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Homo Biologicus. An Evolutionary Model for the Human Sciences

C. Elworthy: Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1993. ISBN 3 428 07749 0.
Review for the Journal of Evolutionary Economics by Esben Sloth Andersen
Although Darwin believed that his theory of biological evolution would have immediate
consequences for the study of human behaviour, it took more than hundred years before
biologists developed the outlines of a theory of complex social behaviour. This modern
theory of sociobiology and the related Darwinian psychology has been met with much
scepticism among economists. The major exception is economists related to the Chicago
tradition who appreciate the apparent biological support for a generalised application of
the model of Homo oeconomicus. In his book, Charles Elworthy (trained in both
economics and political science) argues that a biologically oriented study of human
behaviour and of the underlying psychology provides a much more important stimulus
for economists and other social scientists. A science-based model of Homo biologicus
is not depicting a naked ape, neither it is giving simple support to standard models of
Homo oeconomicus and Homo sociologicus. Instead it creates a creative interaction
between the human sciences, i.e. the different sciences engaged in the study of the
behaviour of Homo sapiens.
The short introductory chapter presents the basic idea: to sketch a model which can
function as a mutually beneficial interface between biology and the social sciences.
According to Elworthy, biologists need social scientists because the latter have the best
techniques for describing and analysing human behaviour. On the other hand, social
scientists need biologists to be able to construct a realistic and useful model of Homo
biologicus. Following the methodology of hierarchical reductionism, the construction of
the model as well as of the book proceeds from basic to still higher levels of analysis.
At the basic level of analysis we deal with the well-known mechanisms of biological
evolution in a way which opens up for the treatment of social behaviour (chapter 2).
Following Dawkins, organisms are seen as the vehicles which allow replicators (genes,
etc.) to multiply themselves. Each identical copy of a replicator gives rise to a more or
less identical vehicle. However, the copying of replicators is not always exact, and this
leads to vehicles with varying behaviour. The reproductive success of the different
vehicles, and thus the success of the underlying replicators, is determined by the selection
environment. A major component of the environment is the competition with other
vehicles, and this competition often have to be studied as a dynamic process (e.g. as an
arms race). Biologists have traditionally emphasised the competition between individual
organisms with varying behaviour, but sociobiology has explained behaviour which
supports other kinds of vehicles, including kin groups and, potentially, groups where
kinship do not matter.
These fundamental concepts are then (in chapter 3) specified in a way which
overcomes some of the arguments against sociobiology. A basic criticism is that presentday humans do not always behave in a way which fulfils the fundamental theorem of
evolutionary biology: that the underlying replicators maximise their representation in the
next human generation. Elworthys answer that the adaption is not necessarily to the
current environment (where many selection pressures have weakened) but should be seen
as reflecting an evolutionary past. Another criticism is that Darwinian evolution is not able
to explain complex social adaptations. The answer is that even complex trade-offs can be
handled. In equilibrium, the result is as if the adapted organism or higher-level vehicle
had solved a maximisation problem subject to constraints. To demonstrate the logic,
Elworthy presents a microeconomic analysis with a biological production function and
fitness indifference curves. This analysis can even be applied to kin-group and group
selection which may give rise to surprisingly complex modes of behaviour.
The fundamental evolutionary concepts can only seldomly be directly used in the
explanation of human behaviour. The reason is that human psychology function as the
mechanism through which replicators influence the behaviour of individuals and groups
of humans. This relationship is the subject of evolutionary psychology which helps to

overcome a series of criticism against sociobiology (chapter 4). Darwinian psychology

