ht. J. Pres. Ves.

& Piping 61 (1995)433-456

030%0161(94)00120-0
ELSEVIER

FRACTURE

MECHANICS
PRESSURE

ElsevierScienceLimited
Printedin NorthernIreland
0308-0161/95/$09.50

ASSESSMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
VESSEL FAILURES

N V Challenger, R Phaal and S J Garwood

TWI, Abington Hall, Abington, Cambridge, UK

ABSTRACT
Fracture mechanics assessment procedures, such as BSI PD6493:1991, R6 and ASME XI,
have become well established in industry. These published procedures provide methods for
assessing the acceptability of flaws in fusion welded structures. For such procedures to be
used with confidence, it is essential that their application be validated by comparison with
large scale fracture mechanics tests, and actual structural failures. This paper describes eight
industrial pressure vessel failures, for which PD6493 fracture assessments have been
performed. It has been demonstrated that the assessment procedures are safe to use, provided
that input data are reliable.

INTRODUCTION
Fracture is an important consideration when evaluating the integrity of welded structures.
Pressure vessels and related systems form a class of components for which particularly high
levels of integrity are required. This is due to the potential hazards which are associated with
many industrial processes, combined with their high capital value. Pressure vessel failure can
cause extensive damage to plant, owing to possible explosion and fire. Many pressure vessel
failures are due to brittle fracture, where the tremendous potential energy stored in high
pressure systems can lead to extensive fragmentation of the vessel, and high projectile
velocities.
Fracture mechanics has proved to be a powerful tool for managing the risk associated
with pressure vessel failure, as well as other welded components. Fracture assessment
procedures such as BSI PD6493: 1980 (1) and R6 (2) have become well established in
industry. They provide a rational basis for the safe assessment of welded joints, based on
fracture mechanics principles. The fracture mechanics section of PD6493 has been extensively

433

434

N. V. Challenger et al.

modified by BSI committee WEE37, leading to a revised version being published in 1991 (3),
and further modifications are under consideration.
For procedures such as PD6493: 1991 to be used with confidence for the assessment
of fracture critical components, it is essential that they be validated by comparison with
results generated from structurally relevant tests, such as wide plate, pipe bend and pressure
vessel experiments, as well as with actual industrial failures.
Since the publication of PD6493: 199 1, an extensive validation programme has been
undertaken, covering over 200 large scale fracture mechanics tests performed at TWI in the
past (4), and published in the literature (5), as well as a range of industrial failures. This paper
describes eight catastrophic pressure vessels failures (summarised in Table l), and presents
the results of PD6493 fracture mechanics assessment of the failures.

PD6493 PROCEDURES
The fracture section of PD6493:1991 incorporates three levels of fracture assessment. Level
1 is similar to PD6493:1980, although assessment results are expressed in terms of a twoparameter failure assessment diagram (FAD), illustrated in Fig. 1. The Level 2 FAD is derived
from R6 Rev. 2 procedures, while the Level 3 FAD is based on R6 Rev. 3. Elastic-plastic
fracture is accounted for, as well as possible plastic collapse of the ligament. The interaction
between these two modes of failure is accounted for by plotting a failure locus on the FAD.
The abscissa, S,, represents a measure of plastic collapse of the ligament, while the ordinate,
K, or dS,, ia a measure of fracture. The assessment of a specific flaw generates a point on the
FAD. If this point lies within the failure locus then the structure may be considered safe. If
the point lies outside the failure locus then structural failure is possible. If the point lies on
the locus then the flaw may be considered to be critical.

1.2
Level 1 assessment line
,
1

UNSAFE

0.47
SAFE
0.21
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.2

Sr

Figure 1. PD6493 Level 1 FAD

1.4

1.6

435

Industrial pressure vessel failures

TABLE 1
Summary of failures reanalysed
Failure

Initiating defect

Causes of failure

Circumstances of
failure

Exxon pressure vessel

- Port Jerome (1981)

Cracks in PV shell at
attachment weld root

Residual stress from

attachment weld and
strain ageing embrittlement

Standby condition pressurised to 75%

op. pressure at ambient temperature

Union Oil amine

absorber (1984)

Hydrogen cracking in
HAZ of repair weld

Hydrogen embrittlement and residual

stresses

Normal operation

Vertical refinery
tower (1981)

Transverse weld
metal hydrogen crack
extended by creep

Low fracture toughness of plate and

weld metal at hydrotest temperature, high
residual stresses

Hydrotest

Typpi Oy ammonia
plate cooler (1970)

Fabrication defect
extended by stress
corrosion cracking

Insufficient PWHT high residual stress,

low fracture toughness

Normal operation

Cockenzie power
station boiler (1966)

Arrested brittle crack

at nozzle
weld/drumshell, origin unknown (present
prior to PWHT)

Large initiating defect

at a stress concentration

Hydrotest

John Thompson
(1965)

Arrested brittle fracture from embedded

transverse HAZ
hydrogen crack

Insufficient PWHT high residual stress

low fracture toughness

Hydrotest

Robert Jenkins (1970)

Arrested brittle crack

from liquation crack
extended by hydrogen
cracking

Low fracture toughness, high stresses

Hydrotest

Ammonia catchpot
(1982)

Hydrogen cracks at
fillet weld toe on
vessel inner wall

Very low fracture

toughness

In service

Level 1 is the most simple and conservative of the three levels, incorporating a
nominal safety factor of two on flaw size in terms of fracture, and 1.25 on load in terms of
plastic collapse. Level 2 (see Fig.2) provides a more comprehensive and accurate assessment
procedure. The primary and secondary stress distribution near the flaw under consideration
is accounted for in more detail, as well as local stress concentration factors such as fillet weld

