Ejectment ,statute of frauds, formalities of contracts

For purposes of legal research, readers may find useful the discussions/citations in the
position paper below that I have prepared in an ejectment case which involved the issues
of stature of frauds and formalities of contracts.

POSITION PAPER FOR THE PLAINTIFF

THE PLAINTIFF, by counsel, respectfully states:
I. PROPERTY INVOLVED.
The property subject matter of the instant ejectment case is the residential house and lot
located at xxx., xxx Subd., xxx, xxx City, with an area of 240 sq. m. and covered by TCT
No. xxx registered in the name of A, plaintiff in the instant ejectment case.
Attached as Annex A hereof is a certified true copy of the said TCT No. xxx to prove the
ownership in fee simple by plaintiff A of the subject property.[1]

II. EJECTMENT COMPLAINT

The verified complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) filed by the herein
plaintiff A , thru her former counsel, Atty. Xxx, prayed for a judgment in favor of the
said plaintiff and against the defendants B, et. al. directing the latter to (a) Vacate the
aforesaid residential house and lot and to peacefully surrender the same to herein
plaintiff; (b) Pay the plaintiff in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php
48,000.00) for actual damages sustained as a result of loss of employment in Japan
and for the monthly rent for the townhouse unit; (c) Pay the plaintiff in such amounts
representing for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, as this Honorable
Court, in its wise and sound discretion, may determine; (d) Pay the plaintiff in the
amount of Php25,000.00 and Php2,000.00 per court appearance as Attorneys fees;
and (e) Pay the cost of the suit.
The allegations of the ultimate facts of the instant ejectment complaint are quoted
hereinbelow:

x x x.
1. That plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino and a resident of
xxx Street, Unit xxx, xxx Subdivision, xxx City
where she may be served with summons and other
processes of this Honorable Court;
2. That defendants are all of legal age and are presently
unlawfully residing at xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision,
xxx II, xxx City and may served with summons and
other legal processes therein by this Honorable
Court;

3. Plaintiff is the lawful owner of a parcel of land

situated in the Municipality of xxx, Province of xxx
evidenced by Transcript of Certificated of Title No.
xxx issued by the Register of Deeds of xxx City,
Metro Manila and more particularly described as: X
x x x x.
4. It was solely out of the compassion and tolerance of
the plaintiff, A which enabled all of the defendants to
temporarily reside at her paraphernal property located
at xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision, xxx City. As
members of the same family, complainant willingly
allowed the defendants to briefly reside therein
together with her minor child, K and eldest son, V
while plaintiff continued her employment at Japan;
5. It was their understanding then that they were to reside
therein by tolerance and rent-free, but as soon as the
time comes that the plaintiff would need a residential
unit for her or her immediate familys need, all of the
named defendants would necessarily vacate the
premises and surrender the peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff;
6. On September 7, 2006, plaintiffs son got
married. Necessarily and by reason of the fact that
they do not have any other residential unit available,
they required the defendants to vacate the premises
and seek another place to stay. Unfortunately, this
infuriated the defendants most specifically,
defendant B who maintained that she was allegedly
allowed to permanently reside therein, after having
been allowed by the plaintiff to allegedly construct
improvements, and to allegedly pay the necessary
bills and dues of the household;
7. That by reason of the persistence of the defendants,
they confronted the plaintiffs son and forcibly
asked him to vacate the residential unit. In order not
to create any commotion and by reason of the
delicate condition of his wife, they provisionally
departed his mothers residential house and lot;
8. All of the defendants are at present still occupying the
residential house and lot and refuse to vacate and
surrender the peaceful possession thereof to the
plaintiff who immediately left Japan to console her
sons predicaments. She immediately asked the
defendants to vacate the premises upon her return
but (was) simply threatened (by the defendants) and

was forcibly asked (by the defendants) to leave her

property;
9. Plaintiff initially made an attempt to settle the matter
amicably by filing a Sumbong (Complaint) before
the Barangay Pamplona Dos Barangay Council
against the defendants for unlawfully depriving her
of the peaceful possession and enjoyment of her
residential house and lot. She sought their assistance
to peacefully lead away the said defendants and for
the plaintiff to get back the physical possession of
the house and lot rightfully belonging to her. X x x.
10. However, no amicable settlement was reached upon
by the parties. In fact, they disregarded the initial
notice sent by the Barangay and even ignored the
scheduled meetings/dialogues before the Lupon. On
a mediation proceedings on the matter, defendants
unwaveringly manifested their refusal to vacate the
premises before the Honorable Barangay Captain
Romualda Villalon who mediated the parties;
11. Thus, on (17 November 2006), the Tanggapan ng
Kapitan ng Barangay issued a Certification
(Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman)
authorizing the plaintiff to file the appropriate action
unto this Honorable Court stating that walang
nagawang pagaayos o pagkakasundo sa mga
partido was reached. x x x.
12. On an effort to settle the matter, plaintiff through the
undersigned counsel transmitted through registered
mail with return card a Final Demand Letter to
Vacate dated 21 November 2006 addressed to all of
the defendants to vacate the premises within
FIFTEEN (15) days from receipt of the demand
letter which defendants received on 23 November
2006. x x x.
13. On 28 November 2006, the undersigned counsel
received a letter in response to the demand letter
transmitted to the defendants. As a reply, the
claimed counsel of the defendants with much regret
informed the undersigned counsel that his clients
cannot comply with the final demand to vacate the
property located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx
Subdivision, xxx City. X x x.
14. By reason of the defendants unjustified refusal to
vacate the premises, plaintiff would be compelled to

