Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 105, Quezon City, convicting appellant in Criminal Cases No.
Q-11867 and No. Q-11868.
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused Farhad Hatani y Abolhassan,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
practice of medicine in violation of R.A. 2382
otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959
(Secs. 8, 10) penalized by Section 28 thereof with
"a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor
more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, or by
imprisonment of not less than one year nor more
than five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court; and
considering the circumstances of the case and the
ignominy caused by him to his two teen-aged,
female, then unmarried victims, this Court
exercising its discretion granted under said
Section 28 of the law, hereby SENTENCES said
accused FARHAD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN to
pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
AND to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years; and
to pay the costs.
This Court further recommends that after service
of his sentence the accused be deported as
undesirable alien (Rollo, p. 35).
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused, FARHAD HATANI y
In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and
Marita and was brought to appellant's house. Again, Precila was given
an injection which caused her to sleep. When she awoke, she realized
that she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was
seated on the bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila
called for her mother and tried to get up. Appellant, however, punched
her on the chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a pillow on her
face and injected her again, causing her to fall asleep.
When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with
her. He was naked and fondling her private parts. The pain all over her
body lingered. When Precila touched her private parts, she saw blood
stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak.
Appellant gave her another injection rendering her unconscious.
When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her
mother was crying. Precila remained dizzy, with throbbing pains all
over her body. When talked to, she was incoherent.
Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their
conversation, appellant would occasionally enter the room but he
never joined their discussion.
Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing
only his pajama pants, slept on the floor at the opposite end of the
room.
him. The pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G" - "G-8'"
undeniably reveal several medical equipment used by practicing
physicians.
Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct
evidence of rape, it concluded that circumstantial evidence indicate
that rape was consummated by appellant considering the following:
1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila,
taken on July 8, 1979 at 10:25 in the morning or
less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6,
1979 found "hymen with deep, healing lacerations
at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"; thus indicating that
the lacerations were recent as they are in the
process of healing; (Exh. "A-1")
2. The above undeniable findings of the expert
confirms the statement of the victim, a young girl
of 16 or 17 years of age, that when she held
private parts which were painful then, she noticed
blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5).
The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault.
(People vs. Ocampo, L-47335, Aug. 13, 1986)
3. In the two short waking moments of the victim
she noticed she was naked and beside her on the
same bed was the accused, also naked. (tsn.
Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 3-5)
4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the
prime of youth, and the unconscious girl beside
him was just 16 or 17 years of age, thus in the full
bloom of womanhood. The sexual excitement on
the part of the accused was therefore exceedingly
great.
5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room
of the accused that early morning of July 7, 1979
she saw her daughter and the accused on the
same bed and both naked. (tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27,
1981, p. 9)
6. The medico-legal found several needle
puncture marks on the arms and buttocks of
Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming Precila's
testimony that she had been injected by the
accused, rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma,
Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5; tsn., Nenita, May 21, 1984,
pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-30).
7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin
state physically." (Exh; "A-i")
8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e.
morning of July 8, 1979, the victim was found to
be "incoherent." (Exh. A) after effect of the
injections or drugs.
9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the
Borjas and Frontreras (sic) were "comadres" and
neighbors. There is no enmity between and
among them.
THIRD DIVISION
With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant
presented inconsistent claims. On one hand, he claims that the
drugs and other paraphernalia were planted by the raiding team; while
on the other hand, he claims that these were seized without any
warrant.
If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his
handwriting on the prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A
Pr
V
PE
- versus -
5.
2.
Medico-legal Report;
3.
4.
A Yes, sir.
Q And for the record, what does
ECA stands (sic) for?
WITNESS:
The Facts
what
PROS. CATRAL:
For purposes of identification, may we
have the two sachets marked as BB be
marked as Exhibit M-1 and M-2 which
are the subject for sale and the other five
other sachets with marking R be marked
as M-3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to constitute the
charge for possession.
COURT:
Mark it. [28]
From the foregoing circumstances, it is unmistakable that there is
no break in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs from the time
that it came to the possession of PO2 Antolin to the point when such items
were presented and identified during trial. Clearly, there is no doubt that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drug were properly
preserved, in compliance with what the law requires.
WHEREFORE, the June 5, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-No. 02734 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
"JAO 2" - 0.02 gram
G.R. No. 194721
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
the former. Upon receipt, PO1 Mendoza examined the contents thereof
and asked the Accused-Appellant, "Panalo to ha?" The AccusedAppellant replied with "Ako pa! Amin ang pinakamagandang bato dito."
When PO1 Mendoza was certain that the plastic sachet
contained shabu, he lit a cigarette, a pre-arranged signal, and
motioned to his team members to arrest the Accused-Appellant. PO1
Mendoza subsequently introduced himself as a police officer and
arrested the latter. A few seconds later, his other team members
arrived. A procedural body search was conducted resulting in the
discovery of a small Mercury Drug plastic bag containing seventeen
(17) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with
suspected shabu, the marked money, and several Peso bills of
different denominations. The confiscated items were immediately
marked, photographed, and inventoried at the place of arrest and in
the presence of Brgy. Capt. Gatchalian. The photographs of the seized
items were taken by PO3 Lique. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant
was brought to the Makati Police Station for further investigation.
