Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Benot Godin
385 rue Sherbrooke Est
Montral, Qubec
Canada H2X 1E3
benoit.godin@ucs.inrs.ca
Abstract
Introduction
Innovation is everywhere. In the world of goods (technology) certainly, but also
in the realm of words: innovation is discussed in the scientific and technical
literature, in social sciences like history, sociology, management and economics,
and in the humanities and arts. Innovation is also a central idea in the popular
imaginary, in the media, in public policy and is part of everybodys vocabulary.
Briefly stated, innovation has become the emblem of the modern society, a
panacea for resolving many problems, and a phenomenon to be studied. As H.
Nowotny defines our epoch: it is a fascination and quest for innovation (Nowotny,
2008; 2006). The quest for innovation is so strong that some go so far as to
suggest that drugs like Ritalin and Adderall, used to treat psychiatric and
neurological conditions, should be prescribed to the healthy as a cognitive
enhancement technology for improving the innovative abilities of our species
(Greely et al., 2008).
This suggests three questions. First, why has innovation acquired such a central
place in our society or, put differently, where precisely does the idea of
innovation come from? To many, innovation is a relatively recent phenomenon
and its study more recent yet: innovation has acquired real importance in the
twentieth century. In point of fact, however, innovation has always existed. The
concept itself emerged centuries ago. This suggests a second question: why did
innovation come to be defined as technological innovation? Many people
spontaneously understand innovation to be technological innovation. The
literature itself takes this for granted. More often than not, studies on
technological innovation simply use the term innovation, although they are really
concerned with technological innovation. However, etymologically and
historically, the concept of innovation is much broader. How, when and by whom
did its meaning come to be restricted to technology? Third, why is innovation
generally understood, in many milieus, as commercialized innovation? It is hard
today to imagine technology without thinking of the market. One frequently hears
of innovations that are marketed by firms, but other types of innovation are either
rapidly forgotten or rarely discussed. By contrast, every individual is to a certain
extent innovative; artists are innovative, scientists are innovative, and so are
organizations in their day-to-day operations.
To answer these three questions, this paper looks at innovation as a category and
at its historical development. The paper is not a history of innovation itself (or
innovations), neither a contextual history. It looks rather at the representations of
innovation and the discourses held in the name of innovation, namely since the
term first appeared in the Middle Ages: how the public, innovators themselves,
and academics, and particularly the theories of the latter, have understood
innovation and talked about it.
This paper offers very preliminary ideas toward a genealogical history of the
category innovation. It identifies the concepts that have defined innovation
through history, and that have led to innovation as a central category of modern
society. It concentrates on the creative dimension of innovation. This dimension
got into innovation in the twentieth century. At the very beginning, innovation
was rather concerned with change, broadly understood, and had nothing to do
with creativity. Innovation as change will be dealt with in another paper (Godin,
2009b).
The paper is programmatic in the sense that it suggests a program of research or
outline for such a genealogical history, a history that remains to be written. In the
Archeology of Scientific Reason, M. Foucault asked Comment se fait-il que tel
concept soit apparu et nul autre sa place?, (Foucault, 1969: 39-40) that is,
under what conditions does a word come to mean what it signifies for us today?
To Foucault, a genealogy is a study of descent rather than origins: the details and
accidents, the forces and struggles that accompany every conceptual beginning
and its further solidification (Foucault, 1984).
social understanding of the world, and the emergence of new words is a marker of
changes in societys values (Skinner, 1988). Put differently, a new word marks
the moment when [a] change had become obvious enough to need a term to
express it (Smith, 1925: 69-70).
Innovation, or the new, does not exist as such. It is constructed through the eyes
and through discourses. The genealogical study suggested here rests on six
elements. It starts with the study of words (or terms), their genesis and
transformation, and the cluster of concepts involved in speaking about innovation:
invention, ingenuity, imagination, creativity, etc. Second, it looks at the meanings
of the concepts developed. Such meaning usually goes from vagueness firstly as
a concept in construction where multiple terms are used, often interchangeably,
and then with an implicit definition to a relative stabilization. Third, discourses
held in the name of the concepts are identified. The discourses on innovation have
been generally of three kinds: innovation as a factor for change in society,
innovation as progress,
As J.G.A. Pocock suggested, before conducting a sociology of ideas, one has to understand
what the ideas were that were in use at a particular time, what in fact they said and implied, and
on what commonly accepted assumptions and methods they were based (Pocock, 1989: 106).
2
Progress in civilization (evolutionists, anthropology), in well-being (sociology), in growth
(economics), in knowledge and the control of nature (philosophy).
the sense that innovation is about novelty, an idea that was present in many forms
before innovation took on a central place in representations, as we will see. It is
also continuity in the sense that innovation is, to many, concerned with
technological invention, which is a dominant understanding of what invention
came to mean over time. However, on the other hand innovation is a break with
the past in the sense that it suggests that invention per se is not enough. There has
to be use and adoption of the invention, namely innovation, in order for benefits
to accrue.
At this stage of the project, the first two parts of this paper (imitation, invention)
are based on secondary sources. The third part (innovation) is composed entirely
of original research and constitutes the core of the paper. It identifies the theories
on innovation proper, and their emergence over the twentieth century. The period
covered in this paper ends around 1970-90, which was when innovation
developed its current understanding in representations, and when the literature on
innovation exploded. 3
Imitation
Imitation is a concept of Greek origin. McKeon (1936) has documented how
Platos philosophy is entirely concerned with imitation and its many senses and
opposites: appearances (or images) versus reality; falsity versus truth. To
Plato, even physical objects are imitations, compared to God and true nature. But
it is through Aristotle that the concept of imitation got its main influence. To
Aristotle, (practical) arts imitate nature (mimesis). Such an understanding of art
gave rise to imitatio as the central problem of art, with pejorative overtones, then
to imitation as inspiration (Abrams, 1953; Nahm, 1956). As M. H. Abrams has
stated, the mimetic orientation was the most primitive aesthetic theory (Abrams,
The author wants to thank the following colleagues for comments on a first draft of this paper:
Irwin Feller, Paul Forman, Denise Lemieux, Pamela Long, Pierre Lucier, Christine Macleod,
Reijo Miettinen, Helga Nowotny, Jean-Jacques Salomon.
