Compilation of Case Digests For Consti 2 (Execution Copy)

Cases in Constitutional Law 2
Compilation of Cases in Constitutional Law II

Based on the Syllabus of
Atty. Reynaldo Flores
A Document Submitted To the Polytechnic University of the Philippines

College of Law
In Fulfilment of the Requirements for Completion in Constitutional Law II
Submitted By:
Ana Portia Carza

Maida Manaog
Alvin Morales
Jobel Pineda
Dana Marie Reyes
May 2015
I. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

A. Police Power
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance
halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions,
the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political
functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court
were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is
compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good
standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end
than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental
and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day. (Whitelight CORP V City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009)
B. Eminent Domain
The power of eminent domain, that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against
the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should,
then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law
at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned,
to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners
would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part
of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for
public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked. (Amigable v Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972)
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. 1.Due Process- Right to Life, Liberty, Property

i. Doctrine of relative Constitutionality
According to Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become
void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory,
its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice,
fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued
operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, they should be declared null and void and without effect. (Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 446 SCRA 299, December 15, 2004)
ii. Hierarchy of Rights
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and
the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between
the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of
human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
51 SCRA 189, June 5, 1973)
iii. Property Right
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected
under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It
does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may
thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and
one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a
contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these
words in the Declaration of Rights. (Chavez vs. Romulo431 SCRA 534, June 9, 2004)
iv. Constitutional vs. Statutory Due Process
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the
abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature
of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due
process violation of the employer. (Agabon vs. NLRCG. R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004)
v. Aspects of Due Process

1. Substantive Due Process
b. Void for Vagueness Doctrine, Overbreadth Doctrine, and Facial Challenge
Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to life, liberty or
property.
Hence the questions if the plunder law is constitutional? Yes, the Plunder Law is constitutional. Petitioner advances the
highly stretched theory that the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution
for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal. Hence the law is clear. (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001)
2. Procedural Due Process
The essence of procedural due process is the one which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial. Contrary to petitioners asseverations, RA 4670 is applicable to this case. It has not been
expressly repealed by the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is
a fundamental rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless
it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they
cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of
construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to
harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.
(Fabella vs. Court Of Appeals 283 SCRA 256, November 28, 1997)
vi. Standards of Judicial Review
The standard of judicial reviews as held in long line of decisions are as follows; 1. That there must be an impartial court or
tribunal cloth with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person
of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; 3. The defendant must be given an opportunity
to be heard; and 4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
The court held that the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. (White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila G.R. No. 122846, January 20,
2009)
B. Equal Protection
vii. Requisites for Valid Classification
Equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play.
Equality of protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance,
they may be treated in law differently.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. (ABAKADA Guro vs. Purisima G.R. No.
166715, August 14, 2008)
viii. Judicial Standards of Equal Protection
According to Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become
void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory,
its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
(Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 446 SCRA 299, December 15, 2004)
B. Search and Seizure

i. Availability of Right to Alien
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable
searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions
to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with
the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; otherwise such search and seizure become
unreasonable within the meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision. This interdiction against warrantless searches
and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. (People vs. Chua Ho San 307 SCRA 432, June 17,
1999)
ii. Requisites of Valid Warrant

b. Drug, Alcohol and Blood Test
Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of
the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform;
no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
The provision [no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. (SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs
BoardG.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)
iii. Administrative Warrant of Arrest
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect
the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or
grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the
exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone. While it may really be contended that the Act did not
expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of
Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation
proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien-which provision was
expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of this power by the
chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions. (Qua Chee Gan vs. The Deportation Board9 SCRA 27, May
31, 1991)
iv. Knock and Announce Principle
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be allowed
entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice
and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is known as the knock and announce principle
which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such
notice are as important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable.
( People vs. Huang Zhen Hua G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004)
v. Warrantless Arrest
1. Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest
It was akin to a stop-and-frisk. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon.
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows
a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function
which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have
hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same
store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years
experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further. (Manalili vs. Court of Appeals280 SCRA 400, October 9, 1997)
2. Consented Search
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in
either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far
from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs
of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence
against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto. (People vs. Johnson G.R. No. 13881, December 18, 2000)
3. Plain View Doctrine
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about
to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the
law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is
entrapment and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an
opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the
evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted. (People vs. Doria 301 SCRA
668, January 22, 1999)
a. Elements
The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that it should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For
the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search. Herein, the police officers first located the marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested
without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's premises. The police team
was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"
applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had
to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and
hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.(People vs. Valdez G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000)
4. Stop- and Frisk Search
The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there
could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed,
was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to
a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk"
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. (Malacat vs. CA283 SCRA 159, December 12, 1997)
5. Search of a Moving Vehicle
The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public vehicle. The rules governing search and seizure have over
the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Unquestionably, the warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause.
(People vs. Balingan 241 SCRA 277, February 13, 1995)
6. Customs Search
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, in closure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace."
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search
and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. (Papa vs. Mago Gr no L-27360, February 28, 1968)
7. Searches at Checkpoints
It is well settled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which
such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to
easily perpetrate their malicious designs. (People vs. Usana 323 SCRA 754, January 28, 2000)
8. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
Under the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime was being committed. Consequently, there was more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. (People vs. De Gracia
233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994)
9. Search by Private Persons
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not
a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof does not constitute a
warrantless search. ( People vs. Marti193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991)
vi. Warrantless Arrest

1. Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
The law mandates that searches be against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such
incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest. In
this situation, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't work the other way around. Likewise, as a
rule, an arrest is legitimate if it is with a valid warrant of arrest. However, a police officer may conduct warrantless arrests: (a) In
flagrante delicto When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. (People vs. Molina352 SCRA 174, February 19, 2001)
c. Continuing Offense
Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully arrested for being members of the New Peoples Army where mere
membership is penalized, and for subversion (a continuing offense).
Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Likewise, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who
committed the offense (based on actual facts), coupled with good faith in making the arrest.
The Court reiterates that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the
arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the arrests on the compliance with the requirements of a
long existing law; probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers; and that the arrest is on the basis of actual facts
and circumstances. (Umil vs. Ramos, GR No. 79731, July 9, 1990)
C. Privacy to Communication and Correspondence

i. Right to Privacy
1. Categories
The Court declared Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional. The Court found that the Government has shown no basis for
claiming that unsolicited commercial ads reduce the efficiency of computers. Moreover, people have been receiving such ads even
before the advent of computers and these have never been outlawed since people might have interest in such ads. What is
essential is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these ads. The same is true with spam. The recipient has the
option to delete or not to read them. The prohibition of unsolicited commercial ads would deny a person the right to read his emails
even those which are unsolicited. While commercial speech is a separate category of speech that is not entitled to the same level of
protection given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression it is nonetheless still entitled to protection. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. (Disini, Jr. vs. The Secretary of Justice GR No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
ii. Concept of Informational Privacy
The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or
order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wifedo not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither one may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. (Zulueta vs. CA 253 SCRA 699,
February 20, 1996)
2. Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA 4200)
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec.1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec.4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
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Absent is a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of
the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. (Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA 235 SCRA 111, August 4, 1994)
v. Two-Part Test to Determine Reasonableness of Persons Expectation of Privacy
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has
always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual--has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a technological age --industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.' (Ople vs. Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998)
D. Freedom of Expression, Press, and Right to Peaceably Assemble

i. Freedom from Censorship or Prior Restraint
1. a. Content- Based and Content-Neutral Regulation or Restraint
The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms in
order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of
interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election
campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of
free, honest, and orderly elections.
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.-The posting of decals and stickers
on cars, scalesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the
preference of the citizenbecomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.Whether the
candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers orpoor and without the means to spread out the
same number of decals and stickers is not asimportant as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of
freespeech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personalproperty. To strike down this right and
enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties. (Adiong vs. COMELEC 207 SCRA713, March 31, 1992)
ii. Prohibition against Third-Party Standing, As Applied Challenge, Facial Challenge. Overbreadth Doctrine and Hecklers
Veto
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The
application of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
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men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council632 SCRA 146,
October 5, 2010)
iii. Privileged Communication
2. Kinds (Doctrine of Fair Comment)
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. (Borjal vs. Court of
Appeals 301 SCRA 1, January 14, 1999)
v. Commercial Speech
The Court however held that the international instruments invoked by respondents, namely, (1) The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken
by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and
well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation;
however, they do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The international
instruments that have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
(Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assn of the Phil vs. Secretary of Health GR No. 173034, October 9, 2007)
vi. Right to be Forgotten
In assessing whether to do so, a balancing test must be carried out between the rights of the data subject (privacy, data
protection), those of the data controller (economic interests) and the interests of internet users (being able to have access to the
information, including the right to receive information under Art 10 ECHR). The processing of data by a search engine enables any
internet user to access an array of information about a data subjects private life. The interference with the data subjects rights may
therefore be very serious. The economic interests of the search engine in processing the data will not outweigh the data subjects
rights. As a general rule the data subjects rights will also outweigh those of the public, however, that balance may depend on the
nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subjects private life and on the interest of the public in having
that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.
The data subject may make the request for removal in the first instance to the data controller, and if not satisfied, may complain to
the national data protection supervisory authority. (Google Spain vs. AEPD Agencia Espaola de Proteccin de Datos Case C-131/
12, May 13, 2014)
vii. State Regulation of Mass Media
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Petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to prior restraint.
It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs. Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status,
still this Court did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners review power. (MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN
G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005)
viii. Academic Freedom and Right of School to Discipline Its Students
This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and
attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom
of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the
Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write
EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore
the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to
the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Miriam College Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals348 SCRA 265, December 15, 2000)
ix. Assembly and Petition
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these
rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic policy, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and for that matter, to organize or
form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section
3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these
rights. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies. (Bayan, et al. V Ermita, et. al., GR No. 169838, April 25, 2006)
E. Freedom of Religion
i. Non-Establishment Clause
1. Concept and Basis
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The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To
allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the
State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners. (Imbong vs. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
3. Test to Determine Whether there is Violation
The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and religion. Excessive entanglement is
determined by the character and purpose of the institution benefited the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship
between the government and church.
The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully prohibited the establishment of a state church
because of the inherent problems. The Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. (Lemon vs. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 29 L Ed 2d 745, 91 S Ct 2105, June
28, 1971)
ii. Free Exercise Clause

1. Dual Aspect
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of
the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the
courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property. Obviously, there was no
violation of a civil right in the present case. (Dominador L. Taruc, et al. vs. Bishop PorfinoDela Cruz G.R. No. 144801, March 10,
2005)
e. PD 1564 (Solicitation permit Law)
PD 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law) Sec. 2 Any person, corporation, organization or association desiring to solicit or
receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional office of the Dept. of
Social Services and Development. As provided in the integrated Reorganization plan.. All contributions designed to promote the
work of the church are charitable in nature, since religious activities depend for their support or voluntary contributions. However,
religious purpose is not interchangeable with the expression charitable purpose. It is true that there is no religious purpose which
is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a charitable purpose which is not religious
in the legal sense of the term.. Although the term charitable may include matters which are religious, it is a broader term and
includes matters which are not religious and accordingly, there is a distinction between charitable purpose and religious purpose. PD
1564 merely stated charitable of public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended
to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing act or consequence excludes all others. (Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos236 SCRA 197,
September 1, 1994)
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2. Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality-Accommodation
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept
in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adhere the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. (Estrada vs. Escritor 492 SCRA 1 August 4, 2003)
F. Liberty of Abode and the Right to Travel

i. Limitations of Liberty of Abode
The right to liberty abode and of travel is however, subject to specific restrictions under the same constitutional provision.
According to Section 6, the liberty of abode can be limited upon lawful order of the court, and the right to travel by the
requirements of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police
power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave
health problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be taken of
the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be shunned and
excluded from society, and that compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease of supported
by high scientific authority. Upon this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over. Similarly, the local
legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized measures to control the dread scourge. To that forum
must the petitioner go to reopen the question. (Lorenzo vs. Director of Health 50 Phil 595, September 1, 1927)
ii. Concept of the Right to Travel

1. Coverage
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution
of the general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her)
oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden
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duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision. (Marcos vs Manglapus G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989)
2. Aliens
An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress and
thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful. And
Congress may, if it sees fit, as in the statutes in question in United States v. Jung Ah Lung, just cited, authorize the courts to
investigate and ascertain the facts on which the right to land depends. But, on the other hand, the final determination of those facts
may be in trusted by Congress to executive officers, and in such a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary
power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert
the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have
never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country
pursuant to law shall be permitted to enter in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive
branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law. (Nishimura Ekie vs. United States 142 US 651, 659, January 18, 1892)
3. HDO
The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was
not unlawful.Petitioner has failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to
a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
A persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In
such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts
sound discretion. (Reyes vs CA G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009)
iii. Limitations of the Right to Travel

1. Commander in Chief Clause
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the
approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a
military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer
has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. (Gudani vs. Senga 498 SCRA 671, August 15, 2006)
2. SCs Administrative Supervision over Lower Court
There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise
of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that
16
such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should
by no means be construed as limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No.
49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they
can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or
direct according to rule. (OAS-OCA vs.Judge Ignacio B. Macarine A.M. No.MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012)
3. Other Statutory and Inherent Limitations
Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizens constitutional right to travel. It is, however, not the issue in this
case. The only issue in this case is the non-compliance with the Courts rules and regulations. It should be noted that respondent, in
her Comment, did not raise any constitutional concerns. In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad
without the required travel authority. Hence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out issues on ones constitutional right to travel.
Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another, as
assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel.
Section 6 itself provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law. (OCA-OAS vs Heusdens A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011)
G. Right to Information
i. Scope
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on
matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent
the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposedcontract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of
powers. The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law. (Chavez v. PEA
Amari, Gr No. 133250, July 9, 2002)
ii. Limitations
Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.The
arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition.
Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents and papers -- a
right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino
citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioners legal
17
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed. (Chavez vs. PCGG 299 SCRA 744, December 9, 1998)
iii. Publication of Law and Regulation Reinforce this Right
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides
for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. (Taada vs. Tuvera136 SCRA 27, April 24, 1985)
iv. Access to Court Records
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern
and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject
to such limitations imposed by law (Article IV, section 6, New Constitution). The incorporation of this right in the constitution is
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the
public of the nation's problems, or a meaningful democratic decision- making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times . (Lantaco, Sr. vs. Llamas
108 SCRA 502, October 28, 1981)
H. Right of Association
i. Right to Strike
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the
right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that
the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under
pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the
absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes. (SSS vs
CA G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989)
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ii. Membership in Subversive Organizations
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy
unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is
insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or
an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the
reins of Government itself. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become
guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
We do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of
rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract
theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with
action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the
same. ( People vs Hernandez 99 PHIL 515, July, 18, 1956)
iii. Right Not to Join
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged
to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
(In Re: Marcial Edillion 84 SCRA 554, August 3, 1978)
I. Non- Impairment of Contracts

i. When there is Impairment
By that statutory provision, it is clear that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver merely suspend the actions for claims against respondent corporations. Petitioner banks preferred status over the
unsecured creditors relative to the mortgage liens is retained, but the enforcement of such preference is suspended. The loan
agreements between the parties have not been set aside and petitioner bank may still enforce its preference when the assets of
ASB Group of Companies will be liquidated. Considering that the provisions of the loan agreements are merely suspended, there is
no impairment of contracts, specifically its lien in the mortgaged properties. (China Banking Corp vs. ASB Holdings, GR No. 172192,
December 23, 2008)
ii. Exceptions
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a
Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. This Section 12 or RA 2264 states
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that implied power of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favor, to give more power to the local government in
promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare
Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area
considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
(Ortigas and Co. vs. Feati Bank, G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979)
iii. Franchises, Privilege and Licenses
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause. (Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary 190 SCRA 673, October 18, 1990)
J. Free Access to Courts and Quasi- Judicial Bodies and Adequate Legal Assistance
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11 Art. III of the1987
Constitution. The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant
may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., a juridical personality cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigant.
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people are of no moment. Clearly, the
Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that the only natural person can suffer.
(Re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.596 SCRA
40, August 19, 2009)
K. Rights of Suspect under Custodial Investigation

i. When Rights Available
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (People vs. Mara
G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994)
ii. Rights Included

1. Miranda Doctrine
a. RA 7438
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The updted Miranda Rights as promounce by the Supreme Court are as follows;
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood
by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a
lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or
one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be
conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer
with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the
presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does
not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had
not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights
does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence . (People vs. Mahinay 302 SCRA 455,
February 19, 1999)
b. Kinds of involuntary or coerced confession
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the
Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which
Art. III, s12 (1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by
intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the
following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will
be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him. (People vs. Obrero 332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000)
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c. Right to Counsel
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. (Gamboa vs. Cruz 162 SCRA 642, June 27,
1988)
d. Admissibility
i. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
The presumption is always against the waiver of constitutionally protected rights.whenever a protection given by the
Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist
him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case. Confession bears clear earmark of involuntariness where
it was taken incommunicado with only the suspect and 5 policemen present inside a small room. (People vs. Jara144 SCRA 516,
September 30, 1986)
iii. Confession Given to Media
The inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon
in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system. We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a
difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. (People vs. Endino 352 SCRA307, February 20, 2001)
iv. Confession given to Municipal Mayor
The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What
the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed
to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (People vs. Andan 269 SCRA 95, February 20, 2001)
v. Signing of Acknowledgment Receipt
The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the accused does not affect
the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by the police in accordance with their standard operating
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procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or
confession.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (People vs.
Casimiro, 383 SCRA 390, June 20, 2002)
vi. Giving Urine Samples
The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence does not render inadmissible
the Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report (Exhibit L) inasmuch as the examined materials were
legally seized or taken from the petitioners bedroom on the strength of a valid search warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or taken from the bedroom of the
petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon were legally and validly done. Hence, the said Reports containing
the results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real evidence of the prosecution, are admissible in
evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the said prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his possession.
(Gutang vs People 335 SCRA 479, July 11, 2000)
vii. Admissibility of other Evidence Obtained
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. In the present case, petitioner did not make
any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession
extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently
used in evidence against him. (Ho Wai Pang vs. People 659 SCRA 624, October 19, 2011)
L. Right to Bail
i. What is Bail
1. Extradition
Extradition is an international agreement whereby the contracting states agrees to surrender a person who might have
committed or is sentence of crime punishable under the domestic of law of the requesting state.
Significantly, both the extradition treaty between the United States and the Philippines, and the Philippine Extradition Law
(PD 1069) contain no provision expressly withholding from the courts the power to grant bail. Had the intention of the parties to the
treaty been to totally nullify the pre-existing power of the extradition court on the matter of bail, they could have easily provided for it
in the treaty. But since they had not done so, it would be reasonable to presume that they had not so intended. Indeed, the treaty
fails to even remotely suggest such judicial limitation insisted upon by the Government. Truly, there is neither logic nor persuasion to
the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases, or that class of cases where courts must render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Bail as a remedy is available where there is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial. In the 1909 case of
United States v. Co Siaco, akin to the situation confronting us but involving a deportation proceeding, this Court allowed the potential
deportee to post bail although a deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was then no law providing for bail in
deportation cases. (Government of the USA vs. Purganan G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002)
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2. Deportation
When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings
because there is no law authorizing it. (Go vs. Ramos G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009)
3. Military
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the
military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The unique structure of the military should be enough
reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Mutinous soldiers operate within the framework
of democratic system and are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. If they are allowed to go on bail, they could freely resume
their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and justice. They cannot say they have been discriminated against because they
are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. (Comendador vs. De Villa G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991)
M. Right of an Accused during Trial

i. Summary of Rights
1. Criminal Due Process
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system
whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. (Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
2. Presumption of Innocence
Equipoise Rule
The equipoise rule is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here as invoked by the
petitioner. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims
of persecution and conspiracy. (Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991)
3. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. As the record shows, the petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was
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never actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, following eleven postponements of the scheduled
hearings, mostly because the prosecution was not prepared. The accused was never absent at these aborted hearings. He was
prepared to be tried, but either the witnesses against him were not present, or the prosecutor himself was absent, or the court
lacked material time. Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang over his head even as he was not given an opportunity
to deny them because his trial could not be held. (Caes vs. IAC G.R. Nos. 74989-90 November 6, 1989)
N. Writ of Habeas Corpus

ii. When Available
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of
habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" in
this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. (Go vs. Ramos G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009)
iv. Writ of Amparo
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Reyes vs. Gonzales G.R. No. 182161,
December 3, 2009)
O. Rights against Self- Incrimination

i. Scope and Coverage
The photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners are not violations against the right against selfincrimination. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. The prohibition of compelling a man in
a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may material. (Alih vs. Castro G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987)
ii. Time to Invoke the Right

1. In Civil Case
It is in a criminal case, when the accused may not be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word, even for his own
defense. 7 But while the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal,
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civil or administrative, said privilege, in proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option to
refuse to answer incriminating question, and not a prohibition of inquiry. (Bagadiong vs. Gonzales
G.R. No. L-25966, December 28, 1979)
2. In Criminal Case
An accused in a criminal case as a witness, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For,
in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to
avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction." Chavez was then ordered released from custody. (Chavez vs. CA G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968)
3. In Administrative Case
In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent. The proceeding, while administrative, in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The petitioner in
the case at bar would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. (Pascual vs
Board of Medical Examiners G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969)
iii. Statutory Immunity

1. Two Types
There are two types of Statutory Immunity the first one is Transactional Immunity which is broader in the scope of its protection. By
its grant the witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction and the Used-andDerivative-Use- a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against
him or her in a subsequent prosecution. (Mapa vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-100295, April 26, 1994)
P. Rights against Imprisonment for Debt or Non-Payment of a Poll Tax

i. Debt
A person may not be imprisoned by reason of his debt or non payment of a poll tax, hence, BP 22 does not conflict with
the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. While a debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, he can be
validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu.
But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently
wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished
as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. (Lozano vs. Martine, G.R. No. L-63419, December
18, 1986)
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Q. Double Jeopardy
i. Two Kinds
1. Same Offense
The bill of rights guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy. The same act offense is where the offenses
charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the
identity of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to
exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. (Lamera vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93475, June 5, 1991)
2.Same Act
On the other hand, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses
may be based upon the same act or set of facts. But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of facts. The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put
to jeopardy provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charges is not included or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case. The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of the statues. If two charges are based on one and the same act,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution under other. (People vs. Relova, G.R. No. L-45129,
March 6, 1987)
ii. Requisites
The issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting
acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less
grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses. (Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010)
Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites; 1. The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; 2. The court has jurisdiction to try the case; 3. The accused has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the charge (Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 97214, July 16, 1994)
iii. Doctrine of Supervening Event/Supervening Fact
There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
27
include another when some of the ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice
versa.
This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the
simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies,
the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. (Melo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
L-3580, March 22, 1950)
iv. MRs and Appeals
After trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The
only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. It
is apparent from the decision of Judge Tria-Tirona that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties.
Even
assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision
was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the
evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no
error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. (People vs. Judge
Tria-Tirona G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2005)
R. Prohibition Against Ex post Facto Law

i. Kinds
The Constitution provides that No ex post facto law shall or bill of attainder shall be enacted, hence an ex post facto law is one
which; 1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; 5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and 5. Deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction
or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In the Matter of the Petition for the Declaration of the Petitioners Rights and Duties
Under Sec 8 of R.A. No. 6132, G.R. No. L-32485, October 22, 1970)
ii. Bill of Attainder
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for
a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
28
powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. (People vs.
Ferrer 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
III. CITIZENSHIP
A. Who are Filipino Citizens
29
As enumerated in The 1987 Constitutuion, the following are the citizens of the Philippines, 1. Those who are citizens of
the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3.
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4.
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. It was proven that Allan Poe, father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was
a Filipino citizen. FPJ was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of
the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, FPJ was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate. The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 had been in vogue. Jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. (Tecson vs. COMELECG.R. No.
161434, March 3, 2004)
C. Naturalization and Denaturalization
Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippines citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. (Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971)
The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republic indicates clearly the merit of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck Lao.
Gan Tsitung established that no retroactive effect is to be given a judicial pronouncement that would impose a requirement not in
existence at a time that the application was heard and favorably acted on. Hence, there would be manifest unfairness in setting
aside a decision that had subsequently become final and lead to the grant of citizenship.
The highest court asserted that the status of the petitioner as a national of this country for practically thirteen years ought
to have remained undisturbed. To rely on the 1964 Tan Ten Koc ruling, which require that positive proof as to the paper wherein the
application was published in the place where the proceeding has general application to petitioner who, as far back as June 15,
1950, had already been granted his citizenship by this Court, his certificate being issued two years thereafter, would, in the language
of Gan Tsitung, be far from "just, fair and reasonable." (Chan Teck Lao vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-25300, January 4,
1974)
D. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a nation by the said states. Such a situation may arise such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.The Constitutional Commission established that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance", or a situation where a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states, and must therefore
be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status. Nonetheless, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, it should suffice for candidates with dual citizenship if, upon filing their
30
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship and consequently
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and
of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. (Mercado vs. ManzanoG.R. No. 135083, May
26, 1999)
E. Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen; 1. By naturalization; 2. By repatriation; and 3. By direct act of Congress. (Bengzon III vs. HRET,G.R. No. 142840, May 7,
2001)
F. Cancellation of Citizenship
Filipino Citizenship may be cancelled by competent authority, hence, Section 18(a) of CA No. 473 provides that a naturalization
certificate may be cancelled if it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently and illegally. (Republic of the
Philippines vs. William Li Yao, 214 SCRA 748 1992)
The Court maintained that while Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office, he subjected the
issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and
out of the country before filing his COC. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an
American.
The Courtagreed with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division and held that, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, Arnadohas recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. Therefore, Arnado is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. (Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 19564, July 2, 2013)
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
Facts:
31
Petitioner,challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance, in view of all the
foregoing, Ordinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.
The Respondent moved to petition the order of RTC, before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local
government units, the power. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Respondent validly exercise its police power when it enacted the City ordinance.
Ruling:
No, Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance
halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a
rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions,
the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political
functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court
were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is
compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good
standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end
than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental
and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.
MMDA VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000
Facts:
32
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil
Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. Respondent
questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of
Neptune Street and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs
proposed action.
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held
that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
Issue:
Whether the Court of appeals erred in its decision that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of the Neptune
Street.
Rulling:
No, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of
local affairs." The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate"- one endowed
with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political
subdivisions of the state.
33
The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and
traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and
goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing
system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning
traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and
administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
MMDA VS. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.

