The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

The Plasticity of Categories: The Case of Colour

Author(s): J. Van Brakel
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 103
-135
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of
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Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 44

(I993)

I03-I35

Printedin Great Britain

The Plasticity of Categories:

The Case of Colour
J. VAN BRAKEL

ABSTRACT

exampleof allegedlyneurophysiologically
Probablycolouris the bestworked-out
innateresponsecategoriesdeterminingperceptsand perceptsdeterminingconcepts,andhencebiologyfixingthebasiccategoriesimplicitin theuseoflanguage.
In this paperI argue against this view and I take C. L. Hardin'sColorfor
Philosophers[1988] as my main target.I startby underminingthe view that
fouruniquehues standapartfromall othercolourshades(Section2) and the
confidencethat the solar spectrumis naturallydividedinto four categories
(Section3). Forsuch categoriesto be trulyuniversal,they have to be true for
all peoplesandin Section4 I showthatBerlinandKay's[1969] widelyquoted
theoryof basic colourcategoriesis not sufficientlysupportedto lend it any
credibility.
Havingdisposedof the view that inspectionof languageor 'pure'perception
and
unveils the universalcolour categories,I turn to neurophysiological
theoriesof colourvisionto see whethertheyprovidea moresolid
psychophysical
basisfordecidingwhat the innateresponsecategoriesare.In Section5 I show
theoryneithersupportshis view
that Hardin'saccountof the opponent-process
' takesplaceearlyin the visualneuralpathway,norhis view
that 'colour-coding
that knowledgeof colourvisionsciencewill help us solvemany philosophical
mysteriesaboutcolour.
In Section6 I give a moredetailedreviewof what is knowntodayaboutthe
of colourvisionand I show that theres nothingin the brain
neurophysiology
whichcouldbe calleda colourmodule,let alonea modulewith homunculifor
models
basiccolourcategories.In Section7 I showthatpsychophysical
particular
do not supportsuch rigid constraintson categoryformationeither. Hence
(Section8), at least in the case of colour,currentsciencesupportsa plasticity
of those
in the formationof categoriesthat goes far beyondthe requirements
who wouldliketo groundprimitiveconceptsin biology.
philosophers
naturalistic
1
2
3
4

Introduction
TheAllegedNaturalPrimacyof Four UniqueHues
Dividingup the SolarSpectrum
TheAllegedUniversalityof ElevenBasic Colours
Criticism
4.1 Methodological

Io4

7
8

J. Van Brakel

4.2 TheDefinitionof ColourTerm

4.3 TheDefinitionof Basic ColourTerm
4.4 OtherExplanations
for TheirUniversality
4.5 UnnamedCategories
4.6 BCCsand UniqueHues
4.7 Languageswith Less ThanSix BCCs
Hardin'sAccountof ColourVision
5.1 Neurophysiological
Account
5.2 PsychophysicalAccount
5.3 PhilosophicalImplications
Moreon the Neurophysiology
of ColourVision
6.1 Single-opponent
Cells
6.2 Double-opponent
Cells
6.3 TheConceptof 'Colour-coded'
Cells
Moreon PsychophysicalOpponentChannels
7.1 Problemswith the SimpleModel
7.2 Chromatic-Response
Curvesand UniqueHues
Concluding
Remarks

INTRODUCTION

SeveraldisciplinesoSer theories accordingto which there are severe constraints on what concepts can be formedto categorizethe experimental
world. Take or leave a few details, a number of primitiveconcepts are
assumed to be biologicallyinnate, wired into the brain as prototypes,
modules,or gestalts,the result of evolutionaryinteractionof the organism
with its environment.As Fodor([1981], p. 312) writesabout emotions:
Considersuchfolk-psychological
conceptsas ANGRY,SAD, HAPPY,etc. I think
there'sno doubtthat these are acquiredearly,that they must have been part
of the universalprehistoryof our species,and that they are easily introduced
by ostension.

In this paper I take colour as an example to argue that the facts of

neuroscience(or psychophysics)set no interestingconstraintson the categorizationsor conceptsimplicitin the way we use colourwords.1
l The term 'constraint'(Hardin[1988], p. xxii) would warrantfurtheranalysis.Here it is
meant to include such formulationsas: the existence of 'linguisticuniversalsbased on
pan-humanneurophysiological
processes'(Kayand McDaniel[1978]); 'hue naminghas a
relativelysimplephysiologicalbasis' (Wernerand Wooten [1979]); 'a primaryepigenetic
rule for basiccolourcategories'(Lumsden[1985]); 'Psychology,anatomy,and psychology
help to constructand to patternbasic categorizationsof color, and there do exist natural
divisionsof the spectrum'(Bornstein,in Harnad[1987], p. 291); 'the link betweenbasic
colorsensationsandtheirnamesis congenialand physiologically
based'(Boyntonand Olson
[1987]); 'our experienceof colorshapesthe way we describeit; the structureof colorspace
is not establishedby convention'(Hardin,p. 202).

ThePlasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

IOS

ThroughoutI shall use as a target C. L. Hardin'sColorfor Philosophers

[1988]. He states as his goal:2
to encourageandprovokeotherphilosophersto cometo gripswith the relevant
scientificmaterial,and to promulgatewithin the philosophicalcommunitythe
opinionthat, henceforth,discussionsaboutcolourproceedingin ignoranceof
nsual scienceare intellectuallyirresponsible.[Hxn]

and whatwe can learn from science is that 'it is the biologicalperspective
which is the via mediabetween. . . colorsin the extradermalphysicalworld
and . . . the propertiesof sense data' [H58]. His methodis 'to supposethat
phenomenalsimilaritiesand diSerencesare rooted in and to be explicated
[H127]. Philosophicallythis will
by physiologicalsimilaritiesanddiiYerences'
problems'
[H181]; in particular:
'providefreshapproachesto stagnant
(a) 'We are to be eliminativistswith respectto coloras a propertyof objects,
but reductivistswith respectto color experiences'[H112].
(b) 'the semanticsof ordinarycolor terms is powerfullyconstrainedby the
physiologyof the human visual system' [Ekxii].
Hence, Wittgensteinand his followersare wide of the mark in trying to
findsolutionsin the use of language.Forexample,the relationsbetweenthe
meaningsof colour words can be explainedwith referenceto the existence
of two opponentpairs of uniquehues or primitivecolours: red/green and
blue/yellow.And the cross-culturaluniversalityof the constraintson the
orderingof the colourspaceis supportedby Berlinand Kay's[1969] theory
of basiccolourterms (to be discussedbelow).
In this paper I shall concentrate on the relation between naming
colours and the science of colour vision and I shall concludethat biology
does not set any interestingconstraintson colour semantics.I am sceptical
about:
(a) theories about pre-linguisticor pre-conceptualcognitive experiences
(such as categoricalperception),invoking privilegedsalient categories
innate to the human race;3
2

In square bracketsI give referencesto Hardin'sbook using 'H' followedby the page
number.Although I often quote literally,the passages so indicatedshould be taken as
paraphrasesof how I interpretHardin'sposition.
For categoricalperceptionsee Harnad[1987]; for pre-conceptualbodily experiencessee
[1987]. It is possible,of course,to arguethat on a pre-linguisticcognitivelevel there
LakoW
are a numberof primitivecolours,the presenceof which may be blurredby 'mistaken'
conceptualschemesembodiedin language,but this is not Hardin'sline. Forexamplesof this
approachsee Kay and Kempton[1984] and Lakoff[1987], who assumethat basic colour
categoriesare cognitivelyinnate, but these cognitive capacitiesmay be suppressedby
language.

Io6

J. Van Brakel

(b) theoriesabout naturalkinds which dividethe worldin a fised number

of basic categories(to be discoveredby science);4
but I wonst argue for that here. If any of these theorieswere true, say a
gene-culturetheory about the pre-linguisticcategoricalperceptionof four
primitivecolours(Lumsden[1985]), then the point of this paperis that the
truth of such a theory sets no interestingconstraintson coloursemantics.
2

THE ALLEGED NATURAL PRIMACY OF FOUR UNIQUE HUES

Whatthen arethe phenomenalsimilaritiesand diSerencesand the semantics

of colourwords,awaitingthe biologicalviamedia7Accordingto Hardin,the
basic fact of colourvision is the existenceof four incompatibleunique hues
(red,green,yellow,and blue).5A uniquehue is a colourshadethat contains
no tracesof the otheruniquehues. Binaryhues (likepurpleand orange)are
equal mixturesof neighbouringunique hues. A colour consisting of two
opponenthues (green/red,blue/yellow)is impossible.In additionthere are
two uniquebrightnessor lightnessterms:blackand white.6All othercolours
can be describedin termsof these six primitivecolours.Hardinhas no doubts
that the four unique hues
do have certaincharacteristicsnecessarily.Thisis a centraltruth. . . Onecan
succeedin the task of identifyingthe hues with some physicalstructureonly
if that structurecapturesthe essentialfeaturesof the hues as thesearedisplayed
to us in experience.. . [for example:]it is impossible
for there to be a unique
orange.[H66]
4

Althoughthe emphasisin the philosophicalliteratureis on things like gold and tigers,also

coloursare oftenconsiderednaturalkinds.Quinediscussed'yellow' as a naturalkindterm
and so does Kripke.Kripke'sview impliesthat there is an extra-cultural,metaphysically
existingnaturalkindYELLOW,
whereasactualusage of the term'yellow'in our culture(or
similartermsin othercultures)may well be (partly)wrong.We mustleave to the specialists
what reallyis yellow. This leaves room for linguisticrelativityto be explainedin termsof
localcircumstances.
Thisnaturalkindapproach,placingwhat is truein the world(eventually
to be describedin terrnsof the TrueScientificTheory),is differentfromboth the Berlinand
Kayapproach(placingwhat is true in language)and the 'rationalWhorfianism'mentioned
in the previousnote (whichplaceswhat is true in innatecognitivecapacities).
Theideaof a perceptualuniqueor unitaryhue has a long history(Leonardo
da Vinci,Goethe,
Mach)andwasfirstputon a theoreticalfootingby Heringt1920]; uniquehueis the translation
of Urfarbe.
AlreadyHeringdrawson languageto supporttheir reality:'languagehas long
since singledout red, yellow, green, and blue as the principalcolors of the multiplicityof
chromaticcolors'(p. 48).
In this paperI shall use the term 'brightness'throughoutto referto the appearanceof
darkand light. In a more narrowsense 'brightness'is only used for the intensityof lights
and surface colours viewed in aperturemode. Then the correspondingterm for the
appearanceof surfacecoloursis 'lightness'.The physicalpropertyof light that corresponds
roughly to brightnessand lightnessis called 'luminosity'.Colourscientistsdo not agree
on the relationsbetweenthese concepts;see Boynton([1988], pp. 87f) and Beck [1972].

The Plasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

Io7

Nevertheless,this sort of necessityis apparentlyof a Kripkeansort, which

is subjectto scientificrevision.Referringto the experimentsof Craneand
Piantanida[1983], Hardinsays that having a reddishgreen experience'is
a matter to be settled by experiment'[H125]. Hence, 'it is conceptually
possiblethat something could look both red and green all over' [H125].
And any necessity in the subdivisionof the colour domain disappears
completelywhen he discussesthe varioussystemsthat have been proposed
to ordercolour space, such as the MunsellColourSystem or the Natural
ColourSystem(NCS).7He says that 'the issue is not that there cannot be a
consistentschemeof representingphenomenalcolour,for there can . . . The
point is rather, that one cannot expect any single representationto be
serviceablefor all purposes'[H120]. And also: 'since we have no independent physicalcriteriafor the identityof hues, we are obligedto fall back on
some form of stipulation'[H89]. But if that is so, we may as well extend
this pragmaticattitudeto the unique hues, and even to the whole category
of colour. Why would a representationof colour in terms of six primitives
be serviceablefor all purposes?Why would there be one concept of colour
which servesall purposes?
Hardinquotesvariousbits of 'behavioralevidencethat shows the natural
of the unique hues' [H41, emphasisadded]. For example:8
primacy
it was discoveredthat subjectscould completelydescribeall the spectrallights
as well as the purplesby usingjust the unique-huenames,but that they were
unableto give a completedescriptionif the namesto which they wererestricted
lackedone of the unique-huenames. [H42]

How necessaryis this result?Englishspeakersmay manage quite well in

psychophysicalexperimentsusing six Basic ColourTerms(BCTsfor short),
7

TheNCSsystemstipulates equaldistancesbetweenthe fouruniquehues andthe same0-100

percent scaleforthe saturationof thesefourhues.TheMunsellsystemis basedon equal-sized
perceptual steps along each of the dimensionshue, saturation,and brightness,but each
dimensionis scaleddifferently.An orderingwith uniformperceptualintervalsbetweenany
two adjacentcoloursis of coursepossible,but this meansthat we lose the attractivefeature
of planesof constanthue (Indow[1988], [H119]). All these systemsare conventionalin
the sense that they definecolourin termsof hue, brightness,and saturationonly (see Notes
9 and 21).
Hardinmentionsthreemorepiecesof evidence:infanthue space(see Note 10), Rosch'swork
with the Dani(see Section4. 5), and ratingsof the 'qualitativesimilarity'of fourteencolours.
With regardto the latterhe says: 'Noticeparticularlythat the uniquehues. . . are spaced
about90 degreesapart,which is the spacingthat the opponenttheorywouldhave led one
to expect'[H42]. However,the picturehe presentswouldfitthe painter'scolourwheelbetter,
with the primariesyellow,blue and redplaced120 degreesapart.Moreover,Indow[1988]
providesdata, spacing the five Munsell primariesred, purple, blue, green, and yellow
about 72 degrees apart. Finally, in the colour hexagon used by printers,six primaries
(magenta-red,violet-blue,cyan-blue,green,yellow, and orange-red)are 'naturally'placed
60 degreesapart.

Io8

J. Van Brakel

naming six Basic ColourCategories(BCCsfor short).9But by itself it does

not supportwhat Hardincalls the 'naturalprimacyof unique hues'. That
would certainlybe an old-fashionedview of the naturalnessof the English
language. In such experiments speakers might just be displaying the
peculiaritiesof the contingentrelationsbetweenEnglishcolourwords.
Evenif it were true, as Hardinsuggests,that 'the divisionbetweenunique
and binaryhues is manifestlybound up with the peculiarcharacteristics
of the human visualsystem' [H67], this wouldbe irrelevantforthe 'natural
primacy'on the phenomenallevel, if speakersof other languages would
employdiSerentBCCs.So it is crucialfor Hardin'sprogramto substantiate
that BCTsare linguisticuniversals.
3 DIVIDING UP THE COLOUR SPECTRUM

Morethan one colourscientisthas askedme the rhetoricalquestionwhether

anybodycoulddoubtthat the solarspectrumnaturallydividesinto fourparts:
blue, green, yellow and red. Therefore,in this section, I list some opinions
on the coloursthat can be seen in the spectrumand in the rainbow.Note
that the discussionhas now shiftedfromunique hues to primitiveor basic
colours.The firstreferto lines in the spectrum,the second to bands of the
spectrum.
Obviouslythe spectrum is the paradigm of the scientific concept of
colour although there are many non-spectralcolours:black,white, grey,
brown, olive, purpleand pink, to name just a few. Also spectrallights are
not very representativeof the ordinarysituation of seeing contextualized
surfacecolours.Nevertheless,almost all scientificresearchon colour vision
is carriedout with spectralcolours,whetherit is humans who are askedto
match a spectral light with a mixture of other spectral lights, or the
unfortunatemonkeyswho are anaesthetizedand paralysedso that a hole
can be drilledin their eyes to measure the responseof particularcells to
spectrallight flashesdirectedat tiny spots on their retina.
What are the coloursof the spectrum?Accordingto one oft-quotedstudy,
four-month-oldinfants see no problem here. They naturally divide the
spectruminto four colours:red, yellow, green and blue.10However,when
9 Althoughone mightwonderwhetherthey wouldmanageas well if presentedwith metallic
surfacesinsteadof spectrallights.Kuehni([1983], p. 42) says that metalliccoloursare a
'groupof colorswe perceiveas unique' (emphasisadded),althoughhe addsthat this is 'an
aspectof the appearanceof objectsnot strictlyrelatedto color'.See also Note 21.
For a reviewof infant colourvision, see Tellerand Bornstein[1987], who stressthat all
pre-1975 studiesare of historicalinterestonly becausedifferencesin brightnessand in hue
were not clearlyseparated.The conclusionthat four-month-old
infants'use' four BCCsto
dividethe spectrumis basedon one 1976 experimentalstudy,invokedby Hardin[H41] to
supportthe existenceof fouruniquehues and also in orderto explainthat we have words
forthe binariesorangeandpurple,butnot foryellow-green[H163]. Becausefour-month-old
infants (and adults) are not interestedin looking at green-yellowcolours this shows

The Plasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

IO9

they grow up they have great difficultylearning to use colour words

correctly.1lAt age two they use them in the right context, but usually
producethe wrong name. At age four they are still makingmany mistakes
in the correctuse of wordslike blue, althoughtheirvocabularymay already
include such words as beige and tan. Even at age twelve they may name
the same spectralcolourblue or yellow on diGerentoccasions.Moreover,the
sequencein which they learn to use colour words correctlyvaries widely,
although there is a definite tendency for North American children at
universityday-carecentres to first get orange right (perhapsbecause they
regularly get oranges).12ThereforeI shall consider the observationsof
four-month-oldinfants irrelevantfor an assessmentof how the colours of
the spectrumshouldbe divided.
What do adults say about the colours of the spectrum?Many textbooks
state that Newton discoveredthe spectrum consisting of the following
colours:red, orange,yellow, green, blue, indigo,violet. How reliableis this
scientificfact?Newton himselfdid not see seven colours:13
I held the Paperso that the Spectrumniight fall upon this delineatedfigure,
and agree with it exactly, whilst an Assistant,whose Eyesfor distinguishing
Coloursweremorecriticalthan mine . . . note the Confinesof the Colours,that
is . . . of the red . . . orange. . . yellow . . . green. . . blue . . . indigo. . . and . . .
blue.

As Campbell[1983] notes: 'If Newton'sassistanthad not been so eager to

please his master our current textbooks would be different. Newton's
assistant 'saw' seven colours because at the time the harmonic series of
Pythagorasstill dominatedmathematicalthinkingand Newton (and many
scientistsafter him) studiedthe analogy between the colour spectrumand

12

13

(accordingto Hardin)that it is an unpleasantcolour.A moreplausibleexplanationmightbe

that a saturationminimumis perceivedin the yellow-greenregionof the spectrum,which
just makes it less colourful.This would also underminethe conclusion that infants
distinguishbetweenthe primitivecoloursyellow and green,as distinctfrombeingsensitive
to saturationgradients.Tellerand Bornsteinconcludetheir review saying: 'The topic of
infant spectralsensitivitythus remainspoorlyunderstood,and nature is still not yielding
her secretseasilyin this area.'
For a reviewof the developmentof colournaming in children,see Bornstein[1985] and
[1986].
also Andrickand Tager-Flusberg
In severalstudies'orange'came out firstor secondfor two- or three-year-oldchildren.It
alsocameout firstas the colourwith the highest'memoryaccuracy'forDaniandAmerican
adults (Rosch Heider [1972]). Andrickand Tager-Flusberg[1986] reporteda strong
correlationbetweenthe mothers'and children'suse of specificcolourtermsand concluded
that 'external&ctors,such as the input and guidanceprovidedby children'smothers,
interactwith and help to shapethe conceptswhich underliethe colorlexicon'.
colourcircleon p. 155. When
Newton,Opticks[1952], p. 126; see alsothe oftenreproduced
he just lookshimself,he only lists violet,blue, green,yellow and red (pp. 31, 114, 124).

I IO

J. Van Brakel

musical chords.l4 Newton's definitionof the spectrumin terms of seven

colourshas survivedprimarilybecausepicturesof the spectrumin textbooks
are either 'artist'srenderings'or very bad photographs.l5I have even come
acrossscientificencyclopaediain which the pictureof the spectrumsimply
consistsof seven homogeneouslycolouredbands.
In fact, it is not easy to assess the colours of the spectrum.Firstly,the
colourswe see in a solar spectrumdependon many factors:the materialof
the prism, the distance of the prism from the screen, the size and shape
of the aperture,the intensity of the light source, the manner of viewing,
etc. Secondly,the observationof colour bands may be enhanced by the
Frauenhoferlines.
What other observationsdo we have, apart iom Newton's assistant?
ThomasYoungdividedthe spectruminto threecolours(presumablyin order
to supporthis trichromatictheoryof colourvision);firstinto red,yellow,and
blue, changingit to red, green, and violet a few years later (becauseof data
reportedby Wollaston).Accordingto Helmholtz,a spectrumshort enough
to be viewed in its entiretyall at once consistsof four colours (red, green,
blue, violet) and he notes further([1911], p. 117):
Newton'sdivisioninto seven principalcolourswas perfectlyarbitraryfromthe
beginningand deliberatelyfoundedon the musicalanalogies. . . Indeed,there
are no real boundariesbetweenthe coloursof the spectrum.These divisions
are more or less capriciousand largely the result of a mere love of calling
thingsby name.