1953: 8). 4 Art imitates the world of appearance. The artist extracts the form of
the natural world and imposes it upon an artificial medium (Abrams, 1953: 11). In
fact, wherever the Renaissance theorist turned, he usually found the concept of
invention somehow subordinated to the imitation of nature (Kushner, 1980: 144).
5
On the representation of art before the Greek theory of mimesis art as presentification of
the divine rather than a human creative act , see Vernant and Zeitlin (1991).
5
On the different of meaning of imitation of nature in art, see Lovejoy (1927) and Lovejoy and
Boas (1935). In history, the naturalist presumption is a widespread idea: what humans do, in
literature, arts, crafts and science is a (continuation or) perfection of nature (Close, 1969). To
many, above all philosophers, nature is generally considered as more primitive and more
authentic. Nature functions as a cultural value and social norm. Nature has a moral authority
(Bensaude-Vincent and Newman, 2007; Daston and Vidal, 2004).
10
On Bacons description of his utopian laboratory (Salomons house) as imitation of nature, see
his description of instruments in New Atlantis (1627).
11
theory and visual arts, one finds recurrent descriptions of imitation as rediscovery
of the old, as something new to copy, as something never seen before. Here,
the charge of lies [imitation] is turned to an argument for the truth of poetic
imagination (Rossky, 1958: 69). An argument frequently evoked is that imitation
requires work, experimentation, judgment and imagination. All these descriptions
in literature, arts and crafts generally refer to an idea that has been very influential
among many authors in defining invention, and subsequently innovation, as we
will observe below: that of combination. Imitation is invention because, when
combining elements from nature, it combines the best of them, and by so doing
improves nature. Combination creates a whole that is more perfect than nature;
it is as nature ought to be (Wittkower, 1965: 148). Equally, in combining previous
schools of thought, the combination surpasses the work of past authors.
Compilatio, a wide literary activity which encompassed various genres in the
Middle Ages (and after), is combination of others material into a new work, a
unio (Hathaway, 1989: 41).
But lets continue with imitation as invention in other areas. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, patents (and their precursors in the fifteenth century: letters
and privileges) were not granted to inventors, as they are today, but to importers
of existing inventions, as a way to develop the local economy (Macleod, 1988;
Popplow, 1998; Hilaire-Perez, 2000). They were accompanied by laws restricting
the mobility of artisans who possessed unique skills or techniques (Epstein,
1988). In addition, premiums and prizes were awarded by societies of arts to
imitations of existing foreign goods (Berg, 1999). Similarly, in consumer goods of
eighteenth-century Britain, imitation was perceived as invention because it
resulted in new commodities, introduced improvements in quality (design), and
brought diversity and variety (Berg, 1999; 2002: Clifford, 1999; Benhamou,
1991). Due to a culture of taste, the goods or commodities and their aesthetic
qualities evoke the distinctive and the exotic, but also the latest technology and
modernity.
12
Now, if we turn to the twentieth century, we clearly observe that imitation gave
rise to, and was often used as a term for, diffusion. As I discuss below,
contemporary theories on innovation now include diffusion (or use) as a step in
the innovation process. In this process, diffusion is really imitation, and the word
appears in early theories, from the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde in the 1890s
to the economic literature on technological innovation in the 1980s. As a matter of
fact, in the sociological literature of the 1940-60s, an innovator is not an inventor
but a user, defined as to time: the first user of an invention. Equally, imitation
gave rise to the idea of adoption as innovation itself: in recent theories on and
measurements of technological innovation, adopting an existing technology is a
behaviour considered just as innovative as inventing (OECD, 2005), and not as
mere imitation, as Levitt has suggested.
See also the much cited concept absorptive capacities: the capacity of a firm to assimilate and
apply (imitate) other firms innovations (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
13
conceived has been eclipsed by one or more of the four other divisions
(arrangement, style, memory and delivery).
Invention as a term in other domains really came to be used in the mid-fourteenth
century as finding or discovery, namely with regard to knowledge, or science
(knowing). It came to be applied to making as well, in poetry (literary criticism),
then in visual arts. From the sixteenth century, invention was used more and more
to apply to newly-created things (artifacts). Lets look at the history of this
evolution.
From late medieval Europe, the idea of invention spread everywhere, to different
degrees and under different terms. A whole cluster of words is used to name the
new, as the list below indicates. Certainly, as M. Kemp has noted, in the
Renaissance, there was no unanimity in usage of divino, ingegno, fantasia,
immaginazione and invenzione (Kemp, 1977: 397). Equally, the term or terms
associated with a specific field in the following list are not exclusive to that field,
but are those that came to gain preeminence in that field (for a complete list of the
vocabulary, see the Appendix). One thing is clear: in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the idea of novelty is everywhere and becomes very much
a (positive) cultural value:
-
Philosophy: praxis 8
In philosophy, praxis has not really been theorized because of the emphasis on mind (Arendt,
1968; Lobkowic, 1957). It slowly begins to be become an issue, quite imperfectly according to
many, with expressiveness (J. G. Herder), utilitarianism (free will), existentialism (life, will,
consciousness), pragmatism (experience, inquiry), and the philosophy of action (Bernstein, 1971).
9
Following Bowler (1983), I group together under evolutionists: early geology, early
paleontology, natural history, and biology.