G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater
Manila Mass Transport System, The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution
No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes
via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila.
In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman
Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals
along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation." This impending move, it stressed, would mean
the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
Alleging that the MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing
bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of
the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,
Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."
The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful
subject matter and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property rights must yield to police power. Thus it reversed its
decision, finding the E.O "an unreasonable exercise of police power".
Hence this petition.
Issue:
34
Whether the trial court erred in its decision that the E.O is "an unreasonable exercise of police power".
Ruling:
No, Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the
recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By
virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991.
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although
authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of
the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the
authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
MMDA VS. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT

G.R. No. 179554
Facts:
In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-leasetransfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 ( Build,
Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for
25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks entered
into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signage and other
advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3.
In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signage and other advertising media pursuant
to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards,
signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks
refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the formers billboards and similar forms of advertisement. n March 1,
2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an injunction suit (with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction), docketed as Civil Case No. 68864.
35
The RTC permanently enjoined MMDA from dismantling , removing or destroying the billboards, signage and other
advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structure of the MRT3.
MMDA moved for reconsideration, but the CA resolution denied the motion for reconsideration on September 3, 2007.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its decision that MMDA has no power to dismantle the signage of the Respondent.
Ruling:
No, The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No.
88-09 did not apply to Trackwork billboards, signage and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and
display of billboards, signage and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to
the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover,
MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks billboards, signage and other advertising media in MRT3,
because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island
of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition.
The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not
in MMDA.
BINAY VS. DOMINGO

G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991
Facts:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 A RESOLUTION TO
CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF
EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN
OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY.Qualified beneficiaries, under the
Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos
(P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the
Burial Assistance Program.
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on
its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the
implementation thereof.
Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision No.
1159 be set aside as null and void.
36
Issue:
Whether the decision of COA is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes, The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Municipal governments exercise this
power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to
promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most
powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. On it depends the security of
social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private
and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests.
However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of
a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
PASEI VS. DRILON

G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department
Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for
certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
Department Order No. 1, it is
contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment
clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
37
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,
and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether the Department order is in the nature of the police power and therefore valid.
Ruling:
Yes, it has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power
and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. Hence, the petition was denied.
TIO VS. VRB

G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987
Facts:
Petitioner, assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Video-gram
Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the video-gram industry. On November 5, 1985, a month after the
38
promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing
SEC. 134. Video-Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
ISSUE:
Whether P.D no. 1987 is Unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No, The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to
include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of video-grams is
evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title
of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Video-gram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or
that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which
impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
"inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature. Only congressional power or competence,
not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to
such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate
branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should
be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms
and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and
cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained
Petition was dismissed.
ROXAS & CO., INC. VS. CA

G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. In the exercise of this
legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program. When Congress
39
took over the legislative power from the President, it enacted R. A No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988.
The three Haciendas were subject for conversion under the R.A no 6657, the petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with
respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued by respondent DAR in the name of
several persons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist
zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land
to non-agricultural.
Respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform,
hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.
The CA dismissed the petition, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in its decision.
Ruling:
Yes, it partly erred in its decision. Land Use refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development
and management. Land Use Conversion refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the DAR. The conversion of agricultural land to uses other than agricultural requires field
investigation and conferences with the occupants of the land. They involve factual findings and highly technical matters within the
special training and expertise of the DAR. DAR A. O. No. 7, Series of 1997 lays down with specificity how the DAR must go about its
task. This time, the field investigation is not conducted by the MARO but by a special task force, known as the Center for Land Use
Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI- DAR Central Office). The procedure is that once an application for conversion is filed,
the CLUPPI prepares the Notice of Posting. The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate to the fact of
posting. The CLUPPI conducts the field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the
information necessary for the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates on the merits of the
investigation report and recommends the appropriate action. This recommendation is transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the
Undersecretary, or Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more than fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the
Secretary. The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however. The Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be
appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, the failure of respondent DAR to comply with
the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued
to the farmer beneficiaries.
REPUBLIC VS. MERALCO

391 SCRA 700 (2002)
Facts:
40
On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application
reflected an average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatt hour (kwh) in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer
for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order No.
172. In the same Order, the ERB requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an audit and examination of the books and
other records of account of the applicant for such period of time, which in no case shall be less than 12 consecutive months, as it
may deem appropriate and to submit a copy thereof to the ERB immediately upon completion. On February 11, 1997, the COA
submitted its Audit Report SAO No. 95-07 (the COA Report) which contained, among others, the recommendation not to include
income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate determination and the use of the net average
investment method for the computation of the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the
determination of the rate base.
Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision adopting the above recommendations and authorized MERALCO to
implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017 per kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning
February 1994. The ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184 per kilowatt hour granted under the
Boards Order dated January 28, 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167 per kilowatt
hour starting with MERALCO billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to
MERALCO customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.The ERB held that income tax should not be
treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from
the operation of their business hence, should not be passed on to the consumers.Further, in applying the net average investment
method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property
should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in service during the test year
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an
average of P0.167 per kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCOs customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing
cycle beginning February 1998.Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.
Ruling:
Yes. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes
prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a
public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation
is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use
of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. Hence the petition was granted.
ACEBEDO VS. CA
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
Facts:
41
Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the
Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the
cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. City Mayor Camilo P. Cabili designated City Legal Officer Leo T. Cahanap to conduct
an investigation. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating
all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan City.
The report further advised that no new permit shall be granted to petitioner for the year 1989 and should only be given time to wind
up its affairs.
The City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and
giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs. Petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction against the respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and Samahan ng
Optometrists sa Pilipinas Ilagan.
Respondent SOPI interposed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
but on Presiding Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara deferred resolution of such Motion to Dismiss until after trial of the case on the
merits. However, the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Thereafter, respondent SOPI filed its answer. The trial
court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier
issued. Petitioners motion for reconsideration met the same fate. It was denied by an Order dated June 28, 1990. The Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners motion reconsideration was also denied in the
Resolution.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in holding that the said special conditions nevertheless became binding on the petitioner bupon
its acceptance thereof as private agreement or contract.
Ruling:
Yes, the public respondents, City Mayor and City Legal Officer, private respondent SOPI and the Office of the Solicitor
General contend that as a valid exercise of police power, respondent City Mayor has the authority to impose, as he did, special
conditions in the grant of business permits.
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code which provides: Sec. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
42
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the
health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and
the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the
ambit of this power. The petition was granted.
TWU VS. CONFESOR

G.R. No. 117169, March 12, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner (PTWU), filed a notice of strike, on grounds of unfair labor practice, more specifically union busting and violation
of CBA. On the other hand private respondent filed a notice of lockout. It also filed a petition to declare illegal the work slowdowns
staged by the petitioner Union. Both cases were then consolidated. Several conciliation meetings were conducted but the parties
failed to settle their dispute. Private respondent declared a companywide lockout which continued until August 22, 1994. There were
about eighty union members who were consequently dismissed. This also brought about the filing of the union members of a notice
to strike in self-defense. On August 15, 1994, the National Labor Relations Commission declared the slowdowns illegal.
Private respondent corporation requested the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Hence, Secretary
Confesor issued the assailed order. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on for lack of
merit.
Petitioners also argue that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of authority. A cursory reading of Article 263 (g)
allegedly shows that the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction or to certify a dispute for compulsory arbitration is
strictly restricted to cases involving industries that are indispensable to national interest. Petitioners posit that the instant labor
dispute does not adversely affect the national interest. The tire industry has long ceased to be a government protected industry and,
moreover, Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation is not indispensable to the national interest. The strike in Philtread will not
adversely affect the supply of tires in the market and the supply of imported tires is more than sufficient to meet the market
requirements.
Issue:
Whether the respondents order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
No. At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the police
power of the State, which has been defined as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People vs. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power,
together with the power of eminent domain and the power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does not need to be
expressly conferred by the Constitution. Thus, it is submitted that the argument of petitioners that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the
Labor Code do not have any constitutional foundation is legally inconsequential. When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration.
43
CHURCHILL AND TAIT VS. RAFFERTY

G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915
Facts:
The Defendant perpetually restrains and prohibits from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the
annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or
removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is,
or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the
preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action.
This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that relating to the power of the court to
restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of those provisions of subsection (b)
of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard
upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
Issue:
Whether the respondent erred in its decision.
Ruling:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature
and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the
police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is
reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.
The courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC. VS. BOT

G.R. No. L-59234, September 30, 1982
Facts:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila,Inc. is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon
accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of
TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. Respondent Board of Transportation (BOT)
issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis.
44
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979;
those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. Petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, seeking to nullify or to stop
its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those
of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
Issue:
Whether BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by
Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
Ruling:
No. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety
and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit
all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even
if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".
The petition was denied.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
Facts:
The defendants, in these cases moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute BP 22 or the bouncing check law being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.
The former Solicitor General in his comment on the petitions, maintained the posture that it was premature for the
accused to elevate to this Court the orders denying their motions to quash, these orders being interlocutory. While this is correct as
a general rule, we have in justifiable cases intervened to review the lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether BP 22 or the bouncing check law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment
for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be
45
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon
the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than
a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing
more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction. The gravamen of the offense punished by
BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
DECS VS. SAN DIEGO

G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Facts:
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to
compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom
and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due
process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and
granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge erred in its decision?

Ruling:
Yes, the believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove
otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
46
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a)
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
SANGALANG VS. IAC

G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988
Facts:
The cases are efforts to enforce the "deed restrictions" in question against specific residents private respondents in the
petitions of Jupiter Street and Reposo Street. The private respondents are alleged to have converted their residences into
commercial establishments (a restaurant, a bakery and coffee shop, an advertising firm; and a construction company,) in violation of
the said restrictions. The petition to hold the vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for
tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had therefore closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air
Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full "commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very restrictions it had
authored.
The Court of Appeals dismissed all five appeals on the basis of 'deed restrictions" as a result of Ordinance No. 81 enacted
by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101 promulgated by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential and
commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police power.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Ordinance Nos. 81.and 8101 is now assailed in these petitions, particularly the Sangalang, et al.
petition.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in deciding that the ordinance is in violation of the police power of city.
Ruling:
No. Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The Ayala Corporation primarily
owing to our finding that it is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public. Insofar as these petitions are
concerned, we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not only because of the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the
restrictive easements based on the "deed restrictions" but chiefly because the National Government itself, through the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into high density commercial (C-3) zone, pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01.
Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the strength alone of the said "deed restrictions.
CENTENO VS. VILLALON- PORNILLOS
G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994
47
Facts:
The officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the
purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together
with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It
is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. an
information 1 was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied by the trial court, and
petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued. The said trial court rendered
judgment finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence they appealed to the
respondent but affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the resspondent judge erred in deciding to convict the petitioner in violation of the solicitation law.
Ruling:
Yes, It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently,
solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the regulatory powers
of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the
cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes imperative to
delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable
restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.
Hence, petitioner was acquitted.
DEL MAR VS. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 138298, August 24, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Raoul B. del Mar initially filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or
operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games, by itself or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on the ground that the controverted
act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCORs own Charter.
However, respondent PAGCOR entered into an Agreement with private respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and
Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make available to
PAGCOR the required infrastructure facilities including the main fronton, as well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai operations
with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of jai-alai.
48
Thus, petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of said Agreement on the ground that
PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such Agreement for the opening,
establishment, operation, control and management of jai-alai games.
Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing as
taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives representing the First District of Cebu City, the Lone
Congressional District of Malabon-Navotas, the Third Congressional District of Quezon City, and the Third Congressional District of
Bukidnon, respectively.
Issue:
Whether PAGCOR can operate jai alai?
Ruling:
No. It is given that in the exercise of his legislative power, President Marcos legally granted PAGCOR's franchise to
operate gambling casinos. The validity of this franchise to operate gambling casinos is not, however, the issue in the cases at
bar. The issue is whether this franchise to operate gambling casinos includes the privilege to operate jai-alai. PAGCOR says it
does. We hold that it does not. PAGCOR's overarching claim should be given the strictest scrutiny because it was granted by one
man who governed when the country was under martial law and whose governance was repudiated by our people in EDSA
1986. The reason for this submission is rooted in the truth that PAGCOR's franchise was not granted by a real Congress where the
passage of a law requires a more rigorous process in terms of floor deliberations and voting by members of both the House and the
Senate. It is self-evident that there is a need to be extra cautious in treating this alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the
legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our people, for plainly it is not . We now have a real Congress and it is best to let
Congress resolve this issue considering its policy ramifications on public order and morals.
AUF VS. CITY OF ANGELES

G.R. No. 189999
Facts:
Petitioner Angeles University Foundation, Filed with the Office of the City Building Official an application for a building
permit for the construction of an 11-storey building of the Angeles University Foundation Medical Center in its main campus located
at MacArthur Highway, Angeles City, Pampanga. Said office issued a Building Permit Fee Assessment in the amount
of P126,839.20. An Order of Payment was also issued by the City Planning and Development Office, Zoning Administration Unit
requiring petitioner to pay the sum of P238,741.64 as Locational Clearance Fee. petitioner claimed that it is exempt from the
payment of the building permit and locational clearance fees, citing legal opinions rendered by the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Petitioner also reminded the respondents that they have previously issued building permits acknowledging such exemption from
payment of building permit fees on the construction of petitioners 4-storey AUF Information Technology Center building and the AUF
Professional Schools building on July 27, 2000 and March 15, 2004, respectively. Hence respondent denied the claim for refund.
The ca reversed the decision of RTC saying it is not exempt from taxes.
Issue:
49
Whether the CA erred in its decision that petitioner is not relieved from paying the taxes impose by the City of Angeles.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the above bases of assessment were arbitrarily determined or unrelated to the
activity being regulated. Neither has petitioner adduced evidence to show that the rates of building permit fees imposed and
collected by the respondents were unreasonable or in excess of the cost of regulation and inspection. Petitioner failed to discharge
its burden to prove that its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. While there is no
allegation or proof that petitioner leases the land to its present occupants, still there is no compliance with the constitutional and
statutory requirement that said real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. The respondents
correctly assessed the land for real property taxes for the taxable period during which the land is not being devoted solely to
petitioners educational activities. Accordingly, the CA did not err in ruling that petitioner is likewise not entitled to a refund of the
real property tax it paid under protest.
PEOPLE VS. PUNTO
GR. No. 46170
Facts:
The accused was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for a violation of article 195 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 235The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the lower court to an
indeterminate penalty of from four months of arresto mayor to two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional,
with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. The amount of P0.91 and the jueteng paraphernalia found in the possession of
the defendant were declared forfeited to the Government. he appellant challenges the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No.
235, amendatory to article 195 of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the penalty is cruel and unusual (par. 18, sec. 1 art.
III).
Issue:
Whether Commonwealth Act No. 235 is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
No, Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, the appellant may be sentenced to a minimum penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum degree which, under the circumstances of the case, should also be imposed in its medium
period, or from one year, one month, and eleven days to one year, eight months, and twenty days. Hence, the minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court is below the proper range and should, therefore, be increased to one year, one month and eleven days of
prision correccional.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA

G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972
Facts:
50
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to
her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said
lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable's counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to SC, there being no question of fact involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
Ruling:
Yes, considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she
has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole
lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is
neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the
land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
MANOSCA VS. CA
G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996
Facts:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila. When the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The
resolution was, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports.Accordingly, the Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation. At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a
hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00)
values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with
the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of
the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992 resolution of the appellate court.
Issue:
51
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its decision on appropriating the land.
Ruling:
No. Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police
power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions
in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is
generally so described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some
public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over
property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so
to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
PCA VS. PANIS

G.R. No. L-106528, December 21, 1993
Facts:
Petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable compensation
therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court As a
result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment,
which was granted on April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise issued by the same court. the City of Manila
filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53531 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, for the
expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the ejectment proceedings. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition before the Court of Appeals a petition assailing the orders. The petition was dismissed, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the ca erred in its decision in ruling the expropriation.
Ruling:
Yes, The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over its territorial
jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain, thus:
General powers. The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold,
lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property for public use,
contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the
powers hereinafter conferred.
52
Hence the petition was denied.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. CA

G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing
the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm
for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the
Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance
of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the
complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial
court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission
of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether the ca erred in deciding that the appropriation is a valid exercise of power of eminent domain.
Ruling:
Yes, To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural
lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the
lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In
effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to
be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination
and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.
Hence the petition was granted.
NPC VS. JOCSON

G.R. Nos. 94193-99, February 25, 1992
Facts:
53
Petitioner filed seven eminent domain for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of the parcels of land
described in the complaints for its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bacolod-Tomonton Transmission Line. The
complaints uniformly allege that petitioner urgently needs portions of the affected land to enable it to construct its tower and
transmission line in a manner that is compatible with the greatest good while at the same time causing the least private injury; the
purpose for which the lands are principally devoted will not be impaired by the transmission lines as it will only acquire a right-ofway-easement thereon; and it had negotiated with and offered to pay defendants for the portions affected by the Bacolod-Tomonton
Transmission Line, but the parties failed to reach an agreement despite long and repeated negotiations. The market values
mentioned in the Order are the same values appearing in the tax declarations of the properties and the notices of assessment
issued by the Assessor. In compliance with the said Order, petitioner deposited the total sum of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine
National Bank. The defendants in Civil Case No. 5938 filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order alleging that the provisional
value of the property involved therein "had been set much too low" considering the allegations therein adduced, stating that the real
compensation that should accrue to them is estimated at P29,970,000.00 and praying that the questioned Order be reconsidered so
as to reflect "the true amount covering the properties subject to (sic) Eminent Domain estimated at TWENTY NINE MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND (P29,970,000.00). Thus respondent judge directed petitioner to pay the increased provisional
value of land. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge act in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and is otherwise either
unmindful or ignorant of the law: when he fixed the provisional values of the properties for the purpose of issuing a writ of
possession on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitioner may derive in violation or in disregard of P.D.
No. 42. the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function; accordingly, We declared as
unconstitutional and void, for being, inter alia, impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which tends to render the Court
inutile in a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to it for final determination, the method of ascertaining just
compensation prescribed in P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533, to wit: the market value as declared by the owner or administrator or
such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees, and the value declared by the
owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or the value as determined by the assessor, pursuant to the
Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to
acquire the property, in the last mentioned decree. If the legislature or the executive department cannot even impose upon the court
how just compensation should be determined, it would be far more objectionable and impermissible for respondent Judge to grant
the defendants in an eminent domain case such power and authority.
REPUBLIC VS. PLDT

G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969
Facts:
54
The defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages,
coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and
vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting
trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications,
entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would
convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. the defendant Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under
which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities. plaintiff Republic commenced suit against
the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to
execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the
Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against
the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
Issue:
Whether parties can be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal
terms and conditions of the contract.
Ruling:
No, parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms
and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by
express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306,
1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel
the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course,
the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement
of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not
much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of
the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided
just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone
systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.
MANOTOK VS. NHA

G.R. No. L-55166, May 2l, 1987
55
Facts:
The President of the Philippines issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 555 instituting a nationwide slum improvement and
resettlement program (SIR). On the same date, the President also issued LOI No. 557, adopting slum improvement as a national
housing policy. Petitioner Elisa R. Manotok, one of the owners of the properties to be expropriated, received from the NHA a letter
informing her that the latter had deposited the compensation for the land. The petitioner was also informed that she was free to
withdraw her share in the properties upon surrender by her of the titles pertaining to said properties and that if petitioner failed to
avail herself of the said offer, the NHA would be constrained to take the necessary legal steps to implement the decree. Petitioner
wrote a letter to the NHA alleging, inter alia, that the amounts of compensation for the expropriation of the properties of the
petitioners as fixed in the decrees do not constitute the "just compensation" envisioned in the Constitution. She expressed veritable
doubts about the constitutionality of the said decrees and informed the NHA that she did not believe that she was obliged to
withdraw the amount of P5,000,000.00 or surrender her titles over the properties.
In the meantime, some officials of the NHA circulated instructions to the tenants-occupants of the properties in dispute not
to pay their rentals to the petitioners for their lease-occupancy of the properties in view of the passage of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670.
Hence, the owners of the Tambunting Estate filed a petition to declare P.D. No. 1669 unconstitutional. The owners of the SunogApog area also filed a similar petition attacking the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1670.The petitioners maintain that the Presidential
Decrees providing for the direct expropriation of the properties in question violate their constitutional right to due process and equal
protection of the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees their properties were automatically expropriated and they
were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation or
to contest the just compensation to which they are entitled.
Issue:
Whether the appropriation of the lands need judicial process.
Ruling:
No. The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such
power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest
semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon
the signing of the decree. No deposit before taking is required under the decree. In other words, although due process does not
always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice
and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his property rights. We agree with the public respondents
that there are exceptional situations when, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the requirement of due process may not
necessarily entail judicial process. But where it is alleged that in the taking of a person's property, his right to due process of law has
been violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged violation.
EPZA VS. DULAY

G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987
56
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the
establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area,
however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328
square meters owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the
parcels of land from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as
amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge
issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises. On December 23, 1980, the
private respondent filed its answer. At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent judge issued an order stating
that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is
thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981.
Issue:
Whether Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533
insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's report for hearing because under
P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared
by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Therefore, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said
commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains
that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of the
properties and that said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to determine the
just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is valid and
constitutional.The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness"
of the decreed compensation.
ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ VS. PEZA

G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001
57
Facts:
On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of irrigated
rice land in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez
under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Order dated July
11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said
order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and
hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated October 25, 1991, the trial court reconsidered the expropriation
of Salud jimenez lot. Finding the said order unacceptable, private respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between
the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993, the trial
court approved the compromise agreement. However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to petitioner inasmuch
as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997,
petitioner Estate filed a Motion to Partially Annul the Order. The trial court annulled the said compromise agreement entered into
between the parties and directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said Order of
the trial court, respondent PEZA moved Hence the CA grant the petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in its decision when it ordered the payment of just compensation.
Ruling:
No. Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where
the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of
dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of
just compensation to be ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally disposes of the second stage. To both orders the
remedy therefrom is an appeal.
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11, 1991 order of expropriation became final and the parties
subsequently entered into a compromise agreement regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed
to abide by the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial could
only validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the
subject of the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot
1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and executory.
REPUBLIC VS. CA
G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002
58
Facts:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio
transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the
premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine
years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued an order of expropriation. Thus the court ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned,
computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid.
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was out rightly denied.
Issue:
Whether the CA in ruling to pay the expropriated land.
Ruling:
No. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no
recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at
most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation,
even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old
case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon
the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. The ubiquitous
character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not
adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the
property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemn or in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property,
and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for
the taking. Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just
compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the
necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively
restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining public use, two approaches are utilized - the first is public
employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as
being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each
demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted.
MCIAA VS. LOZADA JR.

G.R. No. 176625
59
Facts:
Subject of this case is a Lot located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was
subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. As early as 1947, the lots were already
occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned over to the Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National
Airport Corporation and then to the CAA. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the latter to pay
Lozada the fair market value. The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO), formerly
CAA, proposed a compromise settlement. The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was
not pursued. Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots,
as per previous agreement.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of the said
expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted
into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion
thereof was occupied by squatters. The old airport was converted into what is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of
Lot. During trial, respondents presented Bernardo Lozada, Sr. as their lone witness, while petitioners presented their own witness,
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority legal assistant Michael Bacarisas.
Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered
its assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch
57, Cebu City. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated February 7,
2007.
Issue:
Whether the respondent failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise settlement between them
and the Government.
Ruling:
No. with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose
stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper
exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly,
the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice,
fairness, and equity. that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is
always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corrolarily, if this
particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
60
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case,
the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
REPUBLIC VS. LIM

G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation of the Banilad Friar Land
Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The lot was owned by private
respondent. The Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the
Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca GaleosValdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the
Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property.
The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained
their right as such over because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings.
However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view
of the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market value at P16,248.40, to be paid with
6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, the court held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered
owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found
nothing in the records to show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision. While
it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained.
Issue:
Whether the respondent are entitled for the recovery of the lot.
RULING:
Yes. The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate
its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781)
was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has
remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so
when such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondents predecessors-ininterest were given a run around by the Republics officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the
two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of respondents predecessors-in-interest. Even President
Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment,
61
failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed willingness to
pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions similar to
ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation
is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.
NPC VS. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY

G.R. No. 165828
Facts:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power
Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao.
The project included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to
the hydroelectric plants. The respondents, namely: Cebu, Bangowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Edgar, Putri, Mongkoy and Amir, all
surnamed Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters situated in Ditucalan,
Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just
compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water
flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that their
discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra, President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected
their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training
Center and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia
Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-Amanah
Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence of the
underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of
the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking
of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
In its answer with counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section
3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should
they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the
tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years. After trial, the
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The RTC found that NPC had concealed the construction of the tunnel in 1979 from the Heirs of
Macabangkit, and had since continuously denied its existence; that NPC had acted in bad faith by taking possession of the
subterranean portion of their land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and prior consent; that the existence of the tunnel
had affected the entire expanse of the land, and had restricted their right to excavate or to construct a motorized deep well; and that
they, as owners, had lost the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of the land.
62
The RTC fixed the just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on the testimony of Dionisio Banawan.
The Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment he execution, prompting NPC to assail the writ
by petition for certiorari in the CA. On September 15, 1999, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC
from implementing its decision. The Ca affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in directing and ordering the petitioner to pay the defendant just compensation.
Ruling:
No. NPC insist that the evidence on the existence of the tunnel was not adequate and incompetent remains futile. On the
contrary, the evidence on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of the topographic survey map and the sketch map (as
indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was strong, as the CA
correctly projected in its assailed decision. The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just
compensation is based on the Constitution] while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the
former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter
emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change
the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation. For the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition
against the taking of property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to
bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of
Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case, NPC would have
been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC
to pay the fair market value of such property at the time of the taking.
HEIRS OF SAGUITAN VS. CITY OF MANDALUYONG

G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing then Mayor Benjamin
S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Sugui located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets
in Mandaluyong City. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Mayor
Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to
sell. Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. The case was docketed as SCA No. 875. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss because it is not in accordance with law and its
only a resolution. The trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss. Petitioner assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only
exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7160, and not by means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of
63
eminent domain; that pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a
sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the initiation of expropriation
proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for the payment of just compensation,
explaining that the resolution mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting administrative authority to the local chief
executive to file the expropriation case in court and to represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with
the necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under section 19 of the Code.
Issue:
Whether a resolution can be a valid ground to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Ruling:
No. Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote
public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the
common need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government
without the necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the
taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would
otherwise be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of this governmental power. The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is section
19 of RA 7160 which provides that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government
unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the
time of the taking of the property.
SMI DEVELOPMENT CORP VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 137537, January 28, 2000
64
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines represented by the Department of Health thru the National Children Hospital filed a
complaint for Eminent Domain against SMI Development Corporation for the purpose of expropriating three (3) parcels of land
belonging to said corporation which are adjacent to the premises of the hospital.Misspped
After summons was served on the defendant, the plaintiff filed Motion for the Issuance of Order and Writ of Possession,
the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the plaintiffs Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Order and Writ of
Possession. In its Motion to Dismiss, the defendant alleged that the complaint lacked or had insufficient cause of action; that the
taking of the property would not serve the purpose for which it was intended; that the plaintiff failed to negotiate with it for the
purchase of the property which reflects against the urgency and necessity of the plaintiffs need of the property and implies lack of
intention to pay its true and fair market value; and that [the] necessity to expropriate the property is negated by the fact that less
than a kilometer from the plaintiffs premises was the Quezon Institute which is presently not put to its optimum use and is a better
place for putting up the frontline services for which the property is needed with less costs and less prejudice to private rights.
In its Opposition to the plaintiffs Motion for Issuance of Order and Writ of Possession, the defendant alleged that, among
others, no urgency and necessity existed for the plaintiff to take possession of the property; that immediate possession upon mere
deposit of the amount purportedly representing the aggregate assessed value of the property, if authorized by P.D. 42, is offensive to
the due process clause of the Constitution, hence, said decree is unconstitutional, and at any rate Sec. 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court still governs the procedure for ascertaining just compensation, even on a provisional basis, as held in the case of Ignacio v.
Guerrero, 150 SCRA 369 promulgated on May 29, 1987, hence, the courts must determine provisionally the fair market value of the
property and require the deposit thereof prior to allowing the plaintiff to acquire possession.
Issue:
Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error when it annulled and reversed the order of the
Regional Trial Court.
Ruling:
No. The necessity for taking petitioner's property for public use upon payment of just compensation was alleged in the
said Complaint. The allegation stressing that the property would be used to improve the delivery of health services satisfied the
requirements of necessity and public use. Needless to state, respondent has the burden of proving the elements of eminent domain
during the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court, and the petitioner the right to rebut such proof. As pointed out by the
solicitor general, the current effective law on delegated authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is found in Section 12,
Book III of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides: "SEC. 12. Power of Eminent Domain -- The President shall determine
when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National Government, and direct the
Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court."
PPI VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-119694, May 22, 1995
65
Facts:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772
issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec directive through a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.
Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identical letters,
dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and
the Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI directed to provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as
"Comelec Space"or similar to the print support which you have extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was
2 full pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. PPI asked the court to declare the
resolution unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether the resolution of Comelec is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes.To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed
to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March
1995) until 12 May 1995? or every day or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of
the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private
personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at
their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at
the heart of the problem. 3Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of
eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
TELEBAP INC. VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998
66
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide free air time is sufficient to give
it standing to question the validity of B.P. Blg. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of B.P. Blg. 881 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it
is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.
Issue:
Whether B.P Blg. 881 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have
to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Tima have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast
stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better
measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of
the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in
the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be
instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose,
broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election.
NPC vs. GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. L-60077, January 18, 1991
Facts:
67
Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the
construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the
construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias
Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit covered by tax declarations Nos. 907, 4281 and
7582, respectively.
Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots for the
construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, said corporation was constrained to file eminent domain
proceedings against the herein defendants.
The only controversy existing between the parties litigants is the reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or
compensation fee of the expropriated properties.
Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three
commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were
empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair
and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. Hearings were consequently held before said commissioners and during
their hearings, the case of defendant Heirs of Natalia Paule was amicably settled by virtue of a Right of Way Grant (Exh. C)
executed by Guadalupe Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her co-heirs in favor of the plaintiff corporation. The case against
Matias Cruz was earlier decided by the court, thereby leaving only the case against the defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and
Misericordia Gutierrez still to be resolved. Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual reports.
Issue:
Whether petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its
transmission land.
Ruling:
The petitioner should pay the full amount.The power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of
the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
REPUBLIC vs. SALEM
G. R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000
Facts:
68
Batas Pambansa 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands including a portion of the land
belonging to Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama. 5 years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama entered into a contract
with Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property for the amount of P11,800,000.00.
The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof to be paid upon
release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. Guerrero then filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a complaint for
specific performance to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale. While the case was pending, the Republic of the
Philippines filed the case for expropriation pursuant to BP 340. Among the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and
Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of a portion of which was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of
P12,970,350.00 representing 10% of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued in favor of
the government. Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him the entire lot and
that a case for specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas. The trial court approved payment to the De la
Ramas. Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision in the case for specific performance upholding the validity of the contract to
sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of Guerrero. The
De la Ramas appealed to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed. Finally, the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch
111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920-square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just
compensation for the taking of the land. This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The De la Ramas filed a
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo Guerero is the rightful recipient of the just compensation
Ruling:
Yes, Guerero is the rightful recipient of the just compensation. The court held that the power of eminent domain is an
inherent power of the State. No constitutional confinement is necessary to vest in the State. The constitutional provision on eminent
domain, Article III Section 9, provides a limitation rather than a basis for the exercise of such power by the government. Thus, it
states that Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation. In both instances, just compensation is determined by the
courts.
Thus, the De la Ramas still had authority to transfer ownership of their land and covey all rights, including the right to receive just
compensation, to Guerero.
SECRETARY OF THE DPWH VS. SPOUSES TECSON

