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Confessions of a Capital Junkie

An insider perspective on the cure for the industry's


value-destroying addiction to capital

April 29, 2015

Safe Harbor Statement


This document contains forward-looking statements. These
statements may include terms such as may, will, expect,
could, should, intend, estimate, anticipate, believe,
remain, on track, design, target, objective, goal,
forecast, projection, outlook, prospects, plan,
intend, or similar terms. Forward-looking statements are
not guarantees of future performance. Rather, they are
based on the Groups current expectations and projections
about future events and, by their nature, are subject to
inherent risks and uncertainties. They relate to events and
depend on circumstances that may or may not occur or exist
in the future and, as such, undue reliance should not be
placed on them. Actual results may differ materially from
those expressed in such statements as a result of a variety
of factors, including: the future capital expenditures and
research and development expenses of the Group and the
industry, potential benefits from industry consolidation;
developments in global financial markets and general
economic and other conditions; changes in demand for
automotive products, which is highly cyclical; the high level of
competition in the automotive industry; the Groups ability to
realize anticipated benefits from any business combinations,
joint venture arrangements and other strategic alliances; the
Groups ability to integrate its operations; the Groups ability
to access funding to execute the Groups business plan and
improve the Groups business, financial condition and results
of operations; operating expenditures including in relation

Confessions of a Capital Junkie

to vehicle and powertrain development and compliance


with regulations; exchange rate fluctuations, interest rate
changes, credit risk and other market risks; our ability to
achieve the benefits expected from any capital optimzation
plans; and other risks and uncertainties.
Any forward-looking statements contained in this
document speak only as of the date of this document and
the Company does not undertake any obligation to update
or revise publicly forward-looking statements. Further
information concerning the Group and its businesses,
including factors that could materially affect the
Companys financial results, is included in the Companys
reports and filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, the AFM and CONSOB.

April 29, 2015

Purpose of the pitch

Goal is to provide clarity on two issues that have been raised


publicly by FCA
Industry has not earned its cost of capital over a cycle
Consolidation is the key to remedying the problem

What this is not about


An excuse for FCAs current ranking in the automotive food chain
Putting FCA up for sale

A revision to our 5 year plan (which remains a firm commitment)


A matter of life or death for FCA

SMs final big deal

What this is about


Dispassionate look at the industry from the outside using
insider knowledge
It is about choosing between mediocrity or fundamentally changing
the paradigm for the industry
Confessions of a Capital Junkie

April 29, 2015

Before we get into this, we should be reminded that

Everyone is entitled to his


own opinion, but not to his
own facts.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
(Former US Senator and Ambassador to the UN)

Confessions of a Capital Junkie

April 29, 2015

Auto industrys capex and R&D requirements have


grown significantly over the past years
Mainstream OEMs

Premium OEMs

Top OEMs1Total capex + R&D spending over last 5 years (bn)2

CAGR:
Mainstream OEMs: ~12%
Premium OEMs: ~10%

122

117
107
91
76

18
19

17

14

12

91

99

104

78
64

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Source: Company annual reports


1
Includes mainstream OEMs: FCA, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Nissan, PSA, Renault, Toyota, Volkswagen. Premium OEMs: BMW, Daimler Cars
2
Translated at constant 2010 exchange rates (average January to December 2010)

Confessions of a Capital Junkie

April 29, 2015

... and going forward, new technological challenges


will continue to raise the bar on capital requirements
Forces at work increasing capital requirementsSelected examples
Regulatory-driven
Emissions
regulations

Tighter emissions
regulations

Costly new powertrains


Weight-saving
technologies

Customer-driven
Safety regulations

Stricter regulations
and customer focus
on safety

Adoption of state-of-theart safety technologies


across markets

Car connectivity
and autonomy

New infotainment
services

Customer expectations
on connected cars

Autonomous drive push

Auto OEMs

Confessions of a Capital Junkie

April 29, 2015

Product development costs are consuming value at


a much faster rate than in other industries
Time to reinvest enterprise value1 in product development (capital and R&D)2
Average number of years
~ 36

~ 28
~ 23
~ 18

~ 19

Average
across
industries3:

~ 20

~20 years

~ 13
7.8 8.5

Consumer & Retail

Building materials

Packaging
materials

Chemicals

Aerospace &
Defence

Pharma

Telecommunication

Oil & Gas

OEM 4

OEM 6

OEM 8

OEM 2

OEM 7

Premium OEM

OEM 5

OEM 10

OEM 9

OEM 1

~4.1 years
FCA

OEM 3

1.3

3.6 3.8 4.0


2.6 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.4

Auto
industry
average:

~7

5.0

Source: Company annual reports


1
2
3

Industrial activities only. Including pension liabilities


Calculated as 3-year average of the annual ratio between enterprise value (for the period 20122014) and capital expenditures plus R&D expenses
Based on the reference sample

Confessions of a Capital Junkie

April 29, 2015

... and high operational leverage amplifies profitability


swings across the cycle ...
EBIT Margin1 of Auto OEMs vs other sectors (%)
30%

19%

8%

(3%)
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Aerospace & Defence

Building materials

Chemicals

Consumer products

Pharmaceuticals

Telecommunications

Premium OEM

Mainstream OEMs

2013

2014

Packaging

Source: Company annual reports


1
2

EBIT defined as Industrial reported EBIT plus income from equity accounted investments and excludes goodwill impairment. EBIT as per accounting principles adopted by
each company
Mainstream OEMs include: FCA, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Nissan, PSA, Renault, Toyota, Volkswagen

Confessions of a Capital Junkie

April 29, 2015

resulting in structurally low and volatile returns


ROIC1 of Auto OEMs vs other sectors (%)
30%

20%

10%

Consensus
WACC: ~9%

(10%)
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Aerospace & defence

Building materials

Chemicals

Consumer

Pharma

Telecommunications

Premium OEM

Mainstream OEMs

2013

2014

Packaging materials
2

ROIC calculated as [Industrial reported EBIT x (1-taxes) + income from equity accounted investments] / Industrial Net Invested capital. Assumed a normalized tax rate equal
to 30%. EBIT excludes goodwill impairment. Industrial Net Invested capital is defined as industrial Trade Working Capital + Industrial PP&E + Industrial Intangibles
(excl. Goodwill) + Book Value of equity accounted investments + operating cash for OEMs (assumed at 12.5% of industrial sales). EBIT as per accounting principles
adopted by each company
Mainstream OEMs include: FCA, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Nissan, PSA, Renault, Toyota, Volkswagen

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April 29, 2015

Why did this happen? OEMs spend vast amounts of capital to develop
proprietary components, many not really discernible to customers
Typical vehicle development costs

Powetrain
Tooling
~5%

New vehicle programdevelopment


costs split1

Other
~5%

Vehicle R&D
~40%

Powetrain/
R&D
~15%

4550%
5055%

Vehicle Tooling
~35%

Differentiating
products/
technologies

Products/technologies
undiscernible to
customer, potentially
overlapping with competitors

Chart scale based on mid-point of range shown

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One industry solution focuses on reducing the


number of active platforms and increasing scale
Active platforms by OEM1

Number of top hats by platform2

Average across top 10 global OEMs

Average across top 10 global OEMs

22

3.3

21
18

2004

2009

-20%

2014

2.5

2.6

2004

2009

+30%

2014

"More of our components will be common, and more of our vehicles will be on global architectures"
Dan Akerson, GM (2011)
"I'm really proud to say that we've reduced that number down to 12 global platforms. In 2016 we'll reduce that down to a
further nine global platforms, and our team is working towards a further consolidation of that to get down to a long-term target
now of eight global platforms [] that obviously yields tremendous benefits for us as an enterprise
Raj Nair, Ford Group Vice President-Global Product Development (2015)
SOURCE: IHS
1
2

Adjusted to include only platforms with at least 2,000 cars manufactured in a given year
Including FCA, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, PSA, Renault/Nissan, Suzuki, Toyota, Volkswagen

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and some OEMs are trying larger scale


commonization across diverse brands

Golf

Spacefox
(2018)

Fox
(2017)

Lamando

MQB

MC-M

ARCHITECTURE

ARCHITECTURE

Voyage
(2018)

Scirocco
(2018)

Polo
(2016)

Passat

Golf
SportVan

CC
(2017)

Touran

Jetta
(2016)

Tiguan
(2016)

B-CUV
(2016)

Crossblue

Crossblue
coupe (2018)

Golf
SportWagen

Lavida
(2018)

Sagitar
(2017)

A1
(2018)

TT

Octavia

Ibiza
(2016)

Alphard

Harrier

RAV4

Avalon

Highlander

SAI

Avensis

Mirai

Sienna

Q1
(2016)

Q3
(2018)

Yeti
(2017)

Leon

A3

C-MPV
(2017)

Superb

B-CUV
(2018)

Camry

Prius

C-CUV
(2016)

C-CUV
(2016)

Estima

Prius
Alpha
(Prius V)