Mostrecent encyclopaediaI have consultedlist five or six colours.It is still

a matterof disputewhetheryellow can be seen in a finelyresolvedspectrum
(Campbell[1 983]).
But can't we all see that yellow must be includedby looking at a good
rainbow('whose most prominentfeatureis that it consistsof a small set of
clearlydiSerentiatedcoloredregions' [H156])7 Surely,if we concentrateon
seeing yellow, we'll see it (providedthe circumstancesare right); but
the same appliesto pink or orange or turquoise(if the circumstancesare
Theperfectnumbersevenis stillwith us. ParitsisandStewart[1983] write(p. 109): 'When
we look at the analysednarrowband of sunlightthrougha prismas Newtondid, we see
that seven colours are emphasized. . . The above phenomenamay be consideredas an
indicationthat, at the corticallevel, coloursare classifiedinto seven classes of cells' and
data are providedto supportthis claim.
l5 Campbell[1983]: 'I have examinedmany coloureddisplaysof the spectrumin dozensof
text-booksof physics,photographyand visualpsychologyincludingsome very recentones
such as Hurvich(1981) . . . It is difficultto photographa spectrumforthe dyeschosenhave
a narrowerspectralsensitivitycomparedwith the eye . . . The only illustratedspectrumI
could find that was nearlycorrectwas that of R. A. Houston(1923) a very experienced
spectroscopist.
'
4

ThePlasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

III

right).16Newton usually describesa rainbow as consistingof red, yellow,

green and blue; originallyhe identifiedfive colours (includingorange)and
officiallysettledfor seven. Munsellrefersto the rainbowin supportof the
five primaryhues on which his now widely used MunsellColourSolid is
based:red, purple,blue, green, yellow.17The Luri (Iran)call the rainbow
'red-green'.Arawakspeakers(Surinam),when asked about the colours of
the rainbow,were at a loss what to say. When De Goeje([1928], p. 173)
pressedbilingualsto translate 'The rainbow has many diiCerentcolours',
they translatedit by to yawale abalokodiakoka-ya-n-da,glossed as 'this
rainbowdifferentupon with-image'.I leave it to the readerto decidehow
many coloursthey saw in the rainbow.18
Nothingvery much followsfromthis briefsurveyof disagreementson the
coloursof the spectrumand the rainbow.And that is preciselythe point. It
just is not a very reliableprocedureto rely on 'pure' perceptionto establish
that the spectrumis made up of four primitiveBCCs.
4

THE ALLEGED UNIVERSALITY

OF ELEVEN BASIC COLOURS

In supportof the universalityof BCCsHardinrefersto BerlinandKay[1969],

in which it is argued that, although diSerentlanguages encode in their
vocabulariesdiSerentnumbers of BCCs,a universal inventory of exactly
elevenBCCsexists. BCCsare characterizedby their foci:the best exampleof
a colour category. Boundariesbetween colour categoriesfluctuatewidely
between languages, but if we ask people about best examples, there is
(accordingto Berlinand Kay)cross-culturalagreement.
Moreover,the orderin which BCCsemergein the languagesof the world
follows a definitepattern:first white and black, then red, next green and
yellow, followedby blue, then brown, and finallypurple,pink, orange and
grey (the latter in no specific order). This evolution is associated with
technologicaldevelopment.
Accordingto Hardin the work of Berlin and Kay 'has by and large
successfullypassed the critical scrutiny of linguists and anthropologists'
[H156]. All peoples employ the 'natural, biologicallyinduced set of hue
categories'[H156], because'the basiclinguisticcategoriesthemselveshave
been inducedby perceptualsaliencescommonto the human race' [H168].
16

17
18

Again,colourphotographswouldseemto be unreliable.In a photographof a rainbowabove

Newton'sbirthplace(Campbell[1983]) I see five bands:violet, green,white orange,lilac.
Accordingto his diaryof 13 April1900, as reportedby Indow[1988].
In Arawakthereis no separatecolourdomain,althoughthereare wordslikecolourwords.
Thereare three termscoveringthe brightnessor intensityof light: karimeto(dark/black),
(light/white),subuleto(variousmediumbrightcolours,includingyellow and light
harrirato
blue).In additionit designateshue aspectsvia a vegetationmetaphor,also with threebasic
terms:imoroto(unripe,immature,green,paleyellow),kereto(ripe,mature,red,orange,deep
(overripe,overdone,brown,buff,tan, purple).
yellow),and bunaroto

I I 2

J. Van Brakel

Hence:'biologydeterminesphenomenologyand, in consequence,a piece of

semanticstructure'tH156].
Hardin'sappealto Berlinand Kayis paradigmaticof the enthusiasticbut
uncriticalway in which philosophersengaged in naturalizingphilosophy
sometimesdrawon SCIENCE.
I shallthereforespellout a numberof criticisms
of the Berlinand Kay theory of eleven BCCsand the way Hardinwants to
have it supporthis view that biologysets strongconstraintson language.19

4.1 Methodological
Criticisms
In reviewsof BerlinandKay[1969] theirworkwas describedas an outdated
form of science, hastily conducted, gathering data in a slapdash way,
containingmany ethnographicerrorsand uncriticallyacceptingaccounts
by writerswho had theoreticalaxes to grind.20
Furthermore,all subsequentworkin the BerlinandKaytraditionhas been
carriedout with MunsellColour
Chipsand standardizedproceduresto elicit
BCTs.It has been estimatedthat in doing this 95 per cent of the world's
colour words are eliminated.The decontextualizationalso eliminates all
aspectsof semanticor symbolicdepth.If colour is stronglyembeddedin a
culturallysalient semanticnetwork,measuringBCCswill of course mirror
the propertiesof this structure.For example,eight BCTsare found in the
Khmerlanguage(Cambodia).Insteadof assigninga particularevolutionary
stage to this culture on the basis of there being eight BCCs,it is obviously
morecrucialto note that all Khmerspeakersknow variousmyths aboutthe
origin of colours such as the story of 'Eight-Colours-Crystal-Woman
'.
Similarly,having a three-colour-symbolism
(many Africancultures) or a
five-coloursymbolism(forexample,Turkish,MandarinChinese)will strongly
influencethe 'salience' of colour words in the particularlanguage, if not
predeterminethe numberof BCTsthat will be found.
Moretechnicalcriticismsof using a fixedset of 320 colourchipsinclude:
(a) In elicitingthe foci data the 320 chips are shown togetheron a chart
(with hue changing horizontallyand brightnessvertically).It is well
documentedthat the appearanceof colour dependson its environment
l9 In the next subsectionsI give examplesfrommany differentlanguagesdrawingon a few
hundredpublications,all of which it is not practicalto mention here. More detailed
surveys,includingfull bibliographiescan be found in Saunders[1992] and van Brakel
[forthc.].Manyof the relevantreferencescan also be foundin BerlinandKay[1969], Kay
and McDaniel[1978], Kay and Kempton[1984], MacLaury[1987], Saundersand van
Brakel[1988], Tornay[1978], see also van Brakel[1992a, 1992b].
20 The originaltheory was based on 98 languages:for 20 languagesactual colour-naming
experimentswere carriedout with speakersof those languagesin the San FranciscoBay
area (with the exceptionof Tzeltal);for 12 languagesdata were obtainedfrompersonal
contacts with linguistsand anthropologists;for the remaining66 languagesdata were
extractedfromdictionariesand ethnographies.

The Plasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

II3

and when subjectsare presentedwith the same chips ordereddiSerently

diSerentfoci are chosen.
(b) Only hue and brightnessis varied.All chips are at maximumpossible
saturation,but this maximumis very diSerentin diSerentregionsof the
chart. This excludesfindingBCCslike beige.
(c) Most importantly,what people tend to do when asked for the best
exampleof a colouris to pointto the most saturatedchip of that colour.
This would supportthat human beings universallyagree that in the
domainof colour 'bestexample'means 'most saturated',but it does not
supportthe universalityof particularcolourcategories.
4.2 TheDefinitionof Colour Term
Of course, nobodydenies that there is a wide range of symbolicand other
uses of colourterms.But, the argumentruns, Berlinand Kaymeasuredthe
of colour terms. However,there remains a strong scientisticand
reference
ethnocentricbias in the way the referenceof the foci of the BCCsis fixed,
becauseit is assumedthat colour constitutesa separatedomainof abstract
colour categories, where colour is measured on three dimensions:hue,
brightness, saturation. But there are serious problemswith taking this
dimensionsof
three-dimensionalspatialmetricsas the properpsychological
colourperceptions(Burnsand Shepp[1988]).21
Although the 320 chips 'define' colour, often in experiments60-80
per cent of the chips remain unnamed. Many people when presented
with the chips get confused and give inconsistent answers or they find
the naming tasks simply absurd, not to mention the potential racist
implicationsof coming along to measure a culture's evolutionarystage
via colour chips. Ichkari women (Uzbekistan)refused to do classification experimentswith colouredthreads(of theirown making),sayingthings
like 'This is like calf's dung, and this is like a peach; you can't put them
together!'.Such data are discardedbecauseit doesn'tproduceBCCs.On the
other hand, if the Jorai(Vietnam)come up with having 23 BCTs,this can't
be acceptedeitherand the definingcriteriaforBCTshave to be appliedmore
strictly.
In westernlanguages,the domainof colouris clearlyseparatedfromother
categoriesand there is a bias towardshue at the expenseof brightnessand
saturation.In other cultures,the hue aspect of colour may, as it were, be
subsumedunder diSerentcategories,so that it is not really present as a

21

besideshue, brightnessand saturation(Beck

Coloursmay have many othercharacteristics
[1972]): size, shape, location,fluctuation(flicker,sparkle,glitter),texture,transparency,
lustre (glossiness),glow, fluorescence,metallic appearance(iridescence),insistence,pronouncedness,and possiblymore.

