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Catalogue of Notable

Tunnel Failures Case Histories


(up to April 2015)
Prepared by Mainland East Division
Geotechnical Engineering Office
Civil Engineering and Development Department

This catalogue of notable tunnel failures is primarily


based on published information. Both local and international
cases involving collapse or excessive deformation of the
ground are included. For contractual and other reasons, there
are relatively few cases reported in technical publications, and
those reported are usually of such scale or seriousness that
they have received public attention. Even for the cases reported,
usually only limited information is available. Apart from the
cases included, readers can find other information on tunnel
failure in the list of Bibliography given at the end of this
catalogue.

This catalogue is a live document that will be updated


from time to time as further information becomes available.
Readers are always welcome to provide us with additional
information about cases in this catalogue for future update.

The main purpose of the catalogue is to disseminate


information and promote awareness on tunnel failures which
could pose a danger to life and property. The possible causes
of the failures, the geotechnical problems and the lessons learnt,
where these are known, are outlined in the catalogue. Readers
should refer to the source reference documents quoted for
details. Clients and works agents are advised to implement
effective geotechnical risk management measures in the
planning, investigation, design and construction of their tunnel
projects.

The first edition of the catalogue was issued in February


2007 and was put together by Mr W Lee, supervised by Mr K J
Roberts. The second edition issued in March 2009 was prepared
by Ms L Y Pau, supervised by Mr L P Ho. The third edition issued
in October 2012 was prepared by Ms L Y Pau, supervised by Mr K
S Chau. This fourth edition was prepared by Ms K L Wong and Mr
H H Chan, supervised by Mr K S Chau. GEO staff, members of the
Hong Kong Institution of Engineers Geotechnical Division
Working Group on Cavern and Tunnel Engineering and other
individuals have contributed to this catalogue. All contributions
are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are given to Mr Guy
Lance for his valuable advice and guidance given to revising the
systematic structure of this catalogue, sourcing figures and
references from tunnel publications as well as editing reported
cases.

If any information in this catalogue is found to be


inaccurate or out-of-date, please contact the Chief Geotechnical
Engineer/Mainland East of the Geotechnical Engineering Office,
Civil Engineering and Development Department, 101 Princess
Margaret Road, Ho Man Tin, Kowloon, Hong Kong.

N F Chan
Chief Geotechnical Engineer/Mainland East
Geotechnical Engineering Office
Civil Engineering and Development Department
April 2015

1.

Green Park, London, UK, 1964

2.

Victoria Line Underground, London, UK, 1965

3.

Southend-on-sea Sewage Tunnel, UK, 1966

4.

R rvikskaret Road Tunnel on Highway 19, Norway, 18 March


1970

5.

Orange-fish Tunnel, South Africa, 1970

6.

Penmanshiel Tunnel, Scotland, UK, March 1979

7.

Munich Underground, Germany, 1980

8.

Holmestrand Road Tunnel, Norway, 16 Dec. 1981

9.

Gibei Railway Tunnel, Romania, 1985

10. Moda Collector Tunnel, Istanbul Sewerage Scheme, Turkey, 1989


Civil Engineering and Development Department
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

11. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 17 Nov. 1991


12. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 27 Nov. 1991
13. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 11 Feb. 1992
14. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 7 Jan. 1993
15. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 1 Feb. 1993
16. Munich Underground, Germany, 27 Sept. 1994

17. Heathrow Express, UK, 21 Oct. 1994


18. Los Angeles Metro, USA, 22 June 1995
19. Motorway Tunnels, Austria, 1993 - 1995

20. Docklands Light Rail, UK, 23 Feb. 1998

Civil Engineering and Development Department


The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

21. Athens Metro, Greece, 1991-1998


22. L rdal Road Tunnel on European Highway E 16, Norway, 15
June 1999
23. Sewage Tunnel, Hull, UK, 1999
24. Taegu Metro, South Korea, 1 Jan. 2000

25. Wastewater Tunnel, Portsmouth, UK, May 2000


26. Dulles Airport, Washington, USA, Nov. 2000
27. Istanbul Metro, Turkey, Sept. 2001

28. Channel Tunnel Rail Link, UK, Feb. 2003


29. Mtor Metro Tunnel, France, 14 Feb. 2003
30. Oslofjord Subsea Tunnel, Norway, 28 Dec. 2003
Civil Engineering and Development Department
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

31. Shanghai Metro, China, 2003


32. Nikkure-yama Tunnel, Japan, 2003
33. Guangzhou Metro Line 3, China, 1 April 2004
34. Singapore MRT, 20 April 2004
35. Kaoshiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 29 May 2004

36. Oslo Metro Tunnel, Norway, 17 June 2004


37. Kaoshiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 10 Aug. 2004
38. Hsuehshan Tunnel, Taiwan, 1991-2004

39. Barcelona Metro, Spain, 27 Jan. 2005


40. Lausanne M2 Metro, Switzerland, 22 Feb. 2005

Civil Engineering and Development Department


The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

41. Lane Cove Tunnel, Australia, 2 Nov. 2005


42. Kaoshiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 4 Dec. 2005
43. Nedre Romerike Water Treatment Plant Crude Water and Potable
Water Tunnels, Norway, 2005
44. Interstate 90 Connector Tunnel, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, July
2006
45. Hanekleiv Road Tunnel, Norway, 25 Dec. 2006
46. Stormwater Management and Road Tunnel (SMART), Malaysia,
2003 2006
47. Sao Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 15 Jan. 2007
48. Guangzhou Metro Line 5, China, 17 Jan. 2008
49. Langstaff Road Trunk Sewer, Canada, 2 May 2008
50. Circle Line 4 Tunnel, Singapore, 23 May 2008
Civil Engineering and Development Department
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

51. M6 Motorway, Hungary, 24 Jul. 2008


52. Hangzhou Metro Tunnel, China, 15 Nov. 2008
53. Cologne North-South Metro Tram Line, Germany, 3 March 2009
54. Brightwater Tunnel, USA, 8 March 2009
55. Seattles Beacon Hill Light Rail, USA, July 2009
56. Glendoe Headrace Tunnel, Scotland, UK, Aug. 2009
57. Cairo Metro Tunnel, Egypt, 3 Sept. 2009
58. Headrace tunnel of Gilgel Gibe II Hydro Project, Ethiopia, Oct. 2006
and Jan. 2010
59. Blanka Tunnel, Czech Republic, 20 May 2008, 12 Oct. 2008 and 6
July 2010
60. Shenzhen Express Rail Link, 27 March 2011, 4 May 2011 and 10
May 2011
Civil Engineering and Development Department
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

61. Mizushima Refinery Subsea Tunnel, Japan, 14 Feb. 2012


62. Hengqin Tunnel, Macau, 19 July 2012

63. Sasago Tunnel, Japan, 2 Dec. 2012


64. Ottawas Light Rail Transit Project, Canada, 20 Feb. 2014
65. Rios Metro Line 4, Brazil, 11 May 2014

Civil Engineering and Development Department


The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

1.

MTR Modified Initial System, Prince Edward Station, Nathan


Road, Hong Kong,12 Sept. 1977

2.

MTR Island Line, 22 Hennessy Road, Hong Kong, 1 Jan. 1983

3.

MTR Island Line, Shing On Street, Shau Kei Wan, Hong Kong,
23 July 1983

4.

MTR Island Line, 140-168 Shau Kei Wan Road, Hong Kong, 16
Dec. 1983

5.

Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200, Canton Road, Hong


Kong, 21 Oct. 2006

6.

Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200, Salisbury Road,


Hong Kong, 3 June 2007

Civil Engineering and Development Department


The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Case No 1. Green Park, London, UK, 1964


Europe
United Kingdom
1964
Project Title
Green Park to Victoria Tunnel, UK
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground
and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.

Keywords (for searching)


Green Park, London, UK, London Clay
Figures

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Background
Segmental lined tunnel (Green Park to Victoria) driven through
London Clay with low soil cover
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Inflow of sand and gravel, burying most of the shield

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


London Clay overlain by water-bearing sands and gravels
Construction Methods and Support
Using drum-digger shield
Possible Cause of Failure
The crown of the shield penetrated through the London Clay
layer into sand and gravel

Consequence
Little physical damage to the shield
Programme delayed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
A shaft was sunk from the surface to enable the material to be
staunched and treated.
The loose material was dug out by hand
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 2. Victoria Line Underground, UK, 1965


Europe
United Kingdom
1965
Project Title
Victoria Line Underground Railway
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground
and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.

Keywords (for searching)


Victoria Line, London, UK, London Clay
Figures

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Background
Tunnel (300m long and 3.7m internal diameter) driven through
London Clay under a disused railway marshalling yard
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Inflow of sand and gravel

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


London Clay underlain by sands and gravels
Construction Methods and Support
Using hand-shield and lined with cast-iron
Possible Cause of Failure
The shield was ineffective in supporting the overlying ground

Consequence
No significant damage
Programme delayed for about 6 months
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Lengthy grouting operation for stabilizing the ground in the
vicinity
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 3. Southend-on-Sea Sewage Tunnel, UK, 1966


Europe
United Kingdom
1966
Project Title
Southend-on-Sea Sewage Tunnel, UK
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground
and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.

Keywords (for searching)


Southend-on-Sea, London, UK, London Clay
Figures

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Background
Tunnel 40m long with diameter of 1.35m driven mostly by hand

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Water inflow into the tunnel
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
London Clay overlain by sands and gravels
Construction Methods and Support
Driven mostly by hand and lined with PCC segments
Possible Cause of Failure
The tunnel intersected the bottom of an abandoned 600mm
diameter well

Consequence
No loss of life or injury
Emergency and Remedial Measures
The tunnel drive was continued in a timbered box heading and
two plates were fabricated for closed off the bottom of the well.
Grouting was also applied
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 4. R rvikskaret Road Tunnel on Highway 19,


Norway, 18 March 1970
Europe
Norway
18 March 1970
Project Title
R rvikskaret Road Tunnel on Highway 19
Source of Information
Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel
failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong
Kong Civil Engineering and Development Department.
(Unpublished).

Keywords (for searching)


R rvikskaret, Norway, cave in
Figures

Karlsrud (2010)

Background
The road tunnel was 726m long and 8m wide

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Tunnel face collapsed and a 100m high cave-in shaft from the
tunnel up to the ground surface was created
The top of the shaft on the ground surface had a dimension of
about 25m x 50m
Although soft material was hauled out from the tunnel during the
spring in 1971, cave-in continued from the shaft until autumn
1972
The cave-in zone extended 30m along the tunnel and the total
volume of material hauled out from the tunnel was about
75,000m3

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Crystalline gneisses of granitic and syenitic composition
The tunnel was excavated into a large zone of swelling clay.
The rock at the failure was completely altered to swelling clay
Construction Methods and Support
Constructed by the drill-and-blast method and mainly supported
by rock bolts, steel straps and mesh
Possible Cause of Failure
Preliminary investigation carried out without any drilling
Probe drilling was not performed during tunnelling
No stabilization measures to support a large swelling clay
section before blasting

Consequence
Programme delayed for more than 3 years
Double the cost of the tunnel compared to the estimated cost
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Installation of corrugated steel vault, steel tubes and 500mm thick
concrete lining was not successful
The cave-in ceased after filling of about 3,000m3 concrete into the
shaft to form a plug from the tunnel up to 10m above the crown
and another 4,000m3 of sand and stone from the top of the shaft
above the concrete plug
Lessons Learnt
The importance of the adequate ground investigation to identify if
weak ground is present and to provide measures to support the
weak ground before tunnel excavation

Case No 5. Orange-fish Tunnel, South America, 1970


South Africa
1970
Project Title
Orange-fish Tunnel, South Africa

Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground
and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.

Keywords (for searching)


Orange-fish, South Africa, fire
Figures
N/A
Background
Circular tunnel designed to carry irrigation water from the
Orange River (80km long and 5.3m in diameter, 1,200m above
sea level)
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
First failure Heavy water inflow (of about 55,000 litres/min
into the tunnel at 14 bars)
Second failure Fire (Methane gas ignited by a blast, but no
explosion occurred as the gas did not reach the explosive
concentration)

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Sandstones, siltstones and mudstones, generally horizontally
bedded with occasional dolerite dykes
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling using the rail-mounted drill and blast method and lined
with 225mm of insitu concrete
1.5m long tensioned resin-grouted bolts at 1.5m spacing with
occasional shotcrete

Possible Cause of Failure


First failure The tunnel passed through a shallow anticline and
intersected a fissure, about 75mm wide, almost perpendicularly
Second failure Methane gas from a methane bearing fissure
entered the tunnel during excavation

Consequence
First failure Entire 1.6km tunnel section flooded within 24
hours
Second failure The fire burnt for about 6 months

Emergency and Remedial Measures


First failure Grouting was carried out from the surface and the
tunnel was pumped dry. Blob-grouting method with a ring of
very thick grout of unhydrated bentonite to seal the fissures a
short distance away from the tunnel was developed for the
subsequent excavation
Second failure A wall was built across the tunnel, the void
beyond, including the methane-bearing fissure, was grouted up
with cement
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 6. Penmanshiel Tunnel, Scotland, UK, March 1979


Europe
Scotland, UK
March 1979
Project Title
Enlargement of the Penmanshiel Tunnel

Source of Information
McNaughton, I.K.A. (1983). Report on the collapse of Penmanshiel
Tunnel that occurred on 17th March 1979 in the Scottish Region,
British Railways, Department of Transport, 7 p. <Available on the
internet>.

Keywords (for searching)


Europe, Scotland, 1979, Penmanshiel Tunnel, British Railways,
construction failure, fall of rock, anticlinal structure, over-stressed
rock
Figures
Penmanshiel Tunnel, near Grantshouse in Scotland

Source from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penmanshiel_Tunnel

Background
The double rail track Penmanshiel tunnel of 7.72m span and
4.7m height was driven in 1845/1846
In 1979 the roof of the tunnel collapsed during tunnel
enlargement works when the tunnel invert was being
reconstructed to increase the headroom
Nature and Type of Failure
Ground failure during reconstruction
Fall of rock over a length of some 20m
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Sedimentary rock of steeply inclined and complex stratification
with an average cover of 25 to 30m
Dry conditions
Construction Methods and Support
Rock bench system with an arch lined with 4 or 5 rings of bricks

Possible Cause of Failure


The existence of complex anticlinal structure over the line of the
tunnel, which could not have been deduced from rock exposed
in the tunnel but was later exposed in the open cut excavation
after the diversion of the tunnel alignment
The degeneration of the rock within the anticlinal structure built
up heavy loading on the arch ring and side walls
Additional excavation in the tunnel increased the stresses in the
already overstressed rock in the side walls
Consequence
Broken rock pouring into the tunnel with a complete blockage
13 workers escaped but 2 workers were killed

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Immediate support provided to the adjacent portion of the tunnel
by a number of steel arches
Long term abandonment of 1,000m of the tunnel and the
diversion of the line to a new alignment in open cut with the
ends of the old tunnel filled in
Lessons learnt
The consequences of adjusting the profile of a working tunnel
without stress analysis and appropriate support
The importance of understanding the geological conditions of
the site and the need for analysis

Case No 7. Munich Underground, Germany, 1980


Europe
Gemany
1980
Project Title
Munich Underground, Germany
Source of Information
Construction Today (1994b). Unstable ground triggers Munich
tunnel collapse. Construction Today, October Issue, p 5.

