THE ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION VOL 28, NO 1 (JUNE 2006): 41-58

Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational

Coordination and Policy Implementation in
Urban Bangladesh
Pranab Kumar Panday

What happens to policy implementation when the process suffers from problems of
coordination? In this article, the focus is on how central-local relations create interorganisational coordination problems, which in the long run affect the implementation of
policies in urban governance. In the case of the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC) in
Bangladesh, the central-local relationship is determined by the political identity of the mayor.
By virtue of his attachment with the party in power, the RCC receives more favours especially
in terms of the allocation of resources from the central government. These resources facilitate
the completion of many development projects.

Introduction
Modern societies suffer from various challenges, including environmental
protection, fighting poverty or reducing unemployment, which pose many
difficulties for a single authority to manage. This is why the concept of
"inter organisational coordination" has gained paramount importance in
the implementation research literature (Lund 2005: 3). Several scholars
consider that coordination between authorities is inherently good. What
has been learnt from game theory is that coordination among actors will
usually lead to the best mutual solutions (Ostrom 1990). This article
addresses how central-local relationship affect inter-organisational
coordination, which in the long run affects policy implementation in urban
governance in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh, which emerged as an independent state in 1971, has not
yet developed appropriate strategies, policies, and institutions necessary
to cope with urban governance. The country has typically followed a
centralised system of policy making and resource allocation in which intergovernmental transfers are unstable, not well defined, and lack an adequate
system of incentives. In spite of having a legal-institutional framework of a
decentralised system of local government, in reality there has been little
decentralized governance at the local level. Besides, given the lack of fiscal
resources and limited decision-making power of local governments, the
level of decentralised government that exists has been largely ineffective
because of a lack of accountability, a concentration of power by the municipal
executives, obsolete laws and regulatory framework, limited administrative
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capacity, a lack of investment in human resources, and weak supervision

by the central government agencies. As a result, deficiencies in urban
infrastructure and services, including water supply, sanitation, solid waste
collection, drainage and transport range, are severe and at times extreme.
Statement of Problem and Research Questions
Successful implementation of policies is a prerequisite for the establishment
of good urban governance. Policy implementation usually takes place in
cooperation with other organisations. In the case of urban governance in
Bangladesh, the City Corporation needs to cooperate with several
government departments and associated agencies, such as the Power
Development Board, the Roads and Highways Department and the Local
Government Engineering Department. Therefore, urban governance in
Bangladesh is highly dependent on fruitful and useful cooperation with
different actors.
Coordination is a complex and crucial issue that is needed both at the
day-to-day operational level and at the policy level. Problems of coordination
occur because of the involvement of numerous institutions and the
overlapping nature of their jurisdictions. Research indicates that at least 42
institutions are involved in the Dhaka Metropolitan Area1 with different
facets of urban development activities (Mohit 1992 cited in Khan 1997: 16).
Lack of cooperation and coordination between municipal governments, on
the one hand, and special government bodies, special development
authorities and special purpose authorities, on the other, is due to the fact
that the former are elected bodies while the latter are government agencies
whose nature of operation and system of reporting decisions are different.
The acute problem of a lack of coordination has made it difficult for the
municipal governments to implement various policies and to solve the
problems of their clientele (Khan 1997: 16).
A lack of coordination creates a lot of problems, including a failure to
meet project deadlines. As deadlines are not met, the costs of projects
increase. Accordingly, it becomes problematic for the City Corporation
authority to start new projects and, therefore, citizens are deprived of the
opportunity to benefit from good urban governance. It is also evident that
many of the development projects remain incomplete in the middle stage
due to problems of coordination. Thus:
In 2003, the World Bank withdrew nearly 50 percent of US$220
million allocated grants for the development of the transport
infrastructure in Dhaka2 City. That was a clear sign of the donor
institution being disillusioned with the progress made in its
implementation. The fund cuts had led to the dropping of two major
components of the plan, the first one having to do with reduction
of traffic congestion and the second with pollution control. This
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Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational Coordination and Policy Implementation in Urban Bangladesh