14
Nowhere is the idea of novelty more present than in science. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, science was frequently discussed as an active search or
hunt (venatio), a very old metaphor (Eamon, 1994; Hadot, 2004). The scientific
literature of the seventeenth century is full of the term new, as L. Thorndike has
documented (Thorndike, 1957), as well as the term revolution (Cohen, 1985). 10
Equally, the idea of progress is a major one during the Renaissance, the
Enlightenment and subsequently (Bury, 1932; Zilsel, 1945; Sarton, 1962; Rossi,
1970: 63-99; Crombie, 1975; Bock, 1978; Nisbet, 1980; Marx, 1987; Spadafora,
1990).
Change became a preoccupation of study in many emerging scientific disciplines,
from sociology (A. Comte, H. Spencer) and history (A. Ferguson) to natural
philosophy, or the sciences. Geologists, natural historians and biologists from the
eighteenth century are the men of science who have taken change most
seriously. Certainly, at that time, change as the natural process for the
development of life on earth was seen as preordained, even through the nineteenth
century: God is the designer of all things and their development; the linear chain
of being is constructed as leading invariably to man (Lovejoy, 1936). But
evolutionists, since before Darwin, have discussed change as either linear, or
cyclical or catastrophic (in the case of the earth formation), and as spontaneous
generation and degeneration, then natural selection (in the case of biological
species) (Bowler, 1983; 1993). The evolutionists also developed influential
sequential theories of how life and societies evolve (life-cycle theories), based on
15
11
10
Friedman and Karlsson have recently computed the exponential use of the word novel in titles
of the current scientific literature, and have concluded: in the morning hours of 7 February 2020
all science will be novel (Friedman and Karlsson, 1997).
11
On the role of hypothesis (imagination) in science, see Laudan (1981), Park, Daston and Galison
(1984).
12
Frequently heard oppositions are: Good versus bad imagination; imitation versus originality;
science versus art; knowing versus imagining; objectivity versus subjectivity; books versus
16
Over time, invention in science came to share the vocabulary of writers with the
term discovery. In fact, for some time, invention meant finding as well as
making, and was applied without qualification to both activities. Discovery also
meant both. Later, a distinction was made between the two concepts: discovery
referred to facts or things that already exist out there and that one finds out, while
invention combines and makes new things, including scientific theories (Wyman,
1929; Kneale, 1955). However, since social constructivism (Hacking, 1999), the
term construction seems to be the preferred term, applying to both scientific
discoveries and technological inventions.
Literature and visual arts are other fields where the idea of novelty is widespread.
Contrary to science, with its emphasis on facts and method and its negative
assessment of imagination (Southgate, 1992), the power of imagination is
rehabilitated. In fact, literary theory and visual arts (painting, sculpture) in the
Renaissance adapted invention from the literature on rhetoric (then from poetry)
to a psychological process of imagination (Lee, 1940; Bundy, 1930; Spencer,
1957; Bond, 1935; 1937; Rossky, 1958). Although imagination was, as in science,
portrayed for a time as in need of control, namely judgment and rules (Costa
Lima, 1988), the real boundary work of the artist is against imitation: imitation (as
combination) is stigmatized as eclectici. Real art is free and creative imagination
(Cassirer, 1932: chapter 7; Abrams, 1953; Williams, 1961; Engell, 1981; Mason,
2003). The passive role (reproducing) of imagination in medieval usage (as
opposed to fantasy which combines) turned into an active faculty with the
Romantics. Originality came to define the artist (Mann, 1939; Mortier, 1982;
Quint, 1983; McFarland, 1985), and the metaphor of creation already present in
Greek mythology (Prometheus) entered the vocabulary (Nahm, 1947, 1956;
Tigerstadt, 1968; Mason, 1988). Certainly, originality, as with imitation and
invention, carries negative connotations as well. Until the nineteenth century, in
observation; hypotheses versus data; tradition versus modernity; good versus bad effects of
technology (benefits versus disasters).
17
social usage for example, an original person was bizarre, eccentric, ridiculed.
13
However, originality with the following two meanings gained credence over time.
Originality means origin, or source (authorship), and this meaning would be
influential, as discussed below, in the case of technological invention. It also
means a distinctive quality of work, or novelty, unlike the imitation of the
ancients, for example. As such, originality came to characterize the genius, an
important figure in the Renaissance and to the Romantic authors. Genius as a
concept has a long history. First defined as spirit (which gave inspiration), it came
to mean innate talent or ability (ingenium), then a person with superior creative
powers, to which the Romantic conception has added the idea that genius defies
rational analysis (Smith, 1925; Zilsel, 1926; Tonelli and Wittkower, 1968-70;
Murray, 1989; Goodey, 2004).
Ingenuity was also a key concept for the artisan from the Middle Ages onward. In
fact, the artisan, first of all alchemists, through their art created new things in their
opinion, and for the first time made art a creative force rather than only an
imitative entity or mirror-like representation (Newman, 2004).
14
Equally, in
Renaissance painters, ceramists and sculptors really thought they were creating
new things, not only practicing an imitative art (Smith, 2004). This creative power
over nature gave rise to the figure of the inventor, a genius or hero who, as to
scientists and artists, was not without opponents. As a matter of fact, it took time
for inventors to be admitted to the pantheon of great men. Up to the beginning of
the nineteenth century, and again after the commercialization of technological
inventions on a large scale at the end of this same century, the inventor was
anonymous. As C. MacLeod has discussed for Great Britain: inventors were
merely the agents of providence in discovering inventions in accordance with
the divine plan. The inventor was simply born at the right time and place, and was
13
18
the last link in a causal chain (Macleod, 1996; 2006; 2007 Macleod and Tann,
2007; Macleod and Nuvolari, 2006).
While the idea of invention came to share its place with discovery in science
(Branigan, 1981), and with imagination in literature and visual arts (Engell, 1981;
Mason, 2003), it gradually and increasingly came to be identified preeminently
with mechanical or technological invention, first of all in crafts and arts such as
architecture, navigation, metallurgy and the military. Early in the Renaissance, the
term invention was applied to ingenious things like machines, artifices, devices,
engines, methods, for which a whole literature developed treatises, histories
and encyclopedias (Rossi, 1970; Long, 2001) and for which the word
technology subsequently became the category.
