JUAN G. FELICIANO, ET AL., vs. MARIANO ALIPIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-5656, March 24, 1954

Although the petition filed is for declaratory relief, yet prays also for the issuance of a
permanent injunction, the same is equivalent to an action for prohibition and the court
should not dismiss the petition but should proceed with the case considering the action as
one for prohibition.
Facts:
The Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 20, series of 1951, which was regarding the power of
the Director of Public Schools to require all pupils and students in public schools to salute the flag, on
pain of being barred from admission to, or expelled from, such schools.
The petitioners filed before the CFI (now RTC) of Tarlac a petition for declaratory relief and mandatory
injunction, praying that the above circular be declared null and void, that preliminary injunction be
issued prohibiting the respondents Mariano Alipio and other teachers of the Malacampa Elementary
School, and the Director of Public Schools, from carrying out the provisions of said circular, and that,
after trial, the preliminary injunction be made permanent.
The Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that under section 2,
Rule 66, it was not a case in which a declaratory judgment could be rendered. The court dismissed the
case. Hence, the petitioners have appealed to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the CFI (RTC) erred in dismissing the case.
Ruling:
Yes.
The petition filed against the public officers is for declaratory relief, yet it also prays for the issuance of
a permanent injunction from carrying out the provisions of a Department Circular on the grounds of
unconstitutionality. The same is equivalent to an action for prohibition.
Prohibition is a special civil action seeking a judgment commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or
officer to desist from further proceeding in the action because it has no jurisdiction, is acting in excess
of jurisdiction or has gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (Sec.2, rule 65, RC)
As such, the court should not dismiss the petition but should proceed with the case considering the
action as one for prohibition. The order of the court dismissing the petition is reversed, and the case
returned to the CFI (now RTC) of Tarlac for further proceedings as in an action for prohibition.

Semirara Coal Corp., supra

A lawful possessor is entitled to be respected in his possession and any disturbance of
possession is a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
restore the possession.

Barayuga vs. Adventist University

GR no. 168008, Aug 17 2011
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave
abuse of discretion and will result to nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is
doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
Facts:
Adventist University of the Phils (AUP) is a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational
institution. Barayuga (Petitioner) was chosen Secretary and Private Respondent Dayson was the
elected Chairman of such University. Later on, Petitioner was elected President of the University as
well.
An audit of AUP was conducted which revealed that petitioner Barayuga had committed
serious violations of fundamental rules and procedure in the disbursement and use of funds of the
university. A further investigation was made and confirmed the findings of the said audit. The
petitioner was then informed of the findings and the Board of Trustees of the University required him to
explain. He was also reminded of the possible consequences should he fail to satisfactorily explain the
irregularities cited in the report. He replied that he had already prepared his written explanation.
The members of the board then voted to remove him as President because of his serious
violations of fundamental rules and procedures in the disbursement and use of funds as revealed by
the special audit.
The petitioner brought his suit for injunction and damages in the RTC, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), impleading AUP and its Board of Trustees,
represented by Respondent Dayson. He alleged that he was relieved as President without valid
grounds despite his five-year term by the Board of Trustees;
The respondents denied the allegations of the petitioner, and claimed that petitioners term of
office had expired on January 22, 2003, or two years from his appointment, based on AUPs amended
By-Laws which ; that such amended by-laws did not provide a 5-year term. that, consequently, he had
been a mere de facto officer appointed by the members of the Board of Trustees; and that he held no
legal right warranting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC issued the order granting the petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction. On herein
respondents appeal, CA rendered its decision reversing RTCs order.
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to the position of President of AUP
that could be protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.
Held: YES.
A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence submitted by the plaintif
establishing: (a) a present and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) the acts against which the
injunction is directed violate such right; and (c) a special and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damages. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ
constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result to nullification thereof. Where the complainants
right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage sans proof
of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.
In the case at bar, the petitioner rested his claim for injunction mainly
was entitled to serve for five years as President of AUP under its
Bluebook). In such book it was found that the officers, including the
powers vested by Section 2 of the amended By-Laws for a term of only

upon his representation that he

By-Laws (otherwise called the
President, were to exercise the
two years, not five years.

Ineluctably, the petitioner, having assumed as President of AUP on January 23, 2001, could serve for
only two years, or until January 22, 2003. By the time of his removal for cause as President on January
27, 2003, he was already occupying the office in a hold-over capacity, and could be removed at any
time, without cause, upon the election or appointment of his successor. His insistence on holding on to
the office was untenable, therefore, and with more reason when one considers that his removal was
due to the loss of confidence on the part of the Board of Trustees.
The order of the RTC granting his application for the writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with
manifestly grave abuse of discretion.

It is also worthy to note this part of the ruling: (hehe, pero I think the ruling above ang relevant sa topic) The
injunctive writ issued by the RTC was meant to protect the petitioners right to stay in office as President. Given
that the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-extensive with the duration of the act sought to be
prohibited, this injunctive relief already became moot in the face of the admission by the petitioner himself,
through his affidavit, that his term of office premised on his alleged five-year tenure as President had lasted only
until December 2005. In short, the injunctive writ granted by the RTC had expired upon the end of the term of
office (as posited by him).