(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

L-30057, January 31, 1984)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PUBLIC OFFICE, DEFINED. A
public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
(Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 1).
2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICE, NATURE OF RIGHT THERETO. The right to
hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue of some law expressly or
impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem, Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
3. ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT, DEFINED. By "appointment" is meant the act of
designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been
delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office
(Mechem, op. cit., Sec. 102). When the power of appointment is absolute, and
the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is
necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may
issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer
or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment is complete
only when such assent or confirmation is obtained (People vs. Bissell, 49 Cal.
407). To constitute an "appointment" to office, there must be some open,
unequivocal act of appointment on the part of the appointing authority
empowered to make it, and it may be said that an appointment to office is made
and is complete when the last act required of the appointing authority has been
performed (Molnar vs. City of Aurora, 348 N.E. 2d 262, 38 Ill. App. 3d 580). In
either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the
appointing power is performed (State vs. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76, 55 Am. Rep. 65).

4. ID.; ID.; TERM OF OFFICE, DEFINED. The word "term" in a legal sense
means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office (Sueppel vs. City Council of Iowa City, 136 N.W. 2D 523,
quoting 67 CJS OFFICERS, secs. 42, 54[11). According to Mechem, the term of
office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon the expiration of the
officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease (Mechem, op. cit., Secs. 396397). In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by
which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term for which
he was elected or appointed. The question of when this event has occurred
depends upon a number of considerations, the most prominent of which,
perhaps, are whether he was originally elected or appointed for a definite term
or for a term dependent upon some act or event . . . (Mechem, op. cit., Sec. 384).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIXING OF TERM COMPLETES REQUISITES FOR
APPOINTMENT IN CASE AT BAR. The petitioner was appointed as general
manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13 (series of 1960 approved on January
15, 1960) of the Board of Directors of the national Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) as per authority of paragraph 2, Section 8
of Republic Act 1160 which gives said Board the power "to appoint and fix the
term of office of the general manager . . ." A careful perusal of the resolution
points out the fact that the appointment is by itself incomplete because of the lack
of approval of the President of the Philippines to such appointment. However,
such appointment was made complete upon approval of Resolution No. 24
(series of 1962 approved March 15, 1962) wherein the President submitted to
the Board his "desire" to fix the term of office of the petitioner up to the close of
office hours on March 31, 1962. The questioned resolution corrected whatever
requisite lacking in the earlier Resolution No. 13 of the respondent Board.
Resolution No. 24, approved by the respondent Board and pursuant to "the
desire of the President" legally fixed the term of office of petitioner as mandated
by paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIXING OF TERM IN CASE AT BAR, NOT REMOVAL. In
case at bar, the term of office is not filed by law. However, the power to fix
term is vested in the Board of Directors subject to the recommendation of
Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of

the
the
the
the

Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) speaks of no removal but an

expiration of the term of office of the petitioner.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; NO NEED OF CONSTRUCTION WHERE
THE STATUTE IS CLEAR. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in
statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure
or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be
determined from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the
words, there is no room for construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, Sec.
51). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the words (Hondoras vs. Soto, 8 Am. St., Rep. 744). The reason for
the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words,
to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute (50 Am. Jur. p. 212).
(Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 01, 1989)
ELECTION; QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE,
CONTENDING REQUIREMENTS. The probability that many of those who
voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself
is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements
were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the
day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
|||

11. ID.; ELECTION; CANDIDATE OBTAINING THE SECOND HIGHEST

NUMBER OF VOTES; NOT QUALIFIED TO REPLACE THE DISQUALIFIED
CANDIDATE; SANTOSRULING REVERSED. Finally, there is the question of
whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. Re-examining Santos v.