15
engineering and works on bridges, tunnels and railways, then electrical systems
add important inventions to the technological landscape (Chandler, 1977; 1990;
Beniger, 1986; Hughes, 1983).
This alignment of the term invention with technological invention was helped by
the conventionalization, or institutionalization, of technological invention through
privileges and patent laws from the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries onward
(Macleod, 1988; Cooper, 1991a; Popplow, 1998; Hilaire-Perez, 2000). That
invention as idea is itself an invention a social invention is now well admitted.
A scientific theory is invention because a system for attributing authorship to an
individual exists, namely the scientific publication. The scientific publication
developed, in fact, as a mean to resolve priority disputes (Merton, 1957; 1961;
Branigan, 1981; Gross, 1989; Iliffe, 1992; Biagioli and Galison, 2003). Similarly,
the patent system is the institutional mechanism for deciding what a technological
invention is and who owns it (Rae, 1967; Macleod, 1988). As anthropologist O. T.
Mason, curator at the US National Museum, put it in 1895: The public
15
On the history of the term technology, from technique to artifact, see: Morre (1966), Guillerme
and Sebestik (1968), Salomon (1984), Frison (1992; 1993), Marx (1994; 1997), Schatzberg
(2006).
19
recognition and reward of invention may itself be said to have been invented
(Mason, 1895: 15).
It is through the patent system as institution that the criteria for a technological
objects identity are negociated and invention is defined (Cooper, 1991b;
Cambrosio et al., 1990): in fact, all technological inventions are defined here,
whether it is patented or not. Ever since the first modern patent laws in the late
eighteenth century, three criteria have characterized technological invention
(Lubar, 1990). First, originality as to quality of work, or novelty. Applications are
examined for novelty before a patent is granted. Gone is the idea of imitation:
transformations and improvements to existing goods are more and more difficult
to patent. Originality is the norm. A technological invention, to qualify as such,
has to be substantially new. With time, what constitutes novelty is increasingly
settled through the judicial system, which arbitrates competing claims. The
second criterion is originality as to origin, or priority. Here, patents
institutionalized the then-emerging idea of intellectual property (authorship),
whose roots date from the Middle Ages (Long, 2001). Patent laws add property
rights to inventions.
16
16
Copyright laws have followed a similar but distinct development. Early privileges for printed
editions of books were basically for printers, not authors. Rights to writers developed after patent
laws. However, and contrary to patents, originality is a requirement of copyright only in the sense
that it originates in the copyright claimant, not that it is original in the sense of novelty.
20
21
Research Council, 1941; Noble, 1977). As A.N. Whitehead put it long ago, the
greatest invention of the nineteenth century was the invention of the method of
invention. Men have invented a method for (systematic and cumulative)
invention (Whitehead, 1925: 120; see also Lippman, 1934). By 1920, there were
approximately 300 industrial research laboratories in the United States alone, and
twenty five years later industrial research accounted for more than two-thirds of
national expenditures devoted to research and development (R&D) in many
countries. Along with the patent system discussed above, the development of
industries based on the research laboratory and the commercialization of
technological inventions on a large scale were major factors contributing to a
conception of invention as technological invention.
Briefly stated, technological inventions got increased attention because they have
utilitarian value (Long, 2001; Hilaire-Perez, 2000; Macleod, 1988) as opposed
or contrasted to Ancient knowledge, as it was often said from Bacon onward.
They contribute to politics: technology and arts, such as painting, sculpture, and
architecture, serve as political and military power, and as manifestations of power
(displays of grandeur, wealth and magnificence). They also contribute to social
progress. From the medieval guilds (Epstein, 1988) to the mercantilists (Johnson,
1930), from the Enlightenment to the twentieth century, the literature is full of
mentions of progress and utility from technological inventions with regard to
contributing to character (virtue) of the individual, to social well-being, and to
civilization. Finally, technological inventions as power over nature serve
commerce, trade and manufacturing activities seen positively at the time, as A.
O. Hirshman (1977) has documented. From the nineteenth century onward, these
beliefs led to narratives on modernity and technologies from everyone: from
ordinary people to intellectuals (Marx, 1964; Kasson, 1976; Nye, 1997; 2003;
Noble, 1998; Hard and Jamison, 1998; Rieger, 2005).
Things and utility have a place in science too. First, the new sciences of the
seventeenth century increasingly relied on the study of objects of nature.
22
Observation, namely the collection of objects and the compilation of data, and
measurement, with techniques or technologies as instruments, are the keywords
here. There is a rehabilitation of curiosity, which was a vice to Christian writers
like Augustine (Eamon: 1994 58-66, 301-318) and others before him, but which
became a quality of the virtuoso, that is, the cultivated gentleman (Houghton,
1942), giving rise to one of the most central concepts of science, that of
objectivity (Harrison, 2001; Daston, 1995).
17
rarities and exotics (Daston and Park, 1998) also find a place in cabinets of
curiosities, as precursors to museums (Findlen, 1994; Impey and MacGregor,
1985).
Second, there are also calls, for which F. Bacon is the main exponent, for more
useful knowledge in science, namely for the mechanical arts and artificial objects.
18
To Bacon, the real and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endowment of the
human life with new inventions and riches (Novum Organum, 1620: aphorism
no. 81). Bacon is followed by R. Boyle as one of the most serious defenders of his
views, and by the scientific academies (Briggs, 1991; Ochs, 1985).
19
That mixed
mathematics and mechanical arts have utility, that machine technology benefits
the public and industries becomes an argument for the promotion of science and
for securing patronage (Cochrane, 1956; Keller, 1972; Stewart, 1998; 1992).
Innovation
Novation is a term that first appeared in law in the thirteenth century. It meant
renewing an obligation by changing a contract for a new debtor. The term was
rarely used in the various arts and sciences before the twentieth century
17
There is very good literature on the history of objectivity from L. Daston, P. Galison, S.