I I4

J. Van Brakel

separatedomain;still there will be words likecolour words.22The domain

of colourmay overlapwith the domainof form,with the domain of ritual
or the domainof evaluatoryterms. Further,there may be differentsets of
BCTsfor animate and inanimate objects as in Uzbek (Afghanistan)and
Comaltepec(Mexico);for daily and symbolicusage (MandarinChineseand
severalPolynesianlanguages);for naturaland man-madeobjects(Turkish);
or ordinarycolour words may not be applicableto particularclasses of
objects,forexample,many languageshave separatevocabulariesforthe skin
coloursof animals.

of Basic ColourTerm
4.3 TheDe.finition
A detailed discussion of the original definitionof BCT and subsequent
alternativeproposalsis outsidethe scopeof this article.23Eachof the proposed
criteriahas been criticizedbecause of vagueness,internalconsistency,and
for mixing up linguisticand psychologicalcriteria.24Evenwhen appliedin
such a way that lends generalsupportfor the Berlinand Kay theory,there
are many possibleexceptionsfor theirbeing exactlyeleven BCTs.In English
and Germanturquoisemight be a BCT.Frenchand Russianmay have two
BCTs for brown. Russian has two BCTs for blue; Hungarian two for
red. Thereis an extensiveliteraturedeliberatingwhetherRussianhas zero,
one, two or threeBCTsforpurple.In CoastCroatianolive is definitelya BCT.
And we haven't even left Europe.25
Perhaps the most telling of the sort of methodologythat went into
22

23

24

25

For an example,see Note 18 on Arawak.There are many languageswhich emphasize

brightnessinsteadof hue. Paliyan(India)has five BCTsfor degreesof brightness,but none
in hue. Similarly,the problemin translatingGreek'colour'termsis that they
fordifferences
have much moreto do with aspectsof brillianceand tone (lustre)than with hue or tint. In
theoreticalaccounts,Greekwriterstreatcolouras a linearseriesof which white and black
arethe end points(as didGoethe).Insteadof our colourcirclewhich doesnot containblack
or white, they use conceptualmodelslike:in the conversionof pure fire (='white') into
water (=dark') the whole colour-scaleis run through(Plato,Timaeus).
of BerlinandKay[1969] can be summarizedas follows:(i) Themeaning
TheBCT-definition
of a BCTmustnot be predictablefromthe meaningof its parts.(ii)Thereferenceof the BCT
mustnot be includedin thatof anothercolourterm.(iii)Itsapplicationmustnot be restricted
to a narrowclass of objects.(iv) A BCTmust be a commonword with a stablereference
acrossspeakers.
The originaldefinitionhas been criticizedin severalpublications.One alternativeis given
in KayandMcDaniel[1978]. Evaluatingbothdefinitions,MervisandRoth[1980] conclude
that by the criteriaof Berlinand Kay 'none of the eight putativecolors[studiedby Mervis
andRoth]areactuallybasic', while'virtuallyeverycolourwillbe consideredbasicaccording
criteria'.
to K&McD's
Languageswith more than one BCTfor red (i.e. two BCTsnearerto red than to orange,
brown,pinkor purple)include:severalSalishlanguages(Canada),Arabela(Peru),Behinemo
(PapuaNew Guinea),Bodi(Ethiopia),Djuka(Surinam),Jaqaru(Peru),Tikopia(Polynesia).
A BCTfor light blue is found in Spanish (Guatemala,Peru), a few Salish languages
AncientGreek,
(Canada),Nepali(Nepal),Mongol(Mongolia),ChinookJargon(Canada/USA),
Japanese,and otherlanguages.Englishspeakersoftenvolunteertwo foci forblue (one darl
and one light).

ThePlasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

II5

extractingeleven universal BCCsfrom the world's languages is the way

in which implicitrules were used to assign meanings to BCTsin a particularlanguage.Theserulesalmostguaranteethat the evolutionarysequence
will be confirmed.Given a list of BCTs in a language, first the BCTs
meaning white and black are selected. If one of them is not listed it is
assumed that it exists anyway (Berlin and Kay [1969], p. 80). The
next one to be selectedhasto be RED,even if it is glossed in the original
source as yellow (p. 58). In Arunta (Australia)tierga,glossed as 'yellow,
(p. 67), becausethat's the
green, blue' is assignedthe BCT-valueYELLOW
next one to appear.Similarlyin Mazatec(Mexico),sase,glossed as 'blue,
hasto appear
becauseGREEN
blue-greens,blue-violets, is assignedGREEN,
beforeBLUE(p. 78).

of BCCs
for the Universality
4.4 OtherExplanations
Even if it were true that opinions about colour foci around the world
exemplifyeleven BCCsor a specificsubset of them, this universalitycould
have many reasons.It could be that all peoplesof the world are endowed
with the same eleven Platonicbasic colourforms,which they draw on to a
greateror lesserextent. But there are other possibilitiesas well:
(a) Languagesmay have similarsets of BCCsbecauseof (former)geographical
proximity.(Thispointappliesprimarilyto the validityof the evolutionary
part of the theory.)
(b) Cross-languagestabilityof particularcolour saliencesmight be related
to the stabilityof certainkindsof colouredobjectsoccurringuniversally,
for example,blood and firefor red.26
(c) The most plausible explanation for the ubiquity of common colour
meaningsin twentieth-centurylanguagesis, I believe,that it reflectsthe
spreadof culturalimperialismand commontechnology,in particularthe
inventionof artificialdyes. Moreover,in the twentiethcenturythere are
very few monolingual speakersleft who don't use loan words from
westernlanguages.27

26

27

However,one can never be carefulenough in taking what seems natural at face value.
For example,the sky is known in numerouslanguagesas 'prototypically'blue (or light
blue), but in a survey of Italian dialects answers to the question about the colour of
the sky includeddescriptionslike 'knows no colour for the sky' and 'great embarrassment'.
Consider,for example,Khmer(Cambodia)sukulaand Gujarati(India)shoklati,i.e. brown,
which somehowgot there fromSpanish(perhapsvia Tagalogin the Philippines),whereas
the Spanishgot the wordfromNahuatl(Mexico)chokolatl(foodmadefromcacao seeds).In
for brown, fromSpanishcafe(coffee).Kilivila(Melanesia)has
returnNahuatlhas kafentik
kwinin(yellow),from'quinine'(a yellow anti-malariadrug),and so on.

II6

J. Van Brakel

4.5 UnnamedCategories
Berlinand Kay relatethe evolutionarydevelopmentof the numberof BCTs
to a culture'stechnologicaldevelopment.However,the fact that we do not
have Basic OdourTerms does not mean that the Western Flavoursand
FlagrancesSyndicateis underdeveloped.The fact that there are no words
forcertaincategoriesdoes not say very much aboutthe culturalsignificance
of the category,let alone the generallevel of technologicaldevelopment.In
Ancient Egyptpeoplemanagedfor thousandsof years without a word for
blue, but blue was the most prestigiouspaintedcolour.
Of course, the absence of linguisticcategoriesfor certain BCCsgives an
ideal opportunityto check whether at a pre-linguistic,cognitive level the
BCCsare there anyway. Probablythe work of Rosch is the one single-most
completeeSort to show that the eleven BCCsare universalcognitive
categories.28However:
(a) All Rosch's work is concerned with establishing the existence of
elevenBCCs,which is not directlyrelevantto the issue of four unique
hues.
(b) She did several types of experimentsto test the evolutionaryorder
of the Berlin and Kay sequence. In all cases the sequence was not
confirmed.
(c) What was confirmedin most of her experimentswas the universal
primacyof focal colours.They are the most preferredcolours;the best
remembered;the easiest to learn; and so on. However,as pointedout
in Section4.1, this resultonly atteststhe primacyof the most saturated
exemplar within a colour category, not the existence of particular
universalcolours.29
(d) Hardinrefersspecficiallyto her work with the Dani (New Guinea).It's
thereforeof interestto note that Rosch[1973: 340] reportsthat the Dani
'were unwillingto designateone of the color chips as the most typical
member'.
28

29

Hardin[H41, 117, 168] quotesit to supportthe universalityof the uniquehues. Thereis

a largenumberof originalpublicationsby Rosch(formerlyRoschHeider),including[1972,
1973]. For a review and referencessee Lakoff[1987], ch. 2. Severalof her resultshave
laterbeendisputedbecausethey couldn'tbe replicated.Herworkon colourformedthe basis
of 'prototypetheory'(fora critiqueof this theorysee van Brakel[1991]).
In fact Rosch [1972] herselfwrites:'the most saturatedcolorswere the best examplesof
basic color names both for Englishspeakersand for speakersof the other 10 languages
represented'.Furthermore,the distinctionof best examplein terms of conspicuousness,
familiarity,pleasantness,etc. is a matterof dispute.Thereis a long-standingtraditionof
researchon colourpreferences,which has not yet led to any clearconclusions,exceptthat
saturatedcoloursare generallyconsideredmore attractive/better
and the orderof colour
preferencesis definitelynot the same cross-culturally.(See, for example,Martindaleand
Moore[1988], Schwanenflugeland Rey [1986], Wiegersmaand van Loon[1989], Zold
et al. [1986].)

The Plasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

II7

4.6 BCCsandUniqueHues
Assumethat all the abovecriticismscan be countered.30Assumethat there
universal BCCs(although not all
is no doubt that there really are eleven
peoplesemploythem all). Thereis still a problemto presentthis as support
for their beingfourunique hues, which are biologicallyinnate. What about
BCCsBerlinand Kay have foundto exist?Ironically,had
the other universal
Hardinbeen awareof subsequentpublicationsof Kayand collaborators(Kay
and McDaniel[1978], Kay and Kempton[1984], MacLaury[1987]), he
might have found even better supportfor his belief that BCCsare neurophysiologicallywired in. Kay and McDaniel[1978] draw on the same six
primitive opponent colours as Hardin, i.e. they argue that there is a
physiologicalbase for six primitiveBCCsand, derivatively,forfive secondary
ones. Thereare some problemsin takingthe Kayand McDanielmodelas an
extensionof the originalBerlinand Kay theory,but let's not dwell on that.
Therestill remaintwo more generalproblems.
Firstly,it is assumedthat the four unique hues correspondto the foci of
the red, green,yellow and blue BCCs.However,foci are as easily elicitedfor
secondaryBCCsor any other colourterm. So how can we be sure that the
foci measurebiologicallybasedunique hues in some cases, but not in other
cases?Moreover,although it is concludedthat foci are universallyagreed
upon, this law has to be takenwith a pinch of salt. In actualfact everypoint
along the spectrumhas been chosen as a focal point for some BCCby some
speakers.The apparentorder in the publishedcolour maps simply arises
becausethere is a universaltendencyto choose the most saturatedchips as
foci and not to place foci on very light or very darkpatches.
Secondly,how are we going to explain the many languages that have
less than six BCCs,combining two or more primitivecolours into one
category? There are hundreds of languages mapping blue and green
togetherunder one BCT.31Shuswap speakers(on the N.W. Pacificcoast),
to name a yellow-greencategory(i.e.includingyellow
use the word kwaalt
30

31

The examplesin Notes 314 (and also 25) shouldbe seen in this light. When I describea
languageas having,say, one BCTcoveringyellowand green,this is not a factof the matter,
but subjectto the criticismsoutlinedin Sections4.14.3.
For example,speakersof some Italiandialectsuse verdeto referto both green and blue.
Hence,they'lluse a minimumof three wordsto name the coloursof the spectrum.Also
Zuluhas only one BCTforblue and greentogether.Whenthey want to makesure it's one
or the other they'll say 'grue like the sky' or 'grue like grass', which isn't the same as
peopleofteninsiston makinga clear
recognizingblue and greenas BCCs.English-speaking
distinctionbetweenapple-greenand lime-green,but it doesn'tfollowthat both are BCCs.
Onereasonfor therebeingmany languageswhich map green and blue togethermight be
that there'sa strongertendencyto distinguishcolouraccordingto brightnessin this part
of the spectrum.For example, Nahuatl and Tlapanec(both Mexico) seem to employ
separateBCTsfor green,turquoise,blue and violet,but in fact referto differentdegreesof
brightnessin the blue-greenregionand may say in Spanish(using 'standard'translations)
that the sky is greenor violet.

