#1.

Libel: Malice Not Presumed When Imputations

Were Made Against A Public Figure, Subject of
Imputations Were Matters of Public Interest And
Fair Comments

fogure, Elizalde is subject to public criticism on his acts thaw ere imbued with public
interest. Elizalde thus appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. While
acknowledging that he may not appeal the acquittal of Ludolfo, he premises his
appeal on the civil aspect of the case, on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, which provides that extinction of the criminal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil action, whether or not the civil action was instituted with the
criminal action. The CA, according to him erred in declaring him as a public figure,

Suspecting that Elizalde was behind his arrest for perjury, Ludolfo made several
statements against him in several radio interviews; that Elizalde influenced the City
Prosecutor of Legazpi to expedite the issuance of warrant of arrest against him; that
Elizalde manipulated the result of several biddings in a dredging project; and that

since his community is a limited community of business associates. On the other

hand, Ludolfo argues that where there was no separate civil action filed, the
extinction of the criminal action carried with the civil action. There was no wrongful
action to speak of, hence no justification for the award of moral damages.

Elizalde receive P2Million pesos from him on condition that he will subcontract the
project to Ludolfo, which Elizalde never did. Because of this, Elizalde filed libel

The Supreme Court:

cases against Ludolf, which were eventually filed with the RTC. However, Elizalde
did not institute a separate civil action, nor reserved the right to file a separate civil
action against Ludolfo arising from the alleged libellous remarks against him. In his
defense, Ludoldo alleged that exposing the anomalous transactions was a public duty

We do not find the petition meritorious.

The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce
the accuseds civil liability.

for him; he further alleged that Elizalde is a public figure due to his participation in
government projects and prominence in business circles; that the imputations were

The parties have conflicting interpretations of the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule

matters of public interest, thus privileged. In the absence of actual malice, and

111 of the ROC, which states:

applying the rules on privileged communication, the prosecution thus far failed to
show there was malice in his declarations. The RTC, however, convicted him, and
ordered him to pay P5M in damages for each count; and for legal expenses as well as
cost of litigation. Ludolfo appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling and
acquitted him on the criminal case, declaring that the interviews were impressed with
public interest thus covered by the rule on privileged communication. As a public

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Emphasis ours)

Muoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the

if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file it

prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to

separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muoz acquittal of the

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine

crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because Muoz utterance

if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

of the libelous remarks remains undisputed.

(Emphasis ours)

We reject Muoz claim. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC

If, as Muoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction

applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged,

of the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, then Section 2, Rule

regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action.

120 of the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be no need for the

Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended

judgment of the acquittal to determine whether the act or omission from which the

party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its

civil liability may arise did not exist. The Rules precisely require the judgment to

title When separate civil action is suspended. Despite this wording, the last

declare if there remains a basis to hold the accused civilly liable despite acquittal so

paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. This is based

that the offended party may avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil

on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that [e]very person criminally liable for

liability ex delicto.

a felony is also civilly liable. Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one
criminal and one civil.

In Ching v. Nicdao and CA, the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a
party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the

Reflecting this policy, our procedural rules provide for two modes by which civil

judgment:

liability ex delicto may be enforced: (1) through a civil action that is deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal action; (2) through a civil action that is filed
separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon reservation of the right to
file it separately in the criminal action. The offended party may also choose to waive
the civil action. This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect
its nature, as may be apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 120 of the ROC, which states:
Section 2. Contents of the judgment. x x x

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the
civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the
civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party,
may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal

by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he

proved that the imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable

did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action

motive.

prior to the criminal action. (Emphasis ours)

There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance,
Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action because

Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:

the latter would only add to our clogged dockets.

(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the

legal, moral or social duty; and

extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from
the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there
is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances
when, notwithstanding the accuseds acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil
liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus now proceed
to determine if Cos claim falls under any of these three situations.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.