Keywords (for searching)


Munich, Germany, sinkhole
Figures

Construction Today (1994b)

Background
New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) construction of twin 6m
diameter tunnels
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Huge flow of soft clay into the tunnel
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Flinty marl with 3m of cover above the tunnels, overlain by 12.5m
of soft clay
Construction Methods and Support
New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM)

Possible Cause of Failure


Local variation in geology with reduction in marl cover to 1-1.5m
and led to overstressing of the sprayed concrete temporary lining

Consequence
10m wide, 14m deep sinkhole
No injury
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Void was backfilled with crushed rock and cement and pressure
grouted
Lessons Learnt
The danger of tunnel excavation through thin marl cover

Case No 8. Holmestrand Road Tunnel, Norway, 16 Dec. 1981


Europe
Norway
16 December 1981
Project Title
The Holmestrand Road Tunnel
Source of Information
Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel
failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong
Kong Civil Engineering and Development Department.
(Unpublished).

Keywords (for searching) Keywords (for searching)


Holmestrand, Norway, cave in
Figures

Karlsrud (2010)

Background
The road tunnel was 1.78km long and 10m wide
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
A minor cave-in from the face and partly from the crown
occurred during the process of moving the steel formwork for
cast concrete lining forward to the face
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Various rock types (basalt, volcanic dykes, soft siltstone and
quartz conglomerate)
Construction Methods and Support
Constructed by the drill-and-blast method and supported by cast
concrete lining

Possible Cause of Failure


A weak fault zone was encountered
No spiling bolts ahead of the face to support the weak ground
Consequence
More time (5 hours extended to 25 hours) required for hauling out
and concreting the foundation for the mould
Emergency and Remedial Measures
About 600m3 of debris was hauled in to the face for temporary
support
Until break through, the tunnel was excavated with only 2m long bore
holes combined with 6m long spiling bolts from the cast concrete
lining of the former round, and cast concrete lining close to the face
Lessons Learnt
Spiling bolts ahead of the face in combination with fibre reinforced
sprayed concrete, rock bolts, and reinforced ribs of sprayed concrete
are required at the fault zones with extremely poor rock mass quality

Case No 9. Gibei Railway Tunnel, Romania, 1985


Europe
Romania
1985
Project Title
Gibei Railway Tunnel, Romania
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground
and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.

Keywords (for searching)


Gibei, Romania
Figures

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Background
Railway tunnel 2.21km long and 9m in diameter

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Compact fissured clay layer failed suddenly, allowing water
inflow >600 litres/min into the tunnel
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Compacted Clay with fissures
Construction Methods and Support
Shield (A hooded mechanical sheld 9.05 m in diameter, fitted
with a hydraulic bucket and a bottom-monuted conveyor belt)
Possible Cause of Failure
The tunnel penetrated a lens of waterlogged fine-grained sand
just above the crown

Consequence
Ingress of water at more than 10 L/s accompanied by running
sand to the tunnel covering the machine
Programme delayed for about 6 months

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Unpublished
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 10. Moda Collector Tunnel, Istanbul Sewerage


Scheme, Turkey, 1989
Europe
Turkey
1989
Project Title
Moda Collector Tunnel
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground
and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.

Keywords (for searching)


Moda Collector, Istanbul, Turkey
Figures

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Background
The TBM broke out 8m from the shaft with anticipated 3 m of
rock cover
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Fine soil flowed into the tunnel forming a hole in the road as the
TBM went through the rock into the soft ground
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Various ground conditions (very fine and unstable mud & rock)
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnel constructed by Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM)
Possible Cause of Failure
The tunnel intersected a hidden area of soft clay

Consequence
A hole formed in the road some 5m above
Broken rock jammed the shield
Emergency and Remedial Measures
A shaft was sunk down to release the TBM
Lessons Learnt
Probe holes should be drilled to confirm the rockhead profile

Case No 11. Seoul Metro Line 5 Phase 2, Korea, 17 Nov. 1991


Asia
Korea
17 November 1991
Project Title
Second Phase of Seoul Subway
Source of Information
Lee, I. M. & Cho, G. C. (2008). Underground construction in
decomposed residual soils (presentation slides).
The 6th
International Symposium on Geotechnical Aspects of Underground
Construction in Soft Ground (IS-Shanghai 2008), Tongji University,
Shanghai, April.
Madrid (1996). Informe sobre el NATM del Health & Safety Executive,
de Inglaterra, 1996. <http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html> (1996).

Source of Information
Shin, J.H., Lee, I.K., Lee, Y.H. & Shin, H.S. (2006). Lessons
from serial tunnel collapses during construction of the Seoul
subway Line 5. Tunnel and Underground Space Technology,
Issue no. 21, pp 296-297.
Keywords (for searching)
Seoul, Korea, cave-in
Figures

Lee & Cho (2008)

Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Majang
Tunnel at 15-30m below ground

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
After blasting : daylight collapse up to ground surface, involving
the embankment of a river
20m x 15m and 4m deep crater at the ground surface
Water from river flowed into the tunnel
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Various weathered granite
Groundwater table at typical 3-10m below the ground surface
Construction Methods and Support
by drill and blast method

Possible Cause of Failure


Thin weathered rock cover
Inflow of soil and groundwater
Majang Bridge

Consequence
Roads collapse and gas mains fractured
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Backfilling the crater with soil followed
by cement grouting and chemical
grouting
Lessons Learnt
Insufficient ground investigation
Unexpected groundwater inflow
No tunnel face stability analysis
No consideration of blasting effects
closed to weathered zone with shallow
cover

1. backfilling
Fill(SM)
Silty sand

1.4m

1000m3

-3.2m
-3.5m
Cheonggye-choeon

Sink hole

Alluvium

18.0m
Decomposed
granite soil

-12.8m
-13.3m

4. grouting(JSP)
2. sand mat

Weathered
rock

-18.0m

-24.0m
Soft rock
Hard rock

-26.5m
-29.5m

3. face shotcrete

Case No 12. Seoul Metro Line 5 Phase 2, Korea, 27 Nov. 1991


Asia
Korea
27 November 1991
Project Title
Second Phase of Seoul Subway
Source of Information
Lee, I. M. & Cho, G. C. (2008). Underground construction in
decomposed residual soils (presentation slides). The 6th International
Symposium on Geotechnical Aspects of Underground Construction in
Soft Ground (IS-Shanghai 2008), Tongji University, Shanghai, April.
Madrid (1996). Informe sobre el NATM del Health & Safety Executive,
de Inglaterra, 1996. <http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html> (1996).
Shin, J.H., Lee, I.K., Lee, Y.H. & Shin, H.S. (2006). Lessons from
serial tunnel collapses during construction of the Seoul subway Line 5.
Tunnel and Underground Space Technology, Issue no. 21, pp 296297.

Keywords (for searching)


Seoul, Korea, cave-in
Figures

Lee & Cho (2008)

Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Tangsan
Tunnel at 15-30m below ground
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
27 November 1991
10:40am : blasting
4:00pm : rock falls at the tunnel face
10:00pm : soil and groundwater inflow into the tunnel
28 November 1991
3:20am : substantial daylight collapse up to ground surface
forming a 25m diameter crater
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Various weathered granite
Groundwater table at typical 3-10m below the ground surface
Construction Methods and Support
by drill and blast method

Possible Cause of Failure


Weathered granite at the face
and high permeability soil
Consequence
Three buildings collapsed
Several water mains, gas pipes
and sewerage were broken

.0m
.0m
20

25

backfilling
Fill sand

D=20.0m

-1.2m

Silt

: Cement mortar
: Cement milk
: Chemical grout

-4.8m

Emergency and Remedial


Measures
Backfilling the crater with soil
followed by cement grouting
and chemical grouting

-6.0m

Sand

-22.2m
Weathered
rock
Soft rock

-25.1m

-28.5m
-29.2m

Hard rock

Lee & Cho (2008)

5.0m

-37.5m

10.0m

5.0m

15.0m

Lessons Learnt
Insufficient ground investigation
Unexpected groundwater inflow
No tunnel face stability analysis
No consideration of blasting effects closed to weathered zone
with shallow cover

Case No 13. Seoul Metro Line 5 Phase 2, Korea, 11 Feb. 1992


Asia
Korea
11 February 1992
Project Title
Second Phase of Seoul Subway
Source of Information
Lee, I. M. & Cho, G. C. (2008). Underground construction in
decomposed residual soils (presentation slides).
The 6th
International Symposium on Geotechnical Aspects of Underground
Construction in Soft Ground (IS-Shanghai 2008), Tongji University,
Shanghai, April.
Madrid (1996). Informe sobre el NATM del Health & Safety
Executive, de Inglaterra, 1996. <http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html> (1996).
Shin, J.H., Lee, I.K., Lee, Y.H. & Shin, H.S. (2006). Lessons from
serial tunnel collapses during construction of the Seoul subway Line
5. Tunnel and Underground Space Technology, Issue no. 21, pp
296-297.

Keywords (for searching)


Seoul, Korea, cave-in
Figures

Lee & Cho (2008)

Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Youido
Tunnel at 15-30m below ground
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Significant inflow of groundwater
About 4.5 tonnes of soil flowed into tunnel
38m wide x 6m deep crater at the ground surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Various weathered granite
Groundwater table at -11.8m below the ground surface
Construction Methods and Support
Excavated by road header

Possible Cause of Failure


Weathered granite at the tunnel
face and high permeability soil

38.0m

Sewer Box

Consequence
4-lane road collapsed
Utilities damaged

MBC

Emergency and Remedial


Measures
Backfilling the crater with soil
followed by cement grouting
and chemical grouting

1. back filling
Fill
Alluvium(SC)
Alluvium(SP)

Sewer box
-5.6m
-7.8m
-9.9m
-11.8m

Alluvium(ML)
-13.2m
Decomposed
rock

3. urethan grouting
3m

-21.7m
Soft rock
Weathered rock

-25.9m
-26.4m

-23.5m

Hard Rock

Lee & Cho (2008)

2. cement mortal grouting

-33.0m

Lessons Learnt
Insufficient ground investigation
Unexpected groundwater inflow
No tunnel face stability analysis

Case No 14. Seoul Metro Line 5 Phase 2, Korea, 1 Jan. 1993


Asia
Korea
7 January 1993
Project Title
Second Phase of Seoul Subway
Source of Information
Lee, I. M. & Cho, G. C. (2008). Underground construction in
decomposed residual soils (presentation slides). The 6th International
Symposium on Geotechnical Aspects of Underground Construction in
Soft Ground (IS-Shanghai 2008), Tongji University, Shanghai, April.
Madrid (1996). Informe sobre el NATM del Health & Safety Executive,
de Inglaterra, 1996. <http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html> (1996).
Shin, J.H., Lee, I.K., Lee, Y.H. & Shin, H.S. (2006). Lessons from
serial tunnel collapses during construction of the Seoul subway Line 5.
Tunnel and Underground Space Technology, Issue no. 21, pp 296-297.

Keywords (for searching)


Seoul, Korea, cave-in
Figures

Lee & Cho (2008)

Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Yongdungpo
Tunnel at 15-30m below ground
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Tunnel collapsed after removing spoil
Tunnel collapsed starting from the left side of the crown
900m3 of loose material flowed into the tunnel and water inflow
of up to 300 litres/min recorded
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Various weathered granite

Construction Methods and Support


By drill and blast method

Possible Cause of Failure


Weathered granite at the tunnel
face
High groundwater pressure
Consequence
2-lane road collapsed
Utilities damaged

900m3
Fill
Alluvium(ML)

Emergency and Remedial


Measures
Backfilling the crater with soil
followed by cement grouting
and chemical grouting

1. back filling

-1.1m

-4.9m

Sewer box
2. cement mortar

-7.1m

Alluvium(SP)

-16.5m

3. cement mortar

Weathered rock
-20.14m
-21.5m

4. chemical grouting

Soft rock

Lee & Cho (2008)

-28.34m

Lessons Learnt
Insufficient ground investigation
Unexpected groundwater inflow
No tunnel face stability analysis
No consideration of blasting effects closed to weathered zone
with shallow cover

Case No 15. Seoul Metro Line 5 Phase 2, Korea, 1 Feb. 1993


Asia
Korea
1 February 1993
Project Title
Second Phase of Seoul Subway
Source of Information
Lee, I. M. & Cho, G. C. (2008). Underground construction in
decomposed residual soils (presentation slides). The 6th International
Symposium on Geotechnical Aspects of Underground Construction in
Soft Ground (IS-Shanghai 2008), Tongji University, Shanghai, April.
Madrid (1996). Informe sobre el NATM del Health & Safety Executive,
de Inglaterra, 1996. <http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html> (1996).
Shin, J.H., Lee, I.K., Lee, Y.H. & Shin, H.S. (2006). Lessons from
serial tunnel collapses during construction of the Seoul subway Line 5.
Tunnel and Underground Space Technology, Issue no. 21, pp 296297.

Keywords (for searching)


Seoul, Korea, Anyangcheon, cave-in
Figures

Lee & Cho (2008)

Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Anyangcheon
Tunnel at 15-30m below ground
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Daylight collapse when weathered granite found at the tunnel
face
Groundwater flowed into the tunnel
60m wide oval shaped area subsided
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Various weathered granite
Construction Methods and Support
excavated by road header

59.3m
jet grouting

Possible Cause of Failure


Weathered granite and alluvium
at the tunnel face
High groundwater pressure

Sewer Box

Consequence
Six heavy plants buried
Emergency and Remedial
Measures
Backfilling the crater with soil
followed by cement grouting
and chemical grouting

cement milk
grouting

59.3m
8.3m

Anyang cheon

1. backfilling

Sewer box
Alluvium
Decomposed
granite soil

2. cement milk 24.0m


grouting

-21.0m
3. jet grouting
-24.0m

-24.0m
Weathered rock

-29.0m

Lee & Cho (2008)

-32.0m
Soft rock

5.0m

Lessons Learnt
Insufficient ground investigation
Unexpected groundwater inflow
No tunnel face stability analysis

Case No 16. Munich Underground, Germany, 27 Sept. 1994


Europe
Germany
27 September 1994
Project Title
Munichs U-Bahn U2 Underground Extension
Source of Information
Boos, R., Braun, M., Hangen, P., Hoch, C., Popp, R., Reiner, H.,
Schmid, G., & Wannick, H. (2004). Underground Transportation
Systems, Chances and Risks from the Re-insurers Point of View.
Munich Re Group, Germany, pp 58-62.
<http://www.munichre.com/> (31 Jan. 2007).