N. V. Challenger et al.

436

toes. A plasticity correction factor is included to account for crack tip plasticity in the
presence of secondary stresses. There are no explicit safety factors built into Level 2, although
guidance is provided in Appendix A of PD6493 for the application of partial safety factors.
The conservatism of the assessment procedures is ensured by careful selection of appropriate
lower bound values of material properties (fracture toughness and tensile properties), and
upper bound stress distributions.
I

1.2 /
,,/

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

, Level 2 assessment line

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

Sr

Figure 2. PD6493 Level 2 FAD

Level 3 (see Fig.3) is the most comprehensive and complicated assessment procedure.
Ductile tearing is accounted for, and knowledge of the material toughness is required in the
form of an R-curve. The failure locus is material dependent, and the material stress-strain
curve should be known. In cases where this information is not available a conservative default
curve has been established (Eq.[25] of PD6493). This is particularly relevant to assessment
of heat affected zones, for which the stress-strain curves cannot be accurately determined. The
assessment of a specific flaw generates an assessment locus. If the locus lies entirely outside
the FAD then tearing is predicted to occur, followed by unstable fracture. If the assessment
line cuts the failure locus then the tearing is predicted to stop, and the flaw may be considered
to be safe. The critical flaw condition is defined by an assessment locus which just intersects,
or is tangential to the failure locus.
1.6
1.4-

T
P
s 1.21
-6
1
c2 l8

0.87

Assessment line - unsafe

/
,!k-

Material specific FAD

0.67
0.4-G

Assessment line - safe

0.26
0

I
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.2

Lr

Figure 3. Typical PD6493 level 3 FADS

1.4

1.6

Industrial

pressure vessel failures

437

Normally, when performing fracture assessments to PD6493 procedures, the structure

may be considered safe if the assessment point lies within the failure locus of the FAD, as
described above. A point which lies outside the failure locus is of concern. In this report,
since the fracture conditions of the pressure vessels are being predicted using PD6493
procedures, the assessment points are expected to lie outside the failure locus if the method
is conservative. Points lying inside the failure locus are of concern, and represent nonconservative analysis procedures.
It should be noted that PD6493 is not a prescriptive document, and has not been
standardised. Rather, PD6493 is an evolving document, providing guidance on the assessment
of fusion welded joints, and there are many valid interpretations of PD6493.
In this study, each failure has been assessed using the procedures recommended by
PD6493. The input data used for each assessment has been obtained from the published
failure investigation reports. In accordance with PD6493: 199 1, apparently conservative
assumptions have been used for all assessments; for example, lower bound toughness values
and yield magnitude residual stress assumptions. However, because the assessments have been
performed with the benefit of hindsight, a range of assessments has usually been performed
for each failure. These use varying assumptions, some of which are subsequently shown not
to be conservative and result in unsafe predictions from which various lessons can be learnt.
Due to the obviously unexpected nature of real failures, the quality of the input data
is often lower than would be expected from a laboratory test. Where data has been
unavailable, or of dubious nature, this has been indicated, and suitable engineering judgements
made. This process is much closer to the typical situation where an assessment is being
performed on an existing or postulated defect, with usually very restricted input data;
therefore the assessments performed and described in this report are representative of many
assessments which are performed for existing plant.
The PD6493: 199 1 assessments described in this paper have been performed with the
aid of two computer programs, developed by TWI (Crackwise and PC6493). These programs
have been validated (6) to ensure that the fracture assessment procedures of PD6493:1991 are
implemented correctly.

ASSESSMENT

OF PRESSURE

VESSEL FAILURES

Port Jerome pressure vessel

This failure (7) occurred in a 20 year old carbon steel spherical pressure vessel. The vessel
was one of five identical reactors in a cyclic catalytic reforming unit, 4.3m in diameter,
fabricated from 41mm thick plate (with no post-weld heat treatment). The failure occurred
while the reactor was in a standby condition and so was pressurised (24barg, 75% of
operating pressure) at approximately 5C with treat gas (primarily hydrogen).
The failure analysis concluded that failure initiated from cracks (primarily lamellar
tearing) in the pressure vessel shell at the root of the weld used to attach a shroud support
ring. It was concluded that the plate at the defect tips was embrittled by strain-ageing during

438

N. V. Challenger et al.

the welding of the shroud support ring. This support ring had been changed a number of times
and the ring at the time of the incident had been welded to the pressure vessel shell
approximately seven months previously.
The exact dimensions of the initiating flaw are not known. However, surface cracks
in the vessel shell, extending from the attachment weld root, were found up to 3mm deep.
Examination of the fracture surface indicated that the failure had initiated adjacent to a
significant length of this attachment weld, extending to a through-thickness crack which
deviated away from the attachment weld. Therefore the initiating defect is thought to be a
surface defect of depth a up to 3mm and of an unknown but much greater length.
Residual stress was assumed to be uniform and of yield strength magnitude, relaxed
in accordance with PD6493 procedures. Applied stress (69MPa, with stress concentration
factor SCF=1.6) were based on finite element analyses reported in Ref.7, with M, factors
recommended by PD6493 used for comparison, where M, is the stress intensity factor
magnification factor, to account for the stress concentrating effect of weld toes.
Minimum values have been used for parent plate yield and tensile strengths, in
accordance with PD6493 procedures. Three different levels of toughness have been assumed
for all assessments. A value of crack-tip opening displacement (CTOD) toughness of
6,,=0.42mm represented the lowest value of toughness measured from full thickness CTOD
specimens (at 5C) for as-received parent plate. Lower bound values of S,, = 0.03 and
O.Olmm were reported in Refs. 7 and 8, respectively, for full thickness strain-aged CTOD
specimens.
Since the actual flaw lengths were not reported in Ref. 7, maximum tolerable flaw
depths have been calculated as a function of flaw length, for comparison with the reported
3mm flaw depth. Six Level 1 and 2 assessments have been performed, for three levels of
toughness (Fig.4), based on the SCF data presented in Ref. 7. Three additional assessments
have been performed using weld toe M, factors recommended by PD6493 for comparison
(Fig.5).

