ALFONSO MONTEBON vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Facts: This is a petition for habeas corpus by Alfonso Montebon on behalf of Elpidio S.
Cruz, a prisoner at the Iwahig Penal Colony. A similar petition was filed with this
Court by Felicisima Santiago in the name of the same prisoner
(Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil., 927), a petition which was denied by us
in a decision promulgated on January 30, 1947. The ground of the first petition
was the alleged illegality of one of the prisoner's three convictions for estafa. The
present application contests the validity of the prisoner's recommitment decreed
by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine Executive Commission under
date of June 3, 1943, for the unexpired portion of his (prisoner's) maximum
aggregate sentences in three cases in which he had been paroled by the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence on June 26, 1941, when he still had over five years to
serve. The commissioner of Justice's recommitment order was made by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21, 1942, and approved by the Chairman
of the Executive Commission, which read: "The Board of Indeterminate Sentence
and the Board of Pardons having been abolished, the powers, duties and
functions thereof shall henceforth be assumed and exercised by the
Commissioner of Justice.
Issue: Won the recommitment order valid during the Japanese Occupation?
Held: The petition is denied without costs.

Ruling: Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of occupation is not only valid and
binding; it is imposed on them as a high obligation by the Hague Convention and the
theory of jus postlimitinii on the international Law. That the legal truism in political and
international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid." The reason underlying
requirement is thus stated in William vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176, 192), cited in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra:

"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of
society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws.
Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and
descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are
aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,

petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by
JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now
deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent.
Facts: Locquiao spouses executed a deed of donation propter nuptias written in
Ilocano in favor of their son, Benito and his soon-to-be bride, Tomasa Mara. By the
terms of the agreement, the donation consist of 4 parcels of land, one male cow and 1/3
of the conjugal house of the spouses Locquiao. The marriage took place on 1944. The
spouses died on 1962 and 1968, respectively leaving their 6 children as heirs. With the
permission of Benito, Romana, one of the heirs took over the possession of the donated
lands and cultivated it. When her husband got sick, her daughter, Constancia took over
the position in cultivating the land.
Meanwhie Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut leaving the old title
cancelled.
Later, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and petitioner
Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, wherein they
distributed among 3 out of the 12 parcels of land left by their common progenitors,
excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement that respondent Benito and Marciano
Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, have already received our shares
in the estates of our parents, by virtue of previous donations and conveyances, and that
for that reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed. All the
living children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including petitioner Romana,
confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the
properties covered by the deed of partition were adjudicated.
Subsequently, disagreements among the heirs surfaced leading to execution of deed of
compromise agreement. Benito, although not directly involved, signed the agreement.
Sometime in 1983, Constancia filed for the annulment of the agreement. The lower
court dismissed the petition. This lead an ejectment case raised by Benito in favor
of Constancia. Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint for the
annulment of the donated and registered land against respondents Benito and Tomasa.

Petitioners alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent;
that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that the notary public who notarized the
document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation did not observe the form
required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a
separate public instrument.
Issue: (1) whether the donation propter nuptias is authentic; (2) whether
acceptance of the donation by the donees is required; (3) if so, in what form should the
acceptance appear, and; (4) whether the action is barred by prescription and
laches.
Held:
- 1st Issue: To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the
petitioners rely mainly on the Certification that there was no notarial record for the year
1944 of Cipriano V. Abenojar who notarized the document on May 22, 1944 and
that therefore a copy of the document was not available. The certification is not
sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the challenged document.
The mere absence of the notarial record does not prove that the notary public does not
have a valid notarial commission and neither does the absence of a file copy of the
document with the archives effect evidence of the falsification of the document.
The failure of the notary public to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a
ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for
setting aside the transaction therein involved.
Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, made
reference in the deed of partition and the compromise agreement to the
previous donations made by the spouses in favor of some of the heirs. Benito was
not allotted any share in the deed of partition precisely because he received his share by
virtue of previous donations. His name was mentioned in the deed of partition only
with respect to one parcel of land which is the eleventh (11th) parcel in the deed but that
is the same one-third (1/3) portion of conjugal lot of their progenitors included
in the donation propter nuptias. Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of
Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any more share in the deed of partition since
they received theirs by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.
- 2nd Issue: No. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations
by reason of marriage are those made before its celebration, in consideration
of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. The distinction is
crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same
rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Under the Old Civil Code,
donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property
donated must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code
provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts. In other words,
the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with
compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter
nuptias under the Old Civil Code.