G. R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013
Facts:
69
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a parcel of land meters located in San Pablo,
Malolos, Bulacan. Said parcel of land was among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners
consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
Respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras, then
District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of petitioner Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), offered
to pay the subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of
Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the
current fair market value. As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint for recovery of possession with
damages against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the possession of the subject parcel of land and that they be paid
attorneys fees. Respondents claimed that the subject parcel of land was assessed at P2,543,800.00. Instead of filing their Answer,
petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, RTC issued an Order granting respondents motion to dismiss
based on the doctrine of state immunity from suit. To deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice to the landowner. Besides,
petitioner Contreras, in fact, had earlier offered the payment of compensation although at a lower rate. Thus, the CA reversed and
set aside the dismissal of the complaint and, consequently, remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining the
just compensation to which respondents are entitled to recover from the government. With the finality of the aforesaid decision, trial
proceeded in the RTC. The Branch Clerk of Court was initially appointed as the Commissioner and designated as the Chairman of
the Committee that would determine just compensation, but the case was later referred to the PAC for the submission of a
recommendation report on the value of the subject property. The PAC recommended the amount of P1,500.00 per square meter as
the just compensation for the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled just compensation
Ruling:
Yes, the respondents are entitled just compensation. It was held that when a property is taken by the government for
public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return
is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure of
respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are
estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is
left to respondents is the right of compensation.31 The trial and appellate courts found that respondents are entitled to compensation.
The only issue left for determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x fixed
at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an
expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation.
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES

125 SCRA 220
Facts:
70
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) complaints with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA)'s express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within
and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more
specifically, for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential
tourism value, specifically for the construction of a sports complex (basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field,
baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics
and horseback riding for the use of the public. The petitioners filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the taking
is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing
the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount
to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally
repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the CFI, that has
jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The PTA having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports complex, including a golf
course, by the PTA be considered taking for public use
Ruling:
Yes, the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports complex, including a golf course, by the
PTA be considered taking for public use. The Constitution directly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. While
not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on social justice
and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. There can be no doubt that
expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office
buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes.
Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. The
Philippine Tourism Authority has stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the petitioners
and other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better living
standards. The Courts dismissal of the petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore,
sustained.
EPZA VS. DULAY
656 SCRA 315, August 24, 2011
Facts:
71
The controversy has its genesis in the action for the expropriation of three parcels of irrigated rice land situated
in Rosario, Cavite that the petitioner commenced on May 15, 1981 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite against the several
individual owners. During the pendency of the case, Lot 1406 was subdivided into Lot 1406-A (with an area of 12,890 square
meters) and 1406-B (with an area of 13,118 square meters). The RTC sustained the right of the petitioner to expropriate the three
parcels of rice land, but later partly reconsidered and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation.The petitioner appealed to the CA.
Thereafter, the petitioner and the Estate of Salud Jimenez entered into a Compromise Agreement. In due time, the CA remanded
the case to the RTC for the consideration and approval of the Compromise Agreement. On August 23, 1993, the RTC approved
the Compromise Agreement. Contrary to its express undertaking under the Compromise Agreement, the petitioner failed to transfer
the title of Lot 434 to the Estate of Salud Jimenez because the registered owner was Progressive Realty Estate, Inc., not the
petitioner. As a result, on March 13, 1997, the Estate of Salud Jimenez filed a Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23,
1993. The RTC annulled the Compromise Agreement and directed the petitioner to peacefully return Lot 1406-B to the Estate of
Salud Jimenez. During the trial, however, the petitioner raised the issue of whether the just compensation should be based on the
value or assessment rate prevailing in 1981 or in 1993, insisting that the just compensation for Lot 1406-B should be equivalent to
its fair market value in 1981, the time of the filing of its expropriation complaint, which was the time of the taking. The Estate of
Salud Jimenez contended, in contrast, that the just compensation should be reckoned as of August 4, 1997, when the Compromise
Agreement was annulled and set aside. In its decision, the RTC resolved that the total compensation to be paid should bear interest
at the legal rate reckoned from August 23, 199. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the petitioner comes to
the Court to seek a further review.
Issue:
Whether or not just compensation should be based on the value of Lot 1406-B prevailing in 1981 or in 1993
Ruling:
Just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on value of property prevailing in 1993. In G.R. No. 137285, the
Court upheld the annulment of the Compromise Agreement and recognized that the agreed upon mode of payment of the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 was cancelled. It is notable that the Court mentioned nothing therein about the
invalidation of the amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of payment, which was the value of Lot 434 at the time,
which silence was the Courts acknowledgment that the parties understood and accepted, by entering into the Compromise
Agreement in 1993, that the just compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the swap in
1993 was definitely much higher than Lot 434s value in 1981).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court completely agrees with the RTCs observation that when the parties signed the
compromise agreement and the same was approved, they had in fact settled between themselves the question of what is just
compensation and that both of them had intended that defendant would be compensated on the basis of prevailing values at the
time of the agreement. We further completely agree with the CAs conclusion that by agreeing to a land swap in 1993 in the ill-fated
compromise agreement, [PEZA] had impliedly agreed to paying just compensation using the market values in 1993.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
446 SCRA 299, December 15, 2004
Facts:
72
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP. Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rankand-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has
no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which
this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.Respondent BSP, in its
comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it
is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management. The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy
of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national
government
Issue:
Whether or not the challenged provision is a violation of the equal protection clause
Ruling:
Yes, the challenged provision is a violation of the equal protection clause. According to Doctrine of Relative
Constitutionality, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions
with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid
in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if
a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG. VS. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
51 SCRA 189, June 5, 1973
Facts:
73
Petitioners, Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, herein alleged that they informed the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills of their decision to have a mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. The company respondent pleaded to exclude the employees in the first shift to join the mass demonstration. However,
the petitioners still included them. As a result, the company respondent filed a case thru the city prosecutor and charged the
demonstrating employees of violation of the Compromise Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the respondent company, and the petitioners failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
Ruling:
Yes, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights
of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer.
It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg
in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the
men and women by whom we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. Chief Justice
Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.
CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO

431 SCRA 534, June 9, 2004
Facts:
Acting on President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo directive in her speech on the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
places to avert the rising crime incidents, respondent Hermoganes Ebdane, Jr. issued the assailed Guidelines in the Implementation
of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a
PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG to reconsider the implementation of
the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents. The
Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and contends that (1) the PNP
74
Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3)
the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute
an ex post facto law.
Issue:
Whether or not the carrying of firearms is a vested property right
Ruling:
No, the carrying of firearms is not a vested property right. In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in
the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state
that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose,
authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say
that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to
such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by
the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any
property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. At any rate, assuming that petitioners
PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed
beyond the reach of the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the
common good and general welfare. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace
and order in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in
general. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely
the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may reapply for a new PTCFOR which the Court believes to be reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes.
With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be
easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
AGABON VS. NLRC

G. R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004
Facts:
75
Petitioners, employees of Riviera Home Improvements Inc. as gypsum board and cornice installers, were dismissed for
abandonment of work. So they filed a case with labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal for non-compliance with the twin requirements of
notice and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners had abandoned their work. In fact, private
respondent sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for work. Private respondents
manager even talked to petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone sometime in June 1999 to tell him about the new assignment.
However, petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to perform installation work for another company.
Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per day. When this was not granted, petitioners stopped
reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC reversed
the Labor Arbiter finding the petitioners abandonment of work, and thus were not entitled to back wages and separation pay. The
other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the legality
of dismissal but awarded the money claims. CA also found out that petitioners were already employed to another employer, hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed
Ruling:
No, the petitioners were not illegally dismissed. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a
valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship. The second element manifested by overt acts
of the employees indicating the intent to discontinue the employment is the determinative factor.
In this case, it was shown that petitioners abandoned their work twice. First was in January 1996 when they did not report
for work because they were working for another company. Private respondent even warned petitioners that they would be dismissed
if this happened again. Yet the petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-employee
relationship. In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent for having subcontracted for an installation work for Ecent
Jurisprudence Labor Law another company. Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship with private respondent. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the
penalty that should be meted out to him. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for
the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be
stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction
should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration
the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:
76
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, and wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the president of the republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy
with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or
other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy Three and
Seventeen Centavos (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the republic of Philippines through any or a combination.
Issue:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes, the Plunder Law is constitutional. Petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that the Plunder Law circumvents
the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder
when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this
reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has
in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies in the accused is entitled to an acquittal. What the prosecution needs to
prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern
and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information
to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill- gotten wealth.
FABELLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

283 SCRA 256, November 28, 1997
77
Facts:
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary Isidro Cario issued a return-to-work order to all public
schoolteachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The
mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On
October 1990, Secretary Cario filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The
charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the massaction in
violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the
legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the
committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents
to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings,
the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were denied due process of law
Ruling:
Yes, the respondents were denied due process of law. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers
organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA
4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the
DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of
public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in said
committee.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, RA 4670 is applicable to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the
general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental rule of
statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is
based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and
interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as
possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate
set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Clearly, private
respondents right to due process of law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est
recedendum.
WHITE LIGHT CORP. VS. CITY OF MANILA
78
G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
Facts:
Manila City Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774. The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a
day. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The
respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and
void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of
movement;
it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not
violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is
a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by
the well-being of its constituents in general.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional
Ruling:
No, the ordinance is unconstitutional. The court held that the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity.
ABAKADA Guro vs. Purisima
79
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees if they
exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification
or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies. Respondent
contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the
law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the
functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection clause
Ruling:
No, there is no violation of equal protection clause. Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment
of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons
are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
TELEBAP, INC. VS. COMELEC
80
289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers
of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other
reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA
Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television
broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881.Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in
newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses
running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary
source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide
free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free
air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that
it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws
Ruling:
No, Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 does not deny radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as
there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations
and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers
and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that
they provide air time to the COMELEC.
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
81
86 SCRA 270, November 10, 1978
Facts:
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On March 27, 1968, then Manila Mayor
Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila
without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on May 4, 1968 filed a petition
for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and nonuseful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails
to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation
of legislative powers. Judge Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as
being null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution
Ruling:
Yes, the Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed
alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been
held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks
standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse
it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is
true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
ISAE VS. QUISUMBING
82
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
Facts:
The International School, Inc. (IS), under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The local-hires union of the IS were crying
foul over the disparity in wages that they got compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts. The School grants foreign-hires
certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than locals under the theory of (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his home country; the second was on the lack of tenure
when he returns home. The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties. The
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) resolved in favor of the school, while DOLE Secretary Quisimbing denied the unions
Motion for Reconsideration. He stated that the Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is
an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private
covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and applies to all
members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a
limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to
attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School. The union appealed to the Supreme Court. The petitioner called the hiring
system discriminatory and racist. The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin and were paid local salaries.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
Yes, there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to
"humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the
spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article
248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012
83
Facts:
The Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col. Henry A. Galarpe issued a Restriction to
Quarters and a Charge Sheet was filed enumerating the violations allegedly committed by petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia.
Petitioner, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty on all the charges. The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum directed
the transfer of confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the ISAFP Detention Center. On the
same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56), compulsorily retired from military service after availing of the provisions
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1650 which establishes a system of retirement for military personnel of the AFP. Pursuant to a
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial
Detention Center. After trial, petitioner was found guilty. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be
detained at the National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Aggrieved, petitioner filed present
petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus, alternatively, alleging thatthe application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code
in the Articles of War is not in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
Yes, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal
Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification." In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is
entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which
are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled
to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.
PEOPLE VS. DELA PIEDRA
350 SCRA 163, January 24, 2001
84
Facts:
Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Arane ta to ge ther with Jennel yn Baez, and Sandra Aqu ino we nt to the
house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra
was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. The
recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Meanwhile, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment
conducted by a cer tain Mr s. Carol Fi gueroa . Ramo s immed iate ly con ta cted a friend, a certain Ma ye th Bellotindos,
so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly bein g underta ken. U p o n a r r i v a l , Bellotindos entered
the house and pretended to be an applicant. After which, a raid was executed. Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by
the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal , accused question s her conviction for ille ga l recrui tmen t. She
invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine
handed out application forms and even received Lourdes payment, she was the only one criminally charged. Jasmine, on the other
hand, remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional
origins. Petitioner is a Cebuana while Jasmine is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause
Ruing:
No, there is no violation of the equal protection clause. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty
are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in
conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the
statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its
face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there
is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken
with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over
another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear
and intentional discrimination. Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a clear and
intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials. While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of
equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for
instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal
enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of
the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand
protection of the law in the commission of a crime.
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS

324 SCRA 689, February 3, 2000
85
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that
he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for
his constituents to be represented.
Issue:
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will
Ruling:
No, being a Congressman is not a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will
While the Constitution guarantees nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the
mandate of the people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision
of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
86
446 SCRA 299, December 15, 2004
Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP. Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rankand-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has
no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which
this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. Respondent BSP, in its
comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it
is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management. The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy
of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national
government
Issue:
Whether or not the challenged provision is a violation of the equal protection clause
Ruling:
Yes, the challenged provision is a violation of the equal protection clause. According to Doctrine of Relative
Constitutionality, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions
with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid
in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if
a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect.
PEOPLE VS. CHUA HO SAN

307 SCRA 432, June 17, 1999
87
Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of
Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 P.M. from Barangay Captaion Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao
requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speed boat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked
different from the boats ordinarily used by fisher folk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six (6) of
his men led by SP01 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then
observed that the speed boat ferried a lone male passen ger, who wa s la ter iden tified as Chua Ho San. W hen the
speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored straw bag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the
police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing. T hey then introduced
themse lves as police office rs; however, Chua did not understand wha t the y re sayin g. And by re sorting of
sign lan gua ge , Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open hi s ba g. The man acceded to the re quest.
T he said bag was found to con tain several transpa rent plasti cs containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was
later identified to be shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform
him of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement
Ruling:
No, the warrantless arrest, search and seizure does not constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and
seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; otherwise such search and seizure become
unreasonable within the meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision. This interdiction against warrantless searches
and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
88
SJS VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008
Facts:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36
thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. In December
2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a
candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose
a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds
that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements
of candidates for senator.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 9165 is constitutional
Ruling:
No, RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the
basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
89
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO VS. HON. EPHREM S. OBANDO

G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
Facts:
On 11 August 2009, the Court granted petitioner Echanis provisional release upon his posting of a P100,000.00 cash
bond and "for a period not exceeding six (6) months, unless the formal peace negotiations are earlier concluded or terminated.
After he had posted the required cash bond, this Court ordered his provisional release. On 20 July 2011, petitioner Echanis filed a
Motion to Lift Conditions of Releaseon the ground that his co-accused/co-petitioner, Saturnino Ocampo, had been granted bail by
the Court upon posting a P100,000.00 cash bond without any further conditions. In the 17 January 2012 Resolution subject of
Echanis' instant Manifestation, the Court granted petitioner Echanis's motion, requiring him to post bail in the amount of
P100,000.00, "all subject to the condition proposed by the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners' temporary release shall be
limited to the period of their actual participation as consultants of the CPP-NDF in the peace negotiations with the government." In
the present Manifestation, petitioner Echanis wants to clarify whether the 17 January 2012 Resolution requires him to post another
P100,000.00 bail bond separate from what he had earlier filed. The records show no withdrawal from the Court of the 14 August
2009 cash bond previously posted by Echanis. Hence, the P100,000.00 cash bond posted by petitioner Echanis is considered
sufficient compliance with our 17 January 2012 Resolution. Petitioner Echanis need not file another P100,000.00 cash bond to
secure his temporary release, subject to the conditions we had earlier imposed. Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did
not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted
by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them. Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges
that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest.
Issue:
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest
Ruling:
Yes, there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested." Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall
be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled
that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant and the
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the existence
of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds
no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in determining its existence.
90
ABDULA VS. GUIANI

Facts:
A complaint for murder was filed before the Criminal Investigation service command, Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) Region, in connection with the death of Abdul Dimalen, the former Commission on Elections (COMELEC
registrar of Maguindanao. Provincial prosecutor Salick Pandain a Resolution dismissed the charges of murder against herein
petitioners and recommended filing of information for murder against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Respondent Judge
ordered for further investigation. Upon return of the records of the case it was assigned to Second assistant Prosecutor Enok T.
Dimaraw for further investigation. Prosecutor Dimaraw, found a Prima Facie evidence, thus, recommended filing the charges against
Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula.
Issue:
Whether or not a valid arrest warrant was issued
Ruling:
No, there was no valid arrest warrant issued. In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned
warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a
preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information
filed." The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that
probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of
the prosecutors findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause as his own.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties, which in turn
gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land commands the judge to personally
determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely
on the certification or report of the investigating officer.
To be sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the respondents examination of the records
should be. The extent of the judges examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case
require. In the case at bench, the respondent had before him two different informations and resolutions charging two different sets of
suspects. In the face of these conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the certification of the investigating prosecutor at
face value. The circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of the investigating prosecutor and
examine the documents supporting the prosecutors determination of probable cause. The inordinate haste that attended the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and respondents own admission are circumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the
fulfillment of this duty.
Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the
investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before
issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.
91
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

G.R. L-19550, June 19, 1967
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel
Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino
(Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian
Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert
P. Brooks, John J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to
search the said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and
things found and seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of documents, papers
and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides their residences
Ruling:
No, petitioners cannot assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of documents, papers and other
effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides their residences. Officers of certain corporations, from which the
documents, papers, things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations cannot validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers
in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
92
PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

296 SCRA 383, September 25, 1998
Facts:
Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food
and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search warrant
against Aiden Lanuza for violation of The Consumer Act of the Philippines. The application, however, ended with the statement that
the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address. The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy
of the sketch of the location of Aiden Lanuzas residence at her stated address. On the same day the application was filed, the
respondent Judge issued a search warrant. Thereafter, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuzas residence at
the indicated address by a composite team of policemen. The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what
actually happened during the implementation of the search warrant. In an order, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the
seized drugs and authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the drugs analyzed and be brought to the
registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing. Private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion praying that the said
Search Warrant be quashed and that the seized articles be declared inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered returned to the
warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company based on the grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and void
because: (1) it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued
to search the residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for
a non-existing offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by applicant BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the facts upon which it was issued; and (6) its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or
wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person.
Issue:
Whether or not the Search Warrant should be quashed
Ruling:
Yes, the Search Warrant should be quashed. The place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually described in
the sketch, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a different warehouse within the same compound. The said
warehouse is owned by a different person. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In the present case, it must be noted that the
application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch of the compound. The sketch indicated the house of private
respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices,
factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private
respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But
the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound. This description of the place to be searched is too general and
does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private
respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the
constitutional requirement.
93
PEOPLE VS. CA
291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998
Facts:
A search warrant was served against Azfar Hussain which resulted in his arrest together with three (3) other Pakistanis
and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects, i.e. dynamite sticks, plastic explosives, fragmentation grenade
and high powered firearms and ammunitions. Charged in court, they pleaded not guilty and submitted their "Extremely Urgent
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible" on the ground that the place searched, in which
the accused were then residing, was Apartment No. 1, a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit
adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the Court of
Appeals' decision alleging that the police officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before the judge for the issuance of a
search warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid
Ruling:
No, the search warrant is invalid. The Supreme Court held that while their contention may be conceded, the trouble is
that the place described in the search warrant, which is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof, was not
that which the police officers who applied for the search warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to
search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the search warrant. It does not suffice for a search warrant to be
deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination copyright 1994-2011 CD
Technologies Asia, Inc. Student Edition 2010 2 under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly
to the place so described.
QUA CHEE GAN VS. THE DEPORTATION BOARD

9 SCRA 27, May 31, 1991
Facts:
Petitioners were charged by Prosecutor Emilio Galang before the Deportation Board for their unauthorized purchase of
US Dollars amounting to $130,000.00. It is also alleged that petitioners bribed Filipino and American officers to evade prosecution
regarding their illegal acts. Petitioners contended that the charges do not constitute a legal ground for deportation of an alien. They
also added that the Deportation Board has no jurisdiction over such charges. Motion filed by petitioners was dismissed by the board
that lead to the petitioners escalation of such matter to the Supreme Court where it was given due course. The Supreme Court
returned the case to CFI Manila. CFI Manila issued a Writ of Preliminary injunction restraining the board from hearing Deportation
94
charges against petitioners. However, the Deportation Board contended that they, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction
over the charges.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deportation Board has the authority to issue warrant of arrest pending investigation of the abovestated cases
Ruling:
No, the Deportation Board has no the authority to issue warrant of arrest pending investigation of the above-stated cases.
The court sustained the power of the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release
pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested
alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal. It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally
released on bail, but before the charges filed against them were actually investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the question of
jurisdiction of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First Instance, and now before us. Petitionersappellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the
ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power
to deport to be exercised there must be a legislation authorizing the same.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect
the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or
grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the
exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone. While it may really be contended that the Act did not
expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of
Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation
proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien-which provision was
expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of this power by the
chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions.
PEOPLE VS. HUANG ZHEN HUA

G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004
Facts:
Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee
and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided in a
condominium unit in Makati City. The PARAC secured search warrants from the RTC of Manila. The men found that the
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Condominium Unit No. 19 was leased to Lao. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded
to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise, knocked on the
door. Appellant Lee peeped through the window beside the front door. The men introduced themselves as policemen, but the
appellant could not understand them as she could not speak English.The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant
Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were policemen. The appellant then opened the door and
allowed the policemen, Pangan and the security guards into the condominium unit.The policemen brought appellant Lee to the
second floor where there were three bedrooms. Anciro, Jr., Margallo and PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then searched the master's
bedroom, while Ferias and Pangan went to the other bedroom where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Ferias awakened appellant
Zhen Hua and identified himself as a policeman. Appellant Zhen Hua was surprised. Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the
master's bedroom. He two transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic canister and
assorted paraphernalia. Inside the drawer of the bed's headboard, Anciro, Jr. also found assorted documents, pictures, bank
passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports and identification cards of Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr.
asked appellant Lee who was the owner of the crystalline substance, but the latter did not respond because she did not know
English. Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for instructions on what to do with the things he had found, and the latter told him to keep the
same for future reference, and as evidence against any other suspect for illegal drug transactions. The appellants were then brought
to the PARAC headquarters where they were detained. Appellants assails that the police officers committed a violation because the
latter entered their unit without their permission.
Issue:
Whether or not the police officers are allowed to break in to enter premises indicated in the search warrant
Ruling:
Yes, police officers are allowed to break in to enter premises indicated in the search warrant provided that (a) a party
whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises
already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief
that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside
(because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that
an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted.
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be allowed
entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice
and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is known as the knock and announce principle
which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such
notice are as important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable.
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MANALILI VS. COURT OF APPEALS

280 SCRA 400, October 9, 1997
Facts:
Policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini
street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan
City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male
person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced
themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried
to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed
the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The male person was then brought to
the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The
man turned out to be the accused Alain Manalili. Manalili assails that there was no valid search and that the evidence obtained by
the police officers are inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid search
Ruling:
Yes, there was a valid search. It was akin to a stop-and-frisk. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation
of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon.
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate
investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he
observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to
stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an
officer of 30 years experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
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PEOPLE VS. TUDTUD

Facts:
The Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel
Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all
members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao
City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud
was engaged in selling marijuana. Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day
with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. That same day, a team
posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. 2 men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1
Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1
Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them
that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds
description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged,
saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath
which two bundles were, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap
the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his
companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were
turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratoryfor examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the
confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the
newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them.
Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the
admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Issue:
Whether or not the Tudtuds implied acquiescence saying its all right when the police officers requested that the box be
opened be considered a waiver
Ruling:
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No, Tudtuds implied acquiescence saying its all right when the police officers requested that the box be opened is not
be considered a waiver.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the
warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to
a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in
this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to
apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting
officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their informant
Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers
information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal
trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not
identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites
are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and
third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see
the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the
box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive
or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no
evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be
sustained.
PEOPLE VS. BOLASA

321 SCRA 459, December 22, 1999
Facts:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995
that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects
and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their
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unnamed informer. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and x x x saw one man and a
woman repacking suspected marijuana." They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and
thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused
Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo
confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with
violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425 otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Both however denied on the witness
stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements. According to Roberto delos Reyes, he and his wife were
merely tenants in the house of Zenaida Bolasa and at the time he was arrested he had just arrived from work. Upon learning that
Zenaida was repacking marijuana inside their room, he immediately ordered her to leave. Unfortunately however it was at that
precise moment that police authorities entered and announced their presence. He and Zenaida were then brought to the
Valenzuela Police Station for questioning and subsequently detained. On the part of Zenaida Bolasa, she narrated that at 7:30 in the
evening of 11 September 1995 she was on her way to 9th Avenue, Caloocan City, where she was working as a waitress. As she
was about to leave the house she met a certain "Rico" and conversed with him for some time. She denied knowing PO3 Carizon
and the fact that the latter saw her repacking marijuana inside her house. The trial court upon finding the version of the prosecution
to be more plausible convicted both accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of the crime charged and sentenced each of
them not only to reclusion perpetua but also to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Both accused appealed, although separately, each one
represented by a separate counsel. Maintaining his innocence in this appeal, accused-appellant Roberto delos Reyes insists he had
just arrived from work and had, in fact, just entered his room when he was arrested. Assuming he was indeed repacking marijuana
when the police officers arrived, he claims it would have been inconceivable for them to know what he was doing inside his room
considering the height of his window. Significantly, the police officers had to lean first on the window in order to observe the activities
inside the room. Accused-appellant Zenaida Bolasa meanwhile asserts that the search in her residence was likewise illegal as her
arrest preceding it was illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized from her could not be properly used as evidence against
her. She insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Albert Carizon as the same was
hearsay. According to her and her co-accused delos Reyes, PO3 Carizon was not among the arresting officers. As such, PO3
Carizon had no personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest and search thus making his testimony hearsay. Since the
prosecution did not present the two (2) arresting officers the version of the prosecution cannot stand on its own. Bolasa likewise
impugns the identity of the items confiscated from her person vis-a-vis those which were submitted for laboratory examination and
charges that the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily establish the chain of custody over the specimen is damaging to its case.
Issue:
Whether or not the manner of by which Bolosa and delos Reyes were apprehended fall under any of the categories
allowed even in the absence of a warrant.
Ruling:
No, the manner of by which Bolosa and delos Reyes were apprehended does not fall under any of the categories allowed
even in the absence of a warrant.
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and
effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents
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him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure
agreeable."
For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously
operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable." Thus, arrests and seizures in the following instances are not
deemed unreasonable and are thus allowed even in the absence of a warrant
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting
to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop
and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated
categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal.
NOLASCO VS. CRUZ-PANO

