Mythology of Rage: Representations of The Self' and The Other' in Revolutionary Iran

Mythology of Rage: Representations of the "Self" and the "Other" in Revolutionary Iran
Author(s): Haggay Ram

Source: History and Memory, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring - Summer, 1996), pp. 67-87
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25618698 .
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Haggay Ram
Mythology of Rage: Representations of the "Self"
and the "Other" inRevolutionary Iran*
Introduction
In a series of studies exploring the history of madness,
illness,
crime and sexuality, the French philosopher Michel
Foucault
engaged in historical critiques of the discourses of various modern
scientific disciplines. Discerning ways in which people participate
in their own assujettissement (subjectification) by exercising power
over themselves - "tying themselves to scientific or moral defi
nitions of who they are"1 - Foucault brought a historical indict
ment against modernity, specifically against such modern disci
plines as medicine, psychiatry, criminology, sociology, and so on.
showed that the prevalent definitions of rationality, perversion,
appropriate codes of sexual behavior, and delinquency were all
formulated through the subjugation of an "Other" - the "mad
He
man,"
the
"deviant,"
the
"born
criminal,"
the
"delinquent"
and
the "hermaphrodite"
is constituted
through which the "Self
and affirmed. "Discipline makes individuals," Foucault asserts; "it
is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both
as objects and as instruments of its exercise."2
In part, themessage of the Islamic Republic of Iran too - beyond
the exposition of its revolutionary ideas - was the "message of
discontent,"
involving, as Hamid Dabashi pointedly argued, the
construction of a homogenized
hostile Other poised against an
as
Self.
"The
itwas collectively created, is the
injured
injured Self,
most compelling force in the contemporary Iranian
psyche; the
hostile Other is the visceral denial of The West'."3
Indeed, more than anything else, itwas these collective griev
ances against an imaginative construction called "the West"
that
movement
animated
the
in
Iran.
The
deeply
revolutionary
ideological foundation of the Islamic Revolution was nourished by
a repulsive rejection of "the West:"

Haggay Ram
"The West" became the epitome of moral corruption, of
of the
ethical bankruptcy, of illegitimate domination
of
and
the
and
other
of
wealth
world,
dignity
plundering
was
cause
all
nations.
"The
West"
the
of
ills, the
sovereign
mother of all corruptions, the condition of all despair, the
father of all tyrannies.4
68
and ancient history, "the West"

Projected back into medieval
came to symbolize - and indeed enshrine - centuries of European
colonialist confrontation with the injured Islamic-Iranian Self. To
a vast
to Napoleon,
quote Dabashi once again, "from Alexander
came
to
realities
of
historical
and
cultural
be
homoge
diversity
nized into The West'."5

led to
The construction of a homogenized Other consequently
a
of
held
the collective
(Islamic)
(re)construction
commonly
importance of mythology in societies
mythology of revolt. The
animated, in part at least, by
undergoing revolutionary upheavals
has been amply demonstrated
the Self/Other dichotomy
by
as logically coherent
symbolic
scholarly research.
Ideologies,
link "the cognitive and
constructions of common mythologies,
evaluative
perception
of one's
social
condition
... to a
program
of
alteration or transformation
collective action for themaintenance,
of society."6 When
arguments for the
supplying compelling
alteration or transformation of institutions, customs, rites and
beliefs, especially at moments of revolutionary crisis, mythology
elevates
communal
self-consciousness
in
sharp
and
radical
In thisway revolutionary
contradistinction to other-consciousness.7
movements seek to rejuvenate the communal self-identity by a new
set of enchantments. This mythology, itsmethod and manner of
persuasion, and the modes and modalities of public participation
in itwere central to the build-up of the revolutionary momentum
both before and after the 1979 ascendancy of the Iranian 'ulama
(religious scholars) to power.
The primary aim of this study is to examine the substance of
revolutionary Iran's "mythology of rage" which the Iranian regime
utilized in order to mobilize
society against the Other, thereby
the
and
identity of the injured Self. The
reinvigorating
reasserting
discussion will focus on one mythological construct: the "Karbala
that is, the martyrdom suffered by the third Imam
paradigm,"

Mythology
ofRage
Husayn ibn 'Ali and his followers on the tenth day ('Ashura) of the
Muslim month of Muharram, AD 680, at Karbala, in an extremely
uneven battle against the army of the Ummayad caliph Yazid ibn
no other single event in
Mu'awiya.8 As will be seen, perhaps
Islamic history has played so central a role in shaping sectarian
Shi'ite identity and communal sense as the martyrdom of Husayn
at Karbala.9 Equally meaningful
and his companions
in its
this
narrative
Iranian
(or mythological
contemporary
garb,
construct) portrays an exemplary revolutionary way of life, a
paradigm of revolutionaryIslamic self-identity,inwhich one sacrifices
one's life for a common cause: resisting an all-powerful enemy - with a view to
a homogenized
Other, "the West"
rescuing the
Shi'ite Iranian Self from contemporary obscurity, decadence
and
irrelevance.
As may have been gathered by now, for the present study I have
only concerned myself with the question of how Iranian self
(re) constructed and articulated from above
identity has been
without giving due attention to the equally
significant and
perplexing question of how this enterprise has been received and

acted upon from below.Yet although the discussion to follow largely
excludes
the "voices from below,"
I do believe
that official
are
means
no
states
to
of
what
is
in
theminds
ideologies
by
guides
of even themost loyal citizens or supporters. To borrow from Eric
J.Hobsbawm's
piercing observation about nations and nationalism,
Iran's revolutionary ideology is "a dual phenomenon],
construc
ted essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless
also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions,
hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people...."10
The Karbala
Paradigm:
to a Conquering
Self
From
Vanquished
- the
supreme Shi'ite martyr, "the Lord of the
as he came to be
al-Shuhada)
Martyrs" (Sayyid
collectively known
- is the tormented hero of Twelver Shi'ism
par excellence.When
the
cosmic
of
the
Shi'a believe that
considering
problem
suffering,
Imam Husayn
endured the greatest "martyrdom inGod's way" (shahadat

fi-sabil Allah). His suffering at the hands of the Ummayad
army
came to symbolize the historical injustice that was committed
Husayn