happened because of a lack of coordination and understanding

between Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) and Roads and Highways
Department (R & HD), the two principal agencies involved in the
projects. Both the organizations were blaming each other for the
World Bank decision to withdraw funds. Obviously, they were
trying to hide behind their failures by passing the buck against
each other (The Daily Star 12 March 2003).
In this study, the dependent variable is coordination in the context of
the work of the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC). Within the organisational
boundaries of the RCC, there are various departments responsible for
different activities. On the other hand, the RCC deals with various
government departments in regard to the implementation of infrastructure
policy. So, coordination in terms of intra- and inter-organisational
coordination is inevitable for the effective implementation of any policy.
Inter-organisational coordination is influenced by various independent
variables, such as central-local relations, democratic versus bureaucratic
accountability patterns, and so on. The independent variable of the study is
central-local relations. The aim is to assess to what extent central-local
relations as an external factor affect inter-organisational coordination. This
is because successful implementation largely depends on the extent of
autonomy that the central government allows to the urban government
bodies. If the central government tries to exercise more financial and
administrative control over the urban government bodies and local
government bodies vie for more autonomy and resources, problems of
coordination arise among these organisations that might affect policy
implementation. Here, policy implementation specifically concerning
the implementation of infrastructure policy is considered to be the
outcome of interaction between central-local relations and interorganisational coordination.
In order to analyse the problems of inter-organisational coordination
in this regard, the following questions need to be addressed:
1.

Do central-local relations affect inter-organisational coordination in the

process of policy implementation in urban governance?

2.

What is the impact of inter-organisational coordination on policy

implementation in urban governance?

Key Concepts and their Immediate Significance

Inter-organisational Coordination
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, coordination means "the
action of co-coordinating; harmonious combination of agents and functions
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towards the production of a result" (as quoted in Robinson, et al 2000: 7).

The most common notion of coordination is that it is rule-regulated and
hierarchically organised. This view of coordination has strong resonance
with traditional views of management in which the role of the manager is
seen as being "to plan, to organize, to command, to co-ordinate and to
control" (Fayol 1916 as quoted in Robinson, et al 2000: 7). Coordination is a
way of bringing together disparate agencies to make their efforts more
compatible, in the interests of equity, effectiveness and efficiency. Without
coordination, the danger is of lapsing into chaos and inefficiency.
In this study, coordination refers to the working relationships among
various departments and agencies within and outside the city corporation
that affect the implementation of policies. Coordination is discussed from
an inter-organisational perspective.
When a policy is carried out by several organisations, interorganisational coordination is important for the success of that policy. Interorganisational coordination is manifested by the sound working
relationships among the involved actors, based on rules and standard
operating procedures. Here, sound working relationships mean cordial and
helpful working relationships among involved actors. Van Meter and Van
Horn (1975: 465-67) argue that effective implementation requires that the
standards and objectives of a program be understood by those individuals
who are responsible for their achievement. Standards and objectives cannot
be achieved unless they are stated with sufficient clarity for implementers
to know what is expected of them. Communication within and between
organisations is a complex and difficult process. If different sources of
communication provide inconsistent interpretations of standards and
objectives, or if the same sources provide conflicting interpretations over
time, implementors will find it even more difficult to carry out the intentions
of policy. However, it is not always possible to ensure effective
communication among all involved parties. What happens when there is a
lack of inter-organisational coordination in policy implementation due to a
lack of proper rules and regulations?
The most critical problem in urban governance in Bangladesh is the
coordination among development partners, particularly in big cities, where
there are numerous partner organisations and coordination is extremely
important. For example, in Dhaka City, there are more than 16 government
organisations directly involved, and nearly 30 other organisations indirectly
involved, in urban development activities. Despite having an institutional
arrangement for inter-organisational coordination among the first 16 bodies,
real coordination has not yet been possible (Task Force on Urban Governance
2001).
In this study, the lack of inter-organisational coordination is used as
the dependent variable to measure its impact on the implementation of
policies by the Rajshahi City Corporation. While implementing
infrastructure policy, the RCC deals with at least three government
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Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational Coordination and Policy Implementation in Urban Bangladesh