stay at the Philippines for a period of time and as a

result would necessarily lose her employment.
Plaintiff normally receives FORTY THOUSAND
(Php40,000.00) a month as salary from her
employment. Likewise as a result of the unlawful
possession of the residential house and lot, plaintiff
was constrained to rent a residential townhouse unit
at xxx Subdivision for which the plaintiff is
constrained to pay at a month rental of EIGHT
THOUSAND (Php 8,000.00) pesos a month;
15. Defendants, who have been unlawfully possessing
and occupying the subject parcel of land, and
despite due notice and demand to vacate the same,
unjustifiably failed and refused and continue to fail
and refuse to vacated the said premises. Thus, due to
defendants wanton disregard and deliberate
violation of the plaintiffs right to enjoy the rightful
possession of her property, herein plaintiff has
suffered and continuously suffers sleepless nights,
serious anxiety and other similar sufferings from
which entitle her to the recovery of damages in such
amount as this Honorable Court, in its wise
discretion, may determine;
16. By reason of the gross and evident bad faith of the
defendants when they deliberately refused to vacate
the aforesaid premises and by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral damages, plaintiff herein is duly entitled for
the payment of exemplary damages in such amount,
as this Honorable Court, in its wise discretion, may
determine;
17. Due to defendants refusal to vacate the premises,
plaintiff was constrained to engage the services of a
legal counsel to protect her own rights, interests, and
for whose services she agreed to pay the amount of
TWENTY
FIVE
THOUSAND
PESOS
(Php25,000.00) as attorneys fees plus Php2,000.00
per court appearance.
X x x. (end of quote)
The herein plaintiff adopts into this position paper, by incorporation and reference, all
of the foregoing allegations in her verified Answer.
In controverting the instant ejectment complaint, the defendants B, et. al. raised the
defense that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the property to B, without presenting any proof

of the due execution and authenticity of any written/documented or oral contract or

agreement to positively prove and substantiate the alleged transaction.
Further, the defendants B, et. al. in the instant ejectment case cited the pendency of the
case of B vs. A before the Regional Trial Court, Branch xxx, of xxx City, for specific
performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. xxx.
In the said RTC-level civil complaint, B (plaintiff in the said RTC-level case) prayed in her
Amended Complaint as follows:

X x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed that after due hearing judgment be rendered as to the
principal cause of action:
a) Ordering defendant A to execute the deed of
sale in favor of the plaintiff over the house and
lot located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision,
xxx City and covered by the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. xxx of the registry of Deeds of xxx
City;
b) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the
following amount:
i) P300,000.00, as moral damages;
ii) P200,000.00, as exemplary damages;
iii) P100,000.00, as attorneys fees; and
iv) To pay the costs of suit:
In the alternative, judgment be rendered:
a) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the
following sums:
i) P1,351,265.66 representing reimbursement to
the plaintiff for the expenses of the renovations
and Improvements, insurance premiums, real
property taxes homeowners association dues and
payment for compromise settlement on the
property in question, plus legal interest thereof
from the date of the filing of the complaint:
ii) P55,000.00, representing the funeral expenses
of defendant A minor son, K, plus legal interest
thereof from the filing of the complaint:
b) Ordering defendants A and V to pay plaintiff
jointly and severally the following:
i) P1,414,928.20, representing reimbursement to
the plaintiff for the payment of defendant Vs
car, including the insurance thereof, as well as
payment for the debts and loans incurred by
defendant A son, herein defendant V, plus legal
interest thereof from the filing of the complaint:

ii) P1,000,000.00 representing reimbursement to

the plaintiff for the support of defendant A eldest
son, herein defendant V:
iii) P2,105,000.00,
representing
rentals
payments from August 2001 to October 2006 for
the business xxx Enterprise, which was set up by
the plaintiff for defendant V, plus legal interest
thereof from the filing of the complaint:
iv) P100,000.00, as attorneys fees.
Plaintiff prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable in
the premises.
X x x. (end of quote).
For the record, in the said Civil Case No. xxx, A -Seiwa (defendant in the said RTC-level
case and plaintiff in the instant ejectment case before this Court) and her husband K
alleged in their original Answer[2] filed thru their former counsel, Atty. Xxx, the following
basic legal and factual defenses:

Xxx.
1. Defendants deny the allegations stated in paragraph 6 of the
complaint. The truth of the matter being that no written nor oral
arrangement was ever reached by the parties with respect to the
sale or transfer of the paraphernal house and lot registered under
the name of the Defendant A before she contracted marriage with
defendant K;
2. Defendants resolutely maintain that no earnest efforts towards an
amicable settlement were conducted between the parties. She was
surprised to find out that the instant case was filed by the plaintiff
and that inappropriate and dishonest measures were undertaken
which evidently showed her ungratefulness and greediness towards
her sister, defendant A.
3. Plaintiff has no legal right over the property of the defendant.
Plaintiff was permitted by tolerance to stay at the property of the
defendant as a mere transient. It is solely by reason of the
compassion of the defendant towards her sister, the plaintiff herein
and her brothers that they were permitted to stay at
her paraphernal house and lot located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx
Subdivision, xxx City. Along with them then was their biological
mother, C who had predeceased this controversy and her ungrateful
children, B, R and C. Defendants mother stood as the guardian of
V, K1 and K2 as opposed to the allegation of the plaintiff that she
agreed to the proposal that she would stand as the guardian of the