IS

60

90

Crack half ten@. c. m m

Figure 4. Port Jerome pressure vessel - Level 1 and 2 assessments

Industrial pressure vessel failures

30

60

439

Q.

h4kFrtwwd.SCF=l.O
Mk fwor DM used. SCF - 1.6

kk,
0

--i------.-r30

60
90
Crack half length, e, m m

5
%TODmii = 0.b3fG
~_~~
.,
i -CTODmat=OOlmm
120

. ~.

I
I50

Figure 5. Port Jerome pressure vessel - Level 2 assessments - effect of SCF

It can be seen that use of the as-received parent material toughness results in nonconservative assessments. This is not surprising, as the failure investigation identified that asreceived parent plate toughness was not low enough to explain the brittle fracture at such a
low load (75% of operating pressure).
Analyses performed using the fracture toughness values from the strain-aged CTOD
specimens do conservatively predict failure, as can be seen from Figs 4 and 5. It should be
noted, however, that the degree of strain-ageing in the actual pressure vessel is not known
relative to the strain-aged CTOD specimens. The strain-aged CTOD specimens were designed
to maximise the strain-ageing effect, by welding over prepared notches of a depth of 5mm
to 6mm, which was found to give the greatest degree of embrittlement. However, it is
considered that this technique is likely to realistically simulate the embrittlement seen at the
initiating defect caused by the attachment weld.
It can be seen from Fig.4 that in this case Level 1 analyses are significantly less
conservative than the Level 2 approach, particularly at the larger tolerable crack depths
associated with the highest level of toughness. This is due to the use of the CTOD design
curve, as recommended by PD6493.
Union Oil amine absorber pressure vessel
In 1984 an amine absorber pressure vessel exploded, causing 17 fatalities and extensive
damage (9). The vessel was an 18.8m high, 2.6m diameter, 25.4mm thick, carbon manganese
steel cylindrical tower, used to strip hydrogen sulphide from the propane and butane process
stream. The tower operated at just above ambient temperature (38C) and at a low internal
pressure (14barg) and hence primary stresses due to pressurisation were calculated to be low
(35MPa).
The failure investigation concluded that the vessel failed adjacent to the repair weld
between courses 1 and 2. Course 2 had been replaced in 1974 due to the discovery of
hydrogen blisters and delaminations. The repair welds had not been stress relieved.

440

N. V. Challenger et al.

It was concluded that the initiating defect had developed during operation (probably
by hydrogen cracking) in the hard brittle microstructure adjacent to the horizontal repair weld.
This heat affected zone (HAZ) microstructure was caused by the repair procedure and was
not tempered by subsequent passes close to the vessel surface. These surface defects had
extended through the vessel wall (probably due to a hydrogen cracking mechanism), until the
deepest crack extended through more than 90% of the wall thickness, when the remaining
ligament failed by stable tearing, creating a leak. The through-thickness crack then propagated
by slow tearing, until approximately 800mm long, at which point fast fracture occurred.
Fracture toughness values of S,,- -0.17 and 0.064mm were measured from conventional
HAZ notched and hydrogen charged specimens, respectively (both at 38C). Conventional
HAZ notched specimens tested at -40C gave a lower bound S,,=O.l lmm; -40C was
considered to be the lowest temperature that may have resulted due to venting of the propane
immediately before final unstable fracture. For Level 3 assessments, a tearing CTOD R-curve
was assumed: 6=0.144Aa+O.O32mm, where Aa is crack extension. This R-curve offset power
law fit was estimated from a figure in Ref.9 and was used up to the extent of available data
(Aa=4.Omm).
A total of 10 assessments have been performed, summarised in Fig.6 and 7. It can be
seen that all assessments which take account of residual stresses conservatively predict the
failure of the vessel, irrespective of whether fracture toughness is obtained from conventional
or hydrogen-charged CTOD specimens. Indeed, the safety factor in these assessments is
considerable. The fracture mechanics calculations presented in Ref.9 concluded that CTOD
obtained from hydrogen charged specimens was required to adequately explain the unstable
fracture. However this study took no account of residual stresses; levels of hydrogen content
in the steel at failure and in the CTOD specimens were also not known.

0.2

0.4

0.6

011

I.2

1.4
7

6-

5-

p4-

3-

3
Qm-304Nhd

2-

I
Qm=ON/mm'
..----_.
0
0

/
0.2

I
0.4

r-I---0.8

0.6

.._..
-10

---T--.
I

12

14

Lx

Figure 6. Union Oil amine absorber pressure vessel - Level 3 assessments

Industrial pressure

0.2

0.4

vessel failures

441

0.6

0.8

0.6

08

Sr

Figure 7(a). Union Oil amine absorber pressure vessel - Level 1 assessments

02

0.4

0.6

02

0.4

0.6

-.__

0.8

1.2

0.8

1.2

$4
I
3 :

Sr

Figure 7(b). Union Oil amine absorber pressure vessel - Level 2 assessments
Vertical refinery tower
This was a 13 year old, 26m high, 3.7m diameter cylindrical tower which failed in 1981
during a re-validation hydrotest, following the addition of two new nozzles (10, 11). The
tower was manufactured in 24mm thick A204 Grade C, C-1/2Mo steel, clad with 3mm thick
405 stainless steel, and had been stress-relieved. The tower normally operated at 450C but
the water temperature during hydrotest was 8C. Failure of the vessel occurred at a pressure
of 2 lbarg (operating pressure was 1Obarg).
The failure investigation concluded that failure initiated at a weld between the main
vessel cylinder head and a 2.3m high, 1.8m diameter boot at the base of the vessel. At this
position, a compensating doubler plate was attached, resulting in a weld thickness of
approximately 63mm. It was concluded that the initiating defect, which was clearly visible
on the fracture surface, was a fabrication-induced,
transverse, weld metal hydrogen crack