organisations which share responsibility for providing better infrastructure

facilities. These organisations are the Rajshahi Development Authority, the
Roads and Highways Department, and the Local Government Engineering
Department. A lack of inter-organisational coordination means a lack of
communication between different agencies that leaves a negative impact
on the overall policy implementation process. The following example is
relevant:
In 2003, in Dhaka, the sufferings of the pedestrians and commuters
using Mouchak3 crossing in the city increased as the road between
Mouchak and the Malibagh4 railway crossing became almost
unusable due to indiscriminate road digging by different utility
agencies. Traffic jams in the area were worse than ever and
sometimes it took hours to pass the crossing. The flooded road
without any unusable pavements had worsened the situation to
an intolerable level. It sometimes took more than an hour to pass
only this 300 to 400 yards of road. The roads were submerged with
water and full potholes, which often caused accidents.
The Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority (DWASA) first cut the
road for development works more than eight months ago but it
was not repaired. The traffic congestion became worse when heavy
rainfall lashed the city. Residents of the area made a bamboo bridge
on the road to cross from one side to other, as knee-deep water
remained stagnant for days.
When contacted, one of the high official of DWASA told that the
work was pending for last few months as they did not get the
permission of the railway authority to cross DWASA line to the
Malibagh rail gate. He also added that the work would be
completed soon if they got the permission within a short time (The
Independent 9 May 2003).
There are numerous other examples which highlight problems of
coordination between the city corporation and other government
organisations, including:
The Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) builds and maintains roads
and issues riskshaw licenses, but motor vehicle licensing is the
responsibility of the Bangladesh Road and Transport Authority
(BRTA). On the other hand, the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP)
issue motor vehicle driver's licenses and manages city traffic and
the Department of Environment monitors the emission of black
gas by motor vehicles. These bodies are never known to sit across
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the table and learn about each other's difficulties (Siddique, et al

2000: 196).
It is never known who is supposed to own and manage the
manholes in a particular area of Dhaka City, and there is a serious
coordination problem in this regard between DCC and DWASA.
Similarly, while surface drains are the responsibility of the DCC,
the sewerage system is manned by DWASA, and owing to this
dual administration, the two organizations constantly get away
by blaming one another for the poor waste disposal in the City,
while the citizens continue to suffer (Siddique, et al 2000: 169).
These examples indicate the extent to which urban government bodies
have to deal with various other government organisations in the
implementation of policy. As a result of the interdependencies, problems
of inter-organisational coordination inevitably arise.
Central-Local Relations
Governments exist at the national and sub-national levels. The number and
the structure of sub-national governments depend on the system of
government adopted by a particular country. Generally, under a federal
system, sub-national governments exist at the state/provincial and local
levels; while under a unitary system, sub-national governments exist at the
regional and/or local level (Jenkins, et al 2000: 1).
One way of describing central-local relations is based on the ideas of
central and local integration and autonomy. On the one hand, the central
government is concerned with exercising control over local government
and, on the other, local government seeks to enjoy local autonomy.
According to Kjellberg, changes in central-local government
relationships can be analysed from the perspective of an "autonomous
model" or an "integrational model" (Kjellberg 1995 cited in Montin & Erik
2000: 11). The autonomous model reflects the traditional liberal view of
central-local government relationships. In this perspective, central and local
governments constitute two clearly separated spheres of government where
the centre limits itself to monitoring the activities of local government. By
contrast, according to the integrational model, the relationship between
central and local governments is viewed as a question of functions, not as
two separate political spheres. Local government participates in the entire
social process, and any questions concerning who should be responsible
for what should be decided from a pragmatic and flexible point of view
(Montin & Erik 2000: 12).
The distinction between an autonomous and an integrational model
reflects two sets of normative ideas about central and local governments in
terms of which should be the most important political institution within
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Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational Coordination and Policy Implementation in Urban Bangladesh

