Professional Documents
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No. 3:14-2304
Judge Todd J. Campbell
Magistrate Judge Brown
SECOND DEFENSE
Without waiving their affirmative and other defenses, Defendants respond to the
allegations and averments contained in the Complaint as follows:
In response to the paragraph identified as Roman numeral I and labeled
Introduction, Defendants deny that Plaintiff was assaulted at the Rutherford County
Sheriffs Department and Defendants deny that any action or inaction on their part
resulted in a violation of law.
1.
The averments set forth in paragraph number one (1) set forth a legal
conclusion to which no response is required, however, to the extent the same may be
construed as an averment of wrongdoing or violation of law on the part of the
Defendants, the same is denied.
2.
allegations set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint are alleged to have occurred at the
Rutherford County Sheriffs Department, but to the extent this averment implies that
there was any wrongdoing or violation of the law on the part of the Defendants, the
same is denied.
3.
belief as to the truth of the matter asserted in paragraph number three (3), and therefore
the same is denied.
4.
The averments set forth in paragraph number four (4) are admitted.
5.
The averments set forth in paragraph number five (5) are admitted.
6.
The averments set forth in paragraph number six (6) are admitted.
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7.
The averments set forth in paragraph number seven (7) are admitted.
8.
The averments set forth in paragraph number eight (8) are admitted in
part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff was ultimately delivered to the
Rutherford County Sheriffs Department on December 9, 2013, but Defendants are
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to where he was at the
time of his arrest or where he was taken prior to his delivery to the Rutherford County
Sheriffs Department.
9.
The averments set forth in paragraph number nine (9) are admitted.
10.
The averments set forth in paragraph number ten (10) are admitted.
11.
The averments set forth in paragraph eleven (11) are admitted. In further
response, when Plaintiff arrived at the Rutherford County Sheriffs Department he was
delivered in a Murfreesboro Police Department van which indicates that he had been
extremely combative, uncooperative, and aggressive with the arresting agency. Upon
arrival at the Rutherford County Sheriffs Department, officers with the Murfreesboro
Police Department requested that a four-point restraint chair be procured as Plaintiff
had been particularly violent, aggressive, and uncooperative in the arrest process. At
the time Plaintiff was placed in a four-point restraint chair, Plaintiff was extremely
aggressive, violent, combative, and noncompliant, placing both himself and the officers
involved in danger of physical harm.
12.
The averments set forth in paragraph number twelve (12) are denied. In
further response, at no point in time did the Plaintiff comply with all directions and
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirteen (13) are admitted in
part and denied in part. It is admitted that after Plaintiff was placed in a four-point
restraint chair and that Defendant Vanderveer sprayed him with a chemical agent
(Freeze + P), but it is denied that doing so caused severe pain. In further response, the
chemical agent was applied to Plaintiff after Plaintiff, who continued to be aggressive,
combative, violent and noncompliant, tried to escape the restraint chair and refused to
cooperate with attempts to secure Plaintiff in the restraint chair . Plaintiff, despite being
secured in the chair, through his violent, noncompliant, and combative actions,
managed to remove his leg from a restraint which required the deputies attending him
to attempt to secure his leg to the restraint chair. Plaintiff was able to rock and move the
restraint chair in the cell placing both himself and the deputies in danger. Plaintiff was
given multiple warnings and instructions to calm down and comply with the detention
officersefforts to re-secure his leg. Deputy Vanderveer instructed the Plaintiff that if he
did not place his leg back in the restraint chair and cooperate, he would be sprayed with
a chemical agent. Plaintiff continued to resist and fail to comply, at which time
Defendant Vanderveer applied a small burst of chemical agent to Plaintiff to secure his
compliance with the lawful order.
14.
The averments set forth in paragraph number fourteen (14) are denied. In
15.
The averments set forth in paragraph number fifteen (15) are admitted in
part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Green stood next to Plaintiff
while he was confined to the four-point restraint chair, but it is denied that Defendant
Vanderveer illegally administered a chemical agent into the eyes of the Plaintiff. In
further response, Defendants incorporate by reference their response to paragraph
number thirteen (13) of Plaintiffs Complaint.