Construction Today (1994a). Police probe repeat Munich tunnel


breach. Construction Today, October Issue, pp 4-5.
Ground Engineering (1994). London NATM controversy. Ground
Engineering, November Issue, p 6.

Keywords (for searching)


Munich, Germany, sinkhole
Figures

Construction Today (1994a)

Background
7m diameter tunnel supported by sprayed concrete lining
The tunnel was assumed to be beneath a clay layer overlying
water-bearing gravel and groundwater would not be drawn down
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Quick inflow of water and ground materials
Large subsidence crater quickly filled with groundwater
20m wide, 18.5m deep crater
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Flinty marl overlain by some 15.5m of groundwater bearing gravel
Groundwater at about 4m below ground level
Construction Methods and Support
New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM)

Possible Cause of Failure


Layer
of
marl
separating
groundwater bearing layers was
much thinner than originally
assumed
Sand-infilled cracks in the marl
layer
acted
as
preferential
pathways for water
Consequence
Bus fell into the crater
Three passengers killed
30 people injured
Construction Today (1994a)

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Bored-pile wall to form a shaft
Excavation inside the shaft for rescue
Tunnel driven again using compressed air
Lessons Learnt
The danger of tunnel excavation through thin marl cover

Case No 17. Heathrow Express Tunnel, UK, 21 Oct. 1994


Europe
1996 report
2000
report
United Kingdom
21 October 1994
Project Title
Heathrow Express Tunnel
Source of Information
Ground Engineering (2000).
August Issue, pp 10-11.

Catalogue of disaster.

Ground Engineering,

HSE (1996). Safety of New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) Tunnels.


Health & Safety Executive, UK, 86p.
HSE (2000). The Collapse of NATM Tunnels at Heathrow Airport. Health &
Safety Executive, UK, 116p.
ICE (1998b). HSE signs up QC Carlisle for HEX prosecution.
Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, March Issue, pp 4-5.

New Civil

ICE (1999). Heathrow Express court cases kicks off. New Civil Engineer,
Institution of Civil Engineers, January Issue, p 6.

Keywords (for searching)


London, United Kingdom, NATM, sinkhole
Figures

Ground Engineering (2008)

ICE (1998b)

Background
NATM in London Clay
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
10m diameter crater formed
Ground and Groundwater
Conditions
London Clay
Construction Methods and
Support
New
Austrian
Tunnelling
Method (NATM)

ICE (1998b)

Possible Cause of Failure


A series of design and management errors combined with
poor workmanship and quality control
Consequence
Differential settlement induced at adjacent buildings
Rail services to Terminal 4 were halted for one month
Remedial measures caused chaos at Heathrow Airport
Recovery cost 150M (3 times original contract sum)

Central Terminal Area


Settlement Contours

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Backfilling with 13,000m3 concrete
Lessons Learnt
Measures to ensure safety must be planned
Do not lose sight of critical technical issues in the pursuit of
time and cost reduction
Whilst a number of factors contributed to the collapse, half of
them were matters of management
However much engineers are pressured to build quickly and
cheaply, the industry will be judged by its own failures

Case No 18. Los Angeles Metro, USA, 22 June 1995


North America
United States of America
22 June 1995
Project Title
The Los Angeles Metro
Source of Information
Civil Engineer International (1995). Tunnel lining removal
prompts LA Metro cave in. Institution of Civil Engineers, July
Issue, p10.

Keywords (for searching)


Los Angeles, USA, cave in
Figures

Civil Engineer International (1995)

Background
Re-mining/remedial works to realign an existing TBM tunnel
(6.7m diameter, 25m deep), which had been bored off line
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
25m deep sinkhole caused by collapse of south bore
Serious cracking observed in temporary lining of north bore

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Hard siltstone overlain by alluvium with groundwater level 1012m below surface
Construction Methods and Support
TBM with segmental lining
Rock bolts to stabilise segments before removal

Possible Cause of Failure


Failure occurred during removal of segmental lining in tunnel roof
and relining of tunnel to correct the horizontal alignment
Unexpected ground conditions (alluvium found much deeper)
Fractured water mains (unconfirmed)
Consequence
30m length of a four lane road (Hollywood Boulevard) affected
leading to road closure
Collapsed 250mm water main possibly contributing to failure
Broken gas pipe
Evacuation of local residents

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Steel rings installed in tunnel either side of the collapse
3,300m3 of grout to fill void and stabilise area
Road resurfacing
Lessons Learnt
Unpubished

Case No 19. Motorway Tunnels, Austria, 1993-1995


Europe
Austria
1993 - 1995
Project Title
Motorway Contract
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground
and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Keywords (for searching)


Motorway, Austria, inrush, water inflow
Figures
Extent of overbreak
Rock bolts
Second layer WM & shotcrete
Support core
Rock debris
Shotcrete in the overbreak
Water & rock flow
Overbreak

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Background
Four three-lane, twin-tube tunnels (T1-T4) with internal crosssection of 103 m2 and 30 m apart between centrelines
constructed by the drill & blast method
T1 - 376m long; T2 - 562m; T3 2,760m and T4 1,230m
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Failures at T4 in 1993
- About 131 recorded overbreak incidents with total volume of
1,461m3, maximum deformation of 120mm measured in the
tunnel
- 200m3 of loose material collapsed after a blast, resulting in
water inflow of up to 450 litres/min

Nature and Type of Failure (cont)


Two failures at T3 in 1995
- The first collapse came with 650m3 of loose material flowed into
the tunnel, water inflow of up to 1,500 litres/min recorded
- The second collapse of the same size occurred days after the 6
months of recovery of the loss of the 10 m of tunnel. Radial
movement of rib of about 300mm recorded

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Sandstone and shale with zones of crushed and weathered
material
Construction Methods and Support
Drill and blast, heading and benching
Shotcrete, rock bolts, forepoling, steel ribs and invert beams

Possible Cause of Failure


Failures at T4 in 1993 Failure to apply the support in time
Two failures at T3 in 1995 The tunnel pierced through the
water-bearing impermeable thinly bedded shale stratum, which
is located at and above the failure location
Consequence
the tunnel face caved in
construction delay
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Failures at T4 in 1993 For the subsequent excavation,
umbrella of forepoling with 6m long, 50mm perforated grouted
pipes was adopted. An ample central core was kept and the
excavation was carried out in small sections
Two failures at T3 in 1995 work progressed with extreme
caution

Lessons Learnt
Initial support should be installed in time

Case No 20. Docklands Light Rail, UK, 23 Feb. 1998


Europe
United Kingdom
23 February 1998
Project Title
Docklands Light Railway Lewisham Extension
Source of Information
ICE (1998a). Bulkhead location blamed for DLR blast. New
Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, February Issue, pp
3-4.
ICE (2004) Docklands tunnel blowout down to elementary
error, says judge. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil
Engineers, January Issue, pp 8-9.

Keywords (for searching)


Docklands, UK, sinkhole
Figures

ICE (2004)

ICE (1998a)

Background
Tunnel constructed for Docklands Light Rail (diameter 5.2m)
by slurry TBM
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
22m wide and 7m deep crater formed in the grounds of George
Green School

ICE (1998a)

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Thames Sands and Gravels
Construction Methods and Support
slurry TBM
Possible Cause of Failure
Insufficient overburden above the tunnel
High compressed air pressure within tunnel causing blow out
failure
Consequence
Windows up to 100m away broken by the shower of mud and
stones released

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Unpublished
Lessons Learnt
To require specific assessments/calculations to demonstrate the
adequacy of factor of safety against blow out failure

Case No 21. Athens Metro, Greece, 1991-1998


Europe
Greece
1991 - 1998
Project Title
The Athens Metro

Source of Information
IMIA. <http://www.imia.com>.
IMS. <http://www.imstunnel.com/index2.htm>.

Source of Information (cont)


Kavvadas, M., Hewison, L.R., Laskaratos, P.G., Seferoglou,
C. & Michalis, I. (1996). Experiences from the construction
of the Athens Metro.
Proceedings of International
Symposium on the Geotechnical Aspects of Underground
Construction in Soft Ground, City University, London, April.
Mihalis, I. & Kavvadas, M. (1999). Ground movements
caused by TBM tunnelling in the Athens Metro Project.
Proceedings of International Symposium on the
Geotechnical Aspects of Underground Construction in Soft
Ground, Japan, July, pp 229-234.

Keywords (for searching)


Athens, Greece, cave-in
Figures

IMS

IMIA

Background
Construction of the Olympic Metro under a turnkey contract
(estimated cost about 2 billion ECUs)
Construction started in November 1991 and operation in 1998
TBM used for construction of 11.7km long, 9.5m diameter
tunnels located at a depth of 15-20m (with penetration rate
ranging from 1.6m to 18m per day based on 18-hour-per-day
shift, depending on the ground conditions)
Cut and cover, supported by soldier piles, struts and
prestressed anchor tiebacks for 6.3km long tunnels and
stations
NATM for other short auxiliary tunnels and oval-shaped
stations where existence of buried antiquities precluded open
excavation

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Roof collapses of appreciable size often occurred
Large and occasionally uncontrollable overbreaks for TBM
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Athenian schist a thick sequence of flysch-type sediments,
comprising thinly bedded clayey and calcareous sandstones,
alternating with siltstones, phyllites, meta-sedimentary shales and
occasionally, with limestones and marls
Construction Methods and Support
TBM, cut-and-cover and NATM

Possible Cause of Failure


Ravelling of the ground seems to be due to insufficient strength
in the intensely weathered and highly tectonised zones of
Athenian schist (which is a flysch-type sediment consisting of
thinly bedded clayey and calcareous sandstones with alterations
and subjected to intense folding, thrusting, faulting and fracturing)
Large muck openings of the TBM cutterhead which cannot
adequately control muck-flow (the cutterhead operates in the
open air, i.e. under atmospheric pressure)
Consequence
Major delay in TBM tunnelling
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Cavities caused by the TBM overbreaks was backfilled by grout
(which sometimes reached the ground surface)
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 22. L rdal Road Tunnel on European Highway E16,


Norway, 15 June 1999
Europe
Norway
15 June 1999
Project Title
The L rdal Road Tunnel on European Highway E 16
Source of Information
Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel
failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong
Kong Civil Engineering and Development Department.
(Unpublished).

Keywords (for searching)


L rdal, Norway, cave in
Figures
The L rdal Tunnel

CAVE IN

DEBRIS
1200-1500m3

Ch.11080

Karlsrud (2010)

Background
Road tunnel at about 1,100m depth, 24.5 km long and 9m wide
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
A cave-in involving 17m length of tunnel and extending up to about
11-12m above the crown. The volume of the failed rock mass was
estimated to be 1,200-1,500m3
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Precambrian gneisses with layers of amphibolities and massive
granitic rock. Excavation through a major fault zone (rock mixed
with lot of swelling clay)
Construction Methods and Support
Constructed by drill-and-blast method and supported by steel fibre
reinforced sprayed concrete and rock bolts

Possible Cause of Failure


Poor communication : the driller did not inform the engineer about
abnormal drilling rate encountered
Expansion of the swelling clay under high stress to water during
drilling of the rock bolts
The combination of the swelling of the clay and high stress
produced a squeezing effect, which resulted in gradual
weakening of the rock mass in the tunnel
Consequence
The crew was evacuated in time and no one was hurt
About 10 days delay in the excavation works and cost increased
for the remedial works

The L rdal Tunnel


Cave in
zone
700 m3 concrete

Face before
cave in

Debris
Debris hauled out
1200-1500 m3

Concrete

11087

Ch.no

11080

11070

Emergency and Remedial


Measures
Reinforced ribs of sprayed
concrete in addition to layers of
sprayed concrete and rock bolts
were installed just behind the
cave-in zone
Rock material was hauled into
the tunnel building up a barrier
up to 2m below the crown and
concrete was pumped through a
steel pipe to fill the void above
the debris
Debris was gradually hauled out
with step wise installation of rock
anchors and sprayed fibre
reinforced concrete

Karlsrud (2010)

Lessons Learnt
The importance of good communication between
and the engineer
Importance of having good understanding of the
conditions and their influence on the stability
Swelling of clay in condition of high stress could
squeezing effect and result in weaking of the rock
tunnel

the driller
geological
provide a
mass in a

Case No 23. Sewage Tunnel, Hull, UK, 1999


Europe
United Kingdom
1999
Project Title
Hull Sewage Tunnel
Source of Information
Boos, R., Braun, M., Hangen, P., Hoch, C., Popp, R., Reiner,
H., Schmid, G., & Wannick, H. (2004). Underground
Transportation Systems, Chances and Risks from the Reinsurers Point of View. Munich Re Group, Germany, pp 5862. <http://www.munichre.com/> (31 Jan. 2007).

Keywords (for searching)


Hull, UK, Sewage
Figures

Boos et al (2004)

Background
Construction of a 10.5km long underground sewer
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Water and sand ingress
Tunnel subsided by 1.2m causing serious subsidence at
surface

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Water-bearing ground
Construction Methods and Support
EPB TBM (diameter 3.85m) supported by reinforced concrete
segmental lining

Possible Cause of Failure


Fluctuation of groundwater level caused by tidal effects resulting
in vertical movement of the tunnel tube causing opening of joints

Consequence
Damage to buildings, roads and utility lines
TBM had to be abandoned
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Ground freezing
Reconstruction of tunnel using sprayed concrete
Lessons Learnt
The design of the segment connections should take account of
the fluctuations of groundwater level

Case No 24. Taegu Metro, South Korea, 1 Jan. 2000


Asia
South Korea
1 January 2000
Project Title
The Taegu Metro
Source of Information
Boos, R., Braun, M., Hangen, P., Hoch, C., Popp, R., Reiner,
H., Schmid, G., & Wannick, H. (2004). Underground
Transportation Systems, Chances and Risks from the Reinsurers Point of View. Munich Re Group, Germany, pp 5862. <http://www.munichre.com/> (31 Jan. 2007).

Keywords (for searching)


Taegu, South Korea, diaphragm wall, cave in
Figures

Boos et al (2004)

Background
Construction of underground Taegu Metro
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Failure of diaphragm wall
Excavation pit caved in
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Water-bearing ground
Construction Methods and Support
Cut and-cover
Possible Cause of Failure
Rapid fluctuation of groundwater level caused movement of
unidentified gravel and sand strata
Additional loading on diaphragm wall was not considered in design

Consequence
Bus buried and bus driver seriously injured
Three passengers killed
Neighbouring buildings suffered considerable damage
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Excavation pit backfilled
Subsoil grouted and diaphragm wall strengthened

Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 25. Wastewater Tunnel, Portsmouth, UK, May 2000


Europe
UK
May 2000

Project Title
Portsmouth Sewage Transfer
Source of Information
Tunnels & Tunnelling (2000). Portsmouth scheme held up.
Tunnels & Tunnelling International, July 2000. p 9.