the framework of the constitutional state. The first model suggests that local
government, because of its closeness to citizens and their problems and
needs, should be highly autonomous. The second model suggests that the
state is the sovereign political institution, but that it can invest different
kinds of subordinated political institutions with delegated power. The clash
of these two sets of ideas may be referred to as "localism" versus
"integrationism"5 (Montin & Erik 2000: 12).
Empirically, local government can mean different things depending on
the perspective from which it is viewed. In the first perspective, it can be
defined as a politically autonomous sphere with different characteristics,
which depend on the particular system of local government. Page (1991),
for example, uses the concepts of "legal localism" and "political localism" in
order to contrast different ways in which local government politicians can
influence local decisions. The first broad method is to use their constitutional
or legal status. The second is to use their political authority as democratically
legitimated representatives of the locality (Page 1991 cited in Montin & Erik
2000: 12).
Another way of defining and measuring different types of autonomy is
to use a "resource perspective" in which local government has a greater or
lesser degree of control over different critical resources through the use of
constitutional-legal, financial, political and professional controls (Rhodes
1997; Elander & Montin 1990 cited in Montin & Erik 2000: 12). For example,
local governments may have at their disposal a number of constitutionallegal resources, but they might not have the political, financial or professional
resources for real policy-making (Montin & Erik 2000: 12). From an
integrational perspective, local government can be described as a semiautonomous political institution with a greater or lesser capacity for political
action. It can be defined, for example, as a "principal agency" or in terms of
"partnership" (Kjellberg 1995). Other types of integration of central and local
governments which can be found in related literature are "dual
subordination" (the former Soviet Union), "dual supervision" (France), "area
subsidiarisation" (Germany) and "functional regulation" (United Kingdom)
(Montin & Erik 2000: 13).
It is appropriate here to make a distinction between at least two
situations of central-local government relations. In the first of these, local
government is highly subordinated and local authorities may also be
functionally divided into different policy sectors. In the second, centrallocal government relationships could be defined in terms of a partnership
where there is a certain amount of room for negotiation and access to central
state power. Local government may depend on receiving resources from
central government, but the state may in turn depend on local government
to implement national policies (Sharpe 1970). The central government may
therefore be sensitive to pressure from local governments.
In the context of Bangladesh, central-local relations have always been
an issue. In statutory terms, central-local relationships have historically been
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authoritative in nature. This may be due to the colonial legacy and the
absence of democratic government at the centre for a considerable period
of time. The central government primarily exercises its control over the local
governments through its field level functionaries such as the local chief
executive officers or secretaries and the heads of various offices of district
administration which are involved in the activities of local governments. In
addition, local governments are further controlled through a plethora of
intricate and complicated orders and circulars from different ministries and
agencies, which very often contradict the underlying legal framework.
Under the law, the central government is also empowered to carry out
inquiries into the affairs of local governments. After an inquiry, if the
government considers that a local government is unable to discharge its
duties, has failed to meet its financial obligations, and/or has exceeded or
abused its power, the government may declare the body to be suspended
for a period as specified by law (Huq 2001: 11-12).
The central government also exercises substantial financial and
administrative control over local governments in different ways. This is
especially the case in the allocation of resources. For the financing of
development projects, local governments depend fully on central
government grants. In the allocation of grants, the central government has
often acted beyond its power. The allocation of grants depends on the
existing relationship between a local government and the central
government. The central government, ignoring rules and norms, allocates
more grants to those local bodies which are administered by mayors
belonging to the ruling political party. The bodies with mayors from the
opposition suffer from various disparities accentuated by the central
government. In such situations, there is possibility of problems of
coordination among the various organisations involved, which in the long
run affect policy implementation at the local level.
Against this background, the following hypothesis is appropriate: the
more the access to central government, the lesser will be the problems of
coordination in policy implementation at the local level.
Policy Implementation
A policy is a broad guideline of actions designed to achieve some objective(s)
or goal(s). A policy can be transformed into several programs or projects in
order to realise the broader objectives as envisaged in the policy. It is said
to be "public" when it is concerned with the public interest and formulated
by legal government machinery. Jenkins (1978 as quoted in Howlett &
Ramesh 1995: 5) defines "public policy" as a "set of interrelated decisions
taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals
and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those to achieve".
After a public problem has made its way onto the policy agenda, various
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Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational Coordination and Policy Implementation in Urban Bangladesh

