G.R. No.

78903 February 28, 1990

SPS. SEGUNDO DALION AND EPIFANIA SABESAJE-DALION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND RUPERTO SABESAJE, JR., respondents.
Francisco A. Puray, Sr. for petitioners.
Gabriel N. Duazo for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on May 26,
1987, upholding the validity of the sale of a parcel of land by petitioner Segundo Dalion (hereafter,
"Dalion") in favor of private respondent Ruperto Sabesaje, Jr. (hereafter, "Sabesaje"), described
thus:
A parcel of land located at Panyawan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, declared in the name
of Segundo Dalion, under Tax Declaration No. 11148, with an area of 8947 hectares,
assessed at P 180.00, and bounded on the North, by Sergio Destriza and Titon
Veloso, East, by Feliciano Destriza, by Barbara Bonesa (sic); and West, by Catalino
Espina. (pp. 36-37, Rollo)
The decision affirms in toto the ruling of the trial court 1 issued on January 17, 1984, the dispositive
portion of which provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment.
(a) Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff the parcel of land subject of this
case, declared in the name of Segundo Dalion previously under Tax Declaration No.
11148 and lately under Tax Declaration No. 2297 (1974) and to execute the
corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document in favor of the
plaintiff of the said property subject of this case, otherwise, should defendants for any
reason fail to do so, the deed shall be executed in their behalf by the Provincial
Sheriff or his Deputy;
(b) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees and P 500.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs; and
(c) Dismissing the counter-claim. (p. 38, Rollo)
The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 28, 1973, Sabesaje sued to recover ownership of a parcel of land, based on a private
document of absolute sale, dated July 1, 1965 (Exhibit "A"), allegedly executed by Dalion, who,
however denied the fact of sale, contending that the document sued upon is fictitious, his signature
thereon, a forgery, and that subject land is conjugal property, which he and his wife acquired in 1960
from Saturnina Sabesaje as evidenced by the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" (Exhibit "B"). The
spouses denied claims of Sabesaje that after executing a deed of sale over the parcel of land, they
had pleaded with Sabesaje, their relative, to be allowed to administer the land because Dalion did
not have any means of livelihood. They admitted, however, administering since 1958, five (5) parcels
of land in Sogod, Southern Leyte, which belonged to Leonardo Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje,
who died in 1956. They never received their agreed 10% and 15% commission on the sales of copra
and abaca, respectively. Sabesaje's suit, they countered, was intended merely to harass, preempt
and forestall Dalion's threat to sue for these unpaid commissions.
From the adverse decision of the trial court, Dalion appealed, assigning errors some of which,
however, were disregarded by the appellate court, not having been raised in the court below. While
the Court of Appeals duly recognizes Our authority to review matters even if not assigned as errors
in the appeal, We are not inclined to do so since a review of the case at bar reveals that the lower
court has judicially decided the case on its merits.
As to the controversy regarding the identity of the land, We have no reason to dispute the Court of
Appeals' findings as follows:
To be sure, the parcel of land described in Exhibit "A" is the same property deeded
out in Exhibit "B". The boundaries delineating it from adjacent lots are identical. Both
documents detail out the following boundaries, to wit:
On the North-property of Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso;
On the East-property of Feliciano Destriza;
On the South-property of Barbara Boniza and
On the West-Catalino Espina.
(pp. 41-42, Rollo)
The issues in this case may thus be limited to: a) the validity of the contract of sale of a parcel of
land and b) the necessity of a public document for transfer of ownership thereto.
The appellate court upheld the validity of the sale on the basis of Secs. 21 and 23 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
SEC. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved.-Before any
private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 23. Handwriting, how proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, and has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court)
And on the basis of the findings of fact of the trial court as follows:
Here, people who witnessed the execution of subject deed positively testified on the
authenticity thereof. They categorically stated that it had been executed and signed
by the signatories thereto. In fact, one of such witnesses, Gerardo M. Ogsoc,
declared on the witness stand that he was the one who prepared said deed of sale
and had copied parts thereof from the "Escritura De Venta Absoluta" (Exhibit B) by
which one Saturnina Sabesaje sold the same parcel of land to appellant Segundo
Dalion. Ogsoc copied the bounderies thereof and the name of appellant Segundo
Dalion's wife, erroneously written as "Esmenia" in Exhibit "A" and "Esmenia" in
Exhibit "B". (p. 41, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
Against defendant's mere denial that he signed the document, the positive
testimonies of the instrumental Witnesses Ogsoc and Espina, aside from the
testimony of the plaintiff, must prevail. Defendant has affirmatively alleged forgery,
but he never presented any witness or evidence to prove his claim of forgery. Each
party must prove his own affirmative allegations (Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of
Court). Furthermore, it is presumed that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong
(Section 5 (a), Idem), and defense should have come forward with clear and
convincing evidence to show that plaintiff committed forgery or caused said forgery to
be committed, to overcome the presumption of innocence. Mere denial of having
signed, does not suffice to show forgery.
In addition, a comparison of the questioned signatories or specimens (Exhs. A-2 and
A-3) with the admitted signatures or specimens (Exhs. X and Y or 3-C) convinces the
court that Exhs. A-2 or Z and A-3 were written by defendant Segundo Dalion who
admitted that Exhs. X and Y or 3-C are his signatures. The questioned signatures

and the specimens are very similar to each other and appear to be written by one
person.
Further comparison of the questioned signatures and the specimens with the
signatures Segundo D. Dalion appeared at the back of the summons (p. 9, Record);
on the return card (p. 25, Ibid.); back of the Court Orders dated December 17, 1973
and July 30, 1974 and for October 7, 1974 (p. 54 & p. 56, respectively, Ibid.), and on
the open court notice of April 13, 1983 (p. 235, Ibid.) readily reveal that the
questioned signatures are the signatures of defendant Segundo Dalion.
It may be noted that two signatures of Segundo D. Dalion appear on the face of the
questioned document (Exh. A), one at the right corner bottom of the document (Exh.
A-2) and the other at the left hand margin thereof (Exh. A-3). The second signature is
already a surplusage. A forger would not attempt to forge another signature, an
unnecessary one, for fear he may commit a revealing error or an erroneous stroke.
(Decision, p. 10) (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
We see no reason for deviating from the appellate court's ruling (p. 44, Rollo) as we reiterate that
Appellate courts have consistently subscribed to the principle that conclusions and
findings of fact by the trial courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and should
not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, since it is undeniable that the
trial court is in a more advantageous position to examine real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (Chase v.
Buencamino, Sr., G.R. No. L-20395, May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 365; Pring v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-41605, August 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 185)
Assuming authenticity of his signature and the genuineness of the document, Dalion nonetheless
still impugns the validity of the sale on the ground that the same is embodied in a private document,
and did not thus convey title or right to the lot in question since "acts and contracts which have for
their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights over immovable
property must appear in a public instrument" (Art. 1358, par 1, NCC).
This argument is misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only
for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract
of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected by mere consent.
No particular form is required for its validity. Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance (Art. 1475, NCC), i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of
ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold
(Art. 1458, NCC).
The trial court thus rightly and legally ordered Dalion to deliver to Sabesaje the parcel of land and to
execute corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document. Under Art. 1498, NCC,
when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery

of the thing. Delivery may either be actual (real) or constructive. Thus delivery of a parcel of land
may be done by placing the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by embodying the
sale in a public instrument (constructive).
As regards petitioners' contention that the proper action should have been one for specific
performance, We believe that the suit for recovery of ownership is proper. As earlier stated, Art. 1475
of the Civil Code gives the parties to a perfected contract of sale the right to reciprocally demand
performance, and to observe a particular form, if warranted, (Art. 1357). The trial court, aptly
observed that Sabesaje's complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action to compel Dalion to
execute a formal deed of sale, and the suit for recovery of ownership, which is premised on the
binding effect and validity inter partes of the contract of sale, merely seeks consummation of said
contract.
... . A sale of a real property may be in a private instrument but that contract is valid
and binding between the parties upon its perfection. And a party may compel the
other party to execute a public instrument embodying their contract affecting real
rights once the contract appearing in a private instrument hag been perfected (See
Art. 1357).
... . (p. 12, Decision, p. 272, Records)
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the
ruling of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Presiding Judge, Lucio F. Saavedra, RTC, Br. XXIV, Maasin, Southern Leyte.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115402. July 15, 1998]

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE TEK SHENG, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

After his mothers death, petitioner[1] filed a complaint against his father, herein
private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. [2] In his answer
with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered
solely in petitioners name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal
properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime
but was registered in petitioners name only as a trustee considering that at that time,
the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private respondent
prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its
rightful owner the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the
case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial
court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing
petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending
litigation.[3] Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens
via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. [4]
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an
incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to
thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed
upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title
obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the
TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done through a
separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of ownership is
admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings
when the courts jurisdiction is limited.
Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily
for private respondent, petitioners claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a
Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked[5] but that rule is not material to
this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor
can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a

parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D.
1529 which states that:

Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be

subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[6] (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title.
Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. [7] Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. [8] Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat,
registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to
petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent.
[9]
What the latter disputes is the formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although
petitioners certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance,
[10]
yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his
ownership.[11]
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the
motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of procedure [12] or
substance,[13] a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2)
when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to
concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the cancellation of the notice on
the legally untenable grounds that such annotation amounts to a collateral attack of
petitioners certificate of title or that ownership cannot be adjudicated in a partition case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the
purpose of announcing to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. [14] Here, the
parties are still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The
lower court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving
information to the public that that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who
deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.

On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it
to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect partition of the property.[15] For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that
the land belongs to him.[16]Besides, an action for partition is one case where the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.[17]
Further, contrary to petitioners argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the
parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by the spouses
during their marriage.[18] In addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim
prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the issue of ownership
has been put in issue and each claimant must present their respective evidence to
substantiate their respective allegations.[19] Considering that this is a partition case, the
court is required to inquire into the nature and extent of title of the supposed claimant.
[20]
The title referred to by the rule is the purported ownership of the claimants and not
the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter may be
considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]

Petitioner is one of the legitimate children of private respondent. The latter has illegitimate children with
another woman.
[2]
The listed properties are lumber business, rents, four buildings and a warehouse. (Complaint, ANNEX
D of Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, p. 47-48).
[3]
Order of RTC dated November 24, 1992; Rollo, p. 72.
[4]
Court of Appeals Decision promulgated February 8, 1994; Rollo, pp. 35-41.
[5]
Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174.
[6]
Property Registration Decree.
[7]
Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174 (1996).
[8]
Heirs of Gonzaga v. CA, 261 SCRA 327; Republic v. CA, 258 SCRA 712; In ejectment cases, a
certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and it does not matter if the title is questionable
(Dizon v. CA, 264 SCRA 391).
[9]
Private Respondents Memorandum, p. 6; Rollo, p. 196.
[10]
Section 32, P.D. 1529.
[11]
Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 16.
[12]

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, Section 14 (formerly Section 24).

Notice of lis pendens.- xxx xxx xxx.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary
to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. (Emphasis supplied).
[13]
Section 77 of P.D. 1529 provides: Cancellation of lis pendens.- Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled, upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose
of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to
be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof. (Emphasis supplied).

[14]

Sajonas v. CA, 258 SCRA 79; Garbin v. CA, 253 SCRA 187; Tanchoco v. Aquino, 154 SCRA 1; J.P.
Pellicer & Co., Inc. v. Philippine Realty Corp., 87 Phil. 302.
[15]
Catapusan v. CA, 264 SCRA 534.
[16]
Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997.
[17]
The other instances where the notice of lis pendens is proper are: a) an action to recover possession
of real estate, b) an action to quiet title thereto, c) an action remove clouds thereon, d) any other
proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or
the buildings thereon. See Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. CA, 184 SCRA 325 (1990) cited
in Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997; See also Section 14, Rule 13 (formerly Section
24, Rule 14), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 76 of P.D. 1529.
[18]
Annex H of the Petition; Rollo, p. 61.
[19]
Section1, Rule 131.
[20]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 69. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
(Emphasis supplied).

G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, FRANCISCA S.
BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CALOOCAN CITY,respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gonzalo D. David for respondents.

AQUlNO, J.:
These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose
originals are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for.
1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four
hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the
name of theCommonwealth of the Philippines, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594
and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal both dated April 30, 1938.
The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not
destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding cancelled titles for those two lots,
namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the name of the Philippine Trust
Company, are intact in the registry of deeds.
2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior
12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition
dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915.
She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number of which she
could not specify, was "N.A." or not available (Civil Case No. C-677). The petition was sworn to on
November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52, Consolidated Record on
Appeal).
3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968.
The notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in three
conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished the supposed adjoining owners (53-54,
Consolidated Record on Appeal). The registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served
with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.
4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did not oppose the
petition. Laborada presented her evidence before the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin Salvador
in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the petition.

He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and
which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The transfer certificate of title
covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot
were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable action on
the petition (pp. 53-56, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No.
915 in the name of Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It became final and
executory.
6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R) Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots
Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land Registration approved the subdivision plan.
The register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to
Laborada, namely, TCT Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp. 56-59, 61-83, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763 of the lower court, one Francisco S. Bombast,
single, residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated
November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot No. 918.
She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that the title was "N.A" or not available.
She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the title covering it was destroyed during the war.
Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on the same date, November 16, 1967,
before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's
petition was not explained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on Appeal.)
8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition,
the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was published in the Official Gazette. It was posted in
three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining
owners (22, Consolidated Record on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice of hearing
were served upon the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would be
interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original of
the title was really missing.
9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposed by the government
lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon, Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969 granted
the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued to
Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title was
supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The
technical description of the land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration
who submitted a report recommending the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25, Consolidated Record
on Appeal).

