MODE OF ACQUISITION

1.

Dalion vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In 1973, Ruperto Sabesaje Jr. sued for the recovery of a parcel of land located at Panyawan, Southern Leyte, based on a private document of absolute sale. This
document was allegedly executed by Segundo Dalion. Sabesaje claimed that executing a deed of sale over the parcel of land, the Dalion Spouses had pleaded with
Sabesaje, their relative, to be allowed to administer the land because Dalion did not have any means of livelihood.
Dalion, for his part, denied the sale transaction contending that the document sued upon is fictitious, his signature thereon a forgery, and that subject land is conjugal
property, which he and his wife acquired in 1960. He even argued that even assuming the authenticity of his signature and the genuineness of the document, there
was no contract of sale on the ground that the same is embodied in a private document, and did not thus convey title or right to the lot in question. He anchored his
defense on Art. 1358, par 1, NCC which provides "acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights
over immovable property must appear in a public instrument".
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Sabesaje. This was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Issues:
(1) WON the contract of sale of a parcel of land is valid?
(2) WON a public document is necessary for the transfer of ownership?
Held:
(1) Yes, the contract of sale is valid. The defendant has affirmatively alleged forgery, but he never presented any witness or evidence to prove his claim of
forgery. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. Mere denial of having signed, does not suffice to show forgery.
(2) No. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the
validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that
the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its validity.
A sale of a real property may be in a private instrument but that contract is valid and binding between the parties upon its perfection. And a party may compel the
other party to execute a public instrument embodying their contract affecting real rights once the contract appearing in a private instrument had been perfected.

LAWS IMPLEMENTING LAND REGISTRATION / PURPOSE OF LAND

REGISTRATION

1.

LEE TEK SHENG vs. CA

Facts:
After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his father (private respondent) for the partition of the conjugal properties of his
parents.
The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land registered in petitioners name are conjugal properties and the lots were registered under Leoncios name
only as a trustee because during the registration, Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal regime. And to protect the interest of
the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it was denied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or
harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending litigation. CA affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.

Petitioners contention: The resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the
disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case and that it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago.
Private respondents contention: The evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings when the
courts jurisdiction is limited.
Issue:
Held: Yes.
Petitioners claim is not legally tenable. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral
attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides,
the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private
respondent. What the latter disputes is the formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioners certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year
after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership.
A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
premature to effect partition of the property. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking
annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. Besides, an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.
2.

REPUBLIC vs. CA

Facts:
This case involves the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals exist and whose reconstitution is prohibited.
Lots 915 and Lot 918 of Tala Estate, located at Caloocan, are registered in the name of Commonwealth of the Philippines. The originals of the title are on file in the
registry of deed in Pasig Rizal and were not destroyed by war.
Fructosa Labrodara filed a reconstitution proceeding and claimed that she was the owner of Lot 915 and the title covering it. However, she could not specify the title
number. The lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and the notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in
three conspicuous places in Caloocan, but the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada.
The transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable action on the petition
The lower court directed the register of deeds of Calocan to reconstitute the title of Lot No. 915. The lot was later on subdivided into seven lots.
Lot 918 was claimed by Francisca Bombast. She also filed for reconstitution of the title. She claimed that the title covering it was destroyed by war. Judge Salvador
ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title in the name of Bombast.
However, five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title, Bombast sold the land to Deo and Deo sold the land to A&A Torrijos Engineering Corporation
The State filed two petitions for cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles. Labradora and respondent corporation contended that they were purchasers in
good faith and for value.
The Lower Court and Court of Appeals both favored Labradora and A&A Corporation.

Issue: Whether or not the Land Title of Lot 918 and 915 can be reconstituted?
Ruling: NO.
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the
said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed
in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are
existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil
Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually
subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil
Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a
registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos
Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that
such title was reconstituted. That circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal
where they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
It should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763, were simply devices employed by petitioners Laborada and Bombast for
landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable value.
3.

ROXAS vs. ENRIQUEZ

Facts:
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system,
four parcels of land located in the city of Manila, this including Parcel A.
From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically. By comparing the technical description with the plan presented, it
will be noted that there is a difference in the general and technical description.
Attached also to the petition are the names of the adjoining owners of the land in question, including the Heirs of Antonio Enriquez.
Court of Land Registration- presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other
parcels; the CLR recommends the registration of said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner. ***
***Judge del Rosario issued a notice addressed to each of them and generally To all whom it may concern.
***In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration to each person mentioned by registered mail and caused the
publication of said notice in two daily newspapers: The Manila Times and La Democracia.
Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, presented a written statement to the court calling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the
plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error.
In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was brought on for trial in accordance with the notice. At the hearing the
petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio Enriquez."
Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by the
petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in
the plan of said Parcel A.
The court ordered a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who may be concerned in opposing the application.
Petition was granted. Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of land, A , be registered as the absolute
property of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian.
The court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became registered under the Torrens
system, in the name of the petitioner.
Five years later, Asst Atty of Manila filed a petition addressing the error and praying for a new survey of the land in question.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certificate issued
to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition.