Subsequently, the seized plastic sachets were brought to the Crime
Laboratory to determine the presence of shabu. The results thereof
showed that the substances therein were positive
for Methylamphetamine,Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.13
The version of the defense, on the other hand, consisted of the sole
testimony of the accused, to wit:
The Accused-Appellant testified that, on April 8, 2006, at around 3:00
oclock in the afternoon, he was watching a game at the basketball
court in Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, when
several men arrived and asked him if he knew the whereabouts of a
certain Alvin. When he could not give any information, they brought
him to the Makati Police Station. It was only after he was detained that
he learned that charges were being filed against him for the sale and
possession of dangerous drugs.14
After trial, the court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of both crimes.15 The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 28
July 2008 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
xxxx
On April 8, 2006, PO1 Mendoza x x x received a telephone call from an
informant that a certain Jao Mapa (later identified as the AccusedAppellant) was selling prohibited narcotics at Laperal Compound,
Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City. Immediately, a briefing for a buy-bust
operation was conducted. The buy-bust team prepared Three Hundred
Pesos (PhP 300.00) worth of marked money and designated PO1
Mendoza as the poseur-buyer. The other members of the team were
PO2 Lique, PO1 Randy Santos, and PO1 Voltaire Esquerra. The team
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency before
proceeding to the target area.
At around 9:15 oclock in the evening of the same day, the team
proceeded to the basketball court inside Laperal Compound where the
Accused-Appellant was sighted. Once inside, PO1 Mendoza and the
informant, with the help of sufficient lights coming from the nearby
shanties and sari-sari stores, saw a man wearing a camouflage short
pants and a dark t-shirt casually standing beside one of the basketball
courts post while talking to two (2) men. The informant called the
attention of the Accused-Appellant and introduced PO1 Mendoza to
the latter as a buyer intending to purchase Three Hundred Pesos
(PhP 300.00) worth of shabu. PO1 Mendoza then handed the marked
money to the Accused-Appellant who, in turn, took from his right
pocket a small plastic sachet allegedly containing shabu and gave it to
the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing.18 And, to secure conviction, it is material to
establish that the transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to
the court the corpus delicti as evidence.19
Q: So you knew all along that you will be called to act as the witness
when the inventory would be prepared?
SECOND DIVISION
Q: When you reached the place where the incident happened, was the
inventory sheet already accomplished wherein the items allegedly
seized from the accused were listed?
A: Not yet, when I arrived, thats the time they prepared the inventory
sheet, so, when I arrived, then they started to write the
items.29 (Emphasis supplied)
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 1590-B convicting
appellant Domingo Sabardan of serious illegal detention with rape,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering the appellant to indemnify the private complainant, Richelle
Banluta, the sum of P50,000.00.
The Information2 against the appellant reads:
That about and during the period beginning the 15th day of
September 1991, to the 30th day of September 1991, in the
Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and by force and intimidation, detain and keep lock one
Richelle Banluta, a girl twelve (12) years of age in his rented
apartment at No. 5 Linaluz St., SCH-Subdivision-Tayuman,
Binangonan, Rizal, from September 15 to September 30,
1991, or a period of fifteen (15) days, under restraint and
against the will of said Richelle Banluta, and said accused
during said period of detention did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge of the
complainant Richelle Banluta while she is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug which he
administered to her, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on June 9, 1992, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution
Richelle Banluta was born on August 10, 1979. When she was about
four (4) years old, Nimfa Banluta, a beach resort owner, allowed
Richelle to stay in their house and considered her as a natural
daughter. Nimfa had Richelle enrolled in the elementary school using
her surname, "Banluta."
Sometime in 1990, the Banluta family transferred their residence to No.
5, Linaluz Street, San Carlos Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan,
Rizal. Opposite their house was that of Elizabeth de Luna. Another
neighbor of the Banluta family was the appellant, then fifty-year-old
Domingo Sabardan, a cathecist who resided in a two-storey apartment
about fifteen meters away from the Banluta residence. The appellant
came to meet Richelle as he frequented the Banluta house and
befriended Rico Banluta, Nimfas twenty- one-year-old son.
At about 10:00 p.m. on September 15, 1991, Nimfa berated Richelle
for playing with the diaper of her niece. Richelle, who was then a little
more than twelve years old, placed some underwear, shorts, long
pants, and four shirts in her school bag and surreptitiously left the
house. She passed by the appellants apartment while the latter was
on his way out to throw garbage. The appellant inquired where she
was going, and Richelle replied that she was earlier berated by her
mother and was leaving the house. The appellant invited Richelle to
his apartment, and to spend the night therein. Richelle agreed. She felt
happy, thinking that she was in good hands.3 Besides, she had
nowhere to go.4
along with Rico and Val, they proceeded to the appellants apartment.
They saw that it was locked from the outside with three padlocks.
Instead of destroying the padlocks, the policemen asked Rico and the
latters friends to climb over the wall. Toto and Binoy, who were friends
of Rico, climbed the wall, and managed to extricate Richelle from the
second floor of the apartment through the window, after removing the
jalousies.15 The appellant was not in the house at that time.
Richelle was, thereafter, brought to the police station for investigation.
There, she executed a written sworn statement dated October 2, 1991.