10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in
the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N.A.4(R) dated August 27, 1969(pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title, Francisca
Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco,
Manila, which was the same address used by Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the address
2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34146R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly for
P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the
reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent thereto (Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge
Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation
were assigned, issued on June 5, 1970 restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city
engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from accepting or recording any transaction
regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separate answers containing
mere denials. The Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he
interposed no objection to the issuance of the preliminary injunction sought by the State. After a joint
trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they
pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.
14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in
the two cases holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish its ownership and
possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation
were purchasers in good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and
annullable.
Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in
conformity with law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and
their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the originals before the reconstitution"
(pp. 160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The State appealed.
15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the orders of
reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969 could no longer be set aside on May 26, 1970,
when the petitions for annulment and cancellation of the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if
there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State, as
the party that made possible the reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals cited
section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the
registration of any other person as owner of such land".

The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the
trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of the reconstituted titles which, although issued
with judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C763, were simply devices employed by petitioners Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the
usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable
value.
The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lower court and the Fifth
Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes, L.B., Domondon and Ericta, JJ.), is that two valid and
existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly
reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption that the
two titles were destroyed during the war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was
a stultification of the judicial process. One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and
then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully
reconstituted titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the
reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged
ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were
sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be
countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of
title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to
reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The
reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary
to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually
subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26
to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and
Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent
machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of
Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos
Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because
the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That
circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of
deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside.
The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are declared void and are set

aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147-R and 30257 to 30263 and the survey plans and
subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise declared void. The register of deeds is directed to
cancel the said titles.
The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is hereby
declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, as shown in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private
respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me
inconceivable how any court can order the reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when the
record shows beyond doubt that the land in question, per its technical description and location, is
covered already by another title actually subsisting in the office of the corresponding register of
deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to underscore my considered view that considering the
records that the various offices of the government having to do with the matter should keep regularly,
like the Land Registration Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the corresponding Register of
Deeds, only bad faith and bad faith alone can give occasion to occurrences like what happened in
this case. The Torrens system of land registration was conceived to give every duly registered owner
complete peace of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the same in the
manner allowed by law that he would be safe in his ownership and its consequent rights. The
provision about recourse to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act for the benefit of
scoundrels who might ingeniously "steal" lands nor to open opportunities for chicanery of any shade
or mode.

Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the
reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other national catastrophe is a function that deserves the
most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be
performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable pro forma certificates of other officials concerned.
I would go as far as to require oral testimony of the said official, unless this be very inconvenient,
subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge
to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office of the Register of Deeds covering the same land
claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his been lost, absent any showing of voluntary
transfers or other lawful transmission by the registered owner in favor of a person from whom the
petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the
government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has
made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion,
honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.

# Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me
inconceivable how any court can order the reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when the
record shows beyond doubt that the land in question, per its technical description and location, is
covered already by another title actually subsisting in the office of the corresponding register of
deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to underscore my considered view that considering the
records that the various offices of the government having to do with the matter should keep regularly,
like the Land Registration Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the corresponding Register of
Deeds, only bad faith and bad faith alone can give occasion to occurrences like what happened in
this case. The Torrens system of land registration was conceived to give every duly registered owner
complete peace of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the same in the
manner allowed by law that he would be safe in his ownership and its consequent rights. The
provision about recourse to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act for the benefit of
scoundrels who might ingeniously "steal" lands nor to open opportunities for chicanery of any shade
or mode.

Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the
reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other national catastrophe is a function that deserves the
most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be
performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable pro forma certificates of other officials concerned.
I would go as far as to require oral testimony of the said official, unless this be very inconvenient,
subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge
to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office of the Register of Deeds covering the same land
claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his been lost, absent any showing of voluntary
transfers or other lawful transmission by the registered owner in favor of a person from whom the
petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the
government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has
made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion,
honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.

G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.
Southworth and Faison for appellants.
D. R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A,
Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said
parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.
From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically.
I. General description. It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in
the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the
northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on
the south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas
for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10
meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan.
II. Technical description. The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to
survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical plan of a lot occupied by
buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo
Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94,
and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan
with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle
Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S.
49 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the
topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:
1awphil.net

| Points
or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |
| stations. | degrees. | in meters. | |

| A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |

| B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |
| C to D | S. 42 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |

| D to E | S. 40 50' E | 13.20 | |
| E to F | N. 49 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. |
| F to G | N. 52 00' E | 10.94 | |
| G to H | N. 37 10' W | 24.90 | |
| H to I | N. 35 45' W | 6.56 | |
| I to J | N. 50 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
| J to K | N. 35 00' W | 7.60 | |
| K to A | N. 42 05' W | 25.50 | |

The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked
on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle
Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the
west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez.
The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the
petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."
{bmc 029035a.bmp}
By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that
the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44, 30' W., and that the distance between A and B
was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters.
Attention is called to this difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but
its importance to the questions presented will be discussed below.
Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of
title of the petitioner.
We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in
question. The petition gives the names of said persons, as follows:
The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land
conterminous with this estate are, according to my information:
The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple,
Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P. Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San
Miguel.
Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the
petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who
made a very careful examination of the title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th
day of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title

of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, the recommends the registration of
said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner.
Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d
day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the
following notice:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
Case No. 1895.]
To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F.
M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No.
92; Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28;
Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36;
and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio
Vy Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng
Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these
of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs
of Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of
Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores
Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San Miguel;
Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and
Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of
Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the
city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:
Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa
Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59,
district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the following
described land: Four parcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon,
situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as
follows:
Parcel A. Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked "A" on plan, being
S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at the S. intersection of the Escolta
and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt.
"B"; S. 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42 E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to
pt. "E"; N. 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36 20' W., 14.20
m. to pt. "H"; N. 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38 50' W.,
4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N. 44 W.,
15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River.

Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by
property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta.
Date of survey, December 26, 1905.
You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall,
Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of April, A. D. nineteen hundred
and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the prayer of said
application shall not be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and place
aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken as confessed,
and you will be forever barred from contesting said application or any decree entered
thereon.
Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year
nineteen hundred and six.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of said Court.
In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th
day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each of the persons mentioned therein, by
registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice, including
the representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further
shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said notice was
posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been published in
two daily newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.
On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the
following certificate relating to the notice and to the publication of the notices required by section 31
of Act No. 496.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.
I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands, certify that, in
compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice referring to the application for
registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The
Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and
year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General
of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke

& Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao
Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams &
Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde &
Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez;
Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in
Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the
purposes of the necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April,
1906.
A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila
(p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the court calling its attention to the fact that there
existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error. The
said attorney also called the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the
original petition. Our attention has not been called to any order made by the lower court, relating to
said request of the attorney of the city of Manila.
In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was
brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said
notice. At the hearing the petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of
Antonio Enriquez."
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on
for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city
of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact
that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by
the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said errors be
corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable
Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or judgment in default against all persons:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
No. 1895.
Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real
estate described herein,
vs.