Keywords (for searching)


Sewage tunnel, Lining crack, Portsmouth

Figures
N/A

Background
Wastewater tunnel 4km long and 3.3m diameter constructed
with precast concrete tunnel segments by the TBM method
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Cracks were found in the tunnel segments together with
associated water ingress
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Mixed ground comprising Chalk, Calcareous sands, gravels
and stiff clay
Water head of 21m above the tunnel crown
Construction Methods and Support
EPB TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Localised poor ground conditions not account for in the design
of the tunnel segments
Consequence
Tunnel drive was halted and delayed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Temporary application of compressed air, followed by ground
freezing
Replacement of damaged rings and back grouting
Lessons learnt
Understanding the ground conditions and account for them in
design

Case No 26. Dulles Airport, Washington, USA, Nov. 2000


North America
Washington, United States of America
November 2000

Project Title
Expansion at Washington DCs Dulles airport
Source of Information
Tunnels & Tunnelling (2000). US airport collapse claims miners
life. Tunnels & Tunnelling International, December 2000 issue, p 8.
Stehlik, E & Srb, M.
NATM Tunnelling at Dulles Airport.
Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2007 and 33rd
ITA/AITES Annual General Assembly, Prague, May 2007, pp 16091612.

Keywords (for searching)


Dulles, Washington, NATM
Figures
Project Layout

Tunnels & Tunnelling (2000)

Background
Pedestrian tunnel of approximate cross-sectional area 100m2 with
shallow ground cover of 4.5m
Excavated in 4 stages using two side drifts followed by bench and
invert, using road-header
NATM design with systematic spiling, steel-fibre reinforced
shotcrete and lattice girder support
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
One of the tunnel headings caved in without the collapse
extending to the surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Mixed face comprising clay, silt and competent siltstone

Construction Methods and Support


NATM, following a sequence of a top heading comprising two
side-wall drifts, followed by bench and invert. 1m-1.6m advances
in each round of excavation
Steel-fibre reinforced shotcrete and lattice girders at 1m-1.6m c/c

Possible Cause of Failure


Unknown
Consequence
A miner was killed

Emergency and Remedial Measures


An area of 40x40x10m deep was excavated from the surface to
recover the body of the trapped worker
Lessons learnt
Necessity for safe application of NATM in shallow tunnelling works
Introduction of a requirement for NATM Engineer in the second
contract of the project

Case No 27. Istanbul Metro, Turkey, Sept. 2001


Europe
Turkey
September 2001
Project Title
Istanbul Metro Construction
Source of Information
World Tunnelling (2001). Istanbul Metro collapse investigations,
World Tunnelling, December 2001 issue, pp. 490-492.

Keywords (for searching)


Istanbul, Metro, boarding house
Figures
Collapsed building above tunnel

World Tunnelling (2001)

Longitudinal section

Background
Metro tunnel 7.9km long with 14m wide sections of 100m2
constructed by a multiple drift technique coupled with pipe
umbrella roofing and benching at central drift
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction Failure
Soft clay kept falling through the gaps between the pipe
umbrella and liquid mud flowed from the face.
Tunnel collapsed and a 25m wide crater was created
Three 2-storey buildings and a workshop building caved in
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Soft ground with groundwater close to ground level
Construction Methods and Support
Multiple drift mined Tunnel
Pipe umbrella, shotcrete lining and lattice girders as
temporary support

Possible Cause of Failure


Existing well 1.5-2.0m above the tunnel crown not properly
filled causing the saturated clay and well water flowing into
the tunnel and subsequent collapse of the well walls and
surrounding clay followed by the draining of the upper finegrained sand layer into the tunnel and the undermining of the
building structures
Consequence
5 people died
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Unpublished
Lessons learnt
The importance of the study of the construction history of
buildings that are under-tunnelled

Case No 28. Channel Tunnel Rail Link, UK, Feb. 2003


Europe
United Kingdom
February 2003
Project Title
Channel Tunnel Rail Link
Source of Information
ICE (2003). Ground failure linked to well collapses. New
Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, February Issue,
pp 6-7.

Keywords (for searching)


UK, Channel, Rail, sinkhole
Figures

ICE (2003)

Background
Boring at a depth of 21m
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
10m diameter and 20m deep void
formed in the ground behind a row
of houses
Ground and Groundwater
Conditions
Thanet Sands
Construction Methods and
Support
Tunnelling using TBM (diameter
8.2m)

ICE (2003)

Possible Cause of Failure


The vibration from the TBM may have caused the nearby wells
(30m deep and 1.8m diameter) to collapse

Consequence
Three uncharted wells collapsed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
The voids were backfilled with grout

Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 29. Mtor Metro Tunnel, France, 14 Feb. 2003


Europe
France
14 February 2003
Project Title
The Mtor Metro Tunnel
Source of Information
Dubois, P. & Rat, M. (2003). Effondrement sur le chantier
"Mtor. Conseil Gnral des Ponts et Chausses, France,
22p. <http://www2.equipement.gouv.fr/actualites/Rapports/Meteor.pdf> (31 Jan. 2007).

Keywords (for searching)


Mtor, Pairs, France, sinkhole
Figures

Dubois & Rat (2003)

Figures
Location map and section

Dubois & Rat (2003)

Figures
Hall plan

Dubois & Rat (2003)

Background
Construction of the extension of Mtor Metro Tunnel including
the Olympics station and a maintenance hall
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
About 3,000m3 of sedimentary deposits collapsed underneath a
school, occupying an area of 400m2 on plan
Ground and Groundwater
Conditions
Coarse limestone and plastic
clay (clays of Sparnacian)
Construction Methods and
Support
Supported by bolts and
shotcrete
Dubois & Rat (2003)

Possible Cause of Failure


The coarse limestone had inferior mechanical characteristics to
the homogeneous medium assumed in the design
Unfavorable orientation of the fracture
Implementation of inadequate support due to the overreliance on
calculations

Consequence

No casualties
The school had to be closed for a year affecting 900 students

Emergency and Remedial Measures

Filling the hall under the building by concrete

Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 30. Oslofjord Subsea Tunnel, Norway, 28 Dec. 2003


Europe
Norway
28 December 2003
Project Title
The Oslofjord Subsea Tunnel
Source of Information
Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel
failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong Kong
Civil Engineering and Development Department. (Unpublished).

Keywords (for searching)


Oslofjord, Norway, subsea tunnel, rock fall
Figures

First failure

Third failure
Karlsrud (2010)

Background
The road tunnel was 7.3 km long and 11.5 m wide (3 lanes)
Three major failures and many minor failures occurred
Nature and Type of Failure
In service failure
First failure occurred on 28 December 2003: about 20m3 of
crushed and weathered rock involving with clay, which came
down from the crown went through the frost insulated water
shielding vault and down to the carriageway
Second failure involved about 3m3 of heavily weathered rock,
which came down from the springline and fell down to the invert
Third failure involved 2-3m3 of completely weathered rock,
which fell down from the crown and rested on top of the water
shielding vault

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Precambrian gneisses with lenses of amphibolites, veins of
pegmatite, and a few dykes of diabase and rhomb porphyry
Swelling clay was found at the weakness zones
Construction Methods and Support
Mainly supported by steel fibre reinforceed shotcrete combined
with rock bolts
Possible Cause of Failure
The humidity behind the vault constructed for frost insulated
water shielding was high and the high content of swelling clay in
the weathered rock started sucking water and expanded
gradually over a long period of time

Consequence
Closure of the tunnel for more than 3 months for extensive repairs
and upgrading of the tunnel support
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Complete removal of the vault before installing additional rock
support including fiber reinforced shotcrete, rock bolts and
reinforced ribs of sprayed concrete

Lessons Learnt
The importance of proper geological mapping and rock mass
classification
The need to identify swelling minerals and the potential of
deterioration of strength in weathered rock
The importance of adequate support design for long-term stability
in weathered rock

Case No 31. Shanghai Metro, China, 2003


Asia
China
2003

Project Title
Shanghai Metro Project
Source of Information
Boos, R., Braun, M., Hangen, P., Hoch, C., Popp, R., Reiner,
H., Schmid, G., & Wannick, H. (2004). Underground
Transportation Systems, Chances and Risks from the Reinsurers Point of View. Munich Re Group, Germany, pp 5862. <http://www.munichre.com/> (31 Jan. 2007).

Keywords (for searching)


Shanghai, China, water ingress, ground subsidence
Figures

Boos et al (2004)

Background
Expansion of the Shanghai Metro () Line 4 crossing
beneath the Huangpu River ()
Two parallel tunnel tubes constructed by earth pressure balance
TBM
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Failure occurred during construction of a cross passage
Massive ingress of water and material at the face at a depth of 35m
Several metres ground subsidence
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Water-bearing ground
Construction Methods and Support
EPB TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Failure of ground freezing unit
Consequence
High rise office buildings seriously damaged
Flood protection dyke on the river badly damaged
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Unpublished

Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 32. Nikkure-yama Tunnel, Japan, 2003


Asia
Japan
2003
Project Title
Nikkure-yama Tunnel of the Joshinnetsu Expressway
Source of Information
Takahashi, Hiroshi (2010). Huge collapse leading to ground
surface caving in 130m earth thickness.

Keywords (for searching)


Japan, mudstone, sinkhole
Figures

Takahashi (2010)

Background
East work section of Nikkure-yama Tunnel

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Ground collapse of an avalanche type containing cobbles, gravels
and water took place at the point 900m away from the tunnel portal
A large crater was observed at the ground surface about 130m above
the tunnel
Ground and
Groundwater Conditions
Mudstone

Construction Methods
and Support
Shortcrete and ribs
Takahashi (2010)

Possible Cause of Failure


Existence of high groundwater
pressure

Decrease in cover of the mudstone layer

Water path created


investigation drillhole

by

the

Consequence
Programme delayed for about 2
years

Emergency and Remedial


Measures
Filling the cave-in area by foam
concrete
Grouting under the collapse area
Boring for drainage from the tunnel

Takahashi (2010)

Lessons Learnt
The importance of adequate ground investigation before
tunnelling
The importance of investigations and observations during
construction for adopting appropriate support measures

Case No 33. Guangzhou Metro Line 3, China, 1 April 2004


Asia
China
1 April 2004
Project Title
The Guangzhou Metro Line 3
Source of Information
China Daily (2004). 100 homeless after metro site collapse.
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-04/02/content_320246.htm>
2004).

(2

April

Soufun (2004). : 3 .
<http://news.gz.soufun.com/2004-04-04/259585.htm> (4 April 2004).

Longhoo (2004).

3.

<http://www.longhoo.net/big5/longhoo/news/civil/node107/userobject1ai172577.html>
(2 April 2004).

Keywords (for searching)


Guangzhou, China, diaphragm wall, building collapse
Figures

ChinaDaily (2004)

Background
Construction of a 58.5km long underground metro in which
45.6km is a single-tube shield TBM
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Failure of a diaphragm wall
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Unpublished
Construction Methods and Support
Single-tube shield TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Rapid fluctuation of groundwater level due to the heavy rainfall
Complicated geology including a layer of swelling soil

Consequence
A three-storey building collapsed and sunk into the ground
Collapse of nearby underground water mains
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Backfilled with crushed rock and cement
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 34. Singapore MRT, 20 April 2004


Asia
Singapore
20 April 2004
Project Title
Circle Line of the Singapore MTR
Source of Information
Government of Singapore (2005). Report of the Committee of
Inquiry into the Incident at the MRT Circle Line Worksite That
Led to the Collapse of Nicoll Highway on 20 April 2004.
Government of Singapore, Land Transport Authority.
<http://www.lta.gov.sg/home/index_home_nicoll.htm> (31 Jan. 2007).

Keywords (for searching)


Singapore, MRT, Cut-and-Cover, diaphragm wall
Figures

Government of Singapore (2005)

Background
An open cut tunnel excavated for Singapore MRTs new Circle
Line
Design and build
Excavated trench of 15m wide and 33m deep supported by 0.81.0m thick diaphragm wall which is 35-45m deep without rock
socket
Steel struts: 4-5m horizontal and 3m vertical spacing
Bottom-up construction
Jet grouted base slabs
Layer 1-1.5m thick at 28.5m below ground
Layer 2-3m thick at 33.5m below ground (Layer 2 not yet constructed
when collapse occurred)

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
9th level of struts being installed when
collapse took place
Unusual cracking and groaning noises heard
early in the morning (6 hours)
Loud cracking noise heard in the afternoon, 15
minutes before collapse
Collapse plan area was 100m by 130m
Settlement up to 15m
Diaphragm walls displaced
Steel struts mangled
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Mainly marine clay with some fluvial clay
Government of Singapore (2005)

Construction Methods and Support


Cut-and-Cover method
Possible Cause of Failure
Under-design of the strut-waler connection in the strutting
system
Incorrect use of Finite Element Method
No proper design reviews
Disregard of different warnings, for example, excessive wall
deflections and surging inclinometer readings
Poor construction quality
Ineffective instrumentation and monitoring system
Failure to implement risk management

Consequence
Part of Nicoll Highway, Singapores major east-west harbour-front
road, destroyed
Four workers killed
Several others injured
15,000 people and 700 businesses affected
Three offices and retail towers at risk from further ground
movement
Damage of a gas service line, resulting in an explosion and fire
A storm drain damaged

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Rescue and backfilling
Structurally disconnected the Merdeka Bridge
All contracts of the Circle Line put on hold
All contracts to carry out checks and review of design and
construction of temporary works
All Professional Engineers to confirm in writing the adequacy of
their designs
All designs to be independently checked by the Building &
Construction Authority

Lessons Learnt
This is a need for robust design, risk management, design review
and independent checking, purposeful back analysis, an effective
instrumentation, monitoring and interpretation regime, an effective
system of management of uncertainties and quality during
construction, corporate competencies and safety management
The safety of temporary works is as important as that of
permanent works and should be designed according to
established codes and checked by competent persons

Case No 35. Kaohsiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 29 May


2004
Asia
Taiwan
29 May 2004
Project Title
Kaohsiung Rapid Transit
Source of Information
Lee, W. F. & Ishihara, K. (2011) Forensic diagnosis of a
shield tunnel failure. Engineering Structures. Volume 32,
Issue 7, July 2010, Pages 1830-1837.

