Protecting the
reputation and interests of the clients and
company at all times
12.
To execute
scope content and frequency of any technical
audits of GENERIC DISCIPLINE
operations in the region and advise the
regional leadership team of corrective or
preventative actions arising there from.
67
QUESTION 6
List which TA Disciplines are included in
your operation, include both in-house and
3rd party TA services you contracted in.
15 staff TAs support UKCS offshore, plus
Company A
1. Communications
68
Company D
1. Electrical
2. Mechanical
9. Metering
10. 3rd Party
11. Lifting
12. Telecoms
13. HVAC
We currently have 17 TAs defined in our
Company E
Company F
2. Structures
3. Static equipment
4. Rotating equipment
5. Inspection and materials
6. Electrical
7. Instrumentation and control
8. Pipelines
9. Operations
10. Maintenance
11. Non facilities- subsurface e.g.
Wells, logistics etc.
There are a total of 29 disciplines with
TAs.
Company G
QUESTION 7
What is the basis upon which you select
TA's?
Company A
Company B
71
Company D
Company E
Company F
Company G
72
Company B
Company C
Company D
Company E
Company G
74
QUESTION 9
State the number of persons in each of the
TA disciplines
The latest data I have for the size of the
Company A
Instrument
&
Control,
including
Measurement (71)
5. Electrical (28)
6. Structural (13)
7. Pipelines (14)
8. Materials & Corrosion (14)
9. Welding (1)
10. Rotating Equipment (11)
11. Production Chemistry (4)
12. Flow Assurance (1)
13. Floating Systems (1)
14. Inspection (3)
15. Subsea Hardware (32)
Company B
75
Company C
Company D
Company E
Company F
76
QUESTION 10
For each TA discipline area describe who
is accountable for ensuring that equipment
meets the KPI.
Company A
Company B
Company C
77
Company E
Company F
Company G
QUESTION 11
For each TA discipline how many people
fill this role in your company?
Company A
Company B
See previous
Company C
Company D
78
Company E
Nil
Company F
Company G
QUESTION 12
In relation to modifications, at the highest
level who/what function reviews the
technical content of the Statement of
Requirements (SOR) for a discipline
perspective?
Company A
Company B
79
Nil
Company D
Nil
Company E
Company F
Company G
QUESTION 13
On a discipline basis how many people fill
80
Company B
Nil
Company C
Nil
Company D
Nil
Company E
Company F
Nil
Company G
QUESTION 14
Who defines your company engineering
technical standards?
Company A
Company B
Company D
N/A
Company E
Company F
Company G
QUESTION 15
On a discipline basis how many people fill
this job role in your company?
Company A
Company B
Nil
Company C
Nil
Company D
Nil
82
Company E
17
Company F
Company G
QUESTION 16
Do you have a process for approving
exceptions to your company technical
standards?
Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
Nil
Company E
Nil
Company F
Yes- by TA1
Company G
83
QUESTION 17
Yes
Company B
Company C
Company D
Nil
Company E
Company F
Company G
Yes
QUESTION 18
If not, what is it based on and is it
84
Company B
Nil
Company C
Nil
Company D
Nil
Company E
Nil
Company F
Nil
Company G
Nil
QUESTION 19
In relation to assurance to Safety Critical
Elements (SCEs), who approves
maintenance deferrals?
Company A
85
Company C
Company D
Company E
Company F
TA2
Company G
QUESTION 20
Does the deferral process involve
documenting a risk assessment of the
deferral?
Company A
Company B
Company C
Yes
Company D
Yes
Company E
Yes
Company F
Yes
Company G
Yes
QUESTION 21
Is there an escalation process for the
approval depending on time?
Company A
87
Company B
Yes
The default time is 90 days but this can be
reduced by the TA. A process is in place
to escalate subsequent deferrals to senior
management
Company C
Yes
Company D
Yes
Company E
No
Company F
Company G
QUESTION 22
If so is this done on a discipline basis, by
whom and how many of these job positions
do you have on a discipline basis?
Company A
N/A
Company B
N/A
Company D
N/A
Company E
N/A
Company F
N/A
Company G
APPENDIX C
FINDINGS FROM HSE OSD 2009
89
90