J.

I I8

VanBrakel

and green).32Much to the amazementof MacLaury[1987] reportingthis

fact, it 'contradictspresent physiologicalknowledge'. Could it really be
possiblethat the meaning of a word in a farawayculture contradictsour
knowledge?33
physiological
Even more serious a problemis the fact that there are many languages
who have BCTsfor some secondarycolours,but not for all primitiveBCCs.
Forexample,a Quichespeaker(CentralAmerica)may use BCTsfor each of
orange,grey,purple,brownand pink,but only one termcoveringboth green
and blue.34A similardifficultyis the occurrenceof BCTscoveringa primitive
and a secondary colour and focusing in the non-primitivecolour, for
example,a blue-purplecategorywith focus in purple.
HenceI concludethat the languagesof the worldprovidelittlesupportfor
therebeingfouruniquehues or six primitiveBCCs,which arepsychologically
elementaryand natural referentsin the domain of colour. Let us now see
what colourvision science itselfcan tell us about there being three pairsof
opponentcolours.
5

HARDIN

S ACCOUNT

OF COLOUR VISION

In his book Hardingives a survey of the state of the art in colour science,
which is presentlydominatedby the psychophysicaltheory of 'opponentprocesses'. In this section I summarizeseparatelythe parts of Hardin's
accountthat drawon neurophysiologyand psychophysics,althoughHardin
himselfis not very concernedwith this distinction.Next I discusshis claim
32 In the Berlin and Kay tradition the occurrence of a yellow-green category is considered more

threatening because it combines a 'warm' and a 'cool' colour. Other languages which have
one term covering both green and yellow include: Ancient Greek, Sanskrit, at least 13 Salish
languages, most Wakashan languages, a Haida dialect and both Tsimshian languages (all
Canada), several Ainu dialects (Japan), Aguaruna (Brazil), Klamath (USA), two Numic
languages (Mexico), Natchez (USA), Creek (USA), Jicaque (Honduras), Fanti (Ghana), several
languages in/near Australia (Arunta, 'Fitzroy River', Murinbata, Martu Wangka, 'Queensland', 'Seven Rivers').
33 There are also a number of reports on languages which have one BCTcovering two opponent
colours: Ainu (Japan), Daza (Nigeria), Proto-Slavic, Pukapuka (Samoa). This information
may be less reliable, but the explanations offered are not implausible. For example, in the
vegetative domain green = fresh red. Occurrences of yellow and blue under the same
dictionary entry may arise because of the suppression of the brightness domain: light blue
and yellow may go together as bright colours, whereas dark blue would go with 'black'.
(Of course, on the Berlin and Kay theory this is rendered as YELLOWand BLACKpresent,
but not BLUE.)
34 Languages with one BCT for blue + green (or, much less common, one term for green +
yellow) and at least one BCT for (something like) purple, orange, brown, or pink include
Angaatiha (Papua New Guinea), Bodi (Ethiopia), Cofan (Ecuador), Chayahuita (Peru),
Chinantec (Mexico),Didinga (Sudan), Haisla (Canada),Huastec (Mexico),Kapsiki(Cameroon),
Makah (USA), Menye (New Guinea), Mikasuki (USA), Mixtec (Mexico), Mono (USA), Navaho
(USA), Ocaina (Peru), Paiute (USA), Papago (USA), Tikopia (Polynesia), Tlapanec (Mexico),
Vietnamese, Wester Apache (USA), Yupik (Alaska), Yucuna (Columbia). Compare also
Note 31.

The Plasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

II9

that knowledgeof colourvision sciencehelps to dissolvevariousphilosophical worriesabout colour.

Account
5.1 Neurophysiological
In the retina of the eye there are two types of photoreceptorssensitiveto
visualstimuli:rodsand cones.Visualstimulireachingthe eye consistof light
which, for the present purpose,will be characterizedby wavelength and
intensity only. Rods are specializedfor perceivingachromaticcontrast at
night. Conesoperateunderdaytimelight levels and produceboth chromatic
and achromaticperceptions.They differin their absorptionspectra:the
efficiencywith which they absorblight of diSerentwavelengths.The L-cones
are most sensitiveto lon:gwavelengths,M-conesto medium, and S-cones
to short wavelengths.35Coloursensationsdependupon the relativerates of
absorptionof light in the L-,M- and S-cones.However,the signal passedon
by an individualcone preservesno informationaboutthe wavelengthof the
light that is being absorbed:single cones are colour-blind.Also a particular
stimuluspatternof the receptorscan be causedby morethan one wavelength
distributionof the incominglight. This explainsthe phenomenonof metamers,the fact that objectswhich reflectdiSerentspectramay have the same
phenomenalcolour.
In fact, this descriptionof the cone mechanismis alreadytendentious,
modelof perception.The
assuminga strictlydeterministicstimulus-response
followingalternativemight be slightlybetter:perceptionof colourin normal
circumstancesdependssomehow on the combinedstimulationof the three
types of cones, i.e. colour perceptionsusually dependon the proportionsin
which the three cone types are activatedby an objectand its surrounding;
this activityis a functionof how the cones were stimulatedin the past and
is not always processedin the same way at higher levels in the brain.
Cones (and rods) connect, interalia, to retinal ganglion cells, which
have opponentproperties.This means the following:two sets of receptors
are connectedto a single ganglion cell. One set subservesthe centre of the
cell's receptivefieldand anotherits surround.The cell is calledan opponent
cell because simultaneousstimulationof the centre and surround leads
to no response (e.g. when the whole receptive field of the cell is filled
with the same light),but a spot on eitherthe centreor the surroundexcites
the cell.
35

Becauseof the predominanceof the trichromaticcolour theory in the first half of the
twentieth century, the cones are still often called the blue, greenand red cones. The
trichromatictheoryof colourvision was firstproposedat the beginningof the nineteenth
centuryby ThomasYoungand foundsupportwhen Maxwelland Helmholtzdemonstrated
that all the spectralcolourswe see can be completelymatchedby mixturesof threesuitable
spectrallights.

I20

J. Van Brakel

Thisconceptof opponentcells lendsitselfvery well to explaininga variety

of phenomena,for example:
(a) It can explain why we are good at observingedges and other abrupt
changes in space or time.
(b) It providesa theoreticalformat for talking about various aspects of
contrast;for example,darkness(blackness)arisesfromcontrastonly.
And Hardinreportson these mattersat some length in orderto explain
the ideaof opponency.However,at this stage thereis no referenceto colour
or hue. Colour-opponent
cells are introducedby Hardinonly much later
[H52], after he has outlined the attractivenessof the psychophysical
opponent-process
theory.

5.2 Psychophysical
Account
The psychophysicaltheory of opponent-processeswhich Hardin presents
consistsof two parts.36
(1) Certaincolouredlights when mixedcancel each other, for examplered
and greenlight mixedin the rightproportionyieldswhite light, whereas
it is impossibleto obtaina reddishgreen.Apparentlyred and green are
somehow antagonistic.To explain this it is assumed that brightness
(white) is the result of some sort of summing of cone outputs, while
perceivedhues are the resultof some sortof diSerencingof cone outputs.
The diSerencing or subtracting mechanism can also explain why
humans have a sharp colour discrimination,although the absorption
curvesof the three cone types overlapconsiderably.
(2) This generalidea is then workedout by assumingthat there are three
colour-opponentchannels, includingone achromaticchannel, yielding
six BCCs:
(a) The summed output of the L and M cones gives the achromatic
channel: L + M > O codes for whiteness, L + M < O codes for
blackness.
36

Thisis basicallythe theoryproposedby Hurvichand Jamesonin the 1950s as reviewedin

Hurvich[1981]. The idea of opponencyas a basisof a theoryof colourvision stemsfrom
Hering[1920]. Duringthe firstpartof the twentiethcenturyHelrnholtz's
[1911] trichromatictheorydominatedbecauseHering'stheorywas basedon the phenomenologyof colour
appearances.It could be revivedbecausewavelengthdependentopponencyin cells was
discovered,and relying on subjects'qualitativejudgementsgained new respectability.
NotwithstandingHardin'sclaim that Hurvichand Jamesonbroughtabout a revolutionin
colour science, there are many similarapproachesthat took into account post-receptor
subtractivecombinationsof colour signals.For a review of early zone-theories,see Judd
[1979]. As was already acknowledgedby Helmholtzand proven more elegantly by
Schrodinger,taken as calculi (i.e. as instrumentsfor predictingphenomenalcolourdata),
the trichromaticand tetrachromatictheories are to a very great extent functionally
equivalent(Niall[1988]).

The Plasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

I2I

(b) The diSerencedoutput of the L and M cones generatesa red-green

opponentchannel:L-M > Ocodesforredness,L-M < Ocodesfor
greenness.
(c) Similarly,L + M-S generates a yellow-blue opponent channel:
L + M-S > O codes for yellowness, L + M-S < O codes for
blueness.
In order for the formulae to be read as linear equations, weighting
coefficientshave to be added.Por example,aL-M > O codes for redness,
where a is a measureof the relativecontributionof the L and M cones to
the red/greenchannel.
Using this psychophysicalmodel, which is hopedto fit the neurophysiologicalhardware,Hardinexplainsvariouscolourphenomena:
(a) The fact that certain colours (red/green,yellow/blue)seem to exclude
one another.For example,the explanationruns, the red/greenchannel
either gives a positiveresponseor a negative response.So we cannot
have a red and green experienceat the same time. But as the colour
circle shows, there is an infinitenumberof opponentcolours, so why
single out red/greenand blue/yellowas special?
(b) He uses the model to discuss various simultaneous/successivecontrast
phenomena,forexample,yellowgives a blue after-image.However,very
theory
little is explainedwith explicitreferenceto the opponent-process
and he does not explain why the older explanationsin terms of the
trichromaticcolourtheory are less good.
5.3 PhilosophicalImplications
The psychophysicalopponent-processtheory does not support Hardin's
materialisticprogrambecause there is no evidence that the three psychopat)zways(see
physicalchannels correspondto particularneurophysiological
next section). Secondly,as a functionalmodel it covers the whole colour
channel, from the light rays entering the eye all the way up to the
psychologicalcolourexperience.Hence,it has the statusof a psychophysical
bridge law (connecting physical and mental events). That one kind of
psychophysicalmodelis bettersuitedto explainthe phenomenathan another
would seem to be of little relevance for Hardin'sgoal of showing that
reductivismis the right philosophicalapproach.
Hardincriticallydiscussesvariousphilosophicaltheoriesaboutcolour,but
particularknowledge about our biological make-up does not play any
significantrole in his account.37For example, I am sympatheticto his
37

He dismissesobjectivismbecause:there are at least 15 (physical)causes of the colourswe

experience[H2J;thereare no standardconditionsfor measuringspectraltransmittancesor
reflectancesof translucentmaterials [H69]; objectivismcannot solve the problem of
metamers[H7] or why there are four unique hues [H66]; and finallythe setting-offof

I22

J. Van Brakel

argumentsagainst taking indistinguishabilityas an all or nothing aSair:

perceptualthresholdsare not absolute,but statisticalproperties[H169-82],
but we do not need the statisticalnature of neuron firings, let alone a
full-fledgedcolour-opponenttheoryto make this point.
In setting up an argumentagainst the possibilityof spectralinversions
[H13442], Hardinsuggests that there is a straightanalogy between, on
the one hand, the phenomenologyof colours and the neurophysiologyof
opponent cells and, on the other, thermodynamicsand the kinetic gas
theory.However,firstly,phenomenalcolourdoesnot correspondto temperature in 'phenomenal'thermodynamics,but to feelinghot or cold.
Secondly,he argues that it is as implausibleto assume that 'the heat
of a gas should not be constitutedby the motion of its molecules'tH136]
as it is to assume that seeing orangeis constitutedby the fact that 'the
r-g channel codes for r, whereas the y-b channel fires at its base rate'
(which representsperceivingred). However, he forgets that the point at
which the 'y-b channel fires at its base rate' has simplybeen fixed as the
point where people say they are perceiving red (see Section 7.2). So,
obviously,the philosophicalworry that they might be experiencingorange
is not aSectedby the codingstory.On the other hand, if the goal is to show
that if two brain states in two observersare identicalthen they musthave
the same experience,we do not need all the scientificdetails.
Hence I concludethat Hardinhas not shown that knowledgeof colour
science,and the opponent-process
theoryin particular,providesnaturalistic
solutionsto oldphilosophicalproblems.Ifanything,it is the otherway round:
the opponent-process
theoryis builtupon a particularphilosophicalpreconception that the phenomenalessence of colour is three pairs of opponent
colours.
6 MORE ON THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF
COLOUR-OPPONENT CELLS 3 8

The neurophysiologicalcore Hardinappealsto is the existenceof opponent

cells.Thereare,however,a numberof problemswith the conceptof opponent

38

colourillusionsfromother perceivedcoloursis not grounded[H72, 82, 91f]. Hence 'our

common-sensenotion that objects have colour simpliciter cannot withstand scientific
scrutiny'[H7, 81]. But none of these argumentsdrawson the specificsof the opponentprocesstheory and similarlyfor his argumentsagainstsubjectivismin general[H43, 59,
76, 81] and sense data theoriesin particular[H103-9].
Thissectionand the next are basedon a largenumberof scientificpublications,all of which
I have not listed in the bibliography.Since Hardin'sbook was written many more
publicationshave appeared,but the generalpicturehas not changeddrastically.To indicate
this I have included,where applicable,referencesto contributionsin Mollonand Sharpe

ThePlasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

I23

cells in relationto colour vision. Firstly,there are at least two majortypes

of colour-opponentcells in the primate visual pathway. Secondly, cells
sensitiveto wavelengthexist only, if at all, in the visual cortex.
speciQcally
Ganglioncells in the retina and in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN)
initiatethe colour coding process,but they processboth spatialand colour
information.

Cells
6.1 Single-opponent
Single-opponentcells among retinal and LGNganglion cells can display
spatial opponency,colour opponency,or both. A spatiallyantagonisticor
opponentcell has a receptivefieldconsistingof an 'on ' or 'off' circularcentre
andan annularsurroundof the oppositesign, wherethe centreandsurround
are connectedto diSerentparts of the retina. Such cells do not respondto
the absolutelevel of illumination,but rather to diSerencesin illumination
in differentregions of their receptivefield. If the same type of cones is
subservingthe centreandsurround,the cell is spectrallynon-opponent.Such
broad-bandcells are usually phasic,i.e. they respond with a transient
discharge to the on/oS-set of light stimuli. If centre and surround are
connectedto diSerenttypes of cones, the cell is also wavelength-opponent
and usuallytonic,i.e.the dischargerateof actionpotentials(impulses,spikes)
is sustainedthroughthe whole periodof light stimulation.39If in the latter
but not
case centreand surroundcoincide,the cell is wavelength-opponent,
however,
that:
spatiallyantagonistic.Note,
(a) A small spot of light may cover the receptivefieldsof many ganglion
cells, some of which are excitedand othersinhibited.
(b) The interactionbetweenthe on- and oF-regionsvarieswith the state of
adaptationas well as with the locationof the receptivefieldon the retina.
(c) No agreementexists on the significanceof the inhibitorysignal.
(d) The spectralresponsivenessof cells is determinedunderconditionsthat
are far fromthe stimulusconditionsin which the visual systemusually
operates[MS225, 235].
About90 percent of the ganglioncells in the retinaand the parvocellular
layers of the LGN(PLGN)are connected to L and M cones and are also

39

[1983] and Ottosonand Zeki[1985], which Hardinalso used. Thesereferencesare given

in squarebracketsas 'MS' or 'OZ' respectively,followedby the pagenumber.Otherreferences
to the originalliteratureare given primarilyvia two reviewarticles:Boynton[1988] and
in cases
Lennieand D'Zmura[1988], referredto as 'B' and 'LD'respectively.Furthermore,
where there are many publicationsby the same author(forexample,Zeki),I referonly to
the mostrecentpublication,in whichreferencesto earlierpublicationscan usuallybe found.
Thewavelengthopponencymightbe a trivialconsequenceof the receptivefieldcentrebeing
drivenby a singlecone [LD372]!

I24

J. Van Brakel

spatiallyantagonistic([MS220], [OZ167], [LD368],Gouras[1984]). These

L/M-cellsare capableof respondingto both colourand contrastinformation:

they cannot distinguishbetween a large colouredspot and a small white

model:both summing
spot. Hence,in termsof the simpleopponent-process
and diSerencingsignals, i.e. both brightnessand chromaticity,go through
a singleneuralpathway([MS202, 277], [H33, 54], [B77], [LD369]).This
presentsa seriousdecodingproblemfor the cortex,but makes sense of the
fact that there is such a large numberof L/M-cells.They can also switch
instantlyto non-opponentprocessing,e.g.if an objectis presentedonly briefly
([MS206], [OZ179], [B77]). Hence they show a surprisingfunctional
plasticity;in a way, they adapt to the tasks imposed by the physical
characteristicsof the objectsto be analysed[MS208].
Moreover,the neutralpointof the L/Mcells (i.e. the cross-overpointfrom
excitatory to inhibitory responses) is not fixed in one spectral region
([MS211], [OZ165], [LD368]). Even with identicalspatial and temporal
stimuliand identicaladaptingconditions,therecan be considerablevariation
in the neutral point among individualcells. Zrenner([MS215], [OZ171])
gives a range of 420-650 nm for the L/Mcross-overpoint (i.e. virtuallythe
whole spectrum).Also, the points at which they respondmaximallydo not
correspondto wavelengths representingunique hues. Hence, it seems
prematureto associate the L/M cells with the red/greenchannel of the
theory.
psychophysicalopponent-process
If we look at the other cells and the possibilityof a blue/yellowchannel
the situationis even more confused.As many as nine diSerentways have
been reportedfor cones and rods being connectedto retinal ganglion cells
([MS196], Gouras[1984]). Apartfromthe predominanceof L/Mcells,there
is definitelya small numberof cells connectedto S cones [MS202]. They
have been calledblue-yellowopponentcells, but this means no more than
that they are connectedto S cones as well as to the L and/orM cones. They
are not spatially antagonistic.They respond positivelyto blue light, but
it is not clear in which way they might be said to processa yellow signal.
Apart from the L/M and S/L+ M opponent cells, 'magenta/green' and
'cyan/red' opponentcells have also been identifiedin the PLGN(Gouras
[1984]). Most cells in the magnocellularlayers of the LGN(MLGN)are
broad-bandcells.
Whateverthe detailedpropertiesof all these cells are, 'The absenceof a
distinct"achromatic" pathwayis the mosttroublesomephysiologicalfinding'
[LD372].
Since Hardin'sbook was written, there has been more emphasisin the
literatureon there being two distinctvisual pathwaysfromretina through
LGN to visual cortex ([OZ24], Livingstoneand Hubel [1984, 1988],
[LD366], Mollon[1989]). In its most extremeform(Shapley[1990]), it is
arguedthat achromaticvision can be identifiedwith the M pathway (via the

The Plasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

I25

MLGN)and chromaticvision with the P pathway(via the PLGN),but this

seems highly implausible:
(a) The MLGNis much smallerthan the PLGN.Perhapsit is the case that
is processedprimarilyvia the MLGN([LD380],Merigan[1989]),
motion
but then the PLGNdoes not only processcolour, but also texture,fine
patternand fine stereoscopy,i.e. it carriesboth spatial and chromatic
information.40This was confirmedby Schiller et al. [1990] who
examinedthe visual capacityof rhesus monkeysbeforeand afterPLGN
and MLGNlesions.
(b) Even Shapley [1990] who is a strong 'advocate for a version of
dualismand parallelism'admitsthat '(c)ooperachromatic/achromatic
tive and suppressiveinteractions... demonstratethat these pathways
may start in parallelbut they converge'.
(c) It would seem to be almost analytic that we cannot have a purely
chromaticpathway,becausehow would it manage to associatecolours
with objectsif it does not carryspatialinformationas well?4