Schaeffer and S. Shapin (see also Poovey, 1998; Shapiro, 2000). From this literature, one could
develop a genealogical history of objectivity in three steps as follows: curiosity matters of fact
objectivity.
18
The fascination with machines entered science very early, via the mechanical philosophy. The
metaphor of the clock for explaining different aspects of nature is one of the most well-known
examples in the scientific literature. On the analogy of knowing to making (machines), see
Crombie (1994: chapter 14).
23
although new was, as mentioned above. Create and invent were preferred words
for mans productive power and creative abilities. N. Machiavelli (The Prince,
1513) and F. Bacon (Of Innovations, 1625) are among the very few individuals
having devoted early pages to innovation, using the term as such, and to the
resistance of people to innovation.
20
One should also include here the reformers of learning like S. Hartlib, J. Dury, W. Petty and J.
Evelyn in England (Houghton, 1957; Jones, 1936).
24
21
20
On Bacon and novelty, see Whitney (1986). On Machiavelli and innovation, see Pocock (1975).
Precursors on parallel inventions are evolutionists in archeology (G. de Mortillet) and
paleontology (multiple centers, discontinuous invention: R. Owen, G. S. Mivart, H. F. Osborn),
historians (W. Robertson on parallel invention, but at different rates), and philologists.
22
Convergence refers to things originally different that have become the same, and divergence to
things originally the same that have become different. For the first discussion of the principle of
limited possibilities of divergence, see Goldenweiser (1913).
21
25
24
25
23
26
because of the opposition or competition between the new and the old inventions.
27
26
The French sociologist A. Espinas (1897), his praxeology and his discussion on animal societies
(ants) was a source for Tardes model of individual initiative followed by imitation.
27
On Tardes theory of opposition, see Tarde (1897).
28
To Parsons, the social sciences may be all classified as sciences of action. However, a theory
of social change is not possible in the present stage of knowledge (Parsons, 1951: 486).
27
than with creative action (Hield, 1954; Joas, 1996; Berk and Galvan, 2009).
The study of individual creativity was left to psychology.
30
29
Be it as it may, one
For example, to R.K. Merton innovation (as rejection of institutional means to social goals or
norms) is (one of four types of) deviant behavior. See R.K. Merton (1938). On a refinement of
Mertons thesis and a more constructive view of innovation, see Dubin (1959). H. Joas (1996)
argues that there has been no real theory of creativity in sociology. He is right. To many
sociologists, action is rationality rather than creativity. Creativity is non-rational: a residual, a
deviation. But from a genealogical perspective, the authors and the theories Joas discusses
(Durkheim, Weber, Tonnies, Simmel, Parsons) are steps or precursors, not metaphors as he
called them, and should be studied in a genealogical history of innovation.
30
Following N. Machiavelli, W. Pareto has contrasted types of individual as to whether they are
innovative (foxes) or conservative (lions) (Pareto, 1935). However, he did not devoted analyses to
the process of innovation itself.
31
The role of genius in civilization was an idea widely debated in philosophy (W. James versus G.
Allen), in history (T. Carlyle versus the Spencerians, the Hegelians and the Marxists), in science
(F. Galton on heredity versus A. de Candolle), and Tarde has previously positioned himself on the
question. In anthropology, it was discussed in terms of great civilizations and the diffusion of
culture to other parts of the world.
28
behaviours).
32
the culture of any people (Ogburn, 1922: 4). What he observed was the growth
and acceleration of material culture, as would be documented quantitatively by
American sociologist H. Hart from the 1930s to the 1960s (Hart, 1931; 1957;
1959), and its enormous consequences on society, or social change, a field he
studied for over thirty years. Ogburn developed the concept of the cultural lag to
account for this process. There is an increasing lag between the material culture
(technology) and the rest of culture (adaptive culture) due to inertia and lack of
social adaptation. Hence the need for control and adjustment, forecasting and
planning.
To the sociologists, technological invention is a combination of prior art and
ideas, and a complex of diverse elements: design, science, material, method,
capital, skill and management (Gilfillan, 1935: 6). It is a social process rather than
an individual one. Certainly without the inventor there can be no inventions
(Gilfillan, 1935: 78), but the inventors are not the only individuals responsible
for invention (Gilfillan, 1935: 81). Social forces like demographic (race) and
geographic factors, and cultural heritage play a part. Secondly, technological
invention is social in a second sense: it is cumulative (or evolutionary), namely
the result of accumulation and accretion of minor details, modifications,
perfectings, and minute additions over centuries, rather than a one-step creation
(Gilfillan, 1935: 3).
33
32
33
29
What place does the term and category of innovation take in sociological
theories? In studying the literature, one observes a move from multiple terms used
interchangeably to innovation according to an implicit definition, then to explicit
definitions. In the voluminous literature produced by Ogburn, the most frequent
terms are the combined one invention/discovery and technology. There is no use
of the term innovation until it appears occasionally in both a paper from 1941
(Ogburn, 1941: 3, 14, 18) and the 1950 edition of Social Change (Ogburn, 1950:
378), and then in the title of a chapter (plus p. 710) from the fourth edition of
Sociology (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1964). Similarly, Gilfillan made no use of the
term, but twice (Gilfillan, 1935: 59; 1937: 20). In the meantime, however, the
term began to appear among other sociologists, at first concurrently with other
terms, like technological change (Stern, 1927, 1937; Chapin, 1928; Davis, 1940).
Then one finds more widespread use of the term (Hart, 1931; Nimkoff, 1957), and
entire theories devoted to innovation (Rogers, 1962).
Innovation, in the hands of Ogburn and his contemporaries, meant many things.
One was simply novelty (Kallen, 1930). In this sense, the use of the term is rare,
and is without real consequences for sociological theories. A second meaning is
social change (Stern, 1927), and this meaning includes more than technological
invention, that is, social invention as repeatedly suggested by Ogburn and some
others (Bernard, 1923; Chapin, 1928: chapter 11; Weeks, 1932), or social
experiments (Chapin, 1917).