Keywords (for searching)


Kaohsiung, Taiwan, diaphragm wall, building damaged,
sinkhole
Figures

Lee & Ishihara (2010)

Background
Chemical Churning Piles (CCP) of
350mm diameter installed as guide walls
for the diaphragm wall construction
Soil improvement works by the use of
Super Jet Grouting (SJG) method at the
reception area for break-out operations
The diaphragm wall panels were first
cored through by chain saw according to
the face-shape of the shield tunnel
machine and manual power tool was
used to disassemble the reinforced
concrete residual inside the coring holes
EPB Tunnel Boring Machine 500mm
away from the wall face awaiting for
break-out and invert leakage started

Lee & Ishihara (2010)

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Sinkhole of about 10m in diameter formed at the ground surface
Ground settlement influence zone ranging from 40m to 50m in
diameter with maximum settlement from 500mm to 1,500mm.
Several rings of tunnel segmental linings were damaged
Settled Area of Ground Surface

Chemical Churning Pile


(CCP)

CCP

Soil Improvement Zone

Tunnel Boring Machine

Possible
Collapse Zone

Leakage spot

Diaphragm Wall
Soil Improvement Zone
Path of Leakage

Lee & Ishihara (2010)

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Silty sand and sandy silt soil layers
Silt deposit sandwiched by impermeable clay layers

Construction Methods and Support


Tunnelling by EPB Tunnel Boring Machine
Possible Cause of Failure
Progressive development of unexpected cracks inside the soil
improvement zone resulting in groundwater leakages in the
reception area as a result of piping and/or hydraulic fracturing
Leakage paths at the interfaces between Chemical Churning Pile
(CCP) and the diaphragm wall, CCP and Super Jet Grout (JSG)
materials, or inside the lower portion of the JSG body
Chloride assault and deterioration of CCP, which were installed two
years before the wall breaking process, had significant effects on the
integrity and water tightness at the interfaces

Possible Cause of Failure (cont)


The highly sensitive and erodible soil dispersed around the SJG
might have been disturbed due to the application of highly
pressured water jet in the grouting process
Mechanical and/or vibration disturbances occurred during the wall
breaking process leading to serious cracks and fissure
development inside the deteriorated CCP and defective SJG
blocks
Unfavourable sub-surface conditions which consisted of silty
sands and sandy silts with water contents almost reaching their
liquid limits
Consequence
Adjacent buildings were damaged

Lee & Ishihara (2010)

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Stabilizing the ground by piling-up sand bags in front of the tunnel
face to reduce leakage, backfilling the sinkhole and grouting the
tunnel crown and invert
Advancing the TBM further to reduce the gap between the D-wall
and the tunnel
Installation of steel frames to reinforce the damaged ring segments

Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Lee & Ishihara (2010)

Case No 36. Oslo Metro Tunnel, Norway, 17 June 2004


Europe
Norway
17 June 2004
Project Title
The Oslo Metro Tunnel
Source of Information
Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel
failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong
Kong Civil Engineering and Development Department.
(Unpublished).

Keywords (for searching)


T-baneringen Modell 3
Oslo, Norway, cave in

St rste hovedspenning, 1 er styrt av lagdelingssprekkene


og tverrsprekken.
Strekkspenninger over taket til
Figures
Hasletunnelen og videre til indre lp mot Sinsen.
Planned
concrete wall

Cave in area
F:\i\21\miljo\div\2000\ah-1.ppt

F:\i\21\miljo\div\2000\ah-1.ppt

Karlsrud (2010)
F :\i\21\miljo\div\2000\ah-1.ppt

Background
Metro line tunnel 1.3km long and 7m wide connecting with an old
tunnel
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
At the junction where the two tunnels met in an acute angle, tunnel
cave-in after removal of most part of the rock pillar between the
tunnels
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Interlayered shale and nodular limestone with 1-5cm thick clay
seams along many of the bedding planes
The bedding planes were dipping 20-45 and running almost parallel
to the tunnel

Construction Methods and Support


Constructed by drill-and-blast method supported by rock bolts
and fibre reinforced sprayed concrete. A concrete wall/pillar was
planned to be constructed between the old tunnel and new
tunnel
Possible Cause of Failure
Unfavourable direction of the bedding planes in relation to the
geometry and span of the tunnels
Over excavation of the rock pillar and the removal of the
remaining rock pillar and old concrete wall before the planned
concrete pillar was constructed
Consequence
Programme delayed for about 3 months
Cost implication: extra cost of the remedial works

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Filling up the whole opening by concrete above the fallen debris
Installation of 10m long cable anchors together with permanent
support of 200mm thick lining of reinforced sprayed concrete,
reinforced ribs of sprayed concrete and additional 6m long rock
bolts
Lessons Learnt
The importance of adequate ground investigation
The need to follow the sequence of rock support installation in
accordance with the design plans during construction

Case No 37. Kaohsiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 10 Aug.


2004
Asia
Taiwan
10 August 2004
Project Title
Kaohsiung Rapid Transit

Source of Information
Taiwan Info (2004). Nouvel incident sur le chantier du mtro
de Kaohsiung. Taiwan.
<http://taiwaninfo.nat.gov.tw/Societe/1092119498.html> (31 Jan. 2007).

Keywords (for searching)


Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Figures

Taiwan Info (2004)

Background
Construction of the Kaohsiung Rapid Transit Blue & Orange
Lines in Kaohsiung City
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
First collapse on 29 May 2004 underneath a street
Second collapse in mid June 2004
Third collapse on 13 July 2004 with formation of a large
sinkhole
Fourth collapse on 10 Aug 2004
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Unpublished
Construction Methods and Support
Unpublished

Possible Cause of Failure


Possible adverse ground and groundwater conditions
Consequence
First collapse - Several buildings affected and 100 people
evacuated
Third collapse - Three residential buildings evacuated and
significant disruption to water/electricity supply
Fourth collapse - No casualty, one building affected and part of
the works suspended
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Unpublished
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 38. Hsuehshan Tunnel, Taiwan, 1991-2004


Asia
Taiwan
1991 - 2004
Project Title
The Taipei-Ilan Expressway
Source of Information
TANEEB ( 2 0 0 5 ) . Hsuehshan Tunnel. Taiwan Area
National Expressway Engineering Bureau ( ),
Taiwan. <http://egip.taneeb.gov.tw> (31 Jan. 2007).

Keywords (for searching)


Hsuehshan, Taiwan, groundwater inflow, tunnel collapse
Figures

Taiwan Info (2004)


TANEEB (2005)

Background
Construction of 12.9km long and 11.7m diameter Hsuehshan
Tunnel in Taiwan ()
Works commenced in 1991 and completed in 2004
Comprised 2 main tunnels (East & Westbound) and a pilot
tunnel

Westbound

Eastbound

Pilot Tunnel
TANEEB (2005)

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Eastbound - 28 collapses occurred
Westbound - TBM badly damaged due to tunnel collapse and
groundwater inflow of 45,000 litres/min into the tunnel
Pilot Tunnel - 8 collapses occurred
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
The major geologic elements are Eocene, Oligocene and minor
Miocene folded sedimentary rock formations
Highly fractured rock with six major faults
Construction Methods and Support
Eastbound by TBM method (July 1993 to Sept. 2004)
Westbound by TBM method (July 1993 to April 2004)
Pilot tunnel by drill & blast method (July 1991 to Oct. 2003)

Possible Cause of Failure


Unexpected difficult geology with fractured rock and massive
inflows of water
6 major faults found along the tunnel alignment
Consequence
Eastbound - Failure in May 1993 affected 56 buildings and 73
families
Westbound - 11 men died
Pilot Tunnel - 13 stoppages
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Unpublished
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 39. Barcelona Metro, Spain, 27 Jan. 2005


Europe
Spain
27 January 2005
Project Title
Barcelona Line 5 Metro Extension
Source of Information
European Foundations (2005). Tighter NATM rules follow
Barcelona failure. European Foundations, Spring Issue, No.
26, p 3.

Keywords (for searching)


Barcelona, Spain, sinkhole
Figures

European Foundations (2005)

Background
Tunnel for Barcelona Line Five Metro Extension
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Part of the lining collapsed
30m wide and 32m deep crater formed
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Weathered slate and ancient and weathered metamorphic
ground with a vertical and hidden fault at the location of
collapse
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling using NATM

Possible Cause of Failure


A hidden vertical fault located 1m behind the sprayed
concrete lining
Consequence
2 five-storey buildings and a smaller one demolished
More than 50 families made homeless
Emergency and Remedial Measures
The void was backfilled with grout of about 2,000m3
The tunnel section was backfilled with 18,000m3 of grout
through a horizontal borehole in the debris and five points from
the surface
Additional boreholes, horizontal probes and supports for future
excavation
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 40. Lausanne M2 Metro, Switzerland, 22 Feb. 2005


Europe
Switzerland
22 February 2005
Project Title
Lausanne Metro M2 project
Source of Information
Tunnels & Tunnelling (2005). Lausanne Metro Tunnel collapse.
Tunnels & Tunnelling International, April Issue, p 6.

Keywords (for searching)


Lausanne, Switzerland, sinkhole
Figures

Tunnels & Tunnelling (2005)

Background
Tunnel (6km long, approximately 10m wide x 7m high) for
Lausanne Metro M2 Project (cost US$472M) in Switzerland
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
50m3 of material displaced into the tunnel at a depth of 12m,
leading to a crater at the surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Collapse in area of soft ground (lake deposits)
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling using an Eickhoff ET 380-L roadheader

Possible Cause of Failure


Tunnel driven through a pocket in the glacial moraine, causing
sudden inflow of groundwater
Consequence
People in two buildings, a supermarket and a food outlet in
commercial district evacuated when their cellars collapsed
No injuries reported
Emergency and Remedial Measures
A curtain of 11 piles constructed ahead of the collapsed face with
grouting to strengthen the ground and limit further flow of material
into the tunnel
The void was backfilled with 800m3 of glass-sand (recycled glass)

Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 41. Lane Cove Tunnel, Australia, 2 Nov. 2005


Australia
2 November 2005
Project Title
Lane Cove Tunnel Project
Source of Information
Golder (2005). Causes of Subsidence, 2 November 2005,
Lane Cove Tunnel Project. Sydney NSW, 52p.
Ground Engineering (2005). Australian tunnel collapse raises
doubts over NATM. Ground Engineering, December Issue, p
6.
Ground Engineering (2006a).
Sydney tunnel collapse
triggered by under-designed rock bolts. Ground Engineering,
February Issue, p 4.

Source of Information (cont)


Ground Engineering (2006b). Rock bolts used instead of steel
girders may have contributed to Lane Cove collapse. Ground
Engineering, May Issue, p 4.
ICE (2006). Australian tunnel collapse raises new NATM
doubts. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers,
January Issue, pp 6-7.
NNN (2005). National Nine News. 2 Nov. 2005, Australia.
SMH (2005). The Sydney Morning Herald. 2 Nov. 2005,
Australia.

Keywords (for searching)


Lane
Cove,
Sydney,
Australia, cave in, NATM
Figures

ICE (2006)

Background
Twin tunnels (7m high, 8.1 wide and 3.6km long) constructed in
Sydney
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Collapse occurred during breakout for a ventilation tunnel from
the running tunnel
A 10m by 10m, 25m deep crater formed in the ground between
a 3-storey high residential building and a highway exit ramp
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Hawkesbury Sandstone underlies Ashfield Shale
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling by New Austrian Tunnelling Method

Possible Cause of Failure


Possible rock slippage
Ground investigation did not identify dyke at the tunnel
intersection
Under designed rock bolts due to increased effective span at
intersection of adit and tunnel
Consequence
A 3-storey building partially collapsed and 47 residents evacuated
A water main burst
Citybound road closed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
The void was backfilled with 1,400m3 of concrete
Continual monitoring

Lessons Learnt
unpublished

Case No 42. Kaohsiung Rapid Transit,


Taiwan, 4 Dec. 2005
Asia
Taiwan
4 December 2005
Project Title
The Kaohsiung Rapid Transit project
Source of Information
TVB News (2005). TVB News. 4 Dec.
2005, Taiwan.
TT (2005). Cave-in at KRTC site snarls up
Kaohsiung traffic. Taipei Times. 5 Dec.
2005, Taiwan.
SP (2005). Sing Pao Newspaper. 6 Dec.
2005, Hong Kong.
.

TVB News (2005)

Source of Information
ST (2005). Sing Tao Newspaper. 6 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong.
Sun (2005). Sun Newspaper. 6 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong.
WWP (2005). Wen Wei Po Newspaper. 6 Dec. 2005, Hong
Kong.
OD (2005). . Oriental Daily. 7 Dec. 2005, Hong
Kong.
TKP (2005). Ta Kung Pao Newspaper. 7 Dec. 2005, Hong
Kong.

Keywords (for searching)


Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Orange Line, seepage, sinkhole
Figures

TT (2005)

Background
Construction of Kaohsiung Rapid Transit (KRT) Orange Line at
the junction of Chungcheng Road and Tashun Road in
Kaohsiung City

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Failure occurred during excavation of an underground sump pit
at a cross passage (33m below ground) underneath an existing
reservoir
A 30m by 20m, 4m deep trench initially formed on 4 Dec. 2005
and was collapsed to form a 50m by 30m, 10m deep crater at
the road surface
This was the 10th reported failure of the KRT project
Another crater (10m diameter, 7m deep) formed at another
location on 10 Dec. 2005

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


33m below ground
Construction Methods and Support
TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Massive water seepage from a reservoir

Consequence
Chungcheng Road (a major trunk road) closed for a week
The nearby Linkang railway line temporarily suspended
A 100m long section of tunnels and utilities damaged
Cracks found at 20 nearby residential buildings
Emergency and Remedial Measures
The crater was backfilled with about 2,800m3 of soil/rock and
concrete 20 hours after the accident
The damaged sections of the KRT tunnels needed to be reconstructed
Cost of the remedial measures estimated to be up to NT$500M
(US$15M) excluding reconstruction of the damaged sections of
the KRT tunnels
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 43. Nedre Romerike Water Treatment Plant, Crude


Water and Potable Water Tunnels, Norway, 2005
Europe
Norway
2005
Project Title
Nedre Romerike Water Treatment Plant, Crude Water and
Potable Water Tunnels
Source of Information
Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel
failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong
Kong Civil Engineering and Development Department.
(Unpublished).

Keywords (for searching)


Nedre Romerike, Norway, water tunnel, progressive failure
Figures

Karlsrud (2010)

Background
The tunnel works were completed in 1980.
The crude water tunnel was 3.7km long
and 3m wide. The potable water tunnel
was 1.5km long and 3m wide
Nature and Type of Failure
In service failure
The failure was progressive for more than
25 years resulting in blockage of the
crude water tunnel
A major failure occurred in the crude
water tunnel in winter 2005 and the
weathered rock failed
Two major progressive failures occurred
in 2007 and about 200m3 and 30-40m3
rocks fell each time
Karlsrud (2010)

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Precambrian highly metamorphic gneisses
In some areas, the gneiss is highly weathered and is partly
transformed to clay. Some of clay is swelling clay (smectite)
Construction Methods and Support
Spot bolting and 1-3cm thick layer of plain sprayed concrete in
small parts of the tunnels
Possible Cause of Failure
Lack of mapping of weakness zones containing swelling clay
resulting in insufficient rock support
The humidity in the water tunnel probably causing a gradual
expansion of the swelling clay which resulted in detachment of the
rock

Consequence
About 150, 000 people affected by disruption in water supply

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Due to the limited access in the crude water tunnel, only manually
replacement and redistribution of the debris downstream from the
cave-in areas could be carried out by divers when the water level
was lowered
Lessons Learnt
The importance of proper rock mass classification, detailed
mapping of weakness zones and weathered rock, and
implementation of adequate rock support

Case No 44. Interstate 90 Connector Tunnel, Boston,


Massachusetts, USA, July 2006
North America
Boston, Massachusetts, USA
July 2006
Project Title
Bostons Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) project (also known as
the Big Dig)

Source of Information
NTSB (2007). Ceiling collapse in the Interstate 90 Connector
Tunnel.
National Transportation Safety Board Highway
Accident Report. <http://app.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2007/HAR0702.pdf >
(2007).