Cells
6.2 Double-opponent
Double-opponentcells have not yet been foundbelow the cortex.They are
most sensitiveto the simultaneouspresentationof two diSerentcolours,one
coveringthe centre of the cell's visual field and the other illuminatingthe
cells give a maximumresponseto
surround.For example,green oW-centre
a red spot surroundedby a green annulus. Such a cell is not influencedby
largehomogeneous(chromaticor achromatic)light spotscoveringthe entire
receptivefield. Hence, double-opponentcells are sensitive to wavelength
diSerencesonly. But it would be prematureto concludethat we have now
foundthe locus of the 'colour-coded'cells.
Firstly,there is a 'bewilderingvarietyof colour-codedcell types' (Livingstone and Hubel [1984], p. 348; cf. [LD367]) and in fact little is known
about the organizationof the receptivefield of double-opponentcells. Also
it is unresolvedhow they connect to cells in the LGN[OZ33].Experimental
evidenceis disputablebecause it is very difficultspatiallyto isolate centres
from surround(Shapley[1990], p. 647), and in general the wavelength
sensitivity varies with the particular conditions under which the
measurement is made. This may explain why there is no agreement
40

41

This is not to say that it is undisputedthat colourand motionare processedseparatelyat

the levelof the LGN[B81] . Perhapsit wouldbe morerelevantto concentrateon the different
evolutionaryage of the MLGNandthe PLGNto accountfortheirdifferentfunctions.Because
the PLGNis much older a cell-for-cellcomparisonof the two is a dubiousundertaking
anyway (Mollon[1989]).
It shouldbe notedthat Livingstoneand Hubel[1988], who are oftenquotedfortheirclaim
that colourand formis processedseparatelyin the visual cortex,do not deny that colour
informationitselfmay be used to give informationaboutborders.

I26

J. Van Brakel

on the spatial propertiesof colour-opponentcells [LD376] and on the

numberof such cells in diSerentareas of the visual cortex [OZ24,206].
Secondly,we are not talking about one particularlocus for these cells.
Mostreporteddata are for particularlayersin area V1 in the visual cortex
(Brodmann'sarea 17). Fromthere on we go to area V2 (Brodmannssarea
18)ata
on wavelength-sensitivecells here were only reported after
Hardin'sbook appeared(Livingstoneand Hubel [1988]). From V2 we
probablygo to V4 (see next subsection).
Thirdly,there are not only double-opponentcells in V1, but also singleopponentcells ([MS277], [B92]), cellswith singlespectralsensitivitycurves,
and cells which only respond to wavelength in conjunction with lines
or edges of particularorientations([MS275, 282], [H57]). Livingstone
and Hubel and others [MS275, 282] reportcolumns in the visual cortex
which respondsolely to colour stimuli and not to white light; but others
disputethe existenceof such columnsor blobs ([MS293], [B92], [OZ24]).
Moreover,in area V1 wavelength-sensitiveneurons may still respond
diSerentlyto signalsfromthe leftand the righteye ([MS272,291], [OZ200],
[B79])
Hence, the neurophysiologicaldata on single- and double-opponentcells
do not supportthe psychophysicalopponent-process
theoryHardinappeals
to in explainingcolour phenomena,and in particularit does not warrant
his conclusionthat the 'Berlin-Kaybasic colour categoriesare simply the
productof a set of filtersat an early stage of neuralprocessing'[H169]. It
is not clear how we should understandthis ln the light of the fact that
spatialand colour informationis transferredtogetherin 'the early filters'
and in our search for truly colour-codedcells we are pushed all the way
up through the visual cortex. There is also considerablepsychophysical
evidencethat many of the mechanismsof colour discriminationare not
retinallybased(inducedcolours,colourconstancy,memorycolours,filling-in
mechanisms).42

6.3 TheConceptof Colour-coded

Cells
Almostall publicationsof the last ten years agreethat double-opponent
cells
foundin area V1 are truly respondingto colour and they are oftenreferred
toas the neurologicalbasis which explainscolour contrast.However,Zeki
[OZ219-44] has disputedthat these cells code for colour.In his view they
42

See [MS422], Boynton[1988]. Actuallya lot of this is acknowledgedby Hardin[H35,

48f, 87], which makes his conclusioneven more surprising.As we need to accountfor
the relation between the colour of a surface and the illumination,this would require
physiologicalmechanismssensitiveto spatialarrangementsof coloursignals,but none has
been reported[LD389].

ThePlasticity of Categories:The Case ?f Colour

I27

merelyrespondto a predominanceof a signalfromone cone type43and only

in area V4, which he has been studying,would we be findingthe firsttruly
colour-codedcells (i.e. cells that respondto colour as a human sees it and
not merelyto wavelength,independentof colourobserved).However,Lennie
and D'Zmura[1988] state that 'his conclusion seems to be mistaken'
(p. 390), whereasLivingstoneand Hubel[1988] note that also in V4 many
cells displayselectivityfororientationand referto a 'dozenor so areasnorth
of the striatecortex' of which the (colour)vision propertiesstill need to be
investigated.So the search for the cells that really contain the colour
homunculiis not yet finished.
Hardincorrectlyraisesthe question'whether [a] cell might respondjust
as well, or better,to some characteristicfor which we did not test and if so,
how the visual system is able to disambiguatethe two stimuli' [H56], but
he does not draw any consequencesfrom that. By what criteriashould a
cell be qualified as a colour-codedcell? This already poses a problem
Furthermore,neurophysiologicalsupportfor
on a purely technical
theorieson human colour vision has, until recently,45primarilydrawn on
experimentswith monkeys.Take Zeki'spioneeringexperiments,which are
oftenreferredto in the literature.Whatis not oftennotedis that his monkeys
were anaesthetized,meaning that in additionto feelingno pain they were
seeingno colours.46
Thistoucheson the morefundamentalproblemof how to makea principled
divisionbetween colour seers and mere wavelengthresponders.As Hardin
notes, very primitiveorganismssuch as 'single-celledEuglenashow diSerential responsesto light of long and shortwavelengths,but nobodyis prepared
to speakseriouslyabout the animal'scolour vision' [H148]. But why not,
if responses of individualganglion cells contained in paralysed eyes of
opponency?
anaesthetizedmonkeysare interpretedas displayingred/green
level.44

43

44

45

46

Note 47): 'the responsesof this

Accordingto Zekithis supportsLand'sretinextheory (cS.
andother,similar,doubleopponentcellsdo not correlateobviouslywithcolours.Wesuggest,
therefore,that the double opponent cells may be the first stage in local wavelength
differencingand thus the generationof brightness'[OZ31].
Criteriathat have beenproposedinclude:(1) responsesto colouredbut not to white stimuli,
(2) a large differencein strengthof responseto two coloursirrespectiveof other stimulus
parameters,and (3) a largedifferencein strengthof responseto two coloursforat leastone
out of severalstimulusconfigurations([MS295];cf. [LD382]).
In additionnon-intrusivevisually evoked potential (VEP)measurementshave become
increasinglypopular.However,EstevezandDijkhuis[MS261,267] say:'Caution,however,
is recommendedin judgingevokedpotentialstudiespurportingto show that colouris the
codedvariable.Althoughmodulating"colour" at constantluminancecan resultin different
formsof EPresponses,these changesin the EPscannot automaticallybe takenas evidence
of "chromatic"coding . . . Among the manyattributesof the image that may affect-and
perhapsbe encodedin the VEPs are spatialcontrastand colour'(emphasisadded).
Boynton[1988]. Thismeansthat 'the extra-retinalinputsto the prelunatecortex. . . would
be reducedor eliminatedand the whole state of controlof the excitabilityof this cortical
areamightbe different,leavingthe cellswith theirpureafferentsensoryinputsthatoriginate
fromthe retina'(Krugerand Fischer[MS293]).

I28

J. Van Brakel

Cellsthat are sensitiveto wavelengthdiSerenceshave now been reported

at seven or more stages in the visual pathway, and no doubt more levels
are to follow.At most of these levels a varietyof wavelengthrespondershas
been identifiedand most, if not all, respondalso to other stimuli.Somehow
these cells may be implicatedin colour perception(amongstother things),
but it would seem to be premature,if not false, to ascribeto any of these
cells the task of codingcolour.
7 MORE ON PSYCHOPHYSICAL OPPONENT CHANNELS
7.1

Problemswith the SimpleModel

Let us now look in more detail at the status of the psychophysical

opponent-processtheory. We have seen that there is no one-to-one correspondencebetween the physiologicalpathways and the psychophysical
channels.DiSerentfunctionalchannels representthe same set of anatomic
cells. In particular there is no evidence for the chromatic-achromatic
distinction.
But perhapswe should not be as materialisticas Hardin.Perhapspure
functionalismis right and there is room for a separatecognitivescience,in
this case psychophysics,which can explain the folk psychologyof colour
experiencesin its own terms(ofthreeopponentchannelsof the sortdescribed
in Section 5).47 Unfortunately,there is also increasingpsychophysical
evidence that the processingof spatialandcolourinformationis intricatelylinked,
whereas non-linearitieshave been reportedfor all three psychophysical
channels([MS433, 465], [B80-2], Schefrinand Werner[1990]). Thereis
disagreementas to whetherthe chromaticchannelscontributeto brightness
([MS353, 446], [OZ67], Coleet al. [1990]); there seem to be inputs from
the colour signals to the motion channels [B81] and colour-selective
channels also display orientation sensitivity ([MS383], Shapley [1990],
Flanaganet al. [1990]). Non-linearitiesare very prominentin the yellowbluechannel ([MS347], [OZ70], [LD352], [B78], [H35]), and also occur
in the red-greenchannel ([MS429], [OZ70], [B79]) and the black-white
channel([LD356],Leeet al. [1989]). Moreover,thereare rod-coneinteractions, some of very great magnitude ([MS196], [H10]).48 There is no
agreementas to whetherthereis S cone inputto the L/Mchannel([MS479],
47

48

Purelycomputationaltheoriesof colourvision,such as Land'sretinextheory,do not make

the assumptionof fouruniquehuesas the phenomenalbasisof colourscience.Hardinfollows
most psychophysicistsin not taking the retinex theory very seriously.Becauseof space
limitationsI shallnot discussLand'smodelin this paper.Fordiscussionsof the retinextheory
in relationto the neurophysiologyof colour vision, see, for example [LD385f], Gouras
[1984], Livingstoneand Hubel[1984]; Land,Zekiand Blakein [OZ5-60].
For example, against textbook wisdom, some dichromatsexperiencethe sensation of
red in largefieldtests;this anomaloustrichromacyis partiallybasedon signalsfromrods
[B74].