34
35
A third
meaning is the use of (technological) inventions and their social effects (Stern,
1937). For example, to sociologists an innovator is not one who invents but
adopts an invention for the first time. This gave rise to studies on diffusion and to
34
See also the (short-lived) literature on technicways (Odum, 1937; Davis, 1940). On
organizational innovation, see below.
35
To a certain extent, studies on scientific growth (development and diffusion) are concerned with
innovation. For example, see Crane, 1972.
30
31
Table 1.
Sociologists Sequences of Innovation
Tarde (1890)
Ogburn (1920)
Bernard (1923)
Chapin (1928)
Ogburn
and Gilfillan (1933)
Gilfillan (1935)
Gilfillan (1937)
US National Resources
Committee (1937)
Ogburn
and Nimkoff (1940)
Ogburn (1941)
Ogburn (1950)
Rogers (1962)
Rogers (1983)
36
For social invention, the stages are: theory, rules, organizations and institutions.
Adoption itself is composed of steps, or stages, as first suggested and popularized by Beal and
Bohlen (1955): awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, adoption.
37
32
33
The production function is an equation suggested in the late 1920s that links the
quantity produced of a good (output) to quantities of inputs (Cobb and Douglas,
1928; Douglas, 1948). There are at any given time, or so argue economists, inputs
(labour, capital) available to the firm, and a large variety of techniques by which
these inputs can be combined to yield the desired optimal output. The production
function came to be interpreted as representing technological change, a precursor
term to technological innovation in economics. Economists interpreted
movements in the curve of the production function as technological change (the
substitution of capital for labour), while others equated labour productivity with
technology (technological change is likely to result, all other things being equal,
in increased labour productivity), paving the way for R. Solows influential paper
which equated the residual in the production function with technology (Solow,
1957). Then economists started correlating R&D with productivity measures.
Beginning in the late 1950s, a whole literature developed, analyzing the
contribution of research to industrial development, and to performance,
productivity and economic growth, first from mainstream economists.
The term technological change, already used by sociologist B. J. Stern in 1937,
was popularized by economic historian W. R. Maclaurin from MIT in his
pioneering program of research into the economics of technological change in the
1940s and 1950s (Godin, 2008). Before Maclaurin, the term technological change
appeared sporadically in the economic literature, together with technological (or
technical) progress or advancement, and meant the substitution of capital for labor
as factors in industrial production. In the late 1930s, the US Works Projects
Administration, as part of a project on Reemployment Opportunities and Recent
Change in Industrial Techniques, started using the term technological change
regularly to discuss changes in employment due to technology. Then in the early
1940s, Maclaurin gave the term a new meaning concerned with the development
and commercialization of new products, rather than the use of technical processes
34
in production.
38
39
1) introduction of a
40
However, it
took time for the category to gain acceptance. In the early 1960s, the category was
still not widely accepted. To economist F. Machlup, we shall do better without
the word innovation (Machlup, 1962: 179). To others, the term is in need of a
more rigorous definition, because it has come to mean all things to all men
(Ames, 1961: 371). J. Schmookler, after having defined innovation (Schmookler,
38
Nevertheless, for many years most economists continued to focus on technological change as
processes (used in production), rather than as products (for final consumption).
39
On some of Schumpeters borrowing from the German and Austrian economic literature, see
Streissler (1994) and Reinert (2002).
35
1966: 2), has never used the term but rather invention and technical change. In the
1970s, the skepticism continued: the use of the term innovation is
counterproductive, claimed the authors of a survey conducted for the US
National Science Foundation, because each individual has his or her interpretation
(Roberts and Romine, 1974: 4).
41
economic literature were rather invention, technological change (and its variants:
technical advance and technical progress) and sometimes automation.
Schumpeter is usually credited in the economic literature, particularly by
evolutionary economists, as being the first theorist on technological innovation.
This deserves qualifications. Certainly, Schumpeter did develop influential ideas
on technological innovation as a source of business cycles, for example. However,
Schumpeter did follow the literature on technological change and the production
function for defining technological innovation as new combinations of means of
production: innovation as change in the factors of production (input) to produce
products (output) (Schumpeter, 1939: 87s; Lange, 1943). Second, as Maclaurin
(1953) has stated, Schumpeter never developed a theory of technological
innovation. To Schumpeter, the entrepreneur (and, in a next stage, the large firm)
is responsible for technological innovation. But how?
It is really the economic historian Maclaurin, as the very first economic theorist
on technological innovation, who launched the economic study of industrial
research and the commercialization of technological inventions (Godin, 2008).
Studying technological change in its economic dimensions was the task to which
Maclaurin devoted himself entirely from the early 1940s onward. To Maclaurin,
the study of technological change is concerned with factors responsible for the
rate of technological development in industry, and for conditions that are more
conducive to technological progress. From historical analyses of how the process
40
Ten years earlier, the British economist and civil servant Josiah Stamp made a similar
distinction (Stamp, 1929; 1934). For the distinction among German and Austrian economists prior
to Schumpeter, like A.F. Riedel, see Streissler (1994).
36
of technological change takes place, Maclaurin broke down this process into
distinct and sequential steps, from fundamental research to production
engineering, and then to diffusion.
Over time, authors from business schools and economists developed theories or
conceptual models of technological innovation as a process from invention to
diffusion, similar to those of the sociologists (Table 2).
42
In these theories,
41
The same diversity of opinions characterizes the responses to current surveys of innovation from
national statistical bureaus.
42
The steps in the theories of Table 2 vary from psychological steps to organizational steps
(development of new products) to economic steps (production and diffusion).
37
Table 2.