children of the defendant which is self-serving in nature and cannot

be substantiated by the plaintiff by evidence oral or documentary;
4. Defendant belies the allegation of the plaintiff that the former was
required to stay at Japan most of the time having the resident status
therein and being married to a Japanese national. To prove the
contrary, defendant incorporates her Philippine Passports issued on
March 1, 2006, February 14, 2001 and February 6, 2006
respectively x x x.. The annotations therein will show that
defendant was at constant connections with her children, her
mother, C and her paraphernal property;
5. xxx that defendant was never in default in meeting with her
obligations as well as that of her children. She was a frequent
vacationer here in the Philippines who at all times have shouldered
the necessary payments for the obligations enumerated by the
plaintiff upon her return and through her money transfers from
Japan in order to pay these obligations;
6. This is the primary reason why the various receipts (various
attachments supplied by the plaintiff in her complaint) are issued
under the name of the defendant and significantly not under the
name of the plaintiff precisely because these were in fact paid by
the defendant or by the defendants child, V or by the plaintiff in a
few instances using the money provided by the defendant;
7. Further, no contract express or implied would indicate the claimed
allegation of the plaintiff that she was to permanently reside on the
property of the defendant and introduce improvements thereon, pay
the legal taxes due, and support the defendants son, V with his
various obligations;
8. Significantly, the improvements introduced by the plaintiff were
constructed without the knowledge or the express consent or
authority of the defendant who is the registered owner of the house
and lot as perused from the Transfer Certificate of Title No. xxx
registered with the Registry of Deeds of xxx City. X x x.
9. The allegation that the defendant be required to sell her house and lot
to the plaintiff by virtue of the supposed verbal communication
does not have any legal or factual basis. It is relevant t point out
that under Article 1403of the Civil Code of the Philippines, among
the following contracts that are considered unenforceable are:
(2) Those that do not comply with the statute of frauds as
set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action,
unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be
in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or his
agent; evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot be

received without the writing or as secondary evidence of its

contents:
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another.
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein. X x x.
10. Furthermore, the complaint merely alleges that defendant is liable
to pay plaintiff for moral and exemplary damages. The operative or
constructive facts making up the pleaded cause of action for
damages were not stated in the complaint for which no credit
should likewise be given thereto; x x x. (end of quote)
In their same Civil Case No. xxx, A and her spouse K raised the following counterclaim:

X x x.
By way of COUNTER-CLAIM, the foregoing paragraphs are
herein repleaded and reproduced insofar as they are herein
relevant, material and significant;
11. As a result of this present controversy, defendant was
compelled to stay at the Philippines for a period of time and
as a result lost her employment in Japan. Defendant
receives a monthly equivalent of Forty Thousand Pesos
(Php 40,000.00) a month as salary from her employment for
which the plaintiff must be required to pay by way of actual
damages. A copy of the Certificate of Possible Salary
Payment, the Withholding Exemption Certificate of earned
Income, and the Incumbency Certificate of the defendant
are herein attached and made an integral part of this Answer
with Counter-Claim x x x.
12. Likewise and as a result of the unlawful possession by the
plaintiff of the residential house and lot of the defendant,
the latter was constrained to rent a residential townhouse
unit at xxx Subdivision for which the defendant was
constrained to pay a monthly rental of EIGHT
THOUSAND (Php 8,000.00) pesos a month for which once
again the plaintiff must be compelled to pay by way of
actual damages. X x x.
13. By reason of this baseless complaint, defendant, A suffered
and continuously suffers sleepless nights, serious anxiety
and other similar sufferings from which entitles her to the
recovery of damages in such amount as this Honorable
Court, in its wise and sound discretion, may determine;

14. Also, by way of example or correction for the public good,

in addition to the moral damages, defendants herein are
duly entitled for the payment of exemplary damages in such
amount, as this Honorable Court, in its wise discretion, may
determine;
15. Lastly and by reason of the baseless and unfounded
complaint, defendant was constrained to litigate this case
and in order to protect their rights and interests was
constrained to engage the services of counsel whom she
was obligated to pay the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php 50,000.00). X x x. (end of quote)
Further, in the said Civil Case No. xxx, A and her spouse K (defendants
therein) prayed for the following reliefs in their original Answer:
X x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Court to
dismiss the instant complaint, as to the counter-claim,
after due hearing be ordered to pay the defendant, B the
following amounts:
Forty Thousand Pesos (Php 40,000.00) respecting
the monthly income lost by the defendant from
her employment in Japan;
Monthly rentals of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php
8,000.00) incurred and continually incurred by
the defendant as a result of the refusal of the
plaintiff to surrender the peaceful possession of
the defendants paraphernal property;
Moral and Exemplary damages in such amount as
determined by this Honorable Court;
Attorneys fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00)
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
X x x. (end of quote)

For the record, the herein plaintiff A hereby adopts into this Position Paper, by
incorporation and reference, all her foregoing allegations, counterclaims and prayers
as stated in her original Answer in the said Civil Case No. xxx.
III. EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF
IN THE INSTANT EJECTMENT CASE