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides
that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds.
Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the
contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as
provided in Article 129, express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these
donations. Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are
applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended
to have retroactive effect.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation
propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on
August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese
occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that
municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated
by a change of sovereignty. Thus, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a consequence,
applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the
questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the
donation.
The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. Even if the
provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would
collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a donation
propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code.
- 3rd Issue: It is barred by prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an
action for recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein,
can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues. Thus,
petitioners action, which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than forty (40) years
from the execution of the deed of donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.
Even following petitioners theory that the prescriptive period should commence from
the time of discovery of the alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. As
early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of donation was registered and the transfer
certificate of title was issued, petitioners were considered to have constructive
knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that registration
of a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive notice to the whole world of its
contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. As it is now
settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property allegedly
registered through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title, the action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
The elements of laches are present in this case, viz:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation that led to the complaint and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, having had knowledge or
notice of defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would

assert the right on which he bases his suit, and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred Of the facts which support the finding of
laches, stress should be made of the following:
(a) the petitioners Romana
unquestionably gained actual knowledge of the donation propter nuptias when the deed
of partition was executed in 1973 and the information must have surfaced again when
the compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as petitioner Romana was a
party-signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the opportunity to question the
donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and she should have done so if she were of
the mindset, given the fact that she was still in possession of the land in dispute at the
time. But she did not make any move. She tarried for 11 more years from the execution
of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the
annulment case in 1985.
in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did
not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution." The same doctrine has been
asserted in numerous other cases.

LAWYERS LEAGUE vs AQUINO

Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The petitioners claim that her government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the legitimacy of the government of President
Cory Aquino is being questioned.
Issue:
W/N the government of Aquino is legitimate
Held:

Petitioners had no personality to sue and petition states no cause of action.

Ruling:
a.)Legitimacy of Aquino govt belongs to realm of politics where only the people
of the Philippines are the judge (not a justiciable matter)
b.) The people have made the judgment, accepting the Aquino govt w/c is in
effective control of the entire country.
c.) Aquino govt is not merely a de facto govt but in fact and law a de jure govt..
d.) Community of nations has recognized its legitimacy.
e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under Aquino govt.
The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is not a justiciable matter but a
political one. It is political because it belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge.
The Aquino government is a de jure and a de facto government for the people
have made the judgment and have accepted the government of President Aquino which
is in effective control of the entire country.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government and all the 11 members of the Supreme Court have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO

Facts:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a
letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization
of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the
Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was
created. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the
revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization
of the Judiciary. When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July
1986, petitioners seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to
number twenty six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed
to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 33, which reads:
"SEC. 2. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall
consist of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines
A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November
1990 was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two
(2) of the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the
present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members and that petitioner
could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was
returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed
ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Issue:
- WON the Executive Order No. 33 is questionable regarding the reappointment and
reconsideration of the ranking of Associate Justice Reynato Puno.
- WON the the B.P Blg 129 is effective in the time of the new regime of President
Corazon Aquino.
Ruling:
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of
members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the
appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.
Rationale:
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the
revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was
an entirely new court with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier
appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank
contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive Order
No. 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.
It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33, President
Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing
both executive and legislative powers, such that she could, if she so desired, amend,

modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order No. 33. It should
also be remembered that the same situation was still in force when she issued the 1986
appointments to the Court of Appeals. In other words, President Aquino, at the time of
the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or disregarded the rule embodied in
B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33, on precedence or seniority in the
case of the petitioner, for reasons known only to her. Since the appointment extended by
the President to the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with
its implicit ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the
Presidents exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at this time
to question or correct that exercise.

Taada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985
FACTS:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or

a number of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of
public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution, which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval. The Court held
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. The Court noted the conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law, which presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING:

The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the laws. The clause unless otherwise
provided in Article 2 of the new Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

RATIONALE:
The clear object of the necessity of publication is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden
a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such

as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the

assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Tanada, et al. versus Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997
272 SCRA 18
EN BANC
THE FACTS
On April 15, 1994, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Rizalino
Navarro), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in the
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. By
signing the Final Act, the Philippines, among other countries, was put into WTO
Agreement requiring the Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. As a consequence, the
President sought for a Senate concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, the petitioners assailed the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and
to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
THE ISSUES
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND
12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN
PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE

UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

First Issue: JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
The Court responded that in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this
Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a
policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies,
quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
constitutional duty to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in
ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION CONTRAVENES
There was no contravention of the Constitution specifically on the provisions in Section
19, Article II, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII. These provisions read as follows:
Article II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Article XII, Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Article 12, Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make
them competitive.
Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
Third Issue: THE WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE POWER
The Court stressed that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all
nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO AGREEMENT AND JUDICIAL POWER
The Court says that:
The requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if
(1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has
not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of
these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate

method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and
processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the
third issue -- derogation of legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice
it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually
exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on
patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure
will not be substantial.
Fifth Issue: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND NOT IN
OTHER DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its
annexes -- but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of
discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed
by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President.
They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate which enumerated
what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.
THE RULING
The Court DISMISSED the petition for LACK OF MERIT. The concurrence of the
Philippine Senate to the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO
is sustained.

DOMINO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2)
months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd
Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement
and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of
voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon
City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year
immediately preceding the election.

3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of
DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be
proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINOs disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings
declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and
conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained. It is not within the competence of
the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged voter a resident of
another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited
only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered,
specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the decision to be a
basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be
between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
identity of causes of action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the
highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of
office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of
the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal
which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. It would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA

Facts:
President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled Redirecting the Functions
and Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the changes in the
roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive

order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to
being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the
devolution of basic services to local government units.
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of
government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The said provision under the HSRA
reads:
Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government
hospitals must be allowed to collect socialized user fees so they can reduce
the dependence on direct subsidies from the government. Their critical
capacities like diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities and medical staff
capability must be upgraded to effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such
investment must be cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by
public-private networks. Moreover such capacities will allow government
hospitals to supplement priority public health programs. Appropriate
institutional arrangement must be introduced such as allowing them
autonomy towards converting them into government corporations without
compromising their social responsibilities. As a result, government
hospitals are expected to be more competitive and responsive to health
needs.
Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted
in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically
disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for being in violation
of the following constitutional provisions:
ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.
ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.
ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved
quality of life for all.
ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-

building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being x x x.
ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:
(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing
safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal
functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation.
ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order 102 is constitutional?
Held:
Yes. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to
the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They
claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article
III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the
1987Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine
and free medical services.
This contention is unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution
areconsidered self-executing, and do not require future legislationfor their enforcement.
For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be
easilynullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisionshave already been
categorically declared by this Court as nonself-executing.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,this Court declared that

Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article
XIV of the1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and
Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general
principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing
and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from
Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the
provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the
aforecited case of Taada v. Angara. Moreover, the records are devoid of any
explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process
clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no
allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA.
Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached,
petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions,
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful
working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special
protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared
as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of
principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and
the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but
rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes

ANTONIO M. SERRANO (Petitioner)

vs
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO.,
INC., (Respondents)
G.R. No. 167614
March 24, 2009
FACTS:
Antonio Serrano (Petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was hired by Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (Respondents) under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with
the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract
Position
Basic monthly salary
Hours of work
Overtime
Vacation leave with pay