Wish

ES

Mebius

HS

NX
Venza

RX
Voxy

By the middle of 2020, we plan to expand TNGA (Toyota New Generation Architecture) to approximately half of the line-up [] Traditionally we
have tended to focus on developing individual models and lacked the total alignment and consistency, which will change with a company-wide effort.
Mitsuhisa Kato, Toyota Executive VP (2015)
Source: IHSGlobal 2018 Sales database as of April 2015, Toyota global newsroom
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while others through one-off co-operations,


JVs and other equity tie-ups
Successful
Long-term industrial
co-operations (JVs)

Cross-shareholdings
enabled co-operations

Full integration

Low/negative

Expected impact at the time of the deal

High

One-off industrial
co-operations

Failed

Low

High
Level of integration

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But all this has produced poor results so far,


as OEMs' returns and valuations are still depressed
2014 EV/EBITDA2

2014 ROIC

13.0x
22%
11.1x
10.7x 11.0x

13%
10%

11%

6.8x

12%

6.2x

Pharma

Consumer & Retail

Building materials

Chemicals

Telecommunications

Oil & Gas

Mainstream OEMs

Consumer & Retail

Pharma

Aerospace and Defence

Packaging materials

Chemicals

Building materials

Telecommunications

4.0x

Oil & Gas

Mainstream OEMs 1

9.1x

14%

7.8%

1
2

9.0x

Packaging materials

16%

Aerospace and Defence

19%

Mainstream OEMs include: FCA, Ford, General Motors, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Nissan, PSA, Renault, Toyota, Volkswagen
Based on 2014 average enterprise value for the companies in the reference sample. EV including pension liabilities. EBITDA as per accounting principles adopted by
each company

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Why havent these approaches provided


a significant lift to returns?

Large scale organic reduction in platforms


Reluctance to replace old, less costly architectures
Option available only to those OEMs with existing scale across platforms,
top hats and regions
Requires strict discipline to avoid upward standardization/over engineering
Lower risk in the short-term, BUT significantly slower execution,
entailing lower returns over an extended period

OEM co-operations
Most effective on single ventures, but with limited scope
Usually involve non-core elements of portfolio
Not a pervasive, substantive solution for any OEM

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Why does industry consolidation matter?

High mortality rate caused by partial if non-existent integration


Cultural divide (corporate and otherwise)
Inequality of integrating parties

Operating models radically different and never merged


Insufficient sensitivity for brand differences

Lack of respect/trust for one another

Complexity proved to be too much of a stretch for leadership teams


BUT

It enables

Fast execution, enabling rapid scale gain

Fostering step-change/best-of-best approach to modularity/ commonality

AND

The potential savings are too large to ignore

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The facts: Breaking down product development costs


E-MPV segment mainstream all new vehicle example
OEM B

OEM A
Typical development cost for vehicle and platform (excluding powertrain)
% of total development costs
100%

14%
17%
7%

1%

4%

1%

2%

5%

38%
11%
Underbody

Upperbody
exterior

Power- Brakes
train
installation
systems1

Suspen- Steering HVAC


sions/
wheels

Electri- Interiors
cal/
Electronics/
Connectivity

Common Total
general
Assy/
Paint

Frame/chassis

Potential
commonality
while
~70%
preserving
differentiation

~10%

~75%

~90%

~80%

~80%

~80%

~70%

~30%

100%

Potential
commonality
up to
~45-50% of
total
development
cost2

Potential benefits up to 2 billion on vehicle investments


1
2

Includes mounts, fuel system, cooling and other minor components/systems


Average weighted on contribution to product development cost

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Powertrain portfolios show even higher duplications


across OEMs, both for engines
Overlap with future FCA engine offering
Major global car OEMs benchmarked

Engine lineup

OEM 1

OEM 2

OEM 3

OEM 4

OEM 5

OEM 6

OEM 7

OEM 9

>70%

>50%

>90%

Diesel

Small (1.3-1.6L)
Medium (2.0-2.3L)
Large (3.0-6.0L)

Gas

3 Cylinder
4 Cylinder
V6

Hybrid

V8
Mild (BSG)

Full
Minor overlap

Exotic engines1
Potential overlap with FCA
engine budget

>90%

~90%

~50%

>60%

~90%

High performance engines, limited productions, low volumes

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and for transmissions


Overlap with future FCA transmissions offering
Major global car OEMs benchmarked
Transmissions lineup