Brady, S. (2013). Interstate 90 Connector Tunnel ceiling


collapse. The Structural Engineer, Volume 91, Issue 4, April
2013.

Keywords (for searching)


Boston, Massachusetts, Ceiling collapse, anchor creep
Figures
Concrete panels detached from the tunnel roof

Brady, S. (2013)

Background
The I-90 Connector tunnel, known as the D Street portal, was
opened to traffic in December 2000. It was built to improve
traffic flow in Boston
Nature and Type of Failure
In service failure
Ceiling panel anchor failure
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Unpublished
Construction Methods and Support
Suspended ceiling panels affixed to the tunnel roof by stainless
steel anchors held in place with epoxy adhesive

Possible Cause of Failure


Poor creep resistance of the Fast Set epoxy adhesive used to
install the anchors
Consequence
A section of the tunnels suspended concrete ceiling detached
from the tunnel roof. A total of about 26 tons of concrete and
associated suspension hardware crushed a vehicle. The driver
suffered minor injuries and a passenger was killed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Installing temporary shoring for a portion of the tunnel ceiling
where adhesive anchors showed displacement
Replacing displaced adhesive anchors with undercut anchors
Lessons learnt
Understanding of the creep performance is crucial for adhesive
anchoring system

Case No 45. Hanekleiv Road Tunnel, Norway, 25 December


2006
Europe
Norway
25 December 2006
Project Title
The Hanekleiv Road Tunnel
Source of Information
Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel
failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong
Kong Civil Engineering and Development Department.
(Unpublished).

Keywords (for searching)


Hanekleiv, Norway, cave in

Figures

Karlsrud (2010)

Background
The tunnel was about 1.77km long and 9.6m wide. The tunnel
was opened for traffic in October 2001
The cave in was released between two parallel filled joints
Nature and Type of Failure
In service failure
A section of tunnel caved in 10 -11 years after excavation
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Moderately jointed syenite (joints filled with swelling clay)
Construction Methods and Support
Supported with a combination of rock bolts and steel fibre
reinforced concrete

Possible Cause of Failure


Unfavourable geometry with joints almost parallel to the tunnel axis.
The rock bolts installed mainly parallel to the rock joints and with
limited influence on the stability
Consequence
About 200m3 of debris fell down from the crown and the tunnel was
closed for about 6.5 months

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Casting concrete lining and installing about 4,000 rock bolts
Lessons Learnt
Lack of qualified engineering geologist at the site to carry out
mapping and design during the tunnel construction

Case No 46. Stormwater Management and Road Tunnel


(SMART), Malaysia, 2003 - 2006
Asia
Malaysia
2003 - 2006
Project Title
Stormwater Management and Road Tunnel
Source of Information
Siow, M. T. (2006). Geotechnical aspects of the SMART tunnel.
International Conference and Exhibition on Trenchless
Technology and Tunnelling, 7-9 March 2006, Malaysia.
McFeat-Smith, I. M. (2008). Personal communications. GEO
File Reference: GCME 6/8/6-1, Newspaper Articles for
Tunnels/Media Reports.

Keywords (for searching)


Stormwater, SMART, Malaysia, sinkhole
Figures

Limestone

SMART

Siow, M. T. (2006)

Siow, M. T. (2006)

McFeat-Smith (2008)

Background
9.7km long and 13.26m diameter tunnel

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
37 incidents within 8 km of tunnel excavation
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Karst formation
Construction Methods and Support
slurry shield TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Adverse geology and karst conditions

Consequence
Unpublished

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Unpublished
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

So Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 12 Jan. 2007


Case No 47. So Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 12 Jan. 2007
South America
So Paulo, Brazil
12 January 2007
Project Title
So Paulo Metro Station
Source of Information
ICE (2008). Heart of darkness, New Civil Engineer, Institution of
Civil Engineers, September Issue, pp 14-15.
Gulp (2007). Desenvolvimento e diverso.
<http://gulp.com.br/imagem/acidente-no-metro-de-sao-paulo> (17 January 2007).

Barton (2008). Tragic collapse of a station cavern during


construction of the So Paulo Metro: Unexpected and
unpredictable ground despite eleven boreholes,
Bergmekanikk/Geoteknikk 2008, 23.1-23.22.

So Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 12 Jan. 2007


Keywords (for searching)
South America, So Paulo, Brazil, 2007, So Paulo Metro Station,
NATM
Figures

Gulp (2007)

So Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 12 Jan. 2007


Background
New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) was used to excavate a
19m span 40m long station cavern/tunnel
The cavern/tunnel failure occurred close to a junction with a 40m
diameter, 35m deep station/access shaft
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Collapse of the station cavern/tunnel and partial damage to the
station/access shaft
The rate of settlement at the tunnel crown increased rapidly and
reached 15mm to 20mm two to three days before the failure
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Assumed 3m rock cover overlain by 18m of saprolitic soil and sand
Construction Methods and Support
NATM with primary support of lattice girders at 0.85m centres and
minimum 350mm thick steel-fibre reinforced shotcrete

So Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 12 Jan. 2007

Possible Cause of Failure


Failed to account for the geology of the site
An undiscovered ridge of rock with a curved top 10m higher than
predicted in the weathering profile might have caused the collapse
of the large span cavern/tunnel excavated
The existence of the curved top ridge-of-rock has added to the
dead weight above the cavern/tunnel and might have prevented
arching action, overstressing/overloading the cavern/tunnel support
elements
Consequence
Several vehicles dropped into the 30m-deep hole
Seven persons killed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Open cut excavation through the section was performed after pregrouting with the support of systematic tie-back anchors extending
32m into the soil to stabilize the cut face

So Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 12 Jan. 2007

Lessons learnt
Sub-urban tunnelling with thin rock cover should be avoided if
possible due to the unpredictable degree of rock weathering
If this cannot be avoided, adequate ground investigation should be
carried out for the design of the large span cavern/tunnel, taking
into account possible variation in rockhead in the local geology

Case No 48. Guangzhou Metro Line 5, China, 17 Jan. 2008


Asia
China
17 January 2008
Project Title
The Guangzhou Metro Line 5

Source of Information
AD (2008a). . Apple Daily Newspaper. 19
January 2008, Hong Kong, pp A22.
Sina (2008a). <http://news.sina.com/ch/phoenixtv/102-101-101-102/200801-17/15232606535.html> (17 Jan 2008).

Sina (2008b).
(18 Jan 2008).

<http://news.sina.com.hk/cgi-bin/nw/show.cgi/9/1/1/613096/>

Keywords (for searching)


Guangzhou, China, sinkhole
Figures

Sina (2008a)

AD (2008)

Background
Construction of a cross passage between two tunnel boring
machine tunnels
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Collapse of the cross passage tunnel

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Water-bearing ground
Construction Methods and Support
Unpublished
Possible Cause of Failure
Groundwater flowed into the tunnel

Consequence
Cave-in at the road, about 100m2 on plan
No injury
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Crater backfilled with concrete
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 49. Langstaff Road Trunk Sewer, Toronto, Canada, 2


May 2008
North America
Canada
2 May 2008
Project Title
Langstaff Road Trunk Sewer
Source of Information
Wallis, P. (2009). EPBM recovery reveals the unexpected.
TunnelTalk.
<http://www.tunneltalk.com/YorkSewer-Aug-09-TBM-recoveryreveals-the-unexpected.php> (August 2009).

Wallis, S. (2008). Buried EPBM recovery in Toronto. TunnelTalk.


<http://www.tunneltalk.com/Buried-EPBM-recovery-in-Toronto.php> (August 2008).

Keywords (for searching)


Langstaff, Toronto, Canada, EPBM, sinkhole

Figures
Discharge through the screw conveyor of the EPBM

Wallis, P (2009)

Background
The Langstaff sewer tunnel was about 3.6km long
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
About 1,800 m3 of liquefied mud flowed into the tunnel over a
48-hour period through the tail brushes causing the tunnel and
the TBM to sink by more than 3m and collapse
A deep sinkhole formed at the ground surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Wet sands and silts under a high water table
Construction Methods and Support
Constructed by EPBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Damaged wire brushes of the tailseal of the EPBM were the
catalyst for initiating the whole sequence of the failure events
Highly saturated very fine sands and silts under 1.5 bars of
groundwater pressure
Consequence
The road above the excavated area closed
Major delay to the project
The TBM was buried
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Filling the sinkhole with unshrinkable fill (low strength concrete)
Areas of continuing subsidence were stabilized with sand infill
Bulkhead was built about 300m behind the TBM to control the
infow
Water main repaired and road repaved

Lessons Learnt
Sealing of the wire brushes is crucial to the safe operation of the
EPBM

Case No 50. Circle Line 4 Tunnel, Singapore, 23 May


2008
Asia
Singapore
23 May 2008
Project Title
Circle Line 4 Tunnel
Source of Information
Property Highlights of Singapore (2008).
<http://propertyhighlights.blogspot.com/2008/05/circle-line-work-causescave-in-off.html> (25 May 2008).

Keywords (for searching)


Circle Line, Singapore
Figures

Property Highlights of Singapore (2008)

Property Highlights of
Singapore (2008)

Background
Construction of Circle Line 4 tunnel by 6m diameter slurry
mixshield TBM
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Cave-in at Holland Road approximately 8m diameter x 3m deep

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Tunnelling 22m below ground

Construction Methods and Support


Slurry mixshield TBM
Possible Cause of Failure
Loose ground
Consequence
Temporary suspension of water supply
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Crater backfilled with concrete
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 51. M6 Motorway, Hungary, 24 Jul. 2008


Europe
Hungary
24 July 2008
Project Title
M6 Motorway
Source of Information
Mecsi J. (2014). Some construction experience of a motorway
road tunnel collapse. Proceedings of the 8th International
Symposium on the Geotechnical Aspects of Underground
Construction in Soft Ground, Seoul, Korea, August, pp387-392.

Keywords (for searching)


Motorway, Hungary, NATM, Red Clay
Figures

Deformation of tunnel wall

Mecsi J. (2014)

Background
The M6 Motorway section connecting Szekszrd to Pcs
consists of four tunnels with cross section area of 101 m2
First collapse occurred at the double tunnel A (2 x 1,356m
long) on 24 July 2008
Posterior collapse occurred on 12 August 2008

Mecsi J. (2014)

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
First tunnel collapse with surface subsidence affected a 113m
section of the tunnel in the east tube and 90m in the west tube
Second tunnel collapse further collapse of 76m stretches of
the two tubes
Ground and
Groundwater Conditions
Tengelic
Red
Clay
overlain by Pannonian
strata
About 40m below ground

Mecsi J. (2014)

Construction Methods and Support


NATM with 1m heading advance and the support of 50mm
shotcrete and steel lattice girders at 1m intervals
Possible Cause of Failure
Excavation of the bench and the invert was advancing in the two
tubes parallel with each other, and was carried out in an
unfavourably long segment within a short period of time. The
excavation of large quantities of soil entailed a sudden relief of
load
Unfavourable geology
The red Tengelic clay
stratum with high volume
change behaviour was
situated partly at the
bottom of the tunnel and
mostly under the tunnel
Mecsi J. (2014)

Consequence
Evacuation completed successfully, but the increased air
pressure knocked down workers waiting at the entrance of the
tunnel
Work in the four tunnels was stopped and a thorough
investigation was carried out
Emergency and Remedial Measures
A stabilizing row of cemented jet grouting piles (8m long and
150cm diameter) was constructed in both tubes of the collapsed
tunnel section
Further excavation in the collapsed section was carried out under
the protection of a tube umbrella (15m long with 5m overlap)
Lessons Learnt
The excavation and support sequence needs to be controlled

Case No 52. Hangzhou Metro Tunnel, China, 15 Nov.


2008
Asia
China
15 November 2008
Project Title
Hangzhou Metro Tunnel
Source of Information
AD (2008b).
219
<http://www.appleactionews.com/site/art_main.php?&iss_id=20081116&
sec_id=10793096&art_id=11853290&dis_type=ss&media_id=1>.

Beijing Review website (2008). Death Toll Could Reach


21 in Tunnel Collapse.
<http://www.bjreview.com.cn/headline/txt/200811/19/content_165283.htm> (19 Nov 2008).

Source of Information (cont)


CNS (2008). <http://www.chinanews.com/>.
NCE (2008). China tunnel collapse toll rises to 7. New
Civil Engineer. 17 November 2008.
XINHUANET (2008) <http://www.xinhuanet.com/>

Keywords (for searching)


Hangzhou, China, cut-and-cover
Figures

AD (2008b)

CNS (2008)

CNS (2008)
CNS (2008)

XINHUANET (2008)

XINHUANET (2008)

XINHUANET (2008)

XINHUANET (2008)

XINHUANET (2008)

Background
Construction of Hangzhou Metro

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Failure of a series of continuous walls of 800mm thick
constructed by cut-and-cover method forming a 21m wide x
16m deep excavated area
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Water-bearing ground
Construction Methods and Support
Cut-and-Cover method

Possible Cause of Failure


Unpublished
Consequence
A 75m long section of road collapsed and 11 vehicles fell into
the 16m deep excavation
A 600mm diameter water main was broken
Water from the nearby river flowed into the collapsed area
Three 3-storey buildings seriously damaged and needed to be
demolished
Two 110kV cables were damaged
8 persons died, 13 persons missing (as of 19 Nov. 2008) and
11 persons injured
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Unpublished
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 53. Cologne North-South Metro Tram Line,


Germany, 3 Mar. 2009
Europe
Germany
3 March 2009
Project Title
Cologne North-South Metro Tram Line
Source of Information
Wallis, S. (2009). Kln - speculation and anger in aftermath.
TunnelTalk.
<http://tunneltalk.com/Cologne-collapse-Mar09-Deadlycollapse-in-Cologne.php> (March 2009).