69
Haggay Ram
of the Prophet Muhammad.11
Imam
against the household
of
Twelver
Husayn's martyrdom therefore became ^origin
myth
Shi'ism. Insofar as it lays the foundation for the "structure of
reality" and provides the "exemplary models of human behav
ior,"12 it "pulls together in a universal way anxieties and suffering
on
several dimensions
and
attempts to present acceptable
solutions."13
70
the Karbala paradigm

is - to paraphrase
the
Consequently,
renowned anthropologist Branislaw Malinowski - a living reality
in primeval times (the dawn of
believed to have once happened
Islam), and continuing ever since to influence the Shi'a and its
human destinies. "It is not symbolic but rather a direct expression
of reality."14 As one
scholar of Iranian culture vividly put it:
In the Shiite scheme of the universe, there is a time in

which there is no time and a space in which there is no
to Husayn thirteen centuries ago
space. What happened
is repeated today whenever and wherever Shiites live and
find themselves oppressed.15
Indeed, all human history is pictured as a continuous

struggle
between the forces of evil and the forces of good. In every age
there is an oppressed Husayn, a man who fights on the side of
God, and a tyrannical Yazid, who fights against God. The Karbala
paradigm thusmade the struggle between the injured Self and the
oppressive Other a perpetual reality in the Shi'a collective self
consciousness; hence the well-known Shi'ite motto: "every place is
and every day is 'Ashura."
that
for many centuries the traditions and hagiography
on the 'Ashura episode
had reinforced political
elaborated
and submissiveness among the Shi'a. In
passivity, acquiescence
a Shi'ite self-image of a vanquished,
to
worked
short, they
forge
to give effective battle against
and
unable
helpless
powerless sect,
Karbala
Yet
the Other,
let alone change its own plight for the better. To
we need to turn to the "operative
this
phenomenon
explain
of the Husayn myth,
the
behavioral,"16
exemplary, dimension
the faithful with a practical
insofar as it has always provided
guideline for coming to grips with reality.

ofRage
Mythology
It is said that Napoleon
"at the period of his Eastern exploits ...
himself
with Alexander;
confounded
while after he
mythically
T am
turned his face westward he is said to have declared:
In
other
human
words,
beings, especially in the
Charlemagne'."17
most crucial hours of their lives, have recourse to mythological
constructs from which to draw inspiration for and justify theirmost
meaningful activities.18 The Shi4a had equally drawn on theHusayn
narrative to acquire the means - the paradigm - to come to grips
with their dire reality. Yet for the most part, the courageous
conduct of Imam Husayn, his exemplary ideals and values, were
far less important to the faithful than his actual defeat and brutal
death. Almost all Shi'ite sources - early and late ones - indicate
that:
... there were found on the

body of Husayn
thirty-three
stabs of the spear and thirty-four strikes with the sword,
and his body was riddled with arrows like a porcupine....
It seems thatHusayn was killed gradually, so to speak, first
by randomly shot arrows, then by wounds inflicted upon
him by stones and strikes of the swords from those passing
by....
At
last...
one
man
ran
and
dealt
him
a blow
with
his
sword which severed his left shoulder. Another man

stabbed him in the back and he fell on his face. It is not
clear who finally cut offHusayn's head.19
heroic conduct notwithstanding, his ultimate defeat

Husayn's
continually exemplified to his partisans the futility of immediate
and concrete action to overcome their predicament. Disillusioned
and, as a result of Husayn's
failure, invariably acted upon by the
(Sunni) authorities, the Shi'ite Self became submerged in an all
encompassing
passivity, directing its hopes for salvation to the
miraculous
intervention of the twelfthHidden
Imam - the Mahdi
- who would
reappear at an indeterminate point in the future to
redeem his tormented believers. Indeed, such messianic
expec
the Shi'ites to endure under difficult circum
tations "helped
stances pending the return of theMahdi....
[They] did not require
the Shi'ites to oppose the establishment actively."20
What reinforced the passivity and submissiveness of the Shi'a was
to Imam Husayn as promoter of
the prominent role accorded

71
Haggay Ram
72
to a dominant
tradition in the
otherworldlysalvation. According
Shi4 a, all the Imams had died martyrs (with the exception of the
twelfth in their line who, as stated, is to return from his occulted
state of being as the expected Messiah).21 Having borne witness to
faith by dying in God's way (giving themselves over to be slain in
to
witness of, or to uphold, the Truth), the Imams had ascended
the most sublime station in paradise - the one nearest to God's
throne and called dar al-shuhada ("the abode of the martyrs").22
In this station the Imams serve as intercessors (shufa'd), urging
God to grant true believers the reward of eternal bliss in paradise.

Imam Husayn, however, has occupied a more eminent position in
paradise than his fellow Imams. After all, he is regarded as "Lord
of the Martyrs," whose great earthly sacrifice proved his staunch
and unequaled devotion toGod. The importance of Imam Husayn
as the advocate of otherworldly (not worldly) redemption was thus
viewed
as
supreme.23
But even as an interceder, Imam Husayn was unable to help the

if they were not proved
faithful attain eternal bliss in paradise
It
of
such
reward.
be
recalled, Imam Husayn's mythical
may
worthy
...
but with what happens
time deals "not with what happened
in
there
is
element
the
action";24
[with]
"only
typical recurring
'the eternal return,' the constantly repeated cycle, the endless
followers had
round."25 Thus, for many years Imam Husayn's
found it appropriate to recreate - or repeat - his anguish, mainly
through self-flagellation and the staging of passion plays during
the month of Muharram.26 Proving worthy of the Imam's inter
cession meant that the faithful should constantly reenact his grief
and suffering on 'Ashura.As the eighth Imam 'Ali al-Riza reported
ly reassured his partisans:
... he who takes the

as the day of his
day of Ashura
afflictions and grief and weeping, God would make the
day of resurrection a day of joy and exaltation, and we
of the Prophet]
shall be a comfort and
[the Household
in
him
for
Paradise.27
security
It may be argued, then, that the Ashura episode was one of the
main causes of the "notorious political passivity" of the Shi'ites
during the greater part of their history.28 It thereby inhibited