147 SCRA 509, October 8, 1985
Facts:
Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case SMC-1-1 before Special
Military Commission 1, and also one of the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case MC-25-113 of Military Commission 25, both
cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on August
6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of
Aguilar-Roque, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA." Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases. At 11:30 a.m., Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D.
Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon
City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued against Nolasco. At 12:00 noon on the same
day, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in charge
of the premises, was arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest. The searching party seized 428
documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. On August
10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office upon complaint filed by the CSG
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against the former for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. On August 13, the City Fiscal filed
an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-Roque, et.
al. before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding. On August 16, CSG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the City Fiscal, praying that Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco be charged with Subversion. The Motion
was denied on November 16. On September 10, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the Search Warrant case praying, inter
alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, "in connection with cases that are presently pending
against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court." On December 13, Judge Pao admitted the
Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against
respondent." A day before that, Aguilar-Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to Suppress, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to
them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the
Motion on 7 January 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the other case, apparently
unaware of the Order issued by Judge Pao on December 13. Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the
Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC Judge Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et.
al.'s Motion to Suppress.
Issue:
Whether or not the description of the personalities to be seized in the search warrant is too general to render the warrant
void.
Ruling:
Yes, the description of the personalities to be seized in the search warrant is too general to render the warrant void.
The disputed Search Warrant (80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as "Documents, papers and other records of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party
Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources." It is at once evident that the Search Warrant authorizes
the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. Search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although,
ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque.
Some searches may be made without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is declaratory in the sense that it is confined
to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched". Considering that Aguilar-Roque has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant
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for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling;
and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of the opinion that, in her respect, the
search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of
public order. Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission 1 to return to her any
all irrelevant documents and articles.
PEOPLE VS. JOHNSON

G.R. No. 13881, December 18, 2000
Facts:
Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California,
U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a
registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia
Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers,
employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's
abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an
operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest
women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed
outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson
gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought
out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a
total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area
of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14
May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against unreasonable search and
seizure
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Ruling:
No, the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport does violate her right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly
arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed
and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from
being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs
of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence
against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
PEOPLE VS. DORIA

301 SCRA 668, January 22, 1999
Facts:
In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command
(Narcom), received information from 2 civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong
City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting
between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on 5 December 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City. On 5
December 1995, at 6:00 a.m., the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust
operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit,
SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer
and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North
Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set
aside P1,600.00 a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills as money for the buy-bust operation. The market
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price of one kilo of marijuana was then P 1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in
the police blotter. The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. At 7:20 a.m., "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced
PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P 1,600.00.
"Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from
his associate. An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting.
"Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as
SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed
that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang
Bakal. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and at woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. SPO1
Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit
noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped
in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion
aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained
10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from "Neneth." The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and
the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is
Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The 1 brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun"
plus the 10 bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The bricks were found to be dried
marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. On 7 December 1995, Doria and Gadda were charged with
violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig City convicted Dorria and Gaddao. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and
sentenced both to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are legally permissible
Ruling:
No, the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are illegally permissible. It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a
certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The
type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into
a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. Where, however,
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a
decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is
aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the
accused must be convicted. The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. The warrantless arrest of
Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit: "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. xxx"
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Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Herein, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended
in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant. The warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and
marked bills, however, are different matters. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily
chores when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause"
which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused, Doria. Save for Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that
she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right,
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Since
the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the
marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000
Facts:
At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya, received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y
Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut.
Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S.
Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At approximately 5:00 a.m. the following day, said police team, accompanied by
their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found Valdez alone in his nipa
hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana
plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from Valdez's hut. PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the 7 marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms. The police took photos of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plants. Valdez was then arrested. One of the plants,
weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.
Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she
106
found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination,
the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. Valdez alleged otherwise. He claims that at around 10:00 a.m., 25 September
1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought Valdez to the place where the marijuana plants
were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of
the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge
thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Valdez was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then
made to uproot 5 of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle
of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko
Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him,
because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise
be would "be put in a bad situation." At the police headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants
seized by the police. Still, on 26 September 1996, Valdez was charged for the cultivation and culture of the 7 fully grown marijuana
plants. On 15 November 1996, Valdez was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued. On 18 February 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
3105, found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Hence, the automatic review by the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to warrantless search and seizure, based on the
plain view doctrine
Ruling:
No, the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to warrantless search and seizure, based on the plain view
doctrine. The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant.
Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Herein, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at
least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the
cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that
there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended
the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection
against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without
warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions. The Court finds no reason to subscribe to
Solicitor General's contention that it should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be
present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the
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evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. Herein, the
police officers first located the marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid
warrantless arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's premises. The police team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to
search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the
cannabis plants was not inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot
the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum,
the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made
to apply.
MALACAT VS. CA
283 SCRA 159, December 12, 1997
Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of
the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on
foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug
store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men,
posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with
"their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about
30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching
Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to
Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not
issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea
of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers
mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the
grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial
court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while
the police officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful
arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not
more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he
was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In
its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
108
Whether or not the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk
Ruling:
No, the search made on Malacat is invalid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk. The general rule as regards
arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.
As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the
circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b)
has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be
confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could
not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of
the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach
a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3)
reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First, there are grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None
was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 75 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant
violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
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PEOPLE VS. BALINGAN

241 SCRA 277, February 13, 1995
Facts:
On 31 August 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City Police Station received a telephone call from an
unnamed male informant. He passed the information that Jean Balingan y Bobbonan was going to Manila with a bag filled with
marijuana. Acting on the information, then P/Lt. Manuel Obrera formed a surveillance team to monitor Balingan's movements. The
team as deployed at different places in Baguio City, including Balingan's house on Brookside and bus stations. Cpl. Garcia soon
reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence at Brookside and board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of
Bonifacio Street. Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage with orange or yellow belts. She also reported the
make and plate number of the taxicab which Balingan boarded. Upon receiving the report, Lt. Obrera ordered Cpl. Garcia to
proceed to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would go there. Pat. Kimay, who must have intercepted Cpl. Garcia's
message, also reported that the taxicab described by the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda. Lt. Obrera instructed him to move
out and proceed to the Police Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military Academy. From his post at the Dangwa
Bus Station, Pat. Bueno informed Lt. Obrera that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU-153 bound for Manila. Lt.
Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify the report. There, he went up the bus described by Pat. Bueno, and he saw
Balingan on the third or fourth seat behind the driver's seat. In the luggage carrier above her head was the gray luggage earlier
described by Cpl. Garcia. He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the Lakandula burned area to wait for the bus to depart. At
about 11:00 a.m., the bus moved out (on its way) to Manila via Kennon Road. Lt. Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay, who was at the
Kennon Road Checkpoint, to stop the bus when it reaches the place. Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong tailed the bus at about 15
to 20 meters behind. As instructed, Pat. Kimay stopped the bus at the Kennon Road Checkpoint. That was already at 11:30 a.m. Lt.
Obrera and Pat. Ong arrived at the Checkpoint less than a minute after the bus did and immediately boarded it. Lt. Obrera
announced a routinary check-up. Pat. Ong identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her
luggage, she did not respond and just looked outside the window. He opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and
above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera. Thereupon, Lt.
Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held tightly onto the window pane. Lt.
Obrera asked Pat. Ong to fetch Cpl. Garcia from the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in the City proper, so that she would be the one to
bring out Balingan from the bus. In the meantime, he remained inside the bus holding the confiscated luggage while the other
passengers alighted from the bus. After some 30 minutes, Garcia arrived and pulled Balingan out of the bus and brought her to the
Baguio City Police Station and there locked her up in jail. On 24 October 1988, Balingan was charged with Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II
of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act. On 4 April 1989, Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. After trial, Balingan was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Balingan appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the search conducted in the Dangwa bus, subsequent to police surveillance pursuant to an informants tip,
is valid.
110
Ruling:
Yes, the search conducted in the Dangwa bus, subsequent to police surveillance pursuant to an informants tip, is valid.
The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public vehicle. The rules governing search and seizure have over the years
been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought." Unquestionably, the warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio
INP Narcotics Intelligence Division received information that Balingan was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their
surveillance operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics Division,
boarded a Dangwa Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 77 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) bus bound for Manila carrying a suspiciouslooking gray luggage bag. When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those
circumstances, the warrantless search of Balingan's bag was not illegal.
PAPA VS. MAGO

L-27360, February 28, 1968
Facts:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information
received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued,
would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of
the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit
went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales
of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of
the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by
the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention
of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining
order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and
a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in
their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of
Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining order was
received by Papa.et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15
November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of
Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the
111
conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives
of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23
December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not
show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the
appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago
upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had
been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a search warrant is required for customs search
Ruling:
No, a search warrant is not required for customs search. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa,
having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other
movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 79 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other
container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding
or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the
search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police
officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine
bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo.
Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent
court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying
any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their
cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the
circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
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obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having
declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and
by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs
and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
ROLDAN VS. ARCA

No. L-25434, July 25 1975
Facts:
Morabe, de Guzman and company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which
had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus
respondent company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI. Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels
Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the
Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965-, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
The Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and
cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. On October 1 and 2, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine
Navy to take the boats in custody. Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by the company of a bond of 5,000.00 for the release of the two (2) vessels.
On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ.
Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order dated 18October 1965, and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction there under issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of thevessels of the
company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
Ruling:
YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable
to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude
pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
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Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person(a) who has
committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have
committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving
a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and
without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently,
the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
PEOPLE VS. USANA

323 SCRA 754, January 28, 2000
Facts:
Accused-appellants Usana, Lopez and Escano were apprehended during the election ban in Pasay City for violation of
PD 1866 that is illegal possession of firearms and ammunition as well as possession of illegal drugs.
The trial court found the evidence of the prosecution more credible and sufficient to convict the accused as charged. The
defendants Lopez and Usana anchored their appeal on the manner that the hashish was found by the policemen and that the trial
court failed to consider the exculpatory statements of Escano in favor of his co-defendants.
Issue:
Whether or not searches at checkpoints are illegal.
Ruling:
The SC took judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period
issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The national
and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of the month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995,
was well within the election period.
It is well settled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard
put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for
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which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able
to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and
seizure. Despite the validity of the search, SC did not affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not
opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the
place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the
presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the cars trunk, the car was in the
possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of
the car. Their having been with Escao in the latters car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or
transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of
the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.
PEOPLE VS. DE GRACIA

233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994
Facts:
The facts of the case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements
headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that
time, various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their
"tora-tora" planes.
At around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base,
while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station.
Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in
San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. EfrenSoria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense
Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos.
The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant
to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the
Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot.
A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a
while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that
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moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car
and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at
the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh.
Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that
civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching
them composed of F/Lt. VirgilioBabao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the
16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons
of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the
Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door.
De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found.
As a result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar
building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team.
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is
supposedly a "boy" therein. DeGracia was charged in two separate information for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives
in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried
jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
During the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not authorized to
posses any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from
November 30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted
homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not a search warrant may validly be dispensed with at the height of a coup detat
Ruling:
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that
time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to
the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the
requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun
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store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal, which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and
solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not
be justifiably or even colorably explained.
In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime was being committed. Consequently,there was more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
PEOPLE VS. MARTI

193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991
Facts:
On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of theManila Packing and
Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages.
Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled out the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his
name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II,
8052 Zurich, Switzerland."
Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that thepackages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti'srepresentation, the 4 packages were then placed
inside a brown corrugated box, with styrofoam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape.
Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband
of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and tookseveral grams of the
contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBIand requesting a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
At theNarcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages wasopened,
yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents madean inventory and took charge of
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the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledgingcustody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents
tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office.
Thereafter, an information was filed against Martifor violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of
violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.
Issue:
Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, is invoked against the
State.
Ruling:
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless searchand seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not
a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof does not constitute a
warrantless search.
PEOPLE VS. MOLINA

352 SCRA 174, February 19, 2001
Facts:
On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received information about a marijuana pusher in Davao. Paguidopon first saw
the pusher in person on July of the same year, when his informer identified Mula as the driver of a motorcycle who just passed by
them. Molina, on the other hand, was never identified prior arrest.
In the morning of August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information that the drug pushers will pass by at NHA, Ma-a,
Davao City that morning, so he called for assistance from the PNP.
A team composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were dispatched to
proceed to Marino's house where they will wait for the drug pushers will pass by.
Two hours later, a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina and Mula passed by. So, the team boarded their
vehicle, overtook the trisikad and accosted the two. At that point, Mula was holding a black bag. He handed the same to Molina.
Pamplona, introducing himself as a police officer, asked Molina to open the bag, to which Molina replied "Boss, if possible, we will
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settle this. "Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were
handcuffed.
Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to Evidence, saying that the marijuana was illegally seized from them, therefore it is
inadmissible. The trial court denied this. The two waived presentation of evidence, and opted to file a joint memorandum. Later, the
trial court still found them guilty, and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC and Rule 122, Sec.
10 of the ROC, the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review. The Solicitor General moved for the acquittal of the
two.
Issue:
Was the arrest of Mula and Molina fall under the exception of in flagrante delicto in warrantless arrests?
Ruling:
NO. Applicable Laws: Article III, Sec. 2, Article III, Sec. 3. The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search
warrant upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds
evidencetaken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this situation, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't work the
otherway around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it is with a valid warrant of arrest. However, a policeofficer may
conduct warrantless arrests: (a) In flagrante delicto When, in his presence, theperson to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion.
TheConstitution provides: SEC. 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant orwarrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oathor affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched andthe persons or
things to be seized.
UMIL VS. RAMOS

GR No. 79731, July 9,1990
Facts:
These are separate motions before the Court, seeking reconsideration. In the Umil case, the arresting officers had good
reason to believe that an NPA member (Rolando Dural, although using a fictitious name) was indeed being treated at St.
Agnes Hospital, QC for gunshot wounds. The information was from the attending doctor and hospital management, and therefore
came from reliable sources.
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was an NPA courier. In the case of Amelia Roque,
subversive documents and live ammunition were found at the time of her arrest, and she admitted to owning such documents. As
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regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, agents frisked them and found subversive documents & loaded guns without
permits.With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a search warrant. Ammunition and subversive documents
were found in her car. In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil Regala as the latters companion in killing
Romulo Bunye II.
Issue:
Whether or not Rolando Dural (and other petitioners in the other consolidated cases) was lawfully arrested.
Ruling:
Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully arrested for being members of the New Peoples Army where mere
membership is penalized, and for subversion (a continuing offense).
Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Likewise, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to bearrested is the one who
committed the offense (based on actual facts), coupled with good faith in making the arrest. The Court reiterates that mere suspicion
of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely nota ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The
Court predicated the validity of the arrests on the compliance with the requirements of a long existing law; probable cause and good
faith of the arresting peace officers; and that the arrest is on the basis of actual facts and circumstances.
Petitioner's plea for the Court to re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, that a writ of
habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment, is issued by the court where said information has been filed. The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was
handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic
dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said
doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is
only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of
law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the
freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action. However, the Court finds no compelling reason to
abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law.
DISINI, JR. VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

GR No. 203335, February 18, 2014
Facts:
The present case involves consolidated petitions that assail the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175 (RA 10175)
otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of several provisions of the
cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable
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the government to track down and penalize violators. Section 4(c)(3) provides: Sec. 4.Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: (c) Content-related Offenses: (3) Unsolicited Commercial
Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless: (i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient;
or (ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing
users, subscribers or customers; or (iii) The following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic communication
contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from
the same source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message;
and (cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in
order to induce the recipients to read the message.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 4(c) 3 violates the petitioners right to privacy of communication and correspondence.
Ruling:
Section 4(c)(3) punishes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications also known as spam. The
Government defends the provision on claims that such unsolicited commercial communications waste the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful
enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spam amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the
recipients domain without prior permission. It is likewise argued that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
The Court declared Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional. The Court found that the Government has shown no basis for
claiming that unsolicited commercial ads reduce the efficiency of computers. Moreover, people have been receiving such ads even
before the advent of computers and these have never been outlawed since people might have interest in such ads. What is
essential is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these ads. The same is true with spam. The recipient has the
option to delete or not to read them.The prohibition of unsolicited commercial ads would deny a person the right to read his emails
even those which are unsolicited. While commercial speech is a separate category of speech that is not entitled to the same level of
protection given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression it is nonetheless still entitled to protection. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
ZULUETA VS. CA
253 SCRA 699, February 20, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
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The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from
the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as
evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.
Ruling:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety
or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wifedo not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither one may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity), who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ VS. CA
235 SCRA 111, August 4, 1994
Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages
against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons.
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Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private
respondents offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition
for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.These tape recordings were
made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can
be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes
them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously
inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the
merits and not through the special civil action ofcertiorari.The error assuming gratuitously that it exists cannot be anymore than an
error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not bycertiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
NO. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy
of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus: Sec.1. It shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described.
Sec.4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent is a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
NAVARRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

313 SCRA 153, August 26, 1999
Facts:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police station to report alleged
indecent show in one of the night show establishments in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim
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Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit
with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under
treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation
that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man, testified. Presented in evidence to
confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police
officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
Issues:
Whether or not the voice recording is admissible as evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
Ruling:
The answer is affirmative; the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is
confirmed by the voice recording he had made. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan
was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
OPLE VS. TORRES

G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of
Computerized Identification Reference System on the following grounds: 1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is
deemed to be a law and not amere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to make laws, and
2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy.
Issue:
Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violate the constitutional right to privacy?
Ruling:
YES, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will
put peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting
the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics andother means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons
to access confidential information and circumvent the rightagainst self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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Assuming arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the
1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled
that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has
always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual--has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a technological age --industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"
It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights: "Sec.3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law."
POLLO VS. DAVID

GR No. 181881, October 18, 2011
Facts:
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place
in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team to back up all the
files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over
to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that
most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on
extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing expedition when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer. He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 ( Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For
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Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search
which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer to the charge. In view of the
absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to
the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground
that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further
denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation
of his constitutional right to privacy.
Ruling:
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his
constitutional right.In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a
conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and
seizure.
Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal
telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARRY ALEJANO, ET AL. VS. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,
ET AL.
G.R. NO. 160792, AUGUST 25, 2005
Facts:
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took
controlof the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of
Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings.
The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
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authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers thenreturned to their barracks.
A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command
who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which
required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA
dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup dtat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the
detainees confinement is under a valid indictment.
Issue:
The narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison
authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail to
indicate contraband.
Ruling:
The SC does not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present
case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.The
letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers.
The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting asthe detainees personal
courier and not astheir counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, sincethe letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the
letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the
letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presenceof the detainees. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with
other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, the court gave the military custodian a wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks
involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate
regulations depend largely on the security risksinvolved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the
absence of patent arbitrariness.
MARQUEZ VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001
Facts:
In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a
case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et.al, for violation of
RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was
grounded on Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides, among others, the following powers, functions and
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duties of the Ombudsman, to wit: (8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein.Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405)
and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was a trail of managers checks (MCs)
purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that
Trivinio purchased on May 2 and 3, 1995, 51 MCs for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank (TRB) UN Ave.
Branch. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven 11 MCs in the amount of P70.6M were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the
UBP.
On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction with the
Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly because the Ombudsman and other persons acting under his authority were
continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the
Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, Marquez would
be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.
Issues:
Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents requested by the
Ombudsman.
Ruling:
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions: (1.) Where the
depositor consents in writing; (2.) Impeachment case; (3.) By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public
officials; (4.) Deposit is subject of litigation; (5.) Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB
vs. Gancayco. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending
case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional
evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which
would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages
for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.
The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
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trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. VS. CAPULONG,

160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; April 29, 1988
Facts:
Respondent Juan Ponce Enrilefiled an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie "The
Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners
contended that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and the subject matter of the
motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on the individual private life of respondent senator.
But the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making
reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. Thus, this action for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.
Ruling:
YES. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of public interest. Private respondent is a
public figure due to his participation in the culmination of the change of government. The right of privacy of a public figure is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them. What is involved is
a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of the preferred character of
speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The Judge should have stayed his
hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present danger." The subject matter of
the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful
historical account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom
of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture
must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth.
Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the use of his
character in the movie and had refused the offer sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and his
family's name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint, which is no
better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiastical officials.In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is
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unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only
his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie dealt with both the public
and private lives of Moises Padilla.
ADIONG VS. COMELEC

207 SCRA713, March 31, 1992
Facts:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646and 7166 andother election laws.-Section 15(a) of the resolution
provides: Sec.15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards,
decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in
width and fourteen (14) inches in length.Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting
areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides: Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms
of election propaganda. It is unlawful: xxx xxxxxx (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at thecandidate's own
residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall
not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.
Petitioner Bro Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile"places like cars and other moving vehicles. According
to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In
addition,the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements,he, being a neophyte in the
field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with thisprohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
moving vehicles would be hislast medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992elections.
Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) hehas not received any notice from any of the
Election Registrars in the entire country as to thelocation of the supposed "COMELEC Poster Areas."
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and
limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that itfixes.
Ruling:
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.-The posting of decals and stickers
on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the
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preference of the citizenbecomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.Whether the
candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers orpoor and without the means to spread out the
same number of decals and stickers is not asimportant as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of
freespeech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personalproperty. To strike down this right and
enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
OSMENA VS. COMELEC

288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998
Facts:
Emilio Osmena and Pablo Garcia, candidates for public office in the 1998 elections, seek to invalidate provision of RA
6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987) which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or airtime for
campaign or other political purposes, except to the COMELEC. They contend that the ban has not only failed to level the playing
field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to
pay while their affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching voters.
Issue:
Whether or not the ad ban is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES. There is actually no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of time and manner of advertising. The term
political ad ban is actually misleading, as although the provision prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime to political
candidates, It mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to thecandidates space and time in the media. In this case,
there is nototal ban on political ads, muchless restriction on the content ofthe speech.
In Adiong v. COMELEC the Supreme Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case sustaining a
Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on public property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Justice Panganibans dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that media ads do not partake of the
real substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the peoples cardinal right to choose
their means of expression and of access to information. The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for
all free speech problems. It was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases. For the
criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty conspiracy or attempt
begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws whichare not concerned with the content
of political ads but only with their incidents.
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CHAVEZ VS. GONZALES

GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008
Facts:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that the
conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority
explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and TV
stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisananngmga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which
resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be
treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press?
Ruling:
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NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom
of speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule
applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the
clear and present danger test. The great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation
of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls
short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of
the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to
the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on thewhos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions.
The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this
case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
SWS, INC. VS. COMELEC

GR No. 147571, May 5, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social researchinstitution conducting
surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation.Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections fromenforcing
Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveysaffecting national candidates shall not bepublished
fifteen (15) days before an election andsurveys affecting local candidates shall not be publishedseven (7) days before an
election.Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes aprior restraint on the exercise
of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger tojustify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published theresults of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days beforethe
election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empiricalnor historical evidence to support the
conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles
concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is noreason for ordinary voters to be denied access
to the results of election surveys, which arerelatively objective.Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4
of R.A. No. 9006 asnecessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulousand erroneous
surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period
proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law,i.e.,the prevention of the debasement of the
electoralprocess resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the
"evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in
duration, i.e.,the last 15 daysbefore the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does
notprohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.
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Issue:
Does the Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitute an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the
press
Ruling:
The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

632 SCRA 146, OCTOBER 5, 2010
Facts:
This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, An Act to Secure the Stateand Protect our
People from Terrorism, a.k.a. Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
suspected communist fronts by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the transcendental importance doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers. KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been
subjected to close security surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons andvehicles with
dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build.They likewise claim they have been branded as enemies
of the State.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante,
HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant
organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA.They claim such tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law. Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL based their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty touphold the
Constitution.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague andbroad, in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with
no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Issue:
Whether or not the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines are appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes
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Ruling:
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The
application of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.
BORJAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS

301 SCRA 1, January 14, 1999
Facts:
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing
articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he
send to support a conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with
anomalousactivities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The
lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A
petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the
published articles.
Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
Ruling:
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named.
It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at
least a third person could identify him as the object of the libellous publication. These requisites have not been complied with in the
case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said
conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.
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The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged communications must
be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an
action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the conference, the composition of
its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being
genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public
issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media
members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
RODOLFO VASQUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37
families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager LitoAtienza regarding their complaint
against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner
and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next
day, April 22, 1986, the following excerpts of the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished
were supposed allegations by Vasquez that (1) nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkamang may
14 n aloten glupa; (2) ang mga lupa ay illegal napatituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager
at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga illegal napasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga
nakawan ng manok. xxxBased on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the
latters statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this
petition is for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the actual malice standard in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in prosecutions for criminal
libel.
Ruling:
The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in criminal prosecutions for libel. For that
matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official
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concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made
them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives
and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above
all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel was used as a form of harassment: Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the
charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case to harass petitioner.It is curious that the ones most
obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself,
were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients who have nothing to do with
the editorial policies of the newspaper.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSN OF THE PHIL VS. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
GR No. 173034, October 9, 2007
Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct.28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to her under the FreedomConstitution.One (1) of the preambular clauses of TMC the law seeks to give effect to
Article11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA (World Health
Assembly) in 1981.
In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of theChild. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates
that States should take measure todiminish infant mortality and should ensure that all segments of society areinformed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.-From 1982 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect thatbreastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should beensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.
May 15, 2006 DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No.
2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutesJune 28, 2006 Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibitionwith Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of
Preliminary injunction.-August 15, 2006 the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining therespondents from
implementing the assailed RIRR.-Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC therebyamending and
expanding the coverage of the said law.
DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also variousinternational instruments regarding
infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land
andtherefore may be implemented by the DOH in the RIRR.
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Issue:
Whether or not (W/N) the RIRR is unconstitutional
Ruling:
NO. However, what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Codewhich in turn is based on the ICMBS as this
is deemed part of the law of the land. Theother WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of
thelaw of the land.
The Court however held that the international instruments invoked by respondents, namely, (1) The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken
by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and
well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation;
however, they do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The international
instruments that have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
GOOGLE SPAIN VS. AEPD (AGENCIA ESPAOLA DE PROTECCIN DE DATOS)