442

N. V. Challenger et al.

(51mm long by 38mm deep), which had propagated by a creep mechanism, due to the applied
and residual stress field.
It was noted in Ref. 11 that the residual stress was unusually high for a stress-relieved
vessel; this, together with locally high hoop stresses from the hydrotest, low fracture
toughness at the hydrotest temperature, combined with a pre-existing defect, was sufficient
to cause brittle fracture.
Lower bound weld metal properties have been used throughout the analyses, 6,,t =
0.019mm; however the fracture toughness of the compensating plate and vessel shell were not
significantly higher (0.035mm).
Values of membrane and bending primary stress (P, and PJ have been obtained from
Ref. 11. These were originally obtained by finite element analysis of the failed region; hence
an SCF of 1.0 has been used for all analyses. The value of membrane residual stress (Q,)
obtained from Ref. 11 was measured by the block removal and layering technique. This
resulted in internal measured hoop residual stresses of up to 119MPa. Hoop residual stresses
measured at the outer surface varied up to 171MPa. A value of 120MPa (residual stress at
inner surface) was assumed for all assessments. In the absence of any measurements of
residual stress, for transverse flaws in PWHT joints PD6493 recommends the use of a value
equal to 30% of the room temperature weld metal yield strength. This results in an assumed
value for Q,=l83MPa (i.e. > measured Q,).
Various approaches were used for calculating the applied stress intensity factor, K, in
Ref. 11. Upper and lower bound values of K, 3145 and 2564Nlmm3, were calculated for the
plate surface and deepest point of the crack, respectively. In addition the Newman-Raju K
solutions in PD6493 were used, for the deepest point of the crack (2775N/mm32).
Assessment results are presented in Fig.8 and 9, where it can be seen that all
assessments conservatively predict the failure of the vessel, irrespective of the K solution
used, or the location of the K calculation (plate surface/deepest point).

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

08

09

SI

Figure 8. Vertical refinery tower - Level 1 assessments

Industrial pressure

0.2

0.4

0.6
Sr

vessel failures

443

7----.-

0.8

--

Figure 9. Vertical refinery tower - Level 2 assessments

Typpi Oy ammonia plant failure
This failure occurred at the Typpi Oy ammonia plant, Finland, in March 1970 (12). A set of
four 1. lm diameter high pressure gaseous effluent water coolers failed with no prior warning.
The failure was traced to an existing defect in the forged head chamber of heat
exchanger B. The defect was an internal, circumferential, surface defect, located in the head
chamber wall, at the toe of the weld overlay on the tube plate. The head chamber wall at this
point is understood to have been 85mm thick, and the tube plate 270mm thick.
It is thought that the initiating flaw was a fabrication defect (3mm deep, 12mm long).
This defect then extended by a stress corrosion cracking mechanism caused by residual water
from the hydrotest, during the period before final installation (one year). The stresses
responsible for this crack extension are thought to be residual stresses remaining due to an
inadequate post-weld heat treatment (PWHT). The defect size at failure was approximately
5mm deep by 70mm long.
The quenched and tempered forged material in which the defect was situated was also
found to have very poor fracture toughness, attributed to slow quenching, leading to formation
of upper bainite.
Residual stresses of
diffraction. This value was
stress was used for others,
strength, in accordance with

up to 137MPa were reported in Ref.12, measured using X-ray

used in some assessments, while an assumed level of residual
assuming that PWHT had been successful (i.e. 15% of yield
PD6493).

An applied stress (P,) of 116SMPa (18% of yield strength) is mentioned in Ref. 12

as the stress caused by the process pressure, and was used in some assessments. Based on the
pressure at failure (23MPa), a hoop stress of 136MPa has been calculated using standard thick
shell solutions. For Level 1 calculations an SCF of 1.48 has been assumed, based on the
PD6493 M, solutions for flaws at weld toes.

444

N. V, Challenger et al.

Fracture toughness data were obtained from two SENB specimens close to full section
thickness (76mm), giving valid plane strain KrCresults. The lower bound value was used for
all assessments (1316N/mm32).
The results of all assessments summarised Fig.10 and 11. It can be seen from Fig.10
that all Level 1 assessments are conservative. All Level 2 assessments resulted in conservative
assessments, except where it was assumed that PWHT was effective at stress relieving, which
was not the case (using the lower level of applied stress assumed).

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9
1.2

1.2
.
.

-F

0.8

r;

.s

0.6

3.6

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

sr

Figure 10. Typpi Oy ammonia plant failure - Level 1 assessments

0.2

1.2

0.4

0.6

0.11

..

II

00

0.8
O.S-I

&
&

0.6
0.6--

0.4-0.4

0.2
0.2--

0.2

O.,,.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

+.+----+0.8

0
1

Sl

Figure 11. Typpi Oy ammonia plant failure - Level 2 assessments

These assessments illustrate that small variations in assumed values can be crucial to
the conservatism of an assessment in certain cases. In borderline cases, it is clearly advisable