On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration,
accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her rights, title, and interest in
said Parcel A,including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple Association of Manila.
Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it.
CRL granted motion of City of Manila, Roxas and Masonic Temple.
Issue: WON personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to
the validity of said registration
Ruling:
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to
relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to land
only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the
title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever character, except those which shall be noted in the order
of registration and in the certificate issued.
If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfer of
his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court and to make there
a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.
The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason
that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants. Known
claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles.
4.

LEGARDA vs. SALEEBY

Facts:
The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of
Legarda and Saleeby.
On Oct. 1906 Plaintiff (Legarda) petitioned for the registration of the said land and was issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Such
Title included the Stone Wall.
On Mar. 25, 1912 After her petition for the registration of the lot, Saleeby (Predecessor of the owner) was granted the registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
The land occupied by the wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Lower Court: Ruled in favor of Saleeby by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate
they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

WON the Lower court is correct?

Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

RULING:
1. NO.
In applying the same theory to Saleeby, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more
than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration?
If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the Torrens system of land registration must fail.
THE PURPOSE OF TITLE
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can
not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482).
It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
EFFECT OF REGISTRATION
After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are
foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties.

To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt
upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner
any better title than he had.
CERTIFICATE as an EVIDENCE of TITLE
The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner.
The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. A registered title cannot be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
REGISTERED TITLE as a NOTICE to the WHOLE WORLD
A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system cannot be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration .
2.

LEGARDA. We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the
land.

THE EARLIER IN DATE PREVAILS

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter
certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued
in respect thereof.
THE LAW
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description"To all whom it may concern."
It will be noted, from said section the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after
the lapse of one year.
THE RULE ON DOUBLE SALE: CIVIL CODE
Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry.
This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of
registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection
thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double
registration under said Act.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in
case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
WHO WAS THE FIRST NEGLIGENT? SALEEBY.
In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not
opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the
appellants, in 1906.
"Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the
validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the
absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should
be applied to the appellants than to him.
ADDITIONAL NOTES within the CASE:
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of
the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee?
The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the
knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established.

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
THE RULE OF NOTICE
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot
be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith . Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot
be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must
know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows
clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding.
As a summary:
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected .
5.

TIBURCIO vs. PHHC

NATURE: This is an action filed by Tiburcio against PHHC and UP for reconveyance of a parcel of land located in QC containing an area of about 430 hectares.
FACTS:
Tiburcio filed an action before the CFI on the ground that (1) they are the sole heirs of Elaido Tiburcio who died intestate and upon his death left them a
tract of land located in QC, (2) they have always been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession of the land, (3) they have been
cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits exclusively, (4) they have been paying the land taxes thereon, (5) that sometime in 1955 PHHC began asserting title to the
land claiming that the same is covered by its certificate title embracing practically all of Tiburcios property while UP claimed that its certificate title covers the
remaining portion, and (6) both PHHC and UP are not innocent purchasers for they acquired their respective certificate titles with full notice of the actual possession
and claim of ownership of Tiburcio.
ISSUE:
HELD:
1.

Tiburcio has never taken any step to nullify the titles of PHHC and UP but only until 1957 therefore allowing a period of 43 years to lapse before
invoking that the registration of the land in the name of PHHCs predecessor-in-interest was erroneous.

This cannot be done because under our law and jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the ground of fraud
provided no innocent purchase for value has acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496). Our law is also clear that that upon the expiration of the one-year period
within to review the decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible. The purpose of this is to put a limit to
the time within which a claimant may ask for its revocation otherwise if an action may be instituted beyond the one-year period after title to the property is decreed,
the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated.
2.

Both PHHC and UP are presumed purchasers for value in good faith and are therefore entitled to protection under the law

There is nothing in the complaint to show that PHCC and UP knew of any defect in the title appearing on its face I the form of any lien or encumbrance. This finds
support in well-settled principle: "A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of
the primary objects of the Torrens System."
3.

Assuming that the action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed, the action is considered barred by laches for not having taken the action
seasonably after title to the property had been issued under the Torrens system.

The property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11, 1957 that Tiburcio asserted their claim thereto when they brought
the present action (43 years after).
4.