She also signed a criminal complaint charging the appellant of serious
illegal detention with rape.16
Dr. Jesusa O. Nieves, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, conducted a physical and medical examination on
the private complainant on October 3, 1991. She prepared a MedicoLegal Report,17 with the following findings:
Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant contends that
he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him because he was charged of detaining and
raping the private complainant in his apartment at No. 5 Linaluz Street,
San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal.
However, the prosecutions evidence shows that she was detained and
raped at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision,
Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Furthermore, the appellant asserts that
under the allegations of the Information, the private complainant was
raped when she was "deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious by
reason of a drug" which the appellant supposedly administered to her.
The prosecution, however, failed to adduce evidence that he
administered any drug to the private complainant before she was
raped.25 If this were true, Richelle could not have known that she was
raped by the appellant since she testified that she felt dizzy and lost
consciousness after drinking beer and juice.
The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that Richelle
was illegally detained by the appellant in his apartment, and that he
forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The evidence on
record, the appellant insists, shows that Richelle agreed to stay with
him in his apartment after leaving their house and consented to having
sexual intercourse with him. From the time Richelle arrived at his
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application
of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for
gram-negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.
The case for the prosecution was not enfeebled by its failure to adduce
in evidence the substance or drug which the appellant forced Richelle
to drink and which made her dizzy and unconscious, or its failure to
present an expert witness to testify on the presence of any sedative in
the beer and juice which Richelle was made to drink.
First. The drug or substance in question is only corroborative to
Richelles testimony that she became dizzy and unconscious when the
appellant forced her to drink beer and juice. There can be no other
conclusion than that the appellant mixed a sedative in the beverage
which he forced Richelle to drink. It must be stressed that Richelle was
then barely twelve years old. The alcoholic content of the beer must
have caused her to feel dizzy and lose consciousness. She was
rendered to such stupor, weakness of body and mind as to prevent
effectual resistance and preclude the possibility of consent.
Second. In People vs. Del Rosario,27 we held that a test to determine
the presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks given to a victim is
not an indispensable element in the prosecution for rape:
True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any
sedative or drug in the drinks given to the victims which caused them
to lose momentary control of their faculties. But this is of little
consequence as the same is not an indispensable element in the
prosecution for rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices that the
victim was found to have been unconscious at the time the offender
had carnal knowledge of her.28
Richelle testified that during the fourth and fifth days of her captivity,
before she was rescued on September 30, 1991, the appellant forced
her to drink beer or juice, threatening to kill her if she refused. Despite
her resistance, the appellant succeeded in forcing her to drink the
beverage. Richelle felt dizzy and unconscious as a consequence, and
when she came to, found herself completely naked with the appellant
beside her who was also completely nude.29
Q On the 5th day when you wake (sic) up in the sofa was
your vagina bleeding?
A Yes, sir.
A None, sir.
Q On the 4th, on the 5th day that your vagina was bleeding,
Madame witness, is it not a fact that you washed your
vagina?
Q With a soap?
A No, sir.33
The testimony of Richelle, that the appellant succeeded in raping her,
is corroborated by Dr. Jesusa Nieves medical findings that Richelle
was no longer in a virgin state physically and that her hymen had a
deep laceration at seven oclock when she was examined on October
3, 1991.
Q Can you please tell us your findings with regard to the
genital of the victim?
A Upon the examination of the genie layer, the sex organ of
the victim, the only pertinent findings Ive got was the
laceration, a deep healed laceration at the hymen, sir.
Q Madam witness, lets go back to the 4th day that you were
inside the room and that the following day you wake (sic) up
early in the morning nude where the accused was nowhere
in that place, when you wake (sic) up in that morning, what
did you feel in your body?
Q That is (sic) all that you felt, your vagina is (sic) painful, is
it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, there was no blood in your vagina, is it
not?
A There was, sir.
COURT:
Answer.
A Yes, sir.
Witness:
Q What was the state of the virginity of the lady when you
conducted an examination upon her person?
Q In all that occasions you did not box nor kick the accused,
is it not?
A I tried to fight back and I even pulled his hair, sir.37
The appellants contention deserves scant consideration. As gleaned
from Richelles testimony, she had been shouting and pleading to the
appellant everyday to stop the lascivious acts and the sexual advances
on her. She resolutely fought back and even pulled the appellants hair.
In fine, when the appellant subjected Richelle to his bestial desires,
Richelle resisted, to no avail. If, as claimed by the appellant, Richelle
had consented to having sexual intercourse with him from September
16, 1991 to September 30, 1991, there would no longer have been a
need for him to force her to drink beer and juice to render her dizzy
and unconscious.
The testimony of Richelle should not be considered in its truncated
parts but in its entirety. The meaning of the words in a portion of the
testimony of a witness should be considered, taking into account the
entirety of the latters testimony. Besides, bearing in mind the chastity
and bashfulness of a typical Filipina, especially one in her tender
years, it is highly inconceivable for Richelle, a young girl, to consent to
sexual acts with the appellant. Richelle was barely in her teens when
the harrowing experience took place. We find it deviant for a twelveyear-old nave and unsophisticated grade school student to be
consenting to sexual intercourse with the appellant. Richelles
unwaivering sincerity and candor while testifying in court convinces us
that she was constrained by her desire to seek justice for the bestial
act committed upon her person.38 In fact, Richelle cried while recalling
the sexual assaults on her.