Keywords (for searching)


Cologne, North-South Metro Line, Germany, diaphragm
wall, building collapse
Figures

Wallis, S (2009)

Background
North-South-Metro Line was 3.8km long with 7 underground
stations
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Collapse of the diaphragm walls
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Water-bearing quaternary Rhine deposits consisting of sands
and gravels
Water table at about 8-10m below ground with seasonal
fluctuations
Toes of the diaphragm walls at 37-40m depth

Construction Methods and Support


The tunnels were constructed by TBM. Cut-and-cover method
(diaphragm walls) was used in construction of an underground
turn-off
Possible Cause of Failure
Boiling of the shafts invert under high pressures and loss of
ground due to inflow of groundwater created a void outside the
diaphragm walls into which the archive building collapsed
Protective measures not carried out for protection of the
buildings adjacent to the excavation

Consequence
Collapse of the citys historical archive building
Partial collapse of two apartment buildings
Evacuation of local residents (80 families in 10 buildings)
Two people killed

Emergency and Remedial Measures


About 2,900 m3 concrete was poured into the shaft to balance
the buoyancy and stabilize the situation
Concrete barrier walls were erected in the connected running
tunnels to stop propagation of soil and groundwater
Lessons Learnt
The hydraulic gradient at the toe of the diaphragm wall should
be kept below a certain critical value taking into account the
seasonal fluctuations of water table
Toes of the diaphragm walls should be critically reviewed during
construction and should be extended to less permeable layers if
necessary

Case No 54. Brightwater Tunnel, Seattle, USA, 8 Mar. 2009


North America
United States of America
8 March 2009
Project Title
Brightwater conveyance tunnel
Source of Information
Wallis, P. (2009a). Sinkhole bothers Brightwater. TunnelTalk.
<http://www.tunneltalk.com/Brightwater-Mar09-Brightwater-sinkhole.php>
(March 2009).

Keywords (for searching)


Brightwater, Seattle, USA, over-excavation
Figures

Wallis, P (2009a)

Background
The Brightwater conveyance tunnel facility in King County was
about 4.2 km long
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
4.5m x 9m sinkhole formed at a driveway of a house
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Abrasive glacial deposits (composed of sand/gravel (Outwash),
silt/silty sand (Till/Alluvium) and hard clay) and under high
groundwater pressures
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling by Mixshield slurry TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


The inexperience TBM operator with the closed slurry system
making it difficult to judge the amount of material being
excavated during a shove
The presence of a large boulder in the face that stalled
penetration without slowing extraction of material and caused
over excavation
The high artesian water pressure and its influence on the
excavation cycle
Consequence
The driveway of a house damaged
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Filling the sinkhole with crushed rock and sand
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 55. Seattles Beacon Hill Light Rail, USA, July


2009
North America
United States of America
July 2009
Project Title
Beacon Hill Light Rail
Source of Information
Wallis, P. (2009b). Beacon Hill celebration and
investigation. TunnelTalk.
<http://www.tunneltalk.com/BeaconHill-Jul09-Celebration-andInvestigation.php> (July 2009).

Keywords (for searching)


Seattle, Beacon Hill Light Rail, USA, sinkhole
Figures

Wallis, P (2009b)

Background
The Beacon Hill Light Rail Station was opened in July 2009
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
A 6.4m deep sinkhole formed at the ground surface
Six other large voids were found 6m to 18m below the ground
surface and behind the segmental lining of the bored TBM
running tunnels

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Mainly stable clays with packets of sand
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling by EPBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Over excavation when the EPBM hit pockets of sand in the
stable clay stratum
Consequence
Sinkhole in the front yard of a house near its foundation
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Filling the voids with 200 to 400 cubic yards of controlled density
fill
Compaction grouting beneath the voids and the top of the
running tunnels
Lessons Learnt
Results of the excavation management control system should
not be overlooked as they could help identify locations of over
excavation

Case No 56. Glendoe Headrace Tunnel, Scotland, UK, Aug.


2009
Europe
Scotland, UK
August 2009

Project Title
Glendoe Hydro Scheme
Source of Information
Wallis, S. (2009a). Rockfalls shut down Glendoe power plant.
TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/Glendoe-Aug09-Rockfallshutdown.php> (Aug 2009).

Wallis, S. (2009c). Glendoe rockfalls more serious than initial


fear. TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/Glendoe-Oct09-Rockfall-largerthan-anticipated.php> (Oct 2009).

Wallis, S. (2010). Recovery contract for failed headrace at


Glendoe. TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/Glendoe-Feb10Recovery_contract.php> (Feb 2010).

Keywords (for searching)


Glendoe, headrace tunnel, rockfall
Figures
Junction of TBM and drill and blast tunnel

Wallis, S (2009a)

Background
20,000 tonnes of rock fell inside a headrace tunnel connecting
to the power generation turbine. The unlined headrace tunnel
was constructed by TBM. Tunnel section of 7-800m in length
was blocked by the debris
Nature and Type of Failure
In service failure
Rockfall
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Competent Rock
Construction Methods and Support
5m diameter unlined TBM tunnel
Temporary Support was designed in accordance with Barton Q
system. Support comprised steel-fibre reinforced shotcrete,
rockbolts and mesh

Possible Cause of Failure


Weak material was evident from a pilot drill for raisebore of a
planned shaft. The pilot drill was abandoned and the 250m
deep intake at that location was cancelled. However, there was
no indication in the tunnel during the TBM drive of any
weakness or instability of rock
The imposed water pressure was relieved during the
dewatering process
Consequence
Electricity generation at the site was suspended for a prolonged
period
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Construction of a 200m long by-pass tunnel

Lessons learnt
Potential effect of weak zone found in the vicinity of tunnel

Case No 57. Cairo Metro Tunnel, Egypt, 3 Sept. 2009


North Africa
Egypt
3 September 2009
Project Title
Cairo Metro Tunnel
Source of Information
Wallis, S. (2009b). Cairo Metro tunnel collapse. TunnelTalk.
<http://www.tunneltalk.com/Cairo-Metro-Sep09-tunnel-collapse.php>
(September 2009).

Keywords (for searching)


Cairo, Metro Tunnel, Egypt, sinkhole
Figures

Wallis, S (2009b)

Background
Line 3 Phase 3 of the Cairo Metro was about 7.2km long
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
First failure A segment fallen out of a ring subsequently
forming a sinkhole on the ground surface
Second failure Second ground collapse occurred after the
pouring of concrete in attempt to arrest the first collapse

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Ground comprising an upper 8m layer of mixed fill on base
deposits of very soft, highly permeable sand and sandy-clay soil
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling by 9.4m diameter Mixshield slurry TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


First failure - a segment of the recently installed ring just leaving
the tail shield fell and allowed water and soil to flow to the tunnel,
filling the interior of the TBM and the tunnel
Second failure More than 1,000 m3 of concrete was used to fill
the first sinkhole. The weight of the concrete acting on soft
ground under a high groundwater table caused a second ground
collapse
Consequence
TBM buried
A parked car slid into the 15m-20m diameter x 20m deep
sinkhole
Evacuation of local residents (80 families in 10 buildings)

Emergency and Remedial Measures


First failure Backfilled the sinkhole with concrete
Second failure Injection of chemical grout, vertically and on
inclines, to strengthen the soil around the TBM and the tunnel to
support the recovery excavation to uncover the TBM
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 58. Headrace tunnel of Gilgel Gibe II Hydro


Project, Ethiopia, Oct. 2006 and Jan. 2010
Africa
Ethiopia
October 2006 and January 2010

Project Title
Gilgel Gibe II Hydro Project
Source of Information
Wallis, P. (2010). Collapse of head race tunnel after grand
opening. TunnelTalk. <http:/www.tunneltalk.com/Gilgel-Gibe-II-Feb10collapse.php> (February 2010).

Reynolds, P. and Wallis, S. (2010). Repair of limited collapse


in Ethiopia. TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com /Ethiopia-Mar10Recovery-and-lining-performance.php> (March 2010).

Keywords (for searching)


Gilgel Gibe, headrace tunnel, collapse
Figures
Geological longitudinal section of the tunnel

Wallis, P. (2010)

Figures
Route of the 26km long headrace

Reynolds & Wallis (2010)

Background
A 26km headrace tunnel was constructed in Ethiopia as a
part of the Gilgel Gibe II Hydro Project
Nature and Type of Failure
1st Failure: Construction failure in October 2006. High
pressure, 40 bar, mud inflow pushed the TBM backwards
and crushed the segmental lining at the back
2nd Failure: In service failure in January 2010. Cave in
and rock fall occurred in the completed tunnel. About 1520m section of the tunnel 9km from the portal was affected
by the incident and the estimated quantity of material ingress
into the tunnel was about 8500m3. The collapse created a
cavity of 30m to 40m depth above the tunnel crown

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


At the point of 2nd collapse, the cover was about 800m
Tunnel under high water/mud pressure
Construction Methods and Support
8.10m diameter double shield TBM
Possible Cause of Failure
1st incident: High pressure mud inflow was encountered at
fault area which prevented the advance of TBM and
damaged seven rings of the segmental lining
2nd incident: Hard but fissured rock around the tunnel was
disturbed during tunnel excavation. Some rock blocks fell
from the face damaging some of the cutters. It was
suspected that a major fault was hidden behind a thin and
fissured rock diaphragm. The high concentrated water/mud
pressure broke the diaphragm and subsequently the lining

Consequence
1st incident: Two year delay of construction
2nd incident: Reduction/suspension of power generation
capacity
Emergency and Remedial Measures
1st incident: A 230m bypass tunnel was excavated by the TBM
to pass the point of failure
2nd incident: Program for drilling of additional boreholes,
clearing and either reconstruction of the collapsed tunnel
section with shotcrete and steel rib support or construction of
bypass tunnel at the point of collapse

Lessons learnt
Additional ground investigation works could improve the
understanding to the actual geology and hydrogeology. Risk of
excessive inflow should be taken into account during the
design stage
Any abnormalities observed during tunnel construction should
be carefully assessed noting that rock blocks unravelled from
the face during the tunnel excavation. Such abnormalities may
not cause immediate collapse but may initiate the collapse
mechanism in future
Only 10-15m of lining was damaged and the lining did not
collapse along the joints. The use of hexagonal lining could
help prevent progressive collapse

Case No 59. Blanka Tunnel, Czech Republic, 20 May 2008,


12 Oct. 2008 and 6 July 2010
Europe
Czech Republic
8 May 2008, 12 October 2008 and 6 July 2010
Project Title
Blanka Tunnel
Source of Information
Butovic, A. & Padevet, M. (2008). Design and excavation of the
Blanka Tunnel. World Tunnel Congress 2008. pp 183-192.
Tunnels and Tunnelling (2010a). Collapse on Pragues Blanka
Tunnel. Tunnels & Tunnelling International, August issue. pp 5.

Source of Information (cont)


Tunnels and Tunnelling (2010b). Questions asked as
Blanka Tunnel collapses for third time. August issue. pp 14.
Falvey, C. (2010). Current Affairs - Part of Blanka Tunnel
Collapses, again. Czech Radio 7.
< http://www.radio.cz/en/article/129592>

Keywords (for searching)


Blanka Tunnel, Prague, sinkhole
Figures
Blanka Tunnel Alignment

From http://www.ulma.cz/?q=en/node/387

Figures
Photo of Third Collapse on 6 July 2010

From https://cijblog.wordpress.com/tag/prague/page/8/

Background
Blanka Tunnel (about 6.0km long) forms part of the ring road
system in Prague. Cut-and-cover method and NATM were
used for the tunnel construction
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
1st incident: On 20 May 2008, a crater of 15m deep was
formed inside Stromovka Park
2nd incident: On 12 October 2008, a crater of 15m deep and
30m in diameter was formed inside Stromovka Park
3rd incident: On 6 July 2010, a crater of 15m in diameter was
formed in the vicinity of the buildings of the Ministry of
Culture

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Tunnelling in rock
Excavation under the groundwater level

Construction Methods and Support


NATM
Possible Cause of Failure
1st incident: Rock mass instability at the face of excavation
caused by water intake
2nd incident: Unexpected structural instability of rock mass at
a fault zone
3rd incident: Instability occurred at the temporary support
walls. Detailed investigation was on-going and exact cause
of failure remained unknown

Consequence
No injury in the 1st and 2nd incidents; In the 3rd incident, an
excavator driver was buried and then rescued
Additional cost and construction program delay
Emergency and Remedial Measures
1st and 2nd incidents: Unknown
3rd incident: Crater was backfilled with 2000m3 of concrete up
to 3m below ground
Lessons learnt
From the 1st incident, the consequence of unsuccessful
groundwater ingress control was illustrated
For the 2nd incident, additional ground investigation works
could improve the understanding to the actual geology and
may reduce the tunnelling risk in the aspect of unforeseen
ground condition

Case No 60. Shenzhen Express Rail Link, China, 27 Mar. 2011,


4 , 10 & 18 May 2011, and 30 Oct. 2011
Asia
China
27 March 2011, 4 , 10 & 18 May 2011, and 30 October 2011
Project Title
Express Rail Link
Source of Information
2home (2011). <www.2home.com.cn/article/article_4190.html> (31 October
2011).

21CN (2011).

<http://house.21cn.com/collect/2011/10/31/9615710.shtml> (31

October 2011).

OD (2011). .
2011, Hong Kong.

Oriental Daily, 29 March,

Source of Information (cont)


SD (2011). Fourth land collapse in Xiameilin. Shenzhen Daily, 20
May 2011, Shenzhen.
TKP (2011). . Ta Kung Pao
Newspaper, 11 May 2011, Shenzhen.
World Journal (2011). 10
<http://www.worldjournal.com/view/full_news/12536326/article%E9%AB%98%E9%90%B5%E6%83%B9%E7%A6%8D%EF%BC%9F%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E5%9C%B0%E9%99%B7%E9%A9%9A%E7%8F%BE10%E7%B1%B3%E6%B7%B1%E5%9D%91?instance=n
ews_pics> (29 March 2011).

Keywords (for searching)


Shenzhen, Express Rail Link, sinkhole
Figures

2home (2011)

Background
-Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Several ground failures occurred in
Xiameilin, Futian District ()
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Unpublished
Construction Methods and Support
Tunnelling by TBM at about 22m to
26m below ground
OD (2011)

First failure (World Journal (2011))


A sinkhole of about 7m diameter and 10m deep was formed at a
football pitch on 27 March 2011
The sinkhole was full of muddy water and air bubbles

Consequence
Evacuation of nearby residents
Possible cause of failure
Unexpected change in sub-surface materials encountered, from slight
decomposed rock to completely decomposed rock
Remedial Measures
Backfill of the sinkhole with concrete

World Journal (2011)

Second failure (21CN (2011))


A sinkhole of about 10m in diameter was formed near the
location of the first failure on 4 May 2011
Possible cause of failure
Heavy rainfall and the ground at the location of the previous
failure had not been fully stabilized
Third failure (TKP (2011))
A sinkhole of about 7m deep was formed at the ground surface
during the changing of cutter discs on 10 May 2011
Possible cause of failure
Loose fill layers with high water infiltration
Existence of a sub-layer drainage channel

Fourth failure ((SD(2011))


A sinkhole of about 1.5m in diameter and 7m deep formed at
football pitch where previous three ground collapses occurred
on 18 May 2011

SD (2011)

Fifth failure (21CN (2011))


A sinkhole of about 5m deep in plan area of 100m2 was
formed on a road on 30 October 2011
Possible causes of failure
Existence of soft and hard lens of soil above the tunnel
Leakage of compressed air
Remedial Measures
Backfill of the sinkhole with soil

Case No 61. Mizushima Refinery Subsea Tunnel, Japan, 14 Feb.