Commission on Election, 137 SCRA 740 the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. There the Court held it would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
|||

(Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. 16808, January 03, 1921)

1. QUO WARRANTO; JUDGES; APPOINTMENT, TRANSFER, AND

REMOVAL. B was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District on
July 1, 1914. He qualified and took possession of office on that date. On
February 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District
and M was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. B has since
the latter date refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial
District. Held: That B is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "APPOINT," CONSTRUED. The term "appoint" found
in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, is well-known in law
and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to
the nomination or designation of an individual.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Judges of First Instance are not appointed Judges
of First Instance of the Philippine Islands but are appointed Judges of the
Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine
Islands. They hold this position of Judge of First Instance of definite districts
until they either resign, reach the age of retirement, or are removed through
impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate
and distinct judicial offices.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. The proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code
must be given a meaning which will not render abortive the main portions of
the law, especially those relating to the removal of judges.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. Appointment and qualification to office are separate
and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power
to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be
chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands, however,
which can compel a man to accept the office.
6. ID.; ID.; ID. The language of the proviso to section 155 of the
Administrative Code does not empower the Governor-General to force upon
the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his will,
thereby removing him from his former district.
7. ID.; ID.; ID. The reasonable force of the language used in the
proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the
whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the
principles of the law of public officers, leave room for no other construction
than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district
only with his consent.
|||

|||

(General Manager, Philippine Ports Authority v. Monserate, G.R. No.

129616, April 17, 2002)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DE FACTO OFFICER, ELUCIDATED. While petitioner Anino's

appointment to the contested position is void, as earlier discussed, he is
nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency.
A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly
exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though
such appointment or election may be irregular.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DE JURE OFFICER MAY RECOVER SALARIES FROM THE DE
FACTO OFFICER. In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that a
rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary

received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he
(the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title.
A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must,
therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the
period of his wrongful tenure. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary, this Court allowed ade facto officer to receive emoluments
for actual services rendered but only when there is no de jure officer.
DaCTcA

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DE JURE OFFICER ENTITLED TO BACKPAY

DIFFERENTIALS FROM DE FACTO OFFICER. The rule is that where there is
a de jure officer, a de factoofficer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled
to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good
faith. This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the present case in view
of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed under protest the
position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988, which
position she currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments,
salary and other compensation attached to such office. While her assumption to
said lower position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot
be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful office (Division
Manager), she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she was
unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay differentials for the
period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her
actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such backpay
differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rates for the positions of
Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino
corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the contested position up to
the time of his retirement on November 30, 1997.
(Lo Cham v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-831, L-876, L-878, November 21, 1946)
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RESTRICTIONS NOT GIVEN
UNLESS EXPRESSED. Statutory provisions should not be given a
restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the express

enumeration of persons, objects, situations, etc., is construed to exclude those

not mentioned, so no distinction should be made where none appears to be
intended.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE; LAWYER APPOINTED BY
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE TO ASSIST FISCAL; AUTHORITY, SCOPE OF.
A lawyer appointed by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to section 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 144, to assist a fiscal, is authorized to sign informations, made
investigations and conduct prosecutions. If the legislature had wanted to forbid
him to discharge said functions, it would have said so or indicated its intention
by clear implication. There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of
complaints, making of investigations and conducting of prosecutions that only
an officer appointed by the President or one expressly empowered by law may
be permitted to assume these functions. Certainly a lawyer who is invested
with the same authority as might be exercised by the Attorney General or
Solicitor General is presumed to be competent to be entrusted with any of the
duties, without exception devolving on a prosecuting attorney.
3. PUBLIC OFFICERS; PUBLIC OFFICE; DUTIES INCLUDED. The
duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within its scope, those
which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the
office was created, and those which, although incidental and collateral, are
germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal
purposes.
|||

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.

vs Santiago
Posted on March 5, 2013

58 SCRA 493
1974
The Public Service Commission (PSC) imposed a fine on a radio company for failure to
render service expected of a radio operator.