The appellant harped on his being a catechist of good moral character
to escape conviction. This hardly justifies the conclusion that he is
innocent of the crime charged. Indeed, religiosity is not always a badge
of good conduct and faith is no guarantee against any sexual
perversion. In the case of People vs. Diopita,39 this Court pronounced
that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because he is of
good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the
instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of the
appellants good moral character cannot prevail.
The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his
apartment; hence, he cannot be convicted of serious illegal detention.
We agree with the appellants assertion that he is not guilty of serious
illegal detention, but we do not agree that Richelle consented to stay in
his apartment from September 17, 1991 until she was rescued on
September 30, 1991. Understandably, Richelle did not leave the
appellants apartment on September 30, 1991. She had just
surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had nowhere to
go. She believed, at that time, that she was safe with the appellant,
who was their neighbor and her brothers friend. However, when the
appellant sat on her bed in the evening of the same day, completely
naked, Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving
only when the appellant warned her that her mother, Nimfa, would
berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning Richelle
of what to expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in
her mind to force her to remain in his apartment. Richelle should have
left the apartment and returned home that day, and contend with her
mothers anger for leaving their house and sleeping in the appellants
apartment. However, Richelle, then barely twelve years old and a mere
grade six pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like an adult
would. She could not have foreseen the appellants evil intent of raping
her. Moreover, even if she wanted to leave the appellants apartment,
she could not do so because the appellant did not allow her to leave.
Frustrated in his first attempt, the appellant was determined to deflower
Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on the fourth day of
Richelles stay in the appellants apartment, the appellant forced her to
drink beer which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her
unconscious. The appellant forthwith raped her.
In light of the evidence on record, the original and primordial intention
of the appellant in keeping Richelle in his apartment was to rape her
and not to deprive her of her liberty. Hence, the appellant is guilty only
of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and
not of the complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape under
Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code.40 Hence, the
trial court correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua.
Richelle could not have escaped from the appellants apartment during
her stay therein from September 17, 1991 until September 30, 1991,
because the appellant locked the door from the outside whenever he
would go out. Richelle could move around the house, but the windows
on the ground and second floors had grills with smoked
glass.41 Richelle tried to open the windows, but she could not.
We, likewise, find it incredible for Richelle to contrive a story of rape
which would expose herself to a lifetime of shame, allow an
examination of her private parts and face public trial.42 A rape victim
who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. The bare denial
of the appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Richelle.
Well-settled is the rule that testimonies of young victims of rape
deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere
fabrication.43 In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of
the victim to be trustworthy and convincing. It has been held in a long
line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are afforded great respect, since it is
the trial judge who observes and monitors the behavior and demeanor
of the witnesses.
April 7, 2014
Finally, the assertion of the appellant that the charge against him was
motivated by Richelles desire to extort money from him is
preposterous. The appellants testimony to prove his claim is hearsay
because he was merely told by his counsel of Richelles desire for
money. The appellant failed to present his counsel to prove his claim.
Besides, the appellant was merely a catechist and had no apparent
sustainable means of livelihood, and only survived through the support
given to him by his siblings. We agree with the findings of the trial
court, viz:
The accused tried to insinuate ulterior or improper motive on
the part of the complainant by alleging that complainant
Richelle charge[d] him with this offense because they are
asking money as told [to] him by Atty. Mendoza.
This allegation is patently unmeritorious and cannot be given
any value by the court, as it was hearsay, and Atty. Mendoza
That on or about the 12th day of July, 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, not being authorized by law
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade deliver
and give away to another, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug weighing 98.51 grams contained in one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet, in violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.4
When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. Upon demurrer
to evidence filed by accused Jenny del Rosario, the trial court rendered
judgment acquitting her of the crime charged considering that her mere
presence in the car used by appellant is not indicative of conspiracy in
the sale of illegal drugs.5
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:
1. The identity of the accused as the persons charged;
2. The jurisdiction of this Court over the persons of the
accused;
3. Police Inspector Ruben Mamaril Apostol Jr. is a member
of a PNP Crime Laboratory Office as of July 12, 2006 and he
is an expert in Forensic Chemistry;
4. That a request for laboratory examination was made for
the specimens allegedly confiscated from the accused;
5. The existence and authenticity of the request for
examination of the seized items and Request for a drug test
on the persons of the accused;
6. That pursuant to the requests for the drug test and
examination of the specimens, the corresponding Regional
Crime Laboratory Office, Calabarzon issued two (2)
chemistry reports, D-267-06 and CRIM[D]T-286-06 that
subject specimens submitted are positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride; and
7. That only a representative sample of the specimens
submitted were examined by the Forensic Chemist which
consist of one (1) transparent sachet containing white
crystalline substance in black and red markings.6
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following factual milieu based on the
testimonies of SPO1 Jaime A. Cariaso (poseur-buyer), SPO1 Norman
Jesus P. Platon and Police Inspector Ruben M. Apostol, Jr. (Forensic
Chemical Officer):
