Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.

Facts:
Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he received the
injuries that gave rise to this complaint. On September 30, 1905,
plaintiff and Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to the power
plant owned by the defendant to visit one Murphy, an employee. Not
being able to find Murphy on inquiry, the boys for curiosity wandered
around the premises and reached the place where the company dumped
in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There they found some 20-30
fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for
explosion of dynamites, and have in themselves explosive power. The
boys picked up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they met
Jessie Adrian, a 9-year old girl. The 3 went to Manuels house and
performed a little experiment. They opened the caps and found
yellowish substance. They lighted a match and applied it on the
contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance
exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessies neck, burns on Manuel, and
loss of Davids eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages.
Issue:
Whether the company could be faulted for the allowing the children to
be exposed to the harmful substances
Held:
Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of
blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the
average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of
all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or
thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on
defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant
company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps
under its possession and control. We think also that the
evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully
and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot
where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried
out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that
neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this

may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a

finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or
through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which
the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from
visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that
young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the
fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found,
or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an
appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have
been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered
upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the
express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its
premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps
and applied a match to its contents.
Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn
by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well
as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to
congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which
arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them
to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron
which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of
premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed,
or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or
upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to
roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can
not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises
without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner
owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take
reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises
at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are
accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and
impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions
the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child
against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such
premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the

child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had
entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or
permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the
community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of
the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's
property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not
have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause
of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the
other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the
detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate
cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for
the injuries thus incurred.
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the general rule
in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury
resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by
the circumstances of the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of
the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age. The evidence of record
leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand,
he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt
to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to
discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of
the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about.

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself
when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in
the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand
and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution
which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have
been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act,
so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
Vda. da Bataclan v. Medina
Facts:
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of
Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and
operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay,
the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some
passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some
help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not
get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then
there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As
they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers
died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud
Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her
5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus
company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of
Appeals forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to the
amount involved.
Issue:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the
other passengers?
Held:

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of
contract
of
transportation
for
hire,
the
Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to
his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court
that there was negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show the bus was speeding, as testified by one passengers, and
a witnesses, from the point where one of the front tires burst
up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging,. The
chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in
order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the
bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned
turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the
defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found
in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited
by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the
same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was
the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back,

the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with
them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed
even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus.

Fernando V. CA (1992)
G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992
Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and
Damages)

FACTS:

November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of

the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the

Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the reemptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won
November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other

companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso,

Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank.
The bodies were removed by a fireman.
The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his

uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but

he expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case

and learned they entered the septic tank without

clearance from it nor with the knowledge and
consent of the market master.
Since the septic tank was found to be almost

empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did

the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found

them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of

oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase

order
RTC: Dismissed the case
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the

poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent

ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is
the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

test by which to determine the existence of

negligence in a particular case:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged

negligent act use that reasonable care and caution

which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence
standard supposed to be supplied by the

imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the

Roman law
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent

man in the position of the tortfeasor would have

foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences
The question as to what would constitute the

conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of

course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by

the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision,

is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist
Distinction must be made between the accident

and the injury

Where he contributes to the principal

occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can

not recover
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover

the amount that the defendant responsible for the

event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed
a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per

se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code

which would necessitate warning signs for the
protection of the public
While the construction of these public

facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and

sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning
signs is not one of those requirements
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic

tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its

covers
Considering the nature of the task of emptying a

septic tank especially one which has not been

cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person
should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of
the accident.
proximate and immediate cause of the death of
the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand
damages from the public respondent.

Sanitary Steam Laundry vs CA

Xxx

MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BAKING

GR. No. 156037, May 28, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: (Proximate Cause) Sebastian M. Baking
went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After
undergoing an ECG, and several examininations, Dr. Sy found the
respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal. The
doctor then prescribed two medical prescriptions- Diamicron for the
blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then
proceeded to Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines.
The sales lady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription
for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent sleeping
tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three
consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, he met an
accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could not
remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting
the tablet he took, respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked
after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of Diamicron.
He filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial
court favored the defendant which was affirmed by the CA hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: YES. Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage
suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3.
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. It is generally
recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.
Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling the
wrong prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of
life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been
very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether
the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the
physician. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident
was respondents negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is that
cause, which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the

result would not have occurred Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common
sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have
occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading the
prescription. Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it
was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car,
resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.

Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai

Facts:
At 5:30 in the morning, on Highway 54 (now EDSA) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village,
Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car from QC to the airport (southbound)
to bring his son who was going to Mindoro. Coming from the opposite direction was the
Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven by Bernardo, going to Wack Wack from Paraaque
(northbound.) Considering there was no traffic at that time, both cars were traveling a fairly
moderate speeds

Caedo at 40-50kph, Bernardo 48-56kph. In front of the car of Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai was a
carretela going in the same direction. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a
short rope coiled around the carretelas post. The carretela had two lights, one on each
side. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela, veered to the left in
order to pass. As he did, his car caught the rim of the carretelas left wheel,
wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded to the other land, colliding with
Caedos car.
Caedo, tried to avoid the collision by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful. Caedo and the members of his family were injured because of the accident, so
they filed this suit for recovery of damages from Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai.
Issue/s:
1. Who was responsible for the accident?
2. If it was Bernardo, was his employer, Yu Khe Thai solidarily liable with him?
Held/Ratio:
1. Bernardo in the Cadillac. The collision was directly traceable to Bernardos negligence.
He tried to beat Caedos car or squeeze between Caedos car and the carretela. He should have
known that passing the carretela was a risky maneuver, but he still took a gamble.

The first clear indication of his negligence was his claim that he was almost upon the
carretela when he saw it in front of him, only 8 meters away. The carretela had two lights, one
on each side, which should have given him sufficient warning to take necessary precaution.
Even if he claims he didnt see the lights of the carretela, the carretela should have been visible
to him if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights.
2. No, Yu Khe Thai cannot be held solidarily liable with Bernardo.
Art 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
Under Art. 2148, if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise
of due diligence
Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado, G.R. No. 85331, Aug. 25, 1989
Kapalarans driver had become aware that some vehicles
ahead of the bus and traveling in the same direction had
already stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either
to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the
intersection. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too
high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the
highway, and in any case too high to be able to slow down and
stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had
stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane
and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection
and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection.
Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually
violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among
others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic
Act No. 4136, as amended. Thus, a legal presumption arose the
bus driver was negligent, a presumption that Kapalaran was
unable to overthrow.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO
FACTS:
On August, 1982, the jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was
coming from Laguna on its way to Sta. Cruz. As it reached the

intersection where there is a traffic sign yield, it stopped an

cautiously treated the intersection as a Thru Stop street,
which it is not.
The Kapalaran Bus Line was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna
driven by its driver, Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila.
As the KBL neared the intersection, Llamoso inquired from his
conductor if they could still accommodate passengers and
learning that they were already full, he decided to bypass Pila
and instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio
admitted that there was another vehicle ahead of him.
The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has
the right of way as against a feeder road. Another general rule
is that a vehicle coming from the right has the right of way
over the vehicle coming from the left. The general rules on
right of way may be invoked only if both the vehicles approach
the intersection at almost the same time. In the case at bar,
both roads are national roads. Also, the KBL Bus was still far
from the intersection when the jeepney reached the same. As
testified by Atty. Conrado Manicad, he stopped at the
intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera.
However, there was a collision between the jeepney and the
bus. The KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles and the other
vehicles behind Atty. Manicad and overtook both vehicles at
the intersection therefore causing the accident.
Kapalaran filed a suit against the owner of the jeepney and its
driver. However, it lost the case. Furthermore, the Court did not
hold as liable the driver of the bus.
ISSUE: Whether or not KBL is accountable, considering the
driver of the bus was not held liable by the Courts.
HELD: Yes, Kapalaran is liable. The driver violated certain
general rules, and provisions in the Land Transportation and
Traffice Code. Hence, he can be presumed negligent. The
patent and gross negligence on the part of Kapalarans driver
raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was
guilty of negligene either in the selection or supervision of its
bus drivers. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it

has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent

employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining
its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own
driver, it should have appealed from that portion of the trial
courts decision which had failed to hold the bus driver
accountable for damages. The liability of employer under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent on its
own part.
The law requires Kapalaran as common carrier to exercise
extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances. In requiring the
highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and
creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law
compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. The law
seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people
(whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property
(whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very
size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of
their drivers.
Anonuevo vs CA
XXX
Mendoza vs Soriano
XXX
Africa vs Caltex
16 SCRA 448 Civil Law Torts and Damages Res Ipsa
Loquitur

In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing

Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it.

gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a

However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden

fire broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and

of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the

burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe

latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that

and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a

caused the injury complained of.

cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which caused

the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this
theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real
reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch

FF Cruz and co vs CA

owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to

Facts:

contain fire if in case one happens.

A fire broke up from the furniture shop of the petitioner in Caloocan city early
September 6, 1974. Prior to that, neighbor of the said shop requested that the
petitioner should build a firewall but failed to do so. The cause of the fire was
never discovered. Private respondent got P35k from the insurance on their
house and contents thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay

for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle
of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) which
states: where the thing which caused injury, without fault of
the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such control use proper care,
it

affords

reasonable

evidence,

in

the

absence

of

the

explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of

care. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment
and employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren.
A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have
known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened

Issue:
Whether or not the 35k be deducted from the damages thereof
Ruling
Since P35k had already been claimed by the respondents, the court held that
such amount should be deducted from the award of damages in accordance with
Art 2207 NCC
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received
indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the
wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who
has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not
fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the
deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are entitled only
to recover the deficiency from the petitioner.

because of want of care.

Whether or not the insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it
had been subrogated lies solely within the former's sound discretion. Since the
insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not of record and no claim is
made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to claim his right to
reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.

respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of

CII since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a
common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of
damage was purely accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking

to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove

that it was a common carrier.

Corporation and Lambert Eroles

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It
G.R. No. 141910

subsequently dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was

not a common carrier defined under the law & existing

August 6, 2002
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver
on June 18, 1994, 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators
aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the Central

jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for reconsideration

having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA. The
CA rejected the FGUs appeal & ruled in favor of GPS. It also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:

Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While traversing the North

1. WON GPS may be considered a common carrier as defined

Diversion Road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol,

under the law & existing jurisprudence.

Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it

to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.

2. WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier,

may be presumed to have been negligent when the goods it

FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered

undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged

cargoes (P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being

while in its protective custody & possession.

subrogee of CIIs rights & interests, FGU, in turn, sought

reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim,

3. Whether the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the

FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of

instant case.

carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer,

HELD:

1. Expectation interest interest in having the benefit of his

bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have

1. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be

been in had the contract been performed;

amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor & hauler of

Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering/offering its services to no

2. Reliance interest interest in being reimbursed for loss

other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common

caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a

carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or

position as he would have been in had the contract not been

associations engaged in the business of carrying or

made;

transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or

air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the

3. Restitution interest interest in having restored to him any

public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele

benefit that he has conferred on the other party.

in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a

common carrier is the carriage of passengers/goods, providing
space for those who opt to avail themselves of its
transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS
scarcely falls within the term common carrier.

Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the

basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a
new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual
obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like

2. GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the

proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the

mere proof of the existence of the contract & the failure of its

diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by

compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.

stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers,

The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for

that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of

any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a

fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.

contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract

confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that
which may have been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to
preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his:

A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives

rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability
on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him
to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.

10

Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner

(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the

without concrete proof of his negligence/fault. The driver, not

absence of negligence;

being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners

principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the

(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the

agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have

evidence (includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third

entered into it or their successors who have assumed their

persons); and

personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res

inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can
neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil

(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the

defendants duty to the plaintiff.

action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana,

Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be

which would require the claimant for damages to prove the

attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the

defendants negligence/fault.

defendant could not be responsible.

3. Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing

Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a

which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under

contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the

the latters management and the accident is such that, in the

defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the

ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if

circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the

those who have its management/control use proper care. In the

nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless,for the

absence of the defendants explanation, it affords reasonable

doctrine to apply, the requirement that responsible causes

evidence that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a

(other than those due to defendants conduct) must first be

rule of substantive law and does not create an independent

eliminated should be understood as being confined only to

ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or

cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the

a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute

presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately

for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing

attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.

specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places the

burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.

On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is
predicated on culpa acquiliana, can be said to have been in

However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:

control & management of the vehicle, it is not equally shown

11

that the accident has been exclusively due to his negligence. If

branch manager Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract

of lease of the first door beside the Matsushita office
It was converted into a two door so he had a

garage where he parked a company car 1981 model 4-door

Ford Cortina which he used to supervise different towns
July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga

leaving the car

3 days later: When he returned and warmed up the car,

it made an odd sound. On the second try, there was again

an odd sound and a small flames came out of its engine so
he was startled, stopped the car, went out and pushed it
out of the garage
Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment

and burned the whole garage where he was trapped so he

suffered burns in the face, legs and arms
The spouses were busy atching TV when they heard 2

loud explosions, smelt of gasoline and fire burned all their

belongings
city fire marshall investigated and concluded that the

fire was accidental

Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for gross

negligence and Perla for lacking the required diligence in

the selection and supervision of its employee.
RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily
Pascual was held liable under the doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur
CA: affirmed but modified the amount of damages

it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to

properly work against him. However, clearly this is not the
case.

Laguyan vs IAC
XXX

Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., Et Al. V. Sps. Gaudencio And

Primitiva Sarangaya (2005)
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva

Sarangaya erected Super A Building, a semi-concrete,

semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the
provincial road of Santiago, Isabela
It has three doors which were leased out
The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was

behind the second and third doors of the building

On the left side of the commercial building stood the
office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation
(Matsushita)

1988: Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its

ISSUE:
1. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable - YES

12

2. W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in the selection and

supervision of its employee. - NO

Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur

1) the accident is of a kind which does not

ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent

Ordinary refers to the usual course of

HELD: DENIED

1. YES.

Res ipsa loquitur

Latin phrase which literally means the thing or

events

Flames spewing out of a car engine,

when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event.

Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine
is revved.
Pascual, as the caretaker of the car,

failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically

checked - negligence
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive

control of the person in charge and

3) the injury suffered must not have been due to

the transaction speaks for itself.

It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an

inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs

prima facie case
The doctrine rests on inference and not on

presumption
facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of

negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of

negligence when direct evidence is lacking
based on the theory that the defendant either

any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the

person injured.
When there is caso fortuito:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected

knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity

of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge
thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms
plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the

occurrence was independent of the human will

human agency must be entirely excluded as

the proximate cause or contributory cause of the injury or

loss -Not because car not maintained
(b) it was impossible to foresee the event which

accident alone to establish negligence

provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin

liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to

explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident
complained of
defendants responsibility to show that

constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it

was impossible to avoid - NOT under the control of pascual
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner Spouses had no access nor obligation for the maintenance

there was no negligence on his part

13

(d) the person tasked to perform the obligation

must not have participated in any course of conduct that

aggravated the accident
2. YES.

Perla did not include any rule or regulation that Pascual

should have observed in performing his functions

There was no guidelines for the maintenance and

upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught

fire
Did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its

properties
Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that

employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their

employees. The liability is imposed on all those who by
their industry, profession or other enterprise have other
persons in their service or supervision
Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited
to employers in the transportation business.

Paulan vs Sarabia
XXX
Taylor vs Manila Electric (Supra)

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et al.Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to

bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well as natural,
in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its location.

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the
sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was
the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks
filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress
and egress was easily made because the gates were always
open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also
the tanks didnt have any barricade or fence. One day when
Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the
factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While
bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished
out later, already as a cadaver, having died of asphyxia
secondary to drowning. The lower decided in the favor of the
parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to
the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is

applicable in this case?

14

RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. American

Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine

generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well
as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or
artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In
the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such
doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios
death.

15