(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v.
CA, we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of
the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged.
In Guingguing v. CA, we ruled that the remarks directed against a public figure are
likewise privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged
communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were
made or published with actual malice or malice in fact the knowledge that the

The CA has acquitted Muoz of libel because his statement is a privileged

statement is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. In other

communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the

words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that privileged communication

crime. The law presumes that every imputation is malicious; this is referred to as

has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in law and

malice in law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that

consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.

the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of

the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muoz statements

#3 PEOPLE V DESMOND

were fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution
has the burden of proving that Muoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that
the prosecution failed in this respect.

#4 DALURAYA VS OLIVAR

Co assails the CAs ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of the
CAs factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the present
petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with
respect to factual matters, and without violating Muoz right against double jeopardy
given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on a question of fact.

#5 Warrantless Arrest: Peeking Inside Partially

Opened Door Not Valid Ground For Warrantless
Arrest And Search

In light of the privileged nature of Muoz statements and the failure of the
prosecution to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muoz.

At around 4:45 A.M. of February 11, 2004, police officers Gregorio and Laurence

Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be

while onboard a patrol car, saw two unidentified men rush out of a house in David St.,

pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise

Pasay City. Sensing something amiss, the police officers approached the house and

that exists.

peeked inside the partially opened door, where they saw George holding an

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355 dated January 31, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.

improvised tooter and a pink lighter, and beside him, his live-in partner, Corazon.
Because of this, they entered the house, and arrested George and Corazon. A search of
the immediate surroundings revealed a wooden box containing improvised tooter,
scoop 10 sachets of suspected shabu, and strips of aluminium oil. Because of they,

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 181986, December 04, 2013, ELIZALDE S. CO,

they were charged with illegal possession of drugs paraphernalia. Only George

PETITIONER, VS. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR., RESPONDENT

appealed the decision rendered by the RTC convicting him as charged, since Corazon
jumped bail. The Court of Appeals denied his appeal, hence he elevated his case to

#2 RAFAEL COSCOLLUELAS VS SB

the Supreme Court. Both lower courts justified the conviction of George, citing his
arrest was a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court:

The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of

crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the

valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz

jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and

through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid

a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers

warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for

instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for

from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially

shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,

opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.

ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of

Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution,
had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug

Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:

THE COURT:

paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even
assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace

Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the
open door, how was the door open?Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A It was partially open Your Honor.

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act

Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a

only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?

A We pushed the door, Your Honor.

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
xxxx

authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the abovementioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia

Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and
peeped inside it, as a police officer?
A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may

that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible,
having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice
but to acquit the accused.

Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you
can search the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by
itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.

Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before

Accused acquitted.

searching the interior of the house?

A Yes, Your Honor.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013, GEORGE

ANTIQUERA Y CODES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to
investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was
something wrong inside the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

#6 Declaration Of Voidness Of Second Marriage

Not Ground For Dismissal Of Bigamy

Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep
through its opening because you did not know what was happening inside?
A Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)

Shirley filed a case for bigamy against James Walter, alleging that he
contracted marriage with her on December 8, 1999 despite the

subsistence of a previous and lawful marriage with one Karla. James

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has

Walter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, alleging that there is a

been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in

pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage filed by

case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be

Karla before the RTC of Antipolo, which if declared void would exculpate

presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second

him from the charge of bigamy. Thus, the arraignment and pre-trial of

or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage

James Walter was reset. In the meantime, the RTC of Antipolo declared the

has all the essential requisites for validity.

second marriage between James and Shirley void. Because of this, James
Walter filed a Motion to Dismiss the bigamy case, on the ground that the
second marriage had been declared void. The RTC granted the motion,

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

ruling that the declaration by the RTC of Antipolo of the voidness of the

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private

second marriage between James and Shirley meant that there was no

respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence

more bigamy to speak of. On petition for certiorari before the Court of

of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili

Appeals, the latter reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and remanded

contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself

the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Thus, James elevated the case

declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner

to the Supreme Court. The main issue for consideration being that if a

and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the

second marriage is declared void, will the bigamy case be dismissed?

second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the

The Supreme Court:

We rule in the negative.

prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of

declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first

bigamy as follows:

marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon

In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy

any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before

ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the

the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent

subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially

spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment

declared null and void, viz.:

rendered in the proper proceedings.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was

the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being

immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already

prosecuted for bigamy.

been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the

prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a

offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,

petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that

liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear

action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted.

he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the

finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage
does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013, JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI,

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be

#7.Private Prosecutor May Participate In Criminal Case

deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even

Even If No Civil Liability Exists In Crime

if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before

Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. by virtue of a

the first marriage was annulled.