options are or might be proposed to resolve it and a government makes a

choice among them. The resulting decision has then to be acted on. This is
the policy implementation stage of the policy process or cycle. The standard
dictionary definition of the term implementation is simply "to put into effect
according to some definite plan or procedure".
McLaughlim (1985 as quoted in Howlettt & Ramesh 1995: 153) defines
implementation as "the process whereby programs or policies are carried
out; it denotes the translation of plans into practice". According to Van Meter
and Van Horn (1975), "policy implementation encompasses those actions
by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the
achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions". This includes
both one-time efforts to transform decisions into operational terms, as well
as continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated by
policy decisions. For present purposes, public policy implementation is
regarded as consisting of organised activities by government directed
toward the achievement of goals and objectives articulated in authorised
policy statements.
In this study, the focus is on the implementation of infrastructure policies
at the urban level by the Rajashahi City Corporation (RCC). Implementation
is what happens after infrastructure policies concerning roads, drains and
so on have been passed by the Corporation Parishad, which is the highest
decision-making authority in the RCC. Here, implementation is assessed
broadly in terms of good and bad implementation. Good implementation
means timely project completion, minimisation of cost, and satisfactory
public service delivery. Bad implementation means delays in project
completion, cost increases, and unsatisfactory public service delivery.
The RCC faces a real challenge of maintaining both intra- and interorganisational coordination. The engineering department in the RCC has
the immediate responsibility for the implementation of infrastructure policy.
But it requires cooperation from other departments in the RCC, which also
have to deal with various government departments and agencies beyond
the RCC.
The various concepts and associated matters addressed so far can be
brought together as an analytical framework, as presented in Figure 1.
Research Focus, Data Collection and Findings
This study employs a case-oriented qualitative research strategy. A
descriptive and exploratory case study approach is utilised because specific
how, what and why questions needed to be addressed, with a focus on
contemporary arrangements (Yin 1994: 1).
The Rajshahi City Corporation as the Case Focus
The Rajshahi City Corporation was selected from among six city corporations
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50

* Autonomy vs.
centralisation

* Problems in
fund
management

* Relations with
central
government

* Autonomy

Central-local
relations

Independent
variable

Sound working relationships

Cordial and helpful working
relationships among involved
actors

Inter-organisational coordination

Dependent variable
Outcome

* Satisfactory
public service
delivery

* Minimisation of
cost

* Unsatisfactory
public service
delivery

* Cost increases

Bad
* Delay in
project
completion

Policy implementation

Good
* Timely project
completion

Figure 1
Analytical Framework for the Study

The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration

Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational Coordination and Policy Implementation in Urban Bangladesh

in Bangladesh. Rajshahi is the fourth largest city of Bangladesh. It has a

reasonable growth rate and a semi cosmopolitan nature which is generally
representative of urban Bangladesh. By contrast, Dhaka, being the largest
city of Bangladesh, is not so representative as a result of being the capital
and having some other special historical features. Rajshahi was also selected
for a personal reason. It is a city in which I have spent the last 13 years. I
know the city well and have access to relevant information about the
activities of the RCC.
The RCC started its activities in 1 April 1876 as Rajshahi Pourashava.
An eight-member town committee headed by the then Rajshahi College
Principal administered Rajshahi Pourashava. The government nominated
all of the members. The district magistrate, sub-divisional chief and the
chief medical officer were the members of the town committee by virtue of
their positions. Subsequently, provision was made for the election of the
chairman and vice-chairman by the taxpayers within the jurisdiction of the
Pourashava. In 1884, a committee was formed comprising twenty-one
commissioners. Among them fourteen were elected and seven were
nominated. For the effective delivery of urban services, eight urban
committees were formed in 1930 and were responsible for administration,
finance, manpower, light, water, sanitation, health and education. Decisions
were taken in the parishad meeting based on the recommendations of the
various committees. Each committee was formed for a one-year term and
the whole urban area was divided into seven wards. On 5 August 1958, the
government dissolved the municipal committees and appointed an
administrator for Rajshahi Pourashava. Until 18 February 1974, government
officials acted as the administrator. On 13 August 1987, Rajshahi Pourashava
was upgraded to a "Pour Corporation" and on 11 September 1987 year,
"Pour Corporation" was changed to "City Corporation" The first mayoral
election of the RCC was held on 30 January 1994.
Data Collection
The study is based on both primary and secondary data. Primary data
relevant to the research objectives and questions were collected through a
structured interview guide with closed and open-ended questions.
Secondary data were gathered from the RCC's general administration
department and libraries (including the library of the Department of Public
Administration, Rajshahi University and the library of the Center for Urban
Studies, Dhaka), various published documents (articles, books, study
reports, etc.), newspapers, unpublished theses, research monographs and
the internet.
The RCC and Infrastructure Policy
The RCC works under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural
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Development and Cooperatives (LGRD & C). For the financing of its
development budget, the RCC depends largely on government grants,
although it has the power to levy taxes on people, the income of which is
negligible. All of the policies of the RCC are passed in the Corporation
Parishad that consists of the Mayor, thirty elected ward commissioners,
and ten elected women commissioners. The Corporation Parishad takes
decisions on various projects proposed by various departments. During
the later part of each financial year, every department makes their demands
in terms of various projects for the forthcoming financial year. The normal
process is that each department places its demands before the concerned
Standing Committee. Currently, there are eleven Standing Committees in
the RCC. Then, the demands of each department are considered and
recommended in their respective Standing Committee meetings. After the
demands are recommended, they are placed before the Corporation Parishad
meeting for approval. They are finally passed or otherwise by a majority
vote in the Parishad.
The immediate responsibility for infrastructure development rests with
the Engineering Department in the RCC. Every year, this department
proposes a number of projects relating to the development of infrastructure.
Once the projects have been approved, the department is responsible for
implementing them.
The RCC and its Engineering Department cannot independently
perform all of the construction work required. They need to liaise and
coordinate their activities with various central government organisations
with ownership or other interests concerning roads and drains. The main
organisations are the Roads and Highways Department (R&HD), the Local
Government Engineering Department (LGED), and the Rajshahi
Development Authority (RDA). The arrangements involved are depicted
in Figure 2.
Central-Local Relations and Inter-organisational Coordination
The question of autonomy is an important variable in the study of centrallocal relations. Although urban local government bodies in Bangladesh enjoy
a degree of operational autonomy, they are in no way independent of the
central government in the country's overall administrative system. As a
result, there are a number of areas of interaction between an urban body
and the government, covering legal, operational and financial matters
involving control and supervision by the government. Here, the concern is
to consider the types of central-local relations that exist for the RCC and
how these relations affect inter-organisational coordination on the basis
of answers from respondents in the RCC.
All but one of the seven respondents referred to there being a positive
relationship between the RCC and the central government. They attributed
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53