16.
The averments set forth in paragraph number sixteen (16) are denied. In
further response, Plaintiff was examined by medical staff at the Rutherford County
Sheriffs Department following application of the chemical agent.
17.
The averments set forth in paragraph number seventeen (17) are admitted.
18.
The averments set forth in paragraph number eighteen (18) are denied.
19.
paragraphs.
20.
The averments set forth in paragraph number twenty (20) are denied.
21.
The averments set forth in paragraph number twenty-one (21) are denied.
22.
The averments set forth in paragraph number twenty-two (22) are denied.
23.
denied.
24.
The averments set forth in paragraph number twenty-four (24) are denied.
25.
The averments set forth in paragraph number twenty-five (25) are denied.
26.
The averments set forth in paragraph number twenty-six (26) are denied.
27.
denied.
28.
denied.
29.
paragraphs.
30.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty (30) are denied.
31.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-one (31) are denied.
32.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-two (32) are denied.
33.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-three (33) are denied.
34.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-four (34) are denied.
35.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-five (35) are denied.
36.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-six (36) are denied.
37.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-seven (37) are denied.
38.
The averments set forth in paragraph number thirty-eight (38) are denied.
39.
paragraphs.
40.
Any and all such other or further averments or allegations set forth in the
Complaint neither heretofore expressly admitted nor denied, and any and all averments
set forth in the Complaint that are inconsistent with the Defenses set forth in this
Answer, are hereby denied.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff was not deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the
United States Constitution or other Federal law.
FOURTH DEFENSE
The claims against Robert Arnold, James Vanderveer, and Jessica Green in their
official capacities are actions against Rutherford County itself. Campbell v. Anderson
County, 695 F. Supp. 2d 764, 770 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). A Section 1983 claim against a
governmental entity cannot be based on a theory of vicarious liability. Rather,
Rutherford County may only be sued under Section 1983 for an unconstitutional or
illegal municipal policy or custom and not for the unconstitutional conduct of its
employees. Ocala v. Metro Government of Nashville, 2012 WL 3779475, at *5. (M.D. Tenn.
2012).
FIFTH DEFENSE
To the extent Defendants have been sued in their individual capacities, they are
all entitled to qualified immunity as their conduct did not violate clearly established
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
SIXTH DEFENSE
There was no policy, custom, or lack of a policy or custom, that was the alleged
moving force behind the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs rights, nor did the alleged
deprivation occur due to deliberate indifference.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
The force applied to the Plaintiff was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
and restore discipline; it was not applied maliciously or sadistically to cause harm.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff is not entitled to Punitive damages as Defendants did not act with an
evil motive or intent, nor does the conduct at issue demonstrate a reckless disregard for
or indifference to federally protected rights.
NINTH DEFENSE
Defendants did not intentionally discriminate against Plaintiff because of his
membership in a protected class or otherwise.
TENTH DEFENSE
Pending investigation and in order to avoid waiver, Defendants aver that all of
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations and/or statute of repose
applicable to the same.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that some or all of Plaintiffs claims are barred by Plaintiffs
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. 1997e.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they are entitled to recover attorneys fees from Plaintiff
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that some or all of Plaintiffs claims are barred by 42 U.S.C.
1997e(e) because of the absence of any physical injury to Plaintiff.
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring some or all of the
claims contained in Plaintiffs Complaint.
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
Pending investigation and in order to avoid waiver, Defendants aver that all or
some of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel,
and/or equitable estoppel.
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that Plaintiff was not deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law.
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that any harm alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint is not sufficiently
serious under the Eighth Amendment and, further, that Defendant was not deliberately
indifferent to any alleged harm.
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants deny that they are responsible for any action or omission that was in
violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights or that was otherwise improper or in
violation of federal or state law.
NINETEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because of the lack of any violation of law and/or because of the lack of any
policy or custom which was the moving force behind an alleged violation of law.