Secretarys Certificate issued by Virginia Lee, for and in behalf of CHI, filed a

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned

petition for issuance of an owners duplicate certificate of title of TCT No. 232238,

case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,

covering a property owned by CHI. Despite opposition by Chua Pue Chin Lee, her
sister, who alleged that as Corporate Treasurer of Chi, she has possession of important
documents of the Corporation, including the duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238, the
RTC of Manila granted the petition and directed the Registrar of Deeds of Manila to
issue a new TCT. Chula filed an Omnibus motion to recall the order granting the

and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the

petition, alleging that she has possession of TCT No. 232238; because of this the RTC

marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before

recalled the order. Chua Lee also filed a case for perjury against Paul Lee because of
the alleged perjurious statements made in the Petition as well as his testimony in court

regarding the loss of TCT 232238, which she alleged Paul Lee did to mortgage the

civilly liable. Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a

property to Planters Bank, even though there is an intra-corporate controversy

person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he

between him and his siblings, including Chua. The Office of the City Prosecutor then

lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the

filed an Information for perjury against Paul Lee before the Metropolitan Trial Court

individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property

of Manila. After Atty. Augusto Macam, private prosecutor under the control of the

was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

public prosecutor, presented the first witness, Atty. Roland Viesca Jr of the Registry
of Deeds, Manila, the accused thru counsel, moved in open court that Atty. Macam be
excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a public offence, to which
Atty. Macam vehemently objected. After allowing the parties to file their respective
written memoranda in support of their positions, the MeTC denied the Omnibus
Motion filed by the accused, where he principally raised his objection on the
appearance of the private prosecutor on the ground that perjury is a crime against
public interest; since there being no allegation of damage to private interest, hence on

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,

provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

private prosecutor is needed. According to the MeTC, citing that the rules do not
distinguish between public and private crimes when it comes to participation of

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

private prosecutors; since the private offended party did not waive her civil action or
reserved her right to institute a separate civil action, then the private prosecutor may
participate, under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. His motion for
reconsideration denied, Paul Lee elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which
also denied it, citing such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability
attaches to a crime. Hence, Paul Lee went right up to the Supreme Court to question
the propriety of allowing a private prosecutor to intervene in a case for perjury, a
crime against public interest.
The Supreme Court:Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that [e]very person criminally liable x x x is also

For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private
prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to
Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
defines an offended party as the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, this Court rejected

petitioners theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public

only averted by respondents timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the

offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of

RTC.

the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the
commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly
liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being
tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,
cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is
erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by

In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, we also held that

counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has
asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended
party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts
complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in
the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive
law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the
demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities.
Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The
interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. (Emphasis supplied.)In this
case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering
CHIs property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without
doubt, injurious to respondents personal credibility and reputation insofar as her
faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and
Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable
as the court-ordered issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was

right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole
purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.

In Chua v. Court of Appeals, as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private

Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from

respondent who is also the corporations Treasurer, four counts of falsification of

crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly

public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholders Meeting) was instituted by the

liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society

City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondents testimony

in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated;

was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private

and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or

prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the

property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act

case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private

or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives

prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the

rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to

latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the

another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and

criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his

the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by

petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.

reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The

When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private
prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of
the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of
the offense.

indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil
liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel
in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that, [w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC

institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the

committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude

offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of

Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.

the criminal action.

Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did not

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013, LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A.
PAUL LEE, PETITIONER, VS. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, RESPONDENT.

establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners
alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were
proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were
supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without

#8 Arraignment: Courts Should Conduct Searching

basis.