Case C-131/ 12, May 13, 2014
Facts:
Mario Costeja Gonzlez, a Spanish national, made a complaint to the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) against La
Vanguardia newspaper, Google Spain and Google Inc, in relation to pages in the newspaper which appeared in Google search
results when his name was searched for. The pages contained an announcement for a real estate auction following proceedings for
the recovery of social security debts owed by Mr Costeja Gonzlez.
The AEPD rejected the claim against La Vanguardia as the information had been lawfully published by it, but upheld the
complaint against both Google entities and requested that they take the necessary measures to withdraw the personal data from
their indexes. Google Spain and Google Inc brought actions before the High Court seeking to have the AEPD decision annulled. The
Spanish High Court referred the matter to the CJEU under the preliminary ruling procedure.
Issues:
Do the activities Google carries out in compiling its search results constitute activities covered by the Data Protection
Directive?
Ruling:
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The activities that Google undertakes are covered by the Directive. In compiling its search results Google undertakes
activities which are expressly referred to in Art 2(b) of the Directive and are classified as data processing. These include collecting,
retrieving, recording, organising, storing, disclosing and making available data. That Google does not alter the data and that it also
carries out the same operations on other types on information not distinguishing between personal data and other information does
not affect this classification. Google determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data which it carries out in
compiling its search results. Thus it falls within the definition of data controller under Article 2 (d) of the Directive. The fact that it
does not exercise control over the contents of the websites which it indexes does not stop it from being a data controller. The
Directive envisages there being joint data controllers, and Google and the operator of the website in question may both be data
controllers in relation to certain personal data.
In assessing whether to do so, a balancing test must be carried out between the rights of the data subject (privacy, data
protection), those of the data controller (economic interests) and the interests of internet users (being able to have access to the
information, including the right to receive information under Art 10 ECHR). The processing of data by a search engine enables any
internet user to access an array of information about a data subjects private life. The interference with the data subjects rights may
therefore be very serious. The economic interests of the search engine in processing the data will not outweigh the data subjects
rights. As a general rule the data subjects rights will also outweigh those of the public, however, that balance may depend on the
nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subjects private life and on the interest of the public in having
that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.
The data subject may make the request for removal in the first instance to the data controller, and if not satisfied, may complain to
the national data protection supervisory authority.
The obligation on the search engine data controller subsists independently of any obligation on the operator of the website
where the information is displayed. As operators of websites may be based elsewhere in the world and not subject to the Directive,
or may be able to avail themselves of an exemption (for example the exemption for journalistic purposes) the effective operation of
the Directive could not be achieved if there was a need for the data subject to show a parallel obligation on the website operator.
If the personal data has become irrelevant, even if it was relevant and therefore lawful when it was first published the data
subject may request its removal in accordance with the Directive. To this extent the data subject may exercise a right to have that
information forgotten.
MTRCB VS. ABS-CBN

G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005
Facts:
Respondent ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the TV program The Inside Story produced and hosted by
respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. PWU was
named as the school of some of the students involved and the faade of the PWU building served as the background of the
episode. This caused uproar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents 1) Did not submit The Inside Story episode to petitioner for review 2) Exhibited the
same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations
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ABS-CBN averred: 1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press 2) Petitioners have no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents. After hearing and submission of the parties memoranda,
MTRCB investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program. MTRCB affirmed the
ruling.
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and
setting aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD 1986 and MTRCB
do not cover the TV program Inside Story, they being a public affair program which can be equated to a newspaper.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the Inside Story prior its exhibition or broadcast on TV.
Ruling:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board. b) to screen, review and examine all motion
pictures herein defined, TV programs, including publicity materials. The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the
power to screen, review and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS *LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may
not exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says all TV programs, the word all covers all TV programs whether religious, public affairs, news documentary,
It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review it. The only exemptions from the
MTRCBs power to review are those mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986 1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or
departments and agencies. 2) Newsreels In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under
the category of newsreels.
MTRCB rules and regulation defines newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished from analyses,
commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and within petitioners power of review.
Issue related to Consti law: Petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount
to prior restraint. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a
preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x xx. Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been
accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners review power.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner
MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to respondents, is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
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The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986,
such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2)
newsreels.
ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC

GR No. 13348628, January 28, 2000
Facts:
COMELEC passed a resolution issuing a restraining order on ABS-CBN from conducting exit polls after the1998 elections,
upon the belief that such project might conflict with theofficial COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the Namfrel.
ABSCBN prayed for a TRO against the COMELEC resolution, which was granted bythe court.The exit polls were then actually
conducted and reported by the media without any difficulty or problem.
Issue:
Whether or not the freedoms of speech and of the press also protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of
data derived therefrom.
Ruling:
YES. The freedoms of speech and of the press should be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination
of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom
of a candidate to speakor the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean, this
Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the States power to regulate should
not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right
to know are unduly curtailed.
(2) NO. The assailed COMELEC resolution is too broad, since its application without qualification as to whether the polling is
disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. Thereis no
showing, however, that exitpolls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been
presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
RE: LIVE TV AND RADIO COVERAGE HEARING OF CORAZON AQUINOS LIBEL CASE
October 22, 1991
Facts:
141
In connection with the libel case filed by then President Aquino against certain journalists, the trial judge had initially
allowed a live coverage of the case. One of the accused protested and the Supreme Court issued a resolution banning the same.
The Court recognized that granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast, record, or photograph court
proceedings involves weighing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the
right to public trial, and on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional power of the
courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of justice. Collaterally, it also raises issues
in the nature of media, particularly television and its role in society, and of the impact of new technologies on law. It found that
there was no discussion by the Constitutional Commission on the same and Philippine courts have not squarely ruled on the
question.
It adverted to the current rule of the Federal Courts of the U.S. banning televisions cameras in criminal trials. And it cited
the case of Estes vs. Texas where the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves
an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant.
"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened,
play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences which might affect their testimony.
Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judges responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his
own performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the
defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the
effective presentation f his defense.
"The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in
the eyes of the public."
Issue:
Whether or not the banning of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings infringes upon the freedom of the
press and the right of the people to information.
Ruling:
In its resolution the Supreme Court held that - Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendants right to due process
as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and
limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official
proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001
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Facts:
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised
and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letterrequesting theSupreme Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato
Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
Issue:
Whether or not the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and
all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against
the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Ruling:
The Court declared that the issue involved the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one
another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
The Court seemed afraid of the power of medium as generating both histrionics and in terms of possible public opinion
tainting the judicial process.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make
absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would
come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether
open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from
improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to
presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television can work profound changes in the
behavior of the people it focuses on." Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear
on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in
varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision
of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
The right of the accused to a public trial is not the same as publicized trial. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right
that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that
he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long
ago.
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RE: LIVE MEDIA BROADCAST OF AMPATUAN TRIAL, RES.

A.M. Nos. 10-11-5-SC, and 10-11-7-SC, October 23, 2012
Facts:
Regarded as the single-day, worst election-related killing in Philippine history, the Ampatuan massacre left 57 people dead
and one missing. The victims belonged to an electoral convoy that was supposed to register then Buluan Vice Mayor Esmael
Mangudadatu, who was challenging the influential Ampatuan clan for the gubernatorial seat. Mangudadatu eventually won in the
polls, and clan patriarch Andal Ampatuan Sr. and several of his sons were all arrested for the killings. More than 100 suspects have
already been arrested, while around 90 others remain at large three years after the carnage.
In its original ruling, the high court allowed live radio and television coverage of the trial, under certain conditions like
requiring media entities to apply for broadcast and to continuously broadcast a hearing with no commercial breaks. The guidelines
also disallowed the media from re-airing recordings of the trial and giving annotations while the hearing is on-going.
Issue:
Whether or not the banning of the live media broadcast of the Ampatuan trial infringes upon the freedom of the press and
the right of the people to information.
Ruling:
Reversing a June 2011 ruling, the Supreme Court has barred live media coverage of the almost three-year-old trial for the
grisly Maguindanao massacre, where 58 peoplemostly media workerswere killed. In its latest decision, the high court granted a
petition filed by the camp of the Ampatuans, asking the SC to reconsider a June 14, 2011 ruling penned by then Associate Justice
and now Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales that allowed live coverage of the high-profile trial.
The court partially grants the Motion for Reconsideration dated June 27, 2011 filed by accused Andal Ampatuan, Jr. and
modifies this Court's Resolution dated June 14, 2011, by disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial," the high court said in a
seven-page ruling issued on October 23 but were made known to media only on Monday.
In its latest ruling, however, the court totally scrapped live coverage but allowed audio-visual recordings of the trial for
documentary purposes and for transmittal in closed-circuit viewing areas within the Camp Bagong Diwa premises and trial court in
Maguindanao, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and General Santos City, where relatives of the victims currently reside. The viewing
area will be installed to accommodate the public who want to observe the proceedings within the Camp Bagong Diwa premises. The
streaming of this video coverage within the different court premises in Mindanao will be installed so that the relatives of the parties
and the interested public can watch the proceedings in real time.
144
Witnesses however would be prohibited from watching the proceedings, whether inside the court room or the designated
closed-circuit viewing areas. The high court said a single fixed compact camera will be used to provide a wide-angle full view of the
sala of the court, with no panning and zooming "to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

348 SCRA 265, December 15, 2000
Facts:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school paper were subjected to disciplinary
sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the
school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they
were required tosubmit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the
issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them
disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or not the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.
Ruling:
The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing
sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and
attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom
of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the
Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write
EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore
the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to
the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against
respondent students.
145
BAYAN, ET AL. VS. ERMITA, ET AL.

GR No. 169838, April 25, 2006
Facts:
The rally was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then
forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one ofthem. Three other rallyists were arrested in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6,2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880All
petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them In toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,13(a), and 14(a), as well
asthe policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They seek to stopviolent dispersals of rallies under the "nopermit, no rally"
policy and the CPR policy recently announced.Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
publicassembly regardless of the presence or absenceof a clear and present danger. It alsocurtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause asthe time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which
theexpression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to massactions in support of the government. The
words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some causenot espoused by the government.
Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against thegovernment because they are being
tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Issue:
Whether or not the implementation of B.P.No. 880 violated their rights as organizationsand individuals when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005.
Ruling:
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise
the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would
publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required
permits to press their claim that no such permitcan be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee.
Respondents, onthe other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without
the permit. Sec. 4 Art.III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
146
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these
rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic policy, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and,for that matter, to organize or
form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as wellas to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) ofArticle IX, and Section 3 of Article
XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. It is very
clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies, it as a"content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair
and impartial reading of B.P.No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words"opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" inthe
definition of public assembly contentbased, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government forredress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot beavoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the contentof the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be
denied on the ground of clear and present danger topublic order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public healththe
so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has noplace in our legal firmament and must be struck downas a darkness that
shrouds freedom. It merely confuses ourpeople and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No.880
cannot becondemned as unconstitutional; it does notcurtail or unduly restrictfreedoms; it merely regulates the use of public placesto
the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" isvalid because it is subject tothe constitutionallysound "clear and present danger" standard. In this Decision, the Court goes evenone step further in safeguarding liberty by
givinglocal governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P.No. 880. If,
after that period, nosuch parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the
municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an
assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper coordination and
orderly activities.
INTERGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) VS. ATIENZA

G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010
Facts:
IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally at thefoot of Mendiola Bridge. The
mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on givendate but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of
Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. A criminal action was thereafter instituted against Cadiz for violating
the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion.
147
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely abusedhis discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first onthe matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant thechanging of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since
theapplicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he had
arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
whichblank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court wouldhave it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.
The public official concerned shall appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant
but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP
who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant
the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and
present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit
adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur
as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of
what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so
where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there.
IN RE: PETITION TO ANNUL EN BANK RESOLUTION A.M. 98-7-02 SC RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS
AND ADVOCATES FOR TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT (ULAT)
GR. No. 134621, September 29, 1998
Facts:
A resolution prohibiting demonstrations within a radius of 200 meters from the boundary of any hall of Justice. - The
Court, it would seem, has the power to promulgate rules concerning conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of the courts to assure
the people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice. It was anchored on Art. VIII Sec. 5 (5)
148
Petitioners also claim that this Court committed an act of judicial legislation in promulgating the assailed resolution. They charge
that this Court amended provisions of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 880, otherwise known as "the Public Assembly Act," by
converting the sidewalks and streets within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from every courthouse from a public forum place
into a "no rally" zone. Thus, they accuse the Supreme Court of violating the principle of separation of powers.
Issue:
Did the Supreme Court commit an act of judicial legislation in promulgating En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC, entitled,
"Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme
Court and All Other Courts?"
Ruling:
Public places historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks,
are considered, without more, to be public fora. In other words, it is not any law that can imbue such places with the public nature
inherent in them. But even in such public fora, it is settled jurisprudence that the government may restrict speech plus activities and
enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Contrary therefore to petitioners impression, B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks, among other places, as
public fora. A close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Thus, it
requires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places subject, even, to the right of the mayor to modify the
place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or
sound system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly.
The existence of B.P. Blg. 880, however, does not preclude this Court from promulgating rules regulating conduct of
demonstrations in the vicinity of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice as mandated by the
Constitution. To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from public hysteria, this Court merely
moved away the situs of mass actions within a 200-meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes general
restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. On the other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating
demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice. There is
thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures.
Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and the assailed resolution
complement each other. We so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an apparent conflict between a court rule and a
statutory provision should be harmonized and both should be given effect if possible.
IMBONG VS. OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Facts:
149
The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 informally known as the Reproductive Health Law
(RHL), is a law in the Philippines which guarantees universal access to methods regarding contraception, fertility control, sexual
education, and maternal care. The passage of the legislation was highly controversial in the Philippines and a number of groups
rose up against its passage, primarily religious institutions. A number of experts, academics, major political figures, and civil society
weighed in either in support or opposition to the legislation while it was pending.
The RHL mandates that the government promotes, without bias, all effective natural and modern methods of family planning that
are medically safe and legal. The bill further states that the government shall ensure that all women needing care for post-abortion
complications shall be treated and counseled in a humane, non-judgmental and compassionate manner, though abortion is
currently illegal and punishable by law in the Philippines. Further, the law calls for a multi-dimensional approach that integrates
family planning and responsible parenting.
However, the bill was passed with a temporary restraining order clause that stopped the government from implementing the RHL for
fourth months. Eleven petitions were filed against the constitutionality of the temporary restraining order. The petitioners argued that
the delay in implementing the RHL will allow that mothers and their children continue to suffer at the hands of a high maternal
mortality rate (221 mothers for every 100,000 live births in the country in 2011). The petitioners also argued that the Department of
Health had already found that the maternal death rate was highly preventable if only women had access to the reproductive
services they need. The Supreme Court, in a 14 to 1 vote, resolved that the temporary restraining order was constitutional because
the law was duly enacted by Congress and so it was presumed to be constitutional.
Issues:
WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Ruling:
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures
is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority
to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To
allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the
State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
LEMON VS. KURTZMAN

403 U.S. 602, 29 L Ed 2d 745, 91 S Ct 2105, June 28, 1971
Facts:
150
Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and other instructional
materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement. A group
of individual taxpayers and religious liberty organizations filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the program. They claimed
that, since the program primarily aided parochial schools, it violated the Establishment Clause.
Issue:
Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools for the cost of teaching secular
subjects?
Ruling:
No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and religion. Excessive entanglement is
determined by the character and purpose of the institution benefited the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship
between the government and church.
The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully prohibited the establishment of a state church
because of the inherent problems. The Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.
The Court's decision in this case established the "Lemon test" (named after the lead plaintiff Alton Lemon), which details the
requirements for legislation concerning religion. It is threefold: 1. The statute must not result in an "excessive government
entanglement" with religious affairs. (also known as the Entanglement Prong) 2. The statute must not advance or inhibit religious
practice (also known as the Effect Prong) 3. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose. (also known as the Purpose
Prong).
If any of these prongs are violated, the government's action is deemed unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The act stipulated that "eligible teachers must teach only courses offered in the public schools, using only materials used in the
public schools, and must agree not to teach courses in religion." Still, a three-judge panel found 25% of the State's elementary
students attended private schools, about 95% of those attended Roman Catholic schools, and the sole beneficiaries under the act
were 250 teachers at Roman Catholic schools.
The court found that the parochial school system was "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church," and
held that the Act fostered "excessive entanglement" between government and religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause.
Both statutes are unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, as the cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.
DOMINADOR L. TARUC, ET AL. VS. BISHOP PORFINODELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005
Facts:
151
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared
petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication,
petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They
contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case
Ruling:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion
of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the
courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property. Obviously, there was no
violation of a civil right in the present case.
The case at bar is purely ecclesiastical matters which is considered to be outside the providence of the court due to the
form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts must
not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a
religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court,
and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property. Those who unite
to an ecclesiastical body do so with implied consent to submit to the Church government and they are bound to submit to it. The
power to exclude membership from the church of those considered unworthy lies solely to the Church thus it is outside the province
of the civil court.
The expulsion of membership of the petitioners was legally made. They have not violated the due process of law because they were
given opportunity to be heard when they were also warned of the consequences of their actions.
AUSTRIA VS. NLRC

G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999
Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a pastor of the SDA
for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated.
152
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the treasurer
of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his
wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.
A fact-finding
committee was
created
to investigate. The petitioner
received
letter
of
dismissal
citing:1)
Misappropriation of denominational funds; 2) Willful breach of trust; 3) Serious misconduct; 4) Gross and habitual neglect of
duties; and 5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as grounds for the
termination of his services. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA
for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state.
Ruling:
No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here is the relationship of the
church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioners dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor Code.
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL OF CEBU

G.R. No. 95770, December 29, 1995
Facts:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue
whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both
public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu
for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act
making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
153
Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against
their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and
religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
expulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious
significance and it doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from
participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt
school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of
religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion
Ruling:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified. Religious freedom is a
fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones
belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of
grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts
or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
Facts:
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were
rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB).
These TV programs allegedly offended and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant
petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA
ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series
154
of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the
subject TV series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV program?
Ruling:
YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program. Petitioner contends that the term television
program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious
programs like its program An gIglesia ni Cristo. A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the
Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed.
The Court however reject petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of
the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule
thatthe exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history
counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . The
Court shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not
leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand
still.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against
another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence
of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by
the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
CENTENO VS. VILLALON-PORNILLOS

Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for violating P.D. 1564 known as
the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.
155
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaanng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel
in Bulacan.
The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, a contribution of
P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon.
Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law. In this instant case, the petitioners assert
among others that the term religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does
not include, it excludes.
Issue:
Whether or not solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit of PD 1564
Ruling:
PD 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law) Sec. 2 Any person, corporation, organization or association desiring to solicit or
receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional office of the Dept. of
Social Services and Development. As provided in the integrated Reorganization plan.. All contributions designed to promote the
work of the church are charitable in nature, since religious activities depend for their support or voluntary contributions. However,
religious purpose is not interchangeable with the expression charitable purpose. It is true that there is no religious purpose which
is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a charitable purpose which is not religious
in the legal sense of the term.. Although the term charitable may include matters which are religious, it is a broader term and
includes matters which are not religious and accordingly, there is a distinction between charitable purpose and religious purpose. PD
1564 merely stated charitable of public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended
to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing act or consequence excludes all others.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

492 SCRA 1 August 4, 2003, June 22, 2006
Facts:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pias City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote
to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pias City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that
Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband,
who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pias but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if
the court allows such act.
156
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together,
she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration
is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the importance of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was
signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
Ruling:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept
in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency. There is nothing in the Office of the Court Administrators (OCA)
memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of
evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free
Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the
court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state
interest test.
It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, it is the spirit, intent and
frame underlying the Philippines Constitution-our own Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and exempt.There is no ambiguity with regard to the Philippine Constitutions departure from the U.S. Constitution, insofar as religious
accommodations are concerned. It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is
157
the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. We therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpios total adherence to the
U.S. Courts interpretation of the religion clauses to effectively deny accommodations on the sole basis that the law in question is
neutral and of general application. For even if it were true that an unbroken line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions has never held
that an individuals religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate, our own Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and exempt religion. Philippine
jurisprudence shows that the Court has allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect, interpreting our religion
clauses to cover both mandatory and permissive accommodations.
LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH

50 Phil 595, September 1, 1927
Facts:
Angel Lorenzo was a leper. He was confined in San Lazaro Hospital in Manila in conformity with the provisions of
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code, authorizing the segregation of lepers. Lorenzo filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that his confinement in said hospital was in violation of his constitutional rights. He
alleged that human beings are not incurable with leprosy and that the disease may not be communicated by contact. The trial
court sustained the law and denied the petition for habeas corpus. Lorenzo appealed.
Issues:
Whether the Administrative Code provision on the confinement of lepers is violative of one's constitutional right.
2. May the court resolve the question whether or not leprosy is a contagious disease?
Ruling:
No. Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police
power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave
health problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be taken of
the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be shunned and
excluded from society, and that compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease of supported
by high scientific authority. Upon this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over. Similarly, the local
legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized measures to control the dread scourge. To that forum
must the petitioner go to reopen the question.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Facts:
158
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution
and forced into exile in Hawaii, USA. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his
family
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
Ruling:
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution
of the general grant of executive power.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear
showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin
the implementation of this decision.
NISHIMURA EKIE VS. UNITED STATES

142 US 651, 659, January 18, 1892
Facts:
The petitioner arrived at the port of San Francisco on the steamship Belgic, from Yokohama, Japan, on May 7, 1891. She
states that she has been married two years, and that her husband has been in the United States one year, but she does not know
his address. She has $22, and is to stop at some hotel until her husband calls for her.
William H. Thornley, Commissioner of Immigration of the State of California, and claiming to act under instructions from and contract
with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, refused to allow her to land, and on May 13, 1891, in a "report of alien
159
immigrants forbidden to land under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved August 3, 1882 at the port of San Francisco,
being passengers upon the steamer Belgic, Walker, master, which arrived May 7, 1891, from Yokohama.
With this report Thornley sent a letter to the collector, stating that after a careful examination of the alien immigrants on
board the Belgic he was satisfied that the petitioner and five others were 'prohibited from landing by the existing immigration laws,
for reasons specifically stated with regard to each; and that, pending the collector's final decision as to their right to land, he had
'placed them temporarily in the Methodist Chinese Mission, as the steamer was not a proper place to detain them, until the date of
sailing.'
Thereafter, on the same day, this writ of habeas corpus was issued to Thornley, and he made the following return thereon:
'In obedience to the within writ I hereby produce the body of Nishimura Ekiu, as within directed, and return that I hold her in my
custody by direction of the customs authorities of the port of San Francisco, California, under the provisions of the immigration act;
that, by an understanding between the United States attorney and the attorney for petitioner, said party will remain in the custody of
the Methodist Episcopal Japanese and Chinese Mission pending a final disposition of the writ.' The petitioner remained at the
mission-house until the final order of the circuit court.
John L. Hatch, having been appointed on May 14, by the secretary of the treasury, inspector of immigration at the port of
San Francisco, on May 16th made the inspection and examination required by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 551, entitled 'An act in
amendment to the various acts relative to immigration and the importation of aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor,'
and refused to allow the petitioner to land, and made a report to the collector in the very words of Thornley's report, except in stating
the date of the act of congress, under which he acted, as March 3, 1891, instead of August 3, 1882; and, on May 18th, Hatch
intervened in opposition to the writ of habeas corpus
Habeas corpus, sued out May 13, 1891 by the petitioner on her restrained of her liberty and detained at San Francisco
upon the ground that she should not be permitted to land in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to writ of habeas corpus for restraining her not to land in the US.
Ruling:
An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress and
thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful. And
Congress may, if it sees fit, as in the statutes in question in United States v. Jung Ah Lung, just cited, authorize the courts to
investigate and ascertain the facts on which the right to land depends. But, on the other hand, the final determination of those facts
may be in trusted by Congress to executive officers, and in such a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary
power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert
the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have
never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country
pursuant to law shall be permitted to enter in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive
branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.
160
The result is that the act of 1891 is constitutional and valid; the Inspector of Immigration was duly appointed; his decision
against the petitioner's right to land in the United States was within the authority conferred upon him by that act; no appeal having
been taken to the Superintendent of Immigration, that decision was final and conclusive; the petitioner is not unlawfully restrained of
her liberty.
REYES VS CA
G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009
Facts:
Father Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege, 30 th of November, 2007
and they were temporarily held at Camp Crame. A Hold Departure Order (HDO) for the petitioner and to the other accused was
issued by the DOJ upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government. Probable cause was found during
investigation and petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC however dismissed the charge against him but the HDO was still in
effect. Petitioner requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner argued that a Writ of
Amparo should be issued against the respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in the Constitution, specifically,
his right to travel.
Issue:
Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling:
No. The petition for a Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was
not unlawful.Petitioner has failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to
a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
A persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In
such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts
sound discretion.
161
GUDANI VS. SENGA

498 SCRA 671, August 15, 2006
Facts:
Gudani and Balutan are high ranking officials of thePhilippine Marines who, at the time of the in cidents in this
ca se, we re assigned at the Ph ilippine Military Academy in Baguio.
Senator Biazon invited several junior officers of the AFP including Chief of Staff Senga to appear before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security on Sept. 28, 2005, in light of the electoral fraud in the 2004 elections. (Gudani and Balutan were
assigned to maintain peace and order in Lanao del Norte and Sur during the 2004 elections).
Gen. Senga informed Senator Biazon that he could not attend due to prior commi tmen ts bu t he wou ld ask the other
offi cers to attend so the PM A superin tenden t was informed that Gudani and Senga were invi ted to appear
before the Senate hearing.
O n t h e e v e n i n g o f S e p t . 2 7 , a m e s s a g e w a s t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e P M A super intenden t tha t

as per in struction of Pre siden t Arro yo , no AFP personne l shall appear before any congressional hearing without the
approval of the Pre s. However, by tha t time , Gudan i and Senga alread y left Baguio for Manila.
The following day, Gen. Senga informed Senator Biazon that no approval has been granted b y the Presiden t to
an y AFP offi cer to appear before the hearing schedu led on that day. Nonethe less, both Gen . Gudani and Col.
Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
Note: Executive Order No. 464 was also issued on Sept 28, 2005.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifests that shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen .
Sengas letter to Sen . Bia zo n sen t earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Tolentino to Gen. Gudani, who
replied that he already had a copy. Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latters cell phone and asked to talk to
Gen.Gudani , but Gen . Gudani refused. In response , Gen . Senga in structed Commodore Tolentino to inform
Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen. Sengas call.
A f e w h o u r s a f t e r G e n . G u d a n i a n d C o l . B a l u t a n h a d c o n c l u d e d t h e i r testi mony, the office

of Gen. Sen ga issued a sta temen t wh ich noted tha t the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War
65(W illfully Disobe yi ng Superior Offi cer) , hence the y wi ll be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings. Both
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.
Petitioners were separately served with Orders directing them to appear in person at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the
Charges for violation of Articles66 and 97 of Common we alth Act No . 408 and to submi t thei r coun ter- affidavits and
affidavits of wi tne sse s at the Offi ce of the Jud ge Advoca te General . The Orders we re accompanied
b y respective char ge sheets against petitioners, accusing them of violating Articles of War 65 and 97.
It was these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
were filed, particularly, seeking the order of
President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be
declared unconstitutional.
162
Issue:
Whether or not the President may p r e v e n t a m e m b e r
of the
armed
f o r c e s f r o m testifying before
legislative inquiry?
Ruling:
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the
approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a
military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer
has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding
General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in
turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution
simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by
which the same result could have been achieved without offending constitutional principles.
OAS-OCA VS.JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE

A.M. No.MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012
Facts:
August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting
for authority to travel to Hong Kong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th
birthday. The respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the
corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained
unacted upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. On January 28,
2010, the respondent was informed by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been
disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but
from his salary corresponding to the seven days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. The
respondent was also required to submit his explanation on his failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
163
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a violation to the right to travel.
Ruling:
There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise
of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that
such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should
by no means be construed as limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No.
49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they
can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or
direct according to rule.
OCA-OAS VS HEUSDENS
A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011
Facts:
Respondent left for abroad without waiting for the result of her application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued
in her favor because she was not cleared of all her accountabilities as evidenced by the SC Certificate of Clearance. The OCA found
respondent to have violated the OCA Circular for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority.She explained
that it was not her intention to violate the rules as she, in fact, mailed her leave application which was approved by her superior
Issue:
What are the inherent and statutory limitations on the constitutional right to travel?
Ruling:
Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizens constitutional right to travel. It is, however, not the issue in this
case. The only issue in this case is the non-compliance with the Courts rules and regulations. It should be noted that respondent, in
her Comment, did not raise any constitutional concerns. In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad
without the required travel authority. Hence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out issues on ones constitutional right to travel.
Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another, as
assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel.
Section 6 itself provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law.
CHAVEZ VS PEA AND AMARI