starts by recognising that human behaviour is not primarily directed by instincts but by
flexible programs. However, these Darwinian algorithms are heavily influenced by
the problems of social life. For instance, many experiments have demonstrated that
although humans have no general logical capability in analysing games, they share a
strong tendency to look for cheaters. They also share a large brain and a capacity for
complex division of labour which have not been found in any other animal which forms
genetically heterogeneous societies. Elworthy supports the minority of sociobiologists
who consider these very human characteristics of psychology as the outcome of a very
intensive and inhuman warfare and arms race (group selection) between past groups
of hominids and humans.
Given a basic understanding of the characteristics of human psychology, the task is to
analyse actual human behaviour and how it influences the fitness of the replicators
individually, in kin groups, and in groups (chapter 5). Here the applied methodology
closely resembles that of the neoclassical analysis of Gary Becker et al. Given the
frequent occurrence of a certain type of behaviour, it is explained as the contextdependent outcome of Darwinian algorithms which maximises the historical fitness of
the underlying replicators. Literature surveys are given which suggest that even
phenomena like anorexia, infanticide, rape, altruism, and conformism can be explained in
terms of algorithms of behavioural response. In all these cases, humans are considered to
be born with a potential for a certain response, which may sometimes only be a capacity
to learn a particular kind of behaviour. There are, however, given no ultimate proofs that
such algorithms are present in the brain, and there is no quantitative indication about the
possibility of overcoming them by culturally spread rules of behaviour.
Elworthy agrees with the criticism that until we know much more of the underlying
genetic mechanisms, an explanation in terms of evolutionary psychology may at best give
ex post accounts rather than ex ante predictions. In neoclassical terms the problem is that
we do not know the underlying utility function and the information of individuals. In
contrast to the model of Homo oeconomicus we may, however, construct a model of
Homo biologicus which allows to draw many conclusions (chapter 6). The basic
difference, which has been ignored by the previous debate, is that evolutionary
psychology suggests specific cognitive characteristics of humans. This leads to
differences with respect to the concepts maximisation, individuality, and rationality. First,
the present-day selection environment makes it likely that we only find a maximisation of
replicator survival with respect to past conditions. Second, the individual and social
vehicles which are of relevance to the past success of replicators make it clear that humans
have a complex and variable psychology which in some respects are individualistic and in
other respects are supporting kin groups, and ordinary groups and organisations. Third,
the notion of substantive rationality tends to confuse the discussion. For instance, strong
evolutionary arguments can be given for the results of Tversky and Kahneman which
demonstrate that humans do not make a mathematically rational treatment of decisionmaking under uncertainty.
There is no doubt that readers gain a lot from Elworthys book. First, they are given
an up-to-date presentation of modern sociobiology and Darwinian psychology. In this
respect the book is not only a critical survey but also an excellent reference work. The
latter is characterised by traditional German methods of scholarship with an extensive use
of large footnotes which include easy-to-read references to an enormous literature.
Second, the book is characterised by a good understanding of important parts of biology,
psychology, economics, and political science. Such a degree of interdisciplinarity is
necessary for developing the basic idea of a model of Homo biologicus in the interface
between natural and social sciences. Third, the book argues forcefully that readers should
give up their prejustices against a long-term coexistence and cross-fertilisation between
evolutionary biology and the social sciences. One really wants to give the model of Homo
biologicus another chance after reading the book.
However, the book also raises serious questions and objections. First, the idea of
developing a model of man based on evolutionary biology is, as emphasised by the
author, still just a sketch. How it is to be implemented is not at all clear. Second, the
validity of the results which are supposed to be used in the construction of the model is

still open to serious doubts. Economists have not forgot the unsound generalisations
based on a primitive understanding of Darwinism which were applied in earlier times.
Even in Marshalls Principles we find statements about British superiority based on the
high genetic quality of the different waves of immigration. Todays biologists teach us
that even if the premise is correct (which has not been proven), then the relevant qualities
are based in a large number of genes and that there would be a rapid regression towards
the mean unless a continuos selection pressure was present. Third, there is no discussion
in the book of the dual inheritance models of e.g. Boyd and Richerson (1985) which
suggests that the conclusion of models of biological evolution may be modified in
important respects if they are supplemented by the much faster mechanisms of learning
and cultural evolution.
The subtitle of the book is An Evolutionary Model for the Human Sciences. The
word Evolutionary is chosen because the model relates to evolutionary biology, and
because is appears to be able to adapt and evolve according to problems and results of the
different human sciences. It is not chosen to relate to the theory of cultural evolution and
to evolutionary economics. On the contrary, Elworthy seems uninterested and largely
unaware of the contributions in these areas. Nevertheless, the book is of interest to
evolutionary economics in three respects. First, the abstract schemes of evolutionary
processes which can be described in terms of the creation and selective retention of
behavioural variants may be seen in a new light when applied to sociobiology rather than
evolutionary biology in general. This might give new inspiration to evolutionary
economics. Second, specific pieces of information may give rise to renewed discussions.
For instance, the recorded evidence of group selection in the shaping of human behaviour
seems to cast new doubt on Vanbergs (1986) arguments for methodological
individualism. Furthermore, recorded mix of individualistic and group-oriented behaviour
may be used in evolutionary economic modelling. Third, the books tendency to
overestimate the direct biological determinants of behaviour may provoke a systematic
search for the mechanisms of creation and transmission of institutional rules which
supplement or countervail genetically based behaviour. In this way evolutionary
economists may help to alleviate some of the confusion which has followed the
emergence of genetic engineering and the Human Genome Project. The potential of
provoking such an effort is just one of the many merits of Elworthys book.
References
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P.J. (1985), Culture and the Evolutionary Process,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
Vanberg, V. (1986), Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules: A Critical
Examination of F.A. Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution, Economics and
Philosophy, Vol. 2, 75-100.