Management and Economists Sequences
of Technological Innovation 43
Mees (1920)
Epstein (1926)
Holland (1928)
Usher (1929)
Jewett (1932)
Stevens (1941)
Bichowsky (1942)
Maclaurin (1947)
Furnas (1948)
Mees and
Leermakers (1950)
Brozen (1951a)
Brozen (1951b)
Maclaurin (1953)
Usher (1954, 1955)
Carter
and Williams (1957)
Enos (1958)
Ruttan (1959)
Ames (1961)
Enos (1962)
Machlup (1962)
Scherer (1965)
Schmookler (1966)
Mansfield (1968; 1971)
Myers and
Marquis (1969)
Rothwell and
Robertson (1973)
Utterback (1974)
43
Mees, Holland, Jewett and Stevens are industrialists (managers or consultants). They appear
in the list because of their innovativeness and/or influence on business schools and economists.
44
This was only one of Ushers descriptions of the process. Others are: 1) technologies,
consequences, adaptation; 2) discoveries and inventions, synthesis (concept, device), construction
(design); 3) problem, setting of the stage, achievement (configuration).
45
The last term was added in 1949 (Maclaurin, 1949).
38
Theories combining both production (of goods) and distribution have a long
history in economic thought, from Quesnays tableau conomique to A. Smith, D.
Ricardo and K. Marx, then the System of National Accounts. From the 1940s,
such theories were applied to technological innovation. The most popular and
influential is what came to be called the linear model of innovation (Godin,
2006c). The theory suggests that technological innovation starts with basic
research, then goes through applied research, then development, and then
production and diffusion. Such an understanding of technological innovation has
been very influential on science policy after 1945.
While innovation as technological innovation and as commercialized innovation
came to dominate the literature, other conceptions of innovation developed
elsewhere. The category of social innovation (or rather social invention) as such
had few followers but, beginning in the 1920s, researchers have studied
(institutional or) political innovation: innovation in public institutions such as
schools (with P. Mort from Columbia University as the most active researcher)
and government agencies (Chapin, 1928: chapter 11; McVoy, 1940; Walker,
1969; Mohr, 1969).
46
individuals. Then, management and business schools have developed the study of
organizational innovation. First, and following Schumpeter, entrepreneurial
change in firms became a topic of study for which programs of research
developed, for example that of A. H. Coles Research Center in Entrepreneurial
History (1948-58) at Harvard University (Cole, 1959; Aitken, 1965). Second, the
study of innovative behaviours of organizations developed, such as organizational
structure and management style, mainly following T. Burns and G. M. Stalker
the latter a psychologist (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Hage and M. Aiken, 1970;
Zaltman et al., 1973; Wilson, 1966).
Third, the management of research activities, which has been a concern for
industrialists and managers since after World War I (Mees, 1920), gained
46
39
Very rarely have psychologists made use of innovation as a category, except in studies of
organizations (West and Rickards, 1999). They preferred creativity. A genealogy of the concept of
creativity would have to look at genius, then talent (or ability), then intelligence, then creativity. In
fact, the very early studies on imagination from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment were
psychological in kind. However, it was only in the mid-twentieth century that psychologists
themselves started studying creativity (Guilford, 1950). The word creativity itself emerged at
about this time, although create and creation had existed for centuries, as the literature on poetry
and art attests (Tatarkiewicz, 1980; Kristeller, 1983), and creativeness emerged in 1820. To the
psychologists, eminent men, artists, inventors and scientists, were perfect representatives of
creative individuals or geniuses. Creativity was defined here by way of measurement: measuring
the attitudes of individuals and performances to test scores, but also, increasingly, counting the
volume of output produced, or productivity. Beginning with a study published under a pseudonym
in the American Journal of Psychology in 1928, the period in which an individual is more
productive (the creative years as it was called) became a serious topic of discussion (Nelson,
1928). The most active psychologists here were A. Roe, C. W. Taylor, M. I. Stein, H. C. Lehman
and W. Dennis. Many of the studies focused on the study of creativity of personnel in
organizations. A favorite study group was scientists and engineers. Creativity as productivity gave
rise to a whole literature on the counting of scientific papers produced by scientists (Godin,
2006a). These studies were generally funded by government departments, for example the US
Office of Naval Research, the Air Force, NASA, the US National Institute of Health, and by
industries and their associations like the US Industrial Research Institute. Then, in the 1950s and
subsequently, sociologists also got into the study of scientific productivity and its relationship to
recognition and the reward system (B. N. Meltzer, D. Crane, H. Zuckerman and R. K. Merton, S.
Cole and J. S. Cole, P. D. Allison, J. S. Long, J. S. Scott). Let us add that the first psychological
40
What role did policy play in all this? A major one, indeed. Over the twentieth
century, innovation was in fact a policy-driven concept. Psychologists,
sociologists and researchers from management, business schools and economics
acted as consultants to governments, and were concerned with offering policy
recommendations for social engineering, productivity and economic growth
based on their theories, the more recent ones being conceptual frameworks like
the knowledge-based economy, the information economy, the new economy, and
national innovation system (Godin, 2009c). Over the last sixty years, economists,
including evolutionary economists, have been the experts most solicited by
governments. The first among the consulting experts and academic think tanks
were researchers from the US National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
(Alchon, 1985) and RAND (Hounshell, 2000),
48
Research Unit (SPRU) at Sussex University, Brighton, UK, and the Policy
Research in Engineering, Science and Technology (PREST) group at Manchester
University, UK. In the 1990s, centers on innovation multiplied, such as the
Fraunhofer ISI in Germany and the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on
Innovation and Technology (MERIT) in the Netherlands.