Inquiry Into Voluntariness And Full Comprehension

When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken

Of Plea Of Guilt By Accused.

of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled
to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does
not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be
allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the
offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through
the private prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

EN BANC, G.R. No. 135053, March 06, 2002, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

(2) The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of

APPELLEE VS. BENJAMIN GALVEZ, APPELLANT.

the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and

Benjamin was charged with Rape by her own daughter, AAA, allegedly committed on
the third week of april, 1997. During his arriagnment, where the charges for 10 counts

(3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and

of rape where read to him in a language he understood, assisted by Atty. Renato

allow him to do so if he desires.

Mercado, he pleaded not guilty to the charges. However, during the hearing on May
14, 1998, Benjamin, this time assisted by Atty. Ruby Rosa Espino, changed his plea
from not guilty to guilty, and an inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension

Moreover, as prescribed in Aranzado, the searching inquiry to be conducted by the

trial court should consist of the following:

of his plea was conducted by the trial court. Even so, the trial court proceeded to hear

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of

evidence from the offended party. Benjamin did not file evidence in his behalf, thus

the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial

the trial court convicted him of Rape, thus automatic appeal was resorted to the court.

and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and

In his brief, Benjamin assails the failure of the trial court in assuring the safeguards

interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the

set forth under Rule 116 of the Rules off Court, particularly on his plea of guilt.

possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either

The Supreme Court:

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case
involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room
for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea.
In People v. Aranzado, the Court, citing Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, set
the following guidelines for receiving a plea of guilt in a case involving a capital
offense:
(1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea;

by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the acused [of] the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty

(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against

under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently

him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him

indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice

to supply missing details of significance.

or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he

admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions.

Appellants re-arraignment on May 14, 1999 miserably fell short of these guidelines,
as shown by the pertinent portion of the transcript of stenographic notes, which we
quote hereunder:
PROS. CASTILLO: By way of dialogue with the defense counsel the accused is
willing to enter a plea of guilty for the ten (10) counts of rape, your Honor.

COURT: Why dont you arraign him? Alright, the previous plea of not guilty is now
withdrawn to give way to the plea of guilty by the accused for 10 counts of rape but
as the Court had already observed we have to conduct the re-arraignment of this case.
Will you please arraign him.

(The accused was arraigned by reading to him the Information in Ilocano dialect
which the accused speaks and understands.)

INTERPRETER: The accused pleaded guilty.

COURT: I would like to ask the accused if he understands from his counsel, the

It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge did not conduct a searching inquiry

circumstances in this case because the victim here is his own daughter and she is

into the voluntariness of appellants plea of guilt and full comprehension thereof. He

below 18 years of age. In accordance with the heinous offense law, the Court will

asked no questions on the subjects mentioned in Aranzado. His purported compliance

have to impose on him the penalty of death. Is this clear to the accused? At any rate

with Alicando was more like a monologue, or a warning at best, rather than a

we will conduct a trial to find out if there is sufficient evidence to convict you so that

searching inquiry. He did not inquire into appellants personality profile age,

your rights will be protected you are given a chance to prove your innocence latter to

socio-economic status or educational background. His Honor did not even require an

refute the evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

answer to his question on whether appellant realized that the death penalty would
result from the latters plea. No response from appellant was given or recorded.
Moreover, there is no showing that the lawyer explained to appellant the
consequences of the latters plea probable conviction and death sentence. Equally
important, the trial judge should have asked why the plea of appellant was changed.
The former obtained none of the information required in Aranzado. Hence, there is
no basis to conclude that the latter voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty to the
charges against him.
In Bello, the Court remarked that there were cases when the accused would plead
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or because of promises from the authorities or
parties that an expression of remorse would result in a lighter penalty.
Where the punishment to be inflicted is death, it is not enough that the information be
read to the accused or even translated into the dialect they speak. This is because the
implementation of such penalty is irrevocable, and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The trial court must avoid improvident
pleas of guilt, since the accused might be admitting their guilt and thus forfeiting their
lives and liberties without having fully understood the meaning, significance or
consequences of their pleas.

What is apparent here is that appellant was not properly advised by his counsel.
InPeople v. Sevilleno, the Court remanded the case for re-arraignment of the accused
who had been charged with the rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl, because his

#9 Rights Of The Accused: Right To Counsel

Mandatory Only In Custodial Investigation

counsel had declined to present evidence for his client, banking on the mitigating
circumstance of the plea of guilt. This Court clarified that under no circumstance
would an admission of guilt in that case affect or reduce the death sentence because it
was a single indivisible penalty which is applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attending the crime.