In the morning of July 11, 2006, a Confidential Informant (CI) went to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 4-A
(CALABARZON) at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba City, Laguna. The
CI informed Regional Director P/Supt. Raul L. Bargamento that he was
able to set up a deal with a certain "Aida" who directed him to look for
a buyer of 100 grams of shabu for the price of P360,000.00.7
Immediately, P/Supt. Bargamento instructed Police Chief Inspector
Julius Ceasar V. Ablang to form a team who will conduct a buy-bust
his car where Toto, Ablang and a driver also boarded. He saw SPO1
Cariaso for the first time at the PDEA office. He likewise does not know
SPO1 Platon. At the PDEA office, appellant and his co-accused were
photographed after they were made to change clothes. Appellant
further claimed that PCI Ablang demanded money (P1 million) from
him in exchange for his release. When he was unable to give such
amount, they just detained him and his co-accused. Their urine
samples were taken and submitted for drug testing.17
As to the shabu allegedly seized from him in a buy-bust operation,
appellant vehemently denied having such drug in his possession at the
time. They have already been detained for two days when they were
photographed with the said item. The taking of photographs was done
in the presence of PDEA personnel, barangay officials from Canlubang
and the media.18
On cross-examination, appellant explained that he had talked to his
lawyer regarding the filing of a case against the PDEA officers who
tried to extort money from him but his lawyer suggested they should
first do something about this case. He added that he does not know of
any reason why SPO1 Cariaso is accusing him of selling an illegal
drug.19
Imelda G. Solema testified that on July 12, 2006 between 1:00 to 2:00
in the afternoon, she was inside her house watching TV together with
her seven-year-old son when some persons carrying long firearms
arrived asking if she is "Aida". She shouted to them that she is not
"Aida" but "Im." These armed persons searched her house for shabu
and when she shouted she was pushed into a chair. After ten minutes
of searching, nothing was found in her house. When somebody
knocked on the door, one of the armed men opened it and they saw
appellant. They pulled appellant inside, poked a gun at him, made him
lie down and handcuffed him. She and appellant were brought outside
the house and boarded into the Revo. They waited for the other car for
the armed men to board appellant there. Thereafter, they were brought
to the PDEA office in Canlubang where they were detained. 20
On cross-examination, Imelda Solema admitted that appellant was her
friend even prior to their arrest because he was the "kumpare" of her
sister. Appellant went to her house at the time as they had an
agreement that he will rent one of the units of her apartment.21
The defense presented another witness, Rowena S. Gutierrez, a
siomai/sago vendor who allegedly saw what transpired at the house of
Imelda Solema from a distance of 6-8 meters. She testified that on July
12, 2006 at past 2:00 p.m., a red car immediately parked infront of the
house of Imelda Solema, whom they call "Im." A man and a woman
(whom she later learned were police officers) alighted from said car
and entered the house of Im. Not too long after, a silver car also
arrived which was supposed to park in the area but there were
barangay tanods and so it parked instead in the garage of the mother
of Im. She later learned that the driver of the silver car was appellant.
Appellant went out of his car and proceeded to Ims house. When
appellant was already inside Ims house, two vehicles (Revo and
Crosswind) suddenly arrived and there were armed men who alighted
from said vehicles and entered Ims house. Thereafter, she heard Im
crying as she was being held by a woman and a man. The armed men
forced Im and appellant into the Revo. The persons left were a female
and a child who eventually drove the silver car.22
On cross-examination, the witness admitted that the relatives of her
friend Im asked her to testify because the others who also saw the
incident were afraid to do so.23
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found that the police officers complied with all the
requirements in conducting a buy-bust operation, and that their
testimonies were spontaneous, straightforward and consistent on all
material points. On the other hand, the RTC observed that the
testimonies of defense witnesses do not jibe or are inconsistent with
each other. It held that appellants denial of the crime charged is a
negative self-serving evidence and cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution who,
being police officers, are presumed to have performed their duties in
accordance with law, and who have no reason to fabricate the charges
against the accused.
Convinced that appellant and his co-accused Imelda Solema had
conspired in selling shabu, the RTC noted that it was the latter who
called up the former about the offer of the poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso
to buy shabu. Appellant thus brought the pack of shabu to be sold to
SPO1 Cariaso, unaware of the entrapment plan of the police officers.
As to their warrantless arrest, the RTC held that such arrest was legal
since the accused were caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, a
dangerous drug, to a poseur-buyer who turned out to be a police
officer, in a legitimate buy-bust operation.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused MARCO
ALEJANDRO y PINEDA and IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ
GUILTY of violating Sec. 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 beyond reasonable doubt, they are sentenced to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to suffer all the accessory penalties provided by
law and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00)
each with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Acting Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the subject
"shabu" contained in a transparent plastic sachet which was marked as
Exhibit "J" to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.
Accused MARCO ALEJANDRO y PINEDA is ordered committed to the
National Bilibid Prisons and accused IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ
is ordered committed to the Philippine Correctional for Women until
further orders.
The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused shall be
credited in their favor.
SO ORDERED.24
Ruling of the CA
By Decision dated November 11, 2011, the CA affirmed appellants
conviction. The CA rejected appellants argument that there is no proof
beyond reasonable doubt that a sale transaction of illegal drugs took
place as there appeared to be no prior meeting or conversation
between him and appellant, and hence they could not have agreed on
a price certain for a specified weight of drugs to be sold. It stressed
that from the prosecutions narration of facts, the basis of the meeting
between the poseur-buyer and "Aida" was the arrangement made by
the CI for the sale of shabu; hence there was already an agreement for
the sale of 100 grams of shabu for the amount of P360,000.00.