The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas
Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo &
Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim
Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala
de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui;
Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern,
defendants.
The present case having been duly tried, and
Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due from
referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of general circulation, one printed
in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of
this city, and La Democracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication
of said notice was effected;
Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the
publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish language to each one of the
persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein;
Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land
included in the application a certified copy of the notice in Spanish, and also in a
conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila, before the fourteen
days preceding that set for the termination of the period fixed;
Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn the
application, within the period fixed by the law;
This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who
may be concerned in opposing the application, which is granted.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in
Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of
land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said
decree was as follows:
Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the absolute owner of the real
property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is
hereinafter set forth:

A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the
NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW.
by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta.
Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49 40' W. from the
extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of Calle Escolta and Passage de
Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46 15' E., 16.15
m. to point C; thence S., 42 E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point
E.; thence N., 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence
N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52
35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53 30' E.,
0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to
point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters.
All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey,
December 26, 1905.
Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39
of said Act that may be in force and effect.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in
Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, at eight o'clock and ten
minutes ante meridian.
Attest:
[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,
Clerk of the Court.
A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and
delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became registered under the
Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.
After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906,
nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of Land Registration until on or about the 19th
day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after said land had been registered, when we
find that the assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.

Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.

MOTION.
The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and
respectfully represents;
I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected by an error of
closure greater than 1/1500;
II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a
portion of said land for use as a public street;
Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in
the plan filed in this case.
Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.
It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the
incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C, and D), which were included in the
petition of the petitioner.
On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th
day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure
in said plans."
On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief
surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of Act No. 1875, and directed that
notice be given to the adjoining owners.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certificate issued to her on the 21st day of
July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was as
follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.
Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and represents:

1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the
applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four estates, among them the following:
(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta,
district of Binondo.
(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle
Escolta, district of Binondo.
(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva,
corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.
2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the
buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle Rosario, district of Binondo,
which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the
year just past, and it cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.
3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter
(a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United States currency, and the buildings at
18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter (b)
was assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at
15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the estate designated by the letter (c)
was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars
United States currency.
4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical
descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are annexed to the aboveentitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates under
consideration there are erected buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one
behind the other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry in
that designated by the letter (b); and another house of stone and masonry in that designated
by the letter (c).
5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said
estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of land and the buildings stated.
6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners
conterminous with the estates referred to therein, the buildings erected on them are likewise
mentioned.
7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered
in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the application; but in the certificate of the decree
or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the
parcel of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building on each
was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743,
which accompany this application.

8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of
the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the rights of issuance of title and
one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency,
the receipts and vouchers wherefore do not accompany this application because the
applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit them, but averring
that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court
of Land Registration and the office of the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a
person delegated therefor by the applicant.
9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the
omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the building existing thereon, the same as
in the certificates of title corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed
that said omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects
the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the request that you order the
correction of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcels of land,
without modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed when legalization of title
thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the aboveentitled case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph.
10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist
not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building erected on each, the applicant
attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the said estates, wherein
are stated the two points mentioned.
11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable
court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings, correction of the omission referred to
by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein
record be made of the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third
paragraph of this application.
Manila, February 28, 1912.
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.
On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to
Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, accompanied by a contract,
showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold
all her rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic
Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the judge of the
Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it.
On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of
the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with the order of the court of the 23d of
December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of correcting the errors in closure in the
original plan presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as
follows (see page 48):

After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan;
(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title the
buildings located upon the lands registered in accordance with her original petition; and
(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in accordance
with its contract of purchase of said lands from Maria del Consuelo

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Felisa Roxas y Chuidian after notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down
for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on said motion were transferred from one date
to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings,
in addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon
the question of the correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906.
During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some
objection to the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement in which their specific
objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and specific statement of their objections
appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears
that their objections to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new
certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was based upon the ground that
they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question.
After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto
Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a
unanimous decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a motion for new trial,
basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the lower court were manifestly contrary to the
proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a new trial and after hearing the respective
parties, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A.
Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this court. In
this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error:
1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land
Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, confirming
the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.

2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.

3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments
of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussed together.
In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument
against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole
argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued
July 21, 1906) is absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of
the original action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now admit that a notice of the
pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez.
Appellants now allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its members
represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record shows, as we have pointed out
above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the representatives of
the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the
record now in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that they were the representatives of said
heirs, even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the present
proceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found in the various
hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said attorneys were not the
representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither
does the record show any attempt on their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given
in the original action. The appellants assert in their argument that "personal notice was absolutely
necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceeding). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to
show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original certificate
(No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This brings us to the
question whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the
registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of
said registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of
the original petition had been given and that a publication of the same had been made in accordance
with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the period during
which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that
the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and
published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk
that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the
case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such service."
On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of
the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears and answer
within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken for
confessed. By the description in the notice. "To all whom it may concern," all the world are made
parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by
the report of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof."

The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It
seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the
granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section
38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quite the title thereto, subject
only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice or citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may
concern.'"
There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a
prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that:
"The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining
owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the
application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to give
any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31
and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the
application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is
seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give
motive to any person of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the Torrens
system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or delay or
additional expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal notice?
Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffered
damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law. (Noble State
Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled,
unless he comes within the provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against
the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration and the
granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by
fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the
present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an
innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud,
in the slightes degree.
While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many States and its
provisions have been attacked at almost every point. The requirements relating to notices has been
a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because
of the provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has been
presented to this court. The same question was presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs.
De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that
fraud existed, simply because personal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was
predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that question, this court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus):
In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was
made a party- defendant by publication, but was not personally served with notice: Held,

That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against his as well as all the
world.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in
personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to
those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a
proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not
known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all the persons who
might have an interest in the registration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged
even with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do.
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration
of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims,
just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration
of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that
lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title, which the
petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever
character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued.
If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by
his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfer of his title. The registration either
relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to
come into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly
concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.
The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would
absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could
never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of
possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment,
in fact, to the transfer of titles.
Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give
the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep.,
49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was
first established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of the case.
The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found in the most distant ports of the
earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its
business necessitated the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its
capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might also, perchance, cause damage to other craft,
in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible obligations, to
continue its voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the

"ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and not its real owner. Consequently
there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the broader
purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally considered that the action should be
considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the State of
Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of
Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing this question, said:
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice,
a proceedingin rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside
of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or
the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have
said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to make
a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who
were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95
U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)
There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights,
without personal notice of the proceedings in which that may occur. For instance, in attachment
cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S.,
714, 727.) So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of
deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had. Also
unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the
condemnation of private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal
service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient.
The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quited "by
notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley,
etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs.Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal.,
580.)
Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a
procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had control over real property within its
limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a
citizen, are subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or
public, and the models of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determining these
question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters,
195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues,
130 U.S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and
proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to establish the method of procedure.
(American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc.,
Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)

The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a
proceedingin rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons
known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86
Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's
National Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175;
Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppinvs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa, 343;
Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A.,
571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp.,
76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)
If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against
an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method for securing substituted services against
residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known
persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it
be made to operate on all interest and persons known or unknown.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said:
"If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all
the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as
well as known claims indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end and
unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant."
Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American Land
Company vs.Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to
the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a case may be conceived where rights in and
to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is
in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not the possibility of
conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to
the subject with which the statute deals."
The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N.Y., 199,
215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in suitable cases for substituted service, said:
"Various prudential regulations are made with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen,
notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the
acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actual knowledge of the
process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this
legislation, that the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a
legal proceedings due process of law, it then belongs to the legislature to determine in the particular
instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner of
constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the Legal
steps which are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Title,
Document, etc., Company vs.Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 289.)"
The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land
Company vs.Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts and the decisions of the different courts which

are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is authority in support of the contention of the
appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows:
Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the country San
Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the
public records contained in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco
was destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the
complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels of land in
controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that
of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of
any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that the be adjudged to
be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of
owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of any
kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be
the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that
no one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either
legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency
of the action was published in certain newspaper, as was required by law. Notice was also posted
upon the property, as required by the statute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of
the petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the
complaint, a default was ordered against all persons, and on the 19th days of December, 1906, a
decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and
entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other person had any
right title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present
or future, vested or contingent.
Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th
day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the entry of the decree of the superior court, in
the city and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in
the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed
title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to
Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San
Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of
law, and that said superior court, in said action and proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the
persons holding the title during such proceedings, and that said court did not have or obtain
jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss
had no right whatever in said parcels of land, other than his rights of possession and occupation."
The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of California, not
seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily reached for that purpose; that,
notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon them nor did they in any way receive notice of
the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real
property herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decree until more
than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss, demurred.

Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the
question involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United
States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion
(219 U. S., 47), decided each of the question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the
contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.
The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land for the purpose of
registrating his title to the same under an act of the legislature of the State of California, entitled "An
act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction
of public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide a
method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where records had been destroyed to such an
extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a degree in the court which would
furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that
practically all of the public records of title in several counties in the State of California had recently
theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said law provided that whenever
the public records in the office of the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost or
destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an
estate of inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons holding
under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county, may bring and
maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior court for the county in which said real
property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto.
The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in
which he shall name the defendants as "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real
property herein described, or any part thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular
description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or
notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and the country in which the
action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved,
which notice was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein
described, or any part thereof," as defendants.
The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where the action was brought, at least once a week for a period of two
months.
The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in
the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.
The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service
upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed to be specially served, the
court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person
and every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any
part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and control of said property, for
the purpose of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein,
which is provided for in the law.

In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the
validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the
reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual
notice of the application to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the
United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law was constitutional and
that a compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the
decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of the
appellants.
Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure
provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the title of lands; and
Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law;
and
Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties
connected with said action, we are forced to the conclusion that the appellants here are not now
entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and certificate amended or set aside.
There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we
deem of importance. It is the question of the right of the Land Court to correct an error of closure in a
plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the petition
for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to the
registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law have been taken. The land is registered. It
is then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of the lines in the
plan, said plan will not close that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four
corners of the wall would not meter. We believe that an error of the character may be corrected by
the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the original petition.
Upon the question whether the amended plan (p.252, record) included more or different lands than
were included in the original petition, we find the following statements made by one of the judges
who ordered said plan amended. The statements is:
At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is incumbent upon
the court than to determine the property as it was adjudicated in this case.
Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should
be the holding on this particular point.
We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to
the same question, in an answer presented by him to a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by
some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved
practically the same question presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or
not additional lands had been included in the new plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering
for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:

Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of
the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established by an order of the court issued at
the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be
that the dividing line between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so
indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties beginning on
the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description
and approved by the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have
not been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the
adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished, except possibly as to alleged
easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some of the roots of the
petitioners' building over the aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is
settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property ran
S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A,
page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of the
certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30' W.,
for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no application why the original plan (see Exhibit
A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That error, in our
judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said
conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in ordering the plan corrected
for the purposes above indicated.
There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and
that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian to have her original certificate of
registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she was the owner of the buildings located
upon the parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12,
1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, together with
the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the
land as described in her petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should have been
omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been an errors. on the part of the
clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors.
Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected
any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on
any duplicate certificate." We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such
original certificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we believe that
the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of land, unless the record
contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon,
even though they are not mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in
view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate be amended so as
to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as
well.
With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record contains no
sufficient reasons for not granting the same.

Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court
below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. L-8936

October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in
the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate
included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court
decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall
which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of
each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition
upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot
of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all
parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had
not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory
to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the
same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured
the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to
watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion
of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to
quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep.,
482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world.
It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep.,
49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.
All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and
there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of
giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they
are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of
the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the
torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of
registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the
fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title
can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in acollateral proceeding and not even by a
direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties

relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all
the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be
no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not
be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription
(section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page
823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly,
or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;
Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R.,
152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can
be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that
the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his
"Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said:
"Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates
for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of
the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all
whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments
or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition
for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser
for value has acquired an interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If
then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct
proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by
including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not
believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry.
This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the
land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to
Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the
validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would
be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose
a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose
within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or
sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are
bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the
duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to
avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real
owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the
name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in
question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably

bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not
be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which
the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in
the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There
is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than
to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of
the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule
be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other
of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent
purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his
vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that
the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate
that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not.
Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale
of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is
the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have
been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be
deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the
appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be
included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these
examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be
applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent
purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in
said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original
certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public
registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are
charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any
portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710,
710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents
and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286,
289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson,
27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot
be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must
take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.
Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of
the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of
that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the
plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of
land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public
record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that
no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule,
however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore
been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38,
55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule
should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the
original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion
of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record
contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent
purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor,
or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We
believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases
where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system.
When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all

subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded
as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We
think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very
strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of
the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting
from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are
of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate,
and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like
the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest
secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and
complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate,
by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged
and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather
than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in
dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the
torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of
the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements
of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TRENT, J., dissenting:

I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority
on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no
transfer of title by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion,
being at fault in permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later
certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the
innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion
sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid
down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of
course of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is
applicable to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set
forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable
rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who
acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The
rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and
equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the
same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title
and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the
absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in
cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in
the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land
Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;"
and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to

adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking
into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein
the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand
the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule
that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given
the preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this
equity rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other
equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited
in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping
registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an
innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the
issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard
to invoke the"just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own
title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any
case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the
holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely
entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally served upon him in the
course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights
under the earlier certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment
to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by
reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between
the original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule should
prevail, because both such original parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being
equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it
undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier
certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to
demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it
is said, negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can
he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a
duly registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate
of title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the
various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a
purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the
contents of each and every one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on
file in the land registry office, so that negligencemay be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that
all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of any one of the

thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than
the date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to
be without fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover
that the land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a
comparison of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be
found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the
introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed
intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure
as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that
he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar
so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead
of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the
necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to
ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor,
expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title
to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of
land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the
transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and
all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title
to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent
to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of
every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him
should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to
avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made
the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures
should he adopt in order to search out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are
no indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he
proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to
the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to
him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration,
would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary
lines contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in
all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention
of the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly
registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may
be imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of
lands which have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.

On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered
certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him,
adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was
served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land
Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice
that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is
seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his
appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title registered in his
name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from
the double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of
land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a
registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is
being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to
do, his lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to
subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage
resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land
under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise
equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only where both or neither
of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as between opposing claimants under an
earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder
of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can
confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the
holder of one or the other certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to
determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question in favor
of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title of the
other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for the
registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur
cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts
to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking
into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
lawphil.net

It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority
opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency
of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which
he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice
of the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far
as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to appear
and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order
of publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice
thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in
permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier

certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate.
Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the
holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador
de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the
majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate,
which was not contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable
burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to
him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title
to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the
pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has
been personally served with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems
to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent
purchaser who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier
certificate who permitted a default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases
such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which
militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified
and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional cost,
annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands;
while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object
for which the land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a
certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific
occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land
Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the
conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore,
judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case
such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or
overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and
conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part
of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial
proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security
of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of
appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that
their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual
notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be
practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands
held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double
registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal service of notice of the

pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such
notice to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for
registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud,
conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice
to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a
certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of
Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus
purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder
of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in
the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of title in
favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the
fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and
was personally served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to
me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties,
and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the
number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their
titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously
increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in
registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by
the Courts of Land Registration.
Carson, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-13479

October 31, 1959

MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellee UP.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land located in Quezon City containing an area of
about 430 hectares.
On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
alleging that for many years prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they and their ancestors
have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of the
land in litigation; that they have been cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from
time immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been paying the land taxes thereon; that in 1955
defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto claiming that its
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 embraces practically all of plaintiff's property, while the other
defendant University of the Philippines began also asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer of
Certificate of Title No. 9462 covers the remaining portion; that defendants are not innocent
purchasers for value, having had full notice of plaintiff's actual possession and claim for ownership
thereof; and that the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the technical boundaries set out in
defendants' titles was a clear mistake and that at no time had defendants' predecessors in-interest
exercised dominical rights over plaintiff's property.
On October 31, 1957, defendant University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the complaint states no cause of action; that it is barred by the statute of limitations; that the court
has no jurisdiction over the case; and that in the event the motion is not granted, defendant is
separated from the case and be impleaded in a separate action. To this motion plaintiffs filed a reply
alleging that the complaint on its faces alleges a valid and sufficient cause of action upon which the
court could render a valid judgment. Defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, on the
other hand, filed a motion for bill of particulars to which plaintiffs filed also a reply. On November 20,
1957, Leonila G. de Perucho and Jose Pearanda filed a motion for intervention which was likewise
opposed by plaintiffs. On December 11, 1957, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action and that it is already barred by the statute of
limitations, leaving unresolved the other points raised in the pleadings for being unnecessary. From
this order plaintiffs took the present appeal.
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
sufficient cause of action for the reason that on its face said complaint alleges sufficient facts on
which a valid judgment could be rendered against defendants. Thus, it is claimed that the complaint
alleges the following facts: that plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate in
1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in
Quezon City; that said plaintiffs have always been actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession

of the land as owners pro indiviso; that sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the
land claiming that the same is embraced and covered by their respective certificates of title; that
defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of
ownership of plaintiffs, and as such they cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation of the Torrens
system since 1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of defendant's predecessor-ininterest. It further appears that sometime in 1955 defendant People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff's
property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor, while defendant
University of the Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of the land
which embraces the remainder of the property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was
issued in its favor. It is therefore, clear that the land in question has been registers in the name of
defendant's predecessor-in-inters since 1914 under the Torren's system and that notwithstanding
what they now claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for
their validity, they have never taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the
present action. In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what
they now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in the
name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and
jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the
ground of fraud provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property (Section 38, Act
No. 496; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581; Salmon vs. Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. 1607;
Rivera vs.Moran, 48 Phil., 836).
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within to review
the decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes
incontrovertible (Section 38 Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period
within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time within which a claimant may ask
for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the one-year
period to set aside the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the
indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 520).
Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint alleges that defendants acquired their respective
titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership of plaintiffs with respect to the
land in question, it is error to dismiss the complaint for such averment is sufficient to establish a
cause of action against defendants. This contention overlooks the fact that the land in question is
covered by Torrens title. Thus, it appears that defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation
bought the portion of the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime in 1955 for
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor. There is nothing in the complaint
to show that when it acquired the property said defendant knew of any defect in the title appearing
on its face in the form of any lien or encumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to defendant
University of the Philippines. It likewise acquired the portion of the property on question sometime in
1955 from its predecessor-in-interest for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its
favor. There is also nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property it knew of any
defect in the title appealing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrace. Said defendants are

