Professional Documents
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special law, will not ordinarily affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute.9 So it must be here.
The tax privilege of PAL provided in Sec. 13 of PD 1590 has not
been revoked by Sec. 131 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended by Sec.
6 of RA 9334.
That the Legislature chose not to amend or repeal [PD] 1590 even
after PAL was privatized reveals the intent of the Legislature to let
PAL continue to enjoy, as a private corporation, the very same
rights and privileges under the terms and conditions stated in said
charter.
Any lingering doubt, however, as to the continued entitlement of
PAL under Sec. 13 of its franchise to excise tax exemption on
otherwise taxable items contemplated therein, e.g., aviation gas,
wine, liquor or cigarettes, should once and for all be put to rest by
the fairly recent pronouncement in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.12 In that case, the Court, on the
premise that the "propriety of a tax refund is hinged on the kind of
exemption which forms its basis,"13 declared in no uncertain terms
that PAL has "sufficiently prove[d]" its entitlement to a tax refund of
the excise taxes and that PALs payment of either the franchise tax
or basic corporate income tax in the amount fixed thereat shall be
in lieu of all other taxes or duties, and inclusive of all taxes on all
importations of commissary and catering supplies, subject to the
condition of their availability and eventual use.
The main issues for resolution are, therefore, (1) whether or not the
CA properly denied due course to the appeal for raising pure
questions of law; and (2) whether or not the petitioners were
entitled to the tax credit or tax refund for the taxes paid under
Section 21, supra.
Held:
The CA did not err in dismissing the appeal; but the rules should be
liberally applied
for the sake of justice and equity
Collection of taxes pursuant to Section 21 of the
Revenue Code of Manila constituted double taxation
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the resolutions promulgated
on June 18, 2007 and November 14, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72191;
and DIRECTS the City of Manila to refund the payments made by
the petitioners of the taxes assessed and collected for the first
quarter of 1999 pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of
Manila.
Ratio:
The CA rightly concluded that the petitioners thereby raised only a
question of law. The dismissal of their appeal was proper, strictly
speaking, because Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides
that an appeal from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law
shall be dismissed;
On the basis of the rulings in City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., 595 SCRA 299 (2009) and Swedish Match
Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila, 700 SCRA
428 (2013), the Court now holds that all the elements of double
taxation concurred upon the City of Manilas assessment on and
collection from the petitioners of taxes for the first quarter of 1999
pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila. Firstly,
because Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila imposed the tax
on a person who sold goods and services in the course of trade or
business based on a certain percentage of his gross sales or
receipts in the preceding calendar year, while Section 15 and
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9280 excluded the Bureau of Customs (BOC)
Commissioner as member of the Professional Regulatory Board for
Customs Brokers (PRBCB).Section 39 of RA 9280 expressly
repealed the TCCP provisions (Section 3401 to 3409) on the
customs brokers profession. Section 39 of RA 9280 further declared
that all laws...and parts thereof which are inconsistent with [RA
9280] are [deemed] modified, suspended, or repealed accordingly.
In lieu of the Board of Examiners, RA 9280 created the PRBCB
whose members are appointed by the President from a list of
recommendees submitted by the PRC which has supervisory and
administrative control over the PRBCB. Significantly, RA 9280
excluded the BOC Commissioner as member of the PRBCB. The
exclusion of the BOC Commissioner as a member of the PRBCB
evinces the legislative intent to remove any power he previously
exercised over custom brokers, and to transfer the supervision,
control and regulation of this profession to the PRBCB. By
conferring these powers on the PRBCB, the declared policy of RA
9280 to professionalize the practice of the customs broker
profession is executed and fulfilled.
With the repeal of Section 3409 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines (TCCP) by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9280, this specific
rule-making power was transferred to the Professional Regulatory
Board for Customs Brokers (PRBCB) to complement its supervisory
and regulatory powers over customs brokers.The BOC
Commissioners power under Section 608 of the TCCP is a general
grant of power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to
enforce the provisions of the TCCP. Under the rules of statutory
construction, this general rule-making power gives way to the
specific grant of power to promulgate rules and regulations on the
practice of customs brokers profession to the CSC Commissioner
under Section 3409 of the TCCP. Indeed, in the exercise of this
specific power, the Board of Examiners (of which the BOC
Commissioner serves as ex officio chairman) was to perform only a
recommendatory role. With the repeal of Section 3409 of the TCCP
by RA 9280, this specific rule-making power was transferred to the
PRBCB to complement its supervisory and regulatory powers over
customs brokers.
Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9280, a successful examinee of the
customs brokers examinations acquires a Certificate of
amount of tax and the date of payment. Thus, the audit team sent
to appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute the total
amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus,
prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public
funds through falsification of public document against him.
Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He
averred that as Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La
Union, he never accepted payments from taxpayers nor issued the
corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew Aberin and
Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the
corresponding RORs. RTC rendered its consolidated decision
convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
WON RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several counts
of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents on the basis of the finding that he had been negligent in
the performance of his duties as Revenue District Officer;18 that the
acts imputed to him did not constitute negligence; and that he
could not be convicted of intentional malversation and
malversation through negligence at the same time.
Held:
No. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
August 16, 2006 by the Court of Appeals subject to the modification
of the penalties imposed as stated in this decision.
Ratio:
The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness
Magluyan based her examination to determine the discrepancies in
the Official Receipts listed by the accused therein, bore only the
typewritten name of the accused without any signature. However,
prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta showed that those individual
pages were part of a number of pages of a report submitted for a
particular month, and she showed that the last pages of the related
reports were duly signed by the accused.