2012
Asia
Japan
14 February 2012
Project Title
Mizushima Refinery Subsea Tunnel
Source of Information
Wallis, S. (2012). Possible causes of Japans fatal tunnel failure.
TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/Japan-tunnel-disaster-Mar12-Bodiesfound-and-causes-investigated.php > (March 2012).

Kenyon, P. (2013). Salvage team recovers Japan disaster TBM.


TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/Japan-04September2013-UnderwaterTBM-recovery-to-investigate-fatal-Japan-tunnel-collapse.php> (4 September 2013).

Keywords (for searching)


Japan, subsea, flooding
Figures
Kenyon, P. (2013)

Kenyon, P. (2013)

Wallis, S. (2012)

Background
The 5m diameter, 800m long tunnel was constructed for housing
an undersea pipeline between two refineries on opposite sides of
a sea channel at Mizushima Port in Kurashiki

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Collapse of tunnel segment one or two rings behind the tail seal
Inrush of water into the tunnel
A sinkhole on the sea bed of some 19m diameter was found
behind the face of the TBM
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Soft ground (silt and sand)
About 26m depth of water

Construction Methods and Support


EPB TBM (160mm concrete segmental lining)
Possible Cause of Failure
The lining might have failed or the shield 'dropped' into a huge
void or fault in the ground and the tail was separated from the
lining
Consequence
Five workers killed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Works suspended
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 62. Hengqin Tunnel, Macau, 19 July 2012


Asia
China
19 July 2012
Project Title
Hengqin Tunnel

Source of Information
MD (2012). . Macao Daily, 21 July 2012, Macau.
MDT (2012). Report : four causes account for Hengqin tunnel
collapsed. Macau Daily Times. 14 August, 2012.
OD (2012). . Oriental Daily, 21 July,
2012, Hong Kong.

Keywords (for searching)


Hengqin, Macau, riverbed tunnel, wall collapse
Figures

MD (2012)

Background
Four-lane 1.57km long road tunnel
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
The lateral support wall collapsed resulting in caving of the
surrounding ground surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Reclaimed land
Construction Methods and Support
Constructed by cut-and-cover method

Possible Cause of Failure


Existence of a weak geological structure in the sub-surface
Rising of groundwater levels due to heavy rainfall causing the
weak soil between the interlayer to slip
Failure of the construction of support structures to keep pace
with the excavation
Weak ground with high groundwater levels increasing pressure
acting on the foundation pit pile
Consequence
Five heavy machines buried
Programme delayed
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Unpublished
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No 63. Sasago Tunnel, Japan, 2 Dec. 2012


Asia
Japan
2 December 2012
Project Title
Sasago Tunnel

Source of Information
Wallis, S. (2012). Tunnel ceiling collapse kills in Japan.
TunnelTalk. <http://tunneltalk.com/Safety-Dec12-Japan-fatal-tunnel-ceilingcollapse.php> (December 2012).

Lynch, D. (2012). Panel fixings likely cause of Japan tunnel


tragedy. New Civil Engineer, 6 December 2012.

Keywords (for searching)


Japan, Yamanashi Prefecture, Sasago tunnel, ceiling collapse
Figures
Concrete panels detached from the tunnel roof

<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/03/world/asia/japan-tunnel-collapse-bolts/index.html>

Background
The twin-tube two-lane Sasago tunnel is about 4.5km long.
It was built in the mid-1970s and was opened in 1977
Nature and Type of Failure
In service failure
Ceiling collapse
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Unpublished
Construction Methods and Support
Suspended ventilation duct ceiling panels affixed to the
tunnel roof by anchor bolts

Possible Cause of Failure


Suspected ageing and deterioration of the anchor bolts and
the precast concrete ceiling panels

Consequence
Up to 300 ceiling panels, weighing about 1200kg each,
collapsed killing nine people and causing two injuries.
Emergency and Remedial Measures
The Japanese Government ordered emergency inspections of
49 tunnels in Japan with the same ceiling design
Lessons learnt
Inspection and maintenance works for old tunnels are
important

Case No 64. Ottawas Light Rail Transit Project, Canada,


20 Feb. 2014
North America
Ottawa, Canada
20 February 2014

Project Title
Ottawas Light Rail Transit (LRT) Tunnel Project
Source of Information
Wallis, S. & Kenyon, P. (2014) Ottawa manages excavation
ground run. TunnelTalk. <http://tunneltalk.com/Ottawa-LRT-27Feb2014Early-excavation-progress-and-shallow-cover-fill-material-causes-sinkhole.php>
(27 February 2014)

Keywords (for searching)


Ottawa, Canada, sinkhole
Figures
Sinkhole formed

Wallis & Kenyon (2014)

Background
The project involves 2.5km underground works of single-tube,
double track running tunnels
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Ground run through the crown leading to the formation of a
sinkhole
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Competent limestone (a pocket of clay and sandy clay deposits
was noted at the incident location)
Construction Methods and Support
Roadheader excavation with an open-face SEM on a top
heading and bench sequence
Shotcrete and pipe-roof arch support

Possible Cause of Failure


The combination of a shallow cover top heading, a zone of soft
clay and sandy clay in the upper left corner of the top heading
face, and a set of earlier and undocumented utility works
Consequence
A sinkhole of 8m wide and 12m deep was formed
Damage to utilities but no persons were injured
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Bulkhead was formed in the tunnel prior to backfilling
The sinkhole was backfilled with more than 620 m3 of concrete
Lessons learnt
Unpublished

Case No 65. Rios Metro Line 4, Brazil, 11 May 2014


South America
Brazil
11 May 2014

Project Title
Rios Metro Line 4
Source of Information
Tunnel (2014). Sinkhole incident at Rios Metro Line 4.
<http://www.tunnelonline.info/en/news/tunnel_Erdfall_beim_Bau_der_Metro_line_4_in Rio
19904770.html>

Tunnel (2014a). Sinkholes in Ipanema were most likely


caused by rock problem. <http://www.tunnel-online.info/en/news/tunnel
2161155.html>

Tunnels and Tunnelling (2014). RIO Realised. Tunnels and


Tunnelling International. September 2014 issue, p 27.

Keywords (for searching)


Rio Metro Line 4, sinkholes, Ipanema
Figures
Project Alignment Map

Tunnels and Tunnelling (2014)

Background
16km metro line connecting Barra de Tijuca to Ipanema is
under construction since 2010 and will be in operation in
2016
Adopted tunnelling methods comprise NATM and EPB TBM
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
Two sinkholes in Barao da Torre Street in Ipanema, Rio de
Janeiro, caused by the TBM excavation underneath

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Tunnelling in transition zone of rock and sandy soil
Unknown groundwater condition

Construction Methods and Support


Convertible Earth Pressure Balance TBM
Possible Cause of Failure
The face of a fractured rock was unfixed during tunnel
excavation. Adjacent rock blocks were affected and failed
progressively. Subsequently, cavities propagated to the
ground surface through the overlying soil and caused
sinkholes

Consequence
No injury
Minor construction delay
Emergency and Remedial Measures
The area was blocked off
The cavities were backfilled with roughly 100m3 of concrete
Lessons learnt
As revealed from the incident investigation study, the impact of
incident has been limited due to four factors

Good choice of excavation method (i.e. EPB TBM)


Pretreatment of Soil
Monitoring works on ground and buildings
Prompt and efficient deployment of the Contingency and
Emergency Plan

Case No HK1. MTR Modified Initial System, Prince Edward


Station, Nathan Road, 12 Sept. 1977
Asia
Hong Kong, China
12 September 1977
Project Title
MTR Modified Initial System
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse.
Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground and
Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.
SCMP (1977). MTR tunnel collapses. South China Morning Post.
13 Sept. 1977, Hong Kong.

Keywords (for searching)


MTR, Prince Edward Station
Figures

Nathan Road
Water table

Annular Ground
Treatment

Annular Ground
Treatment

Station Tunnel

Running
Tunnel

after Clay & Takas (1997)

Background
A running tunnel (5m in diameter) being constructed from Prince
Edward Station by the drill and blast method
Ground above the tunnel strengthened
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
A wall section of the running tunnel under Nathan Road
collapsed
The subsidence did not affect the road surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Decomposed granite overlain by fill
Construction Methods and Support
Drill-and-blast method

Possible Cause of Failure


Gap existed between the ground treatment above the station
tunnel and that above the running tunnel allowing the soil to flow
into the tunnel
Consequence
Nathan Road between Argyle Street and Arran Street closed as
a safety measure
Three buildings (Nos. 745, 745A and 745B Nathan Road)
involving 100 people evacuated
Closure Order issued for nearby shops and a petrol station
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Filling the cavity with concrete
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No HK2. MTR Island Line, 22 Hennessy Road, 1 Jan. 1983


Asia
Hong Kong, China
1 January 1983
Project Title
MTR Island Line
Source of Information
Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected
Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse.
Proceedings of the
International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground and
Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.
SCMP (1983). MTR tunnelling may be to blame. South China
Morning Post. 2 Jan. 1983, Hong Kong.

Keywords (for searching)


MTR, Island Line, Hennessy
Figures
Hennessy Road
Water
table

Rock

Soft Ground

Shield Chamber

after Clay & Takas (1997)

Background
Tunnelling from Admiralty to Causeway Bay for MTR Island Line

Nature and Type of Failure


Construction failure
Water-bearing fill flowed into the tunnel, opening a hole at the
road above
1,500m3 of material flowed into the tunnel creating a void of an
area of 100m2 and 30m deep beneath the road surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Sound granite to soft ground (the reclamation)

Construction Methods and Support


Drill-and-blast method

Possible Cause of Failure


Misinterpretation of the geology by the Contractor
Blasting went too far, resulting in the tunnel penetrating the
rock into soft ground
Consequence
Cracks found in the granite masonry of the outside wall of a
building at 22 Hennessy Road
At least 21 timber piles beneath an adjacent building of 22
Hennessy Road exposed
More than 150 people in 18-22 Hennessy Road evacuated
The building at 18-20 Hennessy Road reopened 3 hours after
the incident and the building at 22 Hennessy Road 6 days
later

Emergency and Remedial


Measures
The void was backfilled by grout
The floor slab of the building at
22 Hennessy Road pushed up
by the grouting works by 5075mm
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

SCMP (1983)

Case No HK3. MTR Island Line, Shing On Street, Shau Kei


Wan, 23 Jul. 1983
Asia
Hong Kong, China
23 July 1983
Project Title
MTR Island Line
Source of Information
MP (1983a). . Ming Pao Newspaper. 24 July
1983, Hong Kong.

Keywords (for searching)


MTR, Island Line, Shing On Street,
Shau Kei Wan
Figures

MP (1983a)

Background
Tunnelling from Tai Koo Station to Sai Wan Ho Station for MTR
Island Line
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
13m x 1m void formed

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Fill, marine deposits, alluvium, grades I-IV granite with
corestones
Construction Methods and Support
TBM with cast insitu lining

Possible Cause of Failure


A narrow crack which developed on the arch of the station
tunnel
Consequence
Section of Shau Kei Wan Road closed
Building at 122-124 Shau Kei Wan Road settled more than
100mm and tilting observed
More than 80 families (400 people) evacuated & a woman
injured
Water main damaged due to the settlement
Water and gas supplies stopped
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Grouting carried out to stabilize the building foundations
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No HK4. MTR Island Line, 140-168 Shau Kei Wan Road,
16 Dec. 1983
Asia
Hong Kong, China
16 December 1983
Project Title
MTR Island Line
Source of Information
MP (1983b). . ing Pao
Newspaper. 17 Dec. 1983, Hong Kong.

Keywords (for searching)


MTR, Island Line, Shau
Kei Wan
Figures

MP (1983b)

Background
Construction of Sai Wan Ho Station for MTR Island Line
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
More than 40mm of ground settlement
About 150m3 of soil flowed into the tunnel leaving a void
between Shau Kei Wan Road and the tunnel

Ground and Groundwater Conditions


Mixed ground
Construction Methods and Support
TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Unfavorable ground condition gaps existed within soil mass
leading soil and water flow into the tunnel
Consequence
Section of Shau Kei Wan Road closed
Water supply stopped

Emergency and Remedial Measures


Steel bulkhead was installed to protect the tunnel and a shaft
was sunk from the road to investigate the extent of the void
and for backfilling the affected areas
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No HK5. Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200,


Canton Road, 21 Oct. 2006
Asia
Hong Kong, China
21 October 2006
Project Title
Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200
Source of Information
GEO File Information. GEO File Reference: GCME 3/5/7989/05,
KSL Southern Link C/No. KDB200, West Kln Station & Ancillary
Bldg & Tunnel.

Keywords (for searching)


Kowloon Southern Link, Canton Road, sinkhole
Figures

GEO File Information

Background
Twin railway tunnels between Jordan Road and East Tsim
Sha Tsui Station
Incident of ground loss occurred at TBM launch area
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
3m(W) x 3.5m(L) x 3m(D) sinkhole formed reaching the
ground surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Fill, marine deposit, alluvium, completely/highly decomposed
granite and MDG; groundwater few meters below ground
Construction Methods and Support
Slurry TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Slurry leakage and loss of slurry support pressure

Consequence
Crater formed at the ground surface closed to a busy road and
a gas main
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Backfilling of the sinkhole with stockpile materials and subbase materials
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

Case No HK6. Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200,


Canton Road, 3 June 2007
Asia
Hong Kong, China
3 June 2007
Project Title
Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200
Source of Information
GEO File Information. GEO File Reference: GCME 3/5/7989/05,
KSL Southern Link C/No. KDB200, West Kln Station & Ancillary
Bldg & Tunnel.

Keywords (for searching)


Kowloon Southern Link, Salisbury Road
Figures

GEO File Information

Background
Twin railway tunnels between Jordan Road and East Tsim
Sha Tsui Station
Nature and Type of Failure
Construction failure
2m x 3m sinkhole reaching the ground surface
Ground and Groundwater Conditions
Fill, marine deposit, alluvium, completely/highly decomposed
granite and MDG; groundwater few meters below ground
Construction Methods and Support
Slurry TBM

Possible Cause of Failure


Sudden air pressure loss through the interface between
CDG/HDG and overlying marine sand during a compressed air
intervention, resulting in loss of face support and subsequent
formation of sinkhole
Consequence
Crater formed at the ground surface, with associated
settlement
Temporary closure of a busy road lane
A low pressure gas main and a 1,200 mm stormwater drain
were affected
Emergency and Remedial Measures
Backfilling of sinkhole with granular fill
Lessons Learnt
Unpublished

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