Industrial

pressure vessel failures

445

to perform sensitivity analyses and/or apply partial safety factors where any doubt exists over
input data.
Cockenzie power station boiler failure
This failure occurred at the Cockenzie power station, Scotland, in 1966 (13). The first of the
power stations 1.65m diameter boilers was approaching its full hydraulic test pressure for the
fourth and final, intended, on-site hydrotest, when the vessel failed by brittle fracture. The
failure was subsequently analysed by Burdekin and Dawes (14) using contemporary fracture
mechanics assessment principles.
The initiating defect was identified as an internal, surface breaking defect (89mm deep
by 330mm long), adjacent to an economiser nozzle and an internal welded attachment bracket.
The economiser nozzle had previously been replaced during drum manufacture, but Ref.13
concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that the nozzle replacement was responsible
for the formation of the arrested brittle fracture. Post failure examination of this initiating
defect revealed that it was an arrested brittle crack at the drum shell/internal nozzle weld
interface, and was not associated with the bracket weld.
The fracture face of the initiating defect was coated with oxides, indicating that it had
been present during the stress relief heat treatment. The failure investigation reported in
Ref.13 could find no defect from which the initial arrested brittle crack initiated. No
conclusions were drawn as to the cause of the arrested brittle crack.
The report (13) stated that there was no evidence of crack extension during the
previous three hydrotests, which had all reached full pressure (4098psig) safely. The report
offers no explanation why the final test should fail at the lower pressure of 3915psig; the
ambient temperature of the final test is reported to have been 7C but no mention is made
of the temperature of the previous tests. Even if the previous tests had been performed at
warmer temperatures, there should have been a warm proof-stressing effect, leading to a
minimum failure load equal to the previous hydrotest loads.
Fracture toughness was not originally measured; however Burdekin and Dawes (14)
presented a fracture mechanics analysis of various failures, including the Cockenzie pressure
vessel, and used a value of CTOD of 0.43mm. This value of fracture toughness was reported
to have been obtained from nominally similar material from another casualty, though no
further details are given. In addition a second value for fracture toughness of 0.255mm was
obtained by Babcock and Wilcox Research Station, from specimens extracted from the
casualty material, as was reported in a comment in Ref.14 by W.M.Ham. This lower value
of fracture toughness was also used in a number of assessments.
Parent material yield and tensile strength data were used in all assessments, in the
absence of any relevant weld metal data. This should be a conservative assumption for the
calculation of stress ratio (S,), assuming that the weld is overmatching.
Residual stresses have been assumed to be equal to 15% of (parent material) yield
strength, following the stress relief heat treatment. Applied hoop stresses were calculated
using both thin- and thick-wall solutions (P,=174MPa; P,=160MPa, P,=lSMPa, respectively).
The results of the latter calculation give a stress distribution which can be linearised over the

N. V. Challenger et al.

446

defect depth in accordance with PD6493. Clearly, the initiating defect is at a fairly severe
stress concentrator (i.e. adjacent to both a nozzle and an attachment bracket.)., and so various
levels of SCF have been assumed. In the absence of more specific guidance, an upper bound
SCF of 3.0 has been assumed.
Assessment results are summarised in Fig.12 and 13, where it can be seen that at the
higher level of fracture toughness assumed (6,,,=0.43mm), the level of SCF assumed is
critical to the conservatism of the assessment. The lower value of fracture toughness
(6,,,=0.255mm) would appear to be the more relevant of the two values, having been taken
from the casualty material. Use of this lower value of toughness results in conservative
assessments at both Levels 1 and 2, unless no account is taken of the SCF due to nozzle and
attachment bracket.

0.1

0.2

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9
I.8

I.8
.A

l.6--

1.6
1.4

Id-'8

01

0.2

0.3

04

0.1

0.6

0.7

08

0.9

Sr

Figure 12. Cockenzie power station boiler - Level 1 assessments

0.2

0.4

0.6

2.2

0.8

2--

2
I.8

l.8-l.6-8

l.4--

I.6

0
A

I.4

rfi

1.2
,I

I
0.8--

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Sr

Figure 13. Cockenzie power station boiler - Level 2 assessments

Industrial

pressure

vessel failures

441

There can be seen to be little difference, in this example, between the results obtained
using applied stresses calculated assuming thin and thick walled pressure vessel equations;
the simplification of assuming a thin wall is conservative in this case
John Thompson pressure vessel failure
This was a large, thick-walled pressure vessel, manufactured by John Thompson (Wolverhampton) Ltd. for use in an ammonia plant (15). The vessel failed by brittle fracture during
hydrotest in December 1965. Despite being hydrotested, the energy released was sufficient
to project several pieces; one 2 ton piece was projected 152 feet.
The fracture was identified as initiating from two similar sites in the HAZ of the
submerged arc circumferential weld joining the large forging and the adjacent strake. The
initiating defects were small, transverse, embedded cracks, located in the forging HAZ. These
cracks were probably formed by hydrogen cracking due to the heavy segregation of carbon
and alloying elements in the forging, locally increasing susceptibility to this form of cracking.
Initiation was then judged to have occurred into the weld metal. Both initiation sites (referred
to as 11 and I2 in Ref. 15) were very similar but I1 was judged to be the primary initiation
site.
Defect 11 (depth 8.3mm, length 9.5mm, ligament height 14.3mm) was judged to have
initially have been a small hydrogen crack from which an arrested brittle fracture was
initiated, either following welding under the influence of residual stress, or during the early
stages of hydrotesting. This resulted in a larger defect from which final failure was initiated.
A stress analysis of the region in which fracture was initiated was reported in Ref. 15,
and the results of this have been used to provide primary stresses. This stress analysis
predicted a maximum stress of 249.7MPa at an internal pressure of 5100 psig; the actual
internal pressure at failure was reported as 5OOOpsig, and so this value of stress has been
linearly scaled accordingly, to give the value of applied stress assumed (P,=244.8MPa). This
is marginally higher than the value of hoop stress calculated using thin wall shell solutions
(213.8MPa).
The vessel was reported to have undergone PWHT, however Ref. 15 concludes that the
stress relieving heat treatment was performed at too low a temperature, resulting in inadequate
stress relief, in addition to the very high weld metal yield strength and very low weld metal
Charpy toughness. Residual stress (Q,,,) levels of yield (parent and weld metal) magnitude
(relaxed by primary stresses in accordance with PD6493) have been assumed. Additional
assessments have been performed assuming residual stresses relaxed by PWHT (30% of
appropriate yield strength, in accordance with PD6493 for transverse flaws).
Assessments have been performed with varying assumptions concerning tensile
properties, due to the position of the flaw in the HAZ region between two regions of very
different tensile properties. PD6493 recommends the use of the lower bound tensile properties
(ie, the parent forging properties) for all calculations, with the exception of the residual stress
assumption. For the residual stress assumption PD6493 states that the appropriate yield
strength is that for the material in which the flaw lies (for transverse flaws). Use of the
overmatching weld metal yield strength is clearly the conservative approach to take in this
case.