therefore, presumed to be purchasers for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to
protection under the law.
The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle: "A person dealing with registered
land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens
System." (William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622;
Paraiso vs. Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed as contended,
their right however to bring the instant action may be considered barred by laches for not having
taken the action seasonably after title to the property had been issued under the Torrens system. It
appears that the property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on
October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when they brought the present action.
In the recent case of Domingo vs. Mayon Realty Corporation, 102 Phil., 32; 54 Off. Gaz., 4954),
September 30, 1957 this Court said: "Like Ciriaco Allingag in the previous case, appellants herein
could have raised the issue of the validity of the certificate of title issued to Valle Cruz since 1928,
when the foreclosure sale in her favor was confirmed. They failed to do so until 18 years afterwards,
and their action (if any) now should be held by their own laches and negligence."
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res
judicata by taking judicial notice of its own records in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in
support of their contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other case even when such case had been tried by the same court and notwithstanding
the facts that both cases may have been tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is
considered to be the general rule, the same is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. Thus,
as noted by former Chief Justice Moran:
In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because
of their close connection with the matter in the controversy. Thus, in a separate civil action
against the administrator of an estate arising from an appeal against the report of the
committee on claims appointed in the administration proceedings of the said estate, to
determine whether or not the appeal was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of the
record of the administration proceedings. Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.
Moreover, appellants' objection to the action of the trial court on this matter is merely technical
because they do not dispute the fact that appellant Marcelino Tiburcio, who instituted the present
case, is the same person who filed the application in Land Registration Case No. L-3 for the
registration of the same parcel of land which application was denied by the court. It appears that in
the registration case the oppositors were the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and
Co., and the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that
case, in effect it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason and Co. from which it
acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two case there is not only identity of

subject matter but identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras. C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera, and
Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 114299

March 9, 2000

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PARIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA
JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A. GONZALES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 118862
PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY, and
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE and
JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II and LIZA R.
ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO,
REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL
BANK, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
In our Decision dated September 29, 1999, we disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1994, in CA-G.R.
C.V. No. 33920, as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the fair market value of the
property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago.
This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against
the Register of Deeds and/or his assistants that may be take by the party or parties
prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate
of title in the name of TRB.
SO ORDERED. 1
On October 21, 1999, the Capays and Ramon Gonzales, private respondents in G.R. No. 114299
and petitioners in G.R. No. 118862, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the above Decision.
They pray for the inclusion in the dispositive portion of said Decision of an award to each of them the
amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P40,000.00 as
attorneys fees, all with legal interest at the time of the filing of the complaint. They also ask that
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) be ordered to pay them the amount of P47,730.00, the price stipulated in
the Deed of Absolute Sale between said bank and its transferee, Emelita Santiago, plus interest at
12% per annum from the date of said contract, instead of the fair market value of the disputed
property at the time of said sale.
I

We clarify that we did not delete the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
interest in favor of the movants. It may be recalled that the trial court, in ruling for the Capays and
Atty. Gonzales, ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the certificate of titles issued in the names
of the transferees and to issue new ones in favor of the movants. In addition, the trial court ordered
TRB to pay movants P100,000.00 as moral damages, P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P40,000.00 as attorneys fees, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint. 2
The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. TRB appealed to this
Court while the subsequent transferees filed a motion for reconsideration in the appellate court. The
Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, granted the transferees motion thus:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for
reconsideration, the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision of this Court,
promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed against
defendants-appellants with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the certificate
of titles originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby restored and duly
respected. We make no pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
As stated in the above Resolution, the appellate court merely dismissed the complaint as against the
subsequent transferees, not as against TRB. In effect, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court ordering the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of the subsequent
transferees but sustained the award of damages in favor of the movants herein. The decision of the
Court of appeals affirming the award of damages remained unaffected by the subsequent resolution.
TRB did not specifically question the award of damages when it appealed to this Court; hence, such
issue was beyond our review.
Inasmuch as we affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, as modified by its resolution, the
award of damages in favor of movants need not be stated in detail. The omission should not be read
as a deletion of the award for damages. Accordingly, we deny the prayer for the inclusion of such
award in the dispositive portion of our decision.
II
Movants ask that TRB be ordered to pay them the amount the former received from its immediate
transferee, Emelita Santiago, and interest thereon, instead of the fair market value of the property at
the time of said transfer. The basis for the award of the amount constituting the value of the property,
which we decreed in our decision, is found in Article 1400 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1400. Whenever the person obliged by the decree of annulment to return the thing can
not do so because it has been lost through his fault, he shall return the fruits received and
the value of the thing at the time of the loss, with interest from the said date.
In accordance with the above provision, movants would ordinarily be entitled to, aside from the value
of the property, interest thereon from the date of the loss, in this case, from the sale of the property
by TRB to Emelita Santiago, with interest from said date. Pursuant also to the above provision,
movants would be entitled to the fruits received from said property, if evidence of such receipt of
fruits is presented.

Movants, however, insist upon the price of the property at the time of the sale to Emelita Santiago,
which was in the amount of P47,730.00 as appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale. To this, TRB
poses no objection and we take the price stated in the deed of sale as a stipulation between the
parties on the value of the property. Accordingly, we grant movants prayer for said amount, with 12%
per annum from said sale, the value of the property being equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 4
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to GRANT IN PART the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of this Courts Decision in
G.R. Nos. 114299 and 118862 dated September 24, 1999 is hereby AMENDED as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R.
C.V. No. 33920, as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the amount of P47,730.00,
with 12% interest from the date of said sale until the same is paid.
This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against
the Register of Deeds and/or his assistants that may be take by the party or parties
prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate
of title in the name of TRB.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Footnotes
1

Decision, pp. 25-26.

See Decision, pp. 5-6.

Rollo, G.R. No. 118862, p. 63.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994).

G.R. No. 165427

March 21, 2011

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against
respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of
the properties involved in this suit and awarding to himP100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite
respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to
respondents son on October 12, 1979.3
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower services company.4 Five parcels of land were also acquired
during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as
husband and wife. The lands are briefly described as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty
Lacbayan."5
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty
Lacbayan."6
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty
Lacbayan Samoy."7
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L.
Samoy."8
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City
covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to
Betty L. Samoy."9
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner
left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City.

Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square
meter property in Don Enrique Heights.10
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991.
In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by
executing a Partition Agreement.11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over
the three other properties will go to respondent.12 However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. 13 Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition14 of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City
on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and
wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real
properties amounting toP15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his Answer,16 however, denied petitioners
claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds
without any contribution from petitioner.17
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in
1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the
morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the
income of the company which she and respondent established.19
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds,
salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.20 He countered that the said properties were
registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of
respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his
legal wife was then a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties
as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new
building.22
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to
petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but
from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share. 24
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of
one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected the
certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for
partition.25
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the
following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to
say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in
the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the
ownership of the subject realties itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim
of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears
emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original
and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in

litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more
underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties name as
husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of reversible error against the trial court
for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action
involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property
against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for
partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether
the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second assuming
that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be divided between
plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for
the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without first making a
determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what
the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellants claim of co-ownership. 26
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against
respondents interest as to the existence of co-ownership between the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating coownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by
respondents self-serving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely
threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the
findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under
the exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts
jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues
may be summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the
action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.

Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that the
determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or
not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may
end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership
does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal
with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x
x29 (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner
pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering
the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this
issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner
in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties. 31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed
realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, 32 but that rule is
not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not
the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as
the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document.34 Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. 35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the
latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always
be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title
in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or
that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title.37 Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be
the best evidence thereof.
1avvphi1

Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission
against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership
between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.