GR No. 133250, July 09, 2002
164
Facts:
In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President
Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA
under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement
that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of
three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsequently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Senator Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public
domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).
Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO
against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estradas administration, PEA and AMARI entered into an amended JVA and Mr. Chavez claimed that the contract is null and void.
Issues:
Whether the right to Information has been violated.
Ruling:
No. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on
matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent
the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposedcontract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of
powers. The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential. The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
BANTAY RA 7941 VS. COMELEC

523 SCRA 1, May 04, 2007
Facts:
165
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the COMELEC to participate
in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the COMELEC
an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the COMELEC as
SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the COMELECs Law
Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of
COMELEC en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net
effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. COMELECs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees
away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is
that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the COMELEC to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must
not
be
personality
oriented
according
to
Chairman
Abalos.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the COMELEC to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named
therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the COMELEC be enjoined from allowing
respondent groups from participating in the elections.
Issues:
Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the COMELEC to the respondent party-list groups named in their
petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
Ruling:
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on
the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is
outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon
to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the
evidence. ( note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization).
VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE

170 SCRA 256, February 13, 1989
Facts:
166
Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the
opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda
Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents as evidence fortheir loan. Expenses in connection
herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.
referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS), Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro
replied that it is his opinion that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they
may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS
to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."
On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote
Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "We are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
On June 26, 1980, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Reynaldo
Bagatsing, Jun Ninoy Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoking their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of
the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to
furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access
to the public records for the subject information.
Issue:
Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by
the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
Ru ling :
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Sections. 5(b) and 46 of PD
1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations
which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to
manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of
the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the
necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause,
PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore, the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits
that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board.
167
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists
between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle
policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy
issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power.
CHAVEZ VS. PCGG
299 SCRA 744, December 9, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government official) initiated this original
action seeking (1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning the properties and
assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to compel
respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating
to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution
of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
countrys economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
PETITIONER DEMANDS those respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's
task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves
an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial
to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government. RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with
the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the
PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional
provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered.
Issue:
168
Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not,
with the Marcoss.
Ruling:
Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.The
arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition.
Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents and papers -- a
right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino
citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioners legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed.
AKBAYAN VS AQUINO
GR No.170516, July 16, 2008
Facts:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers,
requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).
Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters
of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and
reasonable
participation
in
all
levels
of
social,
political
and
economic
decision
making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation
then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of
public concern like the JPEPA. Those diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that
occurred?
Ruling:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the
contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties, public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its
signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic.
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent
that it seeks the disclosure of the full text thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not
169
merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in
this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis; however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking information from the
Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied
the petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.
NERI VS. SENATE

G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
Facts:
This is a a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated Mar. 25 2008, granting the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Romulo Neri against the respondent Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, (the
Committees). Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security
Neri appeared before the Committees and testified for about 11 hours on matters concerning the NBN Project, a project
awarded by the DOTC to ZTE. Neri disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for
his approval of the NBN Project. He informed PGMA of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on PGMA and his discussions relating to the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege.
Committees persisted in knowing Neris answers to (a) w/n PGMA followed up the NBN Project, (b) W/N she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) W/N she directed him to approve it, required him to appear and testify once more on Nov. 20 2007. On that day,
Neri did not appear upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege.
On Nov. 22, the Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
On Nov. 29, Neris replied that he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only
remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and
testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He requested that he be furbished in advance as to what else he needs to
clarify.
Issues:
Whether or Not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system.
Ruling:
170
Yes. In Almonte v. Vasquez, the Court affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. The Court articulated that there
are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, that there is governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters; and that the right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers, by which the Court
meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27, April 24, 1985
Facts:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973
constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.
Ruling:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides
for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
LANTACO, SR. VS. LLAMAS

108 SCRA 502, October 28, 1981
Facts:
171
This is a verified letter-complaint addressed to the President of the Philippines, this case was referred by the office of the
president to this court, by jeepney drivers Martin Lantaco, Sr., Esteban de Barrio, Rosalito Alamag and Borromeo Vitaliano, all
residents of Pasay City, against city judge Francisco r. Llamas of the Pasay City court for "backsliding and grave abuse of
discretion."
On January 8, 1975, an investigating special counsel of the city fiscal's office of Pasay City, filed criminal cases for Estafa against
Ricardo Paredes, an officer of the PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for "non-remittance of SSS contribution
premiums." these cases were assigned to respondent, acquitting the accused of all four Estafa cases on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
After the reading of (the) decision a recess was made by Judge Llamas and the petitioners requested Judge Llamas to
furnish them a copy of said decision but told the petitioners that there are no more copies. The steno-typist failed to furnish them the
copy as agreed by then and told them again to come back next day, August 5. The next morning petitioners went back of the office
of Judge Llamas, but failed to get copy of the decision.
On August 6, 1975 at 11:00 a.m. one of the complainants, Esteban del Barrio and Ceferino F. Ginete, the president of their
labor union went to Judge Llamas to secure copy of said decision to (sic) the same person the steno-typist. The steno-typist went
inside the room of Judge Llamas and a few minutes the typist went back to us and informed us that he could not type the decision
because the folder is at the house of Judge Llamas and when Mr. Ginete inquired why the said folder of the complainants are at the
house of Judge Llamas, the typist reply the judge making "correction." Mr. Ginete wondered why a correction is being made when
the decision has already been rendered anti why the delay in furnishing us copy.
It is respectfully submitted that on the details of the proceedings and the evidence presented, no better answer could be
made by the undersigned except by submitting a copy of said decision promulgated July 31, 1975 and marked as Annex "a" of this
comment. In the same breath, the matter of the advisability as suggested that this finding by this court be reviewed by the military
may best be answered by a thorough reading of the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge has the right to refuse to give petitioners copy of his decision.
Ruling:
After a careful examination of the records before this court, we found that respondent committed grave abuse of authority
in refusing to give the complainants a copy of his decision in these criminal cases. The complainants were understandably
interested in securing a copy of the decision as they were the complaining witnesses in these four criminal cases. The request was
made during office hours. It was relayed personally to the respondent. The decision in question was already promulgated. Copies
were already furnished the counsel for the prosecution and the defense. It was already part of the public record which the citizen
has a right to scrutinize. And if there was "no more copy," the complainants were amenable to have a photo copy of the original on
file, copies of which, as part of court records, are allowed to be given to interested parties upon request, duly certified as a true copy
of the original on file. What aggravates the situation, as seen from the sequence of events narrated by the complainants which were
never denied or rebutted by the respondent, is that respondent, without just cause, denied complainants access to public records
and gave the complainants the run-around, which is oppressive as it is arbitrary.
172
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern
and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject
to such limitations imposed by law (Article IV, section 6, New Constitution). The incorporation of this right in the constitution is
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the
public of the nation's problems, or a meaningful democratic decision- making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.
SSS VS CA
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the implementation of their
CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an
illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court
made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor
Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the
Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court
may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issues:
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike.
Ruling:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the
right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that
the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under
pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the
absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
JACINTO VS CA
173
281 SCRA 657, November 14, 1997
Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the November 27, 1995 Decision of
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the period
September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged; and on
September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario immediately issued a return-to-work order. The directive was ignored by
petitioners. Secretary Cario issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them. During the investigation,
petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the charges against them. As a consequence, Sec. Cario, in his decisions found
them guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal, except with respect to petitioners Merlinda Jacinto and Adelina Agustin
who were meted only six (6) months suspension.
The decisions were appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).The Civil Service Commission, in separate
resolutions, found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed
upon them the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay; and automatically reinstated them to the service without payment
of back salaries. Respondent Court found that the petitioners absented themselves from their classes in furtherance of or in
connection with the mass action for the purpose of pressuring the government to grant their demands.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission that penalized all the petitioners whose only offense (except Jacinto) was to exercise their constitutional right
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Ruling:
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of
grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful
concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 413 and 814 of the Bill of
Rights, Section 2(5)15 of Article IX, and Section 316 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements
defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these rights.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso in accordance with law. This is
a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive
Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly
endorsed an earlier CSC circular which enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service, by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed.
Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute.
174
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike. Government
employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.
Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble
peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools
during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of
classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their
free time -- recess, after classes, weekends or holidays -- to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities
within the bounds of law, no one -- not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court -- could have held them liable for the valid exercise of
their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily
disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act
by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.
PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ

99 PHIL 515, July, 18, 1956
Facts:
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO, he and the other thirty-one (31) Defendants were charged in criminal
cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with
others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their co-conspirators, being then officers and/or
members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the Committee on Labor
Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central
offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other mass organizations in different places in the
Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes its activities with the rebellious
activities of the Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party
of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion
against the Republic of the Philippines, as the herein Defendants and their co-conspirators have in fact synchronized the activities of
the CLO with the rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies, organs and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and have otherwise master- minded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies,
organs, and instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, and being then
also high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is
now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned
to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan
(HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), is the armed force. The court implicates the appellant Hernandez
as a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the Communist Party by his mere membership thereto.
175
Issue:
Whether or not mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or
of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Ruling:
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy
unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is
insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or
an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the
reins of Government itself. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become
guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
We do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of
rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract
theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with
action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the
same.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure,
as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thralldom. By membership in the HMB, one already
advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of
the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
punishable by law.
As the specific charge against appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they
cannot be held guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different offense.
PEOPLE VS FERRER
48 SCRA 382, December 27, 1972
Facts:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 (Provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal
acts of the CPP is punishable) of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co.
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by
means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power.
176
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint
was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was
had, information was filed.
That in or about March 1969 and for some time prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, , the above-named
accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700.
Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void
on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the information against the two
accused. The Government appealed.
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence,
a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped
"the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or
safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a
knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational
guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow." This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a
member of the governing body of any labor organization.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member and the law is still a bill of attainder that said members of
the Communist Party will be punished.
Ruling:
Indeed, was the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as
the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be
judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination
of a foreign power.
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
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The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus
is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired
with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is
punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished? Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization.
The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act are given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime or remaining a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of
any other subversive association: we leave this matter to future determination.
IN RE: MARCIAL EDILLION

84 SCRA 554, August 3, 1978
Facts:
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative
Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since
the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice.
The core of the respondents arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
Issues:
Whether or not payment of IBP is an invasion of his constitutional rights because he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing.
Ruling:
To compe l a lawye r to be a member of the Inte gr ated Ba r i s no t viola tive of his consti tu tional freedom
to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
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An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such
an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers.
BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. DIONISIO

174 SCRA 589, June 30, 1989
Facts:
The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the
petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association, the
respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and
the general welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a property
tax outside the corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment
for lack of privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive,
confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.
Issue:
Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land are bound by
the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The petitioners contention that he has
no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was
understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them,
that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain
amounts for the operation and activities of the association.
The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in
the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A
property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The
dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets,
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street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary,
valid and reasonable for the particular community involved.
The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. The constitutional proscription that no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his
will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like the one in question. The petitioner cannot legally maintain
that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of
property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom
of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.
SANTA CLARA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS. GASTON
GR No 141961, January 23, 2002
Facts:
Ma. Victor and Lydia, residents of SantaClara Subdivision, alleged that they bought the lot in 1974. At the time they
bought the lot, there was no mention or requirement of membership in any homeowners association. Thus they remained nonmembers of the Sta. Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA). Thus, an arrangement was made wherein non-members were issued
gate-pass stickers for use as identification by the security guards manning the gate. This arrangement lasted until March, 1988,
when the homeowners association disseminated a board resolution whereby only members in good standing by the association will
be issued car stickers. Thereafter, Victor, a son of the spouses who lives with them, were required to show his drivers license
despite the fact that the guards know him and the exact location of their residence. Victor Ma. Gaston was himself prevented from
entering the subdivision when the guards lowered the steel bar at the gate and demanded his drivers license for identification. Thus,
the spouses filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction/TRO against the homeowners association, alleging
that these acts of the association caused them mental anguish.
Issue:
Whether or not Private Respondents are SCHA Members.
Ruling:
To support their contention that private respondents are members of the association, petitioners cite the SCHAs Articles
of Incorporation and By-laws which provide that all landowners of the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically members of the
SCHA. We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. The
right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that
the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one. More to
the point, private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in
its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot
owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their common welfare. But that is possible only if the owners
voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the association. True also, memberships in homeowners associations
may be acquired in various ways often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of evidence of property
ownership. In the present case, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that private
respondents have agreed to be SCHA members.
180
As correctly observed by the CA:
The approval by the SEC of the said documents is not an operative act which bestows membership on the private
respondents because the right to associate partakes of the nature of freedom of contract which can be exercised by and between
the homeowners amongst themselves, the homeowners association and a homeowner, and the subdivision owner and a
homeowner/lot buyer x x x.
It should be stressed that the Complaint here is for damages. It does not assert membership in the SCHA as its basis. Rather, it is
based on an alleged violation of their alleged right of access through the subdivision and on the alleged embarrassment and
humiliation suffered by the plaintiffs.
Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, could have rendered
judgment over the dispute.
CHINA BANKING CORP VS. ASB HOLDINGS

GR No. 172192, December 23, 2008
Facts:
In 1999, respondent ASB Development Corporation applied for and was granted a credit line by petitioner China Bank in
the principal amount of P35,000,000.00. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over two contiguous lots with
a combined area of 1,332.5 square meters in Grace Park, Caloocan City.
In 2000, respondent ASB Realty Corporation, an affiliate of ASB Development, obtained an omnibus credit line from
petitioner China Bank in the amount of P265,000,000.00. The loan was secured by two real estate mortgages: (1) over two parcels
of land situated at Salcedo, Legaspi Village, Makati City, and (2) over a parcel of land located at Constellation Street, Bel-Air Village,
Makati City.
In filing the petition for rehabilitation, respondents contended that while they have sufficient capitalization, the company will be hardpressed to service its obligations in favor of petitioner bank and its other creditors due to a glut in the real estate market, the
depreciation of the currency and decreased investor confidence in the Philippine economy.
On May 4, 2000, the Hearing Panel of the SEC Securities Investigation and Clearing Department, finding the petition for
rehabilitation sufficient in form and substance, issued a 60-day Suspension Order : (a) suspending all actions for claims against the
ASB Group of Companies pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of
Companies from disposing of their properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from paying their
liabilities outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c) appointed an interim receiver of the ASB Group of
Companies.
On April 26, 2001, the ASB rehabilitation plan was approved by the SEC. Aggrieved, petitioner bank appealed the plans
approval to the SEC En Banc. According to petitioner, the SEC order compelling the bank to surrender its present collateral and
accept certain properties located in Pasig City and Paraaque City as payment of the obligations due it violates the constitutional
proscription against impairment of contracts. It was likewise argued that the value of the properties being offered by ASB via
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dacion en pago is insufficient to cover the amount of its outstanding loans; and that the preference conferred by law to the bank as a
secured creditor has been rendered illusory.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the ASB Rehabilitation Plan violates the Principles of Mutuality of Contracts, curtails a partys Freedom to
Contract.
Ruling:
No. By that statutory provision, it is clear that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver merely suspend the actions for claims against respondent corporations. Petitioner banks preferred status
over the unsecured creditors relative to the mortgage liens is retained, but the enforcement of such preference is suspended. The
loan agreements between the parties have not been set aside and petitioner bank may still enforce its preference when the
assets of ASB Group of Companies will be liquidated. Considering that the provisions of the loan agreements are merely
suspended, there is no impairment of contracts, specifically its lien in the mortgaged properties.
ORTIGAS AND CO. VS. FEATI BANK

G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979
Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y
Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favor of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed
was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was
annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. FEATI then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and
Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, FEATI started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking
purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but FEATI continued contending
that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area
along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favor of FEATI.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid
considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
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Ruling:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a
Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. This Section 12 or RA 2264 states
that implied power of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favor, to give more power to the local government in
promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare
Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area
considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
YSMAEL VS. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

190 SCRA 673, October 18, 1990
Facts:
Soon after the change in government in 1986, Petitioner sent a letter to the Office of the President, and to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking the reinstatement of its timber license agreement (TLA) which was
cancelled during the Marcos administration.
Petitioner alleged it entered into a timber license agreement with the DENR, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to
cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land located in the municipality of
Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau
of Forest Development , issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and
cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources. That on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau,
requesting him to stop all logging operations and to pull out logging machineries and equipment in order to conserve remaining
forests. That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureaus directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest
conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operation, but no
favorable action was taken on this letter;
It ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege
which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view
of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total
ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao reasoning that the Ministry imposed
the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forests. It considers itself the trustee thereof. This being
the case, it has to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.
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It ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
whether or not TLA are contracts.
Ruling:
NO. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon
their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and
orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction.
As gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as
amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2,
1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already
settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause.
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD
FOUNDATION, INC.
596 SCRA 40, August 19, 2009
Facts:
Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote to the Chief Justice asking the
court to grant to their Foundation, who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people
which is the exemption from payment of docket fees.
Issue:
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Whether or not an incorporated foundation (serving indigent litigants) be exempted from payment of docket fees.
Ruling:
No. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of
the1987 Constitution. The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party
litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., a juridical personality cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigant.
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people are of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution
has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that the only natural person can suffer.
PEOPLE VS. MARA
G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994
Facts:
In information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, John Doe, Peter
Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7,
1992. 1 On June 4, 1992, an amended information was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated as an accused
instead of John Doe. A warrant of arrest was thereafter issued against Allan Tan but the same was returned unserved, 4 hence trial
preceded with regard to herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone.
Having received information that a man in security guards uniform was involved in the incident, they sought information
from a security guard of a nearby bus terminal. Said security guard pointed them to Marra, who at the time was eating in a
carinderia nearby, Informed by Marra that his gun was at his residence, they all went to Marras residence to get the same. After
receiving said firearm, De Vera asked appellant why he killed Tandoc but Marra initially denied any participation In the killing.
Nevertheless, when confronted with the fact that somebody saw him do it, Marra admitted the although he alleged it was done in
self-defense.
Issue:
Whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when admitted the killing but invoked self-defense.
Ruling:
The testimony of De Vera as to the confession of Marra is of significant weight, but the admissibility thereof shall also be
passed upon. We believe that he was not so situated. Appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the
admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answer
questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached
a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been
merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform.
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Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
PEOPLE VS. AMESTUZO

GR No. 104383, July 12, 2001
Facts:
On February 26, 1991, four days after an alleged crime of robbery with multiple rape, a group of policemen together with
accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NLA Road, Pasay City where accusedappellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain Mario and searched the first and second floors of
the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, Niloloko lang yata tayo
ng taong ito and Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was
the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.
Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin. While on board the
jeep, accused Ampatin told him that he (Ampatin) committed an error in pointing him out to the police, namumukaan lang niya ako,
napagkamalan lang niya ako. They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together
with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to
turn to the left and then to the right and he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and
Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the
suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the policemen
intervened.5
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be
represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of
counsel, accused-appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be assisted by counsel to which he was
entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police and placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a critical
stage of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper.
Issues:
Whether or not appellants right to counsel was violated..
Ruling:
186
No. Accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented for identification by the complainants
because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the
complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact, records show
that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of
the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the present case, there is
no such confession or extrajudicial admission.
FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE PTE, LTD. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

197 SCRA 842, May 13, 1991
Facts:
The M/T ULU WAI a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of
Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far
East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs
authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in
the area.The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a
clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for Zamboan.
The vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due
investigation. The District Collector issued his decision, finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are
found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. Feeder International filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs with
the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the
Commissioner from implementing his decision.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals decision with this Court. The Court issued a resolution
referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of our decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, et al. holding that final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed innocent
was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
187
Ruling:
The right to be presumed innocent is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case; it cannot be
invoked by a corporate entity. It bears mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be
presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case. It is quite clear that seizure
and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the
offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the
code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of
which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The
penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or
possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
LUZ VS. PEOPLE

667 SCRA 421, February 29, 2012
Facts:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who was coming from the
direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him
to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said
motor vehicle, invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place is almost in front of the said sub-station. He was
alerted of the accuseds uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have
a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or
metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed
a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and
then subjected to a valid search which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
Issue:
Whether the search and seizure of shabu is invalid.
Ruling:
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following
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are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence
in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search;
and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful
arrest, are applicable to this case.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at
the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY

302 SCRA 455, February 19, 1999
Facts:
On July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide that on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will
and without her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
Larry Mahinay y Amparado started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on 20 November 1993. His task was to take care
of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street,
Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Mahinay stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip located 10 meters away
from the unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by
Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard, catching Maya birds together with other children. On 25 June
1995, at 8:00 a.m., Mahinay joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 a.m., Mahinay, who was already drunk, left
Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends Larry Mahinay y Amparado started working as houseboy
with Maria Isip on 20 November 1993. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old
residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Mahinay stayed and
slept in an apartment also owned by Isip located 10 meters away from the unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years
old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching Maya birds together with other children. On 25 June 1995, at 8:00 a.m., Mahinay joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking
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spree. Around 10 a.m., Mahinay, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his
friends
Mahinay was charged with rape with homicide, to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting Mahinay of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73, 000.00 to the
victim's heirs. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not Mahinay was deprived of rights to be informed of his right through MIRANDA doctrine.
Ruling:
Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained
through lawful means, the court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the
arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No.
7438: It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda
rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood
by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a
lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or
one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be
conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer
with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that
this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the
presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
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9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does
not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights
does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his constitutional rights with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the
crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely
and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person (People vs. delos
Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984;150 SCRA 311). He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his
statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with
details know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by
said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the
testimony. That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful
and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused.
PEOPLE VS. OBRERO

332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000
Facts:
Jimmy Obrerowas a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was selling chickens to customers.
Cabosas's business was located in Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. On August 10, 1989, his fellow employee, Ronnie
Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go to La Union to visit his family. On August 11, 1989, after learning
that only two helpers were then at the residence of Emma Cabrera, Jimmy Obrero and Ronnie decided to pull the heist. Ronnie
covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her.
Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the younger maid Remedios Hitta from which she died. Thereafter,
the two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the house of Emma Cabrera. From
Blumentritt Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while Jimmy proceeded to Pangasinan.
Only Jimmy Obrero had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. When arraigned,
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued. The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by accusedappellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes. Jimmy Obrero claimed that, after being informed of the charges against him, he was
beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De los
Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does
not know how to read.
Issue:
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Whether or not the executed written and coerced confession as a result of a custodial investigation is valid.
Ruling:
No. What renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the
Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which
Art. III, s12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by
intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following
warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used
against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him.
GAMBOA VS. CRUZ

162 SCRA 642, June 27, 1988
Facts:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by
Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then
detained therein together with several others.
The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to
petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but
petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit
down in front of her.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to
Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the
line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner constitutional rights to counsel and to due process were violated during the conduct of police
line-up.
Ruling:
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
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As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest,
hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extendto those under police investigation the
right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford
a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
PEOPLE VS VIDUYA
Facts:
On or about the 26th day of August, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of ATTY. JOSE VIDUYA y
TAVARES, her husband, and with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, by then and there stabbing him several times with a
bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said Atty. Jose Viduya y Tavares mortal stab wounds which were the direct cause of his
death immediately thereafter.
Florentino Bagallon, an investigator of the Crimes against Persons Section of the Manila Police Force, Western Police
District, declared that he conducted an on-the-spot ocular inspection of the victim's house and found, in the bedroom of the victim
and the accused, a single bed with a white blanket in disorder, soaked in a pool of blood.Thereafter, he advised the accused and the
victim's son, Salvador Viduya, to go with him to the police headquarters for a formal investigation.
Bagallon testified that at 3:15 in the morning of August 26, 1980, the accused executed a salaysay. Later, at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning of the same date, Mrs. Viduya executed her extrajudicial confession wherein she categorically admitted
authorship of the killing of her husband. However, she claimed that she merely acted in self-defense After due trial, the lower court
rendered its decision adjudging the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. The trial judge, in holding that
the extrajudicial confession is admissible, reasoned out that there is no prohibition for Assistant Fiscal Domingo A. Mendoza to act
as counsel for the accused as it is his primordial duty not only to prosecute a case but also to protect the rights of an accused and to
see that no violence, force, coercion or intimidation be used to secure from a person under custodial investigation his statement.
Moreover, the answer of the accused ("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado") is a palpable
indication that she did not fully understand her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived
those rights.
Issue:
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Whether or not a fiscal or assistant fiscal can act as defense lawyer while accused is under custodial investigation.
Ruling:
An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even during custodial
investigation. Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution favors the accused and is fully applicable to this case. It is also
elementary that a Fiscal or Prosecutor cannot be a lawyer for the accused at the same time. To allow such a happenstance would
render illusory the protection given to the accused during custodial investigation. What the Constitution requires in Article III Section
12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's defense without any
intervening conflict of interest.
The answer of the accused ("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado") is a palpable indication that she
did not fully understand her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.Like
other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it
must be made knowingly and intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to
reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated
knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.
WHEREFORE, the JUDGMENT of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another entered ACQUITTING her on reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS. JARA

Facts:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 1978, about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, after gaining entrance to the house thru the
window, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike with a hammer,
Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, hitting her on the vital parts of her body and stabbed with a scissor while she was soundly sleeping in her
bedroom with one, Luisa Jara, thereby causing her instantaneous death as a result thereof, and that after killing Amparo Vda. de
Bantigue, accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and
carried away a piggy bank and a buddha bank containing money in the amount of not more than P200.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, in the total amount of Twelve Thousand Two Hundred Pesos [P12,200.00],
Philippine Currency.
On or about June 9, 1978, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike
several times, with a hammer one, Luisa Jara, who is the lawfully wedded wife of accused Felicisimo Jara, and thereafter, stabbed
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her with a scissor in her chest and abdomen, while the latter was soundly sleeping with one, Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, resulting to
the instantaneous death of said Luisa Jara, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Luisa Jara in the amount of Twelve
Thousand [P12,000.00] Pesos, Philippine Currency.
All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Later, two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara
and Roberto Bernadas, were apprehended. After investigation, they confessed their guilt to the Provincial Commander of the
Philippine Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators. They also positively identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the
mastermind who had plotted the killing and who promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation. Before the City Fiscal
and First Assistant City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City, respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and swore to their
extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of Felicisimo Jara in the killing.
Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her friend, Amparo
Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street,
Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his grandchildren at his stepdaughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other
accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions admitting their participation
in the crimes charged and identifying their mastermind as the accused Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They
contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial confessions and the subsequent re-enactment of the crime on the ground that their
participations in these occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.
The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas and Vergara, together with the proof of
corpus delicti of the Special Crime of Robbery with Homicide established the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged extra-judicial confessions of accused-appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas,
which were taken thru force and without benefit of counsel, are admissible.
Ruling:
The presumption is always against the waiver of constitutionally protected rights.whenever a protection given by the
Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist
him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.
Confession bears clear earmark of involuntariness where it was taken incommunicado with only the suspect and 5 policemen
present inside a small room.- It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions in these cases
should testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However, the records show that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant Bernadas gave his confession, his companions in the room
were five police officers. The only people with Vergara when he confessed were also police investigators.
Inadmissible confessions implicating a third party are also inadmissible to prove the guilt of the latter. The strongest
evidence against Felicisimo Jara is the extra-judicial confessions of his two co-accused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the
one who bludgeoned the two victims with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab wounds. He was also
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alleged to have offered them P1, 000.00 each if they would help him in the killing of his wife. However, since the confessions of
Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against them, with more reason can they not be used against Jara.
Bernadas andVergara were both acquitted in the two cases, Jara wasconvicted in both cases.
PEOPLE VS. BALISTEROS