The Plasticity

Or

Categories:The Case of Colour

I29

[LD352],Gouras[1984]) and it is unclearwhetheryellowinputcomesfrom

the L or M cones or both ([MS371, 512, 532], [LD353f.]).
As a resulttherehave been many proposalsfor adjustmentsand modifications.Forexample,it has been suggestedthat on the functionallevel, colour
vision proceedsby a mixtureof opponentand non-opponentchannels;that
diSerentmechanismscontrolthe perceptionof short- and long-wavelength
redness[OZ64]. And, because tuning to wavelengthis drasticallychanged
by presumablyirrelevantdimensionssuch as size and duration([MS391],
[OZ74]),multiplered-greenchannels(presumablycorrespondingto multiple
cell types)have been assumedto exist (cf.[OZ39,172]. But this impliesthat
the idea of fixedspectralsensitivityfunctionshas to be given up [MS392]
and that we have lost a simpleexplanationof why a light cannot appear
red and green at the same time [MS396].
Discrepanciesdisplaythemselvesin psychophysicalexperimentsprimarily
in the form of non-linearities,which are then attributedto various nonstandardinteractionsbetween cone types. One problemin assessingthese
interdependencesis that alreadydescribingstandardsummationand differencingof cone outputsrequiresthe empiricalcurve-fittingof a numberof
free parameters.Hardinsays:
the formulaeneed to be assignedcoefficientsthat reflectthe weightingto be
given to each cone type . . . Althoughthese mattersare of obviousimportance
to visual science,the particularsneed not detainour inquiryfurther.[H35]

But let us look somewhatfurtherinto these details.

ResponseCurvesand UniqueHues
7.2 Chromatic
The coefficientsof the opponent-processesare calculatedfrom absorbance
curves.Only
dataforthe threecone typescombinedwith chromatic-response
recently have direct physical methods become availableto determinethe
absorptioncurvesof the threecone types.However,with the adventof direct
measurementtechniquesit was not only confirmedthat thereare threecone
types (each governedby its own DNA-code),but also various contentious
issues arose,including:49
(a) Are there perhaps sub-populationswithin each class of cones with
somewhatdifferentspectralsensitivities?
(b) Do visual pigment propertiesperhaps vary between individuals of
the same species?
49

See [MS74], [OZ39],Neitzand Jacobs[1990] and for the genes encodingthe three cone
pigmentsNathanset al. [1986]. Becauseamino-acidsequencesof M and L cones are 96
percent identical,whereasforthe S cone they are verydifferent,it has been suggestedthat
S cone colourvisionis evolutionarymuch older.Thisshedsnew light on the controversies
aboutthe functionof the PLGNand MLGN(Mollon[1989]).

I30

J. Van Brakel

The chromatic-response
curves are determinedin experimentsin which
subjectsarepresentedwith spectrallights.50Firstly,they fix theirfourunique
hues, being askedwhich spectrallight is pure blue, etc. This sets the zero
levels for the L-M and L + M-S channels.The subjectis then askedto
mix particularspectrallights, say a red/yellowlight, with so much of an
opponenthue, say blue, that a uniquehue is obtained,in this case red.This
is what is calleda cancellationor differencingexperiment:the blue cancels
the yellow. Similar cancellation experimentsare carried out for other
combinations.In this way the chromaticresponseis measuredfor the whole
spectrum.51
Letus pass overthe fact that only spectrallights are used and an observer
in a 'neutral equilibriumstate of adaptation', which means that she
sees the test fields after remaining in the dark for ten minutes.52The
crucialquestionis: why start with the four unique hues in the Srst place?
Theirpsychologicalrealityis vigorouslydefendedby most colour scientists.
However:
(a) Colourscientists admit they are often unsuccessfulin convincing an
artistthat greenis a primitivecolourand that thereare exceptionsto the
willingness of people to describethe spectral colours using the four
unique hues only.
(b) Thereis a considerablerange in the wavelengthsthat are identifiedas
representingunique green, blue and yellow (unique red is not in the
spectrum).Althoughsome argue that the averagesare reproducible,in
this case it may be more informativeto look at the range: blue
462-496 nm, green 488-545 nm, yellow 566-588 nm.53 Hence the
uniquepointscoverthe whole spectralrangeof these colours,exceptfor
21 nm of yellow-green.
(c) Since Hering ([1920], p. 58) there has been uncertaintzrwhether
perhapsbrown is also a unique hue (Quinnet al. [1988]).
(d) The status of (induced)blacknessis still unclear (Lee et al. [1989],
Volbrechtet al. [1990]).
Colourscientiststell me in correspondencethat there is a vast literature
on uniquehues and a lot of 'objective'supportfortheirexistence,independent of any practicesof naming colour.However,that is not how the subject
is introducedby Hardin,in textbooks(Hurvich[1981], pp. 1-11, 53, and
50 Fora descriptionof the procedureand the relationof chromaticresponsefunctionsto hue
naming,see Hurvich[1981] and Wernerand Wooten[1979].
51 The L/Mand S/L+ M cancellationcurvesare matchedat the point of 'balanced'orange.
They are furthermatched with an achromaticresponsecurve to be able to calculate
saturations.Onlya few of these cancellationexperimentshave been published[OZ63].
52 As Hurvich([1972], p. 64) notes,this is the only way to obtainmeaningful
measurements.
A biasedadaptivestate can lead to 'unanticipatedremainders'[OZ72].
53 Data fromSchefrin& Werner[1990] and furtherreferences
given there.

ThePlasticity of Categories:The Case of Colour

I3I

Kuehni[1983], p. 39), and in reviews[LD337].54 Moreover,if we look into

the more sophisticatedindirectsupport,new ambiguitiesarise:
(a) Non-linguisticsupportfor three opponentchannels is based primarily
on measurementtechniques which rely on some sort of threshold
detection,55which is not representativeof ordinarycolour vision at
suprathresholdlevels [MS399]. Ontop of that there are all the problems
listedin Section 7.1. For example,chromaticaxes that connect unique
hues (in the colour circle) do not seem to representdirectionsalong
which opponentmechanismsare uniquely excited ([OZ65], [LD357],
Flanaganet al. [1990]).
(b) In support the Bezold-Bruckephenomenon is often quoted, always
reproducingthe same data kom Purdy's 1929 dissertation(firstpublished in Purdy [1937]).56 tIowever,Purdy [1931] himselfnotes that
the invarianthues of the Bezold-BruckeeSect are not the same as the
(i.e.the uniquehues), whereasrecenttechnicalpublicationsare
Urfarben
not clear on the position and other characteristicsof the invariant
hues.57
Hence I concludethat it is the opponent-processtheory (as presentedby
Hardin)which is builton agreementsamong some speakersthat red/green
and yellow/bluestand out as specialand not the other way round.
8

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Let us assume that we would all agree that orange, chartreuse,turquoise

and purpleare the four primitivecolours(uniquehues). Hardincould have
writtenalmostthe same bookby just substitutingorangefor red,chartreuse
for yellow, and so on. Or we could change the meaning of unique hue to
'discerniblecolourshade' and have as many opponentchannelsas we like.
Ofcourse,the numberof discerniblecolourshadesvarieswith circumstances,
S4

55

56

57

CompareQuinnet al. [1988]: 'a coloursensationis consideredto be elemental[=unique]

if its usual colour term cannot be replacedby some combinationof other colour terms';
Hurvich[1981], p. 11: 'to explainhow the nervoussysteminteractswith light rays and
certainobjectproperties. . . to generatecolourexperiences,it is criticalthat we know how
many basiccolorswe need to accountfor';and 'Theyare "unique"in the sense that they
cannotbe describedas mixturesof other hues' [LD337].
For example:incrementthresholdfor large monochromaticflashes, thresholddetection
contours, detection of rapid flicker,minimallydistinct borders,heterochromaticflicker
photometry.
Also by Hardin[H45, 67] and Hurvich([1971], p. 73), who writes:'Theseinvarianthues,
as they are called,correspondto the threeuniquespectralhues blue, green,and yellow'.
See, forexample,Zrenner[OZ81],Ejimaand Takahashi[B78]. Vos [1986] concludesthat
eSect may indeed be describedas a purely receptoralphenomena',
'the Bezold-Brucke
(opponent)mechanisms.
whereasthe uniquehues referto post-receptoral

I32

J. Van Brakel

but this could be explainedby referringto the variablesensitivityof the

diSerenttypes of opponentcells that have been identified.We could have,
strictlyspeaking,no colour words at all, but still the conceptof opponentprocesseswouldbe usefulto explainobservationsand experiencesfor which
we would have words.
Thereseemsto be nothing in currentknowledgeaboutthe functioningof
the brain which sets any interestingconstraintson what colour concepts,
BCCsor otherwise,peoplemight employ.They might have verbsfor colour
changes but no nouns for colour properties;they might only have object
names(offlowers,pigments,etc.) doingdoubleduty as colourwords;or have
no separatedomain of colour at all. So perhaps,notwithstandingHardin's
cursorydismissalof the views of Quine and Wittgenstein,what all green
objectshave in common is that we have learnt to call them 'green' and
what all kwaalt objectshave in commonis that Shuswapspeakershave learnt
to call them kwaalt and can teach us which things are kwaalt, just as we
can teach them which objectsare green.
Moreconcretely,neurophysiological
researchindicatesthatbetweenretina
and cortex,colourprocessingis intricatelymixedwith the processingof other
visual informationon form, texture, movementand other changes in the
environment.Combiningthis with accounts of high-level, cross-modality
connections,the absenceof almostany knowledgeabouttop-down,feedback
mechanismsin the brain,58learning models referringto synaptic weight
rearrangements,and chaos theoryindicatingthat analog systemswith vast
amountsof variablesare impossibleto predictperfectly,it should not come
as a surprisethat a cursorystudy of the languagesof the worldpresentsus,
not only with alternativesets of BCCsor no BCCsat all, but also with a
whole gamut of words, bearing vague and varying similaritiesto colour
words.The brainwill not objectand the mind subservesit all.
Departmentof Philosophy
Universityof Utrecht
58

Barlow [1990] notes that eSerent neural connections bom other parts of the brain
outnumberthe afferentconnectionsfromthe opticnervein the LGN,which is of particular
interestin view of the fact that 'evidenceto be reviewedsuggeststhat the LGNdoes little
to transformthe signalsfromretinalganglioncells that projectto it' [LD365].

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