Olivia was a teller at the Prudential Bank branch of Angeles City, the
only one assigned to handle dollar deposits and withdrawals. An
internal spot-audit team conducted by Virgilio inventoried the cash

In the instant case, the Court also notes that guilty was not the original plea of

accountabilities of the branch. Olivia was short by $10,000.00; she

appellant; hence, careful effort should have been exerted by the court below to inquire

only had US5,040.52, when she should have $15,040.52. When

into why he changed his plea. In addition, he refused to present evidence in his

asked to explain, she averred that a withdrawal was made on

defense. This should have again prompted the trial judge to probe more deeply,

December 29, 1006 after the cut-off time, evidenced by a

following the guidelines in Aranzado.

withdrawal memo which she showed to Virgilio; this withdrawal

A plea of guilt is improvidently accepted where no effort is made to explain to the

accused that, in a case involving a capital offense, such plea may result in the
imposition of the death penalty. The same is true when the requirements in Aranzado
are not satisfied. Recently, in People v. Bernas, the Court set aside a death sentence
and remanded the case to the trial court, because the Aranzado guidelines on how to
conduct a searching inquiry had not been followed.

should be treated as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996. The account

belonged to Adoracion Tayag and her co-signatory, Apolinario Tayag.
This withdrawal memo when shown to the branch cashier, Noel, did
not contain the required signature of two officers, hence Noel asked
the nature of this withdrawal. Olivia explained that Apolnario
instructed her to withdraw $10,000.00 from his account thru his
driver. Although the memo was supposed to be made on January 3,

Case remanded to the trial court for re-arraignment and further proceedings.

the memo itself was dated January 2. Noel then instructed her to

EN BANC, G.R. No. 135053, March 06, 2002, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

post the corresponding memo in the corresponding ledger and bring

APPELLEE VS. BENJAMIN GALVEZ, APPELLANT.

the memo back to him so he and the branch manager, Edgardo.

Virigilio, meanwhile checked the account ledger of Apolinario and
Adoracion, where he found out that there is a hold jacket,

indicating that no withdrawal should be made to the account so as

not to reduce its balance below $35,000.00. The withdrawal reduced
its balance to $26,077.51. The account ledger also indicated a
deposit of $10,000.00 on January 2, 1996. When he compared the
signatures in the withdrawal slip to the signature card, he noticed a
big difference which he reported to the branch manager.

The bank then filed a case for Qualified Theft against Olivia. After
the prosecution rested its case, Olivia filed a Demurrer To Evidence
And Motion To Defer Defense Evidence, on the ground that the
prosecution evidence failed to prove its case. The RTC denied the
motion filed by Olivia, and proceeded to rule on the case without
giving her the opportunity to present her evidence, holding that the
Demurrer to Evidence was filed without leave of court, hence, she is

When Edgardo required her to explain, Olivia reiterated that the

withdrawal was made on December 29, 1996 after the cut-off time.
Another cash count conducted by Virgilio for that period revealed
that Olivia should have a cash balance of $21,778.86; her actual
cash count revealed she only had $11,778.86 (Olivia used the
money withdrawn from the account of Apolinario, and replenished it
with her cash accountability). Olivia eventually broke down and told
Edgardo she will explain everything to the bank president.
Apolinario denied affixing the signature on the withdrawal slip.

In a handwritten letter, Olivia explained that the $10,000.00 cash

shortage, and another P2.2 Million shortage was taken by her. She
gave it to a man who approached her at the counter who
threatened her and her family. They allegedly approached her. She
then gave the cash to the man. Despite this, she did not report the
matter to the bank officers.

considered to have waived her presentation of evidence.

The RTC convicted her, affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals which

Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she

increased the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua.

wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial

One of the issues she presented for consideration in her appeal to the Supreme court
was that the handwritten letter she executed should not have been admitted in
evidence, as the same was made without counsel, hence, in the nature of an extrajudicial confession made without counsel and inadmissible in evidence.
The Supreme Court:
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being

investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better
appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial
investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities of the Government.
The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained and under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent
of insulating the latter from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall

admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible

have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and

against her. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the

independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the

reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is

services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived

the admitters fault if the admission does not. By virtue of its being made by the party

except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate

Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not expressly

the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,

acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30, Rule

incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging

guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.

