Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2 The players
3 The strategy
Between September 2001 and the middle of 2002 the Bush Administration
prepared an analysis of the global situation and the resulting military policy and
strategic objectives, in particular, which are markedly different from those of
previous U.S. administrations in recent decades. These assessments and
strategies were not new, but they now found acceptance in government and in
the drive for hegemony.
3
S. www.newamericancentury.org. J. Bookman: The president’s real goal in Iraq, in: The Atlanta Hournal-
Constitution of 29 September 2002. Robert Kagan: Power and Weakness, in: Policy Review 113 (2002). The
project called from the outset for Saddam Hussein’s removal from office, see Washington Post of 19 March
2002, The Guardian of 19 August 2002
4
QDR 01, p. 13.
5
West Point speech in mid-2002, quoted from Nicholas Lemann: The War on What? In: The New Yorker of 16
September 2002.
regime. In the words of George W. Bush: “America has, and intends to
keep, military strengths beyond challenge.”6
The formulation of this political strategy and the elaboration of the details in
2001 and 2002 was paralleled by a steady growth in the arms budget, a
devaluation of the status of multilateral and international agreements and the
discrediting of arms control policy (chemical and biological weapons; land mines;
International Court of Justice, etc.). The production of missile defence systems
was stepped up and the emphasis placed on the capacity to wage war rather
than on the task of guaranteeing stability. The regional focus switched clearly to
Asia. These changes in strategy are understood as being responses to the
changes in the world situation since 1989. The report on “Rebuilding America’s
Defense” drawn up by the neo-conservative “Project for the New American
Century” summed things up as follows in the year 2000: “Over the decade of the
post-Cold War period, however, almost everything has changed. The Cold War
world was a bipolar world; the 21st century world is – for the moment, at least –
decidedly unipolar, with America as the world’s “sole superpower”. America’s
strategic goal used to be containment of the Soviet Union; today the task is to
preserve an international security environment conducive to American interests
and ideals. The military’s job during the Cold War was to deter Soviet
expansionism. Today its task is to secure and expand the “zones of democratic
peace;” to deter the rise of a new great power competitor; defend key regions of
Europe, East Asia and the Middle East; and to preserve American pre-eminence
through the coming transformation of war made possible by new technologies.
From 1945 to 1990, U.S. forces prepared themselves for a single, global war that
might be fought across many theaters; in the new century, the prospect is for a
variety of theater wars around the world (…). During the Cold War, the main
venue of superpower rivalry, the strategic “center of gravity,” was in Europe (…)
the new strategic center of concern appears to be shifting to East Asia.”7 The
predominant objective of this strategy is not the fight against terrorist groups or
states, but the maintenance and extension of the disparity between America and
the rest of the world and the worldwide enforcement of the model of American
dominance.
6
Quoted from Michael Lind: Is America the New Empire? In: The Globalist 19 June 2002. Cf. also New York
Times of 22 September 2002
7
p. 2 f.; Robert Kagan, William Kristol: The Bush Doctrine Unfolds, in: Weekly Standard of 4 March 2002
8
Dick Cheney was then Secretary of State for Defense. The draft bears the hand of Wolfowitz and Libby. The
report on “Rebuilding America’s Defense” of 2000 expressly picks up on this draft (p. 11). See Michael T. Klare:
Endless Military Superiority, in: The Nation of 15 July 2002, Nicholas Lemann: The Next World Order, in: The
New Yorker of 1 April 2002 and Frances FitzGerald: George Bush & the World, in: The New York Review of
Books of 26 September 2002.
hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."9 In an
interview on the Public Broadcasting Network the National Security Advisor,
Condoleeza Rice, put it more bluntly: “But if it comes to allowing another
adversary to reach military parity with the US in the way that the Soviet Union
did, no, the US does not intend to allow that to happen, because if it happens,
there will not be a balance of power that favours freedom“.10 The logical upshot
is that a “threat-based” military doctrine, as it is called, is being replaced by a
“capabilities-based approach”, which stipulates that armament and military
dislocation should be geared to defeating any conceivable attack by any
conceivable enemy at any conceivable time11. To that extent deterrence remains
in place as a policy objective and instrument. But the rationale of this policy has
changed. It is now a question of consolidating the uniquely dominant position
enjoyed by the USA.
The second element of this policy is the doctrine of “pre-emption” and, above all,
of “prevention”. A preventive war was an option that was seldom articulated in
the past and kept largely on the back burner. Rare examples were the threat of
the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea and the justification of the cruise
missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan under Clinton. Both these options have
been given enhanced status under Bush. There was a massive increase in the
calls for pre-emptive action of this kind after the events of 11 September 2001.