237 SCRA 499, October 7, 1994
Facts:
On August 16, 1991 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning Eliza Merceada reported for work at the store of Romeo Abad.
At about 8:00 o'clock, she brought the merienda of the farm laborers of Romeo, who were busy working at the ricefield. On her way
to the rice field, she saw Nilo Avestros, Salvador Balisteros and Ernesto Galvante in the hut of Salvador Balisteros, whom she called
Mang Badong, drinking liquor (Gin). It did not take long, she had to return to the rice field. This time she was bringing the food for
lunch of the laborers, aboard the truck with Romeo. When they reached the National Highway, they alighted from the truck after
parking it, and walked going to the rice field. When they passed by the hut of Balisteros, Romeo was left in the hut while she
proceeded to the rice field. After the laborers had finished eating, Romeo arrived, but he did not stay long because he went to rope
graze (sic) (isinuga) his horse. After several minutes passed, she left and proceeded to the place where the truck was parked at the
highway. That on her way, near the bamboo gr(o)ve, she heard two shouts saying, "huwag, huwag", then she called for Nilo, whom
she believed was in the hut, but no one answered her call so she proceeded. On the way, she saw the three (3), Mang Badong, Nilo
and Ernesto coming out from the bamboo gr(o)ve. Mang Badong was half-naked, wearing a pant (sic) and carrying a bolo. He was
in a hurry, followed by Nilo who was wearing a polo shirt, a short (sic) and barefooted, so with Ernesto who was wearing a short pant
(sic) and barefooted.
Ernesto B. Galvante, who was discharged from the information to be a State witness, testified that: On August 3, 1991 he
went to his uncle's place (Salvador Balisteros) at Siling Matanda, Pandi, Bulacan and stayed with him until August 16, 1991. In the
morning of August 16. While they were drinking, Salvador and Nilo were talking about the riceland which Romeo Abad bought and
where the hut of Salvador was erected. According to Salvador, Romeo gave him a grace period of one (1) month to remove his hut
and vacate the premises. During their conversation, he was beside the window, so he could hear what Salvador and Nilo (were)
talking about. He heard the plan of Salvador and Nilo to kill Romeo who was then in his house far from the hut of Salvador. That he
could hear all their conversation because he was just two (2) meters away from them.
The defense presented appellants Salvador Balisteros and Nilo Avestro who denied the charges filed against them and
interposed the defense of alibi. The lower court gave full faith and credit to the prosecution's version and concluded that "the
defense of denial and alibi of the accused has no weight after Ernesto Galvante, an eyewitness, positively identified and pointed to
Balisteros and Avestroz as the killers of the deceased Romeo Abad. Besides, the accused have not shown any motive why
Galvante, nephew of Balisteros and first cousin of Avestroz, would testify against them."
Appellants now complain to us that the trial court gravely erred (1) in finding that the killing took place in an uninhabited
place and was deliberately augmented by another wrong not necessary for its commission; (2) in giving weight and substance to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and disregarding the theory of the accused-appellants; and (3) in finding the accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime.
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Another contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in accordance
with the present rule for the qualification of a state witness, Galvante executed a sworn statement wherein he categorically admitted
his guilt but without the assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante made his sworn statement in the presence of
Atty. Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another person
whom he did not know. With this battery of persons surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on Galvante.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellants can invoke rights of the confessant that has been violated under Section12 or Article III of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
Appellants cannot seek solace in the provision they have invoked. What is provided by the modified formulation in the
1987 Constitution is that a confession taken in violation of said Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him, meaning the confessant. This objection can be raised only by the confessant whose rights have been
violated as such right is personal in nature.
An extrajudicial confession repeated in court is converted into a judicial confession which, if allowed by the trial court, eliminates the
need for assistance of counsel.It should also be noted that Galvante repeated in court what he had stated in his affidavit and,
although he was likewise subjected to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his confession and the revelations therein.
Appellants imputations of pressure and coercion are refuted thereby. Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted
it into a judicial confession which, having been allowed by the trial court, eliminated the need for assistance of counsel which is
required in extrajudicial confessions. Furthermore, even in extrajudicial confessions which under jurisprudential doctrines have been
held to be generally binding upon the confessant and not against his co-accused, Galvantes confession would readily fall into the
exceptions to that rule since appellants are charged as co-conspirators and said confession is used only as a corroborating
evidence, or as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator, or is corroborated by other
evidence of record.
PEOPLE VS. ENDINO

352 SCRA307, February 20, 2001
Facts:
On 18 October 1991, Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and accusedappellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court
issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their
apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police
forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early
in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin
Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
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On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by
reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward
Endino as the gunman.
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats
of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not ABS-CBN interview of Gagarin's confession is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped confession, we find such admission proper. The
interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence
of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in
an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have
easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. As the trial court stated in its
Decision:
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence
of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an
offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal
justice system.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have
been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.
Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. ANDAN

Facts:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias Bobby was accused of the crime of rape with homicide.
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The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne
Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994.
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the
chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. The autopsy
conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of traumatic injuries sustained. CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face.
Mariannes gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team
of police officers to look for the criminal. The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents house. They
took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied
any knowledge of Mariannes death.
Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and
whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke
down and said Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of
the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant
but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the
police, representatives of the media and appellants own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed
Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son
and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
Issue:
Whether Andans confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be admitted as evidence against Andan.
Ruling:
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellants confession to the
mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellants confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made
by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
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PEOPLE VS. CASIMIRO

383 SCRA 390, June 20, 2002
Facts:
On August 17, 1999, accused-appellant said he received a call from Rose, an acquaintance who worked as a guest
relations officer at a club on Magsaysay Avenue. Rose offered to help him find a better job and asked that they meet at Anthonys
Wine and Grocery. In the past, Rose had offered to sell him shabu or marijuana, but he refused to buy from her as he had no
money. At around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant met Rose in front of the grocery store. While she talked to him about a job
opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3 Piggangay grabbed his hands from behind even as he shouted I-handcuff, i-handcuff!
(Handcuff him, handcuff him!) Accused-appellant was then taken to the Regional Narcotics Office by the policemen, accompanied
by Rose.
At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted accused-appellant about the marijuana allegedly seized from
him. Accused-appellant said he denied having carried the bag of marijuana which he had seen Rose carrying earlier. After taking
pictures of him pointing at the bag, the policemen threatened to shoot him in a secluded place if he did not admit owning the
marijuana. After failing to make him admit ownership of the marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release accused-appellant if he
gave them money. When accused-appellant replied that he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, If you have no money, then we will
work on your papers so that you will go to Muntinlupa. The policemen then took accused-appellant to a hospital for a physical
examination and afterwards asked him to sign a receipt of property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report without explaining their
contents or allowing him to read them.
Issue:
Whether or not the receipt signed by Accused-appellant without the assistance of counsel is a valid and admissible
evidence to prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the accused does not affect
the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by the police in accordance with their standard operating
procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or
confession.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accusedappellant Albert Casimiro as suspect/ owner. In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another,
which is an offense under the law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that
marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.
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GUTANG VS PEOPLE
335 SCRA 479, July 11, 2000
Facts:
On March 5, 1994, accused-appellant David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr.,
was arrested by elements of the PNP NARCOM, in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence in Ortigas
Avenue, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. When the police operatives of the PNP-NARCOM served the search warrant, which
was issued by RTC Judge Martin Villarama, Jr. of Pasig, Metro Manila, they found the petitioner and his three (3) companions inside
the comfort room of the masters bedroom, at the second floor of the house. Materials were also found on top of a glass table inside
the masters bedroom.
The narcotics team also inspected the cars of accused Regala, Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. which were parked inside
the compound of the residence of petitioner Gutang. They found a Winchester Rayban case (sunglasses) with an undetermined
amount of suspected shabu residues and tooters in a black plastic container and aluminum foil inside the car of Regala. The cars of
Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. yielded negative results.
The items which were confiscated were then brought to the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at
Camp Crame, Quezon City for laboratory tests. The results of the laboratory examinations showed that the said items found in the
masters bedroom of the residence of petitioner Gutang were positive for marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
The items found inside the car of Regala were also positive for shabu. Exhibits I and R, which are the Receipts of Property
Seized which described the properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant, contain his signature.
The charge against accused Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was dismissed by the trial court in an Order dated August 3,
1994 on the ground that he voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation and confinement at the New Beginnings
Foundation, Inc., a private rehabilitation center accredited by the Dangerous Drugs Board while the rest of the accused are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16.
Issue:
Whether or not the receipt for property seized; exhibit i and exhibit r the physical science report nos. D-168-94 and Dt107-94 (exhibit d and m) are inadmissible evidence.
Ruling:
It has been held in a long line of cases that the signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible
in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration
against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained possession
of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized
(Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
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We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence does not
render inadmissible the Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report (Exhibit L) inasmuch as the
examined materials were legally seized or taken from the petitioners bedroom on the strength of a valid search warrant duly issued
by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or taken
from the bedroom of the petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon were legally and validly done. Hence, the
said Reports containing the results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real evidence of the
prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the said prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia in his possession.
HO WAI PANG VS. PEOPLE

659 SCRA 624, October 19, 2011
Facts:
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hong Kong
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hong Kong nationals who came to the
Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration
Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline substance
contained in a white transparent plastic.
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang assails the June 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals which also affirmed the RTC decision,
finding him and his co-accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In this petition for certiorari, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He also claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice.
Issue:
Aside from extrajudicial confession, what are inadmissible in evidence if the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation have been violated?
Ruling:
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs
authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however,
lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, the Court categorically ruled that the infractions of the so-called Miranda
rights render inadmissible, only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
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obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. In the present case, petitioner did not make any confession or admission
during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his
guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him.
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS. PURGANAN

G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002
Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to
the Philippine Government Note Verbale and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
DOJ filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition. but before the court could act, Jimenez filed before it an
Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant is set for hearing. This was
granted. After the hearing, Jimenez submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing and the court directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Issue:
Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Ruling:
Significantly, both the extradition treaty between the United States and the Philippines, and the Philippine Extradition Law
(PD 1069) contain no provision expressly withholding from the courts the power to grant bail. Had the intention of the parties to the
treaty been to totally nullify the pre-existing power of the extradition court on the matter of bail, they could have easily provided for it
in the treaty. But since they had not done so, it would be reasonable to presume that they had not so intended. Indeed, the treaty
fails to even remotely suggest such judicial limitation insisted upon by the Government. Truly, there is neither logic nor persuasion to
the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases, or that class of cases where courts must render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Bail as a remedy is available where there is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial. In the 1909 case of
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United States v. Co Siaco, akin to the situation confronting us but involving a deportation proceeding, this Court allowed the potential
deportee to post bail although a deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was then no law providing for bail in
deportation cases.
As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the
loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he
is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. OLALIA
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
Facts:
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces
seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for
each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest
of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. After an order of arrest was issued against
him, he was detained. Munoz then filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued
an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk." Munoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was
granted by respondent Judge Olalia, to whom the case was raffled off. The petitioner there after moved to vacate the Order, but it
was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Ruling:
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object
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of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
GO VS. RAMOS
G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009
Facts:
Three petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis Ramos against Jimmy Go alleging
that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Ramos alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. Ramos presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese" as proof. Luis argued that although it
appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered,
because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in
September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and
with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was
merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos,
who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 625.
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he maintained that such was not of his own
doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding
surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his fathers
citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has
already taken his oath as a Filipino. As regards the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr.,
that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his
father. Initially, an investigation conducted by the NBI found that Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and by operation of law, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making
him a Filipino as well. But the Board of Commissioners reversed said dismissal and directed the preparation and filing of the
appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
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Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition before the RTC of Pasig City to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Board of
Commissioners and challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings. However, the trial court
dismissed their petition. Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension and
detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. Jimmy commenced a
petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail. Carlos and Jimmy
petitioned before the CA, but the appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they
enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens. The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction
to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine their citizenship. Carlos and Jimmy moved for
reconsideration but were denied.
On account of his detention, Jimmy filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City. The RTC dismissed
the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order
has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy assailed the Orders of the RTC in a petition before the appellate court which granted
the petition and enjoined the Bureau from deporting Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Bureau petitioned before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not Jimmy Go is entitled to bail.
Ruling:
No. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings
because there is no law authorizing it.
COMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA

G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991
Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on
December 1 to 9, 1989. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in contempt the commanding
officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobeying the said order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to
release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
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After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner,
Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison. The
RTC declared that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is
applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed
to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing
charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Issue:
Whether or not bail is available to the Military.
Ruling:
No. We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The unique structure of the military should
be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system and are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties
and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. If they are allowed to go on bail, they could freely
resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities and replace the same with a
system consonant with their own concept of government and justice. They cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on
June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded
his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority
Leader, delivered a privilege speech accusing the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor
Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on
excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato
Cayetano) for joint investigation.
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The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate
the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor
spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. Respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Services and later asked for petitioner's resignation. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
Four (4) senior economic advisers also resigned followed by Secretary Mar Roxas II who resigned from the Department of Trade
and Industry. Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected
from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The
negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent
Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.
On the same day, January 20, 2001, Estrada signed a letter he is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office
and by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to former
Speaker Fuentebella and another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day. On January 22, the
Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases involving
bribery, graft and corruption, plunder, forfeiture, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees,
malversation of public funds and property among others previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion. Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed
against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias
and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
Ruling:
No. The SC hed that there is not enough evidence to warrant the Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds
of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
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Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will
be unfavorable to the petitioner.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system
whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
Corpuz vs People Of The Philippines

G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991
Facts:
The petitioner, Generoso Corpuz seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity,
he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. On April 13,
1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22, 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was
effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08.
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing amount but he was able to pay only
P10,159,50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated October 12, 1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51
through the payment to the petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal from
the service. A final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to the petitioner. The demand not having been
met, an information for malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the respondent court on October 11, 1983. The
above facts are not denied by the petitioner but insists that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other persons.
He claims that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the unliquidated withdrawal made by
Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks issued and encashed while the he was on official leave of
absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C.
Aluning and he had no choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said amount. Testifying for the prosecution,
Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the
corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls. He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in
question as alleged but was in fact the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to the sick wife in the
hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were
liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from the hospital. Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the
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petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's cash book. After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan found
the petitioner to be at fault.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Corpuz is guilty of Malversation of Public Funds.
Ruling:
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is
less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he
who is looking for a scapegoat.
The equipoise rule is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here as invoked by the
petitioner. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims
of persecution and conspiracy.
CAES VS. IAC

179 SCRA 54 (1989)
G.R. Nos. 74989-90 November 6, 1989
Facts:
On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms
and illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on December 10,
1981. Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reason postponed. On August 31, 1982, Caes
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties.
On November 15 and December 20, 1982, the trial was again postponed. On January 19, February 21, and March 21, 1983, the
trial was reset. On April 19, 1983, the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset because the prosecution witnesses were
again absent. On June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos
Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on
June 6, 1983. On June 6, July 12, September 6 and October 19, 1983, the trial was again postponed. On November 14, 1983, the
prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared.
On the same date, the judge issued an order stating that the case against Caes is provisionally dismissed due to lack of
interest of the prosecution witness to appear upon motion of the trial fiscal. On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was
filed by Maj. Dacanay and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for
lack of notice. The judge acting on the motion, revived the cases and set a hearing on June 1984. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied, and the revived cases were set from hearing on November 19, 1984.
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The petitioner questioned the judge's order on certiorari with the SC, which referred his petition to the respondent court.
The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on and reconsideration denied. Caes then came to SC again and raised a petition
is based on two arguments, to wit: (a) that the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was not filed by the proper party nor
was a copy served on the petitioner; and (b) the revival of the cases would place the petitioner double jeopardy in violation of the Bill
of Rights.
Issue:
Should the cases against Caes be dismissed?
Ruling:
Yes. There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all
even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the
evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested.
The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. As the record shows, the petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was
never actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, following eleven postponements of the scheduled
hearings, mostly because the prosecution was not prepared. The accused was never absent at these aborted hearings. He was
prepared to be tried, but either the witnesses against him were not present, or the prosecutor himself was absent, or the court
lacked material time. Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang over his head even as he was not given an opportunity
to deny them because his trial could not be held.
Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground of the denial of
his right to a speedy trial. The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was described by the trial judge as
"provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the
consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits. No less importantly,
there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent, as we have repeatedly held, is not
enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a
constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused.
We conclude that the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases against the petitioner and that the respondent court also
erred in affirming that order. Caes having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not having expressly consented
to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases against him, he was entitled to their final dismissal under the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
GO VS. RAMOS
211
G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009
Facts:
Three petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis Ramos against Jimmy Go alleging
that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Ramos alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. Ramos presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese" as proof. Luis argued that although it
appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered,
because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in
September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and
with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was
merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos,
who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1,
paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625.
Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition before the RTC of Pasig City to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Board of
Commissioners and challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings. However, the trial court
dismissed their petition. Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension and
detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. Jimmy commenced a
petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.
On account of his detention, Jimmy filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City. The RTC dismissed
the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order
has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy assailed the Orders of the RTC in a petition before the appellate court which granted
the petition and enjoined the Bureau from deporting Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Bureau petitioned before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not Jimmy Go is entitled to bail.
Ruling:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ
212
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus
should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" in this context
includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of
the Bureau of Immigration.
REYES VS. GONZALES

G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Reverend Father Robert Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007. Upon the request of DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering
respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the BID the name of petitioner and 49 others
relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety. After finding probable cause against
petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed
an Information before RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused
Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the
crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge. On
December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of
probable cause. On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the
lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of the criminal case.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against
petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Petitioner averred that he was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the
Hold Departure List; and every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and
interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List. Further, he stated that the
Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse
to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo. Petitioners MR was
also denied.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Amparo is available to Reyes.
Ruling:
No.The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with
violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo. The petition must fail.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo
Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats
thereof, thus: What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue
on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable
from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ
of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not
the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo
under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. Here, the
restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.
Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. The
direct recourse to the SC is inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
Section 22.Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall
be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45
in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused
did in the same criminal case. Despite the denial of respondents MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court
has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo
retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is
the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case.
RAZON VS. TAGITIS

G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009
214
Facts:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong, an IDB
scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out
to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a
text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised
Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong
executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.
On December 28, 2007, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact,
Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen.
Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
The respondent has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, the
respondent has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the
illegal clutches of the petitioners, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on
January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ. In
their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis
alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against
them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the
CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron
Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. Petitioners filed before the SC a petition
stating: In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CAs March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form
and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent took before
petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence
supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction;
and, generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial
evidence.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Tagitis and his family.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Philippine Law, the Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof." We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is
neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider
all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among
them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all
these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of
the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
ALIH VS. CASTRO

G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987
Facts:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred soldier implemented a zona and raided the compound
occupied Rizal Alih and the other petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and
other explosives. The people inside the compound resisted the invasion which resulted to a shoot-out resulting to a number of
casualties. The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be
finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles,
one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.
216
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as
evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against
self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or not the finger-printing, paraffin-testing and taking of photographs of the seized occupants are violations of the
constitutional guarantee against the self-incrimination.
Ruling:
No. The photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners are not violations against the right against selfincrimination. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. The prohibition of compelling a man in
a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may material.
PEOPLE VS. GAMBOA
G.R. No. 91374, February 25, 1991
Facts:
At around 1:15 o'clock in the morning of August 21, 1988, Cristina Soledad, common-law wife of Rene Impas, was
conversing with the latter inside a bedroom in Rene's house located at John Avenue, Cebu City. Suddenly someone kicked open the
door and Soledad saw the appellant and Celdran who fired his shotgun twice at Rene. The victim fell on the bed and died
immediately. John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Celdran was dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered on
August 30, 1989, finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P30,000.00, with costs against him. The fatal weapon, a shotgun, was ordered forfeited in favor of the government. Gamboa
alleged, among others that the trial erred in not rejecting the paraffin test results as inadmissible evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not paraffin tests constitute a violation of the right against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
No.As to theparaffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question that it was not conducted in the
presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession
or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of
his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional
right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined.
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PEOPLE VS. CASINILLO

G.R. No. 97441, 11 September 1990
Facts:
The case originated from a complaint for rape, dated 17 May 1989 and filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Mati,
Davao Oriental by the offended party, Leticia Soria. Two other complaints for robbery with rape and robbery in band, allegedly
committed by the appellant and his companions, were also filed with said court.
The RTC the trial court acquitted all the accused of robbery with rape and robbery in band but convicted Appellant Domingo
Casinillo for the rape of Leticia Soria. The appellant filed an appeal and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, on 13 May
1989, he was in his house in Dawan, Mati, Davao Oriental together with his wife and son; he alleges that he never left this place. His
wife (Rosalinda) and father (Guillermo) corroborated his story. Casinillo also questioned the three police "lineups" of the four
accused on the ground that the same were conducted without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, the accused were not informed
of their right to counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not police line-ups violate the right against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
No. The grievance concerning the police lineups is misplaced. The trial court's finding as to the identification of the
accused did not even consider the said lineups. Moreover, in People vs. Olvis,the SC ruled, in effect, that a police lineup is not
encompassed in the Constitutional right against testimonial compulsion and the right to counsel.
An act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition
of the Constitution. This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to
unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. This includes requiring the
accused to submit to a test to extract virus from body, or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth, or making her
submit to a pregnancy test, or a footprinting test, or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. In each case, the
accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS

G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920
Facts:
In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino
Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the
218
ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon
she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical
examination required by the court.
Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the
representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision.
Issue: Whether a woman accused of adultery may be compelled to be tested for pregnancy.
Ruling:
Yes. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be
avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use
violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination
being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING CO. INC.VS. PCGG

G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987
Facts:
Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard
and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino on February
28, 1986 and March 12, 1986, respectively, and (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in
accordance with said executive orders by the Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its Commissioners and agents,
affecting said corporation. The PCGG was tasked to sequester the BASECO thru Executive Orders 1 and 2 of President Cory
Aquino. The PCGG was able to take over the BASECO and terminate its executive employees and requested to have the following
documents of the said company. Such as Stock transfer book, Legal documents, Minutes of the meetings, Financial statements, etc.
Petitioner argues that the order to produce corporate records from 1973 to 1986, which it has apparently already complied with, was
issued without court authority and infringed its constitutional right against self-incrimination, and unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents asked by the PCGG would violates the petitioners right against self-incrimination.
219
Ruling:
No. It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons. While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON

G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear
before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision
contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Issue:
Whether or not requiring the accused to write so that his handwriting may be validated with the documentary evidence is
covered by the constitutional proscription against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
Yes. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act,
because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such
cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.
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BAGADIONG VS. GONZALES

G.R. No. L-25966, December 28, 1979
Facts:
On January 12, 1966, the herein plaintiffs-respondents filed a civil case for prohibition with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction with the CFI of Catanduanes against defendants Jorge V. Almojuela, Dominador Monjardin, Fermin A.
Bagadiong (the herein petitioner) and Armando Ala who are the Governor, Vice Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Provincial
Auditor of the Province of Catanduanes, respectively.
In the said petition, it is alleged that defendants, including the herein petitioner, authorized, approved and effected disbursements of
public funds of the province in a falsified document since the said budget was never approved by the Provincial Board.
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the respondent Judge against the defendants commanding them to desist
from authorizing and making any further disbursements of funds from the budget in question. The defendants filed MR and a motion
to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction. The CFQ denied the motion to vacate and lift the writ of preliminary injunction in an
order dated January 31, 1966.
When trial began, counsel for plaintiffs called one of the defendants, the herein petitioner, Fermin A. Bagadiong, to the
witness stand as one of the witnesses for the plaintiffs. Counsel for the defendants raised the objection that the said party cannot be
called as a witness for the plaintiffs because it would violate his constitutional right against self-incrimination. On the other hand,
counsel for the plaintiffs contended that this being purely a civil action, the right against self-incrimination is not involved, and if any
testimony elicited from the herein petitioner would tend to incriminate himself, there would be ample time for the herein petitioner to
raise the proper objection. The respondent Judge in his order held that the position taken by the counsel for the plaintiffs is legally
correct, thereby, ruling that the petitioner may testify as a witness for the plaintiffs. An MR was denied by the respondent Judge,
hence the petitioner filed a petition with the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the compelling the petitioner to testify as a witness for respondents violates his right against selfincrimination.
Ruling:
There is no legal impediment for a party to call any of the adverse parties to be his witness, as clearly provided in Section
6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which expressly provides that a party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading
questions. A party may call on adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all
respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on
behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination
in chief.
221
It is in a criminal case, when the accused may not be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word, even for his own
defense. 7 But while the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal,
civil or administrative, said privilege, in proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option to
refuse to answer incriminating question, and not a prohibition of inquiry.
In the instant case, petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any question being propounded, and simply declined to
take the witness stand. It should be noted that the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded, because before a question is asked, there would be no way of telling whether the information to
be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. Moreover, the herein petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a
criminal case where he is an accused but in civil action. This is expressly permitted by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which authorizes a party to call any adverse party as his witness.
CHAVEZ VS. CA
G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968
Facts:
Petitioner argued that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial
which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. Petitioner
herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio and several others were charged
with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a Thunderbird car together with its accessories. During the trial, the petitioner answered the
questions despite refusing to take the witness stand. He was forced to answer questions for fear of being accused of perjury or
being put under contempt. He a cowed before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to
remain silent.
On May 14, 1968, the CA resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not an accused in a criminal case may refuse to take the witness stand altogether.
Ruling:
Yes. The court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court
as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the
tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair
his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient.
222
An accused in a criminal case as a witness, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For,
in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to
avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction." Chavez was then ordered released from custody.
PASCUAL VS BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on February 1, 1965 with the CFI of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the respondent Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the
petitioner, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge to which the petitioner objected relying relying on the constitutional
right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stated
that at the next scheduled hearing, petitioner would be called upon to testify as witness unless he could secure a restraining order
from a competent authority.
Petitioner Pascual then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative
proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. Petitioner filed for a
writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition. The lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary
injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an
administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter.
The lower court ruled that the claim of petitioner-appellee was well-founded and prohibited the respondent Board "from
compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against
himself." After which, the Board appealed before the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not an accused in an administrative case may refuse to take the witness stand.
Ruling:
223
Yes. The lower courts decision is correct. In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The proceeding, while administrative, in character thus possesses
a criminal or penal aspect. The petitioner in the case at bar would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer the revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. The accused has a perfect right
to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt. InChavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the
doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will. Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional
guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the
truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high
sense of respect accorded the human personality.
MAPA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. L-100295, April 26, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices. However he was granted an immunity
from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in
criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being
tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify
against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of
Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of
Mapa took without force and effect. However, the record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the
prosecution of the RICO Act cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being prosecuted
provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG. In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution
or criminal case where he is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to
testify implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by Mapa to testify against
the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO cannot nullify the immunity given to him by the
PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law and the parties implementing agreements. Though
the petitioners were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it is not their own fault.
224
Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which under the law has the power
to grant immunity.
Two types of Immunity:

1.
Transactional Immunity - is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no longer be prosecuted for
any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.