448

N. V. Challenger

et al.

Results of all Level 1 and 2 assessments are summarised in Fig.14 and 15. It can be
seen that using the value of fracture toughness given in Ref.14 results in assessments close
to the FAD, both at Level 1 and 2, indicating that care is required with the choice of input
assumptions. Use of parent material (or weld metal) tensile properties, and residual stress
equal to weld metal yield strength, results in conservative predictions, as long as no allowance
is made for residual stress relaxation due to PWHT. This approach follows the recommendations of PD6493 but relies on the knowledge that PWHT was ineffective; clearly a similar
assessment, if it were to be made without the benefit of hindsight, would not necessarily be
safe.

0.5

06

0.7

0.8

O/9,

1.4

1.2

0.8

0.6

0.2

0.1

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Sr

Figure 14. John Thompson pressure vessel - Level 1 assessments

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.6

1.6

1.4--

.
1.4
.

l.2--

I2

0
0
I

&f

0.8--

0.6--

0.2
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

-+--.-..

0
I

Sr

Figure 15. John Thompson pressure vessel - Level 2 assessments

Industrial pressure vessel failures

449

It should be noted that the value of fracture toughness (K,,=1840N/mm3*) obtained

from Ref.14 cannot be taken as wholly reliable, despite being described as a K,, value, as
fracture toughness testing was in its infancy at the time. However, use of various Charpy-K,,
correlations suggest that this is likely to be a conservative value. All correlations attempted
using the lower bound Charpy result at test temperature (12J at 7C) resulted in values of K,,
at least as great as the value of I&,t used. The most conservative result was achieved using
a correlation suggested by Girenko (16), which resulted in a correlated value of K,, = 1880N/mm3 .
Robert Jenkins pressure vessel
This 35m long vessel failed by brittle fracture during an hydrotest in November 1970 (17).
The vessel was a relatively thin walled, fabricated from medium strength carbon-manganese
steel (ASTM 515 Grade 70 (1967), unlike the previous two vessels, which were constructed
from thick section, higher strength steel. The vessel was constructed in two sections. The
section in which failure occurred was 2.4m in diameter, 28mm wall thickness, and was not
stress-relieved. The other section was larger, thicker, and was stress-relieved.
The failure investigation concluded that the failure had initiated from an external,
axially oriented, surface crack (114.3mm long and 12.2mm deep), extending from the toe of
a fillet weld attaching a compensating ring at a manway. It was proposed that this defect was
an arrested brittle crack which had been created in the early stages of testing, and had
initiated from a liquation crack that had extended by hydrogen cracking, under the influence
of high residual stress and constraint.
The vessel failed at a pressure of 420psig. Primary stress (P,) has been calculated for
this pressure, assuming the pressure vessel to be thin walled, which results in a value of P,
= 130MPa. Because of the depth of the flaw, M, values were calculated to have decayed to
1.0 and so no stress concentration effect was assumed, for both Levels 1 and 2.
Two different assumptions have been made for residual stresses. The simplest
assumption is for uniform (through the plate thickness) tensile residual stress equal to the
plate yield strength (relaxed in accordance with PD6493, Q,=295MPa).
The second
assumption, also suggested by PD6493, specifically for defects at fillet weld toes, calculates
a residual stress distribution based on the heat input of the adjacent weld run. Unfortunately
details of the weld procedure for this fillet weld have not been published, and so a heat input
of lkJ/mm has been assumed; this assumption results in a value for the depth of penetration
(y) of the residual stress field of approximately 20mm, which is significantly greater than the
defect depth. This assumption resulted in residual stresses of Q,=92MPa and Q,=203MPa.
Results of all assessments, to both Levels 1 and 2, are summarised in Fig.16, where
it can be seen that all assessments conservatively predict the vessel failure. Use of the residual
stress field, specifically for weld toe defects, suggested in PD6493, results in a slightly less
conservative Level 2 assessment. Level 1 assessments are unaffected by this assumption, as
residual stress is automatically assumed to be uniform (Q,,, + Q,).

450

N. V. Challenger et al.

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.0

I.8
1.6--

1.4--

0.
I
0

0.2

0.4

06

0.0

Sr

Figure 16. Robert Jenkins pressure vessel - Level 1 and 2 assessments

Ammonia catchpot pressure vessel failure
This failure involved a thick walled (62mm) ammonia catchpot pressure vessel (7m long, lm
internal diameter), which failed catastrophically, by brittle fracture, in January 1982, after
approximately 16 years of service. The failure resulted in extensive fragmentation of the
vessel, and considerable damage to the surroundings up to 300m from the vessel site.
The failure investigation (18) concluded that the pressure vessel shell was extremely
brittle at the service temperature (26C), demonstrated by the extensive fragmentation of the
vessel. The fracture initiation site was identified as one of several pre-existing axially aligned
surface defects at a fillet weld toe, on the inner wall of the vessel. These pre-existing defects
were identified as hydrogen cracks.
The exact cause of failure, after such a period of service, could not be attributed to
a specific cause; possible causes included a change in service conditions, hydrogen
embrittlement of the parent steel in service and/or extension of pre-existing defects, possibly
by a hydrogen assisted process or fatigue. However, it was concluded that the parent material
was sufficiently brittle that very little change (service conditions, toughness or defect size)
had been required to cause catastrophic failure. Essentially the vessel had been in a condition
very close to fracture from the time it had entered service.
The vessel had undergone a stress-relieving heat treatment after fabrication, however
the failure investigation (18) cast doubt on whether the final pass of the fillet weld of concern
had undergone PWHT.
The initiating defect was an axially oriented surface flaw, located at the toe of a fillet
weld on the inner vessel wall, close to mid-length in the vessel. The fillet weld attached a
bracket to the inside of the vessel; the attachment length (L) used for calculating the M,
factors is not given in Ref.18, but was estimated from photographs to be approximately
30mm. Assessments were also performed with the assumed attachment length L=40mm and
with M, factors set to 1.0 (ie assuming no fillet weld), to act as a sensitivity study.