Speaking at West Point in mid-2002, Bush said: “For much of the last century,
America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and
containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also
require new thinking. Deterrence - the promise of massive retaliation against
nations - means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or
citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with
weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly
provide them to terrorist allies.” Preventive acts of war are now explicitly allowed
on an extensive scale. They are regarded as permissible in respect of military
strikes against terrorist groups, against states that support them and against
states that are already in possession of weapons of mass destruction, in the
process of acquiring them or merely attempting to do so. The USA has the
unique right to intervene anywhere in the world, which includes military action
that is “pre-emptive”, “anticipatory” or geared to “anti-access denial”: “……our
best defense is a good offense“12.
Action of this kind – irrespective of what action the enemy actually takes –
makes it clear that the notion of self-defence has been buried. What was
previously regarded as being the last resort now becomes the done thing. The
high level of uncertainty in respect of information and decision-making and hence
the threat of destabilisation that is bound up with a policy of prevention no
longer form part of the debate. The guideline drawn up in January 2002 on the
use of nuclear weapons allows the preventive use of nuclear weapons against
“rogue states” that do not have any nuclear weapons but are merely suspected
9
NSS, p. 30.
10
The Times of India of 26 September 2002. The sentence "The President has no intention of allowing any
foreign power to catch up with the huge lead the U.S. has opened up since the fall of the Soviet Union" was
included in the NSS version issued on the morning of 20 September 2002, but it had been deleted by the
afternoon, see the press briefing of the press spokesman, Ari Fleischer,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020920-2.html.
11
S. Michael T. Klare: Endless Military Superiority, in: The Nation of 15 July 2002.
12
NSS, p. 6: "We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed” (NSS, p. 14). “America will
act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” (Bush’s preface to the NSS, p. 2).
of attempting to develop or gain possession of them. A barely heeded declaration
made by the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, on 21
February 2002 marked the ending by the Bush Administration of the old
guarantee given by the USA that it would only employ nuclear weapons against
countries that were in possession of nuclear weapons themselves or in an
alliance with a nuclear power. This was underlined by the enhanced efforts to
develop nuclear weapons capable of penetrating deep into the earth and
destroying underground bunkers.
4 Empire
13
See New York Times of 22 September 2002.
14
See the remarks of the Director of Policy Planning of the US State Department, Richard Haass, in Nicholas
Lemann: The Next World Order, in: The New Yorker of 1 April 2002.
follows: “The United States has no rival. We are militarily dominant around the
world. (…) We use our military dominance to intervene in the internal affairs of
other countries (…) our goal is not combating a rival, but maintaining our
imperial position, and maintaining imperial order (…) Planning for imperial wars
is different from planning for conventional international wars. In dealing with the
Soviet Union, war had to be avoided (…) Imperial wars to restore order are not
so constrained. The maximum amount of force can and should be used as quickly
as possible for psychological impact—to demonstrate that the empire cannot be
challenged with impunity. During the Cold War, we did not try very hard to bring
down communist governments. Now we are in the business of bringing down
hostile governments and creating governments favorable to us. (…) Imperial
wars end, but imperial garrisons must be left in place for decades to ensure
order and stability. This is, in fact, what we are beginning to see, first in the
Balkans and now in Central Asia (…) Finally, imperial strategy focuses on
preventing the emergence of powerful, hostile challengers to the empire: by war
if necessary, but by imperial assimilation if possible.“15
15
Stephen Peter Rosen: The Future of War and the American Military, in: Harvard Magazine 5/2002.
16
S. H. J . Krysmanski`s website on the subject of the “New World Order” (2002); Jürgen Wagner, the Eternal
Empire, Hamburg 2002; Philip S. Golub: The Imperium Americanum as a Historical Concept, in: Le monde
diplomatique September 2002; Emily Eakin: “It takes an empire”, say several U.S. thinkers, in: New York
Times of 2 April 2002; Thomas E. Ricks Empire or Not? A Quiet Debate Over U.S. Role, in: Washington Post of
21 August 2001, p. A01.
17
H. Kissinger: Does America Need a Foreign Policy? New York 2001; Joseph S. Nye jr.: The Paradox of
American Power, New York 2002; Dinesh D'Souza: In praise of American empire, in: The Christian Science
Monitor of 26 April 2002; Jonathan Freedland: Rome, AD ... Rome, DC? In: The Guardian of 18 September
2002; Robert Kaplan: Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, Random House 2001; Andrew
J. Bacevich: American Empire, Harvard 2002; Max Boot: The Case for an American Empire, Weekly Standard of
15 October 2001; idem., Savage Wars of Peace, in: Hoover Digest 3/2002
18
Jonathan Freedland: Rome, AD ... Rome, DC? The Guardian of 18 September 2002