12 months
Chief Officer
US $1,400.00
48 hours/week
US $700.00/month
7 days/month

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a
salary of US $1,000.00/month upon the assurance and representation of respondents
that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. However, the respondents
did not deliver on their promise to make the petitioner Chief Officer. The petitioner
refused to stay on as Second Officer and he returned to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Since the petitioners employment contract was for a period of 12 months (March
19, 1998 to March 19, 1999), he had served for only 2 months and 7 days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days. Petitioner filed with the Labor
Arbiter (LA) a complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for

payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and
awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the
finding of the LA. On the other hand, the petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the
sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. vs NLRC that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their
salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. He questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. CA affirmed
the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate however, the CA skirted
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. The last clause in the 5 th par. Of Section 10,
R.A. No. 8042 states that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of 12% per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for 3 months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the
monthly rate of US $1,400.00 covering the period of 3 months out of the 9 months and
23 days unexpired portion of his contract or a total of US $4,200.00. Impugning the
constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US
$4,200, he is entitled to US $21,182.33 more or a total US $25,382.23 for his salaries for
the entire 9 months and 23 days left of his said contract.
ISSUES:
1

Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the
entire unexpired portion of his employment contract (12 months) and not just for
a period of 3 months?

2 Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefit that have
been stipulated into his contract?
HELD:
1

Yes, the petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
contract (9 months and 23 days) at the rate of US $1,400.00/month. The subject
clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less in the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10 R.A. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of
their money claims since they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No.
8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs
with an unexpired portion of 1 year or more in their employment contract have

since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month
cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to
substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary
benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause
being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract,
pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
2 No, the word salaries in Section 10 (5) does not include overtime and leave pay.
For seafarers like the petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33 series 1996
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work performed in excess of the
regular 8 hours and holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on
designated rest days and holidays. With this definition, there is no basis for the
automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of
petitioners monetary rewards unless there is evidence that he performed during
those periods.

ABAS KIDA VS SENATE

FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress.
RA No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials.
RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections for the 2nd Monday of August
2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations
for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In
these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:

-WON the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-WON RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional
RULING:
No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before
bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they pass through three
readings on separate days, is subject to the exception when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment. In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. The Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to
comply with the three separate readings requirement.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established
rule that every statute is presumed valid. Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous
task of rebutting this presumption. Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality. As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive
Secretary:94
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.95 [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA
No. 10153, we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the
validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law.

GR No. 177857-58 September 17, 2009

Philippine Coconut Producers Federationa,
Inc. (COCOFED), vs Republic of the
Philippines
Facts:
The motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court dated September 17,
2009, As may be recalled, the Court, in its resolution adverted to, approved, upon
motion of petitioner Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), the
conversion of the sequestered 753,848,312 Class "A" and "B" common shares of San
Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the name of Coconut Industry Investment
Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies (hereunder referred to as SMC Common Shares), into
753,848,312
SMC
Series
1
Preferred
Shares.
Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor their plea for reconsideration on the

submission or issue that:

The honorable court overlooks the value of the fact that the government, as opposed to
the current administration, is the winning party in the case below and thus has no
incentive
to
convert.
In this recourse, it would appear that oppositors-intervenors seem unable to accept, in
particular, the soundness angle of the conversion. But as we have explained, the
conversion of the shares along with the safeguards attached thereto will ensure that the
value of the shares will be preserved. In effect, due to the nature of stocks in general and
the prevailing business conditions, the government, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), chose not to speculate with the CIIF SMC
shares, as prima facie public property, in the hope that there would be a brighter
economy in the future, and that the value of the shares would increase. We must respect
the decision of the executive department, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue:
(1) WON the PCGG have the power to convert the sequestered shares of stock.
Held:
The PCGG thoroughly studied and considered the effects of conversion and, based upon
such study, concluded that it would best serve the purpose of maintaining and
preserving the value of the shares of stock to convert the same.
It was proved that the PCGG had exercised proper diligence in reviewing the pros and
cons of the conversion. The efforts PCGG have taken with respect to the desired stock
conversion argue against the notion of grave abuse of discretion.
Under the government established under the Constitution, it is the executive branch,
either pursuant to the residual power of the President or by force of her enumerated
powers under the laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of
government property or, in this case, sequestered assets under the administration of the
PCGG. Surely, such control is neither legislative nor judicial.
Apropos the separation of powers doctrine and its relevance to this case, it may well be
appropriate to again quote the following excerpts from the decision in JG Summit
Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,6 to wit:
The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the
Government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not
interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries.
Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-making.