Industrial pressure

vessel failures

451

The approximate initiating flaw depth, a, is known to be 4mm, however flaw lengths
are not given in Ref.18. The failure investigation report does include a photograph of the
initiation region, indicating that the two possible initiating defects are long, relative to their
depth (2c=30-40mm). In view of this uncertainty over initial flaw dimensions, calculations
have been performed to calculate tolerable flaw dimensions for a range of flaws.
Two levels of assumed primary stress were used for the assessments. The lower level
of primary stress assumed (P,=285MPa), was the hoop stress taken directly from Ref.18.
Hoop stress estimated using the vessel dimensions, and assuming the pressure vessel to thin
walled, was slightly higher (P,=314MPa). This latter value agreed closely with the value of
hoop stress calculated using thick walled pressure vessel solutions at the inner surface.
Residual stresses were assumed to have been reduced by PWHT in accordance with PD6493,
to 15% of parent yield strength, despite the doubts cast on the condition of the weld by the
failure investigation.
PD6493 does not distinguish between internal and external axial surface flaws,
however it is known that bulging has little effect on internal flaws; therefore most of the
assessments performed in this case do not include a bulging factor. One assessment has been
performed with a bulging correction factor for comparison purposes.
Defect calculations have been performed to estimate (just) tolerable defect sizes for
a range of defect dimensions. The calculated tolerable defect dimensions are recorded
graphically in Figs.17 to 19 for Levels 1 and 2, where it can be seen that the only analyses
which indicate that flaws of depth greater than or equal to 4mm are tolerable (i.e. potentially
non-conservative assessments), are those which ignore the stress concentrating effect of the
fillet weld; even then the assessments indicate that flaws of 4mm depth (or more) are only
tolerable for very short crack lengths (2c<lO-12mm), which is considerably smaller than the
observed initiating defects (2c=40mm). This demonstrates the conservatism of the procedure
for this case.
:)

IO

I5

20

25

3i

Known crack depth, I

4

__~

0
0

II
5

IO

I5
Crack half length, 6, m m

-.+.20

Pm = 285 N/mm
-~~-.-__~
Pm=3135Nlmm
(
2s

~~

0
30

Figure 17. Ammonia catchpot pressure vessel - tolerable surface defect sizes - Level 1

N. V. Challenger et al.

452

6 i

10

IS

20

A8a&mcnt

b...-+...--__t__

I5
Crack half Ien&

31

2J

length. L = 3Omm

-.+
-.+

.._ +...--20

25

c, m m

Figure 18. Ammonia catchpot pressure vessel - tolerable surface

defect sizes - Level 2 (P,=285MPa)
0

IO

IJ

20

__.___-.-.

21

30
P

I5
Crack half length. c, m m

Figure 19. Ammonia catchpot pressure vessel - tolerable surface

defect sizes - Level 2 (P,=314MPa)

GENERAL

DISCUSSION

It is clear from the above assessments that all non-conservative

incorrect input assumptions or poor input data.

analyses are the result of

Good examples of this include the assessments on the Port Jerome vessel and Union
Oil amine absorber tower, both of which were subject to embrittlement that was only revealed
post failure. Use of standard CTOD specimens in each case would have resulted in nonconservative assessments. The embrittling mechanism had to be simulated in the CTOD test
specimens in order to achieve conservative predictions. In both cases the degrees of
embrittlement in the structure was unknown, and hence the tests employed an arbitrary degree
of embrittlement. In the case of the Union Oil amine absorber tower failure this was achieved

Industrial

pressure

vessel failures

453

by saturating with hydrogen while in the Port Jerome vessel, locally intensified strain ageing
embrittlement was simulated by welding over notches in parent material CTOD specimens.
Several pressure vessels (i.e. Typpi Oy ammonia cooler, John Thompson vessel and
the vertical refinery tower) were described as being stress relieved, but in reality contained
significant residual stresses which were concluded to be primary causes of failure. Again this
fact was only revealed post failure in each case. Residual stresses are not frequently known,
and hence usually have to be assumed, despite being of primary importance in most failures.
PD6493 procedures for residual stress assumptions have been shown to be conservative for
the cases examined, except in the cases mentioned above, where PWHT had been incomplete.
It is interesting to note that low fracture toughness was a feature of almost all the
failures. Examination of the figures show that all assessment points/loci are located in the
fracture dominated region of the FAD. By comparison, assessment points for the large scale
fracture mechanics tests assessed previously (4,5) are located around the knee region of the
FAD, or beyond the plastic collapse limit. It is clear that the majority of research effort has
not being aimed at the region of the FAD (brittle fracture) where many catastrophic industrial
pressure vessel failures occur, but rather at the region of the FAD where normal design
conditions are appropriate.
It would appear that most benefit is to be obtained by the accurate definition of input
data. This requires accurate flaw sizing, location and monitoring, better understanding of
likely embrittling mechanisms, in addition to accurate initial fracture toughness measurements,
and better understanding of the applied and residual stresses. Most of the failures illustrated
here have demonstrated inadequacies in knowledge in one or more of these areas. Further
refinement and reduction in conservatism of fracture assessment procedures are not warranted
without a high degree of confidence in the input data. The cost of generating improved input
data must be balanced by an appreciation of the risk and consequences of pressure vessel
failure.
Improved quality assurance (QA) procedures, at all stages of a pressure vessels life
(design, fabrication, service and maintenance), can lead to improved input data, for purposes
of vessel life extension and failure investigation. Fairly small expenditures of money (for
instance, storing test samples of material from welding trials) can have a significant impact
on the confidence (and hence conservatism) of future structural integrity assessments. The
advantages of a successful structural integrity assessment can be very high, if plant life
extension or change of service is anticipated, or if litigation occurs following a failure.
Smith (19) has reviewed the causes of over 66 pressure vessel failures, of which 26%
occurred during hydrotest, 20% were described as brittle fractures, 14% were attributed to
creep, 20% were caused by H,, stress corrosion cracking or related phenomena, while in 7%
fatigue was reported to play a role in failure. In 6% of cases inadequate stress relief treatment
was applied to vessels, while 5% of failures occurred at weld repairs; 12% of failures were
attributed to low toughness or manufacturing defects. In many of the above failures,
considerable damage to plant occurred, with extensive fragmentation (in one case pieces
weighing over 100 tonnes were thrown more than 400m).