Innovation is also a political concept in another sense. From its very beginning in
the 1960s, science policy has been concerned with funding scientific research,
with technological innovation as the expected output (Godin, 2007b). Over time,
the terms used came to reflect this very first goal. What was called science policy
in the 1960s became science and technology policy in the 1970s, then innovation
policy in the 1990s (Lundvall and Borras, 2005; Branscomb and Keller, 1998:
chapters 5 and 18). However, there has never been a policy for science period,
as many authors argue (OECD, 1963: 18; 1972: 37; Elzinga and Jamison. 1995),
theories on technological inventors were from economic historian A. P. Usher (1929) and US
patent examiner J. Rossman (1931). Rossman is also responsible for a very early survey of
industrial incentives to invention (Rossman, 1935). Rossmans book is also a good indicator of
creativity as buzzword: by the third edition of his book (1964), first published in 1931, J. Rossman
added Industrial Creativity to the previous title The Psychology of the Inventor.
41
only a science for policy one, during which public research and universities
were urged to contribute to technological innovation (Godin, 2009d).
49
Science
policy has always been concerned with applying science to public goals. From its
very beginning, science policy, whether implicit or explicit, was constructed as a
means to achieve social, economic and political goals.
In this quest for technological innovation, statistics has been the best way to
establish evidence. In the academic literature, technological innovation began to
be measured via patents in the 1910s, culminating in the works of economist J.
Schmookler in the 1950s (Schmookler, 1966). Then, it appeared to many that
patent counts measure invention, not (commercialized) innovation. Then
expenditures devoted to R&D came to be used as a proxy, thanks to the
systematic data collected in the then recently-launched survey series from the US
National Science Foundation. This practice then spread to other countries via the
so-called OECD Frascati manual (Godin, 2005). R&D is not a bad proxy of
technological innovation in reality, since two-thirds of R&D expenditures are
devoted to the D (development of new technologies) (Godin, 2006b). Yet an
official study concluded otherwise. In 1967, the US Department of Commerce
published a study, known as the Charpie Report, which was the first governmental
survey of technological innovation per se (US Department of Commerce, 1967).
It showed that R&D does not constitute the main source of technological
innovation. In light of the literature on technological innovation from the 1980s
onward (Freeman, 1994), it appears that the study was correct. But at the time, it
was criticized by economists and statisticians (Mansfield, 1971; Stead, 1976),
among other things because of the definitions and categories used (Kamin et al,
1982) and because the numbers on which the study relied were rule of thumb
figures, so qualified by the authors of the study themselves. Nevertheless, the
48
On an early publication on innovation from these two think tanks, see US National Bureau of
Economic Research (1962).
49
The literature on science policy often contrasts two periods. The first period policy for science
was concerned with funding science for its own sake, the golden age of university funding
according to many researchers, while the second period science for policy in which we now
live, is one where research is supported mainly to achieve political and socioeconomic goals
42
50
50
On a series of early papers on innovation in science covering many disciplines, see the special
issue of Scientific American (1958).
43
8. Organizational Change 51
2. Invention
9. Political Innovation
3. Discovery
10.Creativity
4. Imagination
5. Ingenuity
6. Cultural Change
7. Social Change
51
44
governments, of which the OECD Oslo Manual is the emblem, are witness to this
orientation: the measurement of innovation concerns innovation in firms only.
One observes a dialectics here between reality and language. With the changes in
the world came changes in ideas and categories. For example, the material culture
contributed to the rise of innovation as a central category and to a representation
of innovation as technological and commercialized invention. In turn, categories,
as part of representations, discourses, laws and policies, theories and statistics
make events visible, bring to light novelties and changes in the world, and
contribute to these changes. To paraphrase D.A. Schon, innovation came to be
seen as the instrument of growth, and growth as the occasion for and object of
innovation (Schon, 1967: 54).
Innovation as a (widely-used) category during the twentieth century is witness to
a certain context or era - capitalism - and to changes in political values. As J. Farr
put it, to understand conceptual change is in large part to understand political
changes (Farr, 1989: 25). Until early in the twentieth century, invention,
ingenuity and imagination were discussed as symbols of civilization and as
attributes of geniuses, and their contribution to the progress of the race. Then, the
growing role of organizations in the twentieth century led to changes in values. If
there was to be increasing economic efficiency, there had to be innovation through organizations and the mobilization of their employees creative abilities.
52
For a similar shift in context and its impact on statistics on science, see Godin (2007a).
45
innovation,
user-led
innovation,
open
innovation
and
46
2003; Hippel, 2005; Flowers, 2008). One also hears discourses on the creative
class, which includes the bohemians such as artists and designers (Florida,
2002), and the creative industries, as a category in need of statistical, economic
and policy recognition (Bakhshi et al., 2008). 54 The OECD Oslo Manual itself, in
its latest edition, has broadened the definition of innovation to include
organizational and marketing innovation, although this is limited to firms.
However, projects are now in progress for measuring innovation in the public
sectors in the near future.
The main goal of the promoters of these new ideas is ensuring that policy-makers
takes account of non-technological aspects of innovation in their policy. Whether
the ideas will have an impact on the current understanding of innovation remains
to be seen. For the moment, they certainly contribute to extending the discourses
on, and the fascination with, innovation to more spheres of society, and
mobilizing more people in the name of innovation.
1970s, S. Kuznets already was using social technology and social innovation in this sense
(Kuznets, 1978).
54
On a recent tentative to introduce the term innovation in the field of fine arts, see Oakley et al
(2008).
47
Appendix.
The Vocabulary of Innovation
(ACT)
(SOURCE)
(EFFECTS)
Imitation
Invention
Discovery
Experiment/Investigation
Initiative
Praxis/action
Change
Creation/Creativity
Production (tive)
Novation/Innovation
Inspiration
Ingenuity
Curiosity
Imagination
Reason (logic)
Culture
Civilization
Evolution
Modernity/Progress
Advancement
Improvement
Development
Revolution
Associated terms:
originality, freedom,
expression, will, choice
opinion
Novelty
Useful
Practical
Improvement
Growth/Productivity
Performance
Competitiveness
Leadership
Benefits
Gain
Output
Efficiency/
Effectiveness
Power/safety/
Comfort
Prosperity
Well-being/
Wealth
Returns
Employment
Savings
Standards (or
conditions) of
living
Leisure
48
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