The CA was likewise convinced that the corpus delicti of the crime has
been established. It held that the failure to strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not
necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from
him inadmissible.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential
elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place;
(2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and
(3) that the buyer and seller were identified. Implicit in all these is the
need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated
drug as evidence.25
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a
buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of
the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.26
The above elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution.
Poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso identified appellant as the seller of shabu.
While the police officers were initially unaware of the identity of
appellant, as their CI had only informed them about appellants coaccused, "Aida" (Imelda Solema) with whom the CI had set up a drug
deal for 100 grams of shabu for the price of P360,000.00, appellants
presence at the buy-bust scene, and his act of delivering the shabu
directly to SPO1 Cariaso clearly identified him as the seller who
himself demanded and received the payment from SPO1 Cariaso after
giving the shabu to the latter.
Appellants arrival at the house of Imelda Solema at the appointed time
of the sale transaction arranged the previous day by the CI, and with
Imelda Solema informing SPO1 Cariaso that they should wait for
appellant after SPO1 Cariaso asked for the shabu, were clear
indications that they acted in coordination and conspiracy to effect the
sale of shabu to a buyer brought by the CI and who turned out to be a
police officer detailed with the PDEA. SPO1 Cariaso placed his initials
and date of buy-bust on the plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance sold to him by appellant. After Forensic Chemical Officer
Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. conducted a chemical analysis of the said
specimen, the result yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The same specimen was
presented in court as evidence after it was properly identified by SPO1
Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be the same substance handed
by appellant to SPO1 Cariaso and examined by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
SPO1 Platon corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Cariaso that they
conducted a buy-bust operation as he positioned himself across the
street 15 meters from the house of Imelda Solema. From his vantage,
SPO1 Platon saw the following transpired: SPOI Cariaso accompanied
by the CI in front of the house of Imelda Solema; SPO1 Cariaso
conversing with Imelda Solema; the subsequent arrival of appellant on
board the Vios; appellant going inside the Revo where SPO1 Cariaso
and Imelda Solema waited for him; appellant getting something from
the Vios and returning to the Revo carrying the said item. Upon
hearing the call from SPO1 Cariasos cellphone, SPO1 Platon
immediately proceeded to the scene and arrested Jenny del Rosario
who was still inside the Vios. At that moment, SPO1 Cariaso had
already arrested appellant and Imelda Solema, confiscated the
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and
recovered the marked money from appellant.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime were established by both the oral
and object evidence presented in court. It is settled that in cases
involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the
seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came
into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand."36
With the unbroken chain of custody duly established by the
prosecution evidence, the CA did not err in giving the same full
credence in contrast to the denial by appellant who failed to
substantiate his allegation of frame-up and extortion. Frame-up, like
alibi, is generally viewed with caution by the Court because it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove. It is a common and standard line of
defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.37 To
substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing
and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired
by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty.
Otherwise, the police officers' testimonies on the operation deserve full
faith and credit.38 No such evidence was presented by appellant in this
case. The CA even quoted in part the decision of the RTC which
highlighted the irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of
defense witnesses on what transpired during the buy-bust operation.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and fine, ranging fromP500,000.00
to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Hence, the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine ofP1,000,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
November 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No.
03483 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202709
July 3, 2013
This case is about the need to absolve the accused of the charges
against them because of the police officers outright failure without any
justification to abide by the law governing the conduct of seizure
operations involving dangerous drugs.
The Facts and the Case
On June 21, 2004 the Public Prosecutors Office of Rizal filed separate
charges of possession of dangerous drugs1 before the Regional Trial
The prosecutions version is that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 16, 2004,
PO1 Reynaldo M. Albarico, PO1 Fortunato P. Jiro III, and PO1 Jose
Gordon Antonio of the Rodriguez Police Station in Rizal received
information from a police asset that accused Mercy Oniza was selling
dangerous drugs at Phase 1-D Kasiglahan Village, Barangay San
Jose.2 They immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation. After coordinating its action with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, the police team proceeded to Kasiglahan Village
on board an owner-type jeep. They brought with them two pieces of
pre-marked P100 bills.3
At the police station, the police officers asked their three captives to
produce P30,000.00 in exchange for their release.16 Officer Antonio
took out something from his pocket, showed it to them, and told them
that he would use it to press charges against them. Afterwards, PO1
Antonio took Mercy to the kitchen room and hit her head with two
pieces of pot covers ("pinompyang").17
Nearly after five years of trial or on April 2, 2009 the RTC rendered a
decision18 that found Romeo and Mercy guilty of possession of
dangerous drugs in Criminal Cases 7598 and 7599, respectively, and
imposed on them both the penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and 1
day to 20 years and a fine of P300,000.00. Further, the trial court found
them guilty of selling dangerous drugs in Criminal Case 7600 and
imposed on them both the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,000.00. The trial court, however, acquitted Valentino of the
separate charge of possession of dangerous drugs filed against him in
Criminal Case 7597.