TWENTIETH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because of the lack of an affirmative link between any alleged policy or custom of
Defendants and the particular constitutional violation alleged in the Complaint.
TWENTY-FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because of the absence of an express policy adopted by Defendants that was the
moving force behind any alleged constitutional deprivation or violation of law.
TWENTY-SECOND DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because of the absence of a clear and persistent pattern of constitutional
violations similar to that alleged by Plaintiff of which Defendants were aware or should
have been aware.
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TWENTY-THIRD DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because Defendant did not fail to institute a policy despite an obvious need to do
so such that Defendants were deliberately indifferent in failing to adopt such policy.
TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because Defendants did not tacitly approve of any unconstitutional conduct,
policy, custom, or other law that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional
violation.
TWENTY-FIFTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because Defendants were properly trained and supervised.
TWENTY-SIXTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they did not breach any duty to Plaintiff, nor do their
alleged actions or omissions constitute factual, legal, and/or proximate cause of
Plaintiffs alleged damages.
TWENTY-SEVENTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because there are no prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating
that they had notice that any training or supervision was deficient and likely to cause
injury.
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TWENTY-EIGHTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 because Defendants did not fail to train its employees to handle recurring
situations presenting an obvious potential for a constitutional violation.
TWENTY-NINTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that they cannot be held liable because they are entitled to
qualified immunity and assert their qualified immunity defense.
THIRTIETH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that punitive damages are not recoverable against them as a
matter of law pursuant to City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
THIRTY-FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants aver that an award of punitive damages is violative of the due
process of law protections of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the
State of Tennessee.
THIRTY-SECOND DEFENSE
Defendants aver that such claim for punitive damages cannot be sustained
because an award of punitive damages without proof of every element of such claim
beyond a reasonable doubt would violate Defendantsdue process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under the due process
provisions of the Tennessee Constitution.
THIRTY-THIRD DEFENSE
Alternatively, unless Defendantsliability for punitive damages and the
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damages.
THIRTY-NINTH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that such claim for punitive damages are governed by all
standards of limitations regarding the determination and/or enforceability of punitive
damages awards as established in the decisions of BMW of North America v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996), Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), and
State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003), as well as
any other relevant or applicable statutory or case law.
FORTIETH DEFENSE
Defendants aver that to the extent the Complaint makes a prayer for punitive
damages, such claim for punitive damages must be adjudicated by the Court rather than
the jury pursuant to Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
FORTY-FIRST DEFENSE
Pending investigation and in order to avoid waiver, Defendants raise the
affirmative defense of comparative fault in that Plaintiff contributed to his own injuries
such that Defendants are not liable to Plaintiff. Further, Defendants aver that Plaintiffs
claims are barred by the comparative fault doctrine because Plaintiff is more than fortynine percent (49%) at fault for Plaintiffs damages, or alternatively Plaintiffs damages
should be reduced in direct proportion to the percentage of Plaintiffs fault.
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FORTY-SECOND DEFENSE
Any averments not heretofore admitted or denied, or otherwise explained, are
here and now denied as if they were set forth specifically and denied.
WHEREFORE, having fully responded to the averments contained in the
Complaint, Defendants pray that they be hence dismissed from this action with all costs
taxed to Plaintiff. Failing dismissal, Defendants pray for a trial by a jury of twelve (12)
on all jury issues joined by the pleadings and for such further, general relief to which
they might be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
Cope, Hudson, Reed &
McCreary, PLLC
By:/s/ E. Evan Cope__________
E. Evan Cope, #21436
Blake A. Garner, #31129
16 Public Square North
P.O. Box 884
Murfreesboro, TN 37133
(615) 893-5522
ecope@mborolaw.com
bgarner@mborolaw.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was sent to the following via the District Courts electronic filing system:
David L. Cooper, Esq.
Third Avenue North Building
208 Third Avenue North, Suite 300
Nashville, TN 37201
Aubrey T. Givens, Esq.
501 Union Street, Suite 307
Nashville, TN 37219
on this 28th day of January, 2015.
/s/ E. Evan Cope_______
E. Evan Cope
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