Professional Documents
Culture Documents
-- A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section.
7. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases where an arrest can be made
either by the peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant.
The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his
presence". The key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge".
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the arrest made by the
constabulary without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that he was
a subversive was held unconstitutional, since there was no personal knowledge of
the offense itself.
The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the
former to be his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the
Miranda rule.
a. Strict enforcement of rule
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
F:
On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the appellant was arrested
while plowing his farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of
illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38 caliber revolver was
found buried under his house. Subversive documents were also seized from a place
near his house. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant had readily
admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. The appellant was found guilty
of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and the gun and documents were ordered
confiscated.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge that the crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be
committed, in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or w/in his view. There is no such personal knowledge in
this case. Hence the arrest of the appellant was illegal.
(2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure were likewise illegal and
the firearm and document are inadmissible in evidence.
(3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted ownership of the
gun and claims that it was he who pointed to the place where the subversive
documents were hidden. However, as the appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights at that time, his admission is inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec.
12 (1).] It is true that 6 days later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the
assistance of counsel, but it was then already too late.
(4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is the testimony of
Cesar M. and it is uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted,
but the gun and the subversive documents must be confiscated.
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)
F:
Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the desk officer of Sub-Station
I, namely, Michael Orbeta, who informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was
selling marijuana at No. 8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila and requested
that said person be apprehended. Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael
Orbeta, a team of policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the
house located at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on
board, a driver and 2 passengers, stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St.
They also saw a male person come out of the said house and approach and talk to
the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw the male person go back to the
house and a little later come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff
of a cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give
something to the male person. Pat. Pajilan together with his companions approached
the male person and the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as police
officers, they asked the male person, the tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to
bring out the contents of their pockets, which the male person, the driver and the
passengers of the tricycle did. The male person brought out from his pockets 2 small
plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves. The tricycle driver brought out
from his right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. Nothing illegal
was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the tricycle.
The appellant contends that the police officers had no personal knowledge
that he was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters
away from the alleged sale transaction. The arrest therefore was not valid as the
requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with.
Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
Ruling: YES.
The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was valid since it falls
under the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust
operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to
apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The police officers
were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious
stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after tests were
conducted on them. The attendant circumstances taking place before their eyes led
the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being
committed.
Anonuevo v. Ramos.
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is
justified.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was
still under surveillance. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines.
When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. They were asked to show
their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but they could
not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the
CPP by their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTCPasig. On 8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this Court.
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. there was no
previous warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that they were carrying
unlicensed firearms and ammunitions in their person when apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the info. filed against them are
null and void for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been
first conducted, is sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor
did petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the informations had been filed against them in
court.
IV
Ocaya v. Aguirre.
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal
PC-INP Command, armed w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a house
located at Marikina Green Heights, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head
of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Ocaya arrived in a car driven by
Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunitions for a .45
cal. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought to the PC HQ for
investigation, when O. could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the
ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig.
Rivera was released from custody.
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of these 2.
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is
justified. No. prel. inv. was conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she
refused to waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to R112, Sec. 7,
ROC.
V
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and Roque claim that the
firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents alleged to have been found in
their possession, when arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by the
military to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their
claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on the part of the arresting
officers that could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners
falsely, has been shown.
As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product
of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the petitioners.
VI
Espiritu v. Lim.
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of PISTON. Petitioner claims that at
about 5 AM of 11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa,
Mla., he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to
hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under
arrest. When he asked for the warrant, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in
their owner type jeepney. He demanded that his sister be allowed to accompany
him, but the men did not accede to his request.
An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed
against him.
In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E.
through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide
strike on 11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in order to investigate him,
but he gave the lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa magkagulo na."
Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in accordance w/ the
provisions of R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is detained by virtue of a
valid info. filed w/ the competent court, he may not be released on HC.
VII
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group
of men in Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regala who was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon questioning, Regala
pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of Bunye II. In view
thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police
HQ for questioning.
xxx
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan, Laguna, issued a
resolution denying the petition for HC, it appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an info. filed against him w/ the RTCMkti., MM.
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o warrant pursuant to
Sec. 5 (b), R 113, ROC, after he was positively implicated by his co-accused; and
after investigation by the police.
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a
crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
VIII
In all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of HC will not
be allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.)
On the Ilagan Doctrine.
As the Court sees it, re-examination or re-appraisal, w/ a view to its
abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the
better practice would be, not to limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n
the court w/c issued the process, judgement or order of commitment, or bef. whom
the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rahter, as the court itself
stated in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the court must inquire into
every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-- "from the moment petitioner was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;"
and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause
of our Constitution in fact has been satisfied."
These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds
upon w/c the arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by
probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/ Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note these
admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already
guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task
of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper
in a petition for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. code of 1916, w/c placed the
burden of proof on the accused to show that his confession was involuntary. Under
the new rule, it was sufficient that the confession was given under conditions w/c
accredit prima facie its admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place when the SC held in Peo. v. de los
Santos that "A confession, to be repudiated, must not only be proved to have been
obtained by force and violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects
the confession when, by force or violence or intimidation, the accused is compelled
against his will to tell a falsehood, not even when such force and violence he is
compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of Peo. v. Villanueva, the Court stated
"the admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the supposed illegal
manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission
contained therein.
The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence does not affect its
admissibility (Moncado v. People's Court.)
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases
(Stonehill v. Diokno) worked a parallel in the law of confession. W/o expressly
overruling its decision in de los Santos and Villanueva, the Court, in Peo. v. Urro,
went back to the former rule that involuntary or coerced confessions, regardless of
their truth, are null and void. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure
confessions. xxx
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional coercion will render
inadmissible even the most unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This
is not bec. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law:
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -- a system in w/c the
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and not by
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v.
Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
THE MIRANDA RULE
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the def. unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken to custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. xxx
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings to be given by police
interrogators bef. a person in custody may be interrogated, w/c have been adopted
by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has a right to remain silent. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege
not to be compelled to incriminate himself, to overcome the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere, and to assure the individual that his interrogators are
prepared to recognize his privilege, should he choose to exercise it.
2. The person in custody must be warned that anything he will say can and
wilol be used against him. This warning is intended to make him aware not only of
the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by
his interrogators, it is indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel.
2. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. 17, 1973, but before
March 20, 1985, when the decision of Peo. v. Galit was handed down, the rule is
that the voluntariness of a waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be
determined on a case-to-case basis, taking into account the circumstances under
w/c the waiver was made.
3. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20, 1985 but before Feb.
2, 1987, when the present Consti. took effect, the rule is that a waiver of the rights
to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must be made w/ the
assistance of counsel.
4. With regard to confessions given after Feb. 2, 1987, the present Consti.
requires that the waiver to be valid, must be in writing and w/ the assistance of
counsel.
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him, the Consti. says. No distinction is
made bet. confession or admission. Although the previous Consti. spoke of
confessions only, I have argued that it was not so limited but that it also embraced
uncounselled statements. For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it could
... never be used by the prosecution, in fact, statements merely intended to be
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
guilt by implication."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" conveys the idea that the
rule excluding evidence illegally obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used
in the exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. Does this mean there can
be instances, where uncounselled statements may nevertheless be admissible in
evidence, albeit, for a limited purpose?
In Harris v. US, it was held that although a confession obtained w/o
complying w/ the Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in
chief the confessor's guilt, it may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach
his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what
he had sold to a police officer was baking powder, as part of the scheme to defraud
the purchaser xxx The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation w/
prior inconsistent utterance
In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public safety" exception to the
Miranda rule. xxx. "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda
warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence." It held
that the warnings were not themselves Constitutional rights but merely
"prophylactic" measures to insure the right against self-incrimination. The Court
noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the giving of
warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in
turn to fewer convictions. It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving
of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to
avert an immediate threat to public safety. When answers are not actually coerced,
this social cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. In such exigent
circumstances, police officers must not be made to choose bet. giving the warnings
at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the warnings at
the risk that probative evidence will be excluded.
who is not an independent counsel. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations
of of Sec. 12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution which protects the rights of the
accused during custodial investigation. Suzette.
1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17,
1973
refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not
in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry.
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation
Police Lineups
Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988
Police line-up not part of custodial inquest
F:
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. The following day, he was
included in a police line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a robbery
case. He was later charged with robbery and charged. He moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without the assistance of counsel,
was unconstitutional.
HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner
was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. VV.
No valid waiver.
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing and
intelligent
F:
Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. The
prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who
identified a statement of the accused during a police interrogation and his alleged
waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. When Roca was questioned on
the incriminating answers in the statement, the defense objected, contending that
Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of counsel. Respondent Judge
sustained the objection on the ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived provided
the waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its
suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was
any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a lawyer but not that one
could be provided for him for free. VV.
Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a written confession
showing that he was apprised of his right not only by the police but also by the
fiscal, but that he waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.
assisted by one. These constitute gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case
of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial investigations: No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or of anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule, however, was laid to rest
by the SC in People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v.
Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one
who took no part, the Court was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in
Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling.
In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its charge of subversion against
Asis by means of her confession given in the hospital, in which she admitted
through a leading question, that she was a member of the NPA and that she was
wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld the trial court's decision excluding the
confession on the ground that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made without
the assistance of counsel.
Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be made (1) in writing,
and (2) in the presence of counsel.
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the prosecution
The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of the Miranda warning
devolves upon the one seeking to present the confession, that is, on the
prosecution. This rule applies whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule.
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC noted that the stereotype
"advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators automatically type
it together with "opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in
their handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the
accused.
Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by one entitled to that
protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution
must prove with strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession, and knowingly and deliberately manifested
that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that
confession.
F:
Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and
robbery of Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the
appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa
Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty of
parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made
extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions were
taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and
after two weeks of detention.
HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all
extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal
form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to
that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately
manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the
taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.
7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to counsel, but not
the right to be given "Miranda warnings"
The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are the effectuations of the
Miranda rights, can be waived.
What cannot be waived are:
1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For how can one waive
what one does not know?)
2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the right to remain silent
or to counsel.
8. Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary rule reads: (any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
"for any purpose in any proceeding."
There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One, to impeach the
credibility of the accused. Two, public safety.
Impeach the credibility
C. Right to bail
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
1. When right may be invoked
The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be
before or after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by
final judgement (which means after appeal).
No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so long as one is
under arrest. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
The case was unique in that after the war, the People's Court Act amended
Art. 125 of the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain persons because of the
impossibility of filing charges within the reglementary period due to the number of
indictees.
Bail and Habeas Corpus
In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition that the arrest and
detention, are valid, or that even if they were initially illegal, such illegality was
cured by the subsequent filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that
one be released temporarily from such valid detention, and this can be made
anytime after arrest.
In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that the arrest and detention
are illegal, so that the prayer is to be released permanently from such illegal
detention. When the privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention
remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to the victim is not available. Under
the 1987 Constitution, though the effect of the suspension has been considerably
lessened to the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise
the detainee is to be released.
The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales v. Enrile, that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the
right to bail. Habeas Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail refers to legal
detention, or even detention that started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a
case in court.
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a matter of discretion
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by reclusion perpetua.
It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt is strong. In such a
case, according to People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1966), the court's discretion to
grant bail must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by
the prosecution. Thus, the order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution followed by the conclusion on whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong.
The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (b) the evidence of guilt is strong.
With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 20), and the automatic
commutation of a death sentence to reclusion perpetua, it is contended that when
the 1987 Constitution denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, it is meant to apply only to those crimes which were once punishable by
death. For if it includeds even those crimes which before and now are really
punishable by reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very spirit of the
Constitution.
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991)
3. Bail in courts-martial
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991)
4. Standards for fixing bail
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; guidelines.-- The judge who issed
the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail
considering primarily, but not limited to the following guidelines:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty of the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 upon the accused to make
himself available whenever the court requires his presence, operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. The constitutional right to travel is not absolute,
but is subject to lawful orders of the court. VV.
1. Presumption of innocence
In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971), the SC noted that the requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary of the constitutional right
to be presumed innocent.
In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1980), a judge who allowed the accused
to present his evidence ahead of the prosecution, over the objection of the
prosecution, after the acused admitted the killing but invoked self-defense, was
reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in the order of trial violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence which places the burden proof on the
prosecution.
This ruling was modified by Rule 119, sec. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which now reverses the order of trial when the defendant admits
the act but invokes a justifying or exempting circumstance.
F:
De Guzman, Castro and Catap were charged with murder for the
killing of an unidentified person on Nov. 16, 1994. Only De Guzman and
Castro were arrested and both pleaded not guilty. They were convicted by the
court mainly on the basis of the testimony of Adelia Angeles. She positively
identified the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap who maltreated
an unidentified person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing
her, she testified that they untied the man and brought him towards the
direction of the Pasig river which was only 3 houses away. This was further
strengthened by the extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused Castro to Police
Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the victim and
that he and de Guzman acted only as look-outs.
Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of innocenec of the accused has
been overcome.
HELD: YES
Though there is no direct evidence to link the 3 accused to the killing
of the unknown victim, the circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec.
4, Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
resonable doubt.
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police Cpl. Cunanan, there is
no evidence that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify against accused. While it
is true that accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance of counsel,
hence inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the
accused established through the testimonies of persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). Moreover
in Peo v Alvarez, the court ruled that an extrajudicial confession is admissible
against a co-accused when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of the participation of said co-accused in the crime committed.
2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel
Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty (Art. III, Sec. 11.) No matter how educated one may be, he may not know
how to establsih his innocence for the simple reason that he does not know the rules
of evidence said the SC in People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952).
F:
Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was accused of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution had presented its
evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. After
hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal, the court held the
proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon counsel for the
defense offered to present evidence for the accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the
presentation of evidence by the defense, contending that the present procedural
practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from presenting any
evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation
and after said motion had been denied, and citing as authority the case of United
States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the
opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without allowing the accused to present
evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and sentenced the herein petitioner
to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present evidence after the denial
of their motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution
Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence.
1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present
proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error
which resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section
1 (17), of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is no law nor "procedural
practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before
being sentenced.
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the
case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the
case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court should
proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of
whether or not the defense had reserved its right to present evidence in the event its
motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course
if the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it,
the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by
the prosecution alone.
2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a
case like the present.
We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be
invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence
in his defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that right.
Such constitutional right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive
his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough,
and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it
has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the
sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas
corpus proceeding.
Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons
hereinabove stated, he may be held under the custody of the law by being detained
or admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. The
process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may stand should be resumed from
the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right
to be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the proceedings were valid
and should be resumed from there.
F:
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters
dated 14 December 1989, addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma
and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to
withdraw the appeal due to his poverty.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the
accused in a criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the
right to a preliminary examination. President Mckinley made the first a part of the
Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have
assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today said right is enshrined in the 1987
Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most important
to the person accused of crime."
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly
in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an
accused by a trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the
court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to
appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his
intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the
withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in
this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the
duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason.
After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." Justice should never be
limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its
scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to
favor one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts
to be more circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122
of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if
possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor
the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for
the accused-appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their
respective briefs, upon submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for
decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the accused- appellant
was charged with the crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant
Wilma Phua Rio, duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of
the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar and to the public.
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, he is expected to take
such reasonable precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his
professional guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a
transgressor of its precepts.
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he
was a counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional
responsibility owed to his client. The ethics of the profession require that counsel
display warm zeal and great dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to
pay him his fees. Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation
distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar.
4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation
The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply
with the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. As noted in Vera v. People, procedural due process requires
that the accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted and what charge he
must meet.
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
F:
Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Cebu.
After one postponement due to petitioner's failure to appear, the case was reset.
Again, petitioner failed to appear, despite notice to his bondsman. The court then
allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite the fact that petitioner had not
been arraigned. After the offended party had testified and presented documentary
evidence, the court found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed the decision. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and his decision is
void. Because petitioner was not arraigned, he was not informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in
any criminal proceeding.
5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
(1) Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from vexatious and
oppressive delays. Its objective is to free the innocent person from anxiety and
expense of a court litigation, or otherwise, to have his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time, compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatever legitimate defense the accused may interpose.
so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is
of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies
behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further
protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted
with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse
summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to
arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in
procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem
arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are
free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to
decency or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the
parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers
that the trial was held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of
this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public
was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the
Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though
is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black
in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no
matter with what offense he may be charged."
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least
fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without
objection on the part of respondent policemen. xxx
(3) Impartial trial
One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate who exercises cold
impartiality.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), it was held that a town mayor who
was paid on the basis of the fine he imposes for every conviction for violation of the
drinking laws, could not be an impartial judge. Under such a situation, he would be
interested in convicting those he tries so he would earn more.
Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial tribunal bound by the
Bill of Rights and the strict rules of evidence and procedure.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144 (1987), the SC held that a
civilian cannot be tried by a military court (in connection with the Light a Fire
Movement) so long as the civil courts are open and operating, even during Martial
Law.
6. Right to confront witness
The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to test the credibility of
the witness. The best means of confrontation is the process of cross-examination.
Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver of the right to present
evidence. Thus, if the accused fails to attend trial (which presupposes arraignment),
without any justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed with the presentation of
the evidence, and thereupon, the court may consider the case submitted for
decision. The court will decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's
evidence. This does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence because
it does not mean that the judgment of the trial court will result in conviction.
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), which further
ruled that trial in absentia applies even to capital cases.
HELD: The innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than
to enable a judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under
the conditions therein specified. It does not give the accused the right to jump bail.
VV.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present evidence and confront
witnesses
F:
Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five others, was charged with murder.
After arraignment, during which he pleaded not guilty, the case was set for hearing
on Sept. 18, 1973 but he escaped. He was tried in absentia. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the case against his co-accused but it held in abeyance the
proceedings against him in order to give him the chance to cross examine the
witnesses against him and present evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the
law and failed to appear during the trial? No. As we have consistently ruled,
jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues
until the case is terminated. The lower court was correct in proceeding with the
reception of evidence but it erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the
respondent. The court need not wait for the time until the accused finally decides to
appear. To allow this delay is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on
trial in absentia.
9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the SC held that (a) the accused has the
right to be present during trial; (b) if he is in the custody of the law, presence in all
stage is likewise a duty during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea, and (iii)
promulgation of judgment. This rule however has been modified.
As things stand, the following are the rules:
1. Generally, the accused has the right to be present at all stages the trial
(from arraignment to rendition of judgment).
2. If the accused is in the custody of the law, his presence during the trial is
a duty only if the court orders his presence to enable the prosecution witnesses to
identify him. (People v. Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military Commiission,
infra. modifying People v. Avancena, infra.)
3. Although the accused is not in the custody of the law (and more so if he
is in the custody of the law), his presence is required in the following cases:
a) Arraignment, regardless of the offense;
b) Entering a plea, regardless of whether the plea is guilty or not
guilty.
victim was infected by venereal disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the
accused was material to his conviction.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police
station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the
defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took
a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it
over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of
the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering
from gonorrhea.
Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has gonorrhea may be used
against him
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer
any questions, and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined:
seems no more to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence
of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his
objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result
showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by
Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his
person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been
taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the
clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished
evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection
to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of
even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken
from the defendant, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the
rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be
material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person
and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not
considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for
when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far,
the evidence if material, is competent.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person
shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question
before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical
control] in whatever form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to
shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the
authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by
forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential
articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion
that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec.
2263.)
The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine from his mouth (U.S. v.
Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)).
U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused
was compelled to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this was the
result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. To force a
prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring
him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other
articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng
case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his
guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of
Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person
accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in
order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)
The accused can be made to take off her garments and shoes and be
photographed. (People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)).
court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the
medical examination required by the court.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill
of Rights
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that,
an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that
torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with
its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to
the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.
The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the ones found in the
scene of the crime is allowed (People v. Salas and People v. Sara).
However, making the accused take dictation to get a specimen of her
handwriting is not allowed, for this involves the use of the mental process.
[Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937).]
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
F:
In connection with this administrative case, said respondent filed, six letters
which, for purposes of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37.
He contends that said six letters are the complainant's, but the latter denied it while
she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal.
Respondent required complainant to copy the letters in her own
handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The complainant, refused invoking
her right not to incriminate herself. The investigator, upholding the complainant, did
not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying the respondent's
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to make a copy of the letters in
her own handwriting
Ruling: No. It would violate her right against self- incrimination.
The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the
complainant to copy the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth
before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said
oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her. Were
she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later
that said documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to
evade prosecution for perjury.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is
positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner,
for some an even greater deprivation.
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional
guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and
more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even
those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief
Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light
of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be
legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold
that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.
In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege was held to extend to fact-finding
investigation by an adhoc body.
against themselves, much less their right to remain silent. The SC also said it
cannot be contended that the privilege against self- incrimination applies only to
criminal prosecutions. Art. III, sec. 17 of the Const. provides that "No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievance.
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
xxx
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
Free Market Place of Ideas
1. For the discovery of political truth
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-- that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616.
(1919)
The theory behind freedom of expression is the principle that ours is a
democratic society, and so the only way to rule ultimately is by, means of public
opinion, which is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out and
compete in the free market place of ideas.
2. For self government
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press
is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
3. For individual protection
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality, giving the government a
heavy burden to show justification for the imposition of such restraint. (New York v.
United States (1971); also in New York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v.
Publication of Pentagon Papers).
the case of public officials may or may not constitute a crime, so long as related to
the conduct of his office) and good motive.
C. Content-Based Restrictions
1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard imitation, the Philippine
Supreme Court, have evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of speech.
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body has determined
generally, in the exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve
such danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether
any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and itself, to
bring the substantive evils, is not open to consideration. In such cases, the general
provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its
natural and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925).]
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. When the legislature has decided
that one who advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot
intrude. As it evolved, this test was supposed to apply when there is a statute, in
contrast to the clear and present danger rule which applies when the speech is not
prohibited by statute.
Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. [Schenck
v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919).]
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the circumstances under which it is
uttered. The speech itself may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded
movie house.
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by
its improbability, justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger. [Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge Learned
Hand.]
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present danger. They both
emphasize the circumstances of the speech, but this latter test consider the
weighing of values.
Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees of free speech and press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation, except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such action.
[Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA
438 (1985).]
The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a) What words did he utter?
(b) What is the likely result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present
danger test for being top dependent on the circumstances. Speaker may, when
tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition.
Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake the delicate and
difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights.
[American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
The test applied when two legitimate values not involving national secuirty
crimes compete. Involves an appoint of the competing interest. (Gonzales v.
Comelec)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a question of balancing the
freedom of expression of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-and-present danger
test is over- simplified judgement unless it takes into account also a number of other
factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of
the occasion for speech or political activity, (2) the availability of more moderate
controls than those the State has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent with
which the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted in Dennis v. United States in the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
also invke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public
service. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them
and could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of good faith, the letter
was sent privately, directly to the addressee without any funfare nor publicity. As for
the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen
without known ties to newspaper, could have by himself caused the publication. It
does not appear either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. At any
rate, the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good
faith and without comments or remarks. VV.
preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race to their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words.
.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)
F:
Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a telegram which he sent to
the Secretary of Public Works requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of
the Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe that she has enriched
herself thru corrupt practices xxx." He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
his communication was privileged, but his motion was denied. He filed another
motion which was also denied. Thus, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition in the SC.
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by forty years a similar
decision of the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel prosecution must survive
the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free
speech and free press. However, Justice Malcolm in US v. Bustos was careful to
point out that qualified privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by proof of
malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his conduct, vis--vis
private respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of
conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be
entertained as the bona fides of petitioner. The prosecution should be given a chance
to prove malice.
c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
F:
Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a book written by
Rodriguez. xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie
on the ground that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family life,
including scenes about his mother, Maria Soto vda. de Gonzales, and a certain
"Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister
and mother, agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit, use and develope the life story of
Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the pictures," in consideration of P20,000.
Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to pay the balance agreed upon, he was
sued. Judgement was rendered against him by the trial court, w/c was affirmed by
the CA. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to enter into
the agreement only to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the showing of the
movie and the relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in the life of M.
Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being a public figure does not
automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a
person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how a public figure he or she may
be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the
the flag burning does not fall within the small class of "fighting words" that are likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace;
and (3) the state's asserted interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity does not justify the conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction
on expression is content-based, and thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny,
given that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical
integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but only against impairments that would
cause serious offenses to others and is aimed at protecting onlookers from being
offended by the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity, and (b) although the state
has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag, it may not
foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it and by
criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a means of political protest.
f. Movies Censorship
While prior restraint is the general rule, censorship in the movies is
tolerated because by the nature of the medium, it has a greater impact on the
audience and produces instant reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike newspapers
which are read by people separated by walls.
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the
censors wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that
movies are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that
censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only case
whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other
public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only classify.
media. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has a right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently overthrow it; and 4)
Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
h. Freedom of Information
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to, official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Access of official records (the docket book) for any lawful purpose (to look
into the criminal cases for a report on the peace and order situation of the
municipality) is guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the
custodian of the records.
D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [US v. O'brien, 391
US 367 (1968), adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)]
1. Regulation of political campaign
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
F:
Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented
from selling and donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA
6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to
freedom of expression.
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the
operation f media of communication and information. The fundamental purposes of
such power are to ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media
use of the street, (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a
statement of the duties of the rallyists.
The written application is filed with the Office of the Mayor.
Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the
application, then it is enough for filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the application. If he does not act,
it is deemed granted.
But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and present danger" to public
peace, order, health, etc., and he has proof of this, he should not deny the
application right away. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant can be
heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger exists, then he can
deny the application.
The applicant can then go to any court other than the Supreme Court for
the review of the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on
the petition. If the judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if the
applicant is satisfied with the decision, the judgment becomes final and executory
immediately, and no appeal can be taken by the local authorities anymore.
But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant, then he has 48 hours
from receipt to appeal to the SC.
During the rally, the police must be limited to maintaining peace and order
and so must stay away by 100 meters from the rallyists. They must be in full
uniform, with their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm except a
nighstick, but they are allowed protective devices.
If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the attention of the leader of
the rallyists. When trouble actually erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd
right away but first give a warning. If violence persists, they must give a second
warning. If still violence continues, only then can they fight back.
If a rally does not have a permit, the police can disperse the crowd, but they
cannot use violence. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and organizers.
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the members of their duty
under the law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities
in maintaining peace and order.
validity of the permit system has been upheld by the Court, provided, (a) it is
concered only with the time, place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on
the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the groups which could use
the public place and discriminate others.
As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of
Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be
construed to be limited to the time, place, and manner of the parades socially to
secure public order, convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party
a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by
the recent national election were still high and a rally to protest election anomalies
could only exacerbate the matter, was overturned by the court.
But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730
(1970), upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a
finding that everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed and business was
gravely affected because of violent incidents. It found the policy of the mayor to
allow rallies only during weekends to be reasonable.
F:
The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines
(MDP), an association of students, workers and peasants, applied for a permit from
the Mayor of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent Mayor denied the
application to hold the rally on the date and time specified by petitioners in view of
the events that transpired during the last demonstration held by them which ended
in the destruction of public and private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a
score of other persons and the closing down of schools, offices and many stores.
The Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for
its rally and that the rally be held during weekends and earlier during the day so
that it may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the ground that the same
constitutes a violation of their right to freedom of assembly. Petitioner contended
that the right of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior necessity of securing a
permit from the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without the
corresponding right to use public places for that purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit amounted to a violation
of petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly.
HELD: NO.
The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit
sought by petitioner. He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for the
peaceful assembly during certain days and time, and at a place when they would not
disrupt the normal activities of the community.
The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure
convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of
respondent Mayor to grant their application for a permit unconditionally.
Experience in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations have shown
that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the
peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies,
which, petitioner has manifested, it has no means of preventing. Charo.
In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the majority upheld the mayor's denial
of permit to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within
the town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with members of the Roman
Catholic Church, whose tenets are opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose
church is very near the klosk.
ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to be within
hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident
with members of the rival denomination.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), the SC found no basis
for the denial of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to
the street fronting the U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that the use of
streets is free to all. It found the fear entertained by city authorities that the
rallyists might be agirated by provocateurs to be unfounded, given the report of the
NPD that adequate security measures were provided by the police.
The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance of Manila prohibiting
any rally within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as a means of complying with
the Geneva Convention that requires the host country to protect the premises and
personnel of the embassy.
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any
group which applies must do so within a sufficient time so the authority can have
time to act: (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit, the applicant can
question the denial in the lower court, which can try questions of fact and law, and
(iii) appeal can be made to the SC on an expedited procedure.
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
F:
Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983
starting 2 p.m. from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed this petition
because as of Oct. 20, there was yet no action on his request to hold a rally.
HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment. There is to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits,
prosecution for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there is a "clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent." There can
be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither can there be
objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring
persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a procession is not
unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities are strictly limited to the consideration
of the time, place and manner and the authorities are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse a permit.
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), the SC upheld the power of
the city authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as
a form of "area restriction", in order to protect the President and his family, based on
the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the palace were almost stormed. The
rallyists in this case purported to merely worship at St. Jude's.
In case a rally is held in a private place, no permit from the mayor is
required. However, the consent of the owner of the place must be acquired.
difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class;" that it would be "to the best interest (of the petitioner) to work
with a faculty that is more compatible with her orientation. Garcia assailled her
expulsion for being unreasonable; that the reasons given therefor were invalid for
nowhere did it appear that her conduct constituted a violation of the school's
regulations and grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by mandamus to readmit
petitioner.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by institutions of higher
learning of the right to academic freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of the
students.
The collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as
the freedom of the individual members within it. In considering the problems of
academic freedom, one must distinguish between autonomy of the university, as a
corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher.
The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the right of each university
teacher to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic
work and in his capacity as a private citizen. This status of the individual teacher is
as important as the status of the institution to which he belongs and through which
he disseminates learning.
On other hand, the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university
are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions:
(a) admission and examination of students; (b) curricula for courses of study; (c)
appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) allocation of income
among the different categories of expenditure. It is the business of a university to
proviide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a university
prevail - to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.
For the above reason, mandamus is not available for the petitioner. There is
no duty on the part of the School to admit her to study since the School clearly has
the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space,
facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations.
There are standards to meet and policies to pursue. What a student possesses is a
privilege rather than a right.
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
F:
In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of the UPCB Highshool to
serve, among others, "as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective
teachers - provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting." However, the Dept of
Professional Education in Baguio was never organized. So, the BOR decided to phase
out UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation. The UPCBHS
Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the University from phasing out the UPCBHS.
ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher
learning such as the UP?
The clause prohibits the State from establishing a religion. In assessing the
validity of the law, the questions to be asked are:
a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it secular?
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion?
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive entaglement between the
State and religious matters in religion?
The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the State gives any manifest
support to any one religion, even if nothing is done against the individual.
It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions, for there may be atheists
who are not so favored.
1. Operation of sectarian schools
While the ownership, creation and management of educational institutions
must be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipino-owned corporations, sectarian
schools and those run by religious groups and missions board are exempted from
these requirements, provided the administration is in the hands of Filipinos, who
could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).]
RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by using its public school
system to encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice
wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. The prayer was composed by
govt officials as part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs. The
constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion
means at least that it is not part of the business of the government to compose
official prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious program carried on by
the govt.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit laws respecting an
establishment of religion and abridging the free exercise thereof, although
overlapping in certain instances, forbids two diff kinds of governmental
encroachment upon religious freedom. The stablishment clause, unlike the free
exercise clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion, whether or not those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing
individuals. It rests on the belief that a union of govt and religion tends to destroy
govt and to degrade religion, and upon an awareness of the historical fact that
governmentally established religion and religious persecutions go hand in hand.
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), it likewise
disallowed the reading of a passage from the bible without comment in public
schools as contrary to the Non- Establishment clause.
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated by a Pennsylvania
Statute or a rule of the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to
statutory authority requiring the reading without comment, at the opening of each
school day, of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's prayer by the
students in unison. The students and parents may refuse to participate in the
school exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities
of students who are required by law to attend school and held in school buildings
under the supervision and participation of teachers employed in those schools.
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated.
The establishment clause prohibits a state from placing official support
behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees
the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference to religious
training, teaching and observance, free from any compulsion from the State.
The test in determining whether a legislative enactment violates the
Establishment clause which withdraws all legislative power respecting religious
belief or the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY EFFECT of the
enactment. If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the First Amendment. To
withstand the strictures of the establishment clause, there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid. This
is particularly so where the State's recognition of the pervading religious character
of the exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of
the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as well as from a recent amendment
permitting non-attendance at the exercises, none of those factors being consistent
with the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument for non-religious
moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects.