A petition to cancel a candidates COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC which

provides:
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any timenot later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacyand shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Underlining supplied.)
A petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 of
the same Code which states:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party
is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 refer to election campaign or political activity
outside the campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election
propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules
and regulations on election propaganda through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section
261 [d]); threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion
(Section 261 [e]); unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds (Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any
propaganda on the day of the election (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6).
As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, we held inSalcedo II
v. Commission on Elections[25] that in order to justify the cancellation of COC, it is essential
that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for
the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not
specify what would be considered as a material representation, the Court concluded that this
refers to qualifications for elective office. Citing previous cases in which the Court interpreted

this phrase, we held that Section 78 contemplates statements regarding age,

[26] residence[27] and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.
[28] Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist
of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate
as to ones qualification for public office.[29]
Significantly, we pointed out in Salcedo II the two remedies available for questioning
the qualifications of a candidate, thus:
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised
under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
xxx
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warrantowith the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
(emphasis supplied)
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for
elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be
initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warrantounder Section 253 may be
brought on the basis of two grounds (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results.
Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the only instance where a petition questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
elective office can be filed before election is when the petition is filed under Section 78 of the
OEC.
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disqualification of Candidates provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who

commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
xxxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule
23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. A petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law Department
of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political party, organization,
or coalition or political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained
therein as required by law is false.
Sec. 2. Period to File Petition. The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the
last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate
of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said
Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on
grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No.
6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed
under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention
made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because
there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating
to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and
Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the
petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the
election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from
the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. x x
x[32] (Additional emphasis supplied.)
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 entitled Rules on Disqualification Cases Filed in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections was promulgated
onNovember 11, 2009. Section 4 thereof provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure in filing petitions. For purposes of the preceding sections, the following
procedure shall be observed:
A. PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
1. A verified petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy but not
later than twenty-five (25) days from the filing of certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC);
xxxx
B. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68 OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC and the
verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds
for disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation;

Garvida vs Sales
Doctrine: Qualification of Elective Officers (SK)
FACTS:
In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival
Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time
of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and the SK
elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got
76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21
years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly
21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less
than 22 years so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still,
technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must
be:
1.
2.

Filipino citizen;
an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;

3.

15 but not more than 21 years of age; and

4.

duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not equivalent
to less than 22 years old. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on
election day. If such was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have
expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as
the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though obtaining the
second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winners
eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as successor simply because he did
not get the majority or the plurality of votes the electorate did not choose him. It would have
been different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing
her ineligibility, this would have rendered her votes stray.

Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who
obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote succeed
Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales situation Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not
SK membership.)
The above argument cant be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when the
SK Chairman refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily
resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without
leave for more than three (3) consecutive months. Garvidas case is not what Section 435
contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being
eligible means being legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen. Ineligibility, on the
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.
FAILURE OF ELECTION
Under Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as "The Synchronized Elections Law of
1991,"5 the Comelec en banc is empowered to declare a failure of election under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). Section 6 of the Code prescribes the conditions for the
exercise of this power, thus:
"SEC. 6. Failure of Election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of
such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."
Based on the foregoing provision, three instances justify a declaration of failure of election.
These are:
"(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;

(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes."6
What is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect.7 In the first instance, no
election is held while in the second, the election is suspended.8 In the third instance,
circumstances attending the preparation, transmission, custody or canvas of the election returns
cause a failure to elect. The term failure to elect means nobody emerged as a winner. 9
The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face
that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. In their absence, the petition
must be denied outright.
BANAGA, JR. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134696
July 31, 2000
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of the
City of Paraaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers
proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over
petitioner Banaga, Jr.s 68,970 votes.
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to
Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was
replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that
numerous Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Paraaque
appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.
In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore, the
incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be considered as the
true will of the people.
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the
City of Paraaque, during the May 1998 local elections.
Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioners suit and held that the election offenses relied
upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is
clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot
be viewed as an election protest.

Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio
without any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
Issue:
WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is considered as
an election protest.
WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public
respondent is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi:
1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a special
action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary
governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is
covered by Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements
for filing an election protest such as failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election
protest.
2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition
to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. The
petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that
the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only
based its decision on the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a
failure of election. There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC
have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.

LOONG vs. COMELEC

216 SCRA 760, 1992
Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election
held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum
filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office
of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy as to his age.
Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent
COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a
resolution which is the subject of this petition.
Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue
in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered
a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper
to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there
being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute
Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998
is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first
impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of
the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor
of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of

this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated
election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the
Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is
well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the
municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated
machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing
of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated
count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu
would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the
vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We
cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436
did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel
of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It
ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election
tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in
view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of
votes (2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino
memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count
of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers.
Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu
to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely offline. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and

during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special
election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of
private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in
Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. These officials
were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is
illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election
cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes. The plea for a special
election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.

TAN vs. COMELEC

In the May 14, 2001 elections, Abdusakur Tan and Abdulwahid Sahidulla were
candidates
for
Governor
and
Vice-Governor,
respectively,
while Munib Estino and Abraham Burahan were candidates for Congressman
of the Second and First District of Sulu, respectively. The other candidates for
Governor
and
Vice-Governor
were Yusop Jikiri and Abdel Anni. The
candidates for the position of members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of
the
First
District
of Sulu were
Den
Rasher Salim, Talib Hayudini, Rizal Tingkahan and Barlie Nahudan,
while
those
for
the
Second
District
were
Abraham Daud, Lukman Omar,Onnih Ahmad and Basaron Burahan.
On
May
17,
2001, Abdusakur Tan, Abdulwahid Sahidulla and
Abraham Burahan (Abdusakur Tan, et al. for brevity) filed with the COMELEC
(public respondent) a petition to declare failure of elections in all the precincts
in the Municipality of Luuk, Province of Sulu,
The petitioners further pray that pending final resolution of this petition that an order be immediately
issued directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Luuk, Sulu as well as the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu to suspend and desist from continuing with, the CANVASSING of the election returns
and/or certificate of canvass.
The following day, the petitioners filed a petition to declare failure of elections and/or to annul
the elections or the election results in the Municipalities of Parang and Indanan, Province of Sulu

No respondents were impleaded in both petitions.

petitioners therein filed an urgent reiterating motion to suspend proclamation. [5] Acting on the
said motion, the public respondent issued an order suspending the proclamation of the winning
candidates
petitioners therein filed their Amended Petitions impleading for the first time the winning
candidates, Yusop Jikiri, et al., as party respondents.
the respondents filed their respective answers to the aforesaid amended petitions questioning in
the main the jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc. The petitioners in turn filed an urgent motion to
annul the proclamation of the respondents as the winners. The respondents opposed the motion,
contending that such motion was appropriate only in pre-proclamation controversies.
the COMELEC issued an order recalling and setting aside its June 20, 2001 Order, and
affirming the May 23, 2001 proclamation of the respondents.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction and/or temporary restraining order and/or status quo
ante order, assailing the aforequoted June 28, 2001 Order of the public respondent;

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. - The postponement, declaration of failure
of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall
be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for the declaration of
a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the
expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty
(60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in
the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the succeeding regular election.

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES
Section 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns.

Abella vs. Larrazabal

FactsPetitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for
provincial governor of Leyte in the local election held on February 1, 1988. The private
respondent is the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng BansaPDP-Laban who was disqualified by the Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for lack
of residence. On January 31, 1988, the day before the election, she filed her own certificate of
candidacy in substitution of her husband. The following day, at about 9:30 o'clock in the
morning, Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition with the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her

certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. This was immediately transmitted to the main
office of the Commission on Elections, which could not function, however, because all but one
of its members had not yet been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. De la Cruz
then came to this Court, which issued a temporary restraining order on February 4,
1988,enjoining the provincial board of canvassers of Leyte "from proclaiming Adelina
Larrazabal as the winning candidate for the Office of the Governor in the province of Leyte, in
the event that she obtains the winning margin of votes in the canvass of election returns of said
province." On March 1, 1988, the Commission on elections having been fully constituted, we
remanded the petition thereto "for appropriate action, including maintenance or lifting of the
Court's temporary restraining order of February 4, 1988.IssueWhether or not the private
respondent is qualified thereof. Ruling Pre-proclamation controversies are summary in nature.
The policy of the election law is that pre proclamation controversies should be summarily
decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as
possible." That is why such questions as those involving the appreciation of the votes and the
conduct of the campaign and the balloting, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer
consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest. The purpose of a
pre-proclamation controversy is to ascertain the winner or winners in the elections on the basis of
the election returns duly authenticated by the boards of inspectors and admitted by the board of
canvassers. The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running
or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the
mere fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification
is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.
SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of
the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for president, vice-president, senator, and
member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the
case may be, except as provided for in Section 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or
directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal
certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila
Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of their respective proceedings."

Case Digest: P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, protestee.
Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the Philippines.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed an election protest

before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant died in the course of his
medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe
submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased
protestant FPJ.
Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latters protest case.
Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal
and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to
continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a
real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs.
FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances
of this case, we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this
election protest.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on
the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year,
protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed
with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their
respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator
in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a
consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions
thereof.
The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of
who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as
to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the
nation during this period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion
of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed
the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

Section 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to
prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four
months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of
Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

PEOPLE vs. DELGADO Case Digest

PEOPLE vs. DELGADO
189 SCRA 715, 1990

Facts: On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City
against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually
recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as
recommended.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the
respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by
respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a
reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the
motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders,
rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.

Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasijudicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power
of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of
election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly
authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of
a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The
COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the
court.

FAELNAR v PEOPLE (Election Offenses)

1.
2.

Eugenio Faelnar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of barangay chairman during the 1997-barangay
elections in Cebu.
One day after filing such certificate (April 9), a basketball tourney was slated 2nd Jing- Jing Faelnars Cup

3.

which lasted until April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering against petitioner and Gillamac
filed by Antonio Luy. It was alleged that is was a form of electioneering (campaign outside campaign period) as
there were streamers bearing the name of the petitioner in the venue, name was repeatedly mentioned in the
microphone, it was widely published in the local newspaper, and a raffle sponsored by Gillamac was held with
home appliances as prize. It constituted an election offense.
Initially, COMELEC en banc in a Resolution (973040) resolved to dismiss the filing of the case in the RTC.
Antonio Luy moved for reconsideration prompting COMELEC to proceed with the filing of the case against
petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash on the basis that previous dismissal of COMELEC en banc was
immediately final and executory and that Luys Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution (973040) was
prohibited pleading under Commissions rules of procedure.

Issue: W/N the MR of Luy is allowed in Election Offenses

HELD: YES (Petition DENIED)
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

A Motion for Reconsideration is allowed in election offense cases and there is no question that what is involved is
a resolution of COMELEC en banc in an election offense. Hence, MR of such is allowed under Rules of
Procedure.
Rule 13 Section 1 (COMELECs Rules of Procedure): The following pleadings are not allowed. (d) MR of en
banc ruling, resolution, orders, or decision EXCEPT in election offense cases.
COMELEC en banc is the one that determines the existence of probable cause in an election offense. But it may
also be delegated to the State Prosecutor of to the Provincial/City Fiscal but may still be reviewed by the
COMELEC.
Rule 64 (Rules of Court):
a. Section 2: A judgment or final order or resolution by the COMELEC and COA may be brought by the
aggrieved party to SC except as provided.
b. Section 3: Petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice of resolution sought to be reviewed.
The grounds relied upon by petitioner are directed at the validity of Resolution (973040). The petitioner prays that
such is null and void. The petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of COMELEC. The
petitioners remedy was to seek its annulment by way of a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 Sec 2. In
the case, no such petition was ever filed. The present petition to set aside the orders of RTC denying its motion
to quash and MR was filed more than a year after Resolution (973040) was promulgated. The Resolution is now
final and binding upon parties.