In addition to the aforementioned Title of the herein plaintiff (TCT No. xxx, marked
as Annex A hereof, supra), the plaintiff respectfully submits to this Honorable
Court the following documentary evidence in support of her ejectment complaint
against the defendants:
1. Annex B - Letter (re: Final Demand Letter To Vacate), dated November
21, 2006, addressed to B signed by Atty. Xxx, former counsel for A.
2. Annex C Letter, dated November 8, 2006, addressed to B Herrera, et.
al., and all persons claiming possession of the subject property owned by
A, signed by Atty. Xxx. Tafalla, former counsel for A. It proves the
jurisdictional demand made by the plaintiff to the defendants to vacate the
subject property under Rule 70 and the earnest efforts of the plaintiff to
exhaust all remedies before commencing the instant court action.
3. Annex D - Letter dated November 24, 2006, addressed to Atty. Xxx,
former counsel for A, signed by Atty. Xxx of xxx Law Offices, counsel for
B, et. al., denying and rejecting the demand of plaintiff B to vacate the
subject property. It proves the recalcitrance of the defendants in ignoring
and rejecting the extrajudicial demands of the plaintiff.
4. Annex E Patawag issued by Barangay Pamplona II, dated November
13, 2006, addressed to A and B, et. al.. (Although defendant Maria xxx
was not named therein, she had actual and constructive knowledge thereof,
being an actual resident of the property under the control and subsidy of B;
but Maria xxx chose not to voluntarily participate therein)
5. Annex F Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman, dated November
17, 2006, issued by the said Barangay addressed to A and B, et. Al.. It
shows the failure of the defendants to settle with the plaintiff the instant
ejectment controversy, thus, compelling the plaintiff to seek judicial
redress.
6. Annex G Engagement Contract, dated September 26, 2006, addressed
to A, signed by her former Atty. Xxx, showing the expenses for
professional fees incurred by the plaintiff in hiring the services of Atty.
Xxx to protect her rights against the unjust acts of the defendants.
7. Annex H Letter, dated April 15, 2007, addressed to Atty. Xxx, re: Notice
of Termination of Lawyer-Client Relationship and Legal Services, signed
by A and K.
8. Annex I Letter, dated April 3, 2007, addressed to A and K thru N re:
Attorneys Fees, signed by Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr., current counsel for A.
9. Annex J Legal Retainership Agreement, dated April 3, 2007, signed
by N and the Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices, thru Atty. Manuel
Laserna, Jr., showing the litigation expenses incurred by A in hiring the
legal services of the said law firm to protect her rights against the
unjust acts of defendants B, et. al.

10. Annex K Special Power of Attorney in favor of the Laserna Cueva

Mercader Law Offices acting thru Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. and/or Atty.
Myrna C. Mercader, dated April 11, 2007, signed by A and K and
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan.
11. Annex L - Special Power of Attorney in favor of V dated January 12,
2007, issued by A and notarized by Atty. Xxx in xxx City.
12. Annex M (with sub-markings)- Appraisal Report, dated October 27,
2006, on the subject property, issued by the xxx Co., Inc., with supporting
documents, showing the fair marker value of the subject property and the
improvements thereon. It proves the huge economic opportunity losses the
plaintiff and her children are incurring by reason of the unjust act of the
defendants in dispossessing the plaintiff of her subject property, which the
plaintiff owns in fee simple as its lawful and registered owner.
13. Annex N - Contract of Lease, dated September 16, 2006 of the son of
the plaintiff, V, who was harassed by defendants B, et. al. to move out of
the subject property owned by his mother (herein plaintiff) A, thus,
constraining him to lease a property in xxx City, at P8,000.00/month,
where he and his wife could reside and where his mother could reside
whenever she returns to the Philippines for vacations.
14. Annex O (with sub-markings) - Various proofs of payments caused to be
paid/remitted by plaintiff A either directly or thru her duly authorized
representatives, e.g. his son V, et. al., for the premiums of the fire
insurance policies of the subject property, the various monthly dues,
charges and fees caused to be paid by the plaintiff to the
15. xxx Homeowners Association as a member in good standing of the
Association being a homeowner therein, and the various annual local real
estate taxes caused to be paid by the plaintiff to the local government of
xxx City, They disprove the claim of B that she was the one who had spent
for all such expenses.
16. Annex P (with sub-markings) - Employment records of the plaintiff A as
an employee in Japan, e.g., Incumbency Certificate, showing her
incomes/salaries and financial capacity as such, as well as the Japan-based
incomes that she had lost/waived for attending to the litigation of
the pending cases involving her property in the Philippines.
17. Annex Q (with sub-markings) Proofs of various dollar remittances the
plaintiff A had made from Japan to her son V and the defendant B for the
support, sustenance, personal businesses and other expenses and costs of
living of the son of the plaintiff, V, the burial of another son of the
plaintiff, K, the upkeep and maintenance of the subject property, and all
other related necessary expenses relative to the children of the plaintiff and
to the subject property. They disprove the claim of the defendant B that she
was the one financially supporting the living expenses, education,
businesses, etc. of the children of the plaintiff or that she was the one