N. V. Challenger et al.

454

There are clearly many interacting mechanisms which contribute to pressure

failures. It is important that engineers concerned with pressurised systems be aware
factors which affect the structural integrity of pressurised components, throughout the
life (design, fabrication and maintenance), including the influence of stresses,
mechanical properties, and environment.

CONCLUSIONS

vessel
of the
vessel
flaws,

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Eight ferritic steel pressure vessel service failures involving fracture have been re-assessed
following the BSI PD6493: 199 1 fracture assessment procedures. Assessments have been
performed at Levels 1 and 2 in all cases, and at Level 3 where suitable input data exist. The
fracture assessment procedures in PD6493 have been demonstrated to be safe for all the
failures studied, provided appropriate input data are used.
The following

points arise out of the case studies described in this paper.

(1)

Particular care should be given to ensuring that fracture toughness input data are
relevant to the assessment. Possible embrittling mechanisms, such as hydrogen
embrittlement and locally intensified strain ageing embrittlement, should be considered
and accounted for in fracture toughness testing, if thought to be present.

(2)

The PD6493:1991 procedures for assuming residual stress levels are conservative,
including appropriate relaxation methods, so long as post weld heat treatment (if
performed) is carried out fully.

(3)

Further refinement and reductions in the conservatism of fracture assessment

procedures are not warranted without a correspondingly high degree of confidence in
the input data.

(4)

The use of more advanced methods (Levels)

benefit where input data is uncertain.

of analysis may not offer significant

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The.authors would like to express their thanks to the UK Department of Trade and Industry,
and the Industrial Members of TWI for funding the Core Research Programme. Thanks also
to staff of the Engineering Department at TWI, especially M G Dawes, for providing advice
and suitable references for this report.

Industrial pressure vessel failures

455

REFERENCES

(1)

PD6493:1980, Guidance on some methods for the derivation of acceptance levels for
defects in fusion welded joints. British Standards Institution, London, 1980.

(2)

Mime, I., Ainsworth, R.A., Dowling, A.R. and Stewart, A.T. Assessment of the
integrity of structures containing defects - Revision 3. Central Electricity Generating
Board, London, 1987.

(3)

PD6493: 1991. Guidance on methods for assessing the acceptability of flaws in fusion
welded structures. British Standards Institution, London, 1991.

(4)

Challenger, N.V., Phaal, R. and Garwood, S.J. Appraisal of PD6493:1991 fracture

assessment procedures, Part I: TWI data. TWI Report 7 158.1/93/762.02, March 1993.

(5)

Challenger, N.V., Phaal, R. and Garwood, S.J. Appraisal of PD6493:1991 fracture

assessment procedures, Part II: Published and additional TWI data. TWI Report, to be
published.

(6)

Booth, G.S., Garwood, S.J., Phaal, R., Hurworth, S.J. and Brown, P.L. Fitness-forpurpose assessment of weld flaws using micro-computer software. 4th Computer
Technology in Welding Conference, Cambridge, 3-4 June 1992.

(7)

Merrick, R.D. and Ciuffreda, A.R. Brittle fracture of a pressure vessel - study results
and recommendations. API 48th Mid-year refining meeting Session on unexpected
material failures - refinery performance impaired, May 1983, Los Angeles.

(8)

Confidential

(9)

McHenry, HI., Read, D.T. and Shives, T.R. Failure analysis of an amine-absorber
pressure vessel. Materials Performance Vo1.26, No.8, pp. 18-24 August 1987.

(10)

Garwood, S.J. and Harrison, J.D. The use of yielding fracture mechanics in post
failure analysis. Pressure Vessel and Piping Technology - A decade of progress - 1985
ed. C R Sundarajan ASME pp. 1043-1054.

(11)

Confidential

(12)

Moisio, T. Brittle fracture in failed ammonia plant. Met. Const. and Brit. Welding Jnl,
January 1972.

(13)

Report on the brittle fracture of a high pressure boiler drum at Cockenzie power
station. South of Scotland Electricity Board, January 1967.

(14)

Burdekin, F.M. and Dawes, M.G. Practical use of linear elastic and yielding fracture
mechanics with particular reference to pressure vessels. Proc. of Inst. Mech. Eng.
conf., London, May 1971.

TWI Report 27475/2.

TWI Report 2757 1,

N. V. Challenger et al.

456

(15)

Brittle fracture of a thick walled pressure vessel. BWRA Bulletin, Vo1.7, No.6, June
1966.

(16)

Girenko, V.S. and Lyndin, V.P. Relationship between the impact strength and fracture
mechanics criteria CTOD,, and K,, of structural steels and welded joints in them.
Automatic Welding, September, 13- 19.

(17)

Banks, B. Pressure vessel failure during hydrotest. Welding and Metal Fabrication,
January 1973.

(18)

Confidential

(19)

Smith, T.A. A review of pressure vessel failure experience - some failure case studies.
Vol Ml, SMIRT 8 (Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology) Conference,
Brussels, August 1985, 187- 193.

TWI Report 2277913.