OEM 1

OEM 2

OEM 3

OEM 4

OEM 5

OEM 6

OEM 7

OEM 9

~90%

~90%

~50%

~ 80%

~60%

~ 70%

~ 50%

>90%

Manual 5 Speed
Manual 6 Speed

FWD

MTA
DDCT

Automatic 6 Speed
Automatic 8/9 Speed
CVT
Manual 6 Speed
RWD

Auto. LD, 7 Speeds


Auto. LD, 8 Speeds
Auto. HD, 7 Speeds (1000 Nm)
Auto. HD, 8 Speeds (1000 Nm)
Potential overlap with FCA
transmissions budget

Potential elimination up to 1 billion in duplicated engines and transmissions spending per year

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The facts: Sharing platform, vehicle and powertrain


development can yield significant savings
Illustrative investment for developing 2 full new vehicles
Indexed to 100, example mainstream B/C segment built on same platform
~50

~100

~20-401

~60-80
~50

Vehicle and
platform A

Vehicle and
platform B

Total stand-alone
investments for A
and B

Savings on total
investment

Total consolidated
investment

Illustrative investment for developing 2 new engines2


Indexed to 100, example for two 4-cylinder gasoline engines to be based on the same architecture
~50

~100

~25-30
~70-75

~50

Engine A

1
2

Engine B

Total stand-alone
investments for A
and B

Savings on base
development,
vehicle installation

Total consolidated
investment

Estimate based on 40-80% saving on the second vehicle leveraging commonalities in product development. Example for mainstream B/C segment
estimated with same methodology as of case for E-MPV segment (45-50%)
Assuming a powertrain average lifecycle of 10 years. Tooling synergies not considered

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We believe large scale integrations are required to


unleash full potential
Potential for capital rationalization across different types of co-operation
Low

High
Drivers for capital
rationalization

Key
enabler:
Integrated
industrial
footprint
strategy

One-off technical cooperation

JVs

Cross-shareholding
enabled co-operations

Full
integration

Share R&D
costs and tech
development

Optimize
tooling
investments

Key
enabler:
Integrated
product
strategy

Maximize plant
utilization

Capture crossselling
opportunities
Capture other
opex
opportunities
Potential for
capital
rationalization

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Potential synergies from consolidation of auto OEMs


would be ~70% driven by industrial rationale
Estimated benefits from consolidation of auto OEMs1

Sharing platforms
development costs

Technology and
product development

Leveraging
commonalities in
top-hat
development

(e.g. sharing component


development costs)

~70%

Avoiding budget
duplication for
powertrains

Optimization of

Cross-selling
~15%

Other opex
opportunities

manufacturing
investments and
production
allocation

(e.g. purchasing, SG&A)

~15%

Combinations of FCA with another large OEM would yield benefits of 2.5-4.5bn per year
1

FCA analysis of potential consolidation opportunities among top 10 global automotive OEMs

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Consolidation can support significant ROIC and


valuation improvement
ROIC FY 2014
25%

Consumer & Retail

20%
Pharma
Consensus 2018
adjusted for
consolidation

Premium OEM

15%

Aerospace and Defence

OEM 6
OEM 8

Packaging materials
OEM 7
OEM 4

10%

Telecommunications
Oil & Gas

OEM 5

Chemicals
Building materials

Consensus 2018

Auto industry WACC: ~9%

Automotive
today

5%

Status quo

OEM 9
OEM 10

OEM 2
OEM 1

OEM 3
0%
0.0x

2.0x

4.0x

6.0x

8.0x

10.0x

12.0x

14.0x

EV/EBITDA1 2014
1

Including pension liabilities. EBITDA as per accounting principles adopted by each company

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Some conclusions
Top OEMs spent over 100bn for product development in 2014 only,
>2bn/week in product development and tooling costs, and poised to invest at
similar rates in the futures

Historical returns have been broadly below cost of capital, even after the
restructuring of the US auto industry and NAFTA volumes at peak

Single purpose projects, JVs and the like are helpful, but they are not enough

Capital consumption rate by OEMs is unacceptableit is duplicative, does not


deliver real value to consumers and is pure economic waste

Consolidation carries executional risks BUT benefits are too large to ignore

Up to 4.5bn per annum, ~70% of which is a reduction in investments and R&D

Optimized industrial allocations, with no impact on number employed

Distribution (dealer networks not merged) and brands untouched by consolidation

An exceptional value creation opportunity for shareholders

It is ultimately a matter of leadership style and capability

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The Red Queen

Well, in our country said Alice,


still panting a little, youd
generally get to somewhere else
- if you ran very fast for a long
time as weve been doing.
A slow sort of country! said the
Queen. Now here you see it
takes all the running you can do
to keep in the same place. If
you want to get somewhere
else, you must run at least twice
as fast as that!
L. Carroll
Through the Looking Glass

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