spending for the maintenance of the subject property or that she was the
one who funded the burial of the deceased K.
18. Annex R (with sub-markings) - Various business records of xxx
Enterprise owned by the son of the plaintiff, V, which the plaintiff had
helped fund and organize. They show the financial capacity of V to
support himself, his wife, his business-related transactions, and his costs of
living expenses, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the one
who had funded the same.
19. Annex S - The passports of V showing his business travels abroad. They
show the financial capacity, personal maturity, and business acumen of V
as a businessman, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the
one who was supporting the personal maintenance and business operations
of V.
20. Annex T (with sub-markings) - Business records of xxx Enterprise and
yyy Collection (registered in the names of defendants B and R), which the
plaintiff A, as we well-earning Japan-based employee, had helped put up
and fund at a time when the said B and R were basically penniless or under
financial straits. Please note that the business names xxx and yyy were
patterned after the names of the children of the plaintiff.
21. Annex U (with sub-markings) Records of the checking account of V in
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC), showing that he had paid his
business loans thru his said account, contrary to the claim of the defendant
B that she was the she who paid such business loans of V.
22. Annex V (with sub-markings) - Business and financial records of xxx
Management Inc., re: the purchase and full payment of a Mitsubishi
Lancer vehicle made by the said corporation, whose major stockholders
are the xxx Clan. The natural father of V belonged to the said Clan. The
said records show that the amortizations for the said car were made and
paid by the said Corporation and xxx Clan for the benefit of the latter and
that the payments were made thru the account of the said corporation in
BPI Family Bank, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the
one who had paid for the said car.
23. Annex W (with sub-markings) Records of the amicable settlement of
Civil Case No. xxx (RTC Branch xxx, xxx City), entitled Sps. N v. A
(represented by her [late] mother C), involving the subject property. They
prove that plaintiff A had paid for all the expenses (taxes, registration fees,
etc.) related to the Deed of Exchange, the Compromise Agreement, and the
registration of the titles involved therein, contrary to the claim of
defendant B that she was the one who paid for all such expenses.
24. Annex X (with sub-markings) Records of the amicable settlement of
Civil Case xxx (RTC, Branch xxx, xxx City) which A filed against the
University of Perpetual Help Hospital and its attending doctors to seek
damages for the death of K, a son of the plaintiff A. The records show that

the defendant B, as attorney in fact of A, received P600,000.00 from the

University of Perpetual Help Hospital, et. al. as settlement money for the
death of K (son of A) and showing that Atty. Xxx, counsel for B in the
instant ejectment case, received 10% thereof as his fees. The said amount
was used by B to renovate/improve and maintain the expenses for the
subject property and/or other expenses relative to the children of A and to
defray some of the litigation expenses of the said civil case. B made it
appear claimed that the funds she used for the said purposes came from her
own pockets.
25. Annex Y (with sub-markings) Passports of A and her husband K,
showing their various travels to the Philippines to care for and supervise
As children in Metro Manila and to monitor their education, good conduct
and businesses. They disprove the claim of B that A had abandoned her
children to her care.
IV. APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The alleged contract of sale between the plaintiff A and the defendant B is
unenforceable and cannot be raised as a valid legal and factual defense in the
instant ejectment case, that is, assuming that such an agreement actually
existed, an allegation which is vehemently denied by the plaintiff for being
false, untrue and fabricated.
Under Art. 1403, Civil Code, the following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Fraud as set forth in this number. In
the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action,
unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed
by the party charge, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year
from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a
mutual promise to marry;
(d) An Agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at
a price not less that five hundred pesos unless the buyer accept and
receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of
them, of such things in action, or pay at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made
by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the

amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or
for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing frauds. Under
the Statute of Frauds, the only formality required is that the contract or agreement
must be in writing and subscribed by party charged or by his agent. For example, a
telegram advising a person to whom a verbal promise for the sale of land had been
previously made to come at once in order to complete the purchase, but which
telegram neither describes the property nor states the purchase price, and which is not
signed by any person having authority to bind the seller, is not a sufficient
memorandum of sale to satisfy the requirement of the statue.
Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are susceptible of
ratification. According to Art. 1405 of the Civil Code, such contracts may be ratified
either (1) by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the
same, or (2) by the acceptance of benefits under them. Art. 1405 provides that
contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are
ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same,
or by the acceptance of benefits under them while Art. 1406 provides that when a
contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and a public document is
necessary for its registration in the Registry of Deeds, the parties may avail
themselves of the right under article 1357.
The primordial aim of the provisions is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory
of witnesses (Shoemaker vs. La Tondea, 68 Phil. 24). Although the said
provisions simply provides for the form or method by which contracts coming within
its terms may be proved, nonetheless, the claimant must first prove the existence and
due execution of such a contract, notwithstanding its formal defects, if any. (Conlu v.
Araneta, 15 Phil. 387; Gallemit v. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. 241; Kuenzler & Streff v.
Jiongco, 22 Phil. 111; Gomez v. Salcedo, [26 Phil. 485]; Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33
Phil. 471; Magalona v. Paratcim 59 Phil. 543).
Although the Supreme Court has held in many cases that no particular form or
language or instrument is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in writing
under the statute of frauds, nonetheless, such memorandum of note should be in the
form of a document or writing, formal or informal, which had been written either for
the purpose of furnishing evidence of the contract or for another purpose which
satisfies all the statutes requirements as to contents and signature would be sufficient.
In one case, the Supreme Court held that a voucher or entry in an
accountants book of account purporting to show payment of a specified amount as
consideration for the sale of leasehold right over a house was, however, held
insufficient where the same was not signed by the alleged vendor but merely by the