In addition, the testimony of Maria Domagas establishes that the
questionable receipts were within the series of receipts
accountability of accused for a particular month. x x x. The
Ratio:
Once the taxpayer has established by sufficient evidence that it is
entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate, in
accordance with the requirements of Section 112(A) of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), its claim should be granted.Under
Section 112(C) of the NIRC, the CIR has 120 days to decide the
taxpayers claim from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Section 112(A) of the NIRC. In Intel Technology v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 522 SCRA 657 (2007), we ruled that once the
taxpayer has established by sufficient evidence that it is entitled to
a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate, in accordance with
the requirements of Section 112(A) of the NIRC, its claim should be
granted.
Only preponderance of evidence as applied in ordinary civil cases is
needed to substantiate a claim for tax refund.We likewise applied
RR 3-88 in AT&T Communications Services Philippines, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 626 SCRA 567 (2010), and held
that only preponderance of evidence as applied in ordinary civil
cases is needed to substantiate a claim for tax refund.
July 9, 2014
We deny the right of the BIR to collect the assessed DST on the
ground of prescription.
Before 2004 or the year Republic Act No. 9282 took effect, the
judicial action to collect internal revenue taxes fell under the
jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, and not the CTA. Evidently,
prescription has set in to bar the collection of the assessed DST.
Ratio:
In the present case, although there was no allegation as to when
the assessment notice had been released, mailed or sent to BPI,
still, the latest date that the BIR could have released, mailed or
sent the assessment notice was on the date BPI received the same
on 16 June 1989. Counting the three year prescriptive period from
16 June1989, the BIR had until 15 June 1992 to collect the assessed
DST. But despite the lapse of 15 June 1992, the evidence
established that there was no warrant of distraint or levy served on
BPIs properties, or any judicial proceedings initiated by the BIR.
To determine prescription, what is essential only is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period were sufficiently
and satisfactorily apparent on the record either in the allegations of
the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.
To determine prescription, what is essential only is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period were sufficiently
and satisfactorily apparent on the record either in the allegations of
the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.
Under the then applicable Section 319(c) [now, 222(c)] of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977, as amended, any
internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of
limitation may be collected by distraint or levy, and/or court
proceeding within three years following the assessment of the tax.
July 2, 2014
Facts:
In the course of respondents operations, petitioner found
respondent liable for deficiency income tax, withholding tax, valueadded tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) for taxable
years 1992,1994, 1997 and 1998.4Particularly, petitioner, through
BIR officials, issued demand letters with attached assessment
notices for withholding tax on compensation (WTC) and expanded
withholding tax (EWT) for taxable years 1992, 1994 and 1998. On
February 21, 2003, USTP appealed by way of Petition for Review
before the Court in action (which was thereafter raffled to the CTASpecial First Division) alleging, among others, that the Notices of
Assessment are bereft of any facts, law, rules and regulations or
jurisprudence; thus, the assessments are void and the right of the
government to assess and collect deficiency taxes from it has
prescribed on account of the failure to issue a valid notice of
assessment within the applicable period. USTP moved to withdraw
the aforesaid Petition because it availed of the benefits of the Tax
Amnesty Program. The CTA-Special First Division held that the
Preliminary Assessment Notices (PANs) for deficiency EWT for
taxable years 1994 and 1998 were not formally offered; hence,
pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
Court shall neither consider the same as evidence nor rule on their
validity.12 As regards the Final Assessment Notices (FANs) for
deficiency EWT for taxable years 1994 and 1998, the CTA-Special
First Division held that the same do not show the law and the facts
on which the assessments were based.13 Said assessments were,
therefore, declared void for failure to comply with Section 228 of
the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code). Nevertheless,
the CTA-Special First Division declared that the right of petitioner to
collect the deficiency EWT and WTC, respectively, for taxable year
1992 had already lapsed pursuant to Section 203 of the Tax Code.
Issues:
Held:
After careful review of the records and evidence presented before
us, we find no basis to overturn the decision of the CTA En Banc.
Hence, we agree with the CTA En Bancs observation that the 1994
and 1998 PANs for EWT deficiencies were not duly identified by
testimony and were not incorporated in the records of the case, as
required by jurisprudence.
EWT assessment issued for taxable year 1994 has factual and legal
basis
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 27, 2011 Decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 662 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) shall have the power to promulgate
rules and regulations for the conduct of its business, and as may be
needed, for the uniformity of decisions within its jurisdiction.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1125, the CTA is
categorically described as a court of record. As such, it shall have
the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the conduct of its
business, and as may be needed, for the uniformity of decisions
within its jurisdiction. Moreover, as cases filed before it are litigated
de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their
cases. Thus, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of
evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary
July 2, 2014
Issues:
(a) The CTA gravely erred in holding that it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) the CTA gravely erred in holding that Oilink had
a cause of action;
Held:
The CTA had jurisdiction over the controversy
Oilink had a valid cause of action
Ratio:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1125, the law creating the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), defined the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA as
follows: The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided: Decisions of
the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
Customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or
release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties
imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC).There is no question that the CTA had
the jurisdiction over the case. Nonetheless, the Commissioner of
Customs contends that the CTA should not take cognizance of the
case because of the lapse of the 30-day period within which to
appeal, arguing that on November 25, 1998 URC had already
received the BoCs final assessment demanding payment of the
amount due within 10 days, but filed the petition only on July 30,
under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies. (Third requisite, must be in their
respective office.)
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of
these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under
the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis. (Second requisite, savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices)
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer
to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
(Second requisite, savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices)
In addition, the court also ruled that there is no law pertaining to
such transfer because the GAA were textually unfaithful to the
Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their respective
offices" in 2011 and 2012. (First Requisite)
III No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as
money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may
only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to
the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
Take note: