CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.

L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]

Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence,
which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed
to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 1

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14078

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the nonChristian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of
American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which,
with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause,
in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power
of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the
political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject
now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to
resolve the constitutional questions presented.

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these
people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a
permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by
him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a
place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes
in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that
said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."

I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is
as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:

2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by
the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2
which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior,
on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions
of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 2

districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of
Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned
not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for
the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which
they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation
of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff
of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145
and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed
the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action
was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the
paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read:
Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various
special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section
69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will
later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order
to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government
of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first
of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these
"non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled
in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at
Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on
November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20,
1578,

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian
who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant
to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding
sixty days.

In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law,
and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end
that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with
great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these
purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious
persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles
V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which
meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was
resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and
separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual
and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that
which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having
realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have
entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 3

moderation the concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with
such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not
presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in
settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not
required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the
greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the
manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING,

VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to
remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order
or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that
the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving
information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests and not for
those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change
will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.

LAW VIII.
LAW XV.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF
THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of
waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long,
wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the
Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS
PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided
they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by
them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to
retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.

THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL

BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two
aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more
than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty,
there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine
others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards
and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At
Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on
October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS,
NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some
Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of
dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs
done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and
mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad
customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 4

goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby
order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which
should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take
great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the
ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds
(zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their
houses andhaciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to
separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the
condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones,"
is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881,
reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as
an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other
hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward
races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the
nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in
those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to
allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is
located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.

Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of
Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and
isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby
promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed
by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the
differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races
which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be
divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about
without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as
yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans
shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the
provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn
these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April,
and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.

It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and selfdenial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those
degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the
preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken.
Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have
not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all
the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of
the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the
appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and
schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards
the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the
first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights
and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that
in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those
previously indicated.

As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within
the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study
of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and
material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local
authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after
finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the
Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans,

4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only
in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose
the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of
these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the
bell.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 5

5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be
determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of
the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights
and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their
lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought
by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the
prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any
other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indiosshall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained
and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in
towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the
manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes
upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not
opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be
Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall
teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of
their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from thequintas (a
kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as
the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or
district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered,
shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town
hall, schools, and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with
the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when
the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the
putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious
attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the

Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the
organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they
shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and
cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the
military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the
zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful
accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to
my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military
authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the
southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall
conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a
council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to
the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the
chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official
centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the
best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later
expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 6

their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation;
and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to
prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic
Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a
legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the
Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and
the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The
Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department
of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to
appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the
Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec.
16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall
have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the
Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other nonChristian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province
of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for
the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the
organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic
Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.

Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United
States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos.
4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for
the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc,
Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No.
547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the
powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township
officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the
establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by
him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such
directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to
acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and
his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and
order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes
has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the
provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eightyseven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the
provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure
by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 7

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn,
Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes
retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words
are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are
also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of nonChristian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections
701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws
which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550,
1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394,
Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917;
and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No.
1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative
Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in
giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the
Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion.

In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last
Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M.
Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands,"
1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p.
107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain
what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the
twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to
that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first
section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only
in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province,
Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine
Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not,
however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who
are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this.
( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of
their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is
predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually
introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the
Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty
of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known
as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United
States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose
of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 8

provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of
the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et
seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253
charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference
to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for
bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a
tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who
surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of socalled non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without
compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the
fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked
extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called
upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine
Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had
these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special
Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General
and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were
originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who
have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered
Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The
number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of
them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people

having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they
could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the
Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which
the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical
purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the
benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded
to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to
govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the
opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of
the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p.
214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I
believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the
Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than
of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make
the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of
Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos
and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point,
who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that
persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that
all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal
relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all
others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 9

as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not
so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not
he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner
or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing
his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On
one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the
cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula
taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities
mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a
condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns.
Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad
ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their
tribal relations are not subject thereto.

the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the
tax for former years.

(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,

Collector of Internal Revenue.

(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,

Collector of Internal Revenue,

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part
reads:

Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.

In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula
taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the
purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands,
the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder
is hereby published for the information of all concerned:

The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue
Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue,
and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice.
Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.

Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that
they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes
may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life,
severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community,
belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same
law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so
attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from
other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same
rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of
eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a
man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the
well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and
connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called
"Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes
in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they
belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are
practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina
tribes.
Very respectfully,

The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been
baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain nonChristian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors,
does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable
under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting
the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person
in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the
person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No.
1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court
shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 10

With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of
the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its
natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether
Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of
the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in
the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common
Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction
based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which
later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act
No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized
tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to
give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions
base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P.
Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the
Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands
[1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes
that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive
Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands,
prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title nonChristian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive
officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious
belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands
of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census
of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los
nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:

In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It
may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it
has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt
this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino
languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the
name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were
pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the
"ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for
community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by
the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the
Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to
be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with
the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the
American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how
the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the
neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly
contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and
proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution
which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 11

position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in
Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and
since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and
of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the
Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United
States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed
and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land
itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples
without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or
any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was
the only mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private
persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians
themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been,
regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people,
with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the
laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States.
dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government
with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and
with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by
this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over
these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to
their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and
because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be
considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress
could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the
admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different

superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent
upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general."
Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were
treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official
supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only
does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes,
but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions
have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its
borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether
within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been
deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the
government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S.vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the
Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomasvs. Gay
[1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams
[1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co.
[1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla,
281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as
an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may
be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property.
(U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of
judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This
was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe
of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some
time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith,
and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government;
that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the
United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,
George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed
therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 12

Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and
return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had
caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment
by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the
Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the
Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the
court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of
Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian
country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer
upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon
the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is
wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough
to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be
upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge,
in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States
or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of
the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they
obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to
determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands,
is a "person" within the meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ
in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.

As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do
exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and
placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that,
when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and
for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere
to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists
for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate
this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature
has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not
bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney,
and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.)
The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of
section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 13

the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of
Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of
Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such
regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all
matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal,
especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the
rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been
treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In
the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See
also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S..,
364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914],
232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection
of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his
unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English,
and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of
'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs,
and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded;
religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional
guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants

according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of
legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of
to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be
enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality." (Yick Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual
is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession
of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a
refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to
keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what
one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of
the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person
is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist
with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 14

others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of
his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government especially of any
free government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that
will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving
the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under
the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to
Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as
are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including
epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to
choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster,
in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme
Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that
"every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a
judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not
requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law,
p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first,
that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third,
that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth,
that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling
Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is
due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of
the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.

In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are
ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277;
Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274;
Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It
is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law."
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural
rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are
also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of
the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones
[1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the
United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law
providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite
possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the
Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271
inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes.
Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition
of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The
term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in
fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 15

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their
freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if
section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this
moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its
weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the
government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on
rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the
great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the
right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
"There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government
belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government."
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally
deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the

Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the
site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the
work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after
the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly
unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the
results obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution
definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to
be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following
statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life
and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them
into political communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful
citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden
to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or
if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the nonChristian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the
non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized
Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 16

(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and
with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the
fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the nonChristian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in
order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given
to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to
organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the
control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude
and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with
their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the
Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the
more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the socalled non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674
in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards
the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement
and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate
means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social,
and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and nonChristian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of
the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates
advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude
upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these
people?

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and
to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method
was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing
situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same
class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few
reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that
the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men
are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are
Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and
Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain.
Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will
leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code,
because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If
immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and
its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and
order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State.
Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from
destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity
is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and
making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and
damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they
wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a
heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 17

There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going
from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal
caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that
they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and
do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as
to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any
measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will
mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery
without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed
in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The
latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The
progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the
signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens.
In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most
of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element,
believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and
challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall
we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of
ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in
their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time
will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making
them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become a
vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal
with our backward brothers.

The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that
they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a
school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that
their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living
together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do
services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no
involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living
a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one
place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving
about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering
from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to
concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam
all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner
of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long
to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you
can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them
politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach
a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he
pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example
from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the
same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and
other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless
people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be
the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into
whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress
these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out
the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 18

courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is
generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts,
it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the
accomplishment of its laudable purpose.

tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is
wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made
from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right
and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the
Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the
beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by
force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue,
the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to
restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class
attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive
can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be,
impossible for the courts to determine.

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called nonChristians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been
effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the
Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal
before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich
and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The
public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread
belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately
have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this
progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that
the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that
power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine
Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is
toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving
consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson
[1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents,
the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its
duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts
as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.

Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law,
there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145
of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to
the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would
lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume
towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to

_____________

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 19

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14639

March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application forhabeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in
this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty
if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if
we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of
such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary permit a
government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the
city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited
their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked
if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from
the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out
of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less
clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life
unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in
to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application forhabeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the
application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were
sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application
will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not
be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and
by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal
appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of
First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the
answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to
question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their
consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco
Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring
before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On
motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme
Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the
persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has
been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own
efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal
appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when
pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the
provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the
Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 20

showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to
Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the
Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at
liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers.
Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control
and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the
respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor
explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13,
1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that
the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of
the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao
acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before
the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who
had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns,
once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved
in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their
representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight
women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they
could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that
fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to
submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of
Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the
city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de
los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the
record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left

voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose
the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to
refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law
did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from
Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we
find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from
the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice
of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the
United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted
of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation,
which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city
to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense
lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to
be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system,
liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary
in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise
more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of
delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the
most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents
and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same
privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the
same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right
to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality
to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any
citizen.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 21

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer
to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates
in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee
[1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in
another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ
of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question
was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen
are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.

action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a
case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an
application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the
guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the
matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched
by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties
petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person
in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the
jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city
limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and
friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no
application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in
force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers
distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by
a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twentyfive and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and
press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance
of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good
practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a
hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that
the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women
might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 22

court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ
would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive
of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place
him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he,
the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should
be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do
so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor
and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act
with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no
effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ ofhabeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within

the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State,
who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley,
Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley,
J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was
predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will
hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on
the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have
been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its
many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna
Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits
and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be
discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life
and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt
they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment
within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our
jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its
jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the
right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is
directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former
except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and
set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the
means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the
ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary
to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the
guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to
release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being
beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is,
where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 23

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken
out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench
Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce
the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he
did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed
over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible
for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord
Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal
Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being
taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed,
unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be
shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the
issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an
answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does
not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts
have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the
purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But
the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there
has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience
to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect
the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo,
Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to
the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons,
with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and
that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that
Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas
corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered
that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be
otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released
upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged
in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United

States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly
[1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether
the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918.
The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically
one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of
Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor
of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of
his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not
be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally
resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived
the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to
show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a
considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail
until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case,
supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences;
and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much
more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 24

himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the
court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other
words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish
to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their
good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might
reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a
substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated
in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separatehabeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacenderoof Davao, and Anacleto Diaz,
Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless
when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a
valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body
of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt
committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888],
99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections,
we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has
flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law
of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating

circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would
seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city
government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike
from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses,
the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police
to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who
conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila,
was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ ofhabeas corpus issued by the
court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach
to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members
of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent
Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt
of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two
extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first
mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an
extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine
will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive such an amount is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office
of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record theReplica al Memorandum de
los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope
that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to
protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
___________

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 25

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L.
PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION, HON.
EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM), respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person
facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to
travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred
the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in
said business, but acts as president of the former corporation.
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his costockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment
of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case
No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and
a management committee was organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission
requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for
departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980
to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul
Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due
course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400,
assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 26

Judge Pronove. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of
P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said motion
and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated
March 9, 1982, reads:
Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all embracing ground
that his trip is ... relative to his business transactions and opportunities.
The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is discerned to
warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.
In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the
future until these two (2) cases are terminated . 2

Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14,
1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his
motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the
obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8 He attached the letter dated August
9, 1984 of the chief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr.
Marsden W. Miller 9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and
companies who would be involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on
August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the
ground that after verification of the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission ... (he)
was not in any way connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the date of the commission
of the offenses imputed to him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the dismissal
of the other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before him, ordered merely
the informations amended so as to delete the allegation that petitioner was president and to
substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. On
September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go
abroadpendente lite. 12

On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would allow the
accused to leave the Philippines the surety companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might
claim that they could no longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was the Court
which allowed the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court,
should the accused fail or decide not to return.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts
which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction
over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.

WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED. 3

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the
recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was
also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which
his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of
Appeals 4 seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and
Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him,
pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court
as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. 13

On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in
People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 27

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all
times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving
the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend
beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the
prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials
who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded
merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full
authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving
the state. 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the
court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of
the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right
of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total
liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the
country in the first place, if it were otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling
in People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the
following passage:
... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the pleasure of the
Court. ... The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable only when the
appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants
are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit provisional, is
indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the
granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence
expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the
country.
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced.
The rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is,
indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not
transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the
appellate court.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused
was able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and
the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would
comply with the conditions of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in this case has not
satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his
comment:
A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it is solely
predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly attend to
some business transactions and search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import of
petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of
judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity
for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged business
transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint
that petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from taking
advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that petitioner's nonpresence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice. 15
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has
agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash
indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the
surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it
will not take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or
affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may
be discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his
assent. This result has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until
after the final disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or
country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been
rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending
before said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his
travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no
abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to
have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had
satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 28

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order
as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the
Court finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
___________

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 29

vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29
June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set aside.

by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the
following circumstances:

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised
Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time,
he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28
July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and
reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's
failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent
People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a
hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and
scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor,
and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order
was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14
October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court
on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of
this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January
1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course
and to decide the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated
4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the
scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the
Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the
Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public
health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is
apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several
arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In
fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown

2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in person
before the Court;
3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been
issued against him all for the same reason failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than
enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No.
CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not
based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the
pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been
scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding
that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other
than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had
been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances,
of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against
him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules
(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel
(Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person
facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that
"An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending
(ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]).
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 30

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the
allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in
criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial
officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision.
Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the
effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at
all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to
travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function
of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987
Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down
long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired.
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or
when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health (Article IV,
Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them
differently, to wit:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel
only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof
by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued.
Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to
leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an
accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the
Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner,
Ricardo C. Silverio.
SO ORDERED.
_____________

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty
of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may
be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to
travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 31

The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals 4, issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the
recommendation of the Solicitor General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of
Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco Yap,
Jr., a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million Five
Hundred Thousand (P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz. :
(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until
final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court;

HIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141529

June 6, 2001

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set
aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed
conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months
of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to
one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed
twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty
under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated February 17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the
said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending
Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from
the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to
be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior
notice to the court and private complainant." 3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the
proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail.

(2) The Commission of lmmigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a hold
departure order against accused-appellant; and
(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court
for safekeeping until the court orders its return;
(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-appellant's bail
bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.5
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by
respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the
provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5 million.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the
provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.
The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and
travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively
denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at
P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 32

Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for
the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He
prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be
posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the
amount of bail he posted during the trial of the case. 6

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed to the Court of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the
severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of
the offense of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not
only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The
Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail,
it having been established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had
in fact left the country several times during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It
was also shown that petitioner used different names in his business transactions and had several
abodes in different parts of the country.

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.

As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the
Court of Appeals requires is notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way impair
petitioner's right to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence
during the pendency of the appeal.
Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court
which states:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the
same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with
notice to the adverse party.7
There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor
of allowing bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for
"humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission
he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the
court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. 8 The obvious
rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an
excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano,10 this
Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over
lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same
by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time
being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower
court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a
sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level.
There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the
circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must
have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath as he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach.
It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not
be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to
mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing
illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." XXX 11
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts
to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 33

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's submission that bail in the instant case be set at
P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August
29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is
P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court
has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of
state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, "merits attention, being in a
sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the
enforcement of criminal laws."16 Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but
should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal
justice.17 This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an
amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an
appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused
may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same.
Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to
report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements. 12 In the present
case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case was
pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a
hold-departure order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in
the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the holddeparture order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence
and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal
may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail.
13

The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the Court14. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 15 To fix bail at
an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil
liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
the appellate court.

It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital
offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years
and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused
must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. 18 In the same vein, the
Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact
convicted by the trial court. 19 In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's
disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise
discretion; thus:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to
bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in
the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.xxx 20
Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by
the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty
years --the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the
Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the
foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner
bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor
factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence
against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 34

Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the
area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court", claiming that the same violates his
liberty of abode and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving
the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order. 21 In fact, the
petition submits that "the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee
that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his
residence is already unnecessary."22
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. 23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer
look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode;
he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is
reduced from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, dated October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
_____________

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

CORTES, J.:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the
Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information
on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.
This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to
information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et.
al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed
under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and
other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory
right to information provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended)
was claimed by a newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access
to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering data on real estate
transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 35

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in
the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III,
Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development." The new provision reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167
[1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people
upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
(Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation
may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become
operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may
be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition.
He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any
clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in
securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part
of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party
aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully
excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines
vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved
party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the
duty or act to be performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this
suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual
interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is
a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made
inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).
But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case
upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very
nature, is a public right. It has been held that:
* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985,
136 SCRA 27, 36).
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held
that even those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of
the "public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of
Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:
* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every
person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character
in the particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted
distinction. *** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the
alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his
standing to bring the present suit.
2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the
part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of
Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining
the limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can
properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of
the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the
citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 36

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter
expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy
development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been
further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure,
this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof,
to wit:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).
In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared
as an imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative
acts and resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of
general applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We found occasion
to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada
v. Tuvera,supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied).
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of
public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized
in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It
is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted
before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without
discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to
lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of
public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In
the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in
which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered
lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to
make inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge,
to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case
of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said
administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow
examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge
that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We
absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by
him upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority
to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit.
A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access
to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be
afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which
only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the
government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is
to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the
exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs.
Ozaetal supra).
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by
the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical
exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is,
whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee.
3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern
is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy
(Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 37

that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time
(Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general interest aids
the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving
them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It
does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10;
and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows
that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern.
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold
otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is
in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard
Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens.
In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra,the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in
violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were
appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to
their eligibilities for their respective positions.
b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie
in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to
know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret
about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim
to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position,
the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any
person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
_________________

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 38

EN BANC
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 39

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO

BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN
"NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO
FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of
the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art.
IV, Sec. 6).

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed:

We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on
the matter.
Very truly yours,

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos;
and/or

(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE

(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or

To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:

(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. (Petition, pp. 4-5;
paragraphing supplied.]

[Rollo, p. 7.]

June 17, 1986

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:

Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City

June 4, 1986

Dear Compaero:

Hon. Feliciano Belmonte

GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila

Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President &
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of
June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We
understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be
furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve
this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial
institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 40

(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO

Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance
of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of
the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members,
were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After
petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees.
It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners
have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not
they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort
to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available
under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210;
Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by

petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the
GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of
this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of
whether or not mandamus hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to
be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which
involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing
loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the
constitutional right to information. In Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136
SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May
29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of
matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by
the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of
which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought
and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital
to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in
Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 41

were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the
obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the
press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of
access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's
monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is
in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its
will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted
in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and
honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is
further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of
full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern". As observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public. [Ibid. at p. 541]

In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information
was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the
actions and conduct of citezens. InLegaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of
the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the
GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer
First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay
the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees
to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended)
was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits,
the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were
above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through
mandamus proceedings,viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by
law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers.
It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 42

considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by
the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS
must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case
of Morfe v. Mutuc[130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr.
Justice Fernando, stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson
is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. UItimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute. state,
In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection
of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual
has become increasingly important as modem society has developed. All the forces of
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a
potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the abovequoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v.
Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the
party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of
its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121
Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31
L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to
be violated.

It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may
not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen
v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS
are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary
functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its
insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full
public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has
long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and
Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said
that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would
not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include
government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the
coverage of the State policy of fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 43

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" referring to the
transactions of the State and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the
various agencies, departments, ministries and instrumentalities of the government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis
supplied.)

interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to
furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty
of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform
the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA
443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents
and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as
petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of
inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
______________

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the
Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 44

G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991

MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE &
BIDIN, J.:p
At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the
constitution.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to
examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips
that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior
clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the
members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual
voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private
and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive
property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his
(the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 45

Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in
character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of
examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any
citizen seeking examination of the board's records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to
discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of
the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered
the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent
Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared
as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting
slips of the members.
Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred
the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment.
Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22,
1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on
the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier
approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that
his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of
MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board
"to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial."
Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to
unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board).
After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the
latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse
the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res.
No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).
The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to
ignore it.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following:
A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO.
10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.

B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN

UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF
1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF
RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD FAITH, IN
EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows
the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those
which are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989)
declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee
which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the
committee that reviewed the film.
Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having
failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a
party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative
remedies available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The
rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and
convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative
remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
ample opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the
error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The
applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative
review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v.
Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v.
Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine
Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466
[1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans'
Backpay Commission [1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal,
arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development
Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA
742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review
is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of
qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 46

The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect.
At any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the
administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior
to filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the
matter to the attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim
that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail.
Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve
the issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to
examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee
as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional
right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides
that:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions,as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional
provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also
Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing
films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the
motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private
and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person,
company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a
nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions
of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be
considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the
respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it
is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim

to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to
a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since
what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing
official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an
impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to
which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a
public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and
caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined.
The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made
dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right
would be rendered nugatory. As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]):
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It
is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted
before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy. (emphasis supplied)
It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld
the right to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right,
now constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law
mandates.
The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the
availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet
sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein
enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the
deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or
order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or
matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official
records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,supra).

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 47

We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent
Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed
especially those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree provides:

Committee of at least three Board Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant, within
ten days from receipt of the completed application. The Sub-Committee shall then preview the
motion picture subject of the application.

Sec 4. Decision. The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving for exhibition
in the Philippines a motion picture, television program, still and other pictorial advertisement
submitted to it for examination and preview must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days
which shall be counted from the date of receipt by the BOARD of an application for the
purpose . . .

b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await the
results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After reaching a decision, the Sub-Committee
shall summon the applicant or his representative and inform him of its decision giving him an
opportunity either to request reconsideration or to offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a
better classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in case of disapproval of the film or
denial of the classification rating desired or both, the reason or reasons for such disapproval or
denial and the classification considered by the Sub-Committee member dissenting from the
majority opinion may express his dissent in writing.

For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee composed
of at least three BOARD members to undertake the work of review. Any disapproval or deletion
must be approved by a majority of the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt of
the written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration in writing may be made,
upon which the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee of five BOARD
members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be
rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members so designated and present at the
second review session. This second review session shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the
Vice-Chairman. The decision of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered
within five (5) days from the date of receipt of the motion for reconsideration.
Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity
material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall state the reasons or
grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion picture intended for exhibition at the
moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or
subject matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its entirety.
The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving
or prohibiting a motion picture or television program in its entirety which shall be appealable to
the President of the Philippines, who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by an
ad hoe committee he may create or by the Appeals Committee herein created.
An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby created
composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to the President. The Office of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals Committee.
The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be final.

c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the
Chairman of the Board for transmission to the applicant.
Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. Within five days from receipt of a copy of the
decision of the Sub-Committee referred to in the preceding section, the applicant may file a
motion for reconsideration in writing of that decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman of
the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board Members which shall consider the
motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion, conduct a second preview of the film.
The review shall, to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the preceding
section.
Sec 13. Reclassification. An applicant desiring a change in the classification rating given his
film by either the Sub-Committee of Three? or Committee of Five mentioned in the immediately
preceeding two sections may re-edit such film and apply anew with the Board for its review and
reclassification.
Sec 14. Appeal. The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the second review
shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture in its
entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines who may himself decide the
appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the Office of the President for adjudication.
On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of
the same decree as follows:
Sec. 5. Executive Officer. The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief Executive Officer
of the BOARD. He shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties:

Implementing Rules and Regulations

Sec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. a) A proper application having been filed, the
Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit, designate a Sub-

(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by
the BOARD;
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 48

(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and
recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate
personnel; and
(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically
lodged in the BOARD.
It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato,
as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself
alone a decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or
television programs.
The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults
Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e],
PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board
calls for the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or
orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having been reposed by law
exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as mandated by
law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the
intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari a delegated power cannot
be delegated. And since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary
power with more reason the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power
for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject
of delegation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by
the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
_______________

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 49

related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
heirs." 1
The Facts

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and
MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents,
GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A.
JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people's constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Does this right include access to the terms of
government negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusion? May the government,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the
proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged illgotten wealth? More specifically, are the "General Agreement" and "Supplemental Agreement,"
both dated December 28, 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and
binding?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and "[e]njoin
respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing
any greement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to
make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the
public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery
of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and
(2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the
Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3 and the correlative duty of the state
to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, 4 demands that respondents
make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the
Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten
wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the
country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos
heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that
he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has,
PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the
Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said
Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant
to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with
their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their
assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the
Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum 5 to then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated:
This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press Release of 6 April 1995
that I have not authorized you to approve the Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 50

any agreement at all with the Marcoses, and would have disapproved them had they been
submitted to me.
The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not authorize you to approve
said Agreements, which I reserve for myself as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

WHEREAS, His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, has adopted a policy of unity and
reconciliation in order to bind the nation's wounds and start the process of rebuilding this nation
as it goes on to the twenty-first century;
WHEREAS, this Agreement settles all claims and counterclaims which the parties may have
against one another, whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate.

The assailed principal Agreement 6 reads:

GENERAL AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and between
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), a governmental agency vested with authority defined under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2
and 14, with offices at the philcomcen Building, Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its
Chairman referred to as FIRST PARTY,
and
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr., all of legal age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St., Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr.,
and Irene Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.
W I T N E S S E T H:
WHEREAS, the PRIVATE PARTY has been impelled by their sense of nationalism and love of
country and of the entire Filipino people, and their desire to set up a foundation and finance
impact projects like installation of power plants in selected rural areas and initiation of other
community projects for the empowerment of the people;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal of
December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines
provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been
able to procure a final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous of avoiding a long-drawn out litigation which, as
proven by the past 7 years, is consuming money, time and effort, and is counter-productive and
ties up assets which the FIRST PARTY could otherwise utilize for its Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, and other urgent needs;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein, the
parties agree as follows:
1. The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by, or held by other parties for the
benefit of, the PRIVATE PARTY for purposes of determining the totality of the assets covered by
the settlement. The subject assets shall be classified by the nature thereof, namely: (a) real estate;
(b) jewelry; (c) paintings and other works of art; (d) securities; (e) funds on deposit; (f) precious
metals, if any, and (g) miscellaneous assets or assets which could not appropriately fall under any
of the preceding classification. The list shall be based on the full disclosure of the PRIVATE
PARTY to insure its accuracy.
2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST
PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the
PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the
Philippines. However, considering the unavailability of all pertinent and relevant documents and
information as to balances and ownership, the actual specification of assets to be retained by the
PRIVATE PARTY shall be covered by supplemental agreements which shall form part of this
Agreement.
3. Foreign assets which the PRIVATE PARTY shall fully disclose but which are held by trustees,
nominees, agents or foundations are hereby waived over by the PRIVATE PARTY in favor of the
FIRST PARTY. For this purpose, the parties shall cooperate in taking the appropriate action,
judicial and/or extrajudicial, to recover the same for the FIRST PARTY.
4. All disclosures of assets made by the PRIVATE PARTY shall not be used as evidence by the
FIRST PARTY in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative case, but shall be valid and binding
against said PARTY for use by the FIRST PARTY in withdrawing any account and/or recovering
any asset. The PRIVATE PARTY withdraws any objection to the withdrawal by and/or release to
the FIRST PARTY by the Swiss banks and/or Swiss authorities of the $356 million, its accrued
interests, and/or any other account; over which the PRIVATE PARTY waives any right, interest
or participation in favor of the FIRST PARTY. However, any withdrawal or release of any
account aforementioned by the FIRST PARTY shall be made in the presence of any authorized
representative of the PRIVATE PARTY.
5. The trustees, custodians, safekeepers, depositaries, agents, nominees, administrators, lawyers,
or any other party acting in similar capacity in behalf of the PRIVATE PARTY are hereby
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 51

informed through this General Agreement to insure that it is fully implemented and this shall
serve as absolute authority from both parties for full disclosure to the FIRST PARTY of said
assets and for the FIRST PARTY to withdraw said account and/or assets and any other assets
which the FIRST PARTY on its own or through the help of the PRIVATE PARTY/their
trustees, etc., may discover.

IMELDA R. MARCOS, MA. IMELDA

6. Any asset which may be discovered in the future as belonging to the PRIVATE PARTY or is
being held by another for the benefit of the PRIVATE PARTY and which is not included in the
list per No. 1 for whatever reason shall automatically belong to the FIRST PARTY, and the
PRIVATE PARTY in accordance with No. 4 above, waives any right thereto.

ARANETA

7. This Agreement shall be binding on and inure to the benefit of, the parties and their respective
legal representatives, successors and assigns and shall supersede any other prior agreement.
8. The PARTIES shall submit this and any other implementing Agreements to the President of
the Philippines for approval. In the same manner, the PRIVATE PARTY shall provide the FIRST
PARTY assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any information it may have that could
shed light on the cases being pursued by the FIRST PARTY against other parties. The FIRST
PARTY shall desist from instituting new suits already subject of this Agreement against the
PRIVATE PARTY and cause the dismissal of all other cases pending in the Sandiganbayan and in
other courts.

MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR., & IRENE MARCOS-

By:
[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. 7
[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
Assisted by:
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.

9. In case of violation by the PRIVATE PARTY of any of the conditions herein contained, the
PARTIES shall be restored automatically to the status quo ante the signing of this Agreement.
For purposes of this Agreement, the PRIVATE PARTY shall be represented by Atty. Simeon M.
Mesina, Jr., as their only Attorney-in-Fact.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th day of December,
1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT

Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact

Petitioner also denounces this supplement to the above Agreement: 8
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and between
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), a governmental agency vested with authority defined under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2
and 14, with offices at the Philcomcen Building, Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its
Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY,

By:
and
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand R.

Marcos, Jr., all of legal age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St., Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr.,
and Irene Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 52

W I T N E S S E T H:

[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC

The parties in this case entered into a General Agreement dated Dec. 28, 1993;

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. 9

The PRIVATE PARTY expressly reserve their right to pursue their interest and/or sue over local
assets located in the Philippines against parties other than the FIRST PARTY.

[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA

Assisted by:

The parties hereby agree that all expenses related to the recovery and/or withdrawal of all assets
including lawyers' fees, agents' fees, nominees' service fees, bank charges, traveling expenses
and all other expenses related thereto shall be for the account of the PRIVATE PARTY.
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be
entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said
$356 million Swiss deposits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th day of December,
1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT
By:

[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.

Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact
Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 10 dated March
23, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from "entering into, or perfecting
and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating
to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth."
Issues
The Oral Argument, held on March 16, 1998, focused on the following issues:
(a) Procedural:

[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO

(1) Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition;
and

Chairman

(2) Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.

ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

(b) Substantive:

IMELDA R. MARCOS, MA. IMELDA

(1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and

MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR., & IRENE MARCOS-

(2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the
Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. 11

ARANETA

After their oral presentations, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

By:

On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the
Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention. They aver that
they are "among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the

[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 53

Marcos Estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litigation, Maximo Hilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit US App. Lexis 14796, June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of
December 10, 1997." As such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the subject
matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may
adversely affect their legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution issued on August 24, 1998, the
Court granted their motion to intervene and required the respondents to comment thereon. The
September 25, 1998 Comment 12 of the solicitor general on said motion merely reiterated his
aforecited arguments against the main petition. 13

In Taada v. Tuvera, 17 the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public a right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is
interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result of the action. 18 In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to
be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, 19 in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the
petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced "is a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land."

The Court's Ruling

The petition id imbued with merit.
First Procedural Issue: Petitioner's Standing
Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to
file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people
and [is], in truth hand in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would
constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest
is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets.
Besides, petitioner emphasize, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is
an issue "of transcendental importance the public." He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a
right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are "of paramount public interest;" and if they
"immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people."
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 14 such as in this case. He invokes several
decisions 15 of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the
subject of the case involved public interest.
On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents, contends that petitioner has no
standing to institute the present action, because no expenditure of public funds is involved and
said petitioner has no actual interest in the alleged agreement. Respondents further insist that the
instant petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has requested PCGG to
disclose any such negotiations and agreements; or that, if he has, the Commission has refused to
do so.
Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his
legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is a public
right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. 16

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 20 while reiterating Taada, further declared that "when
a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general
'public' which possesses the right." 21
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, 22 we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, the management and the operation
of the Manila International Container Terminal, "public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved." We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority
for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that
the petition at bar should be allowed.
In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot by the
intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The
standing of the Jopsons is not seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said
petitioners-intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a
distribution or disposition of the Marcoses' ill-gotten properties may adversely affect the
satisfaction of their claims.
Second Procedural Issue: The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for mandamus and one that is not
intended to delay any proceeding in the Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this Court
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 54

was proper. He invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and mandamus.

Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has been erroneously brought
before this Court, since there is neither a justiciable controversy nor a violation of petitioner's
rights by the PCGG. He alleges that the assailed agreements are already the very lis mota in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0141, which has yet to dispose of the issue; thus, this petition is
premature. Furthermore, respondents themselves have opposed the Marcos heirs' motion, filed in
the graft court, for the approval of the subject Agreements. Such opposition belies petitioner's
claim that the government, through respondents, has concluded a settlement with the Marcoses
as regards their alleged ill-gotten assets.

Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and
operative official acts, not to those still being considered. As regards the assailed Agreements
entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued,
because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the Marcos heirs have
failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein. Thus, the Agreements have not become
effective. Respondents add that they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another
compromise with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.

In Taada and Legaspi, we upheld therein petitioners' resort to a mandamus proceeding, seeking
to enforce a public right as well as to compel performance of a public duty mandated by no less
than the fundamental law. 23Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers
upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan,
particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the compromise Agreements is
pending resolution. There may seem to be some merit in such argument, if petitioner is merely
seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to
the public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public
disclose of "all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related
to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."
In other words, this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but
likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of
scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on "public transactions." This broad and prospective
relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141.

The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution
have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4)
other confidential information.
Limitations to the Right:
(1) National Security Matters
At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters. 24But where there is no need to protect such state
secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other
information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous
protection."
Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. 26

First Substantive Issue: Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not

(2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions

In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a compromise

settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the
following provisions of the Constitution:

The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security
matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual
Property Code 27 and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act 28) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure. 29

Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

(3) Criminal Matters

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 55

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension,
the prosecution and the detention of criminals, 30 which courts may nor inquire into prior to such
arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously
jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue
operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.
(4) Other Confidential
Information
The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using or
divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their
office and not made available to the public." 32
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed
door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court. 33
Scope: Matters of Public Concern and
Transactions Involving Public Interest
In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., 34 the Court emphasized that the information sought must be
"matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of
full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." As to the meanings of the terms "public
interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 35 elucidated:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the "legitimate concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles." So was the need to give the general public adequate notification of
various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Taada.
Likewise did the "public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by
the alleged borrowers (members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)" qualify the information
sought in Valmonte as matters of public interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v.

Morato, 36 the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit if their official
functions are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions
are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records.
Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are mandated to "provide
information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure
openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate . . .," except
when "otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest." In particular, the law
mandates free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices
and agencies of government and government-owned or controlled corporations; and the
statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees. 37
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official
functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of
governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine
whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully
and competently performing their functions as public servants. 38 Undeniably, the essence of
democracy lies in the free flow of thought; 39 but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so
that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able
to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and
effective manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
the people. 40
The Nature of the Marcoses' Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth
We now come to the immediate matter under consideration.
Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their cronies in February 1986,
the new government headed by President Corazon C. Aquino was specifically mandated to
"[r]ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
[to] protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." 41 Thus, President Aquino's very first executive orders (which partook of the nature of
legislative enactments) dealt with the recovery of these alleged ill-gotten properties.
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses
fled the country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the
recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad.
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who had
knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 56

penalties prescribed by law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from
otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.

MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction?

On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the
PCGG which, taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national
survival, required it to achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten
wealth.

MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.

With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there
is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. 42 We may also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very
nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten
wealth" refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of
their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, "resulting in
their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated
from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As
such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts.
Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
that it may be used for national economic recovery.
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to
respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses'
purported ill-gotten wealth.
Access to Information on Negotiating Terms
But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement? This same clarification
was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations,
which we quote hereunder: 43
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

Considering the intent of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on
any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications 44 during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.
Second Substantive Issue: Legal Restraints on a Marcos-PCGG Compromise
Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the government and the
Marcoses will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged wrongs done by them, as well as an
unwarranted permission to commit graft and corruption.
Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on entering into a compromise
with the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement does not violate any law.
Prohibited Compromises
In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following
matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any
ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future
legitimate. 45 And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. 46 A compromise is binding
and has the force of law between the parties, 47 unless the consent of a party is vitiated such as
by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence or when there is forgery, or if the
terms of the settlment are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may
be invalidated by the courts. 48
Effect of Compromise on Civil Actions
One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary object, is to avoid or to end a
litigation. 49 In fact, the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a fair
settlement. 50 As an incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who
shows a sincere desire to compromise. 51
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 57

In Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 52 which affirmed the grant by the PCGG of civil
and criminal immunity to Jose Y. Campos and the family, the Court held that in the absence an
express prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is applicable
to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of EO No. 14 particularly the just
and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used to hasten economic
recovery. The same principle was upheld in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television
Stations RPN, BBC and IBC 53 andRepublic v. Benedicto, 54 which ruled in favor of the validity of
the PCGG compromise agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto.
Immunity from Criminal Prosecution
However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not
automatically terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the
malefactor. 55 While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no
similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically
conferred. In the present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was confered on PCGG by
Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, whci provides:
Sec. 5. The President Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation
conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent,
defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any
case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or
his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who
repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
Commission.
The above provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise such authority under these
conditions: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or
testifies in an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony
pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused acquired or
accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain
or prove guilt or civil liability of such individual. From the wording of the law, it can be easily
deducted that the person referred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent,
defendant or accused.
Thus, in the case of Jose Y. Campos, the grant of both civil and criminal immunity to him and his
family was "[i]n consideration of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos [with] this
Commission, his voluntary surrender of the properties and assets [] disclosed and declared by
him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos [] to the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines[;] his full, complete and truthful disclosures[;] and his commitment to pay a
sum of money as determined by the Philippine Government." 56 Moreover, the grant of criminal
immunity to the Camposes and the Benedictos was limited to acts and omissions prior to

February 25, 1996. At the time such immunity was granted, no criminal cases have yet been filed
against them before the competent court.
Validity of the PCGG-Marcos Compromise Agreements
Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. First, the Agreements do not
conform to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal immunity
under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate
of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. As stated earlier, the provision
is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent,
defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses "shall provide the [government] assistance
by way of testimony or deposition on any information [they] may have that could shed light on
the cases being pursued by the [government] against other parties," 57 the clause does not fully
comply with the law. Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an afterthought,
conceived in pro forma compliance with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended. There is no
indication whatsoever that any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information against
any respondent or defendant as to the manner in which the latter may have unlawfully acquired
public property.
Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
Construction. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. 58 Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution,
specifically provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no
power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten
wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes on their
properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill
of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute
class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and
equitable." 59
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal
revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable
doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position
demonstrates a clear inability to pay. 60 Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the
Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims
against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 58

tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This
power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or
(2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax
due. 61 In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the determination of
the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have
been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised. 62
Third, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs,
pending before the Sandiganbayan and other court. 63 This is a direct encroachment on judicial
powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case
has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance
lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which
the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within
the sound discretion of the government prosecution; 64 but the court decides, based on the
evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the
trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the
information or to dismiss the complaint. 65 The prosecution's motion to withdraw or to dismiss is
not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the trial court to
make its own evaluation of the merit of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to
effecting a disposition of the case itself. 66
Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the
dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal
is not within its sole power and discretion.
Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past, present, or
future, matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. 67 Again, this ill-encompassing stipulation is
contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. 68 The
stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the
Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes. Such vague and broad statement may well be
interpreted to include all future illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a
license to perpetrate fraud against the government without any liability at all. This is a palpable
violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively
ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public
accountability. It is a virtual warrant for public officials to amass public funds illegally, since
there is an open option to compromise their liability in exchange for only a portion of their illgotten wealth.

Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets
shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the
Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356
million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains
only to the said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other
properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75
percent sharing ratio. Public officers entering into an arrangement appearing to be manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the Ati-Graft and Corruption Practice
Act, 69 invite their indictment for corruption under the said law.
Finally, the absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express
condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as
detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and Supplemental
Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos
heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL
AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and
all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in
the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED
to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions
embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
____________

Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the
parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit
an inventory of their total assets.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 59

EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250

July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA"
for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay
and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The
petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation.
The Facts
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 60

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed
a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for
brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated
itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." 1 On the
same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" 2 under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend
its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned
by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December
29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP
as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit
price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention
and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing
required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in
favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of
land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been
sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of
approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in
the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three
Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of
reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial
Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on
April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million
Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters
or 157.841 hectares.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate
Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA
seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government
has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order
No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of
Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of
Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, 9 and the Government Corporate Counsel. 10 The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the
Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there
were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President
Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio
Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the
case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation
of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss
of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 61

After several motions for extension of time, 13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October
19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI
contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on
oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999,
which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended
JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then
President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that
on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." 14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT
AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE
PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic
because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going
negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from
"privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI."

PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished
petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and
conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a
public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on
March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May
28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fasttracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue.
Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of
judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and
AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in
the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of
the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to
private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the
Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such
unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title
and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a
single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to
insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to
safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In
the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent
the transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of
AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973
Constitution,18 covered agricultural landssold to private corporations which acquired the lands
from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right
to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles 19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141
("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public
corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes
by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain
undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase.
Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 62

by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of
imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the
deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December
31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions
of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses.
The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entirereclaimed area to raise
financing for the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from
the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual
questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the
public.22 The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the
case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction
of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary
jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly
certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's
direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also
violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
23

PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera where the Court granted the petition
for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of the
President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the
Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code 24 and
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 25 to publish the presidential decrees. There was,
therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from the Office of the
President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly
information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of
petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, 26 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal

duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended
JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had
an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal
duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional
question.27 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held
by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain
to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative
duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he
will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA.
Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA
to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is
the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose
publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which
the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to
prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in
violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus "Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is
an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a
right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several
decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the
subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 63

In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object
of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested
in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be
informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must
be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the
petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general
'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering
the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and
the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the
disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the
petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that
the petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters
of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of
public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized .
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law." (Emphasis supplied)

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis
supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of
freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and
decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public
officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people," 29 for unless citizens have the proper
information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court inValmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent
that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does
not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following
discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 64

Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
32

Mr. Suarez: Thank you." (Emphasis supplied)

AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right.
Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will
degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will
hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release
to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without
demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property.
These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed
of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price
and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the
start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the
Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any
citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken
by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information.
While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or
decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this
moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the nonproprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court
ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon
the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe
the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on
matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information." (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose
its defects.1wphi1.nt

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may
be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This
negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the
framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposedcontract, effectively
truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a
constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely:
(1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and
decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category
refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or
officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether
raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government
policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference
and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the
right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents
and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right
must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also
subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers. 36 The right does not also apply to information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused,
which courts have long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried
open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power.39 This is not the situation in the instant case.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 65

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of
the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he
disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The
Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil
Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and
disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission
enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the
sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On November 7,
1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public
Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within
the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. 44 The
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which
provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by
the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of

the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking
the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve
ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private
individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast,
property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and
open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial
activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public
dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense
of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense
before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties. 45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of
reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title
to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or
filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the
Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the
City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or
reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 66

blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans
of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.

productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the
public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes
will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x x.

Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore,
subject to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order
prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands.
Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer
needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government
reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other
public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were
available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No.
1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government
permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land
Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;

(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of
to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the
same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this
chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the
provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public
domain into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the
Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of the
Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall be classified" as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands,
however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive nonagricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify
inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These
provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the
public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as
well as other non-agricultural lands.

xxx

Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of
these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the
public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in
Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to
private parties.

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited or classified x x x.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 67

service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of
these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public
service.

corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that
were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:

Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section
56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell to private
parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their
sale.49

"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public

agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual
acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in
excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four
hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an
individual, private corporation, or association." (Emphasis supplied)

Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section
5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with
government permission remained private lands.

Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act
No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of retaining
for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain.

Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution

On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people.
The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that

"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands,
considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat,
available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could
alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural
lands.50 However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as
disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because
of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could
therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly

On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public
domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into
"alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President
to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that
the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially
delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, 53 for the
purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 68

manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized
by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare
them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or
quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of
the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to
any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for
agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed
of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary
for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class
(d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of
Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to
private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59
(d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands,
however, became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these
lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended
for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall

be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA
No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply
with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, 54 unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these
provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the
control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national
government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919
and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be
"disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This
requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore
and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of
the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land remained property of the State ." (Emphasis
supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in
CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore
lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands
became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and
classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. 56 These
lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the
government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government
reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands
classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural
purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands
under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or entities
could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 69

"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such
sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided,
however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said
entities conducive to the public interest;but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a
province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized
by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted
government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired
from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these
lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the
transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to
circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition
in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to
private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands. 57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA
No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide
as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public
purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the
Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such
authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as
in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the
highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. 58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with
government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if
classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA No.
141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950

The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion
found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer
needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial
property of the State.59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is
governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion
those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for public service
or the "development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the
national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian
doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any
of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain."
In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except "public
agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution
encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain. 60 If
the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the
classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 70

therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain
unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and
development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the
public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified
individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No
private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber or
forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares.
However, such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public
domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable
lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter.
Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other
means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient,
economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes
for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:

xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by
statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal,
ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of
the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the
tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the
tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain 63 and are
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government
corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private
corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the
public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus,
PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative
authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted
to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian
doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and
except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be
alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that

(a)To prescribe its by-laws.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 71

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares
in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to
the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of
the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of
the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease,
alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in
the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable public
lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the
cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large
landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where
the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel
stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural
lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'ownercultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the
instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have
simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire.
The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more
than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not
more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the
name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would
inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would
prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation
to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals
from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the
constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation
on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only
a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional
intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The
available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to
grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the
practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three
properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo
Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441
square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 72

3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and
further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of
the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares
are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's
"actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own
expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the
reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI
and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net
usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent
earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5
hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides
that
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or
conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation
Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery
of the proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x;
provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to
AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to
AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining
to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint
venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas
in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland
Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby
granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the
Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and
its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the
Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view
of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum, 67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed
lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task
Force concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of
ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which
PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating the
Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by
lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII, 70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose
ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources"
and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be
alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 73

proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. 71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified."72 The President has the
authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive
Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the
Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the
Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that,
under Article 42274of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until
formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66
SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for
lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19,
1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for
the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April
9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and
7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of
certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in
the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance
of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed
the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The
government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom
Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the
reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the
public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural

resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the
public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the
works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State
may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by
the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of
the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea
only with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only
if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one
could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of
public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed
land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State.
Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not
acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like
the sea it replaced. 76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored
principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on
the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain
must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them. These
lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes. 78 Moreover, the contract between
CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which
barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private
corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the
reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the power to
reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under
water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of
areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 74

contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a
contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National
Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government,"
which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any
person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation
services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of
portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in
kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to
disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public
domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned
by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when
actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural
lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate.
Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public
services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the
functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other
kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary
sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be
necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper
use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its
properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or
service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public
services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall

be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the
PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under
EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing
agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public
domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests."79 Since
large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there must
be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from
those still needed for public service.1wphi1.nt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
of the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or
not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525,
vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the
following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands,
mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees,
charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits,
concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the development,
exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over
all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our
natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or
violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the
conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification,
surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises
"exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain."
Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 75

Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before
PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain.
Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under
Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so
classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the
lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then
DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance
with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while
PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water,
whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of
the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed
by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official classification and
formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83of CA No. 141 and other
applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public
Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a
branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x
x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in
behalf of the government by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the
Government. The Court declared that -

"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress.
It requires executive and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract
for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same
area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the
Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the
rights and interests of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant
to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the
aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue
in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with
an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall
execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of
the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or
his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided
for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration
Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that "Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be
responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from
the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA
"shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of
its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the
charter of PEA.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 76

PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled
and/or operated by the government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA
charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial
lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals
since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales
and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits
only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by
PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private
corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions
of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct
a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections
63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from
holding a public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by
authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the
disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law.
Executive Order No. 654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment
for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public
auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and
in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding.
Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no
longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the
head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned
and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be
valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of the
proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other

authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official
Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation , or
where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted
for a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In
the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price
as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. 90 The Commission on Audit implements
Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-296 91 dated January 27,
1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public
auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred
from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA
imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged
areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional
reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. 92No one, however, submitted a bid. On December
23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands
through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public
bidding on December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the
additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim
another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area
to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area
publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more
than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation
in the country had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and
clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by
PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the
constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any
infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of
its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be
repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such
as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 77

constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis
supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT
project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes
local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind
consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist
of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that
of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even
though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a
corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the
contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12
hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the
legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT
Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public
respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is
echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the
eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and
converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend
that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the
157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support
of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land
ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over which the Director of
Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -

"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic
Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of
Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled "While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so
long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive
control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be
part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were
issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the
public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the
whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land
grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging
to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated,
granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become
registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding
certificates of titlesissued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of
Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the
land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration
under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to
Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National
Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings
and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court
affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center
under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered
under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a
wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No
patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of
Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is
that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 78

certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private
corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or
public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely
evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring
ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had
prior to the registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the
alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to
government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made
subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by
then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in
conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the
Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical
description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD
No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale
of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien
affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104Alienable
lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain
public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law
authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional ban.
Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No.
141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands
can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory
if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of
a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to
acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are
concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government
to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that

"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525

Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all
Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be
undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with
national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy
to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to
the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which
shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government
corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in
promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to
reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and
offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do
hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation
of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with
any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency or
entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being
leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain.
Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In
the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 79

Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as
well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private
lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not
automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA
has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction.
This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in
corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very
evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear
direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private
corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands. 105 The 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution
has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD
No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize
lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD
No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section
103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government of
the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall
become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated,
granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of
this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No.
1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.

Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province,

municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No.
141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such
registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the
land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or
encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents
the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to
qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may
be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in
behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any
political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf
may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country.
Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport may also be
titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property
donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in
the name of the municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and
if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no
requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens
System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become
unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes
the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of title
covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is
expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall file for
registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by
an adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the number of the
certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken
shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is
taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province, city,
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 80

The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate
of title shall be for the account of the authority taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis
supplied)

qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or
patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.

AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom
Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of
AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for reimbursement
of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works
performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA
is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the
issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of
AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the
reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the
reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, 108 the
Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas
form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted
pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or
public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural
resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such
equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of
inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on
alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares 111 of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is
contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void
from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this
last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of
factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
__________

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 81

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN
VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.,
defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 82

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known
as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following
day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic
Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act
No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4
of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action
was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in
view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the
Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him
from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the
collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875,
Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial
conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the
defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the
costs of this action. 3

I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.
II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500
as attorney's fees and the cost thereof.
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union contented,
firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the very
phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all
those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization" 4 ,
"prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect
prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of
their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935
Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the
obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective
bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer from
its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a condition
of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union
of dues from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such
members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious
sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7)
of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no
rights or protection to labor organizations. 8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision that
"no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise
of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under
the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his
religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to be
able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of laws"
clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from
the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said
members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from
union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of
all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10

From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law,
assigning the following errors:
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 83

Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision
regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective bargaining
agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared
unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as employers would prefer
to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor
organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate
the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not to
join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membership
therein, and the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers
to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act does not impair the obligation of contracts for said
law formed part of, and was incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15that the
Act does not violate the establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State, for
Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodated the religious needs of those workers
whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and balanced the collective
rights of organized labor with the constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his
chosen religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy and
preference over union security measures which are merely contractual 16 ; that said Act does not
violate the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the
Act depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the
purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally, does
not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to
equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious
beliefs." 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to premise that
there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where
questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are
indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will
be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19

1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of
such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor
unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be
deduced by necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having
thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6)
of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of
1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the
right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial
Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding
the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature
and contents of a "right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of
legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an
association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join
or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which
association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power
to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. 20 It is clear, therefore,
that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as
what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the
employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law
also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does
not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining
is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed
shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the
contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization"
the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 84

be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining
union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350
introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the
following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350
merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the
employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any
labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the
assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds
and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with
labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to
affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to
their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of
its contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a
condition for employment for all permanent employees workers". This agreement was already in
existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it cannot,
therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this
amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his
job even if he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company
could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act,
therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union security clause; the Company
was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing
only Union members in permanent positions, It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was
indeed an impairment of said union security clause.

According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the contract,
or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement,
impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or
manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part
of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by law from its
performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on laws which, without destroying
contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is
not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring
construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 24 In spite of the
constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests
of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate
contracts already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to
any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in
reference to the possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable reforms
may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that
which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are
worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society. The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but
also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the
vital interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing
a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed
in the legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract
rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating relations
between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being
impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of
contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also held that
the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a contract that required the
employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the law having been enacted to secure
the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise
of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no
unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity
of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be
determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 85

sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the
means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted
must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony
with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to
insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and
the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two
aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual
employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power
collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union,
an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual
employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee
rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with
management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also
needs protection the collective bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to
House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of his religious
beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor organization although he possesses
all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a
doctrine he has a right under the law to believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to
flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any labor organization.
Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest
means of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or belief. 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose
exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements is
reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is
superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The
Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the
First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the
constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal
right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights,

therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional, appellant
Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation
of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets
or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's
chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion
clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. 36 Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its
power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be
precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would
be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand
the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No.
3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion)
clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious
or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be
dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find
gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a
valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 86

protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so
now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers. 42

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a fortiori to a
labor union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a
goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A desirable end
cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the
protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement,
and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a
certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of
society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not
directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption
may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The
"establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The free
exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be
preferentially aided. 44

4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is
not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act
require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a
labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such
religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive act to exercise the right to join or to resign from the
union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious
religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor
union he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may
have entered into. How then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when
no right need be exercised?

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of
the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons,
of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed
that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly,
Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every
conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with
scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"
intervenes.45 In the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.

We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No. 3350, and
that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion
of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in
itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49

Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain religious sects,
it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of
Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are
amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence
of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the
validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact
that the law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and remain
members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather
than help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance
spread to other workers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than
political and philosophic objections.

5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation,
inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other
workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial
to any person of the equal protection of the laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 87

because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 54 This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55

war, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other religious
beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial
distinctions.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical
nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions,59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.

Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the
time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of
time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is
applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor
union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor
unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.

We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act
classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up
with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There
is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not
believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons.
Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all
times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many views that
comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in
which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the
country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and
these differences are important and should not be ignored.
Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important
differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they
carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules. of human conduct
and the justification of certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in
their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or
unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in
a religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to
them than their religion, or their not having any religion. Because of differences in religious
belief and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better than the rich, and the man
who even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible
luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable
and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in
religious beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law
is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from
being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union
shop security agreements.

Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its
provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by
itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them
their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in
the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor
unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently situated, are not
granted the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification
allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of
the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification
otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in
some inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope
of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to
be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may
occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision
on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the
people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of
those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being
deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure
is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited it is
sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 88

Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the
community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a religious
sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security
in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop
agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the proper economic and social equilibrium
between labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from
the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements and equalizes,
in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor
unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not
imply social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations
depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality
because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations based on
personal or natural conditions. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is
precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers, irrespective
of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No.
3350 is not called for in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this
matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason,
unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are
unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in
question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by
the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it
may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that unless the Act is
declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do
not agree. The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of
the religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. But there is really no occasion
now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At
any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by
which the validity of a statute is to be measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union argued that the
decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein
the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights under the union
shop provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order
also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually
dismissed by the defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72

In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case there was
really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its
membership in the union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted
intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect
his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704
and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by appellant
provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a labor
organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or on behalf of such
organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only that
such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is in restraint of
trade or interferes with the trade, business or employment of some other person or with the right
of some other person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed for appellant sought the
discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of
Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor
dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor
dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot
be "an act done ... in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor
union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial
dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No.
875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at the time when
Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The article
provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any
other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's
act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being
dismissed from his job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be
allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26, 1965, of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against appellant Union. It is so ordered.
___________
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 89

EN BANC
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member
of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest,
the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt
are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the
vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that
it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may
not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On
November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors,
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 90

the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On
January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue
until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required
the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply
to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was
set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 3

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered,
there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it
would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to
certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his
pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously
sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that
his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment
visited on him was more than justified.

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found
in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession
and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two
years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken
into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for
contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the
power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that
such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No.
526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta,
et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine
Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on
his part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating
character invoked the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the
welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently
undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the
causes entrusted to him.

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
________________
EN BANC
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 91

G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998

UNITED
PEPSI-COLA
SUPERVISORY
UNION
(UPSU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES,
INC. respondents.

Two questions are presented by the petition: (1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and (2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it
prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III,
8 of the Constitution.
In resolving these issues it would be useful to begin by defining who are "managerial
employees" and considering the types of "managerial employees."
Types of Managerial Employees

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed
a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial
employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of
the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization
of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their
own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order dated August 31, 1995, as
reiterated in the order dated September 22, 1995, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Its
petition was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing that respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for
resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares
managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, 8 of
the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

The term "manager" generally refers to "anyone who is responsible for subordinates and other
organizational resources." 1 As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid:
Top management

Middle
Management

First-Line
Management
(also called
Supervisor)
====================
Operatives
or

For this reason, the petition was referred to the Court en banc.
Operating
The Issues in this Case
Employees
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 92

FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are

responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line
managers direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers. Examples of
first-line managers are the "foreman" or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the
technical supervisor in a research department, and the clerical supervisor in a large
office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS The term middle management can refer to more than one level in an
organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those
of operating employees. Middle managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the activities
that implement their organizations' policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with
the capacities of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a
middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top
management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes
operating policies and guides the organization's interactions with its environment. Typical titles
of top managers are "chief executive officer,""president," and "senior vice-president." Actual
titles vary from one organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to membership in
the highest management classification. 2
As can be seen from this description, a distinction exists between those who have the authority to
devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and
those whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file
employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from
the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such
rank-and-file employees.
"Managerial employees" may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the
"managers" per se, who compose the former group described above, and the "supervisors" who
form the latter group. Whether they belong to the first or the second category, managers, vis-avis employers, are, likewise, employees. 3
The first question is whether route managers are managerial employees or supervisors.
Previous Administrative Determinations of
are Managerial Employees

the Question Whether Route Managers

It appears that this question was the subject of two previous determinations by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, in accordance with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.
In Case No. OS-MA-10-318-91, entitled Worker's Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc., decided on November 13, 1991, the Secretary of Labor found:

We examined carefully the pertinent job descriptions of the subject employees and other
documentary evidence on record vis-a-vis paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and we find that only those employees occupying the position of route manager and
accounting manager are managerial employees. The rest i.e. quality control manager,
yard/transport manager and warehouse operations manager are supervisory employees.
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of managerial
attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles
of positions are not controlling. In the instant case, nothing on record will support the claim that
the quality control manager, yard/transport manager and warehouse operations manager are
vested with said attributes. The warehouse operations manager, for example, merely assists the
plant finance manager in planning, organizing, directing and controlling all activities relative to
development and implementation of an effective management control information system at the
sale offices. The exercise of authority of the quality control manager, on the other hand, needs
the concurrence of the manufacturing manager.
As to the route managers and accounting manager, we are convinced that they are managerial
employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so.
On July 6, 1992, this finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition
for Direct Certification and/or Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory Employees of
Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc., as follows:
The issue brought before us is not of first impression. At one time, we had the occasion to rule
upon the status of route manager in the same company vis a vis the issue as to whether or not it is
supervisory employee or a managerial employee. In the case of Workers Alliance Trade Unions
(WATU) vs. Pepsi Cola Products, Phils., Inc. (OS-MA-A-10-318-91 ), 15 November 1991, we
ruled that a route manager is a managerial employee within the context of the definition of the
law, and hence, ineligible to join, form or assist a union. We have once more passed upon the
logic of our Decision aforecited in the light of the issues raised in the instant appeal, as well as
the available documentary evidence on hand, and have come to the view that there is no cogent
reason to depart from our earlier holding. Route Managers are, by the very nature of their
functions and the authority they wield over their subordinates, managerial employees. The
prescription found in Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended therefore, clearly applies to them. 4
Citing our ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 5 however,
petitioner argues that these previous administrative determinations do not have the effect of res
judicata in this case, because "labor relations proceedings" are "non-litigious and summary in
nature without regard to legal technicalities." 6 Nasipit Lumber Co. involved a clearance to
dismiss an employee issued by the Department of Labor. The question was whether in a
subsequent proceeding for illegal dismissal, the clearance was res judicata. In holding it was not,
this Court made it clear that it was referring to labor relations proceedings of a non-adversary
character, thus:
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 93

The requirement of a clearance to terminate employment was a creation of the Department of

labor to carry out the Labor Code provisions on security of tenure and termination of
employment. The proceeding subsequent to the filing of an application for clearance to terminate
employment was outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code. The fact that said rule allowed a procedure for the approval of the clearance with or
without the opposition of the employee concerned (Secs. 7 & 8), demonstrates the non-litigious
and summary nature of the proceeding. The clearance requirement was therefore necessary only
as an expeditious shield against arbitrary dismissal without the knowledge and supervision of the
Department of Labor. Hence, a duly approved clearance implied that the dismissal was legal or
for cause (Sec. 2). 7
But the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. As
early as 1956, inBrillantes v. Castro, 8 we sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court on
the basis of a prior administrative determination of the same case by the Wage Administration
Service, applying the principle of res judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC 9 we applied the
related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that certain jobs at the
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., were project employments was binding in another case involving
another group of employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court
clarified toward the end of its opinion that "the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial
or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers." 10 Now
proceedings for certification election, such as those involved in Case No. OS-M-A-10-318-91
and Case No. OS-A-3-71-92, are quasi judicial in nature and, therefore, decisions rendered in
such proceedings can attain finality. 11
Thus, we have in this case an expert's view that the employees concerned are managerial
employees within the purview of Art. 212 which provides:

DOLE's Finding that Route Managers

Substantial Evidence in the Record

are

Managerial

Employees

Supported

by

The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is indeed supported
by substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route managers is given in a four-page
pamphlet, prepared by the company, called "Route Manager Position Description," the pertinent
parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve this objective
through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR
PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these functions managing
your job and managing your people you are accountable to your District Manager for the
execution and completion of various tasks and activities which will make it possible for you to
achieve your sales objectives.
B. PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES
1.0 MANAGING YOUR JOB
The Route Manager is accountable for the following:

(m) "managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not
falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes
of this Book.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the
finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by
law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to
support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned that employees who are otherwise supervisors may
wittingly or unwittingly be classified as managerial personnel and thus denied the right of selforganization, has decided to review the record of this case.

1.1 SALES DEVELOPMENT

1.1.1 Achieve the sales plan.
1.1.2 Achieve all distribution and new account objectives.
1.1.3 Develop new business opportunities thru personal contacts with dealers.
1.1.4 Inspect and ensure that all merchandizing [sic] objectives are achieved in all outlets.
1.1.5 maintain and improve productivity of all cooling equipment and kiosks.
1.1.6 Execute and control all authorized promotions.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 94

1.1.7 Develop and maintain dealer goodwill.

1.1.8 Ensure all accounts comply with company suggested retail pricing.
1.1.9 Study from time to time individual route coverage and productivity for possible
adjustments to maximize utilization of resources.
1.2 Administration
1.2.1 Ensure the proper loading of route trucks before check-out and the proper sorting of bottles
before check-in.
1.2.2 Ensure the upkeep of all route sales reports and all other related reports and forms required
on an accurate and timely basis.
1.2.3 Ensure proper implementation of the various company policies and procedures incl. but not
limited to shakedown; route shortage; progressive discipline; sorting; spoilages; credit/collection;
accident; attendance.
1.2.4 Ensure collection of receivables and delinquent accounts.
2.0 MANAGING YOUR PEOPLE
The Route Manager is accountable for the following:
2.1 Route Sales Team Development
2.1.2 Conduct route rides to train, evaluate and develop all assigned route salesmen and helpers
at least 3 days a week, to be supported by required route ride documents/reports & back
check/spot check at least 2 days a week to be supported by required documents/reports.
2.1.2 Conduct sales meetings and morning huddles. Training should focus on the enhancement of
effective sales and merchandizing [sic] techniques of the salesmen and helpers. Conduct group
training at least 1 hour each week on a designated day and of specific topic.
2.2 Code of Conduct
2.2.1 Maintain the company's reputation through strict adherence to PCPPI's code of conduct and
the universal standards of unquestioned business ethics. 12

Earlier in this opinion, reference was made to the distinction between managers per se (top
managers and middle managers) and supervisors (first-line managers). That distinction is evident
in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from supervisors in general. Unlike
supervisors who basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to
them, route managers are responsible for the success of the company's main line of business
through management of their respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the
planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work
of supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work
does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating
employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them. They are not mere functionaries
with simple oversight functions but business administrators in their own right. An idea of the role
of route managers as managers per se can be gotten from a memo sent by the director of metro
sales operations of respondent company to one of the route managers. It reads: 13
03 April 1995
To : CESAR T . REOLADA
From : REGGIE M. SANTOS
Subj : SALARY INCREASE
Effective 01 April 1995, your basic monthly salary of P11,710 will be increased to P12,881 or an
increase of 10%. This represents the added managerial responsibilities you will assume due to
the recent restructuring and streamlining of Metro Sales Operations brought about by the
continuous losses for the last nine (9) months.
Let me remind you that for our operations to be profitable, we have to sustain the intensity and
momentum that your group and yourself have shown last March. You just have to deliver the
desired volume targets, better negotiated concessions, rationalized sustaining deals, eliminate or
reduced overdues, improved collections, more cash accounts, controlled operating expenses, etc.
Also, based on the agreed set targets, your monthly performance will be closely monitored.
You have proven in the past that your capable of achieving your targets thru better planning,
managing your group as a fighting team, and thru aggressive selling. I am looking forward to
your success and I expect that you just have to exert your doubly best in turning around our
operations from a losing to a profitable one!
Happy Selling!!

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 95

(Sgd.) R.M. SANTOS

The plasticized card given to route managers, quoted in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug,
although entitled "RM's Job Description," is only a summary of performance standards. It does
not show whether route managers are managers per se or supervisors. Obviously, these
performance standards have to be related to the specific tasks given to route managers in the
four-page "Route Manager Position Description," and, when this is done, the managerial nature
of their jobs is fully revealed. Indeed, if any, the card indicates the great latitude and discretion
given to route managers from servicing and enhancing company goodwill to supervising and
auditing accounts, from trade (new business) development to the discipline, training and
monitoring of performance of their respective sales teams, and so forth, if they are to fulfill
the company's expectations in the "key result areas."
Article 212(m) says that "supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectivelyrecommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment." Thus, their only
power is to recommend. Certainly, the route managers in this case more than merely recommend
effective management action. They perform operational, human resource, financial and
marketing functions for the company, all of which involve the laying down of operating policies
for themselves and their teams. For example, with respect to marketing, route managers, in
accordance with B.1.1.1 to B.1.1.9 of the Route Managers Job Description, are charged, among
other things, with expanding the dealership base of their respective sales areas, maintaining the
goodwill of current dealers, and distributing the company's various promotional items as they
see fit. It is difficult to see how supervisors can be given such responsibility when this involves
not just the routine supervision of operating employees but the protection and expansion of the
company's business vis-a-vis its competitors.
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people (the evidence
shows that they only "recommended" or "endorsed" the taking of disciplinary action against
certain employees), this is because thisis a function of the Human Resources or Personnel
Department of the company. 14 And neither should it be presumed that just because they are given
set benchmarks to observe, they are ipso facto supervisors. Adequate control methods (as
embodied in such concepts as "Management by Objectives [MBO]" and "performance
appraisals") which require a delineation of the functions and responsibilities of managers by
means of ready reference cards as here, have long been recognized in management as effective
tools for keeping businesses competitive.
This brings us to the second question, whether the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting managerial employees from forming, assisting or joining any labor organization, is
constitutional in light of Art. III, 8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

As already stated, whether they belong to the first category (managers per se) or the second
category (supervisors), managers are employees. Nonetheless, in the United States, as Justice
Puno's separate opinion notes, supervisors have no right to form unions. They are excluded from
the definition of the term "employee" in 2(3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947. 15 In the Philippines, the question whether managerial employees have a right of selforganization has arisen with respect to first-level managers or supervisors, as shown by a review
of the course of labor legislation in this country.
Right of Self-Organization of Managerial Employees under Pre-Labor Code Laws
Before the promulgation of the Labor Code in 1974, the field of labor relations was governed by
the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875).
In accordance with the general definition above, this law defined "supervisor" as follows:
Sec. 2. . . .
(k) "Supervisor" means any person having authority in the interest of an employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign, recommend, or discipline other employees,
or responsibly to direct them, and to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
acts, if, in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routinary or clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgment. 16
The right of supervisors to form their own organizations was affirmed:
Sec. 3. Employees' Right to Self-Organization. Employees shall have the right to selforganization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and
protection. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations of their
own. 17
For its part, the Supreme Court upheld in several of its decisions the right of supervisors to
organize for purposes of labor relations. 18
Although it had a definition of the term "supervisor," the Industrial Peace Act did not define the
term "manager." But, using the commonly-understood concept of "manager," as above stated, it
is apparent that the law used the term "supervisors" to refer to the sub-group of "managerial
employees" known as front-line managers. The other sub-group of "managerial employees,"
known as managers per se, was not covered.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 96

However, in Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. Court of Industrial

Relations, 19 the right of all managerial employees to self-organization was upheld as a general
proposition, thus:

Staff Asst. 0 Marketing

It would be going too far to dismiss summarily the point raised by respondent Company that
of the alleged identity of interest between the managerial staff and the employing firm. That
should ordinarily be the case, especially so where the dispute is between management and the
rank and file. It does not necessarily follow though that what binds the managerial staff to the
corporation forecloses the possibility of conflict between them. There could be a real difference
between what the welfare of such group requires and the concessions the firm is willing to grant.
Their needs might not be attended to then in the absence of any organization of their own. Nor is
this to indulge in empty theorizing. The record of respondent Company, even the very case cited
by it, is proof enough of their uneasy and troubled relationship. Certainly the impression is
difficult to erase that an alien firm failed to manifest sympathy for the claims of its Filipino
executives. To predicate under such circumstances that agreement inevitably marks their
relationship, ignoring that discord would not be unusual, is to fly in the face of reality.

Supervisory Assistant

. . . The basic question is whether the managerial personnel can organize. What respondent
Company failed to take into account is that the right to self-organization is not merely a
statutory creation. It is fortified by our Constitution. All are free to exercise such right unless
their purpose is contrary to law. Certainly it would be to attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an
emasculation of, the concept of law if managers as such were precluded from organizing. Having
done so and having been duly registered, as did occur in this case, their union is entitled to all
the rights under Republic Act No. 875. Considering what is denominated as unfair labor
practice under Section 4 of such Act and the facts set forth in our decision, there can be only one
answer to the objection raised that no unfair labor practice could be committed by respondent
Company insofar as managerial personnel is concerned. It is, as is quite obvious, in the
negative. 20

Field Engineer

Sales Supervisor

Jr. Supervisory Assistant

Credit Assistant
Lab. Supvr. Pandacan
Jr. Sales Engineer B
Operations Assistant B

Sr. Opers. Supvr. MIA A/S

Purchasing Assistant
Jr. Construction Engineer
Sr. Sales Supervisor
Deport Supervisor A

Actually, the case involved front-line managers or supervisors only, as the plantilla of
employees, quoted in the main opinion, 21 clearly indicates:
CAFIMSA members holding the following Supervisory Payroll Position Title are Recognized by
the Company

Terminal Accountant B
Merchandiser
Dist. Sales Prom. Supvr.

Payroll Position Title

Instr. Merchandising
Assistant to Mgr. National Acct. Sales
Asst. Dist. Accountant B
Jr. Sales Engineer
Sr. Opers. Supervisor
Retail Development Asst.
Jr. Sales Engineer A
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 97

Asst. Bulk Ter. Supt.

Art. 212. Definitions . . . .

Sr. Opers. Supvr.

(k) "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign
or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not
falling within this definition are considered rank and file employees for purposes of this Book. 22

Credit Supervisor A
Asst. Stores Supvr. A
Ref. Supervisory Draftsman
Refinery Shift Supvr. B
Asst. Supvr. A Operations (Refinery)
Refinery Shift Supvr. B
Asst. Lab. Supvr. A (Refinery)

The definition shows that it is actually a combination of the commonly understood definitions of
both groups of managerial employees, grammatically joined by the phrase "and/or."
This general definition was perhaps legally necessary at that time for two reasons. First, the
1974 Code denied supervisors their right to self-organize as theretofore guaranteed to them by
the Industrial Peace Act. Second, it stood the dictum in the Caltex case on its head by prohibiting
all types of managers from forming unions. The explicit general prohibition was contained in the
then Art. 246 of the Labor Code.
The practical effect of this synthesis of legal concepts was made apparent in the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which the Department of Labor promulgated on January 19,
1975. Book V, Rule II, 11 of the Rules provided:

St. Process Engineer B (Refinery)

Asst. Supvr. A Maintenance (Refinery)
Asst. Supvr. B Maintenance (Refinery)
Supervisory Accountant (Refinery)
Communications Supervisor (Refinery)
Finally, also deemed included are all other employees excluded from the rank and file unions but
not classified as managerial or otherwise excludable by law or applicable judicial precedents.
Right of Self-Organization of Managerial Employees under the Labor Code
Thus, the dictum in the Caltex case which allowed at least for the theoretical unionization of top
and middle managers by assimilating them with the supervisory group under the broad phrase
"managerial personnel," provided the lynchpin for later laws denying the right of selforganization not only to top and middle management employees but to front line managers or
supervisors as well. Following the Caltex case, the Labor Code, promulgated in 1974 under
martial law, dropped the distinction between the first and second sub-groups of managerial
employees. Instead of treating the terms "supervisor" and "manager" separately, the law lumped
them together and called them "managerial employees," as follows:

Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease operation. All existing supervisory
unions and unions of security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to operate as
such and their registration certificates shall be deemed automatically canceled. However,
existing collective agreements with such unions, the life of which extends beyond the date of
effectivity of the Code, shall be respected until their expiry date insofar as the economic benefits
granted therein are concerned.
Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees
shall become eligible to join or assist the rank and file labor organization, and if none exists, to
form or assist in the forming of such rank and file organization. The determination of who are
managerial employees and who are not shall be the subject of negotiation between
representatives of the supervisory union and the employer. If no agreement is reached between
the parties, either or both of them may bring the issue to the nearest Regional Office for
determination.
The Department of Labor continued to use the term "supervisory unions" despite the demise of
the legal definition of "supervisor" apparently because these were the unions of front line
managers which were then allowed as a result of the statutory grant of the right of selforganization under the Industrial Peace Act. Had the Department of Labor seen fit to similarly
ban unions of top and middle managers which may have been formed following the dictum in
Caltex, it obviously would have done so. Yet it did not, apparently because no such unions of top
and middle managers really then existed.
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 98

Real Intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

This was the law as it stood at the time the Constitutional Commission considered the draft of
Art. III, 8. Commissioner Lerum sought to amend the draft of what was later to become Art. III,
8 of the present Constitution:

FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the sense is very acceptable, but the point raised by Commissioner
Rodrigo is well-taken. Perhaps, we can lengthen this a little bit more to read: "The right of the
people WHETHER UNEMPLOYED OR EMPLOYED BY STATE OR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS.
I want to avoid also the possibility of having this interpreted as applicable only to the employed.

MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert between the
words "people" and "to" the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will now read as follows: "The right of the
people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form
associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." 23

MR. DE LOS REYES. Will the proponent accept an amendment to the amendment, Madam
President?
MR. LERUM. Yes, as long as it will carry the idea that the right of the employees in the private
sector is recognized. 24

Explaining his proposed amendment, he stated:

MR. LERUM. Under the 1935 Bill of Rights, the right to form associations is granted to all
persons whether or not they are employed in the government. Under that provision, we allow
unions in the government, in government-owned and controlled corporations and in other
industries in the private sector, such as the Philippine Government Employees' Association,
unions in the GSIS, the SSS, the DBP and other government-owned and controlled
corporations. Also, we have unions of supervisory employees and of security guards. But what is
tragic about this is that after the 1973 Constitution was approved and in spite of an express
recognition of the right to organize in P.D. No. 442, known as the Labor Code, the right of
government workers, supervisory employees and security guards to form unions was abolished.
And we have been fighting against this abolition. In every tripartite conference attended by the
government, management and workers, we have always been insisting on the return of these
rights. However, both the government and employers opposed our proposal, so nothing came out
of this until this week when we approved a provision which states:
Notwithstanding any provision of this article, the right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees.

Lerum thus anchored his proposal on the fact that (1) government employees, supervisory
employees, and security guards, who had the right to organize under the Industrial Peace Act,
had been denied this right by the Labor Code, and (2) there was a need to reinstate the right of
these employees. In consonance with his objective to reinstate the right of government, security,
and supervisory employees to organize, Lerum then made his proposal:
MR. LERUM. Mr. Presiding Officer, after a consultation with several Members of this
Commission, my amendment will now read as follows: "The right of the people INCLUDING
THOSE EMPLOYED IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS to form associations, unions,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. In proposing that
amendment I ask to make of record that I want the following provisions of the Labor Code to be
automatically abolished, which read:
Art. 245. Security guards and other personnel employed for the protection and security of the
person, properties and premises of the employers shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization.
Art. 246. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, and form any labor organization.

We are afraid that without any corresponding provision covering the private sector, the security
guards, the supervisory employees or majority employees [sic] will still be excluded, and that is
the purpose of this amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). What does the Committee say?

I will be very glad to accept any kind of wording as long as it will amount to absolute
recognition of private sector employees, without exception, to organize.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. Bengzon) The Committee has accepted the amendment, as
amended.

THE PRESIDENT. What does the Committee say?

Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is
approved. 25

FR. BERNAS. The Committee accepts.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 99

The question is what Commissioner Lerum meant in seeking to "automatically abolish" the then
Art. 246 of the Labor Code. Did he simply want "any kind of wording as long as it will amount to
absolute recognition of private sector employees, without exception, to organize"? 26 Or, did he
instead intend to have his words taken in the context of the cause which moved him to propose
the amendment in the first place, namely, the denial of the right of supervisory employees to
organize, because he said, "We are afraid that without any corresponding provision covering the
private sector, security guards, supervisory employees or majority [of] employees will still be
excluded, and that is the purpose of this amendment"? 27
It would seem that Commissioner Lerum simply meant to restore the right of supervisory
employees to organize. For even though he spoke of the need to "abolish" Art. 246 of the Labor
Code which, as already stated, prohibited "managerial employees" in general from forming
unions, the fact was that in explaining his proposal, he repeatedly referred to "supervisory
employees" whose right under the Industrial Peace Act to organize had been taken away by Art.
246. It is noteworthy that Commissioner Lerum never referred to the then definition of
"managerial employees" in Art. 212(m) of the Labor Code which put together, under the broad
phrase "managerial employees," top and middle managers and supervisors. Instead, his
repeated use of the term "supervisory employees," when such term then was no longer in the
statute books, suggests a frame of mind that remained grounded in the language of the Industrial
Peace Act.
Nor did Lerum ever refer to the dictum in Caltex recognizing the right of all managerial
employees to organize, despite the fact that the Industrial Peace Act did not expressly provide for
the right of top and middle managers to organize. If Lerum was aware of the Caltex dictum, then
his insistence on the use of the term "supervisory employees" could only mean that he was
excluding other managerial employees from his proposal. If, on the other hand, he was not
aware of the Caltex statement sustaining the right to organize to top and middle managers, then
the more should his repeated use of the term "supervisory employees" be taken at face value, as
it had been defined in the then Industrial Peace Act.
At all events, that the rest of the Commissioners understood his proposal to refer solely to
supervisors and not to other managerial employees is clear from the following account of
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas, who writes:
In presenting the modification on the 1935 and 1973 texts, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum
explained that the modification included three categories of workers: (1) government employees,
(2) supervisory employees, and (3) security guards. Lerum made of record the explicit intent to
repeal provisions of P.D. 442, the Labor Code. The provisions referred to were:
Art. 245. Security guards and other personnel employed for the protection and security of the
person, properties and premises of the employers shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization.

Art. 246. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, and form any labor
organization.28
Implications of the Lerum Proposal
In sum, Lerum's proposal to amend Art. III, 8 of the draft Constitution by including labor
unions in the guarantee of organizational right should be taken in the context of statements that
his aim was the removal of the statutory ban against security guards and supervisory employees
joining labor organizations. The approval by the Constitutional Commission of his proposal can
only mean, therefore, that the Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government
workers, supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By
implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be
deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers. As to them the right of selforganization may be regulated and even abridged conformably to Art. III, 8.
Constitutionality of Art. 245
Finally, the question is whether the present ban against managerial employees, as embodied in
Art. 245 (which superseded Art. 246) of the Labor Code, is valid. This provision reads:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. 29
This provision is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715,
otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of
the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate definitions of the terms
"managerial" and "supervisory employees," as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) "managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest
of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority
is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees
for purposes of this Book.
Although the definition of "supervisory employees" seems to have been unduly restricted to the
last phrase of the definition in the Industrial Peace Act, the legal significance given to the phrase
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 100

"effectively recommends" remains the same. In fact, the distinction between top and middle
managers, who set management policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible
for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present
definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245
faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, 8 of the
fundamental law.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that
its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a
rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a constitutional commissioner, said in
his ponencia inPhilips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC: 31
In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales
force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed
by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered
them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a
confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise
managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility
of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies to them.
In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale,
thus:
. . . The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees
would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become companydominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. 32
To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing with the right of confidential employees to
organize. But the same reason for denying them the right to organize justifies even more the ban
on managerial employees from forming unions. After all, those who qualify as top or middle
managers are executives who receive from their employers information that not only is
confidential but also is not generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to other
employees. It is hardly necessary to point out that to say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is
unconstitutional would be to contradict the decision in that case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
____________

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132088

June 28, 2000

EVERDINA ACOSTA, NOEMI ACOSTA, ELVIRA AMPARADO, REBECCA AQUINO,

ROBERTO ARCAYA, EVA ARCEO, JULIET ARELLANO, ANITA ASCANO, GRACE
AUSTRA, LUISA AVILES, SUSIE AW, VICTORIA BADILLO, SUSAN BALDEMOR,
ELISA BASA, NORY BATUIGAS, TERESITA BAUTISTA, SEGUNDINA BERMAS,
FERMINER BOCO, EVELYN BULAONG, SYLVA BULARIO, GILDA BOLOSAN,
JOSIE BUNGAY, ARCELI CABUSE, TERESA CACHO, ROSSANA CAJANDINEZ,
NELY CALPITO, OLIVIA CARDINES, THELMA CARINO, CORAZON CARRACEDO,
ELENITA CASAUAY, MARIETA CAULI, MARILOU CAYTON, VIRGINIA
CHIAPOCO, ALLEN CIPRIANO, MELINDA B. CONTRERAS, ZENAIDA CORPORAL,
PRISCILLA CORPUZ, LUZ COSIO, EMILIA CRUZ, CRISTINA DELA CRUZ,
ROSALINA DELA CRUZ, GRACE CUNANAN, EVELYN DE CASTRO, HAYDEE DE
VALLE, CECILIA DEL ROSARIO, GULLERMINA DE LA CRUZ, FRANCIS DINGIL,
BELLA DY, CORAZON ESTEBAL, LUZ FAJARDO, TERESA FRAGO, VIRGINIA
GACHO, SABINO GALES, MYRNA GALLEGO, MARILYN GARNA, NATIVIDAD
GAVILAN, LOLITA GAVINO, MARILOU GO, LETICIA GOMEZ, OLYMPIO
GONZAGA, RUTH GONZALES, REMEDIOS HAVOC, GREGORIA HERNANDEZ,
OSCAR HIDALGO, BIBIANO HUGO, RITA HUERTA, LOURDES HULIPAS, ROMEO
IDOS, ERLINDA ISLA, LITA ITALIA, MATIAS JABONETE, DIANA JIMENEZ,
DOMINADOR LABACLADO, ALMA LAGUIAN, MELCY LALU, REBECCA
LAMALINAO, MARITA LAMSEN, LOURDES ESTER LAREDO, TERESITA LATION,
ROSALINA LEDESMA, NORMA LECCIONES, NORMA LEYTE, CECILIA
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 101

LINCOPINES, OFELIA LIZARDO, VENILLA LOCSIN, ADELINA LORENZO,

SATURNINA LORENZO, ALEJANDRA MABAET, JULIETA MADRID, ERLINA
MAGPAYO, ROLANDO MAGSINO, ERLINDA MAILIG, FLORENDA MALAPAYA,
CORAZON MALLEN, ESMERALDA MANALANG, MERLE MANALO, ERLINDA
MANEGA, SHIRLEY MANGAHAS, ELFRIDA MARQUEZ, EFIGENIA MENEZ,
NILDA NAVA, MERLY NERY, ROSAMINDA OBEN, MELISSA OLAQUERRA,
ENRIQUETA OLIVAR, DOLORES ORDINARIO, ESTRELLA ORTEGA, ROSE
ORPRECIO, AURORA OSTACO, ELVIRA PAMPANGA, NORMA PAQUIZ,
EVANGELINE PARDO, GLORIA PARMA, ERLINDA PASTRANA, LERMA QUIRIT,
MECELIN QUILANDRA, MEWLIN QUILLANORA, NATIVIDAD RAGUD, ERLINDA
RANTE, EUFEMIA RAMIREZ, JUDITHA RANESES, ULDARICO REJABA, MELINA
REJUSO, FELISA RENIDO, MILGROS REY, REDENTOR REYES, RESALINA
SAGUN, ZENAIDA SALAZAR, FE SALIMA, SHIRLEY SARAGON, PURIFICACION
SARI, ELVIRA SATUMBAGA, MARIBEY SEALMOY, EDITHA SINJAY, TITA
SILVINO, AURORA TOLENTINO, ESPERANZA URBIZTONDO, SATURNINO
YODICO, RODOLFO MARIANO, ALICIA MARINAY, SUSAN MATANGA, PATRIA
MATIAS, LOUELITA MAYUNA, LOLITA MERCADO, EUGENIA MILLA,
CRESENCIA MIRADOR, ERMA MORAL, RAQUEL MORALES, DOLORES
LAGRADA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
DE LEON. JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated
August 29, 1997 and Resolution2 dated January 7, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39878, affirming the Resolutions3 of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding
petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service and imposing a penalty of six-(6) months
suspension without pay.

to answer these charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating
Committees, Secretary Cario found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate
dismissal from the service.4
Petitioners appealed the orders of Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) and later to the CSC. In 1995, the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cario as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Everdina Acosta guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. She is hereby meted out the penalty of six (6) months suspension
without pay. Considering the period of time she was out of service, she is automatically
reinstated to her former position (sic).5
Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter before
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their petition for certiorari and subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION THAT WRONGLY
PENALIZED PETITIONERS WHOSE ONLY "OFFENSE" WAS TO EXERCISE THEIR
CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION THAT WRONGLY
DENIED PETITIONERS THEIR RIGHT TO BACKWAGES.
This petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in
September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in
mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning
the government for redress of their grievances.
On the basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals that petitioners
participated in said mass actions and refused to comply with the return-to-work order issued
September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cario of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS), petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and
reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed

Petitioners do not deny their absence from work nor the fact that said absences were due to their
participation in the mass actions at the Liwasang Bonifacio. However, they contend that their
participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Petitioner likewise maintain that
they never went on strike because they never sought to secure changes or modification of the
terms and conditions of their employment.
Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass actions which
they participated in have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public
School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v.Laguio, Jr.6 wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions'
were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 102

of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons."7 In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 8 we added that:
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize
their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not
used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential,
since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public
employees for not have the right to engaged in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because they exercised their
right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and
regulations.1wphi1.nt
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceable assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they
exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and
classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and nondisruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition
the government for redress of grievances.
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail
services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in
staging the "mass action," but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent
school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage. 9
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 10 De La Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 11 and Alipat v. Court of
Appeals, 12 we upheld our rulings in MPSTA and Bangalisan. Considering the factual
circumstances of this case and the doctrine of stare decisis to which we consistently adhere, we
find no compelling reason to deviate from our earlier rulings in these related cases.
Anent the second issue, petitioners invoke our statement in Bangalisan that payment of salaries
corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is
found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and if his suspension is unjustified.
Petitioners cite CSC Resolution No. 93-162 and contend that the determination of the CSC
therein that not an iota of evidence was given to substantiate the conclusion that they participated
in a "teacher's strike" amounted to a finding that they were innocent of the charges filed against
them.

As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. 1While there recognized instances when backwages may be awarded to a
suspended or dismissed public official who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in
citing Bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar impel us to rule otherwise.
Petitioners' reliance on CSC Resolution No. 93-162 is misplaced. Said CSC resolution disposed
of the appeals of Fely Ilarina, Adelaida Dela Cruz, Alicia Galvo, Nenita Albios and Nerissa
Abellanda. Petitioners were never parties to their appeals and, therefore, cannot cite CSC
Resolution No. 93-162 in support of their contention. Petitioner also overlook the fact that
although no evidence was presented to prove that Ilarina, et al. participated in the mass actions,
the CSC explained that the deficiency was cured by their admissions during the hearings before
the MSPB. 14 More importantly, however, herein petitioners' claim of exoneration is belied by the
determination of the CSC that their participation in the mass actions constituted conduct
prejudicial to the service. Being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent to
exoneration. 15
Petitioners also point out that from the issuance of the orders of dismissal by Secretary Cario to
the modification thereof by the CSC, almost five (5) years elapsed. Petitioners argue that the
period in excess of their preventive suspension and penalty of six (6) months suspension
amounted to unjustified suspension for which an award of backwages was proper pursuant to our
rulings Bautista v. Peralta 16 and Abellera v. City of Baguio. 17
We disagree. It will be recalled that in Jacinto, we upheld the legality of the immediate execution
of the dismissal orders issued by Secretary Cario on the ground that under Section
47(2), 18 Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, the decision of a department secretary confirming the dismissal of
an employee under his jurisdiction is executory even pending appeal thereof. 19 Since dismissal
orders remain valid and effective until modified or set aside, the intervening period during which
an employee is not permitted to work cannot be argued as amounting to unjustified suspension.
In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, 20 we further explained that:
Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only a
means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the
other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative with full pay
for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) state that respondent "shall be considered as under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the other
hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e. if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension
becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. 21
Petitioners' reliance on Fabella v. Court of Appeals 22 is likewise unavailing. In that case, the
petitioners therein immediately went to court to seek injunctive relief against the DECS
administrative proceedings on the ground that they were deprived of due process. The trial court
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 103

declared the administrative proceedings void and ordered the payment of backwages to the
petitioners therein. The Court of Appeals then upheld the order of the trial court. In affirming
both the trial and the Court, we stated therein that:
. . . Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or
misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted
on them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a consequence, be reinstated and awarded all
monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified
suspension or dismissal. . . . 2
On the other hand, in the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the alleged non-observance of
due process by the DECS Investigating Committees only upon appeal to the MSPB.
Significantly, however, it had been our consistent ruling that an appeal is curative of any
supposed denial of due process. 24 Thus, after full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and
CSC, and later on before the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot now allege denial of due
process to justify their claim for backwages.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
_____________

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170132

December 6, 2006
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 104

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA,

in
his
capacity
as
GSIS
President
&
General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and its President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia
(Garcia, for short) assail and seek to nullify the Decision 1 dated June 16, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87220, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of October 18, 2005
denying Garcia's motion for reconsideration.
The recourse is cast against the following setting:
A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in
front of the GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all. Forming a huge part
of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them
members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or the
"Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Contingents from other
government agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass action's target appeared to
have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City
allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered
by a prior approved leave.3
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not
be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG's counsel, Atty.
Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the
subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order
thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on
October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 4
What happened next is summarized by the CA in its challenged decision of June 16, 2005, albeit
the herein petitioners would except from some of the details of the appellate court's narration:
Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco, commenced the instant
suit on November 2, 2004, with the filing of the Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground
that its members should not be made to explain why they supported their union's cause,
petitioner [KMG] faulted respondent [Garcia] with blatant disregard of Civil Service Resolution
No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action, Section 10 of which
exhorts government agencies to "harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and
attention to employees' grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through
the use of grievance machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing
civil service rules." Two supplements to the foregoing petition were eventually filed by KMG.

The first, apprised [the CA] of the supposed fact that its Speaker, Atty. Molina, had been
placed under preventive suspension for 90 days and that the formal charges thus filed will not
only deprive its members of the privileges and benefits due them but will also disqualify them
from promotion, step increment adjustments and receipt of monetary benefits, including their
13th month pay and Christmas bonuses. The second, xxx manifested that, on December 17,
2004, respondent [Garcia] served a spate of additional formal charges against 230 of KMG's
members for their participation in the aforesaid grievance demonstrations.
In his December 14, 2004 comment to the foregoing petition, respondent [Garcia] averred that
the case at bench was filed by an unauthorized representative in view of the fact that Albert
Velasco had already been dropped from the GSIS rolls and, by said token, had ceased to be a
member much less the President of KMG. Invoking the rule against forum shopping,
respondent [Garcia] called [the CA's] attention to the supposed fact that the allegations in the
subject petition merely duplicated those already set forth in two petitions for certiorari and
prohibition earlier filed by Albert Velasco . Because said petitions are, in point of fact, pending
before this court as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86130 and 86365, respondent [Garcia] prayed for the
dismissal of the petition at bench .5 (Words in bracket added.)
It appears that pending resolution by the CA of the KMG petition for prohibition in this case, the
GSIS management proceeded with the investigation of the administrative cases filed. As
represented in a pleading before the CA, as of May 18, 2005, two hundred seven (207) out of the
two hundred seventy eight (278) cases filed had been resolved, resulting in the exoneration of
twenty (20) respondent-employees, the reprimand of one hundred eighty two (182) and the
suspension for one month of five (5).6
On June 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision 7 holding that Garcia's "filing of
administrative charges against 361 of [KMG's] members is tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition." Dispositively, the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition [of KMG] is GRANTED and respondent
[Winston F. Garcia] is hereby PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from implementing the issued
formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative factual and erroneous legal
premises holding it together, petitioner Garcia sought reconsideration. In its equally assailed
Resolution8 of October 18, 2005, however, the appellate court denied reconsideration of its
decision.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the appellate court in granting
the petition for prohibition absent an instance of grave abuse of authority on their part.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original
charters, like the GSIS, 9 or those created by special law.10 As such, employees of covered
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 105

GOCCs are part of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations
issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general
terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving self-organization, strikes,
demonstrations and like concerted actions. In fact, policies established on public sector unionism
and rules issued on mass action have been noted and cited by the Court in at least a
case.11 Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing
guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is
CSC Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the
public sector.
There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges against the 278 affected GSIS employees
a mix of KMG union and non-union members - having arose from their having gone on
unauthorized leave of absence (AWOL) for at least a day or two in the October 4 to 7, 2004
stretch to join the ranks of the demonstrators /rallyists at that time. As stated in each of the
formal charges, the employee's act of attending, joining, participating and taking part in the
strike/rally is a transgression of the rules on strike in the public sector. The question that
immediately comes to the fore, therefore, is whether or not the mass action staged by or
participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action.
If in the affirmative, then the denounced filing of the administrative charges would be prima
facie tenable, inasmuch as engaging in mass actions resulting in work stoppage or service
disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the punishable offense of acting prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. 12 If in the negative, then such filing would indeed smack of arbitrariness
and justify the issuance of a corrective or preventive writ.
Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the
service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS
employees, there being appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the other
hand, the CA, agreeing with the respondent's argument, assumed the view and held that the
organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the exercise of
their "broader rights of free expression"13 and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative
sanctions. For perspective, following is what the CA said:
Although the filing of administrative charges against [respondent KMG's] members is well
within [petitioner Garcia's] official [disciplinary] prerogatives, [his] exercise of the power vested
under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291 was tainted with arbitrariness and vindictiveness
against which prohibition was sought by [respondent]. xxx the fact that the subject mass
demonstrations were directed against [Garcia's] supposed mismanagement of the financial
resources of the GSIS, by and of itself, renders the filing of administrative charges against
[KMG's] member suspect. More significantly, we find the gravity of the offenses and the sheer
number of persons charged administratively to be, at the very least, antithetical to the best
interest of the service.
It matters little that, instead of the 361 alleged by petitioner, only 278 charges were actually filed
[and] in the meantime, disposed of and of the said number, 20 resulted to exoneration, 182 to
reprimand and 5 to the imposition of a penalty of one month suspension. Irrespective of their
outcome, the severe penalties prescribed for the offense with which petitioner's members were

charged, to our mind, bespeak of bellicose and castigatory reaction . The fact that most of the
employees [Garcia] administratively charged were eventually meted with what appears to be a
virtual slap on the wrist even makes us wonder why respondent even bothered to file said
charges at all. xxx.
Alongside the consequences of the right of government employees to form, join or assist
employees organization, we have already mentioned how the broader rights of free
expression cast its long shadow over the case. xxx we find [petitioner Garcia's] assailed acts, on
the whole, anathema to said right which has been aptly characterized as preferred, one which
stands on a higher level than substantive economic and other liberties, the matrix of other
important rights of our people. xxx.14 (Underscoring and words in bracket added; citations
omitted.)
While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so, the CA equated the right to form
associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the
private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees
are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees' organization, petitioner Garcia could
not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. Citing what Justice Isagani
Cruz said in Manila Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA] v. Laguio, Jr.,15 the appellate
court declared:
It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution No. 021316 that employees of
the GSIS are not among those specifically barred from forming, joining or assisting employees
organization such as [KMG]. If only for this ineluctable fact, the merit of the petition at bench is
readily discernible.16
We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture. For, let alone the fact that it ignores
what the Court has uniformly held all along, the appellate court's position is contrary to what
Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 021316 17 provides. Besides, the
appellate court's invocation of Justice Cruz's opinion inMPSTA is clearly off-tangent, the good
Justice's opinion thereat being a dissent. It may be, as the appellate court urged that the freedom
of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances
stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however, about these
rights as including the right on the part of government personnel to strike ought to be, as it has
been, trashed. We have made this abundantly clear in our past determinations. For instance,
in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment,18 a case decided under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be unfair to allow
employees of government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat
of a strike to wring benefits from Government. Then came the 1987 Constitution expressly
guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-organization 19 to
complement the provision according workers the right to engage in "peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law."20
It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court
resolvedBangalisan v. Court of Appeals.21 In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr.,22 that
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 106

stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation
of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals23 came next and there we explained:
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights
of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national
security . . . .
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in
accordance with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of
this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides
guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance,
implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. (Emphasis and words in bracket
added; citations omitted)
And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court defined the limits of the
right of government employees to organize in the following wise:
It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action
that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike,
adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass
actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Significantly, 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio Lerum, answering in the
negative the poser of whether or not the right of government employees to self-organization also
includes the right to strike, stated:
When we proposed this amendment providing for self organization of government employees, it
does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they have also the right to strike. That
is a different matter. xxx25
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent's
members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually
amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase "prohibited concerted
activity" refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or
through their employees' organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. 26 Indeed, for four straight

days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or
participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office
building. The record of attendance27 for the period material shows that, on the first day of the
protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the
main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., 28leaving the
other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every
business day. On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538
participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no
means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual
level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and
wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring employees beyond the
reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to
mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. 29
The appellate court made specific reference to the "parliament of the streets," obviously to lend
concurrence to respondent's pretension that the gathering of GSIS employees on October 4-7,
2004 was an "assembly of citizens" out only to air grievances, not a striking crowd. According to
the respondent, a strike presupposes a mass action undertaken to press for some economic
demands or secure additional material employment benefits.
We are not convinced.
In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the
stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities
during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were
specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building
during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their
cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be
forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel. 30
The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and gathering in question did not
involve some specific material demand. But then the absence of such economic-related demand,
even if true, did not, under the premises, make such mass action less of a prohibited concerted
activity. For, as articulated earlier, any collective activity undertaken by government employees
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands
or force concessions, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass action 31 and
doubtless actionable administratively. Bangalisan even went further to say the following: "[i]n
the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work
stoppages for any purpose."
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and
responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove,
suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. 32 At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by
filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against the absenting participants of the
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 107

October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law.
Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet, his act can
easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.
It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were proceeded against - and
eventually either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a one-month suspension, as the case may be
- not for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance,
but for engaging in what appeared to be a prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less
admitted that its members and other GSIS employees might have disrupted public service. 33
To be sure, arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave abuse of discretion on
the part of petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred from the sheer number of those
charged as well as the gravity or the dire consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The
principle of accountability demands that every erring government employee be made answerable
for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And lest it be overlooked, the mere filing of
formal administrative case, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged, does not overcome
the presumptive innocence of the persons complained of nor does it shift the burden of evidence
to prove guilt of an administrative offense from the complainant.
Moreover, the Court invites attention to its holding in MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a case involving
over 800 public school teachers who took part in mass actions for which the then Secretary of
Education filed administrative complaints on assorted charges, such as gross misconduct. Of
those charged, 650 were dismissed and 195 suspended for at least six (6) months The Court,
however, did not consider the element of number of respondents thereat and/or the dire
consequences of the charge/s as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of
Education's challenged action. Then as now, the Court finds the filing of charges against a large
number of persons and/or the likelihood that they will be suspended or, worse, dismissed from
the service for the offense as indicating a strong and clear case of grave abuse of authority to
justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing grievance machinery
and other modes of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG Collective Negotiations
Agreement (CAN) before going full steam ahead with his formal charges. 34
The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CA's angle on grievance procedure but for the
fact that it conveniently disregarded what appears to be the more relevant provision of the CNA.
We refer to Article VI which reads:
The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to promote the principle of shared
responsibility on all matters and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and interests of all
GSIS employees . Accordingly, the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall not
declare a strike nor stage any concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS
management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG during the term of this
agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their
sentiments through peaceful concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable
office rules ....35 (Underscoring added)

If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-exhaustion of less

confrontational remedies, it should be at the respondent union for spearheading a concerted mass
action without resorting to available settlement mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty.
Alberto Velasco, which opened fire first. That none of the parties bothered to avail of the
grievance procedures under the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. At best,
both GSIS management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss at length the legal
standing of Alberto Velasco to represent the herein respondent union and to initiate the
underlying petition for prohibition. Suffice it to state that Velasco, per Joint Resolution No. 0410-01 approved on October 5, 2004 by the KMG Joint Executive-Legislative Assembly, had
ceased to be member, let alone president, of the KMG, having previously been dropped from the
rolls of GSIS employees.36 While the dropping from the rolls is alleged to have been the subject
of a CA-issued temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after Atty. Velasco had in
fact been separated from the service and it appears that the TRO had already expired.
As a final consideration, the Court notes or reiterates the following relevant incidents
surrounding the disposition of the case below:
1. The CA had invoked as part of its ratio decidendi a dissenting opinion in MPSTA, even going
to the extent of describing as "instructive and timely" a portion, when the majority opinion
thereat, which the appellate court ignored, is the controlling jurisprudence.
2. The CA gave prominence to dispositions and rattled off holdings 37 of the Court, which
appropriately apply only to strikes in the private industry labor sector, and utilized the same as
springboard to justify an inference of grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, it only gave
perfunctory treatment if not totally ignored jurisprudence that squarely dealt with strikes in the
public sector, as if the right to strike given to unions in private corporations/entities is necessarily
applicable to civil service employees.
3. As couched, the assailed CA decision perpetually bars respondent Garcia and necessarily
whoever succeeds him as GSIS President not only from implementing the formal charges
against GSIS employees who participated in the October 4 - 7, 2004 mass action but also from
issuing other formal charges arising from the same events. The injunction was predicated on a
finding that grave abuse of discretion attended the exercise of petitioner Garcia's disciplinary
power vested him under Section 45 of RA 8291. 38 At bottom then, the assailed decision struck
down as a nullity, owing to the alleged attendant arbitrariness, not only acts that have already
been done, but those yet to be done. In net effect, any formal charge arising from the October 47, 2004 incident is, under any and all circumstances, prejudged as necessarily tainted with
arbitrariness to be slain at sight.
The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the foregoing situations are not lost on the
Court.
We close with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution, if allowed to remain
undisturbed, would likely pave the way to the legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil
servants, regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest of the public they have sworn to
serve with loyalty and efficiency. Worse still, it would permit the emergence of a system where
CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 108

public sector workers are, as the petitioners aptly put it, "immune from the minimum reckoning
for acts that [under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful." This aberration would be
intolerable.

No Cost.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of prohibition issued by that court
is NULLIFIED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 6, 7 & 8) | 109