2.
Used-and-derivative-use- a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will
not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
146 SCRA 323
Facts:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on
April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of
offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts,
except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether or notBP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
Ruling:
No. BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. While a debtor cannot be
imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, he can be validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud. It may
be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is
within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in
se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence,
not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
225
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." An essential element of the
offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to
cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the
check. BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being
rejected or dishonored for payment. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
PEREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

168 SCRA 236 (1988)
Facts:
Petitioner herein was initially charged with consented abduction in the CFI of Pampanga. The accused pleaded not guilty,
but the trial on the merits ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez. On appeal, the CA reversed and
acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. Subsequent to petitioners acquittal, complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed
another criminal complaint against Perez, but this time is for Qualified Seduction.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash involving double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not subsequent filing of case in the form of qualified seduction after acquittal to consented seduction
constitutes double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No. In the case at bar, the issue posed by the petitioner relates to the identity of the two offenses of Consented Abduction
and Qualified Seduction. It is true that the two offenses for which the petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This,
however, does not preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts two distinct elements, arose. A single act
may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact, which the other does not, and
acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction under the other. The
plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law however
closely they may appear to be connected in fact.
226
LAMERA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 93475, June 5, 1991
198 SCRA 186
Facts:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep,
then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and
injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an
information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's
victim.
The MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the
RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty.
He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was denied. He raised before the SC that that he cannot be penalized
twice for an accident and another for recklessness. He maintained that since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless
imprudence, which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged
under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to render to the persons whom he has accidentally injured.
Issue:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for
abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code because it constitutes double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner
has invoked, does not apply. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA
227
G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987

148 SCRA 292
Facts:
Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to charge Manuel
Opulencia in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of electric wire does reduce electric consumption for
his factory - Opulencia Ice Plant. An information however was filed after almost 9 months. The respondent herein then moved to
quash the charges for grounds of prescription that since the violation is classified as light felony, only two months is given for
prescription.
The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed another charge
against the respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That according to the prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable
under the municipal ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the RPC are different.
Issue:
Whether or not the charge of theft under RPC constitute double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Yes. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense
that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based
upon the same act or set of facts. But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under
an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of facts. The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put to jeopardy provided
that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charges is not included or does not include, the crime charged in the other
case. The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation
of an ordinance and the other a violation of the statues. If two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution under other.
IVLER VS. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO

G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010
635 SCRA 191
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
228
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and was meted
out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. After unsuccessfully seeking
reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 157, in a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, petitioner
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment
and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution
denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803 effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Ruling:
The SC held that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366. Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects
him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense."
The SC held the petitioner correct. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to Determine the Penalty.
229
The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution
of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
The issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting
acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less
grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 97214, July 16, 1994
Facts:
January 27, 1978 in the municipality of del Carmen, Province of Surigao del Norte, accused who is the Collecting and
Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte and
while a Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the aforestated school therefore was holding in trust moneys and/or properties of the
government of the Republic of the Philippines and holding in trust public funds with all freedom, intelligence, criminal intent and
intent of gain, did then and there voluntarily, unlawfully, feloniously and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his
own private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines in the total sum of (P16,483.62),
Philippine Currency, which total sum accused failed to account during an audit and failed as well to restitute despite demands by the
office of the Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the Government equal to the amount misappropriated.
Navallo was finally arrested. However, he was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond.
When arraigned by the RTC he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its
records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned
before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was docketed with the
Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by
the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. The bond, having been later found to be defective, a new bond
was approved and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending that since the accused had
already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not prosecution in the Sandiganbayan violates petitioners right against double jeopardy.
230
Ruling:
No.In the case at bar, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then
had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor
was it dismissed.
The SC found no merit when petitioner invoked Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Court. Double jeopardy requires the
existence of the following requisites: 1. The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; 2. The court has jurisdiction to try the case; 3.The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded
to the charge; and 4. The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.
When all the above elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the
said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the
first offense charged, can rightly be barred.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE VILLARAMA
G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992
Facts:
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425 for having in
his possession shabu. During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21,
1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that
private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section
17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor to the change of plea. The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already
rested its case, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the
strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to
waste.
Private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense alleging therein,
among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the motion of
the accused. The prosecutor filed an MR but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not a refusal of a change of plea to a lesser offense violates the right against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No. Change of plea is open to review. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea.
231
Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117.
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as
amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party,i.e., the state. More importantly, the
trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one
or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. Ordinarily, pleabargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient
opportunity to change his plea thereafter as provided by Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2. The trial court need not wait for
a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has
submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice
and of the public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of
valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be
recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of
conviction of the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution.
Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of
plea is improper and irregular.
PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN

G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966
Facts:
In 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The accused, upon
being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. His official counsel, however, petitioned that he be
allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the
deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself
voluntarily to the police authorities. Based on the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the CFI rendered a decision acquitting
the accused. The prosecution appealed to the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Ruling:
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No. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it is true, the
accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the CFI
should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was
not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the CFI rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can
be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the CFI decided the case upon the merits
without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it
clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The
acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a
claim of former jeopardy.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008
Facts:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape, a
relative of Villapandos wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on
July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. On February
2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two
were charged for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan. Upon arraignment on September 3,
2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which
occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted him of the
crime charged.
The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
Issue:
Whether or not granting of demurrer to evidence amounts to acquittal and further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Yes. Although the SC held that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case
that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
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The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision
on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to
any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in
any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is
not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.
MELO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-3580, March 22, 1950
85 Phil 766
Facts:
Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen
knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more
than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. During the arraignment, the
petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night, the victim died from his wounds. Evidence of death of the victim
was available to the prosecution and the information was amended.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No.Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides that if it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial.
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No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It meant that when a person is charged
with an offence and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.
The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being,
as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. SAME OFFENSE under the general rule, has always been construed to
mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical.
There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice
versa. This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the
simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies,
the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
PEOPLE VS BULING
G.R. No. L-13315, April 27, 1960
107 Phil 712
Facts:
On December 7, 1956, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of
less serious physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint
would "require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance
of his customary labors for the game period of time." The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on December 8, 1957
found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay damages to the offended party in
the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has
fully served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious physical injuries. The
information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the accused on Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him for
a period of from 1 months to 2 months. After trial the accused was found guilty of serious physical injuries and sentenced in the
manner indicated in first paragraph hereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second
prosecution for serious physical injuries.
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Ruling:
Yes.In the Melo vs. People case, we stated the ruling to be that: Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the
first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
In the case at bar, the SC did not find that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into existence. What happened is
that the first physician that examined the wounds of the offended party certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as
follows: "wound, incised, wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and
incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual work. It was on the basis of this certificate that on
December 8, 1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month
and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
Under the circumstances above indicated, no new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the offense
from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE TRIA-TIRONA

G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2005
Facts:
By virtue of a search warrant, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Anti-Organized Crime Division, together with
members of the NBI Special Investigation Division and the Presidential Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Task Force Hammer
Head serving as security, conducted a search on the house of Chief Inspector Renato Muyot located on Banawe, Quezon City. The
alleged finding of approximately half kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) led to the filing of an information charging
private respondent with Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. When
arraigned on 27 November 1996, private respondent, assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After
trial on the merits, public respondent rendered a decision acquitting private respondent on ground of reasonable doubt.
The decision, more particularly the acquittal of private respondent, was assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court by the petitioner contending that contends that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed
grave abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on record which, when considered, would lead to the inevitable
conclusion of Muyots guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It added that the appealability of the trial courts decision of acquittal in the
context of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy should be resolved since it has two pending petitions before the
court raising the same question.
Issue:
Whether or not an appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the merits can be made without violating
the constitutional precept against double jeopardy.
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Ruling:
No. After trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy.
The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due
process. It is apparent from the decision of Judge Tria-Tirona that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even
assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision
was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the
evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no
error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. The petition was
dismissed.
ALMARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

355 SCRA 1, March 22, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner, Roberto Almario is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of public
document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases.
The hearing was reset several times due to the trial judge was elevated to higher court and lack of proof of notice to the accused.
The hearing was started October 1992 on September 1995, the complainant failed to appear in spite due notice moved that the
case against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.
The motion was granted by the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was raised and the court granted and reversed its first decision on
dismissing the case against Roberto Almario.
A motion for reconsideration was raised by the defendant but rejected. Upon rejection they sought for certiorari in the CA.
They contended that reversal of the decision was a violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy. After trial the CA denied the petition
for lack of merit. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of the accused against double jeopardy have been violated.
Ruling:
No. In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by
counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his express
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consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his
own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of
evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged
unreasonably, in violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7.Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a
valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011
Facts:
The SC reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on
the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, Lauro G. Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its
decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded
Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage
of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."
Issue:
Whether or not judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.
Ruling:
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. To
reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already
been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against
the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite
power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of
resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
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Although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under
such exceptions. He has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court
supposedly committed.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONERS RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC 8
OF R.A. NO. 6132
G.R. No. L-32485, October 22, 1970
Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation contests validity of Sec. 8 of RA
6132, known as "The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act," saying it violates due process rights of association, freedom
of expression and is an ex post facto law. Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the first
paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and
that it is an ex post facto law.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 6132 Sec. 8 is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto law.
Ruling:
Petition denied. The act is constitutional and not an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is one which: 1.makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;2.aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed; 3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed;4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense; 5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and 6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty
VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE

546 SCRA 450 (2008)
Facts:
Armed with warrant of arrest and based on the probable reason to believe based on surveillance conducted in herein
petitioners hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan, and when the petitioner is about to board a tricycle, he was then arrested and
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was charged in violation of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, as amended. The lower court imposed a
penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and
to pay the fine in the amount of Php 15, 000.
The petitioner herein was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the first
paragraph of Section 1 of PD No 1866. It provides that the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
PD 1866 as amended, was the governing law at the time the petitioner committed the offense/ however RA No 8294
amended PD No 1866 during the pendency of the case with the trial court. Section 1: Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition,
disposition or possession of Firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. - the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Php 15, 000 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfuly manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, suc as..
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 8249 imposing prision correccional as punishment shall be imposed to the petitioner in the case at
bar.
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post
facto law. An EXCEPTION to this rule, however is when the law is advantageous of the accused. A new law has a prospective, not
retroactive, effect. However penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.
These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER

48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Facts:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Judge Jose C. de Guzman directed the Government prosecutors to
file the corresponding information. That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously became an officer
and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
240
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power,
by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of
the said Communist Party of the Philippines.That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances
are present, to wit: (a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities; (b) That the crime was
committed by a band; and afford impunity. (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Another criminal complaint was filed
against Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. In or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the
Province of Tarlac, Tayag organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a
subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700. BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY joined and/or remained
as a member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New
People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; engaging in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow
the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among.
Issue:
Whether or not the anti-subversion act is a bill of attainder.
Ruling:
No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of
separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this
evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a
legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize statute as a bill of attainder.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to
the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus
is not on individuals but on conduct.
Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of
attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
The Anti-Subversion Act Section 4 thereof expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after June 20, 1957, are punished.
241
The Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in
freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party
of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of
national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in his country.
SEC. GONZALES VS. PENNISI

G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2008
Facts:
Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and
Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI). Respondent submitted the following documents before the BI: 1. Certified photocopy of the certificate
of birth of Quintos, and a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born
on 14 August 1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija;
2. Certified true copy of the certificate of marriage of respondents parents dated 9 January 1971, indicating the Philippines as
Quintos birthplace; 3. Certified true copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino;
4. Certified true copy of respondents birth certificate stating that he was born on 13 March 1975 and indicating the Philippines as his
mothers birthplace; and 5. Certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July 1999 of the Australian Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, stating that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
On February 2000, BI issued an order granting respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. However, the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) disapproved the order. But upon respondents submission of additional documents, BI
Commissioner granted the order. In a 2 nd Indorsement dated 8 March 2000, the DOJ affirmed Recognition Order.
On 7 August
2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments recommended, among other
things, that the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings against several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent;
and the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of all orders of recognition. Respondent was included in the list on the basis
the Pennisis alleged mother and other relatives, specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina
G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application for recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not known and have never
existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. According to the affidavits executed by Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman and
Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta of the abovementioned place, there are no Quintoses or Tomedas that have lived or have
resided in the said barangay. Both barangay officials further claimed that even in their census or master list of voters, the family
names of Quintos or Tomedas do not exist. Thereafter, the DOJ conducted an investigation on the citizenship of Filipino-foreign
players in the PBA and issued a resolution revoking Pennisis certificate of recognition and directing the BI to begin summary
deportation proceedings against respondent. Respondent filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which was granted. Hence, the
DOJ petitioned before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Michael Alfio Pennisi is a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
242
Yes.The SC sustained the court of appeals that the evidence presented before the BI and the DOJ, have more probative
value and must prevail over the statements of Soliman and Peralta before the senate committees. The SC agreed with the CA that
while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of Quintos certificate of live birth, such certificate
remains valid unless declared invalid by competent authority. The rule stands that documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The SC sustained the court of appeals that there could be reasons why the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in
the census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in the masters list of voters, they
could have failed to register themselves as voters.
TECSON VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Facts:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, or FPJ, filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. Representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. In G.R. No. 161824 petitioner initiated, a before the ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Petitioner, in support of his claim, presented 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an
affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the
father of respondent, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.
Poe, 5) a certification attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou
resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) and that no available information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being
- a) a that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of
birth of Ronald Allan Poe, a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, a copy of the purported marriage contract between
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Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from
1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
Issue:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Ruling: Yes.It was proven that Allan Poe, father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. FPJ was born on
August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines, FPJ was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate
or illegitimate.
The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born to an
Espaol fatherand a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. The marriage certificate showed that Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years
old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married. There is no doubt that Allan Poe father of
private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under
1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,
Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
TORRES VS. TAN

G.R. No. L-46593, February 3, 1940
Facts:
244
Tan Chim arrived at the port of Cebu in 1937 and sought admission as a minor son of Alejandro Tan Bangco. After
hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny him entry on the ground that the status of his father had not been passed
upon by the Secretary of Labor. A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which ruled that
Alejandro Tan Bangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli, having been born of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother in Manila on
February 27, 1893. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by decision of February 27, 1893, upheld the conclusion of the lower court.
The Solicitor-General then filed a motion to this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Tan Chim is a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that the principle of territoriality or jus soli was recognized prior to the establishment of the
Constitution. The Court cannot simply set aside this reason unless a retroactive effect to the Constitution is provided.
The declaration in Roa vs. Collector of Customs that the applicant is a Filipino citizen was a statement of a general principle
applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, of Chinese father and Filipino mother. This was the rule at the time of the adoption of
our Constitution. The Court held that the applicant, being a minor child of Alejandro Tan Bangco who was a Filipino citizen at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, is a Filipino citizen. Hence, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, VICENTE CHING

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was
born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents: 1. Certification,
dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant; 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and 3.
Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he
245
was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required
to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship" in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625. The OSG adds
that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b)
said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority."
The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:" The clause "upon reaching the
age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years. Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding
Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and
the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar. On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and
his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching stated among others that he elected Philippine
citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625 and which election was expressed in a statement
signed and sworn to by me before a notary public accompanied with his oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government
of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
Ruling:
No. The SC that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the
time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he
delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
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When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of 1935" are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.
It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge
under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted
to
mean
that
the
election
should
be
made
within
three
(3)
years
from
reaching
the
age
of
majority. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
MO YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971
41 SCRA 292
Facts:
This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from causing the arrest and deportation of the petitioner
herein - Lau Yuen Yueng. Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese
residing in Kowloon, Hongkong and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a
period of one month.When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake
among others that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might
properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb. 13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen. Because of the contemplated
247
action of the respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write either English or Tagalog. Except a few words
she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not even name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa.
Issue:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng to Mo Ya Lim Yao made her ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes.Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads: Any woman who is not
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines. Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who might herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to
a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not
required. Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalised," what should be required is not only that
she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of
age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct,
lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local
languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully
naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish her
citizenship status as a fact. Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalised here follows the
Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4.
EDISON SO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007
Facts:
On February 2002, Edison So, a Chinese Citizen born on February 17, 1982 in Manila, filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization by judicial act. In his petition, So alleged that he has lived since birth in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila and is
able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog. The petitioner also claimed that he is a person of good moral character and
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided under C.A. No. 473. On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order setting the petition for hearing on December 12 and 17, 2002 and requiring publication and posting of the entire petition
248
including the Order. Petitioner obliged and no one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented as witnesses Atty.
Adasa, Jr., legal consultant and adviser of the So familys business, and Mark Salcedo, Sos friend for 10 years.
Petitioner offered in evidence the following documents:
1.
Certificate of Live Birth;
2.
Alien Certificate of Registration;
3.
Immigrant Certificate of Residence;
4.
Elementary Pupils and High School Students Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek College;
5.
Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;
6.
Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002;
7.
Income Tax Returns and Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;
8.
Certification from Metrobank that petitioner is a depositor;
9.
Clearances that he has not been charged or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; and
10. Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine General Hospital.
The RTC admitted all these in evidence and having concluded that the petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with
evidence, the RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003. But the OSG appealed the decision to the CA on the basis of the
qualification of the witnesses as character reference and the petitioners failure to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino
citizen.
Petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST and is now on his second year as a medical student. He insisted that
the requirements for naturalization were further relaxed by RA 9139.
In its Decision dated August 4, 2005, CA agreed with OSG and dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice. The CA
added that the petitioner fell short of the age requirement on the day of the hearing of the petition. The CA stated, however, that it
was not its intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that it
believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.
Issue:
Whether or not Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
No. His petition is denied for lack of merit. Under current and existing laws, a native born alien has the choice to apply for
judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. While RA 9139 provides
remedial measure for degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, it does not
justify petitioners contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial act. In
the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act. Also, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented
were competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. Petitioners
witnesses did not testify on his specific acts and did not elaborate on his traits. The witnesses testimonies consisted mainly of
general statements and enumeration of the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. The records likewise
do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good standing in the community. Instead, petitioner focused on
249
presenting evidence tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good moral
character of his witnesses.
The SC ruled that the petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization law
and thereafter denying the petition for naturalization without prejudice.
CHAN TECK LAO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-25300, January 4, 1974
Facts:
The application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was denied by the lower court on October 31, 1949. Upon appeal, the
Supreme Court on June 15, 1950 reversed this Court's decision. More than ten years later, the OSG filed the petition for the
cancellation of the certificate of naturalization, raising the alleged jurisdictional question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc ruling
that there was no showing or proof that the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the
petitioner then resided.
Issue:
Whether or not the certificate of naturalization was lawfully cancelled on the basis of the the petitioners failure to follow
publication requirement.
Ruling:
No. The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republicindicates clearly the merit of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck
Lao. Gan Tsitung established that no retroactive effect is to be given a judicial pronouncement that would impose a requirement not
in existence at a time that the application was heard and favorably acted on. Hence, there would be manifest unfairness in setting
aside a decision that had subsequently become final and lead to the grant of citizenship. The highest court asserted that the status
of the petitioner as a national of this country for practically thirteen years ought to have remained undisturbed. To rely on the 1964
Tan Ten Koc ruling, which require that positive proof as to the paper wherein the application was published in the place where the
proceeding has general application to petitioner who, as far back as June 15, 1950, had already been granted his citizenship by this
Court, his certificate being issued two years thereafter, would, in the language of Gan Tsitung, be far from "just, fair and reasonable.
MERCADO VS. MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Facts:
250
Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were 2 of the 3 candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The results of the election were as follows: 1 st - Eduardo B. Manzano (103,853); 2nd - Ernesto
S. Mercado (100,894); and Gabriel V. Daza III (54,275). The proclamation of Manzano was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States. In his reply, Manzano alleged that he was born of Filipino parents in the US and is considered American citizen
under US Laws. Notwithstanding, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Manzano filed a motion for
reconsideration on May 8, 1998, which remained pending even until after the election was held. Accordingly, after tabulation of votes
for the contended position, the board of canvassers suspended the proclamation of the winner.
COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversed the ruling of its Second Division, declared Manzano qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati, and ordered his proclamation as the winning candidate. Hence, Mamaril filed a petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner holds dual citizenship and therefore cannot run for public office.
Ruling: No, petitioner is qualified to run for public office despite of dual citizenship status. The Court ruled that Manzanos act of
filing certificate of candidacy is tantamount to election of his Filipino citizenship. The Court affirms that Manzanos participation to the
election is an expressed renunciation of his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen.The SC stressed that the constitutional policy is not against dual citizenship but dual loyalty, such as that often manifested by
naturalized Filipinos who, while professing allegiance to their adoptive land retain their allegiance to their native land and even
involve themselves in its political affairs. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a personis simultaneously considered a nation by the said states. Such a situation may arise such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
a citizen of both states.
The Constitutional Commission established that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance", or a situation where a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states, and must therefore
be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status. Nonetheless, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, it should suffice for candidates with dual citizenship if, upon filing their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship and consequently
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and
of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
CALILUNG VS. DATUMANONG

G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007
Facts:
251
Hector Calilung prays for issuance of writ of prohibition to stop then SOJ Simeon Datumanong from implementing RA
9225. Petitioner avers that Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Issues:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.
Ruling:
No. The Court maintains that Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is merely a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance and up until it is passed, it will be premature for the
judicial department to rule on issues pertaining to such matter. The court also ruled that RA 9225 simply (1) allows dual citizenship
to natural-born Filipinos who have become citizen of a foreign country and (2) permits reacquisition of Philippine citizenship for
those who have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization as a citizen in a foreign country. It appears that RA 9225 does
not recognize dual allegiance.
Thus, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
BENGZON III VS. HRET

G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as
a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won
by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Subsequently,
Bengzon filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming
that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed and declared Cruz the duly elected Representative
of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the decision.
252
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision. Petitioner asserts that respondent
Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired
his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
Issue:
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Ruling:
Yes. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as
a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4
of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In Re Petition to Declare Zita Ngo to Possess All Qualifications and None of the Disqualifications for Naturalization Under
Commonwealth Act 473 for the Purpose of Cancelling Her Alien Registry with the Bureau Of Immigration
Facts:
Zita Ngo, a Chinese citizen born in Gigaquit Surigao, married Florencio Burca, a native born Filipino Citizen. On April1964,
she filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Leyte and prayed for her declaration as a Filipino citizen in order for BI to
cancel her alien certificate of registration. On November 1964, the Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss her petition due
to fatal defects in the petition as well as the absence of rules and proceeding to judicially declare citizenship of an individual.
253
Thereafter, the court proceeded to hear the case and rendered its decision dismissing the opposition and declaring the petitioner,
being married to a Filipino Citizen, a citizen of the Philippines.
On appeal, this Court in 1967 upheld the position of the Solicitor General and reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Hence, the petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not an alien wife married to a Filipino husband is a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
No. The Philippine citizenship of the husband does not ipso facto grant Philippine citizenship to the alien wife. The Court
ruled that the only means by which the alien wife may become a Filipino citizen by reason of her marriage is through compliance
with the procedure for naturalization. Hence, the petitioner should have filed first a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate
of registration. The Philippine laws does not allow judicial action or proceeding for declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
Therefore, any action by any office other than the competent authority certifying or declaring Philippine citizenship of an alien wife is
considered null and void. From the foregoing, the Court denied Zita Ngos motion and affirmed the reversal of the decision of the
trial court a quo and the dismissal of the petition, without prejudice to petitioner's availing of the procedure of naturalization.
TABASA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

500 SCRA 9 (2006)
Facts:
Petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven
years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship
derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American
citizenship. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter,
petitioner was arrested in Aklan and was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. Tabasa was accused of violating Section
8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged that in a letter Honorable Kevin
Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that Tabasas passport in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had
been revoked by the U.S. Department of State. Hence, Tabasa is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be
summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to
effect his deportation. Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest
issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, for violation of "Unlawful Flight to Avoid
Prosecution," of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
California Penal Code, and one count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code.
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration
authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S.
254
Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married
to a Filipino citizen as provided in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
Ruling:
No.The Court finds no merit in this petition. RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have
Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipino. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2)
classes of persons. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided,
That the applicant is not a: 1. Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; 2. Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; 3. Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
4. Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
Petitioner Tabasa does not qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or
economic necessity under RA 8171. Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship
on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent
who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently
had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the
children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the
children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have
the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their
own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was
naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner is not entitled to
automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity for he was no
longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor
age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
255
IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES
B.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012
Facts:
On 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying that he be granted the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. He alleged in his petition that he became a member of the IBP in 1966 and that he lost
his privilege to practice law when he became a US citizen in 1981. However, with the intention to retire in the Philippines and to
resume his practice of law, the petitioner in 2006 re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 by taking his oath of
allegiance.
The OBC required Muneses to submit original or certified true copies of pertinent documents in support of his petition, of which the
petitioner all complied. The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with, the OBC recommended that he be allowed to resume his practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not a member of the IBP, who has lost his citizenship and then re-acquires it, may be allowed to practice law.
Ruling:
Yes.The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and remains a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in the bar and ipso jure the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. The Court likewise ruled that a Filipino lawyer, who becomes a citizen of another country
and later, re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the right to
resume the practice of law is not automatic. RA 9225 requires a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines to
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. WILLIAM LI YAO

214 SCRA 748 (1992)
Facts:
William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949 with the CFI of Manila. The lower
court rendered on October 25, 1950 a decision conferring Philippine citizenship to Yao subject to 2-year probationary period as
provided under RA 530. Thereafter, upon subsequent petition of Li Yao, the lower court issued on November 20, 1952 an order
allowing him to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and directing Clerk of Court to issue the corresponding certificate of
naturalization. But on January 5, 1968, the OSG filed a motion to cancel Li Yao's certificate of naturalization on the ground that it
was fraudulently and illegally obtained. The petitioner-appellant opposed but the then Court of First Instance of Manila, on July 22,
1971, granted the foregoing motion and ordered cancellation of his certificate of naturalization.
256
Li Yao filed a motion for reconsideration on December 29, 1971, which the lower court denied. On January 7, 1972,
William LI Yao filed a notice of appeal to this Court, manifesting that he was appealing from the order of the lower court dated July
22, 1971, and from the order dated December 29, 1971. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, petitioner-appellant Li Yao
died.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 18(a) of CA No. 473 provides that a naturalization certificate may be cancelled if it is shown that said
naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently and illegally.
This Court ruled that the lower courts basis i.e., underdeclaration of income and evasion of payment of lawful taxes in cancelling
the petitioner-appellants naturalization certificate is a sufficient ground for denaturalization. Even tax amnesty, which causes
removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability, does not have the effect obliterating his lack of good moral character and
irreproachable conduct. It was maintained that where the applicant failed to meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the
latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship.
MAQUILING VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 19564, July 2, 2013
Facts:
Private-respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. Subsequently, after his naturalization as a UScitizen, he lost
his Filipino citizenship. But in 2008, with the intention for repatriation, he took the Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines. On the same
day, his application was approved.In 2009,he again took his Oath of Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his US
citizenship. On November 2009, Arnado filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On April 2010, privaterespondentBalua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his COC. He attached thereto a
certification issued by the BIindicating the nationality of Arnado as USA-American including computer-generatedtravel records
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippinesbetween the period April 2009 and
June 2009, July 2009 and November 2009, January 2010 and March 2010.
The COMELEC First Division found that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 9225, his consistent use of his US passportafter renouncing his US citizenship effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.Thus, the First Division ruled for disqualification of Arnado and accordingly ordered the annulment of his proclamation
as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan. Arnado subsequentlyfiled before the COMELEC En Banca Motion for
Reconsideration. But Maquiling, who garnered the 2 nd highest number of votes in the mayoralty election,intervened in the case and
filed his Opposition to Arnados motion. However, the COMELEC En Banc granted Arnados motion and reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division.
257
Hence, Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning, among other things, the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing said renunciation
therefore affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court maintained that while Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office, he subjected
the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in
and out of the country before filing his COC. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American. The Courtagreed with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division and held that, by using his US passport
after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnadohas recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. Therefore, Arnado is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
258

Compilation of Case Digests For Consti 2 (Execution Copy)

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Cases in Constitutional Law 2

Compilation of Cases in Constitutional Law II

A Document Submitted To the Polytechnic University of the Philippines

In Fulfilment of the Requirements for Completion in Constitutional Law II

Ana Portia Carza

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

I. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS

A. 1.Due Process- Right to Life, Liberty, Property

ii. Hierarchy of Rights

iii. Property Right

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

iv. Constitutional vs. Statutory Due Process

v. Aspects of Due Process

2. Procedural Due Process

vi. Standards of Judicial Review

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

viii. Judicial Standards of Equal Protection

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

B. Search and Seizure

ii. Requisites of Valid Warrant

iii. Administrative Warrant of Arrest

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

iv. Knock and Announce Principle

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

3. Plain View Doctrine

4. Stop- and Frisk Search

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

5. Search of a Moving Vehicle

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

8. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances

9. Search by Private Persons

vi. Warrantless Arrest

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

C. Privacy to Communication and Correspondence

ii. Concept of Informational Privacy

2. Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA 4200)

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

v. Two-Part Test to Determine Reasonableness of Persons Expectation of Privacy

D. Freedom of Expression, Press, and Right to Peaceably Assemble

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

vi. Right to be Forgotten

vii. State Regulation of Mass Media

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

viii. Academic Freedom and Right of School to Discipline Its Students

ix. Assembly and Petition

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

3. Test to Determine Whether there is Violation

ii. Free Exercise Clause

e. PD 1564 (Solicitation permit Law)

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

2. Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality-Accommodation

in mind. The jurisdiction of the

Court extends only to public and secular morality.

F. Liberty of Abode and the Right to Travel

ii. Concept of the Right to Travel

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

iii. Limitations of the Right to Travel

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

3. Other Statutory and Inherent Limitations

Cases in Constitutional Law 2

iii. Publication of Law and Regulation Reinforce this Right