FACTS
The PSC, acting on complaints by dissatisfied RCPI customers, penalized it with a fine. RCPI
alleged that the Commission was devoid of such competence since the Public Service Act
(C.A. No. 146) expressly exempted radio companies from the jurisdiction, supervision, and
control of such body over their franchises, equipment, and other properties (Sec. 13[a]
thereof) except with respect to the fixing of rates. (Sec. 14 thereof)
The first paragraph of Sec.21 of the Act reads:
Every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms and conditions
of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission shall
be subject to a fine of not exceeding P200 per day for every day during which
such default or violation continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized and
empowered to impose such fine, after due notice and hearing.
ISSUE
Is there anything in Sec.21 of the Act which empowers the PSC to impose a fine?
HELD
None. The power is neither expressly nor impliedly granted.
In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission
lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner.x x x a public official must locate in
the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. It need not be express. It
may be implied from the wording of the law. Absent such requisite, however, no warrant
exists for the assumption of authority. The act performed, if properly challenged, cannot
meet the test of validity. It must be set aside.

|||

(Miguel v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-19869, April 30, 1966)

1. MANDAMUS

PROCEEDING;
AVAILABLE
TO
PROCURE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW; CASE AT BAR. The placing of the
name "President Garcia Hall" at the facade of the building where the name
"Iloilo Provincial Building" originally appeared is intended to give the
impression that the name refers to the building and not to one of its rooms.
This is contrary to Republic Act 1059. As respondents, specifically, the
Provincial Governor, are in duty bound not only to observe, but even to
enforce the law, they may properly be compelled by mandamus to remove
or rectify an unlawful act if to do so is within their official competence, at
the instance of a taxpayer.

(Aprueba v. Ganzon, G.R. No. L-20867, September 03, 1966)

1. MANDAMUS; OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKET STALL; WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE TO

CONTROL OR REVIEW EXERCISE OF DISCRETION; CASE AT BAR. Mandamus
will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in
which he is required to act (Blanco vs. Board, 46 Phil., 192; Lee Wing vs. Collector, 30
Phil., 368; see II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 170-171). In the case at bar,
the privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal of the permit to operate a stall in the Iloilo
City market rested on the sound discretion of respondent, and refusal of the latter to
grant the continuation of the privilege cannot be the subject of an action for mandamus.

|||

(Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968)

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW;

STATUTES;

NULLIFICATION

OF;

FACTUAL

FOUNDATION

NECESSARY TO OVERCOME PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. The lower court's decision

declaring as unconstitutional Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required periodical
submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or
employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon
assuming office, contained no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the
statute could be based. In the absence of such a factual foundation, the presumption of validity
must prevail (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, L24693, July 31, 1967). On this ground alone, the lower court decision could be reversed.

|||

Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, G.R. No. 156039, August 14,

2003)

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENT DID NOT ACTUALLY ASSUME AND PERFORM THE DUTIES
OF HER POSITION SO AS TO DEPRIVE HER OF BACKWAGES AND OTHER
BENEFITS. There is more than substantial evidence in the record consisting
of the general payroll and attendance sheets to prove that petitioner assumed
and exercised the functions of Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning
Officer at MSU as early as June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved
her permanent appointment which was issued earlier on 10 April 1995. It cannot
be refuted that in September 1998 she was terminated from the service on the
alleged ground of expiration of her term and stopped from performing the
functions of her position, and subsequently reinstated to her job upon the
declaration of the CSC that her dismissal from the service was illegal. Clearly, the
CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled that respondent did not actually
assume and perform the duties of her position so as to deprive her of back
wages and other benefits. In Gabriel v. Domingo this Court held that an illegally
dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to
back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up
to his reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible because an employee who is
reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left
his office and should be given a comparable compensation at the time of his
reinstatement. Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to render
any service from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her
reinstatement. The policy of "no work, no pay" cannot be applied to her, for such
distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking even as her family
suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal and while she was
jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other benefits during her illegal
dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure
for those in the civil service.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE STATE UNIVERSITY CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY ALL
ACCRUING BACK SALARIES AND OTHER BENEFITS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT; THE SUPERIOR OFFICERS FOUND TO BE IN BAD FAITH OR
HAVE ACTED WITH PERSONAL MALICE WILL BE HELD PERSONALLY
ACCOUNTABLE. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that MSU cannot

be made to pay all accruing back salaries and other benefits in favor of
respondent. There are allegations to the effect that officials of MSU disobeyed in
bad faith the writ of execution issued by the CSC. In Gabriel v. Domingo we held
that if the illegal dismissal; including the refusal to reinstate an employee after a
finding of unlawful termination, is found to have been made in bad faith or due to
personal malice of the superior officers then they will be held personally
accountable for the employee's back salaries; otherwise, the government
disburses funds to answer for such arbitrary dismissal. This rule is also
enunciated in Secs. 38 and 39 of Book 1, E.O. 292, and in Secs. 53, 55, 56 and
58 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
|||

|||

(Meram v. Edralin, G.R. No. 71228, September 24, 1987)

In the case at bar, the BFD personnel who are considered next-in-rank to the
vacated position were identified. Respondent Edralin was not one of them. In
fact, she was nine or ten salary ranges below the next-in-rank personnel.
Subsequently, the MSB made the same finding in its decision. Evidently,
therefore, the foremost consideration why respondent's appointment was ordered
by the Office of the President notwithstanding the fact that petitioner was more
qualified and that she was next-in-rank was because of her petition to the
President in the form of a letter rather than an appeal and which started by
introducing herself as "Filipina Villeses-Edralin, wife of Efren E. Edralin of Sarrat,
Ilocos Norte." the clear intent of her letter-petition was not to appeal in
accordance with P.D. No. 807 but to elicit some kind of favorable response from
the President based on considerations of blood ties, influence, or ethnic and
regional affiliations. To a certain extent she succeeded but this Court must strike
down the practice of political, ethnic, religious, or blood ties being used to get
choice appointments for it goes against the very purpose behind the
establishment of the civil service in our country. As earlier stated, appointments
under the civil service law should be based on merit and fitness and should never
depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee is to the
powers that be. And granting that the respondent possesses the qualifications
required for the contested position, it cannot be denied that the petitioner equally

possesses the same qualifications, if not in greater degree, and more important,
she is next-in-rank to the vacated position. Therefore, she deserves to be
appointed to the disputed item.
Prcd

|||

(Luego v. CSC, G.R. No. L-69137, August 05, 1986)

2. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE RULES OF PERSONNEL ACTIONS AND POLICIES;

NEXT-IN-RANK, NOT ABSOLUTE. In preferring the private respondent

to the petitioner, the Commission was probably applying its own Rule V,
Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies, which
provides that "whenever there are two or more employees who are next-inrank, preference shall be given to the employee who is most competent
and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service eligibility." This rule
is inapplicable, however, because neither of the claimants is next in rank.
Moreover, the next-in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil Service Decree
allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees,
reinstatement, reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have the
appropriate eligibility.

|||

(People v. De Venecia, G.R. No. L-20808, July 31, 1965)

1. ELECTION OFFENSES; ELECTIONEERING; DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY

HANDBILLS. The distribution by a classified civil service employee of
handbills, urging election of a particular candidate, is a solicitation of the electors'
vote punishable by Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
2. ID.; ID.; SECTION 54 REVISED ELECTION CODE, NOT REPEALED BY
SECTION 29, Republic Act 2260. Section 54 of the Revised Election Code is
not repealed by Section 29 of Republic Act 2260.
For convenience, the two legal provisions are herewith reproduced:
"SEC. 54. Active intervention of public officers and employees. No
justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or

employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city,

municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidates, or exert influence in any manner in
any election or take part herein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer." (CA 357-48)
"SEC. 29. Political Activity. Officers and employees in the Civil
service, whether in the competitive or classified, or non-competitive or
unclassified service, shall not engage directly or indirectly in partisan
political activities or take part in any election except to vote. Nothing
herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee
from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports."

The only issue is whether the latter repealed the former. It is at once apparent
that sec. 29 is administrative in nature, whereas sec. 54 is a penal statute. The
first contains prohibitions of administrative character, even as it grants or
reserves some privileges to civil public servants. Of course, logically, restrictions
contained in sec. 29 that are not contained in sec. 54 could not be criminally
punished e. g. unclassified service employees are not punishable under sec.
54. But a realistic view would hold that activities permitted in sec. 29 though it
is a mere administrative measure should not be criminally death with under
sec. 54.

(Ingles v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20390, November 29, 1968)

2.ID.; ID.; EXPIRATION OF TERM. When an incumbent of a primarily confidential
position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that pleasure turns into
displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office his "term"
merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon
expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and can
not be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of said term.
The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the

latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not prefixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and
determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the
services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not "removed" or
"dismissed" from office his term merely "expired

|||

(Palma, Sr. v. Fortich, G.R. No. L-59679, January 29, 1987)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISCONDUCT; DEFINITION. Misconduct has been defined as

"such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not only as
affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all
times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of
the officer." (Lacson v. Roque, et al., 92 Phil. 456)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT, A REQUISITE BEFORE
CHARGES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE MAY BE FILED. As to whether
or not, such misconduct of petitioner affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not only his character as a private individual, has been laid to rest by
the ruling of the Supreme Court in an analogous case where it was held that
while "it is true that the charges of rape and concubinage may involve moral
turpitude of which a municipal official may be proceeded against . . . but before
the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against the municipal
official, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial
governor of the charges and trial by the provincial board."

|||

(Claudio v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140560, 140714, May 04, 2000)

1. POLITICAL LAW; Local Government Code; ELECTIONS; WORD "RECALL"

REFERS TO ELECTION ITSELF. Recall is a process which begins with the
convening of the preparatory recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at
least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds
to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of
such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the
holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b)
of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECALL; LIMITATIONS. There are two limitations in paragraph
(b) on the holding of recalls; (1) that no recall shall take place within one year
from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no
recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR PROHIBITORY PERIOD FROM ASSUMPTION
OF OFFICE; PURPOSE. The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a
reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official. In
the Bower case cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held that
"The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait
one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on
their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient
time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year
limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the
Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition
shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least
twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle
announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis
for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as
long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary
proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in
office of a local official.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR PROHIBITORY PERIOD PRECEDING A

REGULAR ELECTION; CAMPAIGN PERIOD, NOT INCLUDED. The law is
unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this
limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in theOmnibus
Election Code, it could have expressly said so. Moreover, petitioner's
interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may
be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the
assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following
his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to
about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine
months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in
paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight
months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the
right of recall which is designed to make local government units "more responsive
and accountable."
5. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS ISSUES CANNOT BE RAISED FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL. Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of
the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. He
contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not
obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. This claim
is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before the
COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of the names in
the petition were double entries, that some members had withdrawn their support
for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a
prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for recall
could be given due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the
stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include
the issue now being raised by petitioner. The other point raised by petitioner is
that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty.
Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City

but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised
before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

|||

(Pugutan v. Abubakar, G.R. No. L-33541, January 20, 1972)

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; POWER TO DISREGARD SPURIOUS

OR MANUFACTURED RETURNS; USMAN CASE APPLIED. There is no
merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of power to
disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts
of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or
manufactured. So we have held on facts analogous in character in the Usman
decision last month. What is contemplated in the law is that the electors in the
exercise of their free will can go to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage
with the boards of inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes duly
obtained after an honest count. It is on that basis that election returns are to be
made. Where no such election was in fact had as was found by respondent
Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only justified but it is its clear
duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly spurious and manufactured and
therefore bereft of any value.
3. ID.; RIGHT TO VOTE; NATURE. The right to vote is a political right enabling
every citizen to participate in the process of government to assure that it derives
its power from the consent of the governed. As eloquently expressed by Justice
Laurel: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must
continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied
into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in
the interest of good government and the common weal."

|||

(Carlos v. Angeles, G.R. No. 142907, November 29, 2000)

3. ID.; ID.; ELECTION; ELECTIONS ARE WON ON THE BASIS OF THE

MAJORITY OR PLURALITY OF VOTES CAST AND RECEIVED BY THE
CANDIDATES. The annulment of an election on the ground of fraud,
irregularities and violations of election laws may be raised as an incident to an
election contest. Such grounds for annulment of an election may be invoked in an
election protest case. However, an election must not be nullified and the voters
disenfranchised whenever it is possible to determine a winner on the basis of
valid votes cast, and discard the illegally cast ballots. In this case, the petitioner
admittedly received 17,007 valid votes more than the protestee, and therefore the
nullification of the election would not lie. The power to nullify an election must be
exercised with the greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and
only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure. As
heretofore stated, in this jurisdiction, elections are won on the basis of a majority
or plurality of votes cast and received by the candidates. "The right to hold an
elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the
office."
4. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF ELECTIONS; INSTANCES WHERE A FAILURE OF
ELECTIONS MAY BE DECLARED. In a petition to annul an election under
Section 6, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two conditions must be averred in order to
support a sufficient cause of action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect more
than 50% of the votes cast and (2) the good votes can be distinguished from the
bad ones. It is only when these two conditions are established that the annulment
of the election can be justified because the remaining votes do not constitute a
valid constituency. We have held that: "To declare a failure of election, two (2)
conditions must occur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned
on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election." Neither of these conditions was present in the case at bar.
More recently, we clarified that, "Under the pertinent codal provision of
the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of

elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
electon account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes."

LABO V COMELEC, G.R. No. 105111, 105384, July 03, 1992)

The Commission is bound by the final declaration that respondent is not a Filipino
citizen. Consequently, respondent's verified statement in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a "natural-born" Filipino citizen is a false material representation."

|||

. (Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998)

|||

POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; NUISANCE CANDIDATE; CONSTRUED. A

nuisance candidate is one whose certificate of candidacy is presented and filed
to cause confusion among the electorate by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidate or by other names which demonstrate that the candidate
has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

(Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36 SCRA 1 [1970]) (Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

|||

133840, November 13, 1998)

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. As discussed in the COMELEC's April
30, 1998 decision, in accordance with Section 69, Edwin Bautista was found to
be a nuisance candidate. First and foremost, he was running under the name of
Edwin "Efren" Bautista, when it had been established that he was really known as
"Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo." Second, the following circumstances saliently
demonstrate that he had no bona fide intention of running for the office for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy: He is said to be engaged in a "buy and sell"
business, but has no license therefor. He declared that he had a monthly income
of P10,000.00, but with expenses totalling P9,000.00. He does not own any real
property. He did not file his income tax return for the years 1995 and 1996 and
when asked why, he said he did not have any net income and that he was only
earning enough to defray household expenses. He even violated COMELEC
rules since he failed to submit the names of individuals who paid for his
campaign materials as well as the printing press he dealt with. He did not have a
political line-up and had no funds to support his campaign expenses. He merely
depended on friends whose names he did not submit to the COMELEC. And as
straightforwardly found by the COMELEC, he "has not demonstrated any
accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years of existence as a
person that would surely attract the electorate to choose him as their
representative in government." In contrast, it was shown that petitioner had
previously held under his name Cipriano and appellation, "Efren" Bautista,
various elective positions, namely: Barangay Captain of Navotas in 1962,
Municipal Councilor of Navotas in 1970, and Vice-Mayor of Navotas in 1980. He
is a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine Engineer, and a member of
various civic organizations such as the Rotary Club of Navotas and the Philippine
Jaycees. As early as May 13, 1998, the COMELEC had already spoken and
stated its final position on the issue of whether or not Edwin Bautista is a
nuisance candidate. It had already denied Edwin's motion for reconsideration in
its May 13, 1998 Order. This important detail only shows that as of May 14, 1998,

when Chairman Pardo issued the aforestated Memorandum; Edwin Bautista had
already been finally declared as a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. And
when Edwin Bautista elevated the matter to this Court, we upheld such
declaration

|||

(Macabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 152163, November 18, 2002)

3. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; GROUNDS ALLEGED ARE NOT

PROPER BASES FOR PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES BUT ARE
APPROPRIATE FOR REGULAR ELECTION CONTEST WITHIN THE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. Pre-proclamation
controversies are properly limited to challenges directed against the Board of
Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular election
returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections
subsequently reduced to writing. The proceedings are summary in nature; thus,
the reception of evidence aliunde, e.g., the original copies of the VRRs, is
proscribed. In fine, in pre-proclamation proceedings, the COMELEC is not to look
beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic
returns. Issues such as fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process, the
resolution of which would compel or necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil
of election returns which appear to be prima facie regular, on their face, are
anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. Such issues should be posed and
resolved in a regular election protest. In his petition with the COMELEC, private
respondent alleged that fraud and irregularities allegedly perpetrated by
unscrupulous individuals who substituted for the registered voters and voted for
the latter in the subject precincts, in conspiracy with the Board of Election
Inspectors, or abetted by the members thereof, attended the electoral process in
the subject precincts. The fraud and the irregularities catalogued by private
respondent required the reception of evidence aliunde. As stated earlier, such
grounds are not proper bases for a pre-proclamation controversy but are

appropriate for a regular election contest within the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
4. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NOT A CASE OF A FAILURE OF ELECTION; FRAUD
AS A GROUND TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF ELECTION MUST BE ONE THAT
PREVENTS OR SUSPENDS THE HOLDING OF AN ELECTION, INCLUDING
THE PREPARATION AND TRANSMISSION OF THE ELECTION RETURNS.
Under Section 5, Article 1 of the R.A. 7166, the matter of the postponement or
declaration of failure of election and the calling of a special election as provided
for in Section 6, shall be decided by the COMELEC sitting En Banc by a majority
of its members. Before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, the concurrence of two (2) conditions must be
established, namely: (a) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on
the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in a failure to elect; (b) the votes cast would affect the result of the
election. . . . While fraud is a ground to declare a failure of election, such fraud
must be one that prevents or suspends the holding of an election, including the
preparation and transmission of the election returns. "Failure to elect" must be
understood in its literal sense which is, nobody emerges as a winner. The
barefaced fact that a candidate has been proclaimed and has assumed office
does not deprive the COMELEC of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal
proclamation. A petition for the annulment of election is not the same as one
involving a pre-proclamation controversy.

HATICc

. (Salvacion v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 84673-74, February 21, 1989)

|||

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; FINDINGS OF THE

TRIBUNAL UPHELD, ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
ELECTORAL PROTEST, PROPER REMEDY. While it may be true that duress,
threats, intimidation or coercion attended the preparation of the election return for

Precinct No. 12, there is no showing that the same affected the regularity or the
genuineness of the contested election return. There is no evidence presented to
public respondent that the election return in question was satisfied in such a way
that the true results of the voting had been altered. The court is bound by the
finding of public respondent as there is no showing that it committed a grave
abuse of discretion. It appearing that the questioned Resolution of public
respondent had already been implemented and the private respondent had been
proclaimed as the elected mayor of the Municipality of Leyte, Leyte by the
inclusion of the election return for Precinct No. 12 and that he has taken his oath
of office and assumed the duties of said Office, the remedy of the petitioner is not
a pre-proclamation contest but an electoral protest filed at the proper time before
the competent court

(De Castro v. Ginete, G.R. No. L-30058 (Resolution), March 28, 1969)

1.ELECTION

LAW;

ELECTION

CONTEST;

ACTS

OR

CONDUCT

OF

PROTESTANT DO NOT PRECLUDE HIM FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY

OF PROTESTEE'S ELECTION. The acts or conduct or utterances of
respondent Ginete can not be considered as an estoppel on his part to protest
the election of petitioner de Castro. It is viewed as simply a laudable gesture of
sportmanship and a manifestation of his respect for the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers. There is no showing that Ginete had admitted
that De Castro had won in an election that was clean and honest, or free from
irregularities. As a law-abiding citizen, he had to abide by the proclamation of the
board of canvassers. His having recognized De Castro as the winner in virtue of
the proclamation by the board of canvassers did not preclude him from
questioning the validity of De Castro's election in the manner prescribed by law, if
he had grounds to show that the election of De Castro was brought about through
the commission of frauds and other election irregularities.

2.ID.; ID.; CANDIDATE WHO LOST IN THE DRAWING OF LOTS IS ESTOPPED

FROM CONTESTING THE ELECTION OF THE WINNER. The only case
where this Court has held that a party is estopped to contest the election of the
winning candidate is in the case of a tie where the candidates who were declared
to have obtained equal number of votes had voluntarily submitted themselves to
the drawing of lots to determine the winner, as provided by law. It was ruled by
this Court that the candidate who lost in the drawing of lots is estopped from
contesting the election of the one who won in the draw, because by submitting
himself to the draw the defeated candidate is considered to have admitted that
the announcement made by the board of canvassers regarding the tie was the
result of a valid and lawful canvass. The candidate who submitted himself to the
draw is considered as having deliberately induced his opponent to believe that he
had thereby led his opponent to act upon such belief in the validity of the canvass
and the tie, so that he can not be permitted to repudiate his own acts.
3.ID.; ID.; WHEN A CANDIDATE WHO SUBMITS TO THE DRAWING OF LOTS
IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CONTESTING THE ELECTION OF THE WINNER.
This court has even adopted a more liberal view on this matter when in a latter
case it held that a candidate who has tied with another and who submits himself
to the drawing of lots, stating that if the result of said drawing of lots should be
adverse to him, he would file a protest before a competent court, is not estopped
from doing so. The view adopted by the Court in this latter case is in keeping with
the doctrine that an election protest involves public interest, so that the court
should allow all opportunity possible for the ascertainment of the true result of the
elections.
4.ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF ELECTION PROTEST. The purpose of an election
protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of
canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an
election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is the basis of
the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public
office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate
of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing

candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner
provided by law.
5.ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION TO DISMISS ELECTION PROTEST FOR LACK
OF CAUSE OF ACTION. It is a settled rule that when a complaint - the motion
of protest in the present case - is sought to be dismissed upon the ground that it
does state a cause of action, the party seeking the dismissal admits
hypothetically the facts alleged in the complaint.
6.ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF CAUSE OF ACTION IN INSTANCE CASE. A
cursory reading of the motion of protest readily apprised one of the existence of a
cause of action. The motion of protest alleges that protestee De Castro was
proclaimed winner by the municipal board of canvassers of Bulan with a margin
of only 12 votes over the protestant. The motion of protest impugns the votes of
the protestee in 26 election precincts in the municipality of Bulan because of
election frauds and irregularities. It thus follows that if those allegations of frauds
and irregularities in the motion of protest are proved, the majority of 12 votes
whereby the protestee was declared winner by the board of canvassers would
easily be overcome, and the result of the election would change in favor of the
protestant. It would be an undue recourse to technicality to dismiss the motion of
protest simply because there is no allegation that if the irregularities are corrected
the result of the election would be changed, when it is very apparent that if the
allegations in the motion of protest are proved a change in the result of the
election would necessarily follow.
7.ID.; ID.; THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE TRUTH OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF
FRAUDS

AND

IRREGULARITIES

DO

NOT

NECESSARILY

DECLARE

PROTESTANT ELECTED. When an election protest alleges frauds and

irregularities such that the legality of the election of the protestee is placed in
serious doubt, the courts should proceed to ascertain the truth of the allegations
of frauds and irregularities, not necessarily to declare the protestant elected but
to determine whether the protestee was legally elected, because once it is shown
that frauds and irregularities had characterized the election the court may annul
the election and declare that no candidate had been elected.

8.STATUTE;

STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION;

STATUTES

RELATING

TO

ELECTION CONTESTS TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. It is a settled rule

that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed, and that
immaterial defects in pleadings should be disregarded, to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by merely formal
or technical objections.
9.REMEDIAL LAW; ESTOPPEL; ELEMENTS. The elements of estoppel by
conduct are: (1) that there must have been a representation or concealment of
material facts; (2) that the representation must have been made with knowledge
of the facts; (3) that the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of
the truth of the matter; and (4) that it must have been made with intention that the
other party would act upon it.
|| The Hold-Over Doctrine
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999, 2nd Div.
[Bellosillo]
The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a
fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in
office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and
qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon
the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it,
but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and
qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an
officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed
or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume
that the law-making body favors the same.
-

Galarosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728, Nov. 11, 1993, En Banc [Davide]

The rule is settled that unless holding over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the
incumbent may continue to hold over until someone else is elected and qualified to
assume the office. This rule is demanded by the most obvious requirements of
public policy, for without it there must frequently be cases where, from a failure to
elect or a refusal or neglect to qualify, the office would be vacant and the public

service entirely suspended. Otherwise stated, the purpose is to prevent a hiatus in

the government pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted
into office.
Resignation
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno]
Resignation x x x is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment (Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 [1961]). The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It
can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.