Zenon R. Perez, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan,

respondents
544 SCRA 532
February 12, 2008
Facts:

The petitioner verbally admitted that part of the money from public funds was
used to pay for the loan of his late brother, a portion of it was spent for food and
the remaining was spent for medicines.
An administrative case was filed against the petitioner. He filed an Answer
reiterating his verbal admission.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of Public
funds. The petitioner, duly assisted by a counsel de parte entered a plea of not
guilty.
A pre-trial was set but the petitioners counsel moved for postponement. The
Sandiganbayan proceeded to hear the case due to the presence of witness Arlene
R. Mandin.
Sandiganbayan dispensed the pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to present its
witness.
The defense presented evidence through the petitioner himself. He denied the
contents of his first Answer to the administrative case. He claimed it was
prepared without assistance of his counsel, and at the time of his counsel and at
the time of preparation, he was not in peak mental and physical condition.
Petitioner further alleged that the cash shortage was due to oversight and argued
that the government did not suffer any damage or prejudice since alleged cash
shortage was actually deposited with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer.

Issues:
1

Whether or not the law relied upon in convicting the petitioner and the sentence
imposed is cruel and therefore violates Section 19 Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
The law relied in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does
not violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights

There is strong presumption of Constitutionality accorded to statutes.

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible
in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.83 It is presumed that the legislature has acted
within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every
statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be
valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show
why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its
presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or
inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council,

G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a
vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate.
Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative
from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real
interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The
respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review
have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter
and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party
will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is
put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner
lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true
that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have
locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice

can come to the Court and question the JBC

composition for being unconstitutional.
The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members
of the Judiciary. Albeit
heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations
for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts
all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the
legality of the
very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the
nucleus of the controversy.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal
and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post,
but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only
a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of Congress as a
bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in
the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the
case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire
legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.

DELA LLANA VS THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT REYNATO

A. VILLAR
_______________________________________________________
_____
PROVISION:
Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. - Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
_______________________________________________________
_____
Sub topic: The following must be avoided:
(i) political questions,
(ii) advisory opinions,
(iii) moot and academic issues, and
(iv) no standing.
-FR. BERNAS
_______________________________________________________
_____
THE CASE:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of
the 1987 Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA)
Circular No. 89-299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial
transactions.
FACTS:
The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal
responsibility resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines; and,

second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving

government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring

facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect
the integrity of these transactions.

As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a
mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in
Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because
of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions
have been committed, such as the P728- million fertilizer fund scam,
irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory project of the
Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to raise the constitutional
issue.
HELD: Yes.
This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have
the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that
public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution.

Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the
dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government
financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by
the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its
Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer,
since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR,Respondent.
G.R. No. 192791 | 2012-04-24
FACTS:
Funa filed for a Petition for Certiorari that challenges the constitutionality of the
appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and
accordingly prays that a judgment issue declaring the unconstitutionality of the
appointment.
President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as the third member
of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2,
2011. Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter,
on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He
was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers,
until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on
the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh
term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2,
2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from
office upon the appointment of his replacement.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari that challenges the
constitutionality of the appointment of villar as chairman of the commission on has
been moot and academic.
Held:
Yes. When Villar vacated his position and when President Aquino III named Ma. Gracia
Pulido-Tan as COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,or when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events,so
that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value
or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition.
ISSUE:
2. Whether or not the case at bar is an exception to the principle of moot
and academic which still needs for judicial review.
HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, it is not within the SC charge and function to act upon and decide
a moot case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,We acknowledged and accepted
certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
In the present case, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a
situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional
issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar and the public; and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to
necessarily call for the promulgation of principles that will henceforth guide the bench,
the bar and the public should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future
situations would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case
are resolved straightaway and settled definitely. There are times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be addressed.

WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

The appointment of then
Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission on
Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has
expired, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)
of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

Ynot vs. IAC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Facts:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A where the President
has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos. Petitioner filed the present case claiming that the above-

mentioned executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright

confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. RTC declined to resolve on the constitutionality of the executive order for lack
of authority and also for its presumed validity. IAC affirmed RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC and IAC has the authority to declare a law unconstitutional?
Held:
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.