On appeal in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the judgments of conviction against Romeo and Mercy, hence,
the present appeal to this Court.
Issue Presented
The issue presented in this case is whether or not the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that Romeo and Mercy were in
possession of and were selling dangerous drugs when the team of
police officers arrested them on June 16, 2004.
Ruling of the Court
The police officers brought their three captives to the police station for
investigation and booking. Officer Jiro marked all the items the police
seized and had these brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for examination.10 After forensic chemical analysis,
the contents of the sachets proved to be shabu.11
The prosecution and the defense stipulated that the specimens that
PO1 Annalee R. Forro, a PNP forensic chemical officer, examined
were methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). They further stipulated,
however, that Officer Forro "could not testify on the source and origin
of the subject specimens that she had examined."12 As a result, PO1
Forro did not testify and only her report was adduced by the
prosecution as evidence.
The evidence for the accused shows, on the other hand, that at around
9:30 p.m. on June 16, 2004, the spouses Mercy and Romeo were
asleep at their home when Mercy was suddenly awakened by the
voice of Belen Morales calling on her from outside the house. As Mercy
peeped through the window, Belen told her that the police had arrested
and mauled Mercys brother, Valentino. Mercy hurriedly ran out of the
house to find out what had happened to her brother.13
When Mercy got to where Valentino was, she saw some police officers
forcibly getting him into an owner-type jeep while Zenaida Cabarle,
Mercy and Valentinos mother, kept pulling him out of the owner-type
jeep. When Mercy approached Valentino, the police officers told her to
accompany him to the police station. This prompted her to shout for
her husbands help.14
Pros. Gonzales : If you know, what was the result of the request for
examination?
Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer any sort of reason or
justification for their failure to make an inventory and take pictures of
the drugs immediately after their seizure in the presence of the
accused and the other persons designated by the law. Both the RTC
and the CA misapprehended the significance of such omission. It is
imperative for the prosecution to establish a justifiable cause for noncompliance with the procedural requirements set by law.22 The
procedures outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 are not merely empty
formalitiesthese are safeguards against abuse,23 the most notorious
of which is its use as a tool for extortion.24
And what is the prosecutions evidence that the substances, which the
police chemist examined and found to be shabu, were the same
substances that the police officers allegedly seized from Romeo and
Mercy? No such evidence exists. As pointed out above, the
prosecution stipulated with the accused that the police chemist "could
not testify on the source and origin of the subject specimens that she
had examined." No police officer testified out of personal knowledge
that the substances given to the police chemist and examined by her
were the very same substances seized from the accused.1wphi1
In regard to the required presence of representatives from the DOJ
and the media and an elective official, the prosecution also did not
bother to offer any justification, even a hollow one, for failing to comply
with such requirement. What is more, the police officers could have
easily coordinated with any elected barangay official in the conduct of
the police operation in the locality.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the February
23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301,
which affirmed the April 2, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Criminal Cases 7598, 7599, and 7600 and, accordingly, ACQUITS the
accused-appellants Romeo Oniza y Ong and Mercy Oniza y Cabarle of
the charges against them in those cases on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
The National Police Commission is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE PO1
Reynaldo M. Albarico, PO1 Fortunato P. Jiro III and PO1 Jose Gordon
Antonio for the possible filing of appropriate charges, if warranted.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately
RELEASE both the above accused-appellants from custody unless
they are detained for some other lawful cause.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECONO DIVISION
G.R. No. 195528
Inside the courtroom, PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the one involved in
the illegal transaction.19 He also identified the small plastic sachet of
shabu as the subject of the illegal transaction through the marking
"LRR" he placed on it.20 He testified that he brought the plastic sachet
containing the specimen to the crime laboratory for
examination21 where it was tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, as certified by the examining Forensic Chemist Engr.
Leonard M. Jabonillo (Forensic Chemist Jabonillo) of Central Police
District Crime Laboratory in his Chemistry Report.22
SPO2 Nagera was also called to the witness stand to present his
version of the events. However, some inconsistencies surfaced during
his examination at the witness stand.
When asked about the gender of the informant who came to their
office, he answered that the informant was a female, contradicting the
statement of PO3 Ramos.23 He also differed from the statement of PO3
Ramos when he testified that only two modes of transportation, instead
of three, were used by the buy-bust team in proceeding to the target
area, one Nissan Maxima and one owner-type jeep.24 He also had
difficulty in identifying the accused inside the court room when he was
asked upon by the prosecutor to do so.25
Further contradiction was made when SPO2 Nagera narrated that PO3
Ramos was the one holding the plastic sachet before it was turned
over to PO1 Jimenez for investigation.26 He also admitted in his cross
examination that he never saw Ningning during the entire buy-bust
operation.27 Finally, when asked about on who placed the initial "LRR"
on the plastic sachet, he positively identified that it was the investigator
who put the same.28
PO1 Jimenez was also presented in court as a prosecution witness to
give details of the buy-bust operation. His version, however, also
differed from the versions presented by PO3 Ramos and SPO2
Nagera. He testified that the plastic sachet confiscated was already
marked by the apprehending officers when it was turned over to him
for investigation, a contradiction of the statements of both PO3 Ramos
and SPO2 Nagera that it was him who marked the plastic sachet with
the initial "LRR."29 He positively identified that he saw the item being
marked by the apprehending officers in their office.30
The defense interposed denial.
