Article 148

Agapay vs. Palang

Facts:
Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol (private respondent) got married in July 16, 1949. A few months after the wedding,
Miguel Palang left to work in Hawaii.
Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned to the Philippines for good in 1972, he refused to live
with Carlina and their only child Hermania.
Miguel contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Agapay (petitioner). Two months earlier, May 17, 1973, they jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23,
1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle the case.
The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia
Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher, born on Dec 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of concubinage. Two years later, Miguel died.
Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They
sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation
with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda?
Held:
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed
that actual contribution is required by this provision.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sarisari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact
that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already
sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973
she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property,[11] there being no proof of the same.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we
find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by
the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina
Palang.

Article 149
Docena vs. Lapesura
Facts:
Hombria filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses
claimed ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The trial court ruled of spouses Docena. On
appeal, the CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land. The petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders
and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was filed
beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-forum shopping
was signed by only one of the petitioners.
Issue: Whether it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
Held:
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management
or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power
of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family
Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals
without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a
fatal defect.

Article 150
Gayon vs. Gayon
Facts:
Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against spouses Silvestre and Genoveva Gayon.
Genoveva, in her answer to the complaint, alleged that her husband, Silvestre, died long before the institution of the case; that
the complaint is fictitious for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; that the complaint is malicious
and embarrassed her and her children; and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre, plaintiff did not exert earnest efforts
for the amicable settlement of the case before filing his complaint.
Issue: Whether earnest effort toward a compromise should be first made before the filing of the suit.
Held:
Family relations shall include those:
1. Between husband and wife
2. Between parent and child
3. Among other ascendants and their descendants
4. Among brothers and sisters
Mrs. Gayon is the plaintiffs sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. None of them is
included in the enumeration provided in Article 150 of the Family code. Plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise
before the filing of the complaint does not bar the same.

Albano vs. Gapusan

Facts:
Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan seeking disciplinary action involving latters malpractice
in his notarization of a separation agreement between Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial
liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Likewise, a complaint was filed alleging that said Judge influenced Judge Crispin of
CFI-Ilocos in deciding two criminal cases. In the abovementioned separation agreement, it was stipulated that the spouse
guilty of adultery or concubinage shall be barred to file an action against the other. Respondent judge denied that he drafted
the said agreement and explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed it and the wife had
begotten children with her paramour. He further added that there was a stipulation in the said agreement that the spouse
would live together in case of reconciliation.
Issue: Whether Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of notarizing the void agreement between the spouses
Held:
Yes. There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals
and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family. "Marriage is not a mere contract
but an inviolable social institution". "The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects."
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership".

Family Home (Article 152-162)

Modequillo vs. Breva
Facts:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the
name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also
registered in the latters name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to
be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is
still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a
cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.
Issue: Whether the subject property is deemed to be a family home?
Held:
No. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This
does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.