accountant who claimed (without establishing) that he was the vendors agent (Reyes
vs. Lopez, 76 Phil. 568).
The settled rule is that the statute applies only to executory (Factoran vs.
Laban, 81 Phil. 512; Cocjin vs. Libo, 91 Phil. 777), that is, a contract that has not been
completed or executed yet. Performance, whether total or partial, takes a contact out
of the operation of the statute. (Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil. 493; Hernandez v. Adal, 78
Phil. 196; Almirol vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil. 512; Robles vs. Lizarraga
Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387; Diama vs. Macalibo, I74 Phil. 70; Barcelona vs.
Barcelona, 53 O.G. 373; Carbonnel v. Poncio, 55 O.G. 2415). Performance must be
duly proved.
Examples of performance include: (a) a sale of real property which has been
consummated by the delivery of the property to the vendee (Soriano v. Heirs of
Magali, L-15133, July 31, 1963; Diama vs. Macalibo, supra); (b) or which has been
partially executed by payment of a part of the price to the vendors and the
delivery of the land to the vendees (Almirol vs. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387).
In one case, it was held that the transaction is not taken out of the coverage of
the statute of frauds by the mere allegation that plaintiff had taken possession of the
land as a tenant and that he had made substantial improvements thereon, such
allegation being an insufficient basis for proving the oral contract had been executed
or performed. There must be an allegation to the effect that he had taken possession
of the land in view of a supposed verbal contract he had with the defendant to
purchase it, or that he has made improvements thereon because and as a consequence
of said supposed contract to sell (Pascual vs. realty Investment, Inc. 91 Phil. 257).
Partial performance does not of itself exclude the application of the Statute of
Frauds. Firstly, in order that a contract not to be performed within one year may be
taken out of the operation of the statue, it must appear clearly that full or complete
performance has been made by one party; nothing less will suffice, and if anything
remains to be done after the expiration of the year besides the mere payment of
money, the statute would apply (Babao vs. Perez, 54 O.G. 2888).
The doctrine of partial performance cannot be invoked against the statute
where the contract is vague, ambiguous and uncertain in its terms and as to subject
matter. For, obviously, there can be no partial performance until there is a definite
and complete agreement between the parties. For the doctrine to be availed of, the
parol agreement relied upon must be certain, definite, clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal in this terms and as to subject matter, aside from being fair, reasonable,
and just in this provisions. This is so because the doctrine is based on equity, and it
would be inequitable to enforce an agreement that does not satisfy the above
requirements (Babao vs. Perez, Babao v. Perez, 54 OG 2888).
B. Forms of Contracts
The defense of the defendants that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the subject property
to defendant B fails to meet and comply with the strict procedural and evidentiary

requirements set forth in Articles 1358, et. seq. of the Civil Code as to the forms or
formalities of a contract or an agreement.
Under Art. 1358, Civil Code, the following must appear in a public
instrument:
(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real
property or of an interest therein are governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;
(2) The cession, repudiation or enunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the
conjugal partnership of gains;
(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act
appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third
person;

(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public
document.
Although, as a general rule, contracts hall be obligatory, in whatever from they may
have been entered into, yet there are certain contracts falling within the purview or
scope of this rule which, by reason of their importance, should be executed in
accordance with certain formalities in order to insure their efficacy and to protect the
interests of the contracting parties as well as that of third persons. The Civil Code,
recognizing this necessity, enumerates in Art. 1358 the different classes of contracts
which must appear either in a public or in a private document, and grants in Art. 1357
a coercive power to the contracting parties by which they can reciprocally compel the
observance of the required form.

Under Art. 1359, Civil Code, when, there having been a meeting of the minds of the
parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting
to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end
that such true intention may be expressed. If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or
accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper remedy is not
reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.
C. EJECTMENT LAW AND CASES
The instant ejectment complaint fully complies with technical and substantive
requirements of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and with the relevant jurisprudence
applicable thereto.
Thus, considering the summary nature of the instant ejectment suit, the same
should be resolved by the Honorable Court on the merits in favor of the plaintiff ASeiwa, regardless of the pendency of the RTC-level case filed by B.

The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession
of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure (Gutierrez vs.
Magat, 67 SCRA 262). The subject matter thereof merely is the material possession or
possession de facto over the real property. The questions to be resolved simply are
these: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was
the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by
force, threat, strategy, or stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his
possession? Any controversy over ownership rights should be settled after the party
who had the prior, peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property (Dizon
vs. Concina, 30 SCRA 897).
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective
with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building and that such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the fact
therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession.
Section 1, Rule 70 provides that a person deprived of the possession of any land
or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
Section 2, Rule 70 provides that, unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the
lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such
demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the
premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 70, an ejectment case is a summary procedure, and that all
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure
hereunder provided.
Under Sec. 16 of Rule 70, when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. Under Sec. 18 of the Rule, the judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no
wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.

Sec. 17 of the Rule provides that if after trial the court finds that the allegations of
the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of
the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said
allegations are not true, it shall render judgment
for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall
render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice
requires.
In view of the summary nature of an ejectment suit, Sec. 19 of Rule 70 provides
that if judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately
upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution
files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed
in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits
with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if
any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined
by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month
or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
Under Sec. 21 of the Rule, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom.