Accused Joel denied any involvement in the buy-bust operation. He
recalled that he was inside his house sleeping between 9:00 to 10:00
oclock in the evening of 12 September 2005 when five uniformed
police officers entered his house.31 They got hold of his arm and frisked
him but failed to recover anything.32 The police officers did not inform
him of the reason for his arrest; neither did they recite his constitutional
rights. Afterwards, he was made to ride an owner type vehicle and was
taken to the police station where he was only asked for his name.33 He
denied having sold drugs and having seen the marked money and
plastic sachet containing shabu.34
On cross examination, Joel was also inconsistent in portions of his
testimony. He testified that all of his siblings were in the province and
his only companions in the house at the time of the arrest were his
nephew and niece.35However, when asked why the door was still open
at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, he replied that he was waiting
for his sister.36 He also contradicted his earlier statement that he was
sleeping with his nephew and niece downstairs when in his cross
examination he said that his niece was staying on the second floor of
the house at the time of the arrival of the police officers.37
witnesses were able to establish that the P200.00 bill used to purchase
the illegal drug was in the possession of Ningning who was able to
evade arrest.46
Our Ruling
The trial court on 21 March 2007 found the accused guilty of the
offense charged. The dispositive portion of the decision41 reads:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof
as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.48 It must rest on its own merits and
must not rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails
to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not
even present evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the
presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted.49
The trial court ruled that Joel directly dealt with the poseur buyer and
participated in all the stages of the illegal sale. It found conspiracy
between Joel and Ningning. It pointed out that Ningning was able to
escape the police dragnet while Joel was being arrested because of
her familiarity as a drug operator with police operations.
The police operation and its coordination with the operatives of the
PDEA would be recognized by the appellate court as legally
performed.43 On the contrary the prosecutions scenario that the police
officers entered Joels residence and hauled him out with no reason at
all was found to be improbable.44
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the appellate court ruled that all
the elements of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs were
present.45 First, Joel, as the seller of illegal drug, was positively
identified by the poseur buyer and the police officers; Second, the
confiscated white crystalline substance which was found by the PNP
crime laboratory as positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride which
is a dangerous drug was presented during trial; and Lastly, the illegal
sale was for a consideration of P200.00 given by PO3 Ramos as
poseur buyer. The appellate court further held that the nonpresentation of the marked money was not fatal since the prosecution
A: The informant first introduced me to Gigi that I will be the one to buy
shabu.
Q: Why?
A: Because I placed my marking.
Q: Now, going [back] to the police station, other than searching, what
other matters were taken during the arrest?
A: The evidence that I was able to get from Ningning and it was the
investigator who marked it.
A: No sir, she just open (sic) the door and handed the sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: x x x. You said that it was the investigator who made the marking in
the transparent plastic sachet, where were you when the marking was
placed on it?
Q: When he received that from Ningning at that time, what did you do?
A: I was in front of the investigator.
A: After Gigi got it he gave it to me, sir.
Q: What was the marking placed?
Q: Can you describe that item you received from Gigi that came from
Ningning at that time?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Can you describe?
A: Yes sir, just a small plastic sachet.50
PO3 Ramos initially testified that he placed his marking on the small
plastic sachet he was able to buy from Joel:
Q: If that small plastic sachet is shown to you can you indentify the
specimen?
xxxx
Q: You said that the investigator placed the marking in the transparent
plastic sachet and likewise he was the one who made the inventory
receipt. In what particular place that he prepared this particular
document?
A: At the area, sir.
Q: What do you mean by area?
A: In front of the house of the accused, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the shabu, who was holding it in going to the police
station, Mr. Witness?
A: Ramos, sir.
Q: What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: It was turn (sic) over to the police investigator, sir.59 (Emphasis
supplied)
The clear inconsistency in the presentation of facts is fatal. It creates
doubts whether the transaction really occurred or not. Though Joels
denial as a defense is weak, such cannot relieve the prosecution the
burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal
transaction actually took place.60
Inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses referring to the events
that transpired in the buy-bust operation can overturn the judgment of
conviction. As held in Zaragga v. People,61 material inconsistencies
with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made
and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt
as to the identity of the corpus delicti. Prosecutions failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu led to the acquittal of the
accused in that case.62
Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not
upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses
credibility. If the cited inconsistency has nothing to do with the
elements of a crime, it does not stand as a ground to reverse a
conviction.63 However, in this case, the material inconsistencies are
furthered by inconsistencies of the police officers on minor details.
Referring back to the narration of circumstances of the buy-bust
operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the gender of the informant
who went to their office to report about the illegal activities committed
by Ningning.1wphi1 He readily answered that the informant was a
female.64 PO3 Ramos in turn, when asked to describe what happened
in the afternoon before the buy-bust operation, testified that a male
informant came to their office to report about a person selling illegal
drugs.65
the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the
highest degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction.79
Due to foregoing flagrant inconsistencies in the testimonies of police
officers which directly constitute the recollection of events of buy-bust
together and failure of observance of chain of custody of evidence
which effectively broke the links to sustain conviction, we rule for the
acquittal of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 4 August 2010 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02714 affirming the