E n g in e erin g
D e p a rtm e n t

S ta n d in g
C o m m itte e

C o r p o ra tio n
P a rish a d

P o licy fo rm u la tio n

M in istry o f L o ca l G o v e rn m e n t, R u ra l
D e v e lo p m en t a n d C o o p e ra tiv e s

E n g in e e rin g
D e p a rtm e n t

P o lic y
im p le m e n ta tio n

F ig u re 2
T h e R C C a n d In fra stru c tu re P o lic y

RDA

R &HD

LGED

In v o lv ed g o v e rn m en t
o rg an isa tio n s

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this largely to the Mayor's 6 political affiliation with the Bangladesh

Nationalist Party (BNP) which is now the party in power. The Mayor has a
powerful position in the party. Along with the position of Mayor, he is also
a member of parliament and one of the organising secretaries of the party.
These factors have been crucial in establishing and maintaining a positive
relationship between the RCC and the central government.
The respondents mentioned that during 1996-2001 the scenario was
different when the now opposition Awami League (AL) ran the government.
The RCC experienced many problems, especially in the allocation of
resources and associated time delays, because the Mayor belonged to the
then opposition BNP. The following report is particularly relevant in this
regard:
Rajshahi city has for long been faced with a crisis of drinking water,
especially in the dry season. The City Corporation authorities said
extraction capacity of its pumps declined by about 25 percent in
summer. With a view to providing city dwellers with safe drinking
water, the Rajshahi City Corporation opened the first of the three
water treatment plants in September 2003. According to the
Department of Public Health Engineering, works on the other two
were going on in full swing and were scheduled to be completed
by December 2003. The Rajshahi City Corporation water supply
department said it would provide city residents with only 45 million
litres of water a day against the demand for some 103 million litres.
Rajshahi City Mayor said that the construction of these projects
would have been completed five years back if they would have
received full cooperation from the then AL government. The Mayor
mentioned that the initiative to install water treatment plans to
address excessive hardness of water was taken up in 1994. The
ministry concerned approved the project in early 1995 and the
Executive Committee of the National Economic Council approved
of a Tk 56-crore (equivalent to US$958,9041) project on December
19, 1995. The public health engineering department was entrusted
with the project implementation.
Work on the first phase of the project started on April 1, 1996,
scheduled for a June 1998 completion. But it could not be
implemented as per schedule because of a cold shoulder shown by
the then AL government. The project was left half way for fund
constraints. The money was released after the four-party alliance
government led by BNP came to power and the work resumed
and was completed (Country News, internet edition, 26 September
2003).
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This example indicates that central-local relations and a lack of

