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Jose Burgos vs.

Chief of Staf
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged
to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus
seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the
two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the
items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by
the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The
purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of
the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the
principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which
is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners
of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did
not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses
having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general
warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the

warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification
the subversive nature of the said items.
Alvarez vs. The Court of First Instance
64 Phil. 33 (GR No. L-45358)
January 29, 1937
J. Imperial
Facts:
On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board
presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that
according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law.
In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him
from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search
warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or
night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such
to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took
possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day
or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in
his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date,
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be
declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be
returned to him.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a valid search warrant
Held:
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before
the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the
inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced

without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of


no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles
of government.
As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional
guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor
of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation
on, the rights secured by them. Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the
general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants
must be strictly construed.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the
constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and
seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is
said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has
been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are
unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of
imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by
the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose
of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy
the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with
that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of
the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it
is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the
applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude,
therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on
the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night
when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits
insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is
that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally
be made at night.

The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge
was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities
as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law."
Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no
other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The
description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the
officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly
appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the
Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the
articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that
may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a
search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of
the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify
against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in
question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we
hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be
returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now
question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to
the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing
a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading
the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no
such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of
compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the
institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver
would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner
voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but
such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and
stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the
agents.

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