Tiburcios contention that lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial notice of its own
records in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other case even when such case had been tried by the same court and notwithstanding the facts that both cases
may have been tried before the same judge is not tenable.

Even if the principle is the general rule, the same is not absolute and is subject to exceptions. In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in
other causes, because of their close connection with the matter in the controversy. Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or
not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.

5.

Tiburcios objection to the action of the trial court on this matter is merely technical

They do not dispute the fact that appellant Marcelino Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the application in Land Registration Case
No. L-3 for the registration of the same parcel of land which application was denied by the court. It appears that in the registration case the oppositors were the
People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in
effect it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two case there is not
only identity of subject matter but identity of parties and causes of action.
6.

TRADERS ROYAL BANK vs. CA

Facts:
*Movants Capays
*Transferee - Santiago
Preceeding case: (1999 case)
Capay mortgaged a property to TRB foreclosure of the mortgage notice of lis pendens over the property pending appeal, TRB sold the property to
Santiago
TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute
while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.
SC: in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value (Santiago)
Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties
Santiago obtained a clean title in good faith and for value

FACTS:
In a Decision dated September 29, 1999, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita
Santiago.
On October 21, 1999, the Capays and Ramon Gonzales, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the above Decision. They pray for the inclusion in the
dispositive portion of said Decision of an award to each of them the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P40,000.00
as attorneys fees, all with legal interest at the time of the filing of the complaint. They also ask that Traders Royal bank (TRB) be ordered to pay them the amount of
P47,730.00, the price stipulated in the Deed of Absolute Sale between said bank and its transferee, Emelita Santiago, plus interest at 12% per annum from the date
of said contract, instead of the fair market value of the disputed property at the time of said sale.

ISSUE:

WON the property should be valued at the price stipulated in the Deed of Absolute Sale between said bank and its transferee, Emelita Santiago.

HELD:Yes.
Movants ask that TRB be ordered to pay them the amount the former received from its immediate transferee, Emelita Santiago, and interest thereon, instead of the
fair market value of the property at the time of said transfer. The basis for the award of the amount constituting the value of the property, which we decreed in our
decision, is found in Article 1400 of the Civil Code:

Art. 1400. Whenever the person obliged by the decree of annulment to return the thing can not do so because it has been lost through his fault, he shall return the
fruits received and the value of the thing at the time of the loss, with interest from the said date.
In accordance with the above provision, movants would ordinarily be entitled to, aside from the value of the property, interest thereon from the date of the loss, in this
case, from the sale of the property by TRB to Emelita Santiago, with interest from said date. Pursuant also to the above provision, movants would be entitled to the
fruits received from said property, if evidence of such receipt of fruits is presented.
Movants, however, insist upon the price of the property at the time of the sale to Emelita Santiago, which was in the amount of P47,730.00 as appearing in the Deed
of Absolute Sale. To this, TRB poses no objection and we take the price stated in the deed of sale as a stipulation between the parties on the value of the property.
Accordingly, we grant movants prayer for said amount, with 12% per annum from said sale, the value of the property being equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
7.

LACBAYAN vs. SAMOYE

Facts:Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy met through common friendin 1978. Despite Samoys being already married, their relationship developed until Lacbayan
gave birth to Samoys son.
During their illicit relationship, they (together with 3 incorporators) were able to establish a manpower services company. 5 parcels of land were also acquired during
said period & were registered in Lacbayan and Samoys names as husband and wife.
Lacbayan initially lived with her parents but in 1983, she left her parents & resided in the property located in Malvar. Then she and son transferred to property in
Zobel, then finally transferred to property in Don Enrique Heights.
Eventually, their relationship turned sour & decided to part ways in 1991. So they both agreed to divide their properties & terminate their business partnership by
executing Partition Agreement.
Initially, Samoy agreed to Lacbayans proposal that properties in Malvar and Don Enrique Heights will be assigned to her while the 3 other will go to Samoy. However
when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in partition agreement, Samoy refused.
31 May 99: Lacbayan filed complaint for judicial partition, averring that she and Samoy lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage & they worked together
as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15.5M.
10 Feb 2000: RTC rendered decision, dismissing complaint for lack of merit, giving weight to Lacbayans own admission that the properties were acquired not from
her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company which she owns a measly 3.33% share.
Lacbayan appealed to CA. CA likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1) WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership
2) WON the Torrens title over disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition
HELD: Petition is bereft of merit.The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. The first phase of a
partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court.
Anent issue of collateral attack: no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked but this is not material to the case at bar.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known
as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership, which is, more often than not, represented by that document.
Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered
as conclusive evidence of ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest
over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Another issue on WON Samoys assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, that Samoy is deemed to have admitted existence
of co-ownership between him and Lacbayan: negative. Samoy is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.
Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.