JudyAnnSantosvsPeopleofthePhilippines

Facts:
On19May2005,thenBureauofInternalRevenue(BIR)CommissionerGuillermoL.Parayno,Jr.wrotetotheDepartmentofJustice
(DOJ)SecretaryRaulM.Gonzalesaletter[5]regardingthepossiblefilingofcriminalchargesagainstpetitioner.
BIRCommissionerParaynosummarizedthefindingsoftheinvestigatingBIRofficersthatpetitioner,inherAnnualIncomeTax
Returnfortaxableyear2002filedwiththeBIR,declaredanincomeofP8,033,332.70derivedfromhertalentfeessolelyfromABS
CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR offices and those given by petitioners accountant and third parties, however,
confirmedthatpetitionerreceivedin2002incomeintheamountofatleastP14,796,234.70,notonlyfromABSCBN,butalsofrom
other sources, such as movies and product endorsements; the estimated tax liability arising from petitioners under declaration
amountedtoP1,718,925.52,includingincrementalpenalties;thenondeclarationbypetitionerofanamountequivalenttoatleast
84.18%oftheincomedeclaredinherreturnwasconsideredasubstantialunderdeclarationofincome,whichconstitutedprimafacie
evidenceoffalseorfraudulentreturn.
Prosecution Attorney Olivia LarozaTorrevillas issued a Resolution[9] dated 21 October 2005 finding probable cause and
recommendingthefilingofacriminalinformationagainstpetitionerforviolationofSection255inrelationtoSections254and
248(B)oftheNIRC,asamended.ThesaidResolutionwasapprovedbyChiefStateProsecutorJovencitoR.Zuno.
TheCTAFirstDivisionthenissuedon9December2005awarrantforthearrestofpetitioner.[15]Thetaxcourtliftedandrecalled
thewarrantofarreston21December2005afterpetitionervoluntarilyappearedandsubmittedherselftoitsjurisdictionandfiledthe
requiredbailbond.
On10January2006,petitionerfiledwiththeCTAFirstDivisionaMotiontoQuash
InaResolution[18]dated23February2006,theCTAFirstDivisiondeniedpetitionersMotiontoQuashandaccordinglyscheduled
herarraignmenton2March2006at9:00a.m.PetitionerfiledaMotionforReconsiderationand/orReinvestigation,[19]whichwas
againdeniedbytheCTAFirstDivisioninaResolution[20]dated11May2006.
On1June2006,petitionerfiledwiththeCTAenbancaMotionforExtensionofTimetoFilePetitionforReview,docketedasC.T.A.
EB.CRIM.No.001.ShefiledherPetitionforReviewwiththeCTAenbancon16June2006.However,initsResolution[21]dated
19June2006,theCTAenbancdeniedpetitionersMotionforExtensionofTimetoFilePetitionforReview.
PetitionersprimaryargumentisthataresolutionofaCTADivisiondenyingamotiontoquashisapropersubjectofanappealtothe
CTAenbancunderSection18ofRepublicActNo.1125,asamended,becausethelawdoesnotsaythatonlyaresolutionthat
constitutesafinaldispositionofacasemaybeappealedtotheCTAenbanc.
Issue:
1.Whetherornotaresolutionofactadivisiondenyingamotiontoquashisapropersubjectofanappealtothectaenbanc.
2.WhetherornotthefilingofthesaidInformationinviolationofpetitionersconstitutionalrightstodueprocessandequalprotection
ofthelaws.
Held:
1.No.
Thereisnodisputethatacourtorderdenyingamotiontoquashisinterlocutory.Thedenialofthemotiontoquashmeansthatthe
criminalinformationremainspendingwiththecourt,whichmustproceedwiththetrialtodeterminewhethertheaccusedisguiltyof
thecrimechargedtherein.Equallysettledistherulethatanorderdenyingamotiontoquash,beinginterlocutory,isnotimmediately
appealable,[38]norcanitbethesubjectofapetitionforcertiorari.Suchordermayonlybereviewedintheordinarycourseoflawby
anappealfromthejudgmentaftertrial

AccordingtoSection1,Rule41oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,governingappealsfromtheRegionalTrialCourts(RTCs)totheCourt
ofAppeals,anappealmaybetakenonlyfromajudgmentorfinalorderthatcompletelydisposesofthecaseorofamattertherein
whendeclaredbytheRulestobeappealable.Saidprovision,thus,explicitlystatesthatnoappealmaybetakenfromaninterlocutory
order
AnorderthatdoesnotfinallydisposeofthecaseanddoesnotendtheCourt'staskofadjudicatingtheparties'contentionsin
determiningtheirrightsandliabilitiesasregardseachother,butobviouslyindicatesthatotherthingsremaintobedonebytheCourt,
isinterlocutory.
Hence,theCTAenbanchereindidnoterrindenyingpetitionersMotionforExtensionofTimetoFilePetitionforReview,when
suchPetitionforReviewisthewrongremedytoassailaninterlocutoryorderdenyingherMotiontoQuash.
RecoursetoapetitionforcertioraritoassailaninterlocutoryorderisnowexpresslyrecognizedintheultimateparagraphofSection1,
Rule41oftheRevisedRulesofCourtonthesubjectofappeal.
AssumingthattheCTAenbanc,asanexceptiontothegeneralrule,allowedandtreatedpetitionersPetitionforReviewinC.T.A.
EB.CRIM.No.001asaspecialcivilactionforcertiorari,[47]itwouldstillbedismissibleforlackofmerit.Anactofacourtor
tribunalmayonlybeconsideredascommittedingraveabuseofdiscretionwhenthesamewasperformedinacapriciousorwhimsical
exerciseofjudgment,whichisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction
2.No.
First,amotiontoquashshouldbebasedonadefectintheinformationwhichisevidentonitsface.[56]Thesamecannotbesaid
herein.TheInformationagainstpetitionerappearsvalidonitsface;andthatitwasfiledinviolationofherconstitutionalrightstodue
processandequalprotectionofthelawsisnotevidentonthefacethereof.
Second,petitionercannotclaimdenialofdueprocesswhenshewasgiventheopportunitytofileheraffidavitsandotherpleadings
andsubmitevidencebeforetheDOJduringthepreliminaryinvestigationofhercaseandbeforetheInformationwasfiledagainsther.
PetitionerwasnotabletodulyestablishtothesatisfactionofthisCourtthatsheandVelasquezwereindeedsimilarlysituated,i.e.,
thattheycommittedidenticalactsforwhichtheywerechargedwiththeviolationofthesameprovisionsoftheNIRC;andthatthey
presentedsimilarargumentsandevidenceintheirdefenseyet,theyweretreateddifferently.Theonlybasisforpetitionersclaimof
denialofequalprotectionofthelawswasthedismissalofthechargesagainstVelasquezwhilethoseagainstherwerenot.