To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to any person under

#10. Criminal Procedure: Bail

investigation for the commission of an offense. The phrase does not cover all kinds
of investigations, but contemplates only a situation wherein a person is already in

Jose Antonio Leviste was originally charged with Murder before the

custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in

Regional Trial Court of Makati City. He was convicted of the crime of

any significant way of his liberty. The situation of the accused was not similar to

Homicide, hence he appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.

that of a person already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if

Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail

she is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty.

pending appeal, citing his advanced age and minimum flight risk.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA
CRISTOBAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The Court of Appeals denied his petiton, hence he filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court. In his brief, petitioner assails
the denial of his application for bail, citing that none of the
conditions in Section 5 (3) of Rule 114 are present in his case,; his
theory is that conviction for a crime with an imposable penalty of
more than 6 years, when not one of the conditions imposed in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are present, entitles him to
bail as a matter of right.

The Supreme Court:

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 5. Bail,

when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing

of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid

court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense

justification;

from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be

filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed
to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal
under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding

six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or

has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on

pardon;

bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
(emphasis supplied)
xxx
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission
of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal
confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or
other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the
commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in
remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if

summarized in the following rules:

none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is

xxx

xxx

xxx

present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for
bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment

paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the

denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by

circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and

and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment

stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in

circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny

Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be

or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending

granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)

appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law,

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal

is of the same thinking:

should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the
other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then

allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all

bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under

relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section

paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis

5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may

supplied)

either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the

In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the

appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily

third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty

focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances

imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For

that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of

petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to

those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a

limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of the

finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in

five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any

the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent

such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted

sound discretion approach.

pending appeal.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different
situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead,
petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said
provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending
appeal.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body
whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists.
This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion
of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether
any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
xxx
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency
but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending

capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial

appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by

Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending

death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary.

appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts
for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter
of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter
of post-conviction grant of bail.

where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly

perpetua.

identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal
under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated
the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No. 1294. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. Under
the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bailnegating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such
that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is
prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending

appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail

appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original

pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of

constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. While this is of course not

any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a

to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal

rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant

is no different from that in other democratic societies.

circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is present?

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail
pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly
with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution
and only for strong reasons. In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution
that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted
accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5.
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent,
and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the
presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted,
and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another
point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is
so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to
escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the
Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals (promulgated in 2001 when the present
rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise
discretion.

A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x
(emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial
courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting
the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays
often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the
post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be
more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.

G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

LEVISTE VS CA
BAIL- when it is a matter of right or a matter of discretion.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE,

2010
Petitioner,
- versus -

THE COURT OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 189122- March 17,

Respondents.

Whether or not bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court filed by
an appellant pending appeal?

Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as

RULING:
NO. Absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 means that a less stringent approach in granting bail only subject to the
discretion of the court to grant bail.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

maximum.
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed
an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life

imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice
to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied

(a)

That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual

delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the

Issue:

circumstance of reiteration;

(b)

That he has previously escaped from legal

other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of

confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of

discretion (Sec. 5);

his bail without a valid justification;

f.

After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing

a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20

(c)

years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other

That he committed the offense while under

similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted

probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d)

That the circumstances of his case indicate the

probability of flight if released on bail; or

by said court (Sec. 5); x x x1[24] (emphasis supplied)

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty
imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The
first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime

(e)

That there is undue risk that he may commit

another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal

confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to

an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
xxx

xxx
e.

other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

xxx

After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a

penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years

is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the

114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An

appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily

application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating2[26]

focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances

circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other

that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of

words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said

those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a

circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny
or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may
either allow or disallow bail.
2

less stringent sound discretion approach.