Mythology ofRage
to truly overcome
genuine faith in the capacity of the Shi'ite Self
greater oppressive powers.
In 1968 a religious scholar from the holy city of Qom, Salihi
a book
entitled Shahid-e Javid
(The
Najaf-Abadi,
published
Immortal Martyr). The work at once triggered a heated debate
among religious circles as itwas the first serious, daring and semi
character of the
scholarly attempt to transform the quiescent
an
oriented
drama. A
into
Karbala
active, worldly
paradigm
than five hundred
detailed discussion of this volume of more
pages would take us far beyond our subject. It suffices to note that
the principal aim of the work was the politicization of an aspect of
the Shi'ite Imamology which "until recent times was generally
interpreted in mystical, lyrical and emotional terms";29 that is to
say, the author viewed Imam Husayn plainly as an exemplary hero
who combined readiness for self-sacrifice with political wisdom. He

thus sought to establish that Imam Husayn's defeat was far less
- was
important than his heroism, which
though unique
nevertheless not above the capacity of ordinary mortals.30
The appearance of this book in 1968 might seem an insignificant
event, despite its great influence on militant Shi'ite circles. Yet it
it was indicative of the profound
is worthy of mention because
transformation that occurred during the 1960s in representations
of the Karbala paradigm and, as a result, in the image of the
Shi'ite-Iranian
Self. No doubt, it was in direct relation to this
transformation that a study of the messages
transmitted in the
ceremonies commemorating
the martyrdom of Imam Husayn led
Gustav Thaiss to observe in 1972 that "while at a high level of
itmight be correct to say ... that the twelver Shi'a
generalization
have been content with being observersof the political scene rather
than originators of political movements,
it is no longer fair to
make
this
assumption."31
Indeed, at the beginning of the 1960s one could

a qualitative change in the contents and features
passion plays, in the orations delivered during
them and, most importantly, in the
accompanying
already discern
of the 'Ashura
the procession
image of Imam
Husayn:
'Ashura was being converted from a memorial

day
the martyrdom
of Husayn, whose
sacrifice
extolling
The

73
Haggay Ram
the believers who mourn him, into an outraged
(not mournful)
birthday commemoration
by believers
united in communion with Husayn' s heroism and willing
ness to sacrifice.... [T]he believers [were] called upon not
to lament Husayn, but to emulate him by following in his
path and waging battle against the tyrannical Yazids of
their own time.32
redeems
74
The
Shi'ite ethos of passivity and accommodation

mediated
through the Karbala paradigm made way for an activist-revolution
ary approach that rejects fatalism and such notions as the immuta
bility of reality. In a radical break with the past, the faithful were
called upon to follow in the footsteps of theirmartyred Imam and
to be willing to offer their lives in the struggle against injustice and
tyranny.As a mythological, exemplary hero laying the foundation
for the behavior of human beings, Husayn

inspired his modern
followers to abandon their passivity and take an active role in the
self had set out
shaping of their own destiny. The Shi'ite-Iranian
to reassert its identity, to take vengeance, at long last, against the
oppressive
The
Other.
Karbala
Paradigm:
The
Self Subdues
the Other
The Iranian revolution of 1978/79 has been characterized as

"the ultimate passion play of the Karbala paradigm."33 Indeed, in
in white
of people
Muharram
1978 a multitude
(December)
shrouds took to the streets in demonstration of their willingness to
be martyred in the struggle against the "Yazid of the Age" - the
traditional
Reza Pahlavi. The
Iranian monarch, Muhammad
turned
massive
'Ashura
into
had
of
political
mourning processions
in Tehran alone the protest march attracted nearly two
marches;
clear that the monarchy
million people,34 and it soon became
drama was being re
The
Ashura
would not last much
longer.
one
the
Self had prevailed
difference:
albeit
with
created,
major
succeeded where he had
over the Other. Triumphant, Husayn
failed thirteen centuries previously. As Ayatollah Khomeini asserted
1978:
shortly before these events, in November

Mythology
ofRage
With the approach of Muharram, we are about to begin
the month of epic heroism and self-sacrifice - the month
in which blood triumphed over the sword ... the month
that has taught successive generations throughout history
the path of victory over the bayonet... themonth inwhich
the forces of Yazid
and
the stratagems
of Satan
are
defeated.35
- the
contemporary "Yazid of the Age"
oppressive Other
against whom the injured Self had finally revolted by no means
comprised the royalist forces only. True, in the 1978/79 revolution
the key enemy was the royal dynasty, but thiswas a shah associated
with total westernization
and the undermining
of the practical
sense
culture
of
and
its
of
Islam
moral
religious
responsibility
cultural and political
toward social, economic,
conditions.36
Indeed, the Islamic Revolution was, in several respects, ignited by
a deep revulsion against what appeared to be the social and moral
breakdown engendered by unregulated rationalism and unbridled
37
The
progress.
during the latter half of the twentieth century Iranian

had
found it increasingly difficult to withstand the "West
society
ern onslaught"
precipitated by the shah's "White Revolution"
reform program. The imposition ofWestern paradigms drove the
Shi'ite-Iranian Self to alienation and rootlessness. Writing in the
early 1960s, the celebrated Iranian intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad
in the following passage:
epitomized this predicament
Thus,
We
have
been
unable
to
preserve
our
character in the face of the [Western]

fateful onslaught. Rather, we have been
been unable to take a considered stance
contemporary monster. So long as we do
historico-cultural
machine
and its
routed. We have
in the face of this
not comprehend
the real essence, basis, and philosophy ofWestern civili
zation, only aping theWest outwardly and formally ...we
shall be like the ass going about in a lion's skin.We know
what became of him.38
What thus deeply animated the revolutionary movement were the
real and assumed grievances against the all-out westernization of

75
Haggay Ram
in turn, led to the imaginative construction of a
a wide assemblage of
hostile Other, "the West":
homogenized
individuals and ethnic
states, government agencies, organizations,
the deeply
groups, all of which were seen to be undermining
rooted Islamic values, norms, morality and behavior patterns of the
Iranian Self.39 As we shall see, the recurring nature of Imam
Husayn's mythical time would ensure the endurance, with great
force and fury, of the struggle between the "Yazid of the Age"
(the Self).
(the Other) and the "Husayn of the Age"
Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been
challenged by manifold internal and external crises that seriously
threatened to hinder the stability of the clerical regime. These
crises were invariably traced to what the Iranian regime itself
"alien
terms, "foreign hands,"
called, among other analogous
This
and
"servants
of
influence"
vocabulary, as
imperialism."
a
"treats
Iranian
Abrahamian
Ervand
contends,
politics as puppet
- local
the
marionettes
show in which foreign powers control
at
the
"The
West"
times
by invisible strings."40
politicians
Iranian
at
the
times
the
Iranian
other
United States,
opposition,
Kurdish minority, the Iraqi Ba'th party, the Saudi monarchy, Israel,
to overthrow the newly
Salman Rushdie, etc. - has reemerged
Self.
Shi'ite-Iranian
of
the
acquired victory
the Islamic government was
Repeatedly harassed by "the West,"
arouse the
to
the
Karbala
invoke
paradigm in its attempt to
quick
re-create
to
and
the
Islamic
the
heroism
revolutionary
public
identity of Imam Husayn. In this collective remembrance of things
Iran. These,
76
past as things present, in this extension of the reconstructed

"sacred history" into contemporary realities, the Iranian Self was
the "neo
to maintain
its battle against the Other,
obliged
was
to
reassert
and
revitalize
its
the
If
Iranian
Self
Yazid(s)."
to
was
to
take
in
its
endeavor
it
also
vengeance
persist
identity
against "the West" by re-creating the heroism, sacrifice and activist
commitment which Imam Husayn had displayed thirteen centuries
In short, the Iranian Self was to emerge as the
ago at Karbala.
modern embodiment of Imam Husayn par excellence.Given that the
to date, the most serious external
Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was,
crisis that befell the Islamic Republic, the remainder of this article
will focus on the efforts to reassert Iranian self-identity through the
invocation of the Karbala paradigm during that eight-year conflict.

ofRage
Mythology
A most typical pattern discernible throughout the Iran-Iraq war
was the insistent call on Iranian combatants to display a "Husayn
like spirit of martyrdom" as the only means of gaining victory in
the war. The combatants were urged to exhibit an unflinching
were to be
aspiration to become martyrs. They
willing to be "slain
in the field of sacrifice and jihad" \ they
with no apprehension
should "gratuitously shed their own blood for the removal of the
and persist in their desire
curtains of darkness and oppression,"
to become martyrs "for the country of the revolution and for the
land of Islam."41 Should their thirst for the "elixir of martyrdom"

remain unquenched,
tears" and
they should "cry," "shed
to
to
their
take
them
officers
this or that
"implore"
superior
along
so
that
become
theymay
operation
martyrs.42
Extensive portions of soldiers' last wills and testaments were
in Iranian newspapers
(and recited in the
regularly reproduced
across
the
weekly Friday congregational prayers
country) with a
to emulate their
view to substantiating the troops' determination
martyred Imam. The following last will
reportedly drafted in
October
1980 just before the soldier's final battle - should
illustrate the thrust of most of them: the martyr-to-be begins by
imploring his mother to accept' 'with an understanding heart'' his
decision tomeet death. His martyrdom, the soldier writes, should
be easily accepted since he would suffer it "in the way of God, for
The soldier then expresses his
religion and for the homeland."
for
that
his
quest
hope
martyrdom would be crowned with success.
Indeed, he writes, "I was close" to attaining this goal "many a
I am not worthy of being a
time," but to no avail. "Perhaps
martyr,"
he
exclaims,
"because
martyr
has
an
exalted
and
sublime position," while "I am sinful and despised." The soldier

then declares that he will proceed to the front "not for revenge,
but for the revival of my faith and the advancement
of my
revolution." He
be
"sweeter
than
signs his will by asserting that his own pain would

honey."43
lacking were appeals to Iranian families to encourage

their children to set out to the front equipped with the determi
nation to follow in the footsteps of Imam Husayn. Parents should
in their martyr-child, not grieve or moan, but be
"take pride"
"cheerful."44 Furthermore, if their child was martyred they should
send another child to the war at once "so that the place of the
Also not

77
Haggay Ram
martyr would not remain vacant."45 Implying that Iranian families
were indeed eager to make such sacrifices in the war, Hojjat al
Islam ("Proof of Islam" - a clerical rank below that of ayatollah)
'AliAkbar Hashemi Rafsanjani related to the congregation of the
Tehran Friday congregational prayers the following story about a
father who had come to claim the corpse of his son:
of the shahid (martyr) was severed ... [by] the
Saddams.... We brought his corpse to Isfahan. The father
came, wanting to see his child. At firstwe did not allow
him. Later he was told the corpse had no head. The
father replied: "It makes no difference." Approaching
and seeing the corpse, he placed his lips on the separated
head and kissed it.There was not even the slightest sign
of emotion on his face. He said: "My God! I thank my
child, my son, for becoming a martyr in the way of God.
The
78
head
was
He
in the
martyred
same
way
as
Imam
Husayn.46
As discussed previously, rejuvenating the injured Iranian Self vis

of
often involved the annulment
a-vis the oppressive Other
is
the
into
which
time
and
mythical time,
entering
chronological
at once
both
pulling
war
Iran-Iraq
Thus,
often
and
"contemporary"
down of time and

emerged
beginning
named
as
space barriers,
I,"
"Karbala
a result
As
battle
this
of Karbala.
Iranian war campaigns
II,"
of
the twentieth-century
the seventh-century
in the mid-1980s,
"Karbala
"primordial".
"Karbala
III,"
and
were
so on,
as rahiyan-e Karbala
Iranian recruits were branded
or
on
are
to
their
embark
who
about
("those
journey to Karbala")
karavan-e Karbala ("the caravan of Karbala").47 That the Iran-Iraq
war was to become the Karbala episode itself- the very same battle
that had taken place on 'Ashura thirteen centuries ago - is attested
in
by the following words of Hojjat al-Islam Sayyid 'Ali Khamenehi
which he totally identified between the two occurrences. Note how
he shifts so naturally from past to present and how the two
while
new
events
separate
eventually
become
one.
Ashura,
Khamenehi
announced,
is the day in our glorious history when the bodies

stainless martyrs were still lying on the bereaved

of our
soil of
Mythology ofRage
the day when ... the eternally kindled torch of
martyrdom was trampled under the boots of the brutal
Yazidi animals.... And the [tenth] of our Muharram,
that
Karbala,
is
... Iran's
Ashura
and
... Iran's
Karbala,
is similar
to
the
[Ashura] of the Husayni Karbala. The corpses of our

martyrs have not yet been properly assembled.
[They are]
... those resolved [men] who have, for the love of [their]
religion and God, shielded themselves with their breasts
against the enemy's bullets.... O our beloved martyrs! O
our sacrificing children!... Your memory is alive in our
minds
and hearts. Our
Ashura
is today.48
With the Iran-Iraq conflict thus emerging as a "second Karbala,"

the warring factions - the oppressive Other and the injured Self were equated with the corresponding
protagonists of the Husayn
narrative.
elevated
consciousness,
In
such
in a
a manner
sharp
and
rejuvenating
the
Iranian
was
self-consciousness
radical
contradistinction
Iranian
communal
identity.
to other
Conse
quently, the Iraqi ruler Saddam Husayn was styled as "Saddam

Yazid," just as the Iranian shah before him had been labeled
"Shah-Yazid."49
Still, the contemporary Yazid differed from the
in one important
original seventh-century Yazid ibn Mu'awiya
a
more
that
him
made
detested
and
respect
ignoble foe. On
Ashura, itwas explained, Yazid had had no masters, "but today
of Iraq has a master - global arrogance
Saddam-Yazid
(estekbar)
and the criminal United States are his masters which give him
orders."50
Not surprisingly, the injured Iranian Self assumed (and became

completely submerged in) the identity of Husayn and his partisans.
"We are not the people of Kufa," Rafsanjani proclaimed, referring
to that town's inhabitants whose
last-minute betrayal of Imam
the disproportionate
balance of power
Husayn had compounded
that had secured the defeat of his revolt.51 Indeed, Rafsanjani
on another occasion,
the Iranian armed forces are
proclaimed
"now part of that group that had followed Abi

"The massive
Husayn]."
[part] of the population
are
he concluded.52 Or
him,"
majority,
following
'Abd-Allah [i.e.
... the decisive
in the words of
another Iranian leader, "today the sons of Husayn [i.e. the Iranian
... have
people]
brought [Husayn's] presence to the arena. This

79
Haggay Ram
80
presence is of a nation standing against the [entire] political and

military machineries of the world." The Iranian people, he added,
are "proving that they are sons of Husayn pursuing Husayn's
goal"; they are "the troops of Husayn ibn 'Ali on 'Ashura."53
Assuming the heroic revolutionary identity, ideals and values of
the "Husayni Movement,"
the injured Iranian Self was thus bound
to triumph over the Other and regain itsown identity of grandeur
and splendor. What, then, was the so-called "secret weapon"
of
victory?
secret of the victory of Abraham,
the secret of the
victory of Moses, the secret of the victory of the Prophet
of Islam ... and the secret of the great victories of Husayn
... is found in one issue,
and the Islamic Revolution
namely, that people among the servants of God have been
... in order to achieve
willing to sacrifice their lives
must
We
[therefore] guard this spirit of
martyrdom....
The
martyrdom-seeking.54
Conclusion
Does the Karbala paradigm confirm the proposition that Shi'ite
in a perpetual to-and-fro, in
Iranian history has been developing
an endless repetition of the same pattern? Does
this collective
remembrance of things past as things present, this extension of the
reconstructed
"sacred
history"
into
contemporary
Iranian
realities,
of Iranian history? By
testimony to the cyclical movement
have
successive generations
the
Husayn drama,
constantly invoking
of the Shi'a been captivated by images and expressions from the
on the basis of pregiven
past, acting out their historical roles
in a repeated cycle,
In
locked
themselves
have
short,
they
scripts?
in an "eternal return" of their own past makings and their own
bear
past experiences?55
An affirmative answer to these questions would verifyKarl Marx's
of history as a story of defeat and dis
view of the movement
and
of
ideology as a system of (symbolic) represen
appointment;
tations which "serves to sustain existing relations of class domina
tion by orienting individuals towards the past rather than the
future, or towards images and ideals which conceal class relations

Mythology ofRage
and detract from the collective pursuit of social change."56 Yet, the
active and militant representations of the Husayn drama which
- in and
emerged in the course of the 1960s
by themselves a
radical break from mainstream Shi'a thought and praxis until that
time - render the Marxian dictum untrue, at least in its Iranian
context. The new image of Husayn,
the Shi'a with
endowing
a
Islamic
and
vision
of
the
future, clearly
revolutionary
self-identity
shows that events are not caught up in images from the past,
ensnared by traditions which persist in spite of the continuing
transformation of what Marx would call thematerial conditions of
life.
The revolutionary account of the Karbala paradigm
is by no
means determined by - nor is it tantamount to a return to - the
pristine Shi'ite-Islamic past. An "invented tradition," it is rather a

mirror image of the contemporary historical setting, an expression
correct in
of prevailing
circumstances.57 Marx was perhaps
in
of
that
observing
precisely
periods
revolutionary crisis "the
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on
the brain of the living."58 Yet we cannot infer from this that in
societies characterized
consciousness
the social
by mythical
structure is viewed as "a sacred and timeless order which is
sanctified by the myths that explain its importance and origin."59
Indeed, at the verymoment when human beings are involved in
creating their own history, in undertaking unprecedented tasks, they
draw back before the risks and uncertainties of such an enterprise
and invoke representations which assure them of their continuity
with the past. At the very moment when continuity is threatened,
"they invent a past which restores calm."60 Thus in revolutionary
Iran - to borrow from Marx once again - people may very well
"conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow
from them names, battle cries and costumes."61 Yet in this shuttle
which shoots back and forth across the loom of time there is
manifestly a developing design and not simply an endless repe
tition of the same pattern. Arnold J. Toynbee's metaphor of the
wheel offers an illustration of "recurrence being concurrent with
progress."
The movement
of the wheel is admittedly repetitive in
relation to the wheel's own axle, but ... the fact that the

81
Haggay Ram
vehicle, which is the wheel's raison d'etre, can only move in
virtue of the wheel's circular movement
round its axle
does not compel the vehicle to travel like a merry-go
round
in a circular
track.62
seems to refute the

discussion
of the Husayn
drama
conservative Orientalist
literature, which presents the issue of
"Islam" as an essentialist, monolithic determinant and atemporal
category.63 Indeed, the fluidity of the Karbala paradigm, shaped
and reshaped by the Shi'ite community in response to changing
historical circumstances and emerging as a dramatic catalyst for
The
82
action
revolutionary
tive Shi'ite practices
in stark
in
"fundamentalism"
Iran
to
contrast
- illuminates
and
past,
passive-accommoda
the very modernity

not
and
elsewhere,
of Islamic
its "archaic"
nature.
the recon
During the struggle against the Pahlavi monarchy,
of
version
the
'Ashura
narrative
structed, revolutionary
helped
unite disparate
interest groups into a mass movement
against
entrenched
tyranny.
Once
in power,
the
'ulama
harnessed
the
Karbala paradigm to its campaign of keeping revolutionary zeal at

fever pitch during various phases of the revolution. The regime
the war
invoked the myth in virtually all political crises.64 Once
was
in
reactivated
full
the
force,
Husayn myth
against Iraq began,
becoming the focus of most anti-Iraqi mobilization.
Still, practically all references to the Karbala paradigm met an
war in July 1988 as "[eco
abrupt end with the conclusion of the
the order of the
nomic and social] reconstruction has become
the
dissatisfaction
among many Iranians with
day."65 Indeed,
in the economy, the
the deterioration
unfulfilled expectations,
the
haves
and
the have-nots, the
between
alienation
growing
in
basic
commodities, all these and more
overwhelming shortages
the
Islamic
government with perhaps the most serious
presented
was the very support of a disillusioned
all.
At
stake
of
challenge
a
for
that
had raised expectations for relief and
regime
populace
material improvement. The militant version of the Husayn drama
was obviously unfit to meet
this challenge. A new rhetorical
discourse
was
thus
required,
one
that
sanctified
a more
"positive"
rather than de
for construction and rehabilitation
approach
struction and injury. For that, as Michael Fischer has noted, "one

Mythology ofRage
had to shift to earlier portions of the paradigm of the family of the
Prophet and to the principles of social justice associated with the
name of [the first Shi'i Imam/fourth Muslim Caliph]
'Ali."66
Since the late 1980s, then, the Karbala paradigm has lostmuch
of its relevance and has been, to a large extent, locked back in the
the future holds for the myth, in

Iranian cultural bottle. What
whatever form and content, is obviously contingent on the
changing circumstances and on the regime's shifting strategies.
However, we may already gain partial insight into this perplexing
question through the anthropologist Mary Hegland's

investigation
of what the Karbala paradigm meant to Iranian villagers during
and after the 1978/79 revolutionary upheaval. Postrevolutionary
'Ashuramarchers, she claims, "chanted both traditional mourning
there emerged, in
couplets and revolutionary couplets." Hence
one Iranian village at least, "symbiotic ideologies" - the one of
"Husain as intercessor" and the other of "Husain as [a revolution
ary] example."67 Time will tell whether or not, or for how long,
this accommodation
will last. Yet, given the Karbala paradigm's
innate ability to adapt to the vicissitudes of time and its everlasting
interpretive and exemplary powers, it is clear that, in the near or
distant future, the collective memory of the Shi'ite-Iranian Self will
grant entrance to yet other updated versions of the myth. Revolu
tionary
open
or
otherwise,
the
qualitative
themes
of
these
versions
to debate.

are
83
Haggay Ram
Notes
84
to
I wish
thank
Israel
to read
schedule
for
Gershoni
the manuscript
and
of a very
comments
time out
taking
offer helpful
busy
and
criticisms.
1 Jon
and
Foucault
Simons,
thePolitical
and New
(London
York,
2.
1995),
Prison (NewYork,
2 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
1979), 170.
3 Hamid Dabashi, TheologyofDiscontent: The IdeologicalFoundation of the
Islamic
in Iran
Revolution
(New
York
and
London,
1993),
5.
507.
Ibid.,
5 Ibid.
6 William
A. Mullins,
The American
7
Paul
Lectures
Ricoeur,
York, 1986), 137.

8
The
term
in Political
of Ideology
the Concept
510.
Science Review 66 (1972):
"On
Political
is borrowed
on
Ideology
and Utopia,
from Michael
toRevolution
MA,
and
ed. George
H.
Science,"
J. Fisher,
Iran from Religious
London,
1980).
(Cambridge,
to Trace
"An
9 Yitzhak
Nakash,
Attempt
Die Welt des Islams 33 (1993):
'Ashura',"
Nations
10 Eric J. Hobsbawm,
and Nationalism
of
the Origin
(New
Taylor
Dispute
the Rituals
of
161.
since 1780:
Programme,
Myth,
Reality (Cambridge, 1990), 10.

11 See my book, Myth andMobilization inRevolutionaryIran: The Use of the
Friday
12 Mircea
61-69.
Sermon
D.C.,
1994),
(Washington,
the Encounter
Dreams
and Mysteries:
Myths,
15.
Faiths
and Archaic Realities
(New York,
1979),
Congregational
between
Eliade,
Contemporary
13
Fischer,
14
Branislaw
Iran,
175.
Malinowski,
Magic,
Science
and
Religion
and
(Boston, 1948), 78-79.

15 Peter Chelkowski, "In Ritual and Revolution: The
Transformation
of Iranian
Culture,
Views
10
(Spring
Other
Image
1989):
Essays
in the
8.
16 Emmanuel Sivan, Arab PoliticalMyths (Tel Aviv, 1988), 10 (inHebrew).

17 Thomas
Mann,
"Freud
and
the Future,"
in Henry
A. Murray,
ed., Myth
andMythmaking (New York, 1960), 373.

18 Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality (New York, 1963), 6.
19 Mahmoud Ayoub, RedemptiveSufferingin Islam: A Study of theDevotional

Mythology ofRage
20
in Twelver Shi'ism
Aspects of Ashura'
Abdulhussein
Abdulaziz
Sachedina,
Mahdi
21
The
Idea
of the
in TwelverShi'ism (Albany,NY, 1981), 78-79.

M.
Roger
118-19.
(The Hague,
1978),
Islamic Messianism:
Ideological
of Ithna Ashari
Export
in David Menashri,
"The
Savory,
Background,"
Shi'ism:
Historical
The
ed.,
Iranian
and
Revolu
tionand the
Muslim World (Boulder, CO, 1990), 36.
22 W.
The Encyclopaedia
"Shahid,"
Bjorkman,
1st edition
of Islam,
(Leiden,
1960).
23
The
meant
what Husayn's
death
investigated
Hegland
in
which
reflected
both
their
villagers,
large part
were
and what
told by the ulama.
Before
the
they
being
was
on
as an interceder
for people
placed
Husayn
emphasis
:
See her article "Two
Accommodation
and
Images of Husain
Mary
anthropologist
to Iranian
experiences
revolution
with God.
in an
Revolution
in Iran:
Politics
Iranian
Shi'ism
in Nikki
Village,"
R. Keddie,
to Revolution
from Quietism
and
ed., Religion
(New Haven,
1983),
218-35.
24
Frye, "New
116.
Mythmaking,
Directions
On
structure
Northrop
from Old,"
in Murray,
ed. Myth
and
25 John Knox, Myth and Truth (Charlottesville, 1964), 56.

26
the development,
see Peter
(ta'ziyeh),
and
subject
matter
Ritual
Chelkowski,
of the passion
play
and Drama
in Iran
ed., Ta'ziyeh:
of Ta'zieh
and Literary Aspects
York,
idem, "Dramatic
1979);
Passion
Khani
Iranian
Review
Literatures
2 (Spring
Play,"
ofNational
"A Full Arena:
and William
O. Beeman,
The Develop
121-37;
1971):
ment
and Meaning
of Popular
in Iran,"
Performances
in Michael
E.
(New
Bonine
Nikki
and
R.
Keddie,
eds.,
Modern
Iran:
The
Dialectics
of
Continuityand Change (Albany,NY, 1981), 361-81.

27 Cited In Ayoub, RedemptiveSuffering,151.
28
Hamid
Enayat,
Jurisconsult',"
"Khumayni's
Concept
in James Piscatori,
ed.,
Hamid
Modern
of
the
of the
'Guardianship
in thePolitical Process
(New
Islam
York, 1982), 174.

29
Enayat,
Islamic
Political
Texas,
(Austin,
Thought
1982),
194.
30 Salihi Najaf-Abadi, Shahid-eJavid: Husayn
ibnAli (Tehran, 1982) (in
Persian).
31
Gustav
Thaiss,
of Husain,"
"Religious
Symbolism
in Nikki R. Keddie,
ed.,
and
Social
Scholars,
Change:
and
Saints,
The
Drama
Sufis: Muslim
Middle East since 1500 (Berkeley, 1972), 358

Religious Institutionsin the
32
(emphasis
Emmanuel
Iranian
in the
original).
"Sunni
Sivan,
Revolution,"
(1989): 16-17.
Radicalism
International
in
Journal
the Middle
of Middle
East
East
and
the
Studies
21

85
Haggay Ram
33
Fischer,
34
Ervand
Iran,
183.
Iran
Abrahamian,
between Two
Revolutions
(Princeton,
1982),
522.
35
Rouhallah
M.
Islam
Khomeini,
and Revolution:
and Declarations
Writings
ofImamKhomeini (London, 1981), 243.

36 Nikki R. Keddie, "Is Shi'ism Revolutionary?" inNikki R. Keddie and
Eric Hooglund,
The Iranian
eds.,
Revolution
and
edition (Syracuse, 1986), 121.
86
37
the anti-Western,
On
of
Representations
of
Beeman,
the United
and Politics
in Iran, 191-217.
ed., Religion
A Plague from theWest,
Occidentosis:
Jalal Al-e Ahmad,
the
Islamic
the Great
"Images
in the Iranian
States
of
sentiment
anti-American,
mainly
see William
O.
Revolution,
rev.
the Islamic Republic,
Satan:
in
Revolution,"
Keddie,
38
39
ed. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, 1984), 31.

"
40
41
... is
categorized
and
'the
'The West'
'the noble'
pure,'
final
as
D.
Anthony
redemption."
must
realize
Smith,
Nations
Global Era (Cambridge, 1995), 82.
Ervand
Khomeinism:
Abrahamian,
al-Islam
Hojjat
Sayyid
'Ali Khamenehi
Tehran
Khotbe-ye Nemaz-efom'e-ye
of the sermons
of the Friday
on
Essays
(Los Angeles, 1993), 111.
(In
prayers
to which
in relation
the Other
elect'
trans. R.
Campbell,
their
43
44
in ibid.,
Khamenehi
10 Oct.
Ibid.,
vol.
29 Jan. 1982,
Keyhan,
in Khotbe,
Khamenehi
ibid., vol.
3, 9 Jan.
2, 3 Oct.
340-41.
1980,
and
See
the Islamic
Ettela'at,
vol.
2, 17 Oct.
in a
of Iran
Republic
in Dar Maktab-efome:
the ideology
of Friday:
of Tehran)
(hereafter
Majmu'a-ye
collection
Khotbe),
vol.
329-30.
1980,
also
and
and Nationalism
3 (Tehran, 1364 Sh.), 9 Jan. 1981, 52-54.
42
'the
true worth
the Tehran
1 Nov.
1980,
daily
newspapers
1980.
351.
See
also Khamenehi
in
52-53.
1981,
45 Hojjat al-Islam 'AliAkbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in ibid., vol. 4, 9 Apr.

1982, 346.
46
vol.
Ibid.,
Oct.
1980,
3, 14 Aug.
351-52.
1981,
354.
See
also Khamenehi
in ibid., vol.
2, 17
47 See Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the
Iran-IraqWar Conflict (New York and Oxford, 1988), 112; Ettela'at, 16
Nov. 1985 and 4 Jan. 1986; and Keyhan, 29 Mar. 1986.
48
Khotbe,
49
See,
vol.
2, 21 Nov.
for example,
1980,
Khamenehi
4, 30 Oct.
1981, 72.
50
Rafsanjani
in ibid.,
51
15 June
1985.
Ettela'at,
1981,
Khotbe, vol. 4, 30 Oct.
52
vol.
395-96.
in ibid., 26 Sep.
4, 30 Oct.
1981,
1980,
72.
70.

315,
and
ibid., vol.
Mythology ofRage
53
Khamenehi
in ibid.,
vol.
2,
14 Nov.
1980,
386.
54
Khamenehi
in ibid.,
vol.
3, 20 Mar.
1981,
138-40.
55 Mircea Eliade, TheMyth of theEternal Return, 9th edition (Princeton,

1991).
56 John B. Thompson, IdeologyandModern Culture (London, 1990), 41.
57
58
Cf.
Eric
Karl
and
Terence
Ranger,
eds.,
Mullins,
"The
of Louis
Brumaire
Eighteenth
A
Karl
Marx:
Reader
ed.,
1986),
(Cambridge,
of
"On
the
505.
Ideology,"
Concept
Marx,
"The
Marx,
Elster,
59
J. Hobsbawm
Tradition (Cambridge, 1983).
The
Invention
of
in J.
Bonaparte,"
277.
87
60 Thompson, Ideology,42 (emphasis in the original).

61
Eighteenth
Brumaire,"
277.
62 Arnold J.Toynbee, A StudyofHistory,abridgement of vols. 1-6 by D. C.

Somervell (New York and London, 1947), 253.
63 For a glimpse of Orientalist literatureof this kind, see H. A. R. Gibb,
Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (Oxford, 1962), reprinted with
some revisions in 1970; Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and theWest
(New York, 1970); idem, The Political Language ofIslam (Chicago and
comment
that "The whole
1988). Cf. Fred Halliday's
proposi
tion of an unchanging
and determinant
that is the
dogma
enduring
of so much
of the Orientalist
literature
is, in any comparative
premise
absurd."
"Orientalism
and
Its
British Journal
Critics,"
perspective,
of
London,
Middle Eastern Studies 20 (1993): 155.

64 See my book, Myth andMobilization inRevolutionaryIran, esp. 69-87.
65
David
66
67
Fischer,
Hegland,
Iran:
Menashri,
London,
A Decade
1990), 392.
Iran,
"Two
of War
and Revolution
(New
York
183.
Images
of Husain,"
232,
230.

and

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Mythology of Rage: Representations of the "Self" and the "Other" in Revolutionary Iran

Author(s): Haggay Ram

This content downloaded from 132.72.138.1 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 03:33:39 AM

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and ancient history, "the West"

nized into The West'."5

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perplexing question of how this enterprise has been received and

endured the greatest "martyrdom inGod's way" (shahadat

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the Karbala paradigm

scholar of Iranian culture vividly put it:

In the Shiite scheme of the universe, there is a time in

Indeed, all human history is pictured as a continuous

This content downloaded from 132.72.138.1 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 03:33:39 AM

... there were found on the

sword which severed his left shoulder. Another man

heroic conduct notwithstanding, his ultimate defeat

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God to grant true believers the reward of eternal bliss in paradise.

But even as an interceder, Imam Husayn was unable to help the

... he who takes the

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who combined readiness for self-sacrifice with political wisdom. He

Indeed, at the beginning of the 1960s one could

'Ashura was being converted from a memorial

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Shi'ite ethos of passivity and accommodation

for the behavior of human beings, Husayn

The Iranian revolution of 1978/79 has been characterized as

This content downloaded from 132.72.138.1 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 03:33:39 AM

during the latter half of the twentieth century Iranian

character in the face of the [Western]

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past as things present, in this extension of the reconstructed

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land of Islam."41 Should their thirst for the "elixir of martyrdom"

sublime position," while "I am sinful and despised." The soldier

signs his will by asserting that his own pain would

lacking were appeals to Iranian families to encourage

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As discussed previously, rejuvenating the injured Iranian Self vis

down of time and

Iranian war campaigns

is the day in our glorious history when the bodies

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[Ashura] of the Husayni Karbala. The corpses of our

and hearts. Our

With the Iran-Iraq conflict thus emerging as a "second Karbala,"

quently, the Iraqi ruler Saddam Husayn was styled as "Saddam

Not surprisingly, the injured Iranian Self assumed (and became

"now part of that group that had followed Abi

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presence is of a nation standing against the [entire] political and

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pristine Shi'ite-Islamic past. An "invented tradition," it is rather a

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seems to refute the

tive Shi'ite practices

the very modernity

Karbala paradigm to its campaign of keeping revolutionary zeal at

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the future holds for the myth, in