The action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature (Devesa vs. Montecillo, 27
SCRA 822; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1256). As such, it is inadequate for the
ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of controverted real property. In an
unlawful detainer case suit, while the court cannot adjudicate on the issue of
ownership, it may receive evidence on possession de jure to determine the nature of
possession (Consing vs. Jamandre, 64 SCRA 1).
It is fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases that a mere
plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a
sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for
recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property
(Prado vs. Calpo, et. al., G.R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964, cited in Spouses medina
and Bernal vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278).
In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may
se forth in his pleading. As incidents of the main issue of possession de facto, the
inferior court can decide the questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between
the parties is one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is a lease contract
between the parties, the period of such lease contract and whether or not the lease
contract has already expired; (c) the just and reasonable amount of the rent and the
date when it will take effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep the premises against
the will of the landlord; and (e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial and
valuable building and there is no dispute between the parties as to the ownership of
the land and the building, their rights according to the Civil Code. Defendants claim

of ownership of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient
to divest the inferior detainer. (Alvir vs. Vera, 130 SCRA 357).
An unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land
or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the
expiration or termination of the detainers right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract express or implied (Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pharma Industries,
Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, L-53788, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA 339; Ching Pue vs.
Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 (1950); Lim Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil 868 (1956); Teodoro vs.
Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956); Pardo de Tavera vs. Encarnacion, et. al., 22 SCRA 632
(1968).
An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for
reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the issue
of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance,
ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of
title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or
bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is
material possession or possession de facto (Ramirez vs. Bleza, L-45640, July 30,
1981, 106 SCRA 187).
This is so because the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be
held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case of action not involving possession.
The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved (Republic vs. Guarin,
81 SCRA 269). It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is time
procedure designed to remedy the situation (Mabalot vs. Madela, Jr. 121 SCRA
347).Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction
from the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice
(Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that judgment must be
executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further
damages arising from loss of possession (Salinas vs. Navarro 126 SCRA 167).
Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts may not be divested of its jurisdiction over
ejectment cases simply because the defendant sets up a claim of ownership over the
litigated property (Alilaya vs. Espaola, 107 SCRA 564; Dehesa vs. Macalalag, 81
SCRA 543; Castro vs. delos Reyes, 109 Phil. 64). Even where defendant in a detainer
or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it is declared in a great
number of cases that the trial court will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such
allegations alone (Savinada v. Tuason, et. al., G.R. No. L-2132, May 30, 1949; Loo
Soo v. Osorio, R.G. No. L-1364, May 30, 1951; Cruz v. Lunsang, G.R. No. L-2332,
October 4, 1959; De Los Rey7es v. Elepanio, et al., G.R. No. L-3466, October 13,
1950; Mediran V. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752).

Where the possession of defendant is by tolerance on the part of the plaintiff, or his
predecessor, the possession or detainer becomes illegal from the time that there is a
demand to vacate (Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684, April 28, 1951). It is not necessary that
there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may
be filed against a possessor by tolerance. Neither is prior physical possession of the
property by plaintiff necessary (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136; Pharma
Industries, Inc. vs. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339). When consent is withdrawn and
owner demands tenants to leave the property, the owners right of possession is
deemed asserted. (Philippine National Bank vs. Animas, 117 SCRA 735).
A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lease
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate (Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146; Canaynay vs. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36;
Robles vs. San Jose, 52 O.G. 6193; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257, citing
Montelibano vs. Hingaran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil. 797, 802-803).
D. RECENT EJECTMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The plaintiff A further cites the following recent ejectment-related jurisprudence in support
of her complaint.
In the case of HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS, et. al. vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES RICARDO and GLICERIA JIMENEZ, Respondents,G. R. No.
107036, February 9, 1993, it was held ha on the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled
principle is that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases even if the question of the ownership of the property is raised by the defendant.
The exception is where the question of title is so involved in the ejectment case that it
cannot be decided unless the title to the property is first ascertained.
In the case of CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, et. al. vs. TEODORICO T. MARAYAG,
respondent [G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000], it was held as a general rule, an
ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial
court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on
considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result
from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. Thus:
X x x.
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are
designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of
land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate
proceedings. It has been held that these actions "are intended to
avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law
in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession." [Vda [de Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135,
September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.] In these cases, the issue is

pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made

on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving
ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of
ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above
ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few
occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a
ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the
issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved." [Wilson
Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108, April 10,
1992, per Narvasa, CJ. In this case, the Court also held:
"1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in
ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of
the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 (1966)) do not
abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on consignation of
rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 (1956), citing Pue et al. v.
Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81, (1950)).
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit
against the plaintiff in the former(Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA
187 (1981)).
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the
principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude
nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit
where the only issue involved is the material possession or
possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa Sr. v. CA
et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 (1988)).
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an
ejectment suit involving the same property(Quimpo v. de la
Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect
ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease
contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 (1966); Pardo
de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632 (1968); Rosales v. CFI,
154 SCRA 153 (1987); Commander Realty, Inc. v. CA, 161 SCRA
264 (1988)).
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of
absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend
an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan,
66 SCRA 600 (1975)).
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion
reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the
same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 (1963);
Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. CA, 133 SCRA
520 (1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v.
Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 (1987); Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc.
v. CA, 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 (1989);