An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. 38 Admission against
interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical
and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests,
otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit
against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled coownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing
the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on
the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts view that
respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with
respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged
the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as
attorneys fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon
petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of
representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law
and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to
blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is
hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal
wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in
respondents favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
Rollo, pp. 28-42. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate
Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring;
1

CA rollo, pp. 35-39.

Records, p. 108.

Rollo, p. 29.

Records, pp. 7-8, 51-52.

Id. at 9-10, 57-58.

Id. at 11-12, 55-56.

Id. at 13-14, 53-54.

Id. at 15-16, 59-60.

10

Rollo, p. 31.

11

Records, pp. 61-64.

12

Id. at 63.

13

Rollo, p. 32.

14

Records, pp. 2-6.

15

Id. at 2.

16

Id. at 26-28.

17

Id. at 26.

18

TSN, Betty B. Lacbayan, October 20, 1999, pp. 52-54.

19

Id. at 57-58.

20

TSN, Bayani Samoy, Jr., December 10, 1999, pp. 22-23 and 27.

21

Id. at 28-31.

22

Id. at 29-32.

23

The dispositive portion of the February 10, 2000 RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present complaint is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit and the defendant is hereby adjudged as the sole owner of the
properties which are the subject matters of this case. Furthermore, the plaintiff is
hereby directed to pay the defendant the amount of P100,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees and to pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED. (CA rollo, p. 39.)

24

CA rollo, pp. 37-39.

25

Id. at 23.

26

Rollo, pp. 35-37.

27

Id. at 17-18, 21-22.

28

G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.

29

Id. at 584-585.

See Fabrica v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47360, December 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 250, 255256.
30

Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109262, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 534,
538.
31

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, states in full:
32

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
33

Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544, 547.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 548.

36

Id. at 547-548.

37

Id. at 548.

38

Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II., 2004 edition, p. 715, citing 31 C.J.S. 1022.

39

Id.

40

Art. 6, Civil Code.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
This case stemmed from a complaint for judicial partition of several properties based on the
petitioners assertion of co-ownership. As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the party
(the petitioner in this case) who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts
the affirmative in the issue presented.1
Subject to my observations below, I find that the petitioner failed to discharge by clear preponderant
evidence her co-ownership of the subject properties to warrant their judicial partition. I confine myself
to this conclusion, however, as the issue before us is solely on whether a judicial partition should be
made. Specifically and as articulated in my observations below, I cannot join the ponencias other
rulings.

Article 148 of the Family Code which applies to the property relationship in a cohabitation situation,
is clear on the conditions it imposes. The first sentence of this article states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the partiesthrough their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. [underscoring supplied]
Thus, any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered common property if two
(2) conditions are met: first, there must be evidence showing that the properties were acquired by
the parties during their cohabitation; and second, there must be evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. Stated plainly,
co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof showing the acquisition of the property during the
cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same. These
two (2) conditions must concur.
On the contribution aspect of these elements, mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family
Code, without proof of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership; proof of actual contribution must
be established by clear evidence showing that the party either used his or her own money or that he
or she actually contributed his or her own money to purchase the property.2 Jurisprudence holds that
this fact may be proven by evidence in the form of bank account statements and bank transactions
as well as testimonial evidence proving the financial capacity of the party to purchase the property or
contribute to the purchase of a property.3
In this case, the presumption of co-ownership over the subject properties between the petitioner and
the respondent did not arise. While the first condition was duly proven by evidence, the second
condition was not.
The records sufficiently establish the first condition showing the acquisition of the subject properties
from 1978 to 1991 or during the cohabitation of the petitioner and the respondent. The second
condition is not similarly established since no evidence was adduced showing the petitioners actual
contributions in the acquisition of the subject properties.
Since the petition asserts an affirmative allegation (i.e., her co-ownership of the subject properties to
which she bases her action for judicial partition) she carries the burden of substantiating her claim.
She failed in this regard. The records show that she did not present any evidence showing that the
funds or a portion of the funds used to purchase the subject properties came from her own earnings.
On the contrary, the petitioner presented contradictory evidence when she admitted that the funds
used to purchase the subject properties did not come from her own earnings but from the income of
the manpower business which she managed. The Regional Trial Court found that she only owned
3.33% of share in this corporation.
Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot automatically be
considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income the petitioner referred to
is corporate income. The petitioner should have presented evidence showing that the income she
referred to actually accrued to her in the form of salaries, bonuses, commissions and/or dividends
from the manpower business. Otherwise, the rule regarding the corporations distinct legal
personality from its officers, stockholders and members applies.4 Unless otherwise shown, the
source of the earnings would be the corporations, not the petitioners.
I additionally observe that except for one, all the subject properties name the respondent as the
exclusive registered owner. Although the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real properties covered thereby may be under co-

ownership with the petitioner and vice-versa, the fact remains that the subject properties are
registered in the respondents name. The rebuttable presumption is that these properties belong to
the respondent or to the conjugal partnership of the respondent, in line with Article 116 of the Family
Code and Article 160 of the Civil Code.5
In sum, the petitioners case for judicial partition of the subject properties has no legal basis in the
absence of a clear evidence of co-ownership proven under the circumstances. Consequently, we
must deny the petition for lack of merit without.
As final observations, I disagree with the Majoritys conclusion declaring the respondent as the sole
owner of all the properties sought to be partitioned. Records show that the petitioner is a registered
co-owner of one of the five (5) properties cited in this case, i.e., the real estate under TCT No. 23301
registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan." By the tenor of its
decision, the Majority effectively (and unnecessarily) introduced a cloud over the petitioners
interests in this commonly-owned property. I note, too, that the complaint underlying this petition is
an action for partition; the adjudication of this case should necessarily be limited to resolving the
propriety of the partition sought. Notably, the Majority itself recognizes that registration in ones name
is without prejudice to an action seeking to establish co-ownership.
In light of the undisputed joint ownership of the property commonly registered under the parties
names, this Decision should be without prejudice to an action for partition to divide up this property
a remedy we cannot now provide in the absence of any factual basis on how the parties contributed
in acquiring this property. Alternatively, the actual partition of this commonly-owned property should
be remanded to the trial court for determination of how partition should be made.
The phrase, "without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him" in
the last part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is similarly objectionable. For one, no issue
exists in this case between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties they
commonly or individually hold. Additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the Court is giving
legal advice to the wife of the respondent on what course of action to take against her husband. This
statement is beyond what this Court should properly state in its Decision given the facts and issues
posed, and is plainly uncalled for.
Subject to these observations, I concur with the opinion of the Majority.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 439.

Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593.

AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA
633.
4

Atienza v. De Castro, supra note 3, at 603.