TATAD VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of
Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of
the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then
Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on
April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security
Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted
to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices
against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits
and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan.
However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12,
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for
giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions;
(2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of AmityTrading Corporation as consideration
for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services
rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section
7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the
calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made
alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to
a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
HELD:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were
violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command
for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period
for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is
merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case
at bar.

CERVANTES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
On March 6, 1986, private respondent Pedro Almendras filed a sworn complaint
with the Office of the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman) against a certain
Alejandro Tapang for falsification of Almendra's salaysay alleging that Tapang made
him sign a piece of paper in blank on which paper a salaysay was later inscribed
stating that Almendras had been paid his claim in the amount of P17,594.00, which was
not true. Almendras mentioned in the complaint that he sought the help of petitioner
Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked as analyst in the office of labor arbiter Teodorico L.
Ruiz. Tapang in a counter-affidavit denied the accusation of Almendras. Cervantes also
denied the accusation against him.
On May 18, 1992, more than 6 years after the filing of the initiatory complaint,
the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging Cervantes,
together with Ruiz and Tapang, with violation of Section 3(e), RA3019.On October 2,
1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash and motion to recall warrant of arrest on the
ground that the case against him had already prescribed due to unreasonable delay in
the resolution of the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan in a minute
resolution dated December 24, 1992 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
HELD:

Yes. It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) six (6) years
from the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an information for the
offense with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan and the Special Prosecutor try to
justify the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint by stating that no political
motivation appears to have tainted the prosecution of the case in apparent reference
to the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan where the Court ruled that the long delay (3
years) in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was
violative of the Constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases because
political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process in this case.
The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan alleging that, as in
Alvizo, the petitioner herein was insensitive to the implications and contingencies
thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter.
It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him. The SC granted the petition and annulled the minute resolution of
the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to quash.

CRESPO VS MOGUL

FACTS:
Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for
defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with
the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment
was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the matter
to the appellate court. The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to
refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review
reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to
move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul
denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused then
filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA
dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal
under orders from, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the
merits.
HELD:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint

or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be
controlled by the complainant. However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not
without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or
city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the
action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in
Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.