coordination have seriously affected the implementation of a significant
water plant project by the RCC. Had the RCC received cooperation from
the central government in releasing funds, the project would have been
completed five years earlier to the considerable benefit of the public.
The Rajshahi City Corporation Ordinance 1987 under which the RCC
operates acknowledges the local autonomy of the RCC, while also giving
the central government enormous powers to exercise control over it. Some
of the more important arrangements which directly affect central-local
relations and coordination are as follows (Siddique 2000: 156-157):
a.

the central government makes laws and rules for all local bodies,
including the RCC; and it can also control the RCC through so-called
standing orders;

b. the Mayor may be removed from office at any time, without assigning
any reason; the government may also supersede the entire RCC or
suspend a Department of the RCC;
c.

the government may assign any function to the RCC; similarly, it can
also take away any function from the RCC at any time;

d. the RCC budget must be approved by the central government;

e.

the government may call for any records of the RCC;

f.

the government can inspect the RCC at any time; the RCC has to send
the central government an annual report on its activities;

g. for forming additional standing committees, the RCC must obtain the
permission of the government;
h. the schedule of posts in the RCC has to be sanctioned by the government,
and no appointment beyond the schedule is allowed;
i.

the RCC can not directly negotiate with foreign donors or private
investors; and

j.

the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is appointed by the government, and

he has considerable powers; he is the custodian of all records; he is
allowed to take measures during an emergency; he is allowed to be
present in all Corporation/standing committee meetings; he can hardly
be censured by the RCC, and he is the appointing authority for all
subordinate posts.
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With reference to these arrangements, the respondents were asked their

views on the nature of autonomy and centralisation in the RCC. In reply,
most referred in particular to problems associated with the CEO of the RCC,
who belongs to the Bangladesh Civil Service. They indicated that, as a result
of his being a central government official, he perceives himself as superior
to the city corporation officials, which at times creates frustration among
the officials. This usually has a negative impact on the working environment
and can directly affect the degree to which the affairs of the RCC are
subordinated to the wishes of the central authorities. One official expressed
his opinion in the following way:
As the CEO is deputed by the central government, he suffers from
a superiority complexity. He does not bother with the RCC officials.
Besides, the Mayor is a very busy person who cannot stay in the
Corporation all the time. The absence of the Mayor has made him
more powerful. This type of conflict creates a problematic working
environment that hampers the overall development process.
This was a typical view. It confirms the extent to which the positions
and ties of particular individuals, especially the CEO and the Mayor, can
influence, if not determine, the nature of central-local relations and
associated activities.
Concluding Comments
From the above discussion, it is evident that central-local relations are
important for inter-organisational coordination. The strength of the relations
is based, in large part, on the political identity of the Mayor, but it is also
affected by the CEO being a central government official. If the Mayor belongs
to the government party, the RCC receives more favours especially in terms
of the allocation of resources (however inadequate they may be) from the
central government. But if the Mayor belongs to the opposition, the situation
is the opposite. Currently, the Mayor has considerable power as he has
good access to the central leadership. This facilitates a positive relationship
between the RCC and the central government, which is also influenced by
the CEO as a central government employee. Overall, the competing
pressures and demands of local autonomy and central control are weighted
in favour of centralisation at the expense of local autonomy and initiative.
Notes
1. This is the total territory of the Dhaka City Corporation, which is the largest
city corporation in Bangladesh.
2. Dhaka is the capital of Bangladesh.
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Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational Coordination and Policy Implementation in Urban Bangladesh

3. Mauchak is the name of a place in Dhaka city.

4. Malibagh is also the name of a place in Dhaka.
5. In its extreme form, integrationism may lead to a superior-subordinate
relationship whereby the central government is in complete control over local
government in terms of financial, political, legal and functional matters. This is the
situation that may characterise central-local relations in Bangladesh.
6. The Mayor, who is the executive and administrative head of the RCC, is elected
directly by the people for a five-year term.

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Pranab Kumar Panday is a PhD researcher in the Department of Public and Social Administration at
the City University of Hong Kong and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration
at the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh.

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