Guzman v. CA (annulment of sale and reconveyance), 177 SCRA

604 (1989); Demamay v. CA, 186 SCRA 608 (1990); Leopoldo Sy
v. CA et al., (annulment of sale and reconveyance), GR No.
95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document
affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting
the same property(Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167 (1983) annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to
declare the same an equitable mortgage; Ang Ping v. RTC , 154
SCRA 153 (1987) - annulment of sale and title; Caparros v. CA,
170 SCRA 758 (1989) - annulment of title; Dante v. Sison, 174
SCRA 517 - annulment of sale with damages; Galgala v. Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. , 177 SCRA 288 (1989) - annulment of
document).
In the case of Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank [G.R. No. 129887. February 17, 2000], it was held that nothing is more
settled than the rule that ejectment is solely concerned with the issue of physical or
material possession of the subject land or building. However, if the issue of possession
depends on the resolution of the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the
complaint, the municipal trial court may resolve the latter [Refugia v. Court of Appeals,
258 SCRA 347,366 (1996)] although the resulting judgment would be conclusive only
with respect to the possession but not the ownership of the property [Sec. 18, Rule 70,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure].
In the caser of Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., [G.R. No. 134651. September 18, 2000], it
was held that the rule is settled that although a question of jurisdiction may be raised at
any time, even on appeal, the same must not result in a mockery of the tenets of fair play,
such as where the issue was raised by petitioners for the first time only in a Petition for
Review and only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals; and
where petitioners participated actively in the proceedings before the MeTC [Refugia v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 347, citing Rodriguez v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-29264, 29 August 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Navoa v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 59255, 29 December 1995, 251 SCRA 545.] and invoked its
jurisdiction with the filing of their answer, in seeking affirmative relief from it, in
subsequently filing a notice of appeal before the RTC, and later, a Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals. Thus:
X x x. Be that as it may, we find no error in the MeTC
assuming jurisdiction over the subject matter. A complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law. [Sumulong v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, 10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 372;
Pangilinan v. Aguilar, No. L-29275, 31 January 1972, 43 SCRA
136]. As correctly found by the appellate court, to which we agree,
the allegations in the complaint sufficiently
established a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The complaint
clearly stated how entry was effected and how and when
dispossession started - petitioners were able to enter the subject
premises as sublessees of Purisima Salazar who, despite the
termination of her lease with respondent, continued to occupy the
subject premises without any contract with it; thus, their stay was
by tolerance of respondent.

X x x.
The status of petitioner spouses is akin to that of a lessee or a
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
has continued by tolerance of the owner. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. [Vda. De Catchuela v. Francisco, No. L31985, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA 172, citing Calubayan v.
Pascual, No. L-22645, 18 September 1967, 21 SCRA 146; Yu v.
de Lara, No. L-16084, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 785.]. X x
x.
In the case of TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT ILAGAN, Spouses ADOR and TESS
TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND ZENAIDA ANZURES, respondents, [G.R.
No. 106214. September 5, 1997], it was held that the one-year reglamentary period
under Section 1, Rule 70 for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the time of
the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession". Such unlawful deprivation occurs
upon expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. And such right legally
expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to vacate [Sy Oh v. Hon. Garcia
and Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil. 777]. Thus:

X x x. In this case, although possession by petitioners (other

than Villaluz) lasted beyond March 31, 1988 (the date they
were supposed to vacate the premises in accordance with the
agreement between petitioner Villaluz and private respondents),
nevertheless their continued possession from April 1, 1988 up
to the time they received the demand to vacate on February 23,
1989, is considered as possession by tolerance. Said petitioners
are not lessees but their status is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. Their right of possession
of the said property stems from their being employees of
petitioner Villaluz who only allowed them to occupy the
premises for a certain period. As such, their possession depends
upon the possession of petitioner Villaluz. Having merely
stepped into the shoes of the latter, said petitioners cannot
acquire superior rights than that of petitioner Villaluz. It has
been ruled, that "the person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate the same upon demand," otherwise the remedy of
ejectment may be availed of to oust him from the
premises. [ Refugia v. CA, 258 SCRA 347 (1996); Yu v. De
Lara, 6 SCRA 785 (1962)]. In such case, the one year
prescriptive period for filing the appropriate action to remedy
the unlawful withholding of possession is to be counted from
the date of receipt of the last demand to vacate[Calubayan v.

Pascual, 215 SCRA 146] because it is only from that time that
possession becomes illegal. 28[ See Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes, 14
SCRA 430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36]. Accordingly,
since the complaint for ejectment was instituted on July 12,
1989, or a mere four (4) months from the time of the last
demand to vacate, the same was timely filed within the
prescriptive period. X x x.
In the case of ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., respondents[G.R. No. 128743.
November 29, 1999], it was held that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only
upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they
are:
a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendantfraudulently
occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;

b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the

defendant;

c) transferees pendente lite;

d) sublessee;

e) co-lessee; or

f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.

[I Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 793 (1997)]
The above doctrine expressly and properly applies to co-defendant MARIA xxx, who
is an aunt of the defendants B, et. al. and who lives with them, who is under their
direction, control, supervision, subsidy and assistance, and who had actual and
constructive knowledge of the existence of the mandated Barangay conciliation and
mediation proceedings but nonetheless impliedly waived her appearance thereto by not
voluntarily appearing and participatingtherein despite such knowledge. The foregoing
facts were not denied (in fact, admitted sub silencio) by the other defendants in their past
pleadings in this case.
V. CONCLUSION

It is an established principle in law that one who comes in equity must come
with clean hands. (Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and

Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 137533, 22 November 2002, 392 SCRA 506). One who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. He or she who has done inequity shall not have equity. The courts may deny
equitable relief on the ground that the conduct and actions of a party are inequitable,
unfair, dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. (Miller vs. Miller, G.R. No. 149615, 29
August 2006; Abacus Security vs. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483
SCRA 315.)
VI. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that instant ejectment suit
be decided in favor of the plaintiff A and against all of the defendants, ordering the
defendants to VACATE and SURRENDER the de facto/material possession of the
subject property to the plaintiff or her duly authorized legal representative/s, with awards
of damages, litigation expenses, and costs of suit, as duly proved by the various
documentary evidence attached to this Position Paper.
Las Pinas City, January 9, 2008.